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HISTORY OF THE

FRENCH REVOLUTION,

BY

M. ADOLPHE THIERS,

MEMBER OF THE ACADÉMIE FRANCAISE, AND LATE MINISTER-OF-WAR IN FRANCE.

TRANSLATED FROM THE TWELFTH PARIS EDITION,

BY

THOMAS W. REDHEAD, ESQ.

WITH AN INTRODUCTORY SKETCH OF THE HISTORY OF FRANCE TO THE ACCESSION OF LOUIS XVI

FROM THE FRENCH OF M. FELIX BODIN.

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PRELIMINARY NOTICE

OF M. THIERS AND HIS WORK.

The great French Revolution is an event that still absorbs the attention of mankind, and will doubtless to a remote posterity continue to do so. The extraordinary circumstances that marked its origin and progress, the crimes and virtues of which it was the occasion, the vicissitudes of fortune, national and personal, attendant upon it, and, above all, the influence it has exercised upon civilization and the world at large, render it an object of profound interest to every class of readers. It is not surprising, therefore, that since its commencement in 1789 up to the present time, no subject has attracted the notice of so many writers, both in France itself and in the other countries of Europe. Of these, as is natural from the proximity of the era, there is not one with any pretensions to impartiality. Each views the revolution as a whole, and in its multifarious incidents, through one prevailing medium. He is a partisan of royalty, aristocracy, or democracy, and, under the pressure of political bias, misrepresents, if not distorts, facts, characters, and motives. Hence there is none entitled to rank as a truthful historian of the epoch. This is a subject of regret, but not of wonder, for all contemporaneous annals must be more or less imbued with the passions of the times.

Undoubtedly he who has treated the topic freest from individual theories or prepossessions, is the author of the following work. His is a clear and sparkling narrative, where the eventful tale is told, without tedious dissertations to distract and weary attention, or obtrusive reflections to influence judgment and uphold some pertinacious dogma. On sweeps the story with all its prominent features, shifting from scene to scene with ease and rapidity, introducing character after character as they emerge upon the stage; detailing occurrences with remarkable vivacity and precision, and unfolding with singular acumen the springs of action and the distinguishing peculiarities of individuals. But no *philosophy*, properly so called; and without any intention of disparaging that school of historians known as the philosophical in France at the present day, of which it would be impossible to speak too highly, it may be affirmed that of such an event as the French revolution, so recent in date, and so disputed in its various phenomena, the record is most commendable which nearest assimilates to a chronicle: not a bare outline of facts, but a circumstantial and animated narration, illustrated by those living portraits which convey so lively a perception of the spirit of an age, of its men and deeds. Such emphatically is the history of M. Thiers, and to this recommendation doubtless is owing its extraordinary popularity. Not only in France, but throughout the continent, it is regarded as the great standard work upon the subject. In France numerous editions of it have been exhausted, and the pirates of Brussels have reaped a rich harvest of unrighteous gain from its republication. In this country it is comparatively less known, although a translation of it appeared some time ago, of the merits or demerits whereof it would be invidious to speak. The object of the present translation is to diffuse the work more generally through these islands, for the great moral and political lessons taught by an intimate knowledge of the French revolution are of inestimable value to every order of a community such as the British. And this knowledge will be more impressively conveyed coming from a French source, since that can be liable to none of those suspicions as to unfairness or exaggeration which have attached to compilations of home manufacture.

Before adverting further to the qualities and advantages of the work, however, it will be advisable to introduce the author himself, by a short sketch of his life. M. Thiers, then, although prime-minister of France in the 39th year of his age, is of such obscure parentage that it is yet a matter of dispute what occupation his father followed. It is at least certain that he was born in the city of Marseilles on or about the 16th April, 1797, and, according to the most credible authorities, in the dwelling of an honest locksmith there, whose offspring he was. His mother was of better family, being of an old commercial stock, which had fallen, nevertheless,

into extreme poverty. Through the influence of her relatives, however, the boy, at a tender age, obtained a bursary in the Imperial Lyceum at Marseilles, and there received all his early education. In the year 1815 he was removed to Aix to enter upon the study of the law. Here he met a fellow-student of the same lowly origin as himself, with whom he formed a friendship that has continued through life unbroken, to the signal advantage of both parties. This was M. Mignet, also celebrated as the author of an admirable analysis of the French revolution. After undergoing the usual course of academic attendance, the young Thiers was called to the bar and began the practice of his profession at Aix. In this provincial sphere, unaided by friends or fortune, he met with very slender encouragement; so strapping on a knapsack, he, in company with his friend Mignet, set out one morning to court fortune in Paris. The two wayfarers entered that great metropolis full of aspiring hopes, but for the present indifferently supplied with any extrinsic means of realizing them. The first months of their residence gave but little token of a brilliant future, if we trust a writer who thus describes their modest domicile:—"It is now several years ago since I climbed, for the first time, the innumerable steps of a gloomy building, situated at the bottom of the obscure and uncleanly alley de Montesquieu, in one of the most densely populated and noisy quarters of Paris. It was with a lively feeling of interest that I opened, on the fourth floor, the begrimed panels leading into a small chamber which is worth the trouble of describing:—a low chest of drawers, a deal bed, curtains of white calico, two chairs, and a little black ricketty table, composed the whole garniture."*

The manner in which M. Thiers raised himself from this situation of obscurity and poverty exhibits his energy and powers in a striking light. It was at the commencement of the year 1823, when the repressive administration of Villèle was in full vigour. Manuel, the great orator, had just been violently expelled from the Chamber of Deputies, and was, of course, the popular idol of the moment. M. Thiers saw that to him, an ambitious plebeian, the event might prove auspicious. He went straightway to Manuel, himself a native of the south, and a man of frankness and feeling, who, appreciating the value of the services offered him, forthwith presented Thiers to M. Lafitte, and obtained his admission amongst the contributors to the *Constitutionnel*, then the predominant engine of the press. This opening he lost no time in turning to account. Eminently endowed with a capacity for literary warfare, he soon became distinguished for the vigour and hardihood of his articles; and as in France the occupation of a journalist is regarded with an estimation proportioned to its influence over society, the young contributor speedily found himself the object of high consideration. He passed into the most brilliant circles of the opposition, into the crowded saloons of Lafitte, Casimir-Perier, the Count de Flahault, Baron Louis, the great financier of the era, and even of M. de Tallyrand, who, albeit fastidious in his company, is stated to have detected, with his keen glance, the capabilities of the briefless advocate.

This introduction to society was made available by M. Thiers to facilitate the undertaking upon which he had already entered. He had now opportunities of meeting many of the actors in the great drama of the revolution, remnants of the various Assemblies constituted during its progress, statesmen, generals, diplomatists, and financiers, with whom he cultivated a sedulous intercourse. Endowed with a happy talent of rapid composition, he found time to supply the exigencies of the daily press, and to be a constant frequenter of drawing-rooms, where, storing up the results of conversations with men who had actually taken part in events he was preparing to narrate, he applied them in study and contemplation to improve and embellish the work upon which he was engaged. At length his "History of the French Revolution" made its appearance, and at once placed its author in the highest ranks of literary celebrity.

The rapid progress of this work in public esteem, and the fortunate gift of a share in the *Constitutionnel*, conferred upon him by an admirer, raised M. Thiers to comparative affluence. Leaving his garret in the alley de Montesquieu, he emerged at once as one of the most prominent men in France, in the two paramount fields of literature and politics. Growing discontented with the somewhat antiquated tone of the *Constitutionnel*, he established in 1828 a new paper, more liberal in its principles, called the *National*. In this journal an unrelenting war was waged against the Polignac administration, which, often suppressing particular numbers, and adopting other partial remedies against the galling stings of Thiers and his assistants—Armand Carrel, and some of the most able men of the liberal party—finally took the desperate expedient of the Ordinances of July. The revolution of 1830, the result of that measure, is matter of notoriety.

This occurrence, so fatal to the Jesuits and the elder Bourbons, materially tended to the advancement of M. Thiers. Under the new government he was nominated councillor of state, and intrusted, without title, with the functions of secretary-general to the ministry of finance under Baron Louis. The first ministry appointed after the elevation of Louis-Philippe, being composed of heterogeneous materials, was speedily decomposed. Under the Lafitte administration, formed in November 1830, Thiers received the official title of under-secretary of state in the department to which he was already attached. It may be mentioned that he had previously pub-

* M. Loève-Veimar: "Statesmen of France and England."

lished a pamphlet on Law's system, which, developing sound and comprehensive views of finance, recommended him to that branch of the public service. At the same time he was elected deputy for the town of Aix, his *alma mater*, and made his first appearance in the Chamber, where he experienced a very unfavourable reception.

In person, M. Thiers is almost diminutive, with a cast of features, though intellectual, reflective and sarcastic, far from possessing the traits of beauty. Moreover, the face itself, small in form, as befits the body, is encumbered with a pair of spectacles so large that, when peering over the marble edge of the long narrow pulpit, styled the tribune, whence all speakers address the Chamber, it is described as appearing rather the appendage than the supporter of the two glaring orbs of crystal. With such an exterior, presenting something of the ludicrous, so fatal to effect, especially in volatile France, M. Thiers, full of recollections of Mirabeau, Vergniaud, and other orators of the revolution, essayed at first an ambitious style of oratory. The attempt provoked derision, but only for a moment. In his new sphere, as in the others he had passed through, he soon arrived at distinction. Subsiding into the oratory natural to him, simple, vigorous, and rapid, he approved himself one of the most formidable of parliamentary debaters. He became a leading man in the Chamber, and head of the party known as the *left-centre*, occupying an intermediate position between the *right-centre*, or conservatives, and the *extreme-left*, or radicals.

Parties are scarcely so strictly defined in France as in England, or at least amalgamations of them are more frequent. M. Thiers, though identified at first with the more liberal section of the Chamber, has nevertheless formed part of administrations based upon principles of a rather adverse tendency. In truth, political consistency is not a very eminent virtue amongst the chief statesmen on the other side of the channel. No doubt a sense of duty impels these oscillations, but they cause ruptures and alienations which affect the credit and character of public men. M. Thiers has not escaped the charge of tergiversation, or failed to give great umbrage to the party with which he was originally associated. He became an object of suspicion to his former allies by the support he gave Casimir-Perier's ministry, founded on the *juste-milieu*, or middle-course policy, which succeeded that of Lafitte, and his subsequent career did not tend to restore their confidence. He accepted the office of minister of the interior under the Soult cabinet, formed on the 11th October 1832, and from that time until February 1836, continued to fill some of the principal departments of state, as the ministries of the interior, of commerce and public works, and of foreign affairs, under various chiefs, Marshals Soult, Gerard, Mortier, and Broglié. At length, on the 22d February 1836, he was himself elevated to the post of President of the Council, or prime minister, the highest dignity a subject can attain in France. His administration was not of long duration, being dissolved on the 25th August of the same year. He then passed into opposition, but was again called to the Presidency of the Council by the king, in the beginning of the year 1840, which he held until September of that year, when he gave place to his great rival M. Guizot, under the nominal premiership of Marshal Soult.

Up to September 1840, M. Thiers had always professed himself a warm advocate of the English alliance, but taking offence at the operations of the British squadron against Mehemet Ali in Syria, he then assumed a hostile attitude towards this country, and doubtless but for the firm resistance of the king, Louis Philippe, would have provoked a war. This incident seems first to have awakened the slumbering animosity of the French against Great Britain, which has been since expressed through their journals in no measured terms. At all events the cause of his resignation has completely reinstated M. Thiers in the good opinion of his early party, and it is lamentable to admit that he may at the present moment be ranked as one of the principal leaders of the *war* faction. For, strange as it may appear, all other political differences are merged, and the question of peace or war has become the grand pivot of party polemics. War without object, without aim, save of vengeance for past humiliations.

It is probable that M. Thiers has been driven temporarily to side with this faction from position rather than from real inclination. Personally he must be averse to incur the hazards of a war which would in all probability end in a fresh revolution, especially if the French arms encountered reverses. If called again to power, as it may happen within a brief interval, a heavy responsibility will weigh upon him, since upon the policy he pursues the destinies of civilization itself may depend. Thus there are few more important personages at the present day than M. Thiers, and certainly he exhibits a remarkable example of the social equality existing in France, for in no other country could a man, so totally destitute of every influential prestige, have risen by the mere force of ability from an obscure station to the very summit of social and political eminence. There are instances in this country of successful lawyers reaching dignity and rank from humble origins, but in no other profession, and least of all in literature or politics, the epithet of "literary or political adventurer" being deemed one of the most opprobious which can be applied to an individual. The French, on the contrary, are content to enlist talents in their service wherever they may be manifested, indifferent as to the family or fortune of their possessor.

Having thus traced M. Thiers's past career, and assigned his present position, it only remains to add a few words on the subject of his great

work. One of its principal merits to an English reader is, that it presents the revolution and all its attendant circumstances in a peculiarly French view. Every thing relative to France is more fully developed, its internal condition, the various parties that from time to time arose, obtained supremacy, and eventually fell, the personages who composed those parties and successively directed the storm, are all more strikingly and circumstantially portrayed than could possibly occur in the composition of a foreign writer. Hence a more perfect insight is afforded into the causes of the revolution, and a more distinct appreciation of its numerous phases. The concerns of other countries are rarely introduced, except as they affect, for the moment, the interests of France, and thus attention is exclusively directed to the one paramount object, the elucidation of the event related.

The style of the work is in unison with its design. Not formed upon the severe models of Greece and Rome, it partakes more of conversational freedom, and is light and agreeable rather than stern and dignified. It is at times unequal; occasionally mounting to pathos and eloquence, and again descending below the standard of correctness. As in most modern French works, it is not easy of translation, so as to preserve its tone and spirit. In fact, with the country itself, the language also has been revolutionized, and every one acquainted with French literature is conscious of the remarkable difference that exists between the styles in vogue in the 18th and 19th centuries. A certain brevity of expression and abruptness of transition has become prevalent, rendering the meaning obscure and difficult to render, with a due regard to fidelity, into appropriate English. This singular manner is carried to such excess by one historian, M. Michelet, that he may be said to write almost in apostrophes.

As military events form so large a portion of the history of the Revolution, it is gratifying that M. Thiers treats them with unprecedented clearness and precision. The plans of campaigns and of battles are so lucidly unfolded that every reader, however little conversant with martial tactics, is enabled to sieze and comprehend them. This is no ordinary recommendation, since in general these accounts are given in such confused and complicated verbiage, that few but professional heads can form any distinct ideas upon the matters detailed. The descriptions of Hoche's operations in La Vendée and of Bonaparte's first campaign in Italy, are more particularly distinguished for this clearness of exposition. In fact, for a civilian, M. Thiers displays an extraordinary knowledge of the art of war. He appears, indeed, like all his countrymen, to entertain too decided a partiality for it, esteeming military success as the highest of human glories. After all, this feeling is not confined to the French, for in all countries the most substantial rewards and honours seem awarded to fortunate warriors.

One reproach has been urged against M. Thiers in his history, which it may be necessary to notice. It is the view of inevitability, or fatalism, which he inclines to take of many of the atrocities committed during the revolution. This charge is made against him at least, and principally by those who are prone to exculpate the enormities of kings or princes, regarding them as beings incapable of wrong; but with comparatively little justice. He is no apologist of the reign of terror, but represents popular excesses in no more heinous light than they really merit. In a national outbreak, Thiers argues, they were unavoidable, and in truth were frequently provoked by impolitic opposition; and when France was threatened with invasion by combined Europe, revolutionary fury was driven, by fears and motives of self-defence, to the commission of crimes that would not have occurred if it had been left quietly to exhaust itself. This is an opinion daily gaining ground, and it is now pretty generally admitted that the coalition in 1793 chiefly occasioned all the mischief that subsequently befel France and Europe at large. Thiers's doctrine goes no farther than this, if indeed quite so far. With regard to any dogma about the revolution being predestined for the regeneration of the world, such ideas are so purely speculative as to admit neither of corroboration nor of refutation.

In order to render the work more complete, a sketch of the history of France, from the foundation of the monarchy to the commencement of the revolution, has been prefixed.

16th October, 1844.

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SUMMARY OF THE HISTORY OF FRANCE TO THE REIGN OF LOUIS XVI.

FRANCE BEFORE AND DURING THE DOMINION OF THE ROMANS.

The nations which peopled France in the remote era of its history, are known to us only from the accounts of the Romans their conquerors. There is no doubt those tribes were descended from previous conquerors, mixed with the vanquished people. Cæsar represents them as warlike, always armed, and prompt to terminate their disputes by combat; fickle, somewhat inclined to idleness, but hospitable, generous, confiding, and sincere. They were so impressed with what is called *the right of the strongest* (as if force were in fact a right), that they claimed to be masters of the lives of their wives and children. The Druids, their priests, and sole possessors of certain doctrines, were assured of their obedience from their credulity. Those priests supported their authority by the terror of anathemas; they were exempt from the burdens of the community, and engrossed much of its wealth. In common with many other barbarians, they sacrificed human victims. It is, nevertheless, alleged, that they upheld the dogma of a future life, and the belief in a supreme being; but it seems more probable that they merely practised the superstitions of a polytheism, or of a barbarous fetichism. The poets, or bards, executed martial songs tending to animate the combatants, and perpetuate the renown of heroes.

These tribes, whom the Romans called Gauls, and who gave themselves the name of Celts, were for the most part governed aristocratically. The military chiefs, and men of superior daring, formed what we describe in modern language by the word *nobility*; they held riches and power, whilst to the multitude was left nothing but slavery and misery. Gaul was a species of confederation; each tribe was governed by a *richs*, or king, elected by the fighting men, or nobles. These kings were far from possessing absolute power. One of them said to Cæsar, "The republic has as much authority over me, as I power over it."

Roman discipline, under the genius and fortune of Cæsar, triumphed over Gallic valour in the course of ten years. By the policy of the conqueror, divisions were sown amongst the confederated tribes, and, by a skilful use of allies and partisans, he vanquished them by means of themselves. In proportion as the Gauls were impetuous in attack, they were discouraged by repulse and overthrow. Besides, colonies had begun what conquest completed; the Gauls became Romans; new arts and manners were imparted to them, and civilisation finally bent them to the yoke. The municipal system and improved agriculture of the Romans soon rendered Gaul a flourishing province, and then despotism preyed upon it. This condition lasted for four centuries, at the end of which the Gauls were in the depth of misery, devastated by proconsuls, torn by factions, and alternating between insurrection and submission to ephemeral tyrants.

At this period, Christianity was established in the Roman empire, in the midst of those frightful ravages attendant upon the inroads of several barbarian tribes. It was a religion for the oppressed and the wearied; the Gospel—a code of philanthropy, equality, and consolation to the wretched—was spread abroad over the Gallic provinces. In 325, the Emperor Constantine decreed the public exercise of the Christian religion, which for a moment re-established order. The bishops enjoyed popularity, and despotism caressed them, to secure the obedience of the people. They were not long in gradually enfranchising themselves from all civil dominion, and the Bishop of Rome, who has since been exalted to the rank of sovereign pontiff, had thus early a spiritual supremacy and temporal influence. The civilisation, arts, and literature of the Romans, were in decay; the empire, divided and laid waste, was crumbling into ruins; discipline was relaxed; the prestige of the Roman name was at an end; ignorance and barbarism were extending their darkness over those fine provinces which had been so prosperous under the administration of those philosophic emperors, Trajan, Antoninus, and Marcus Aurelius.

ESTABLISHMENT OF THE GOTHIC AND GERMAN NATIONS IN FRANCE.

The barbarian tribes of the north of Europe, attracted by the mild climate and richness of the provinces of the empire, had made frequent incursions into them; but they had been repelled, either by force, or by treaties and subsidies. This last expedient was mischievous, but despotism, sunk in decrepitude, often employed it; and degenerate Rome even had recourse to the arms of its enemies to defend itself against foes of similar character. Legions of barbarians were subsidised to guard the frontiers. A tribe of *Franks*, a nation of Germany, was long entrusted with the defence of the banks of the Rhine. At length, these barbarians, having learnt from the Romans the art of fighting, were moved to turn the knowledge to their own profit; they preferred invading the empire to merely guarding it, and amidst the disorder reigning within it, they conceived the project of forming durable settlements. The *Vesogoths*, or *Visigoths*, had installed themselves in Spain and the south of France; the *Burgundians* had fixed themselves in the east; and the Franks in Belgium. These Franks had been in closer relation with the Romans than the rest of the barbarians. They marched in several tribes, or armies, and at the head of each was an elective chief. The monks, who have written some wretched chronicles upon those times, have preserved the names of certain of these Frank leaders, of whom our zealous monarchical historians have made kings of France. *Far-mund*, *Chlod*, *Merveg*, *Hild-rik*, were more or less powerful. The existence of the first is uncertain.

Aëtius (A. D. 420), general of Valentinian III., gained some advantage over the second, vanquished several barbarous tribes, and re-established, for a fleeting period, the Roman authority in the Gauls, except in Armorica (now Brittany), which had declared itself independent. About that time (451), the cloud of Tartars which Attila, styled *the scourge of God*, was leading to the pillage of the world, fell in his progress on the Gauls. Aëtius made peace with the other enemies of the empire, joined his army to that of the Visigoths, and conquered Attila in the plains of Châlons in Champagne. Without the occurrence of that great victory, it is possible the race of the Gauls might have been at the present day mingled with that of the Huns.

At that period (459), the son of Merveg or Merovæus, whom we name Childeric, commanded the Franks, established at Tournay. His subjects deposed him because he seduced their daughters. It would appear that this right of the Franks was afterwards held to have fallen into disuse; but the fact itself is worthy of notice, because it proves that the Franks were accustomed to depose their kings. They chose in his place the leader of the Roman militia, Ægidius. But a Roman patrician, his enemy, having excited against him the Visigoths, and even the tribe of *Ripuarian* Franks, he formed an alliance with Childeric, and they conjointly overcame the Visigoths at Orleans, in 463. Childeric being an excellent warrior, recovered the favour of his Franks. He resided at Tournay, and made few incursions into Gaul. When he died (480), he left his son, a boy of sixteen, at the head of his tribe, which was called *Salic*. I have not touched upon all the events which the history of the Gauls presents at this epoch; even were space abundant, they are uninteresting; we have relations of numerous battles and alliances by turns between the Romans, the Franks, the Visigoths, and other barbarians; of ambitious generals, raised by the intrigues of the imperial court, speedily overthrowing their imbecile masters, and occasionally stimulating irruptions of the barbarians, when such a course was suitable to their designs. The empire of the west had come to a close during that era; the *Saxons* occupied Anjou and Maine; the Burgundians the country of the Sequani; the Visigoths the south as far as the Loire; the *Allemanni* and the Franks disputed the possession of the north; the Romans or Gauls preserved the rest; and the *Armorici* were independent.

CONQUEST OF THE FRANKS UNDER CLOVIS.—CIVIL STATE OF THE POPULATIONS IN FRANCE.

(A.D. 481.) The son of Hildrick was Hlodwech or Chlodovech; we call him Clovis, and this name appears to have a common origin with that of Hludvick or Louis. His territory was confined, and he had for neighbours different tribes of Franks. He was ambitious, and had all the talents of a conqueror. He conceived the project of rendering himself master of all Gaul. Having united under his standard another Frankish tribe, his first conquest was over Syagrius (486), the son of Ægidius, who governed the Gallo-Romans of Soissons, whom, having forced to surrender himself, he decapitated. Clovis subsequently allied himself with the Ripuarian Franks, and still more increased his power and influence in the Gauls by marrying Clotilda (493), the daughter of a king of the Burgundians. This princess was a Christian, and by espousing her, Clovis proclaimed himself the protector of all the Christians in Gaul, who composed the greatest part of the population, and at the same time secured their support in return. He soon had occasion for recourse to it; formidable competitors for dominion presented themselves in the Allemanni, whose army was composed of different hordes of German devastators. In conjunction with the Ripuarians, he gave them battle at Tolbiac (496), near Cologne, and routed them. The chronicler Gregory, in relating this victory, mentions a circumstance too much resembling the *Labarum* of Constantine, to induce me to consider it any thing but a fable. It is possible, however, that in the uncertainty of the battle, the Frank king publicly vowed to become a Christian, as a means of animating the courage of the numerous soldiers of that religion serving in his army. The bishop Remigius, or Remi, baptised him, it is stated, at Rheims, together with a part of his army; but the similarity of the name with that of the city throws an air of suspicion over the relation. The history of these times is thickly strewed with falsehoods and miracles.

The Romans had frequently decorated the barbarian princes with their titles of dignity, in order to gain them by flattering their vanity. Clovis had the title of *master of the Roman militia*; after the defeat of Ægidius, he was so in substance. His conversion drew all the orthodox Romans under his sway. The kings of the Visigoths were also Christians, but Arians, that is to say, they disbelieved the divinity of Jesus. The confederated Armorici, against whom Clovis had long waged war, and one of whose cities, Paris, he had taken in 494, were reduced to peace. The Visigoths and Burgundians alone remained for him to conquer, and he began with the latter. Clotilda her self excited him to the attack, to gratify her revenge against Gondeband, who had murdered her father. Clovis, who seldom entered upon an important enterprise without an ally, proposed to share the conquest with the powerful Theodoric, then reigning over the Goths, and endeavouring to restore the Roman civilisation in Italy; but Clovis achieved their subjugation without him (500), which did not prevent Theodoric taking possession of his stipulated portion. The defeat of Gondeband had been mainly owing to the defection of the Christians, which convinced that chief of the necessity of yielding to the predominant opinion; and having declared himself a Christian, Clovis replaced him on the throne as his tributary. This moderation was doubtless caused by the jealousy of Theodoric at the aggrandisement of Clovis, which likewise operated in delaying the subjugation of the Visigoths. However, their king Alaric having incurred the hatred of his subjects, Clovis seized the occasion, coalesced with Gondeband, and overcame the army of Alaric at Vouille, near Poitiers (A. D. 505). The consequence of that victory was the conquest of almost the whole of the south of Gaul, which received at a later date the name of *France* from its conquerors. Clovis returned in triumph to Tours (510), and made offerings at the tomb of St Martin. He there obtained from Anastasius, Emperor of Constantinople, the dignities of Roman consul and of Augustus, which were conferred by diploma. He assumed the consular purple in the church of St Martin. The honour could add but little to his real power.

Clovis afterwards fixed his residence in Paris, which was still called *Lutetia*, the principal abode in the city of the Parisians, and which had been occupied by the Cæsar Julian, when he administered the Gauls. To remove all fears of rivalry, Clovis caused the chiefs of the different tribes of Franks to be destroyed, and procured his own election in their stead. He died at Paris in 511. It will be observed that he resembled Constantine in more than one particular. Equally cruel and ambitious, he likewise knew how to make religion subservient to his designs. Charlemagne was aware of the same secret, as well as divers other spoliators.

The condition of the populations inhabiting France at this epoch, is an interesting subject of inquiry. The Franks were divided into the free and the servile; but the slavery of the latter was not so personal as amongst the Romans. They were governed by the

Salic law, framed by Clovis for his own tribe, or by that of the Ripuarians. The free men assembled every year in the Field of Mars, and there made laws. They elected their kings, but generally nominated the eldest son of him whom they were to replace. The Burgundians, ruled by the law of Gondebaud, maintained themselves as a distinct nation even under the second race; their manners were more ferocious than those of the others. The Visigoths had for the most part passed into Spain. The Romans, or Gauls, preserved their civil rights, so far as was consistent with a state of conquest. As the clerks or ecclesiastics belonged to that nation, through them it retained a portion of influence. Religion was the only check that could be offered to brute force, and it is melancholy that it was so flagrantly abused at a subsequent period. But Christianity then preserved something of its primitive purity, and the simple faith of the barbarians rendered it a salutary instrument of peace and harmony. The bishops were respected from their exemplary manners, and they beneficently interposed between the conquerors and the subject populations. When a Frank assumed the priesthood, his long hair, which distinguished the free men of his nation, was shorn, and he was held to have become a Roman, or a man of letters. It is true that less was paid for the murder of a Roman than of a Frank; but it could not be otherwise in a code of conquerors who exacted pecuniary penalties for homicide proportioned to the importance of the deceased. On the other hand, the Romans were judged by their own tribunals, and when a cause was at issue between a Roman and a Frank, a tribunal was formed drawn equally from the two nations. The Latin language, though infinitely degenerated, had a marked predominance, and was used in the public acts of the Franks; furthermore, the Franks formed alliances with the Romans. A glance at the history of those times, in which not a single insurrection of the Gaulo-Romans against the Franks is noted, but in which, on the contrary, the ascendancy of the bishops in maintaining a degree of equality or union between the two races is distinctly to be traced, is sufficient to disprove the opinion of those who hold that the whole Gallic nation was reduced to slavery. We certainly cannot wholly adopt the deductions which an ingenious critic has drawn from the consulate of Clovis, when he perceives in that Frankish monarch a veritable inheritor of the Roman authority and magistracy, but we must deplore the passion with which a great man disputes that opinion, in order to sustain his pretended rights of conquest. Montesquieu, exalting the prerogatives of the Franks, and degrading the condition of the Gauls, because he had the inexpressible weakness to consider himself descended in a direct line from the former, shows us how aristocratic vanity can lead genius astray. But what matters it to the French of the present day whether they can trace a Frank or Gallic ancestry? What conclusion can be now drawn from the slavery of the whole Gallic people, even were the fact undoubted? Is not the eternal charter of the rights of man and the citizen in full force?

SUCCESSORS OF CLOVIS.—ORIGIN OF FEUDALISM.

The conquerors scattered through the Gauls did not assemble to name a successor to Clovis; his four sons divided his dominions amongst them. Similar partitions were frequently renewed, and hence great confusion arises in the history of the era. Little advantage can be derived from encumbering the memory with the names of a crowd of obscure kings who resided at Orleans, Metz, Soissons, or Paris, or with the wars which they carried on for what is called their inheritances. The annals of that age are but a tissue of barbarities, assassinations, and inglorious battles; no reign occurs illustrated by important changes or great political influences. The country was a scene of desolation and disorder. After two wars, the Franks completely subdued the Burgundians, and they afterwards drove the Goths from the Alpine provinces. In the year 537, the Emperor Justinian granted to the Frank kings the rights of the empire over the Gallic provinces. Clotaire, who at first was only king of Soissons, was master of the whole monarchy of Clovis at the period of his death. His children made a partition, holding Paris in common. Their queens, Fredegonde and Brunehaut, excited perpetual wars between the brothers. The first was a prodigy of boldness, wickedness, and ability; she gained battles in person: the latter suffered a dreadful death, if we must believe chronicles full of falsehoods and contradictions. Dagobert was a prodigal king (A. D. 613), and overwhelmed France with imposts, in order to found monasteries and reward mistresses. Although a popular ballad styles him *a good king*, the massacre of 15,000 Bulgarians who had sought an asylum in his kingdom, and to whom he had given permission to pass the winter within it, is not significant of his humanity. But the monks made him a saint notwithstanding. Eloi, his treasurer and jeweller, administered the finances with the sole view of promoting pious foundations.

This period of history offers little interesting; but we must revert to it when we would learn the commencement of the feudal system which weighed for so long a time on France. It was then that hydra of a hundred heads was born, which was to devour the French people.

What was the tenure of the lands which fell to the Franks after their conquest, or which were given to them by the kings? This is a difficulty upon which critics have been unable to agree. What sort of lands were those called *salic*, and which, being granted with the burden of military service, could not pass by inheritance to females (whence came the salic law which excludes women from the throne)? The fact is, that the kings, after the example of the Romans, gave lands, or military benefices, at first for a certain time, subsequently for life. The great men, the *leudes* or *fideles*, who were most frequently with the kings, fought at their sides, formed their councils, and took oaths of fidelity to them, at length transmitted these concessions to their heirs. Each of them constituted what was called a *seniority* or *lordship*, names borrowed from the municipal hierarchy of the Romans, and by which the Franks designated the superiority of one estate over the neighbouring lands. Then commenced the system of feudalism, which was a sort of preposterous sovereignty vested in land, and exercised by the proprietor over the inhabitants. The *seniores*, or lords, became of necessity so many petty tyrants. They thenceforth exercised the rights of civil and political justice in their districts; fines and confiscations were the advantages they derived from this power. These lordships were at first few in number, but ultimately they covered Europe. Bishops and monks became lords, and soldiers got themselves nominated to bishoprics; kings, lords, and priests, united to pillage and enslave the people, but at this epoch the priests were the chief gainers. The most abject superstition possessed the minds of men, and the priests derived therefrom immense wealth.

When a king committed a flagrant crime, he was absolved by founding a monastery. When it was wished to get rid of a king, he was shut up in a cloister, and converted into a monk. However, the kings often usurped the nomination of bishops, who ought to have been elected by the people, the body of the faithful. If a layman on horseback met a priest, he was bound to dismount for the purpose of saluting him. These circumstances sufficiently characterise the age. We see that feudalism, barbarity, and clerical power, grew in concert.

MAYORS OF THE PALACE.—KINGS WITHOUT POWER.—CHARLES MARTEL.—FIEFS.

The great domestic offices in the palace of the emperors of Constantinople were imitated by the barbarian kings. The last monarchs of the Merovingian race had nothing but the shadow of authority; such weak princes were sure to be governed by audacious domestics or powerful nobles. The *major domus*, or mayor of the palace, was the first of the household dignitaries; and the system of hereditary succession, which began to pervade all employments, having been established in this the most important of all, a new race of kings resulted from the fact. The titular kings, secluded by the mayors of the palace, were condemned to inactivity and nullity, which has caused them to be called *fainéants* (sluggards). We need not speak of those obscure victims who were often immolated, and endured so mournful an existence with their legitimacy. The mayor *Pippin*, or *Pepin*, a man of great ability, succeeded in uniting all France under his sway in 690. He re-established the assemblies of the Field of Mars. His son *Karl* was one of our greatest warriors, and on that account was surnamed *Martel*, that is to say, *the hammer*. This Charles Martel kept the nobility incessantly under arms, and was their idol. The Saracens, who had conquered Spain under the standard of the Koran, advanced into the heart of France. Charles vanquished them at Poitiers in a memorable battle (732), and drove them beyond the Pyrenees. This victory perhaps delayed the return of civilisation; the Saracens possessed several arts and a degree of enlightenment, which long rendered Spain a flourishing kingdom.

What chiefly illustrates the reign of Charles is, that to recompense his officers, and defray the expenses of perpetual wars, he seized upon the possessions of the church, which held almost the whole territory of France; on which account the monkish historians have doomed him to execration. It is believed that the origin of fiefs is to be traced to the numerous benefices granted by him, under oath of fidelity and homage, and burdened with military service. It is remarkable that the greatest feudal lords were usurpers on the patrimony of the church.

PEPIN THE SHORT, THE FIRST KING OF THE CARLOVINGIAN RACE.—THE CLERGY, A POLITICAL ORDER.

Charles Martel disdained the crown; his son Pepin judged it necessary to his political views. He gained it with great address. He rendered himself popular with the influential classes; an able warrior, he gained the army; and he caressed the clergy, to whom he restored a part of their possessions. He dispatched an embassy to the pope for his opinion on a case of conscience. "Ought the title of king to belong to an individual incapable of reigning, when the royal power is in the hands of a man who wields it advantageously?" Zachariah answered, that he who had the power ought to take the title. The legitimate king was forthwith made a monk, and no more spoken of. Pepin was the first who conceived the idea of having royalty sanctioned by the ceremonies of the church; he had himself anointed or consecrated by a prelate (755). Thus, the coronation of kings was introduced into France by an usurper.

The reign of Pepin was sufficiently glorious. He drove the Saracens from the south, and rendered himself potent in Germany. He submitted all important affairs and the making of laws to those national assemblies, which were based on the principle that *the law is made by the consent of the people, and promulgated by the king.* The usurper was an especial favourite with the priests; the pope called him *a second Moses, a second David.* It was doubtless to reward the clergy for their submission, that Pepin resolved to introduce them as a separate political order into the national assemblies. The fact is important in itself, independently of its being peculiar to French history.*

CHARLEMAGNE.—THE WESTERN ROMAN EMPIRE RESTORED FOR A TIME.

A man endowed with great energy of character, and wielding powerful means of action, may found a new political order, but he will effect nothing durable, unless the people are disposed to second his exertions, and unless his projects are the expression of the general desire.

Pepin divided the kingdom between his two sons (768); one of them died prematurely, and the other, whom we call Charlemagne, reigned alone. The King of the Lombards, who possessed all the north of Italy, was a potent monarch at this period; having offered his daughter to Charlemagne, that prince accepted her for his bride, previously repudiating the wife he already had, in spite of the pope. In a short time he likewise dismissed his Lombard queen, and taking part against her father in favour of the people of Rome, his former enemies, he dethroned him (774), after having taken Pavia, his capital. Pope Adrian then placed on the head of Charlemagne the iron crown of the Lombards. Thus king of the Romans, Charles directed his power to subjugate a poor and valiant nation, whose only crime was hatred of dependence. It took him thirty-three years to overcome the Saxons; force of arms not succeeding so effectually as he wished, he sent missionaries amongst them, and forced them to embrace Christianity for the purpose of oppressing them. He put thousands of them to the sword, and transported entire populations into different portions of his dominions. *Vitikind*, their chief, was a man illustrious for his firmness and courage. The decrees which Charlemagne directed against the Saxons, are written in characters of blood. During the same period, he attempted to push his conquests into Spain, but his armies were less fortunate against the Saracens who held that country. He was, however, successful in a yet grander project. In the beginning of the ninth century (800), he set the imperial crown upon his head at Rome. Pope Leo III. assisted him in the execution of that object, and the people of decayed Rome exclaimed, "*Long live Charles, the august and benign emperor of the Romans, crowned by the hand of God!*"

The idea of re-establishing the empire of the Cæsars, is rather remarkable in a successor of those barbarian kings who had united to overwhelm it.

Feeling that it behoved him first of all to revive civilisation, he founded schools for the teaching of grammar, that is to say, reading, arithmetic, and church songs. These schools could only be held in cloisters and episcopal palaces, since the priests alone were acquainted with letters. An English monk was drawn to his court, with the view of founding a literary institute. Charles, continually sweeping over Europe with his troops, was nevertheless watchful of every interest, and learnt grammar himself. He usually passed the winter and spring at Aix-la-Chapelle, and there he held his *Fields of May*, or *plaids*, in which the nobles, the prelates, and certain free men admitted by favour, discussed the capitularies which he promulgated as laws. His legislation was perhaps as conformable to the general interests as the times permitted. Montesquieu, who pronounces so brilliant and effective an eulogy on Charlemagne, is of opinion that he prevented the nobles from oppressing the clergy and the

* M. Bodin must mean *early* French history, as the clerical order took a distinct rank in the national assemblies of all Europe at a later date, in a feudal capacity certainly at first. But in *Magna Charta*, the prelates and abbots are named distinctly from the *magnates* or nobles.

people by keeping them constantly at war. The capitularies were doubtless of great benefit at an era when so many nations, gathered into one empire, had different laws. Charlemagne loved industry and the arts, and possessed in an eminent degree those ideas of order and uniformity, without which all attempts at permanent establishments must fail. Indefatigable in his objects, he was ever present where his helping hand was needed. We can scarcely doubt he was of all men the most capable to grapple resolutely with barbarism, and yet he was unable to raise again either the empire or the civilisation of ancient Rome, because he was, in fact, the only Roman of his age, and because the nations were utterly unfit for the new civilisation, which was destined to spring up many centuries after the tomb had closed on him.

During his long reign, Charlemagne was engaged in negotiations with the court of Constantinople, received an embassy of congratulation from Haroun the Just, and presided over councils. In order to lessen the influence of the bishops, he exempted them from military service, and in return established tithes. He applied himself to the reformation of ecclesiastical discipline, and imposed curbs on the grasping spirit of the priests. He prevented the abuse of the right of sanctuary in cloisters from degenerating into impunity for crime. He enacted several sumptuary laws and regulations for currency and commerce. He established administrative assemblies in the provinces, to which certain officers resorted to superintend the due execution of the laws entrusted to the counts in conjunction with the bishops, and to collect the complaints of the people. But the system of fiefs gradually gained ground even in his time.

Charles, conqueror of the Saxons, Bavarians, and Hungarians, and master of the greatest part of known Europe, divided the empire with his children (809). He made Pepin king of Italy, and *Ludwick*, or Louis, king of Aquitaine. The latter alone surviving, he associated him in the government of the empire (813). He afterwards crowned his grandson Bernard king of Italy. However, the close of this great reign was saddened by gloomy presages. The pirates of Denmark and Sweden, who were then called *Nordmans*, or men of the north, began to devastate the French coasts. Charles determined to put them in a state of defence; he visited the ports in person, and caused vessels to be constructed (814). Death surprised him at the time he could already foresee the disasters that those rapacious barbarians would inflict on France.

Charlemagne was of an astonishing stature and strength. Historians are agreed upon his private qualities; he was sober, just, economical, and generous; simple in his tastes, and attentive to the minutest details. He administered his own domains in the same spirit as his empire, and caused even the produce of his garden to be sold. We may well ask, how could such a prince massacre thirty thousand Saxons?

LOUIS THE GOOD-NATURED. POWER OF THE CLERGY. JUDICIAL ORDEALS.—THE DUEL.—LANGUAGE.

The bonds which had been kept tight by superior force, were soon relaxed by weakness, and in a short interval the mighty edifice of Charlemagne was shaken to its foundation. Louis the Pious, or the Good-natured, had excellent private qualities and virtues; he was brave, learned, and humane; but much more was required in the successor of Charlemagne. He likewise divided the empire with his sons (A. D. 817), and associated one of them with himself. As he was incapable of securing obedience, enemies quickly arose against him. Four revolts against the feeble emperor rendered his reign one long warfare. Bernard, King of Italy, was subdued and chastised (818); the emperor, departing for once from his usual moderation, caused his eyes to be put out (he had been condemned to death); but, speedily yielding to scruples of conscience, he obeyed all the acts of penitence and humiliation which the clergy thought fit to impose on so abject a devotee. This conduct caused fresh rebellions. Judith of Bavaria, his second wife, had obtained from him a second dismemberment in favour of her son Charles, whereupon his other sons revolted. The emperor yielded, confessed his error, and consented to the imprisonment of the empress (830). He soon recalled her, and attempted to resume authority over his sons; they again rose, drew the pope to their party, seduced the emperor's troops from their allegiance, and deposed him (838). Lothaire placed himself on the throne. Some infamous prelates condemned the unfortunate monarch to a public penitence for all the acts of his life. He was clothed in sackcloth, gave up his arms, threw ashes on his head, and retreated into a cell. This revolting degradation moved the people in his favour. A party was formed, to which the kings of Bavaria and Aquitaine, his two other sons, overcome with remorse, united themselves. Lothaire was vanquished, but obtained his pardon, and kept his kingdom of Italy. The bishops, who had so outraged fallen greatness, were punished. However, the ambition of Judith for the aggrandisement of her son, provoked another war. The emperor subdued the rebel Louis (840), and shortly after died, overwhelmed with grief.

What tends to fix our attention upon this reign, is the part played by the church during its continuance. Charlemagne had made use of the clergy as a political instrument; Louis submitted to them as a superior power. The first made a temporal prince of the pope, in order to secure, through his gratitude and dependence, the fidelity and obedience of the people. The latter prostrated himself at the feet of those bishops of Rome who had knelt at the feet of his father. From this reign, we may date the insolent pretensions of the tiara over crowns, and that theocratic despotism which became so terrible under Innocent III. The bishops alleged themselves possessed of the only legitimate power; their riches were immense, and their lives scandalous. They even assumed the armour of men-at-war; an abbot, named Alcuin, had an army of 20,000 serfs. Louis desired to reform abuses so opposed to the precepts of the Gospel, which roused against him the rage and vengeance of the clergy. To attempt reforms in a class whose supremacy he almost fully acknowledged, was a project equally dangerous and absurd.

In this same age, the most stupid barbarism perverted justice. It was believed that God would perform a miracle rather than allow an innocent person to suffer wrong; so, as the criterion of criminality, it was necessary to plunge the arm into boiling water, to grasp hot iron, or submit to other ordeals; and if no injury resulted, an acquittal was pronounced. At other times, disputes, or crimes, were judged by the duel. The adverse parties pleaded as combatants, and accusations were to be made good by a champion. Each monastery had one to defend its interests; the lawyers of those days were gladiators. Charlemagne substituted the club for the sword in these combats, but afterwards the serfs were the only parties who used the club. The witnesses, even the judges themselves, were often obliged to fight. Religious ceremonies preceded these trials, which were derived from the Burgundians, a German nation.

The Romans had popularised the Latin language in the Gallic provinces; the Franks and other barbarians corrupted it. There resulted a dialect named *Romanesque*, in which the Latin predominated, but largely mixed with Celtic, Teutonic, and Gothic. After eight centuries of polishing, this language has become the modern French.

DECAY OF THE EMPIRE UNDER CHARLES THE BALD. THE FEUDAL SYSTEM.

Under Louis, the monarchy, though torn by intestine divisions, maintained itself against foreign attacks; but under his son, Charles the Bald, the whole fabric fell to pieces. He was weak and cowardly, and his reign was one continued series of calamities. After the death of their father, the three brothers still waged war against each other. The one who bore the title of emperor, was defeated by the others at the battle of Fontenay, in Burgundy, in which 100,000 men perished. The bishops, who then disposed of the crown, deposed him, and made a new partition. At this period, the Danes, or Nordmans, were a frightful scourge to France. They pillaged half the kingdom, burned Paris, and, like the emperors of degenerate Rome, Charles was reduced to offer them money to induce them to withdraw, which only served to stimulate them to fresh inroads. With every year new fleets of brigands landed on the coasts, and the king overwhelmed the people with imposts to satisfy their rapacity. In the midst of the disorder, the nobles and the bishops were engaged in a contest for power. (846.) The first prevailed, in an assembly to which the people were not admitted; the latter revenged themselves by deposing the king (858), and giving his crown to his brother, whom they afterwards excommunicated. Thus, the priests and nobles were solely occupied in disputing and dividing amongst themselves the spoils of the people, whilst the pirates were carrying fire and sword through the land. The King of Lorraine narrowly escaped being despoiled of his kingdom by excommunication (860), because he had divorced his wife. It was at this time that Baldwin, a French lord, who was likewise excommunicated for the abduction of Charles's daughter, received from that king the county of Flanders, which he transmitted to his descendants. It is necessary to explain here how a new kind of government was established, which inflicted so much misery on the human species.

At the era of the Frank conquest, the provinces were governed by Roman officers named *counts*, or companions of the emperor, and sometimes commands were given to *dukes*, or generals. The kings continued to nominate the same civil and military functionaries, who presided over the administration of justice, and commanded the provincial militia. Amidst the chaos of Charles the Bald's reign, they rendered themselves independent of the royal power, and even wrung from his weakness an hereditary property in their functions. By such means a new government was established, or rather the government was divided amongst so many members as it had employed agents, into as many monarchies as there were provinces. The king, however, was considered the supreme head; but his power was illusory—force was required to confirm it; and where force is ever necessary, it becomes a state of perpetual war. This political system was based on the principle of fidelity. The inferior was called a *vassal*, and the superior, *suzerain* or lord. The king was the vassal of no one, unless of God, as it was said, and his vassals had under them other vassals of whom they were the lords; and these subdivisions were infinite. The fief was a sort of usufruct; the lord granted it to the vassal under burden of following him in war; and in return he guaranteed him security and protection. There could be no order in such a system, except when the reciprocal obligations were religiously guarded; it was, in truth, an organised insubordination. The *villeins*, or rustics, were not vassals, but subjects of the lord; and when required by him, they were bound to march under his banner. In this political ladder, each grade had direct authority only over the grade immediately below it. Such is the exposition, so far as it is possible to compress into a few words what is but indifferently elucidated in huge volumes, of that grotesque political system which is known by the name of the feudal.

DECAY OF THE ROYAL POWER AND OF THE CARLOVINGIAN RACE. ESTABLISHMENT OF THE NORMANS

The weakness of Charles was surpassed by his successors, who sank into almost complete nonentity. Their names and periods of existence are all they furnish to history. Louis the Stammerer was son to Charles the Bald (877). Louis III. and Carloman succeeded him after his death. In their time a lord erected a petty kingdom in Provence. The Stammerer left another son, named Charles, five years old. The crown was offered in 884 to Charles the Fat, who reigned in Germany with the title of emperor. The Normans, who had never ceased their depredations, laid siege to Paris. *Odon*, or Eudes, who was Count of Paris, made a valiant defence. After withstanding a siege of two years, the emperor marched to his relief with an army, but the Normans intimidated him, and he was fain to purchase a peace. He died amidst universal contempt, a superstitious terror of the devil having previously reduced him to madness. The Count Eudes then accepted the crown (888), as guardian of the young Charles, when he might have seized it for himself. Charles IV., called the Simple, occupied the throne on the death of Eudes in 898, after having shared it with him for a short interval. It was at this epoch that the pirates of the north established themselves in that part of France called Neustria, and which took from them the name of Normandy. Thus the descendants of the Franks, weakened by feudalism, had to submit, in their turn, to the affront their ancestors had given the Romans. The king sent to their chief, Rollo, his daughter, and an invitation to become a Christian (911). The Norman willingly testified his acquiescence, but he refused, when rendering feudal homage to the king, to kiss his foot. One of his officers who undertook that formality, performed it in such a manner that he nearly threw Charles upon his back. This scornful demeanour only excited a smile—to such a point had the feudal system reduced France. However, Rollo rendered Normandy prosperous. That former robber chief enacted the most severe laws against pillage, and his people turned their attention to agriculture.

The minister of Charles the Simple having excited the discontent of his lords, they charged the crime upon the king and dethroned him (922). *Robert*, or Robert, brother of the late King Eudes, took his place, but in a battle which the king gave him, he was slain by the royal hand. From this it appears that Charles was, at all events, not deficient in military courage. Hugh, called the White, son of Robert, gained the victory in another battle; and the king having fled for refuge to the castle of a noble, was there kept prisoner for the remainder of his days. Hugh, who had the title of Duke of France, was indifferent to that of king, and allowed it to be assumed by Raoul, Duke of Burgundy (924), whose reign was a series of intestine wars. A powerful lord had taken it into his head to make his son, a child of five years old, an archbishop, with the approbation of the pope. An eighteen years' war was the consequence, in which the bishops took a prominent part, either in levying soldiers or in fulminating excommunications. On Raoul's death, Hugh put in his place the son of Charles the Simple, Louis IV., surnamed Transmarine, because he had been educated in England (936). This young king attempted to emancipate himself from his protector, but Hugh soon taught him that a king of feudal France was a shadow. He made him prisoner, but afterwards released him.

A question of legitimate right was under discussion in Germany about this time, namely, whether the re-

presentation should go in the direct line, and a grandson thus exclude his uncles from the throne. The case was decided by a duel between two champions. The champion of the direct representation prevailed, since which time the grandson has always stood in the place of his deceased father.

Louis having died in 954, Lothaire, his son, took the crown. Hugh made no opposition, and died two years after, transmitting his power to his son Hugh Capet.* Lothaire, who had some strength of mind, recovered a portion of authority over the feudal lords. Under his reign, Lorraine, which for a hundred years was a subject of contest between the French and German monarchs, was abandoned to the Emperor Otho, who did homage for it to Lothaire, as his suzerain. (A. D. 986.) Louis V. succeeded him after his death. He reigned a year, and was the last of the Carlovingian kings. The brother of Lothaire ought to have succeeded his nephew, according to the principles of legitimacy; but Hugh Capet, being duke of France, and sufficiently powerful, had himself proclaimed king by his vassals and friends (987). The other dukes and counts, who attached very little importance to the royalty of that age, gave him no disturbance in his assumption of the regal title. They did not consider themselves the less his equals on that account.

ACCESSION OF THE RACE OF THE CAPETS.—DESPOTISM OF THE MONKS.

Hugh Capet was, as has been stated, grand-nephew of Count Eudes, who had been king. This Eudes was the son of one Robert the Strong, a man of surpassing bravery, who had been sent by Charles the Bald into Anjou to defend it against the Normans, and there met a glorious death in battle.† Hugh did not fail to have himself consecrated and crowned at Rheims; and adopting the precaution usual with men founding a new dynasty, he associated his son Robert with him, in order to secure to him the succession to the throne. The legitimate pretender endeavoured to make good his right by force of arms, but he was made prisoner at Laon, and died two years afterwards (996). Hugh closed his career at Paris, much regretted by the priests and soldiers, whom he had equally favoured; the people were held as unworthy of regard. The elevation of the Capets was owing to feudal anarchy, and with King Hugh feudalism mounted the throne. He sent one day to ask a revolted noble, "Who made thee a count?" to which the other replied, "Who made thee a king?"

Robert was a very devout and a very unfortunate prince. He was the relation of his wife in the fourth degree, and had been her godfather. Although the bishops had granted a dispensation, the pope judged the union incestuous, annulled the marriage, and suspended the prelates, who excommunicated the king, notwithstanding his regularity in chanting the services. He was thereupon abandoned by all his lords, and shunned by his domestics, who were afraid to touch him, and threw the remains of his food into the fire. He was no longer a king, nor even a man, in the eyes of his fanatical subjects. How could a regular government exist with such ideas? This same prince, after undergoing penance, allowed unfortunate people who rejected the mysteries they were unable to comprehend, to be condemned and burnt. His second wife, Constance, was a fury, who drove his two sons to revolt (1026). He had caused one of them, Henry, to be crowned. Under his disastrous reign, a frightful famine desolated the land, and the people ate human flesh.

Henry I. had to sustain a contest with the queen-mother Constance (1031), who stirred up his brother against him. He afterwards attempted to wrest Normandy from the young Duke William, with whose father he had formerly found an asylum, but he was defeated. His reign is remarkable from the universal sovereignty of the popes being solemnly proclaimed in it. Leo IX. held a council in France in spite of Henry, in which the pope was declared supreme head of the church, and France was afterwards often governed by legates. In 1059, the king wishing to have his son crowned, assembled the bishops, monks, and lords, to procure his previous election. The legates granted him their suffrage, and the permission of the pope. It is thus evident that the crown of France was almost purely elective at that period.

The state of France at this epoch claims a notice. Pure feudalism was at its height—that detestable system which weighed upon France for nearly three centuries, and reduced the human species to the last degree of misery. The whole population had become serfs or slaves. Their condition was scarcely superior to that of beasts. Every lord could strike, mutilate, and even slay his serf, with impunity. Many free men voluntarily renounced their liberty, to shroud themselves from the vexations of the lords in the ignoble but defended state of serfage. The ancient maxim, *no land without a lord*, proves that the nobles disregarded all rights of property, and plundered wherever they were able, for they were in fact robbers by condition. Such was the dreadful consequence of feudalism, that men were compelled to be either oppressors or oppressed. The clergy, generally at war with the lords, pillaged the people equally with the latter. Brute force or religious fear was the sole instrument of influence. Justice was out of the question, in a society where disputes were judged and injuries redressed by an appeal to arms. The use of horses for war, which had been almost unknown to the Franks, was the exclusive privilege of the nobles, as well as the bearing of arms. A lord on horseback, and cased in iron, made a whole district tremble. The serfs, who were driven by blows to war, fought on foot. Overwhelmed with compulsory labour, tolls, fines, and taxes of all sorts, imposed by the nobility or the church, degraded by seignorial rights revolting to decency and nature, their existence was the most deplorable that can be conceived, and they must have fought only with the desperate hope of escaping from their galling fetters. The people of the country were called *villeins*, those of the towns *burghers*. None in either class could produce for individual profit; all was the property of the lord, who often quartered himself upon them, and lived at discretion with his *men, serjeants, and varlets*. These latter were aspirants to the profession of knighthood, or of a man-at-arms.

The lords likewise fought incessantly amongst themselves; their declarations of war included all relations and allies. A family quarrel often steeped a whole province in blood for thirty years. The state of war was in truth the habitual state of all; every castle, every abbey, was a fortress and a den for plunder; 100,000 ruffians roamed over the face of the country, issuing from their strongholds and retreating to them with their booty, and rendering all France one vast field of battle. At last the carnage and devastation wearied even the ferocity of chivalry. The expedient of a council was adopted to impose on the belligerents what was called *the peace of God*, as that of man was not to be anticipated. The bishops ordained fasts and penances, during which humanity had a respite.

* These Hughs, counts of Paris and dukes of France, had seized upon several of the richest abbeys, and enjoyed their revenues, as the lay lords of that age had little scruple in doing. They even took the title of abbot. The surname of *Capet* (Cappatus) came, it is said, from the cope they wore as possessors of the Abbey of St Martin of Tours.

† Genealogists have composed many volumes on the origin of this Robert; some have asserted him a Frank, others a Gaul, a Visigoth, and a Saxon. Louis XIV. was desirous that his descent from the Franks should be established. His history may be read in the "Historical Inquiries upon Anjou," by J. F. Bodin, deputy of the Maine and Loire.

But this peace, for which *the truce of God* was substituted, which prohibited all fighting from Saturday evening to Monday morning, soon fell into disregard. It was a miracle that the brigands paused even for a time.

Such were the results of that monstrous feudal system, a veritable anarchy of the sword, tempered occasionally by priestly anathemas.

FIRST CRUSADE.—POWER OF THE MONKS.

(A. D. 1060.) The long reign of Philip I., son of Henry, is an era of remarkable events. William the Bastard, Duke of Normandy, passed the channel (1066) and conquered England, where he established a harsh tyranny combined with feudalism. He had the firmness to refuse homage to the pope. A joke of the French king upon the obesity of William, provoked a war, whence the long enmities between France and England are dated. Normandy and Beance were the first fields of battle. The quarrels between the emperors and the popes concerning investitures, began also at this period. The imperious and turbulent Hildebrand, as Gregory VII., originated them. He was the pontiff who issued a decree that emperors and kings were to fall at his feet, and who extended his absolute power over the church itself.

King Philip being disgusted with Bertha, his wife, got genealogists to prove that she was his relation in some remote degree, and, according to the usage of the age, dismissed her. He then abducted and espoused Bertrade, Countess of Anjou, of whom he was enamoured. Being excommunicated by Urban II. (1095), he separated himself from Bertrade, but subsequently took her back, and the greatest disorder resulted from the papal anathema upon the act. Another pope came to Poitiers to promulgate it afresh in a council, at which the nobles and bishops pelted each other with stones. The anathema declared rebellion to Philip acceptable to God. But the lords who had changed their wives, like the king, took his part. He himself, a brave and prudent prince, associated his son Louis in the government, the better to enable him to ride out the storm; but Bertrade grew jealous of his influence, and attempted to poison him. At length the bishops thought it for their interest to give the king absolution (1104), which he went to receive, by the gracious permission of the pope, in frost and with bare feet, in a council held at Paris.

In the state of brutal torpidity to which feudalism had reduced the human race, a shock was needed to arouse it, and the want was opportunely supplied by religious enthusiasm.

A pope had already conceived the idea of conquering the Holy Land—that is to say, Palestine—and a hermit was destined to realise it. Peter having returned from the pilgrimage of Jerusalem, which was then in great esteem, traversed all Europe, preaching in courts, in towns, and in councils, and succeeded in exciting a burning zeal for the holy sepulchre, and against the Mahometans who taxed pilgrims. So dismal was the condition of society, that a project so full of hazard was embraced with avidity;—the serfs to escape from slavery, the vassals to get rid of the tyranny of the suzerains, debtors to wipe off obligations by indulgences—all to gain paradise. Old men, women, children, princes, monks, lords, bishops, began their march, crying, *It is the will of God!* On their garments they wore a cross of red stuff, and thus they were called *Crusaders*. This undisciplined multitude, having Peter for their general, spread devastation upon its line of march, slaughtered all Jews, and found a grave in Hungary. A body of 30,000 men, the remnant of a regular feudal army, took Jerusalem in 1099, and made one of its leaders, Godfrey of Bouillon, king thereof. This was what is called the first crusade. These extravagances, arising from a mixture of the devout and the warlike spirit, were ultimately useful to humanity, though causing such a deluge of blood. The people were delivered from the presence of a great many lords, and these sold a part of their lands to the king, in order to defray the expenses of their expedition. Relieved from them, the royal power began to be established somewhat more firmly.

The prowess of the Norman and French knights in England and Judea possesses a tinge of the marvellous, which romancers and poets have not failed to carry to an exaggerated pitch. A handful of Norman knights likewise conquered and founded the kingdoms of Naples and Sicily. To the Crusades is attributed the use of armorial bearings, which served to distinguish the chiefs amongst themselves, and to secure their recognition by their retainers. At the same time the Arab numerals came into use, an invention somewhat more useful than armorial bearings.

During this period the ecclesiastical power was almost exclusively exercised by the Benedictine monks, who, from the reformation of Cluny in 910, had declared they owed obedience only to the pope. They were the militia of Rome at that era. The secular clergy were nearly all married. Owing to the weakness of the royal power, the election of bishops was re-established.

It was about this time that the worship of images was introduced, as likewise the usage of confession, which had formerly been restricted to ecclesiastics.

FIRST RISE OF THE BOROUGHS UNDER LOUIS THE FAT.

The domain of the kings of France did not then extend beyond fifteen or twenty leagues round Paris. Louis VI., called the Fat (1108), had, upon his accession, to fight in the district of Orleans, in Normandy, and in the Isle of France, against the barons his neighbours, formidable brigands, who robbed travellers. The reduction of one of them required him thrice to lay siege to a feudal castle. In a war against England, the advantages were divided between the French and Normans, in spite of the courage exhibited by Louis. The emperor, who was son-in-law to the King of England, took part with his relative, and marched to the invasion of France (1124). Louis summoned the great vassals of the crown, who were bound to serve under the royal standard* against a foreign enemy. They formed an army of 200,000 men, and the Germans repassed the Rhine. The French might have then overwhelmed the Anglo-Normans, but the dukes and counts, afraid of rendering the king's power too great, all betook themselves home, and left him without an army. Although Louis was very pious, he could not escape excommunication, which was pronounced against him by the Bishop of Paris. He died in 1137, after securing the coronation of his son.

The most important event of his reign, was the melioration which began to take place in the lot of the miserable people. Divers insurrections had occurred in towns possessed by the clergy or the barons within the royal domain. The king, unable or unwilling to repress the insurgents, judged it more advisable to make them useful allies. Being himself perpetually at war, and incapable of protecting them from the invasions of his neighbours, he found it expedient to give them liberty to defend themselves. They were authorised to assemble and name their own magistrates, even whilst they were forbidden to change their place of abode, or marry without the permission of the lord. They fixed their taxes, composed their militia, and, shut up within their ramparts, could breathe somewhat in peace. These little democracies, thus

* It was then the Oriflamme, the banner of the Abbey of St Denis. Miraculous virtues were attributed to it, which may be deemed fabulous, as well as the holy blister, and the power which our ancestors believed possessed by the kings of France, from the time of Louis VI., of curing the evil.

independent of their lords, under certain restrictions, were called *boroughs* (communes). They had, however, to pay for the charters by which the king granted them these privileges, but it was a mighty thing to gain them at all, for they excited infinite choler amongst the barons, bishops, and monks, who looked upon themselves as defrauded by the crown. Afterwards, several feudal suzerains followed the king's example, and, as a means of replenishing their coffers, sold liberty to the serfs in the towns of their lordships. In many places the burghers rose in arms, and established their freedom of themselves. The plebeians were thus enabled to enjoy comparative repose, and pursue industrial avocations. But liberty was restricted to the walls of the enfranchised towns; and the better to maintain it, they placed themselves as much as possible under the protection of the king, who increased his own strength by forming a close union with them. He attached them to him still more, by establishing appeals from the seignorial courts, in certain cases, to the royal judges, who defended the people against feudal oppression. In the previous century, the bishops had drawn the greater proportion of causes before the ecclesiastical tribunals, which, bad as they were, were better than those of the lords.

SUGER.—CONQUESTS OF PHILIP AUGUSTUS.—THE ALBIGENSES.

(A. D. 1137.) Louis VII., surnamed the Young, by marrying Eleanor, heiress of Aquitaine and Poitou, enlarged the domain of the crown for a period. In a war against the Count of Champagne, he set fire to a church, by which 1300 persons were burned to death. A fanatic, called Saint Bernard, who was not without genius, having preached a second crusade, Louis was suddenly struck with remorse, and, in a paroxysm of pious zeal, he assumed the cross, together with his queen, his court, and 200,000 men. This second crusade had no better result than the devastation of the countries through which it journeyed. Still, it was useful in another sense. A foundling, named Suger, who had become abbot of St Denis, at a time when abbots were the counsellors of kings, was regent of the kingdom, and pursued the policy commenced by Louis the Fat, whose minister he had been. Suger was admirably fitted for administration, since his attention was mainly directed to the interests of the people; he rendered France as flourishing as was possible in that age. But the king, on his return, committed, contrary to his advice, the fault of divorcing his wife. She espoused Henry Plantagenet, who already possessed Anjou and Normandy, and subsequently became King of England. She carried him, as her portion, the third of France; thus, an antipathy between a man and his wife changed the extent of two kingdoms. The sons of the King of England having revolted against their father, Louis assisted them, but without advantage. After exhibiting himself simply as a devout and imprudent king, he died.

(1180.) His son, Philip II., surnamed Augustus, began his reign by a proceeding which was too much in accordance with those times of superstition and robbery to be at all surprising. The Jews were masters of the little commerce which was then carried on, since their political position forced them to habits of industry; the king expelled them from his dominions by an edict. He showed great firmness in a dispute with the Count of Flanders. He exterminated the banditti called *Brabanters*, and refused obedience to a legate of the pope. He defeated the King of England, who held the half of France, and took the cross, in unison with his successor Richard the Lion-hearted, to recover Jerusalem from the famous Saladin. (1189.) These two kings, however, succeeded only in taking St Jean d'Acre. On his return, Philip invaded Normandy during the absence of Richard. Having divorced his wife, he was excommunicated by the pope, and his kingdom put under interdict, that is to say, mass and the offices of religion were no longer performed, meat was forbidden to be eaten, marriages were put off, and communication by speech sternly interdicted (1200). Philip had sense enough to despise the interdict, and he seized upon the bishops' temporalities. He performed another energetic action. John Lacklands, King of England, had murdered his competitor the young Arthur. Philip caused him to be judged by his court of peers as a vassal of France, and procured a declaration that Normandy, Anjou, Touraine, &c., reverted the crown, which judgment he put in execution with an army. The French royalty, dilapidated by the feudal system, thus began to resume its strength.

A fourth crusade which took place at this period (1204), resulted in the temporary conquest of the Greek empire instead of the Holy Land. The crusaders crowned their leader Baldwin at Constantinople. A more deplorable crusade was directed against the Christians of the south of France, who were named *Albigenses* (1208). They were exterminated by thousands, and consumed at the stake, because they hesitated to believe in certain mysteries.

Pope Innocent III. having offered the crown of England to Philip, John, on his part, surrendered his kingdom to the pope, who thereupon became his protector. A formidable league threatened Philip. John, the Count of Flanders, and the emperor, collected 200,000 men. Philip, with 50,000, beat them in the field of Bovines (1214). A French bishop distinguished himself in that famous battle, by knocking out enemies' brains with an iron club.

In the twelfth century the human mind made various efforts to emerge from the darkness in which it lay buried. Schools began to be established in the seats of episcopacy. That of Paris soon became the most celebrated in Europe, though the instruction it gave was very imperfect. Three thousand students listened in the open air to the lectures of the logician Abelard, the lover of Heloïse, names immortalised by a passion which seems too sublime for so gross an age. Truth was then sought for, not in nature and reason, but in the absurd precepts of Aristotle; professors were not reasoners, they were only casuists. During this age chivalry was in most flourishing condition in palaces and castles, and if the people were oppressed, they had the satisfaction of suffering from the most gallant men in the world. The *Troubadours* were ever on the alert to sing the praises of beauty and love, opening the career of poetry to Dante and Petrarch, the fathers of modern Italian literature. Philip Augustus was the first of the French kings who kept paid troops on foot, thereby giving another blow to feudalism. The crusaders had brought a frightful malady from Asia, which covered France with lepers. As to contagious pestilences, they were in that age as common as famines. The incessant wars, interrupting cultivation, produced scarcity and mortality, and the unburied corpses tainted the air, and engendered the plague. Thus one scourge brought on another.

REIGN OF LOUIS IX.—JUSTICE BEGINS TO DISPLACE THE FEUDAL FEROCITY.

(A. D. 1223.) Louis VIII., called the Lion, overcame the King of England, who attempted to re-establish his power in France, and then made war on the Count of Toulouse, with the intention of despoiling him of his dominions, under the pretext that he regarded heretics with an indulgent eye. He was not successful in his project, and, in 1228, died, leaving his son, twelve years' old, on the throne, and his widow, Blanche of Castille, regent of the kingdom.

The young Louis, whom the church has designated *Saint Louis*, was in reality as excellent a prince as his

times permitted. Together with personal bravery and political courage, he had the constancy of a true Christian. He twice overcame the English, who had supported a rebellious vassal in Saintonge. The pope, who had excommunicated the emperor, being driven from Rome, came to seek an asylum in France. Louis had the firmness to refuse assistance to this disturber of the public peace, who thereupon betook himself to Lyons, a town of which the archbishop was feudal lord. (1245.) However, this same king, being threatened with death, took a vow to prosecute a crusade. Neither the queen nor the bishops could alter his resolution, and Louis departed upon his expedition, which was in every sense disastrous. He was taken prisoner in Egypt, and had to pay an enormous ransom. At the death of his mother, he returned to France, and devoted himself to the administration of his kingdom. He maintained peace amongst the great vassals of the crown, as far as he was able, and often yielded to the pretensions of the kings his neighbours, rather than plunge the country into war. Never was a king with a more scrupulous conscience, or more enamoured of concord. The English barons wishing to depose their king because he infringed the great charter, Louis was chosen arbiter between them, and gave his decision for the maintenance of all liberties compatible with the royal authority.

The pope having placed the King of the Two Sicilies under interdict, offered the crown to Louis IX.'s brother, who held the county of Anjou as an appanage, reserving to himself an annual tribute. The count accepted the gift (1266), and passed into Italy with a host of volunteers, who assumed the cross because they fought in the name of the pope, and believed they were performing a work of piety in dethroning an excommunicated prince. Naples was speedily conquered, and the usurper cut off the head of the legitimate king.

France enjoyed a certain prosperity for so miserable an age, owing to the wisdom of the king, who sequestrated the temporalities of the bishops when they oppressed the people too grievously, but who, nevertheless, would have become a Franciscan monk but for the remonstrances of the queen. He still kept the cross on his garments, intending to proceed on a second crusade, which he finally determined upon in spite of his advanced age and the entreaties of his counsellors. Persuaded that he could easily convert the King of Tunis, he disembarked in Africa (1270), and after witnessing the destruction of his army under its burning sun, he himself died in miserable plight.

The reign of Louis IX. was an era of great political ameliorations. The capitularies of Charlemagne having fallen into disuse, no written laws prevailed, and the greatest confusion resulted from the various local *customs* which held the place of laws. Louis framed a code of *establishments* for that part of France directly under his sway, in which the judicial duel was abolished, and numerous improvements in the administration of justice were instituted, by which the vicious proceedings of the barons and their courts were mitigated or annulled. The family feuds, which included all the relations of the belligerents, were interdicted under penalty of forfeiture. The right of coining money, which a great number of lords had usurped, was restricted. The code of Justinian, discovered at that time, became known in France, but was proscribed by the clergy. The priests, or clerks, being the only instructed class, performed the functions of advocates, and even practised medicine. When a person died intestate, and the church was thereby baulked of the legacy, which was almost indispensable in testaments, it confiscated the whole succession, and beggared the family of the defunct. Louis's *establishments* abrogated this infamous abuse. This king was in truth the restorer of justice, but his religious zeal often carried him to absurd lengths. He pronounced inhuman punishments upon those who ventured to swear by the name of God, or of any of the saints. He exhibited, however, an unbroken firmness in opposing the grasping despotism of the popes; in his famous ordinance, called the *Pragmatic Sanction*, he asserted the maxim that the kingdom depended on God alone.

ESTABLISHMENT OF NATIONAL ASSEMBLIES UNDER PHILIP THE HANDSOME. — THE TEMPLARS. — PARLIAMENT OF PARIS.

After the death of Louis, his son, Philip III., continued the war against the Tunisians, and granted them peace upon their paying tribute. Such was the conclusion of the last of those distant expeditions which depopulated Europe. The young king returned to France, and united to the crown the vast possessions of his uncle, the Count of Poitiers, who had died without issue. He allowed himself at first to be governed by his father's barber; but that person having excited unjust suspicions against the queen, he was convicted of treason, and hanged. The most remarkable event in this reign occurred out of France. The Sicilians, determined to throw off the oppressive yoke of Charles of Anjou, arose at the hour of vespers and massacred all the French attached to the fortunes of the new king (1282). This slaughter extended itself over the whole of Sicily. The King of Arragon then endeavoured to seize upon the island, which drew upon him a papal excommunication; a crusade was even preached against him. Philip put himself at the head of the crusaders against this Christian prince, and after taking Gironne by a tedious siege, he returned to Perpignan, and died (1285). Upon his death, two monasteries disputed the possession of his heart; rather a small matter, one would think.

Philip IV., surnamed the Handsome, his son, succeeded him. Edward I., King of England, rendered him homage for Guienne, which he acknowledged to possess as a vassal of the French crown. But disputes occurring between the two nations, Philip cited Edward to his court, and, upon contumacy, poured an army into Guienne, and reduced it (1295). War afterwards broke out with the Count of Flanders, who had made an alliance with Edward. The English were conquered, and Flanders subdued. Boniface VIII., a pope whose arrogance was quite equal to that of any of his predecessors, was the next antagonist whom Philip encountered. The cause of the quarrel was an attempt of the king to lay a slight tax upon the clergy, as he was in great distress for money, and the people were utterly incapable of supplying the incessant demands made upon them. The pope forbade the ecclesiastics to contribute the smallest coin to the necessities of the state, and Philip, in return, forbade his subjects to pay any thing to the pope. Peace was at length restored; the pope undertook to canonise Louis IX., and a trifling impost was granted him for the glory of St Peter.

However, it was not long before the insolent pretensions of the pope were renewed; a French bishop, his legate, carried his impertinence to such a pitch that the king drove him from his presence. The pope, furious at the insult, fulminated fresh bulls, and summoned the king, under the penalty of having his kingdom placed under interdict, to acknowledge himself king by the grace of the pontiff. Philip, far from being intimidated, answered with boldness; and desirous of finding support in the nation, he convoked a national assembly (1290). This is one of the most important events in the French annals. The assemblies usual in the earlier times of the monarchy had fallen into complete oblivion. Following the example of the King of England, Philip caused the deputies of the boroughs to form part of it; they were then styled the *third estate*. The three orders voted separately to maintain the independence of the crown; the clergy made an attempt to influence a conciliatory demeanour

towards the pope, but the nobles opposed it. As to the third estate, it was overwhelmed with astonishment at its being honoured with consultation; but money being wanted, and the people the supplying source, their presence was judged necessary. An old historian of France has said on this subject something new:—"Diets are excellent expedients to governments for obtaining subsidies."

The pope replied by calling a council, in which he procured the assertion of the sovereign right as vested in the tiara. The king retorted by an assembly of nobles and bishops, in which the pope was accused of imposture and heresy. Thereupon, excommunication was thundered forth, and the crown of France offered to a prince of Austria. The pope was carried off by the French partisans, then set at liberty, and finally died in transports of rage. He had instituted the jubilee, which drew thousands of pilgrims to Rome, and vast sums from the whole of Christendom. During the course of these events, the Flemings had revolted under a weaver, and massacred the French. The Count d'Artois lost against the insurgents the battle of Courtrai, in which 20,000 Frenchmen perished. The king then marched in person, was unsuccessful, and found himself obliged to reinstate the Count of Flanders, with the reservation of certain towns. The excommunication was shortly afterwards taken off by the last pope's successor.

The process against the Templars, a religious and military order founded during the crusades, was a famous event in this reign. Philip the Handsome pursued their destruction with an inveteracy for which we cannot account, and which seemed equally participated in by the pope. They were suddenly arrested throughout the whole of France (1307); they were questioned under torture, and the rack compelled them to avow the crimes that were fixed upon them. When its anguish ceased, some of them retracted their confessions, and were accordingly consumed before slow fires (1312). The order was abolished, and the possessions given to the hospitallers, since the order of Malta. The grand-master and great officers, condemned by a papal commission, were burnt alive, all protesting their innocence, amidst the flames, to the last moment. What caused this frightful atrocity? The Templars were accused of detestable crimes, but all that we know of their offences is that they were rich, haughty, and debauched. Were those who burnt them one whit better?

Philip had overwhelmed the people with imposts, ruined credit by debasing the coin, and expelled the Jews to seize their wealth. The general discontent grew to such a height as to threaten an insurrection. Chagrin gnawed his heart, and killed him. To him are owing the convocation of the states-general, the union of Lyons to France, and the parliament being rendered stationary at Paris. Formerly it was a travelling tribunal, which followed the king, and was composed of noblemen nominated by him. As these men of the sword could neither read nor write, they associated in their judicial labours men conversant in the law, who attended them in the capacity of *counsellors*. By degrees, the nobles withdrew and left the lawyers to judge alone. The peers, the great territorial lords, or high domestics of the court, who were the *leudes* of the first race, or the barons and great vassals of pure feudalism, had right of entry to the parliament. The assembly itself was, properly speaking, the tribunal of the king. From the time of Louis IX., the parliament had cognizance of all the appeals of the kingdom. He recognised the excellent principles of justice laid down in the Roman code, created forms of legal procedure, rendered the study of law necessary, and drew to the men of letters and legal knowledge a part of the authority usurped by ignorant soldiers. It is not generally known that the Pandects of Justinian inflicted the greatest blow on feudalism.

After having gone through the thirteenth century, if we cast our eyes backwards we will find that the human species made some progress towards civilisation during its course. Under Louis IX., a library was collected. Roger Bacon, an English monk, a prodigy for that age, divined a portion of the physical sciences; he invented the camera obscura. His brutal contemporaries took him for a magician. Contemptible parodies, exhibited on scaffolds under the name of *mysteries*, were essays which had at least the merit of preparing the way for Racine and Molière. Theological disputes and scholastic casuistry still continued, and the Sorbonne was founded; but the burgher youth acquired ideas and habits of anti-feudal independence even amidst the disorders of a university education, and the brotherhoods, or guilds, advantageous at the period of their institution, provided it with the means, and conferred upon it the force, of political organisation. The provosts and magistrates were accustomed to resistance against arbitrary power; and the third estate, erected into a political order, began to acquire consistence, and the royal power found it useful to cultivate its alliance.

ENFRANCHISEMENT OF THE PEASANT-SERFS.—REVERSES UNDER PHILIP OF VALOIS.

The royal authority, which had made great strides under Philip the Handsome, was successively exercised by his three sons within a short period. Louis X., surnamed *Hutin*, condemned to death the superintendant of the finances, Enguerrand de Marigny (1314); the proof of his knavery was deficient, so he was accused of sorcery. The king afterwards repented of the iniquity of this execution. The most memorable event of this reign, was the enfranchisement of a great part of the rural serfs (1315).* The king commenced in his own domains, and the lords gradually followed his example. The preamble of the edict set forth these words—"*Inasmuch as, according to the law of nature, every one ought to be born free.*" However, liberty was sold to the peasants in the same manner as it had been sold to the burghers. Many of them accustomed to slavery were anxious to continue it, finding that liberty in those times was not worth the price charged for it. The want of money has often caused injustice both to be committed and redressed. The Jews were recalled in 1316, in the hope of extracting enormous taxes from them.

Philip V., called the Long, who succeeded him in 1319, effected reforms in the administration. He excluded the bishops from the parliament, in which they preserved some influence. He is stated to have projected useful regulations, such as a general system of weights, measures, and currency. He disarmed the burghers, in order the more surely to suppress the right of private war. He named a captain to command the guard of the towns in the royal name; this burgher militia was a species of national guard, which is often mentioned in the wars of that age. Under his reign horrible cruelties were committed on Jews and lepers, who were charged with most absurd accusations. They were burned by hundreds, as a speedy means of securing their possessions. Foundations for persons afflicted with leprosy were very numerous, and all richly endowed; in consequence whereof they excited cupidity, and had their goods confiscated. When fanaticism and rapacity move in concert, no limit can be assigned to atrociousness. It was to these spoliating persecutions experienced by the Jews, that the invention of bills of exchange is owing, by means of which they could transfer their fortunes from one country to another

* There still remained, even in the reign of Louis XVI., serfs of *mortmain*, at St Claude in Franche-Comté, who were enfranchised by that king. They belonged to monks!

(1322.) Charles IV., called the Handsome, caused several rapacious financiers to be punished, as also some noblemen, who, although no financiers, nevertheless ruined the people. He made war on the English in Guienne. His sister was the wife of Edward II., whom she succeeded in dethroning. The famous Edward III. then assumed the English sceptre. Charles IV. having died without issue, Edward III. claimed the crown of France, as nephew, by his mother, of the last king (1328). The Salic law, which excluded females, was directly opposed to his pretensions. The peers decided that Philip of Valois, who was descended from St Louis by a younger branch, ought to be preferred.

The reign of Philip IV. was a continued chain of calamities. He first of all attempted to reduce the Flemings, who had revolted against their count under the conduct of a fishmonger. He afterwards succeeded in obtaining homage for Guienne from Edward III., who was not yet prepared for war. But a wretch, his brother-in-law, whom he had justly banished, having taken refuge in England, stimulated the king to that warfare which became so terrible to France. A fleet, stated to have been 120 vessels strong, and carrying 40,000 men, was defeated by that of England in the battle of Ecluse (1341), in which Edward himself was present. He afterwards made a descent on the coasts of Normandy, acting under the advice of another traitor, Geoffrey of Harcourt; and breaking a truce which Philip observed with too much faith, he advanced to the gates of Paris, whence he retired into Picardy, pursued by the French, who, yielding to their imprudent impetuosity, attacked him at Cressy. (1346.) The Genoese bowmen gave way, and threw the French army into disorder, which was defeated, and 30,000 men left dead on the field of battle. The success of the English was chiefly owing to their cross-bows, a weapon which the French would not use, from an excess of chivalric honour or martial pride, and therefore subsidised foreigners for that service. It is also said that the English used cannon in this combat, which was then a recent invention.

After his victory, Edward besieged Calais (1347), which surrendered after suffering the last extremes of famine. To all these reverses were added a famine and a plague, which depopulated France. The latter was general throughout Europe, and carried off, as is alleged, a fourth of the population. Discouragement paralysed the exertions of the country. Fanatics, named *flagellators*, scoured the fields, and scourged their bodies to the gushing of blood, as a propitiation of divine wrath. The king died (1350) a prey to chagrin, and an object of hatred to his subjects. He first established the *gabelle*, a tax on salt. Under his reign, disastrous as it was, Dauphiny was annexed to France, under condition that the heir-apparent should bear the name of Dauphin. During the same period, Jane of Anjou sold Avignon to the pope.

KING JOHN.—HIS CAPTIVITY.—THE STATES EXERCISED THE SOVEREIGNTY.—JACKERIE.

John, son of the preceding king, was equally impolitic, and still more unfortunate. His first act was to cut off the head of the Count d'Eu, his constable, without any one knowing why. He was afterwards exposed to the enmity of a wicked and powerful prince, Charles the Bad, King of Navarre, who inflicted much injury on his dominions. Edward III. likewise carried the war into France again, when John convoked the states-general in order to raise subsidies (1355). This is one of the most remarkable eras in French history, and deserves to be specially noted.

Philip the Handsome had succeeded in rendering the royal power in some degree absolute; he had emancipated it from the thraldom of the pope, and strengthened it by summoning the states-general, which had then no idea of their rights. The rivalry existing amongst the three orders could not fail to secure the preponderance to the king, even had the states imagined themselves invested with any more formidable character than that of a council appointed to register royal decrees. Now they prepared to take a very different attitude. We will not speak here of the states of Langued'oc, convoked in the south of France, as those of the north, or of Langued'oil, have had the chief influence on affairs. The states of 1355 acted upon the principle that the king had no right to exact any tax without the consent of the nation as represented by them. They determined even to superintend their collection and disposition, and sent deputies into the different bailiwicks charged with the perception. They named a permanent commission, composed of three members from each order, to watch over the king's administration during the recess of the sessions. They took the greatest precautions to ensure the advantageous employment of any surplus funds, and to confine the king within a limited expenditure. They finally decreed a large levy of troops, and called the burgher militias into the field.

The Prince of Wales, generally called the Black Prince, the son of Edward III., and the great hero of his age, led a desolating horde into France. Being intrenched in an advantageous position near Poitiers with 8000 men, and attacked by John at the head of 60,000, he completely overthrew the French, and took the king prisoner. Charles the Dauphin thereupon convoked the states, which once more exhibited a knowledge of their rights. The three orders were unanimous in their discontent, and they ordered an inquiry to be made into the causes of popular complaint. A bishop named Lecocq, and Marcel, the provost of the trades, presided over this commission of inquiry. Subsidies were granted only upon conditions; the ministers and counsellors were to be displaced for deputies taken from the three orders. The court, indignant at this spirit, attempted to collect taxes without the sanction of the states, but the people refused to pay them. The states-general were therefore again convoked (1356), and it was found necessary to submit to the prescribed conditions.

The dauphin put in force a means of gaining money that had often been used by his predecessors, namely, the adulteration of the coin, an expedient pregnant with ruin. The people of Paris rose in insurrection, under the conduct of Marcel. The King of Navarre, who had been imprisoned by the king, escaped, and came to support the revolt. The people were alternately harangued by him, the dauphin, and Marcel. The last enjoyed the greatest degree of popularity; he was a patriot, and born in the burgher rank. Charles the Bad was actuated simply by a turbulent ambition, and was used as a mere instrument against the court. Paris was a perfect hotbed of democracy. The insurgents adopted as a rallying sign a red and blue cap. Marcel began even thus early to form a federation between the other towns of France and the capital, when the dauphin, who had taken the title of regent, escaped to Compiègne, and convoked the states-general (1358).

France was in a state of the most deplorable disorder. Taking advantage of the general disorganisation, the nobility attempted to reduce the peasants under their former yoke of iron, whilst they, on their part, arming themselves with pitchforks and clubs, pillaged the castles and massacred the nobles, who, collecting in armed bands, revenged themselves upon the undisciplined multitude. This war of extermination was called *Jackerie*, from the *jacks* or jackets worn by the peasants.

From the height of anarchy, and the excesses of civil war, there is generally but one step to absolute power, for all grow weary of evil, and readily concede any

thing for peace and order. The states of Compiègne proved the truth of the remark. It is true that they granted imposts under the titles of *aids* and *free gifts*, but they annulled all that the preceding states had done, as the work of the seditious and traitorous. Several of the deputies were condemned to death. Paris was blockaded and taken by surrender. Marcel fell by assassination, and the regent made his entry into the capital.

A treaty with England restored liberty to John (1360), who agreed to cede the half of his kingdom, and to pay four millions of gold crowns; but the ransom was afterwards reduced to a third of France, and three millions of crowns. Being unable to raise this enormous sum, which would have completely drained the country, John returned to London, where he died. He was a man of scrupulous honour, and was accustomed to say, that if good faith were banished from other quarters, it should find a sanctuary in the hearts of kings. This phrase is often repeated, and kings would do well to be sincerely impressed with its excellence. Having acquired Burgundy by inheritance, John gave it as an appanage to one of his sons, and thus commenced the famous house of Burgundy. This evil system of appanages only tended to divide and weaken France, which was not so strong as to render its further reduction at all necessary.

CHARLES V.—DUGUESCLIN.—THE ROYAL POWER REGAINS THE SUPREMACY.—THE FOURTEENTH CENTURY.

When Charles V. mounted the throne (1364) the government was almost wholly to reconstruct: he was prudent and able, knowing how to select and employ men of capacity, and succeeded in repairing much of the general evil. Charles the Bad still continued his intrigues and injuries, and an excellent warrior, Duguesclin, was sent against him and repulsed him. The war in the meanwhile raged with unabated fury in Bretagne. Montfort, supported by the English, having gained a victory in which Duguesclin was taken prisoner, terms of peace were agreed upon. At this era, the class of men pursuing the profession of arms was a complete scourge to the country. When troops were disbanded, it seemed as if so many wild beasts had been unchained, and a new war was necessary to reduce them; so that peace itself became the cause of fresh bloodshed and confusion. A campaign in Spain opportunely offering, Duguesclin was sent there at the head of troops, which were re-engaged to rid France of their baneful presence. However, he was again defeated and made prisoner by the redoubtable Black Prince.

Charles V. was once more engaged in war with the English, which, under the generalship of Duguesclin, became advantageous for him. 1400 enclosed towns and 3000 fortresses were captured in Aquitaine alone. Fresh treasons on the part of the King of Navarre, and a long disastrous war undertaken against the Duke of Brittany, who was ably sustained by his own subjects and the English, occupied the close of Charles V.'s reign. The schism of the West occurred in his time. When the papal see was transferred from Avignon to Rome, two and even three popes were elected at the same time, and the kings sided with the one or the other as they found it best for themselves. Numberless were the wranglings, the combats, and the scandals, wherewith Christianity was overwhelmed.

Charles, remembering the sturdy spirit of the states-general, never convoked them when he became king. He contented himself with holding *beds of justice* in the parliament, in which he caused his decrees to be approved of, after a display of asking counsel. His administration, however, as it is said, was paternal, and historians have surnamed him *the Wise*. He was more engaged in strengthening the royal authority than securing to his people the enjoyment of liberty, and therefore philosophers have passed upon him many severe strictures. But, after all, the best of kings are prone to aggrandise their power, the most reasonable of aristocrats desire peculiar privileges, or a superiority of influence in the state, and the most moral of populations are drawn into excesses, when they endeavour to repair by force the hardships of the social state, and the inequalities of fortune: good laws alone are above corruption and the influence of passions.

In this fourteenth century, the human mind made an insensible progress. Whilst the capuchins were disputing, and even fighting, with each other, as to the comparative sanctity of round or pointed hoods, a Neapolitan invented the compass. Charles V. was a friend to learning; he collected 900 volumes, treating, however, upon astrology in general. The number of universities was increased, but theology and logic were the only subjects in repute. Sallust, Cæsar, and some other Latin works, preserved in the monasteries, were translated into French; the only service that the monks have rendered the human race, is having been its librarians and transcribers.

MINORITY OF CHARLES VI.—HIS MADNESS.—CIVIL WAR.

(A. D. 1380.) The reign of Charles VI. was one of the most disastrous in the French annals. On his accession he was under age, and his uncles disputed the regency. The Duke of Anjou, who obtained it, took advantage of his position to enrich himself with the spoils of the nation. He robbed the treasury of its last coin the moment the king reached his majority. The Parisians refused to pay any taxes, and the states-general were convoked as a last resource. They once more proclaimed the principle that taxes were illegal without the consent of the states. They granted certain subsidies, and the court endeavoured to establish others arbitrarily, but the people rose and massacred the officers of revenue. Troops were marched to Paris, which escaped sacking by paying a heavy contribution. The king, returning from Flanders, entered Paris at the head of his army (1385), caused the richest burghers to be arrested, and some of them executed, amongst whom is mentioned a venerable magistrate upwards of seventy years old; he then declared that all deserved death, but he would limit his vengeance to the exaction of an immense ransom. He subsequently placed the Constable Clisson at the head of affairs, to enable him the better to shake off the yoke of his two uncles. The Duke of Bourbon (a descendant of Louis IX. by a junior line), returning, at this time, from an expedition more brilliant than useful he had made in Africa against the Mahometans, excited the imagination of the king, who took up the chimerical idea of a crusade, but got no farther than Italy, where he went to assist one of the two popes.

In 1392, the Baron of Craon, one of the most formidable ruffians who then enjoyed impunity in France, assassinated Clisson and fled into Brittany, where he was received by the duke. The king, being unable to procure his surrender, marched at the head of an army to take him by force. As he was passing through the forest of Mans, a man clothed in white, and of a hideous aspect, suddenly sprang from a thicket, and seizing his horse's head, exclaimed: "Advance no farther; thou art betrayed, oh king!" Such an incident was scarcely needed to turn so weak a brain as Charles VI.'s. He became raging mad. Having recovered some time afterwards, he relapsed into derangement at the end of a masked ball, in which his clothes caught fire. It was in vain that a pretended magician came forth to cure him; he remained demented, with lucid intervals. This malady of the

king was the signal for disorders of the most frightful description. A truce was fortunately concluded with the English (1395), and Richard II. married the daughter of Charles VI.

In the midst of recriminations and executions, the Duke of Orleans was named lieutenant-general of the kingdom, which excited the jealousy and anger of John the Fearless, Duke of Burgundy. Open war was declared between these two princes (1404), and two furious parties were formed. John advanced with an army against Paris; the regent and the queen fled, and the conqueror got possession of the dauphin (1407). However, the two foes made afterwards a show of reconciliation. They took the communion together, and slept in the same bed; but the regent was suddenly fallen upon by assassins, and sacrificed. The perfidious John, who was unable to deny his crime, departed from Paris, but soon returned to it with his army, and seized upon the government, which he exercised despotically, holding the king and court in complete subjection.

The young Duke of Orleans, aided by the Count d'Armagnac, raised his standard to avenge his father's murder. War raged in almost every quarter of France, the two parties being called respectively *Armagnacs* and *Burgundians* (1411). The king, in an interval of reason, took part against John the Fearless, marched against him with an army, and put his name to several accommodations no sooner signed than broken. Yet greater calamities were in store for France, the recital of which will require a few words of introduction.

CONTINUATION OF THE CIVIL WAR.—THE ENGLISH AT PARIS.—PERMANENT PARLIAMENT.

It is evident that France, at the period under review, was solely a field for the ambition of the nobles; that is to say, for factions. This oligarchical anarchy lasted during the fourteenth, fifteenth, and sixteenth centuries, and certain characteristics of this new disorder are worthy of observation. In the age of pure feudalism, the nobles were independent sovereigns, who despoiled each other of their possessions; but since the crown had regained pre-eminence, the great men, for the most part princes of the blood, disputed with each other for the exercise of the royal authority, and for the wealth of the whole nation. Nothing so effectually demoralises a people, as factions attached to princes; it speedily loses sight of its own interests to serve passions which it stupidly participates; the ruffians alone are the gainers, the mass of the people dupes and victims; like an inert body, struck by the hammer and repelled by the anvil, it is tossed to and fro between the contending parties, and is the invariable prey of the conquerors for the hour. Thus exclusively occupied with a civil war without a definable object, the French cast not a thought upon the states-general, an institution that might have been rendered so powerful a lever of regeneration. They soon experienced one of the inevitable results of court factions, the yoke of the foreigner.

The King of England, Henry V., perceived the circumstances auspicious for conquest (1415). Disembarking with a small army, he crossed the Somme; the French, greatly superior in number, gave him battle at Agincourt, in a disadvantageous position, and were defeated; but the victory was a sterile honour for the moment, and the English, too weak in force, repassed the channel. The factions arose with increased rancour. D'Armagnac treated with Henry V., acknowledging him as King of France. The queen turned to the party of John the Fearless, who delivered her out of a prison in which the king had immured her, on account of her debaucheries. John was introduced into Paris, his enemies there were put to the sword,* and the executioner became his familiar associate. At the same time, Henry V. seized upon Normandy.

The dauphin had an interview with John on the bridge of Montereau, and the latter was assassinated in his turn (1419). The queen united with John's son in opposition to the dauphin; Henry V. came to meet them at Troyes, and was there proclaimed regent of the kingdom. He made his entry into Paris with great magnificence, married the daughter of Charles VI., and sent a marshal of France to the Bastille for looking him in the face. He died shortly after (1422), and was followed to the grave by Charles VI.

The schism in the church still continued, there being always two popes. The Council of Constance deposed one of them, and terminated the quarrel. Before separating, the fathers burnt John Huss and Jerome of Prague, who had been audacious enough to interpret the Gospel for themselves, and to preach reformation. They were the precursors of Luther.

The parliament, which had been formerly named for a year, became permanent, and the counsellors enjoyed the right of presenting new members to the king for appointment. Thence began the influence of that body, which ensured respect by its manners and integrity. We shall see that it subsequently abused its power.

THE MAID OF ORLEANS.—CHARLES VII.—FRANCE RECONQUERED.

The dauphin (Charles VII.), proscribed by the queen and Henry V., had, in his quality of regent, transferred the parliament of Paris to Poitiers. The marshal de Lafayette had gained for him the battle of Baugé over the English. Upon the death of the two kings, his party began to raise its head. The Duke of Bedford, on his part, had himself proclaimed regent of France at Paris for Henry VI., an infant in the cradle. The English possessed more than half of the kingdom, and ranked, as their allies, the powerful Duke of Burgundy and the Duke of Bretagne. Charles VII. was brave, but weak and voluptuous; he allowed himself to be governed by his companions in debauchery, and by his mistresses. He at first took a few towns, but lost the battle of Verneuil (1424). Dunois, Lahire, and La Tremouille, were valiant knights, but sad generals. The cause was in its last throes; Orleans was besieged, and on the point of surrendering, when a young peasant girl, gifted with an exalted imagination, came forward and announced herself as destined by heaven to save France. Her pretensions were laughed at in the first instance, but were subsequently admitted. She spoke as one inspired, and succeeded in communicating her own enthusiasm. Dressed in a coat of mail, and bearing a banner in her hand, she marched at the head of the army, and raised the siege. Persuaded that her mission was to crown the king at Rheims, she traversed with him eighty leagues of hostile country, and accomplished her astonishing enterprise. Upon this occasion, religious enthusiasm was productive of some good. But fortune abandoned the heroine; wounded and captured by the English, who wreaked a disgraceful revenge upon her, she was condemned as a sorceress by infamous judges, and burnt at Rouen (1431). Thus perished Joan of Arc, whose only crime was having saved her country.†

* Villaret reports that 3500 persons were massacred in three days in the prisons; the streets and the courts of the palace were flooded with blood. 2000 nobles, following the profession of arms, superintended these *septembrizers* in their labours, and their leaders, the Luxembourgs, the Harcourts, the Chevreuses, &c., enriched themselves with the spoils of their victims.

† The tribunal that condemned her was composed of nine doctors of the Sorbonne, and of thirty-five abbots and monks, under the presidency of Martin, Vicar of the Inquisition, and Cauchon, Bishop of Beauvais.

In the mean time, Henry VI. was crowned at Paris, and Charles VII. consumed his feeble resources in festivals; as Lahire said to him, "No one could lose his kingdom with more gaiety." But events took a new aspect, and his character rose to a level with them. The Duke of Burgundy, weary of Bedford's despotism, and ashamed of his alliance with a foreigner against his own relation, entered into a treaty with Charles VII. (1435.) Paris opened a gate to him, the English evacuated the capital, and the king made his solemn entry therein. Agnes Sorel, his mistress, stimulated his mind to activity; he signalised himself at Montereau, Normandy was conquered, and the English ultimately driven out of France (1451). The nation had recovered its energy and force in union. The king devoted himself to the re-establishment of a system of order in the government during the remainder of his reign, which was only disturbed by the revolt of the dauphin, a wicked prince, who was afterwards known as Louis XI. The king died in 1461, oppressed with disquiet and chagrin. His mother, the infamous Isabel, had died in misery at Paris during the occupation of the English.

In the course of this reign, a permanent body of cavalry, or *gendarmerie*, was established, as also one of foot *archers*, paid by a tax levied without consent of the states, which were quite forgotten. The council of Basle had limited the power of the popes in 1431, and an assembly of the clergy, held at Bourges, framed in the same spirit the famous Pragmatic Sanction, the charter of the liberties of the Gallican church. It abolished reserves and first fruits, re-established the election of bishops, and prevented the abuse of appeals to the pope. It was registered by the parliament.

LOUIS XI.—OPPRESSION OF THE PEOPLE, AND HUMBLING OF THE NOBLES.

Louis XI., the prince of dissemblers, began his reign by falling into a snare of the pope, who obtained from him the abolition of the Pragmatic Sanction. That law, however, so odious to the papal court, remained in partial execution. The king early exhibited his intention of humbling the power of the nobles, the better, doubtless, to oppress the people when relieved from their intervention. They formed against him a league which they called "*The league of the public good*," under a pretext common to all factions. Charles the Bold, Duke of Burgundy, in conjunction with the Dukes of Bretagne, Bourbon, and Berry, fought the bloody but indecisive battle of Montlhéri against the king (1465). But Louis, the ablest politician of his day, finished the war by negotiations, and ultimately resumed possession of Normandy, which he had granted as an appanage to his brother; a seizure sanctioned by an assembly of the states-general convoked by him at Tours.

England had been long a prey to intestine factions; but in an interval of repose, its king renewed the old pretensions of his crown on France. Louis maintained peace by engaging to pay a tribute, and indemnified himself in other quarters. He got possession of Anjou, the dominion of Réné of Anjou, King of Sicily, and annexed it to the crown of France. Provence shared the same fate, at a later date, by the will of Réné's heir. Louis's conquests were all made by the pen and by trickery. However, his astuteness was foiled by the marriage of the heiress of Burgundy with Maximilian of Austria, the emperor's son. This alliance brought a potent enemy into the heart of France. Burgundy, according to the law of appanages, was ultimately replaced under the French sceptre, but Flanders refused to submit to Louis. He attacked it, conquered Franche Comté, and gained Artois by treaty for a time. Thus terminated the ducal appanage of Burgundy, which had caused so many evils to France. Flanders, one of its portions, was the subject of numerous wars with the house of Austria.

The latter years of the cruel and cunning Louis XI. were filled with terrors and crimes. Shutting himself up in a fortress, he was suspicious of his domestics, his son, and even his physician. Knavish and superstitious, he wore relics on his squalid garments, and perjured himself without remorse. He died in 1483, clinging with tenacity to life, although it was to him but a torment of perpetual apprehension.

Whatever may be said to the contrary, I cannot regard Louis XI. as a popular king, merely because he decapitated, or put in iron cages, the princes and nobles of his time. Crimes only serve to demoralise the people. He was cruel to the great, and a despot to the weak. If he protected the burghers and encouraged industry, it was from avarice; he desired prosperity to gain increased means of taxation. If he were the first to establish the post, it was to stretch out with more rapidity his hand of iron. He was anxious that civil justice should be well administered, for an absolute king has nothing to fear from the equality of his subjects. He caused 40,000 of his subjects to be executed, and children to be sprinkled with the blood of their parents; yet he was the first to assume the title of "*most Christian king!*" His great maxim was, "*He who knows not how to dissemble, knows not how to reign.*" He deceived himself; frankness is the best means of succeeding with the people

CHARLES VIII.—STATES-GENERAL.—CONQUESTS AND REVERSES IN ITALY.—FIFTEENTH CENTURY.

Charles VIII. was thirteen years old at the death of his father. His eldest sister was regent. The Duke of Orleans, a descendant of Charles V., was ambitious of that office, and strove by agitation to obtain it. The states-general were convoked at Tours to decide the question, and he lost his cause. They were likewise occupied with the misery of the people, which the records describe in forcible characters. They were accustomed to wander without subsistence in the forests; men, women, and children, yoked themselves to the plough at night, for fear of being plundered during the day by the tax-gatherers and men of arms. The reduction of two-thirds of the taxes, wherewith Louis XI. had overwhelmed the nation, was decreed. The ministers pretended that they *were clipping the king's wings*, but it was answered, that the interest of the king was that of the people, and that to alleviate the condition of the latter was to benefit the former. The states afterwards evinced a more docile spirit. In the mean time, the Duke of Orleans had retired into Bretagne to form a party, but was beaten at St Aubin by the army of the court. At this period, Anne, the heiress of Brittany, was marriageable. Maximilian of Austria, her suitor, was outwitted, and she was married to Charles VIII. (1491.) Brittany was united to France, and the Duke of Orleans taken into favour. He was the same who afterwards became Louis XII.

The young king took a fancy one day to become a conqueror, and all his courtiers applauded the idea, and prognosticated its auspicious execution. He recollected that he had some rights on Naples, from the succession of Anjou. He set off with an army, designing to subdue that kingdom, and afterwards Constantinople. He successively entered Florence and Rome. He was alternately assisted and betrayed by the execrable Borgia, Alexander VI., a pope, poisoner, and assassin. Naples was conquered by a march, and divers fêtes and tournaments celebrated the event. But a powerful league was formed in Lombardy. The French army repassed the Apennines, and 8000 men defeated in less than an hour 30,000 Italians at Farnoue. (1498.) However, the conquest of Naples was already lost. The artful Ferdinand, King of Spain, who seemed

an ally, drove out the remnant of the army by means of Gonzalvo of Cordova.* The only acquisition of the French in this expedition was a horrible malady; and Charles VIII. himself died soon after, in a fit of apoplexy. Comines describes him as a prince of good heart, but of an indifferent head.

We have arrived at the end of the fifteenth century. Columbus had discovered America, and Gama had sailed round the Cape of Good Hope. The compass had opened the road to a new world, and commerce, as well as ambition, was directed towards it. Speculations, hitherto repressed within narrow limits, were extended over both hemispheres. The wonders of distant voyages and travels enlightened mankind, and removed the barrier of ancient prejudices. A German, by inventing printing, rendered a still greater service to the human race. The light of the arts and sciences was thenceforth to be shed over the universe with an imperishable lustre. By multiplying books, barbarism and fanaticism will be ultimately driven from the face of the earth. In the mean time, disputes go on, and will continue to go on. From age to age, political, religious, and purely speculative questions, will be changed with the era, for which men will be ever ready to enter the lists. But with the progress of time, the number of thinkers, as well as of lessons, will increase; doctrines will become less imperious, creeds less exclusive; and mankind will pay more and more attention to their true destiny on earth.

LOUIS XII.—EXTERNAL WARS.—PATERNAL ADMINISTRATION.

We enter upon a reign which would have been the happiest in French history but for its exterior politics. Louis XII. was perhaps the best of the kings who have sat on the French throne. He was actuated by a true love for his people, whose father he was called; he also repressed the nobles without maltreating them. Unfortunately, a mania for conquests had seized upon the nation, and he yielded to the phrensy. Political relations were then beginning to be extended in Europe. Louis XI. had introduced therein the cunning and perfidy of which Machiavelli reveals the secrets. That ridiculous diplomacy of modern Europe, unknown to the ancients, which treats a people as a dowry, an inheritance, or an indemnity, and risks the lot of nations upon art and capacity in negotiation, was then in full vigour.

Louis XII. repudiated his wife, in order to marry the widow of Charles VIII., and preserve Brittany. Then, having *rights* on the Milanese through his grandmother, he departed with an army to enforce them. (1501.) In twenty days, the Milanese was conquered; Naples subsequently met the same fate: but Ferdinand once more drove the French out of that kingdom. Louis was about to give away the hand of his daughter, and a third of France for her dowry, when the states, which he assembled at Tours (1506), turned him from the design. He was afterwards engaged in a contest with Julius II., a pope who made war and mounted the breach in person. The league of Cambray, formed by almost all Europe against Venice, was the next great event. It involved France in war with Spain, and the Milanese was eventually evacuated by the French. La Tremouille, having returned into Italy, was defeated by the Swiss at Novarre. At the same time, the English, united with the imperialists, beat the French in Picardy, and the Swiss penetrated as far as Dijon. Louis XII. entered into a treaty with Henry VIII., King of England, and married his sister; he finally died, without doing France all the good he desired. (1515.) He was economical, and reduced the taxes, could distinguish merit in obscurity, protected labourers and artisans, watched over the administration of justice, and strove to render the law paramount. The Cardinal d'Amboise was his worthy minister.

Unfortunately, the states-general were only once convoked in this reign. The only authority which had the semblance of a national check was the parliament, which, according to its institution, was merely to concern itself with the decision of lawsuits. However, the people, deprived of the states, saw with pleasure a respected and permanent body stand forth as their defender, although with the view of increasing its own importance. The parliament sometimes resisted the royal power, by refusing the formality of registering edicts, and thus participated in some degree in a legislative veto. It at least subjected arbitrary power to certain forms, and to a prescribed procedure, which so far restrained its action.

* Spain was then becoming an imposing power. The Christians, descendants of the Iberians and Visigoths, had succeeded in expelling the Moors, who had occupied their country for nearly eight centuries; and the crowns of Arragon and Castille were united by the marriage of Ferdinand and Isabella.

FRANCIS I.—CHARLES V.—LUTHER AND CALVIN.—REVIVAL OF LETTERS.

Louis XII. was called *the plebeian king;* Francis I. was the king of gentlemen. He was likewise descended from Charles V. by another branch. He was a prince of graceful mien, brave, profuse, gallant, of chivalric honour, vastly brilliant as a knight, worthless as a politician. To enable him to carry on the war in Italy, Francis exposed the office of judge to sale, and proceeded to gain the battle of Marignan over the Swiss in the emperor's pay. He afterwards concluded with Leo X. a concordat, which annulled the Pragmatic Sanction, and abolished the principle of election (1516): the chancellor Duprat made this disgraceful treaty because he was ambitious of being a cardinal. The imperial throne becoming vacant, the king declared himself a candidate with the heir of Austria and Spain, who defeated his pretensions, and became his most unrelenting foe, under the title of Charles V. Francis allied himself with Henry VIII., but Charles succeeded in dissolving their union. Another enemy, Leo X., assisted the emperor in wresting the Milanese from the French, who had made themselves detested in that dutchy. Nearly the whole of Europe was in league against France, and one of its greatest warriors, the Constable Bourbon, passed over in disgust to the side of its enemies. But Francis was not intimidated; he entered Italy and fought the disastrous battle of Pavia, was made prisoner, and carried to Madrid (1525). Francis purchased his freedom by ceding Burgundy, &c.; but the treaty was not executed, as the states of Burgundy refused to pass under a foreign sway. Having entered into a league against Charles with a new pope, Henry VIII., and the Venitians, the king again passed the Alps, besieged Naples, got the plague in his army, and once more evacuated Italy. A peace was signed at Cambray, and the ransom was liquidated for 2,000,000 of gold crowns. Previous to this period, the Duke of Bourbon, being in want of funds to pay his soldiers, had led them to the pillage of Rome. The pope, who was taken prisoner, had likewise to pay a heavy ransom to Charles V., who asked pardon for the violence committed on the head of the church.

At this era a religious schism prepared a new burst for the human mind, and new combinations of a political order. We refer of course to the Reformation, which great event, the subject of so many descriptions and disputes, need not be enlarged upon here.

The Duke of Milan, Sforza, having provided a pretext, the king brought forward his old pretensions. (1535.) The emperor undertook on his part an invasion of France, but was not successful. Being accused of poisoning the dauphin, he was cited before the parliament, which confiscated Artois and Flanders by a decree pronounced in contumacy. Francis afterwards contracted an alliance with the Sultan Soly-

man, which was exclaimed against in Europe, though a pope had once before allied himself with the Turks. The plan concerted failed; the artful Charles obtained a truce, and a passage through France to proceed to Ghent, which had revolted against him. Any other than Francis would perhaps have seized the occasion of exacting a ransom in his turn: the confidence of a man of bad faith is an illustrious homage to the scrupulous honour of his dupe.

The two monarchs having soon quarrelled again, a new war broke out (1542), which was prosecuted on all the frontiers. The galleys of France were united with those of the Turk Barbarossa. The Count d'Enghien gained the battle of Cerisoles in Italy, without any advantage to France. Charles, in alliance with Henry VIII., penetrated as far as Soissons, and peace was once more signed at Cressy, but scarcely procured a single moment of repose. In the mean time, Francis I. expired from the consequences of a loathsome disease (1547).

Francis was one of the most absolute of the French kings, and oppressed the people with unauthorised taxes. For the states-general he substituted assemblies of notables, that is to say, of courtiers, who were chosen for the purpose of being consulted, and who were always sure to approve. He enslaved the Gallican church, and corrupted the nation by the profligacy of his manners. He is called the restorer of arts and letters, because they were revived when he happened to be on the throne: he protected them, doubtless, but their age was come, and did not need him. The republican genius had prepared the way in Italy; liberty had peopled Florence with great men, and the Medicis, who rose from merchants to princes, seconded them. The only praise due to Francis is that of founding the college of France, and establishing the use of French in public acts.

HENRY II.—CONTINUATION OF THE WARS OF FRANCIS I.

The character of Henry II. bore a great resemblance to that of his father Francis, and their reigns had some parallel points. The war continued against Charles V. The king wrested from him Metz, Toul, and Verdun (1553), and the emperor advanced to Metz with 100,000 men. The Duke of Guise, the first celebrated man of that Lorraine family which became so potent in France, repulsed him. Charles revenged himself by destroying two towns, and shortly after astonished Europe by surrendering the empire, and retiring to die in a convent (1555). Ferdinand, his brother, became emperor, and Philip II., his son, king of Spain. The latter was the Louis XI. of his age, and the most powerful prince in Europe, which he moved by a mighty lever, the gold of Peru and Mexico. Whilst the French were carrying on an unsuccessful warfare in Italy, his general, the Duke of Savoy, gained a victory at St Quentin (1557), which threatened the most disastrous consequences to France. Terror spread into every quarter; Paris was fortified, and the Spaniards might easily have entered it, had not Philip judged it expedient to retrograde. The Duke of Guise, named lieutenant-general of the kingdom, repaired the misfortune by taking Calais from the English. A peace was signed at Chateau-Cambresis. The celebrated Queen Elizabeth then reigned in England. Henry II. did not long survive the treaty, being killed in a tournament (1559).

In this reign, as well as in the preceding, women exercised considerable influence at court. Their intrigues have been always fatal to France. Henry II. allowed himself to be governed by his mistress, Diana of Poitiers, who had previously governed his father. The ingenious Rabelais has painted these two kings and their courts, under the veil of a fantastic allegory; and Brantome has depicted the dissolute manners of the age with a truth inconsistent with decency. In 1558, the states were assembled conjointly with the parliament, which appeared therein as a fourth order: this singular representation was not repeated.

RELIGIOUS FACTIONS UNDER FRANCIS II.

The nobles, humbled by Louis XI., had become courtiers under his successors: the luxury of the court drew them to the royal abode, and there they were moulded to obedience. But when foreign wars ceased to give them occupation, they fell into factions. Religion was the motive or the pretext. The Prince of Condé, and the King of Navarre, his brother, of the Bourbon branch, were the chiefs of the Protestant party; whilst Guise, the uncle of Mary Stuart, the king's wife, directed the Catholic party. The Constable Montmorenci had likewise his faction. The queen-mother, Catherine de Medicis, a faithless and imperious woman, protected and betrayed them in their turns. She sought to hold the balance between them, acting upon her favourite maxim of *dividing in order to rule*; an infamous maxim, since it fixes the security of the throne on the misery of the nation.

A magistrate having been hanged as a Protestant, his co-religionists formed a league at Amboise to revenge him (1560). Guise repressed it by force of arms. The punishments on the Calvinists were redoubled; they defended themselves, and made a vain assertion of the right to liberty of conscience in the assembly of Fontainbleau. It was resolved to convoke the states at Orleans, in order to draw the Bourbons to attend it. Condé was there arrested, condemned to death, and about to be executed, when the king died. Francis II. was an amiable young man, but is a mere cypher in the history of his reign. His brother succeeded him at the age of ten years, under the title of Charles IX.

CHARLES IX.—CIVIL WAR.—ST BARTHOLOMEW.

The states made no step towards pacification. A virtuous citizen and philosophic magistrate, L'Hôpital, vainly strove to move the respective parties to moderation and union. Catherine afterwards proposed a conference to terminate the disputes with the Calvinists (who were called Huguenots, from a German word signifying *confederates*), which was held at Poissy (1561), and ended in rendering them more bitter. It was at this time that the Jesuits established themselves in France, and yet liberty of conscience was proclaimed by the queen-mother. Certain outrages committed by the retainers of the Duke of Guise, occasioned a massacre of the Huguenots at Vassy in Champagne. A civil war exploded (1563). The Protestants were defeated by the royalists at Dreux; the generals of both armies were made prisoners in the battle. The Duke of Guise besieged Orleans, and was assassinated: he was an ambitious man, who made use of religion to aggrandise himself. A short peace was then made. The vexations of the Catholics were renewed, and suffered with impunity; the Huguenots were again driven to exasperation. Condé attempted to carry off the king, in order to be master of the government, but he failed in his enterprise. The battle of St Denis (1567) took place shortly after, in which the victory was doubtful. Montmorenci perished in the conflict. After a treaty, the war recommenced. Aided by the Protestants of Germany and England, the Huguenots gave battle at Jarnac, and were defeated by the Duke of Anjou, the king's brother (1569). Condé was assassinated on the field of battle when in the act of surrendering. Coligny, a prudent general, repaired this defeat, and rallied the Calvinist forces. The young Henry of Navarre, whom he was training to war, was placed at the head of the party. Anjou was again victorious at Montcontour.

Notwithstanding these two checks, the Protestants concluded an advantageous peace. But it was a perfidious snare. After yielding them four towns as pledges, and civil and religious liberty, Catherine drew the chiefs to court, and lulled them into a blind confidence. The young Henry went to espouse the king's sister (1572). The rejoicings were scarcely concluded, when suddenly, in the dead of night, the royalists broke into the houses of the Huguenots, and massacred them without distinction of age or sex. The detestable king fired from a balcony on his own subjects. The same horrors were enacted simultaneously in several of the provinces. The aged and illustrious Coligny was immolated, and Henry and the young Condé were forced to abjure their errors. The king openly avowed that the whole had been done by his orders; and the parliament decreed an annual procession to celebrate this massacre of 100,000 Frenchmen. It is sufficient at the present day to mention St Bartholomew to excite horror; and yet that day has had its apologists.

The effect of persecution and cruelty is invariable: martyrs engender proselytes. The Protestants increased in number; and war being renewed (1573), the Duke of Anjou lost 24,000 men at the siege of Rochelle. The following year the party of *malecontents* was organised, which the Huguenots joined, and fresh conflicts occurred. During these events, the king died (1574). We learn with surprise that this monster had wit, made verses, and protected letters.

THE LEAGUE.—THE SIXTEEN.—HENRY III.

The Duke of Anjou, who had gone to Poland, where he had been elected king, returned to France under the name of Henry III. He had shown talents as a general, but on the throne he was idle, silly, empty, superstitious, and addicted to infamous debaucheries. He was advised to conciliate the Calvinists, but he declared against them. His brother, the Duke of Anjou, and Henry of Navarre, united against him. The Protestants obtained some political advantages by an edict of pacification issued in 1576. Then the *holy league* was formed, a confederacy of those whom we may call ultra-Catholics, who bound themselves to defend religion and the king, whilst yielding a blind submission to their leader Henry of Guise. The states were convoked at Blois, the leaguers predominated in them, and the king sanctioned the league. Each party took up arms and stood on the watch. The leaguers, contemning the king, consulted the pope whether they might disobey a monarch for the advantage of religion; and he responded in the affirmative. Guise put forward the old Cardinal de Bourbon, who published a manifesto in the name of all the Catholic monarchs in Europe. Pope Sixtus V. excommunicated Henry and Condé, who laughed at him. The war called that of *the three Henries* broke out (1587); Henry of Navarre defeated the royalists, commanded by Joyeuse and other favourites, at Coutras; whilst Henry of Guise defeated the German Calvinists who were advancing to his aid.

During this period, the insurrection, known by the name of the *sixteen*, was organised at Paris. The appellation was taken from the sixteen quarters of the commune, corresponding to the *sections* of 1792. The Sorbonne, which was favourable to the insurgents, decided that the government might be taken from an incapable prince. The leaguers, assembled at Nanci, dictated orders to the king; he endeavoured to evince resistance, and called some Swiss to Paris. The burghers immediately ran to arms, barricaded the streets to the Louvre, and encompassed the troops. The king fled, and abandoned the capital to Guise and the league. A new union against the heretics was imposed on the king by the leaguers.

A meeting of the states-general was held at Blois in 1588, in which the leaguers had again the majority. The Guises had reached the summit of power, and might easily have played the part of Pepin or Capet The king was conscious of the truth, and being unable to resist them openly, he had them assassinated. The rage of the leaguers knew no bounds; they cursed the king in the pulpit; and the parliament which opposed them was sent to the Bastille, and replaced with new members. The Duke of Mayenne succeeded Guise, his brother, as head of the leaguers, whose party was still predominant. Only a few towns remained to the king, who at length perceived the necessity of reconciling himself with Henry; they embraced, and forgot mutual wrongs (1589). Excommunicated by the pope, the king, conducted by Henry, marched on Paris. They were already at St Cloud, when a young Dominican, incited by the leaguers, slew the king with the thrust of a knife. The Parisians celebrated the murder, and Jacques Clement was regarded as a saint. The Catholic theologians of that era proved by the aid of scripture that it was lawful to kill kings. The intriguing Catherine died in 1589, cordially detested by all parties.

END OF THE LEAGUE.—ENTRY OF HENRY IV. INTO PARIS.—SIXTEENTH CENTURY.

The branch of Valois was extinct. Henry of Bourbon-Navarre took the crown as descendant from Louis IX., and deserved it by his eminent qualities. Only recognised by a few provinces, and ill provided for war, he struggled against Mayenne, whose numerous army included a portion of Spanish infantry, then the best in Europe. He had almost decided upon retiring into England, when, meeting Mayenne at Arques, he defeated him with 5000 men (1589). He immediately marched upon Paris, and nearly succeeded in taking it. The old Cardinal de Bourbon, his cousin, had been declared king, under the title of Charles X. Henry again vanquished Mayenne at the battle of Ivry (1590), and blockaded Paris. The leaguers defended themselves with a species of phrensy, kept up by fanaticism; whole regiments of monks and priests were formed to resist the heretic. A frightful famine raged; bread was made with dead men's bones; but Henry permitted provisions to pass into the besieged city when in this extremity. The celebrated Farnese, Philip II.'s general, advanced with an army to raise the siege.

In the mean time, the flames of war were lighted up in every corner of France, either by foreign or domestic foes. In this disastrous state, a new party sprung up in Paris, the party of *politicians*, who joined themselves to the *malecontents*. They were moderate Catholics, who aimed at a pacification by recognising the king. Wearied with so long and bloody a strife, all parties at length were disposed to reconcilement, and met together in conference. The king resolved upon an abjuration, saying, "*Paris is well worth a mass.*" Mayenne signed a treaty, and the league sunk under the shafts of ridicule and contempt, giving forth its last furious groan in an attempt to assassinate Henry IV. That prince entered Paris on the 22d March 1594.

Thus finished the sixteenth century, one of the most glorious to the human intellect, illustrated as it is by so many great names. Copernicus, Galileo, Torricelli, Bacon, Montaigne, Grotius, Luther, Calvin, Erasmus—every name involves a mighty revolution.

REIGN OF HENRY IV.

Henry's first measure was to re-establish the parliament; and he then attempted a sort of amalgamation between the Calvinists and leaguers. In the mean time several endeavours were made to take away the

king's life, for assuredly the Jesuits loved him not. They were driven forth the realm (1595) by the advice of the parliament, of the university, and of the church. Mayenne, however, was not quite reduced to submission, and Henry needed another victory over him, which having gained at Fontaine-Française, he pardoned him. The Duke d'Epernon, having also revolted, was subdued, and war declared against Philip II., who had taken Calais. The king wanted money to resist him, and therefore convoked an assembly of notables to ask their advice, and told them that his most glorious title was his quality of a gentleman. The Spaniards were repulsed. Mercœur, governor of Bretagne, who still held for the league, was subdued, and a treaty signed with Philip (1598), who died shortly after. The Calvinists assembled at Saumur, and loudly exclaimed against the little favour with which they were regarded. Henry gave them the edict of Nantes, in which the exercise of their religion was subjected to the restrictions of a galling toleration. The edict was far removed from religious liberty, and yet the ultra-Catholics regarded it as a most unjust concession.

The latter events of this reign were the recall of the Jesuits, solicited by the pope; the conspiracy of Henrietta d'Entragues, to whom Henry had given a promise of marriage; and the mediation (1609) between the pope, Venitians, Spain, and Holland. Henry was arming against Austria, and projected, as is said, a plan for an European confederation and a perpetual peace, long the object of philanthropic prayers, when he was assassinated by a fanatic. It was Ravaillac, since we are bound to name him: history is too complaisant in immortalising ruffians and assassins.

Assisted by Sully, his friend and minister, Henry IV. introduced order and economy into the finances: formerly not more than the fifth of the taxes ever reached the royal treasury. He had a good heart, and possessed the art of making himself beloved; but he reigned as an absolute monarch. He repressed every symptom of resistance, even to the obstinacy of the parliament, by the vain parade of beds of justice. We may ask how a prince, who desired the good and comfort of the poor, could sign the atrocious ordinance which condemned them to the galleys for killing a rabbit? We must acknowledge, although with reluctance, that the despotism of Richelieu and Louis XIV. can be traced back to Henry IV. With that conviction, it is unnecessary to reproach him for having been too fond of play and of his subjects' wives. Nevertheless he was popular, and still lives in the recollections of the people; a glory which, as far as we know, is peculiar to him.

RICHELIEU.—LOUIS XIII.—DESPOTISM.

Louis XIII. being on his accession (1610) only nine years old, the parliament gave the regency to his mother, Mary of Medicis, thus attributing to itself a prerogative of the states-general. The benefits of the preceding administration were lost; Sully was dismissed, and his savings dissipated. The Florentine Concini (afterwards Marshal d'Ancre), and his wife Galigaï, ruined France by their influence over the regent. Factions began to rend the kingdom again. The states-general were thereupon convoked (1614), the time of which was consumed with the affairs of the clergy. It was their last assembly before the Revolution. The complaints of the parliament concerning the administration of affairs were rejected, and the Prince of Condé, who was at the head of the malecontents and Calvinists, was arrested. A young page attending the king, named Luynes, who had gained complete sway over the royal mind, persuaded his master to rid himself of the minister, in order to throw off the yoke of the regent. The king, cruel from imbecility, caused Concini to be assassinated. His wife was accused of witchcraft, and burnt. The new favourite inherited the immense wealth which they had hoarded by their malversations. Louis XIII. was one of those weak creatures who derive their energy from the suggestions of others, and revenge themselves for their habitual submission by bursts of brutal ferocity. He exiled his mother, and treated her with great harshness. She got up two revolts by the assistance of certain lords. The Calvinists likewise rose several times in insurrection, and obtained advantageous terms of peace.

Then appeared Richelieu (1624), a creature of Concini, who had lived in retirement since his patron's downfall. This man had a most stern and inflexible will, with an unremitting assiduity in imposing it upon others; a despot in every sense of the word, he annihilated every instrument of resistance. Throwing suspicion upon the designs of the nobles, he imitated the conduct of Louis XI., and had several of them condemned to death by commissions. He suppressed the great offices of admiral and constable, which formerly conferred so vast an influence, and which were already degraded, since the latter had been given to Luynes, a simple gentleman. Appearing at first disposed to conciliate the Calvinists, he soon formed the project of oppressing them, by seizing their places of security, the feeble guarantees of their religious freedom. After a year spent in the siege of Rochelle, conducted by himself in person, and which was defended with heroic courage, displayed amid the horrors of famine, he took that town, although supported by an English fleet. He destroyed that bulwark of the Protestant faith, and reduced Rohan, the leader of the Huguenot army. It is stated that the plan of the reformers was to found a federative republic, such as they saw prospering in Holland. If they had succeeded, how different would the history of Europe have been!

It is not the reign of Louis XIII., but of Richelieu, that is to be related; before him all bent the knee. The king was accounted a cypher. Roussillon was conquered in 1628. The house of Austria was humbled. Several wars were maintained against the Spaniards, with varying success; Catalonia gave itself up to France. The genius of Richelieu shone in a skilful use of the arts of political intrigue, and under him France took a commanding station in Europe. Nevertheless, his reign has something mournful and monotonous in its aspect, like every thing marked by the hand of despotism. From time to time, feeble attempts at resistance were provoked, which were always suppressed by severe punishments: the Marshal de Marillac was executed in 1630; the Duke de Montmorenci, taken with arms in his hands, was condemned by the parliament of Toulouse and executed in 1632, in spite of the king's pardon; Cing-Mars and De Thou were decapitated in 1642, for having conspired against the cardinal, at the instance of the king himself, irritated at the haughty thraldom of his minister. At length this tyrannical priest died. Louis XIII. had scarcely time to breathe freely, before he likewise paid nature's debt (1643); as if Richelieu, unwilling that he should reign an instant, had ordered him to follow him to the tomb.

The absolute power of Charles V. and Henry IV., preserved at least the elasticity of the French character. Richelieu, like Louis XI., broke and degraded it. France was perfectly miserable under him; it seemed as if despotism struck the minds of men with stupor, and the soil with sterility. The pretensions of the parliament, which formerly claimed to be a portion of the sovereign power, were out of season under such a master. One day that the magistrates had refused to register a decree, Richelieu had them summoned before the king, and kept them on their knees during the whole audience. To him, however, was owing the institution of the Academy, which had the patience to pronounce a periodical eulogium upon

him during a space of 150 years; but *The Cid*, which he caused to be condemned, gave the true impetus to French literary genius; whilst Descartes, persecuted by the zealots, was driven to pursue philosophy in Sweden.

MAZARIN.—MINORITY OF LOUIS XIV.—THE FRONDE.

Louis XIV. was five years old on his accession. The parliament again arrogated the right to confer the regency. The queen-mother, Anne of Austria, a vain and frivolous woman, obtained it. The Italian, Mazarin, her favourite, a disciple of Richelieu, governed in her name. He was an adroit and supple minister, who carried on despotism by cunning, and seemed to regard the art of reigning as synonymous with the art of making dupes. The war continued with Austria without any object. The young D'Enghien, who became the great Condé, distinguished himself in its course. He conquered at Rocroi and Fribourg. Turenne was successful at Nordlingen (1644), and took Dunkirk; and Condé was again victorious at Lens. This war, in which the Swedes were useful allies, was terminated by the treaty of Westphalia (1648).

After the peace, the nobles gave vent to their discontent against Mazarin; they made common cause with the parliament, and were sometimes aided by the people, who, upon one occasion, erected barricades in Paris, and compelled the court to set two magistrates at liberty. However, the people had no real interest in the quarrels of a few turbulent and ambitious men; bowed beneath the iron yoke of despotism, they had not even an idea of deriving any popular advantage from such contests. The factions at this time were little more than coteries; laughter and jokes were as plentiful as blows. A sprightly prelate bethought him of enacting the character of Catiline, and in the recital of his fantastic exploits, he has rendered civil war a very amusing relation. Condé, disgusted with the court, which he had previously served, abandoned it. Mazarin caused him to be arrested, then released him; and, seeing the storm increasing, quitted the kingdom, into which he returned with 7000 men. Condé and the *Frondists* had formed an alliance with the Spaniards. The armies came to close quarters in the faubourg St Antoine. The royalists were commanded by Turenne. The parliament named the irresolute Gaston, Duke of Orleans, lieutenant of the kingdom. Mazarin again retired, and the Fronde, having no further pretext to allege, was dissolved; whereupon the king and Mazarin entered Paris (1653). The natural result of this revolutionary display, so ill supported, was to give additional strength to absolute power. Condé had rejoined the Spaniards in the Low Countries. The war between him and Turenne continued for a long time, and was terminated by the treaty of the Pyrenees (1659): France kept Artois, Roussillon, and Alsace; and Louis XIV. married the Infanta Maria Theresa. Mazarin died, leaving despotism in excellent hands. Louis now declared that he would reign in his turn (1661). He had already entered the parliament in his hunting-dress, booted and whip in hand, to enjoin it to abstain from any interference in affairs of state.

PROSPERITY OF LOUIS XIV.

Louis XIV. conceived the project of becoming the most powerful monarch in Europe, and he succeeded therein by the assistance of superior men, whom he had the sagacity to discover and draw out. Colbert restored the finances, cherished commerce and industry, protected learning, and organised the whole administration. A man of genius, Riquet, consecrated his life and fortune to the construction of the Languedoc canal. A marine was created, capable of opposing the navies of Holland and England. The king alleged pretended rights upon the death of Philip IV., as a pretext for declaring war against Spain. (1668.) Flanders was conquered in a short time, and Franche-Comté was overrun in three weeks. Holland, England, and Sweden, formed an alliance in favour of Spain. By the treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle, the Comté was restored; but France retained Flanders, which the celebrated Vauban fortified.

Holland gave Louis XIV. divers causes of irritation and antipathy, presenting in its republican form of government so striking a contrast to his own. He collected against it 200,000 men, after having deprived it of all its allies; and he made with Condé, Turenne, Luxumbourg, &c., that passage of the Rhine which was celebrated as a military prodigy, at a time when a king who made war in a carriage, surrounded by his court, was compared to Cæsar. Holland was invaded, and Louis proposed conditions of a most humiliating and oppressive character. Despair stirred up the Dutch to the last pitch of exasperation. Ruyter, who from a cabin-boy had become an admiral, frequently beat the French and English fleets. The Dutch flooded their country to preserve its freedom (1673); and Louis XIV. was compelled to evacuate it. A general league was formed to curb the freaks of this imperious despot. But he was the strongest; he again overran Franche-Comté, and laid waste the Palatinate by means of Turenne. Condé gave battle to the Stadtholder of Holland at Senef (1678), which was attended with no other result than the destruction of 25,000 men. Duquesne rendered the French flag formidable in the Mediterranean, and the peace of Nimeguen consolidated the conquests of France.

The stadtholder, however, attempted an invasion, and was repulsed by Luxumbourg. In 1681, Strasburg was taken. Louis sent a fleet to bombard Algiers, as a hint to the pirates to respect French commerce in future. He likewise bombarded Genoa, for having assisted Algiers. He was at the summit of power; no king was ever regaled with such incense; his very person was idolised as the type of beauty and dignity. The extravagant magnificence of his court, in which the wealth of France was ingulfed, intoxicated his vainglorious mind. In his delirium he resolved *to extirpate heresy*. The women, poets, and Jesuits, applauded his design. Missionaries were sent into the Cevennes, accompanied by dragoons, who massacred the Calvinists by way of converting them. The edict of Nantes was revoked (1685); the churches were demolished, and children torn from their parents to be made Catholics. Eight hundred thousand peaceable citizens migrated, and carried into foreign countries their industry and resentment; their possessions served to reward sycophants. Indignant Europe coalesced at Augsburg (1687) against this intolerant despotism. The Prince of Orange was the soul of this confederacy; he was called, under the title of William III., to the throne of England, whose parliament once more expelled the Stuarts; and Louis XIV. offered his protection to the dethroned king, James II. A fierce war was the result. The Palatinate was again devastated, by the order of Louvois. Luxumbourg conquered at Fleurus, Steinkerque, and Nerwinde, the king, William, a brave warrior, and a man of great ability, but unfortunate in battle. Catinat, a philosophic and plebeian general, triumphed over the Duke of Savoy at Staffarde and Marseilles. On the other hand, Tourville lost fourteen ships of the line at La Hogue. In every quarter humanity suffered, and groaned amidst useless carnage and desolation. Peace was concluded at Ryswick (1697) from mutual exhaustion: Louis no longer reigned as master, and France was ruined. Any expedient was adopted to get money; nobility was sold for 2000 crowns, as it had been bought before Henry III. by fiefs.

REVERSES OF LOUIS XIV.—THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY.

The King of Spain, having no direct heir, made, after long hesitating between the houses of France and Austria, his will in favour of a grandson of Louis XIV. (1700). That prince accepted the inheritance, knowing, however, that he exposed himself to a terrible war. He again excited the anger of England, by declaring for the son of James II. He sent Philip V. into Spain, saying to him, "*There are no longer any Pyrenees.*" An abbé, whom the superb Louis had despised, and who became the best general of the emperor, Prince Eugene, obtained great advantages over the old Villeroi in Savoy. The Duke of Savoy, Victor Amadeus, abandoned the French party, notwithstanding the ties that attached him to the Bourbons. Marlborough triumphed in the Low Countries; but Villars conquered the imperialists at Hochstet (1703), where the French were in the following year vanquished, in their turn, by Eugene and Marlborough. The English took Gibraltar and Barcelona. Vendôme repulsed Eugene in Italy (1706), when Marlborough gained the decisive battle of Ramillies over Villeroi. Then fortune changed in the south; the French army was beaten at Turin; Toulon was besieged; the archduke was crowned at Madrid; and Philip V. would have lost Spain, if Berwick had not gained for him the battle of Almanza (1707). Eugene fought both in the south and the north; in 1709, he took Lille in concert with Marlborough. Louis craved peace; harsh conditions were offered him; and he preferred continuing the war, notwithstanding the extreme misery of the people. After a brave resistance, the French army, commanded by Villars, was defeated at Malplaquet (1710). The king again humbled himself, and his offers were rejected. Vendôme restored affairs in Spain; Marlborough, disgraced by his court, retired, and a truce was concluded with England. Villars, having surprised Eugene at Denain, gained one of those striking victories which save empires. The peace of Utrecht was the consequence (1713). Villars passed the Rhine, repulsed the Austrians, and signed with Eugene the peace of Radstadt (1714). The issue of this ruinous war was less disastrous to France than it had reason to expect. The most humiliating condition was the destruction of the port of Dunkirk. The almost simultaneous deaths of the dauphin and his son, the duke of Burgundy, completed the misfortunes of Louis XIV. He died in 1715, in his seventy-seventh year, after a reign of seventy-two years. He left France two thousand six hundred millions of debt; and in the course of his career he had destroyed more than a million of men.

The seventeenth century is called the age of Louis XIV., because he contributed to give it lustre by his magnificence and his taste for a certain species of grandeur. But what good did he perform for the human race? He rendered France powerful in Europe, and enslaved it at home; he was the cause that, during a century, the French had no national spirit. By constituting himself the dispenser of glory as well as of fortune, he demoralised the nation; it forgot itself in thinking only of him; and when he uttered the phrase, "I am the state!" it believed him. His idle splendour corrupted the ideas of a nation which has always been too prone to concentrate upon the man of the moment its admiration, its idolatry, and its own destinies. Under Louis XIV., Racine, Boileau, and Molière, purified taste, and produced masterpieces of genius. Without him, Corneille, Pascal, La Fontaine, Fénélon, and La Bruyère, would not the less have adorned France; reason would have had freer organs, and genius, emancipated from an absorbing contemplation of the grand monarch, would have risen to more noble, that is to say, more useful, conceptions. The spirit of independence, awakened by the struggles of the Fronde, would not have been smothered; the inquiry into the true interests of humanity would not have been retarded; and the seventeenth century might have been the age as well of reason as of genius.

The better to repress freedom of opinion, despotism availed itself of the yoke of religious intolerance. Bossuet was the apostle of Louis XIV.'s monarchy, and preached its infallibility. The Jansenists were persecuted, not on account of their doctrines, but because they thought for themselves, and invaded the unity of belief. All France was bound to think like the king. Thence came that hypocritical varnish which covered the corruption of manners. *The Tartuffe*, permitted at court, was an extraordinary anomaly, and evinces the triumph of genius. In conclusion, this Louis XIV., so absolute a king, and who had never suffered himself to be governed by his mistresses, finished by sharing his throne with his confessor and an old woman whom he had married, the widow Scarron (Madame de Maintenon).

THE REGENCY.—REIGN OF LOUIS XV.—THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY.

The great-grandson of Louis XIV. was likewise king at the age of five. The parliament annulled the will of the deceased monarch, and nominated his nephew, the Duke of Orleans, unlimited regent. He was a refined debauchee, and indifferent as to affairs. The dull grandeur of the last reign, joined to its misfortunes, had at last disgusted the French: delivered from the galling restraint of tiresome ceremony and hateful intolerance, which had pervaded the very manners of the people, they abandoned themselves to the license of unrestrained folly, like children let loose from a stern taskmaster. During a war against Spain, excited by an old Italian priest, Alberoni, who was bent upon embroiling and throwing into confusion all Europe, schemes were entertained for paying off the debts of Louis XIV. The adventurer Law arrived from Scotland, with a financial system, which was seized upon with avidity. The whole was paid with the money of dupes, who received in exchange paper and mighty promises. The Mississippi scheme plunged the nation into a vortex of madness, and turned the period into a saturnalia of fallacious wealth. The minister of the regent, the Abbé Dubois, was as vile as his master was corrupt: he made himself the creature of the Jesuits.

The king entered upon his majority when the regent died (1723). The Duke of Bourbon, his first minister, signalised his administration by persecutions against the Protestants. The Abbé de Fleury, who succeeded him, was a very moderate and prudent man, seventy-three years old: he had the talent of appeasing and conciliating. He procured France a long peace, which was troubled by the expulsion of Stanislaus, King of Poland, the king's father-in-law. Alliances were formed, and war was declared against the emperor, who on his part contracted an alliance with Peter the Great, the first czar who made Russia's influence felt in Europe. The campaign which occurred in Italy (1734) was decisive. Peace was signed at Vienna; France gained Lorraine, of which Stanislaus had the life-sovereignty secured to him.

The war of 1740, for the succession of the emperor, which his illustrious daughter Maria-Theresa wished to preserve entire, was less fortunate. Several French armies were destroyed without fighting. Frederick, the famous King of Prussia, exhibited great political and military talents: he conquered Silesia. In this war, France was the ally of Prussia and the Elector of Bavaria, the pretender to the empire, and fought against England, Holland, and Piedmont. The battle of Fontenoy was gained by the Marshal de Saxe against the two first powers (1745). Success was divided in Italy, and the peace of Aix-la-Chapelle

rewarded the courageous perseverance of Maria-Theresa (1748).

The war soon recommenced (1749). England coveted Canada, and began hostilities without a declaration. The French armies were at first successful both in America and Europe. The old political system of Europe was overthrown in this war: France was united with Austria against Prussia and England. Soubise marched against the King of Prussia with the powerful army of the coalesced powers, which Frederick routed at Rosbach, as completely as, fifty years later, the Prussians were scattered at Jena. The war was continued until the peace of Paris (1763), which despoiled France of her possessions in America, with the exception of New Orleans. The alliance contracted at that time with Spain, under the title of the *Family Compact*, was disastrous to France. Chatham governed England, whose power he carried to an exorbitant pitch.

To complete the picture of this reign, we should speak of the interminable religious quarrels and political intrigues, resulting from a bull *Unigenitus*, proclaiming the infallibility of the pope. We should recall the persecution raised by the Jesuits and the crown against the Jansenists and the parliament, as well as the absurd miracles with which they endeavoured to defend themselves. We should relate the excesses of the court, and the scandalous life of a king who hated the people—of a king who, abandoning himself to the most shameless women, gave the government as a reward to debauchery, and passed in disgraceful orgies the time in which his people were crying for bread. We should describe the infamous despotism of *lettres de cachet;* and tell how, in the face of the nation, a Chancellor Maupeou had the audacity to put his creatures in the place of judges who were found too upright. But why linger on the revolting spectacle of such degradation? It has produced the greatest benefits, and that is enough. The reign of Louis XV. is the one to which France is the most deeply indebted; it made people reflect with an earnestness before unknown; opened their eyes, by removing the deceptive halo which surrounded the despotic throne, and hastened the advent of national hardihood. A degraded despotism is as instructive to nations as a despotism crowned with glory is mischievous to them.

We need only speak a word about the ministry of De Choiseul, who restored some dignity to France in the eyes of foreigners, and conquered Corsica. The expulsion of the Jesuits is also worthy of commemoration. Avignon, which had been seized, was restored to the pope, as a recompense for abolishing the Jesuitical order.

The eighteenth century, upon which the maledictions of the partisans of ignorance have been so profusely heaped, has so often been described in its intellectual characteristics as to render any notice here a superfluous task. It is sufficient to know that the human mind advanced with rapid strides in every branch of inquiry during its course, and that it has been justly deemed to have prepared France for her revolution.

HISTORY OF THE FRENCH REVOLUTION

PREFACE OF M. THIERS.

I PROPOSE to write the history of a memorable revolution, which has deeply agitated the minds of men, and still divides their opinions. I do not conceal from myself the difficulties of the undertaking, for passions which were thought to be stifled under the influence of military despotism, have been again aroused. Men, tottering with the weight of years and labours, have suddenly felt revived within them resentments which were apparently hushed, and have imparted them to us, their descendants and successors. But if we have to support the same cause, we are relieved from the necessity of defending their conduct, and we are permitted to separate liberty itself from those who have served or injured it, whilst we possess the advantage of having heard and observed these aged men, who, still full of their recollections, still swayed by their impressions, display to us in more vivid characters the spirit and nature of bygone parties, and teach us better to comprehend them. Perhaps the moment in which the actors are about to vanish from the scene, is the most fitting for the compilation of history; we may gather their testimony without participating their passions.

Be that as it may, I have endeavoured to divest myself of every sentiment of animosity: I have, by turns, imagined myself born beneath the thatch, and animated with a just ambition, longing to obtain what the disdain of the higher classes unjustly denied me; and again, reared in palaces and the inheritor of ancient privileges, feeling the pain of renouncing a possession which I viewed as a legitimate subject of ownership. Thus, any emotions of anger could not fail to be calmed: I have felt pity for the combatants, and solaced myself by an admiring contemplation of generous minds.

CHAPTER I.

ACCESSION OF LOUIS XVI.—COMMENCEMENT OF THE REVOLUTION.

THE revolutions of the French monarchy are recorded in the pages of history: it is known that the Greeks, and afterwards the Romans, carried their arms and their civilisation into the midst of the Gauls, then in a state of semi-barbarism; that after them, the hordes of northern Europe established their military hierarchy in those provinces, and that this hierarchy, transferred from individuals to lands, was, as it were, implanted in the soil, and thus formed the feudal system. In that system, authority was divided between the chief, called the king, and the secondary chiefs, called vassals, who in their turn were kings of their own people. In our times, when the eagerness of all parties for mutual accusation has induced so close a search for reciprocal wrongs, it is sufficiently established that authority was first disputed by the vassals, which those, indeed, invariably do who are most nearly affected by its exercise; that this authority was afterwards partitioned amongst them, during which period feudal anarchy reigned paramount; and that it finally returned to the throne, where it was concentrated into despotism under Louis XI., Richelieu, and Louis XIV. The French population gradually enfranchised itself by labour, the first source of wealth and liberty. Agricultural in the first ages, subsequently commercial and manufacturing, it acquired so considerable an importance, that it formed the nation in its collective capacity. Introduced into the states-general in a suppliant posture, it appeared there to be taxed according *to mercy and forbearance;* but Louis XIV. at last announced that he would have no more of these abject assemblies, and declared his resolution to the parliament with a horse-whip in his hand. Thenceforth,



we behold a king, seated at the head of the state, invested with a power ill defined in theory, but absolute in practice; nobles, who had abandoned their feudal dignity for the favour of the monarch, and who disputed amongst themselves, by ways of intrigue, what was thrown to them from the substance of the productive classes; underneath, an immense population, holding no farther relation with this courtier aristocracy than a customary submission and the discharge of imposts. Between the court and the people interposed parliaments, possessing the power of administering justice and registering the royal volition. Authority is always disputed; when it is not so in the legitimate assemblies of the nation, it meets opposition in the very palace of the prince. By refusing to register the royal decrees, the parliaments stayed their efficacy, which abeyance was ended by a bed of justice, and some concession when the king was weak, and by an unreserved submission when the king was strong. Louis XIV. had no occasion even to concede a favour, for in his reign no parliament durst utter a remonstrance; he drew the nation at his heels, and it glorified him for the marvels which itself accomplished in war, in arts, and in sciences. The subjects and the prince were in perfect concord, and moved by an identical impulse. But Louis had scarcely expired, before the regent offered to the parliaments an opportunity for revenging their long degradation. The pleasure of the monarch, so reverenced in his lifetime, was contemned at his death, and his last will abrogated. Authority was then once more made the subject of contest; and a lengthened struggle ensued between the parliaments, the clergy, and the court, in sight of a nation exhausted by long wars and weary of contributing to the prodigality of its masters, given by turns to voluptuous excess and to a rage for war. Previously, its genius was exclusively displayed in ministering to the purposes and pleasure of the monarch; thenceforth, it directed its powers for its own advantage, and to the consideration of its own interests. The human mind moves incessantly from one object to another. From the theatre and the pulpit, the French genius was borne towards the moral and political sciences, and then all was changed. Let us conceive, during an entire age, the usurpers of all national rights tearing at each other for an emasculated authority; the parliaments fulminating against the clergy, and the clergy against the parliaments; these, again, contesting the power of the court; the court, careless and tranquil amidst the strife, calmly devouring the substance of the people, encompassed by the most alarming disorders; the nation, enriched and aroused, attentive to these divisions, arming itself with the avowals springing from mutual recrimination, deprived of all political action, dogmatising with boldness and ignorance, because it was limited to theories; eager, above all things, to recover its rank in Europe; and vainly offering its gold and its blood to resume a position which the imbecility of its rulers had lost it;—such was the eighteenth century.

The scandal had reached its height when Louis XVI., an equitable prince, moderate in his tastes, negligently educated, but impelled to good by a natural bias, mounted in the flower of life the throne of his ancestors (1774). He called to his side an old courtier* to take charge of his kingdom, and divided his confidence between Maurepas and the queen, a young princess of the house of Austria, lively, amiable, and exercising the greatest ascendancy over her consort. Maurepas and the queen were in hostility; the king, yielding sometimes to his minister, at others to his queen, early commenced his long career of vacillation. Aware of the state of his empire, he agreed with the philosophers on that point; but, reared in the strictest Christian principles, he entertained the greatest repugnance towards them. The public voice, loudly expressed, pointed out Turgot to him, one of the economists, a man of simplicity and virtue, endowed with a firm character, slow in forming his opinions but obstinate in maintaining them, and of profound reflection. Convinced of his probity, and charmed with his projects of reform, Louis XVI. was wont to repeat, "There are only myself and Turgot who are friends of the people." The reforms of Turgot miscarried through the resistance of the first orders in the state, interested in preserving all those abuses the austere minister designed to abrogate. The king dismissed him with regret. Throughout his life, which was but a long martyrdom, he had always the misfortune to be sensible of what was beneficial, sincerely to desire it, and to lack the force necessary to put it in execution.

The king, placed between the court, the parliaments, and the public, beset by intrigues and suggestions of every kind, changed his ministers with every gust. Giving way once more to the public voice, and the necessity for reforms, he called to the financial department Necker (1777), a Genevese, enriched by his labours as a banker, a partisan and disciple of Colbert, as Turgot was of Sully; a thrifty and upright financier, but vain and conceited, laying claim to the office of regulator in all things—religion, philosophy, and liberty, and, led astray by the eulogies of his friends and the public, flattering himself with capacity to lead and arrest the minds of others where his own stopped short.

Necker infused order into the deranged finances, and found means to meet the heavy expenditure of the American war. Less comprehensive in his grasp of intellect, but more flexible than Turgot, enjoying, above all, the confidence of capitalists, he procured for the moment unexpected resources, and succeeded in reviving credit. But something more than financial manœuvres was needed to terminate the embarrassments of the treasury, and he fell upon the expedient of reforms. The higher orders were not more accommodating to him than they had been to Turgot; the parliaments, apprised of his projects, united to oppose him, and drove him from the helm of affairs.

The conviction of abuses was universally entertained and proclaimed; the king himself was aware of them, and endured much anguish from the consideration. The courtiers, who prospered upon these abuses, would have willingly seen the financial difficulties removed, but not at the cost of a single sacrifice to themselves. They descanted much at court, and gave vent within its precincts to philosophical maxims; professed infinite sorrow for the vexations inflicted on the agriculturists whilst pursuing their darling chase; had been seen even to applaud the independence of America, and to receive with distinguished honour the young Frenchmen, when they returned from that scene of popular triumph. The parliaments likewise called lustily upon the public weal, set forth in sounding phrases the miseries of the poor, and yet opposed the equal distribution of the taxes, as well as the abolition of the remains of feudal barbarism. All spoke of the general welfare, few really desired it; and the people, not yet distinguishing their true friends, gave their voices to all who resisted power, their most apparent enemy.

By removing Turgot and Necker, the state of affairs had not been changed; the exigences of the exchequer were not the less urgent. Had not their very exist-

* "The selection which Louis XVI. made at his accession to the throne, of Maurepas, especially contributed to impart an irresolute, vacillating character to his reign. The young monarch, alive to his duties and his own inexperience, had recourse to the wisdom of an old man of seventy-three, who had been disgraced under Louis XV. for his opposition to the mistresses. But, instead of a sage, he found only a courtier, whose disastrous influence brooded over his whole life. He accustomed him to half measures, to changes of system, to fitful absurdities in the exercise of power, and more than all, to the habit, amounting to a necessity, of doing every thing through others, and nothing of himself."—*Mignet's French Revolution.*

ence been threatened, had not the prodigality of the court seemed doomed to curtailment, the courtiers would have gladly submitted to a long prorogation of an appeal to national interference. The difficulty, got rid of for the moment by the displacement of a minister, by a loan, or by the forced enactment of a tax, soon re-appeared in an exaggerated form, like every neglected evil. They hesitated, as it always happens when a distasteful but necessary course is rendered incumbent. An intrigue carried M. de Calonne to the ministry—a person in little favour with the public on account of his share in the persecution of La Chalotais. Of sprightly temperament, and fertile in resources, Calonne relied upon his genius, upon fortune, and upon the co-operation of men, and contemplated the future with marvellous indifference. His doctrine was that premature alarm was foolish, and that it was time enough to discover an evil the day before it was proposed to remedy it. He gained the good graces of the court by his manners, moved it by his readiness to grant all that was asked, procured for the king and all around him a few blissful moments, and caused the gloomy presentiments that darkened every brow to be exchanged for smiles of joy and confidence.*

This future, upon which such sanguine hopes were founded, drew portentously nigh; decisive measures could at last be no longer delayed. It was impossible to burden the people with additional taxes, and yet the public coffers were empty. Only one mode existed of remedying the mischief, and that was to reduce the expenditure by the suppression of all sinecures; should this expedient not prove sufficient, then to extend taxation over a larger contributing surface; or, in other words, to include the nobility and clergy in the fiscal fold. These projects, successively attempted by Turgot and Necker, and now resumed by Calonne, seemed to him capable of succeeding only by obtaining the consent of the privileged classes themselves. Calonne, therefore, conceived the idea of gathering them into one assembly, under the name of *Notables*, to lay before them his plans, and extract their consent by address or conviction. This assembly, which opened on the 22d February 1781, was composed of members taken from the nobility, the clergy, and the magistracy; of numerous masters of requests, and certain provincial functionaries. By means of this composite infusion, and more especially by the aid of the popular and philosophic nobles whom he took care to call, Calonne felt assured of carrying all before him.

The too confident minister deceived himself. In public opinion he was never forgiven for occupying the post of Turgot and Necker. Pleased at seeing a minister obliged to render accounts, the people supported the resistance of the notables. The most stormy discussions ensued. Calonne had the indiscretion to throw upon his predecessors, and partly upon Necker, the forlorn condition of the treasury. Necker retorted, was exiled, and the opposition became in consequence more vehement. Calonne met the storm with presence of mind and great composure. He caused M. de Miromenil, the keeper of the seals, to be dismissed for abetting the parliaments in their outcries. But his triumph lasted only for two days. The king, who was attached to him, had promised more than he could fulfil, when he engaged to support him. He was shaken by the representations of the notables, who undertook to accede to the plans of Calonne, but on condition that their execution should be intrusted to a minister less unscrupulous, and more worthy of confidence. The queen, by the advice of the Abbé de Vermont, proposed and induced the king to nominate a new minister, M. de Brienne, Archbishop of Toulouse, one of the notables, who had mainly contributed to the overthrow of Calonne, in the hope of succeeding him.*

The Archbishop of Toulouse, an obstinate and vain old man, had all his life been dreaming of the ministry, and pursued his darling object by every possible expedient. He rested his hopes chiefly upon his credit with the women, whom he assiduously courted, and succeeded in pleasing. He was accustomed to refer with exultation to his administration of Languedoc. If, on becoming minister, he did not obtain such general favour as would have been accorded to Necker, he had at least the merit of supplanting Calonne. At first he was not made prime minister, but he soon became so. Seconded by M. de Lamoignon, keeper of the seals, a bitter enemy to the parliaments, he opened his career under somewhat happy auspices. The notables, bound by their promises, consented with alacrity to all they had previously refused; a land-tax, a stamp-duty, the suppression of compulsive labour (*corvées*), and provincial assemblies, were granted with affected warmth. It was not to these measures, but to their author, they pretended to have been repugnant. Thus public opinion triumphed. Calonne was pursued with imprecations, and the notables enjoyed the public esteem; an honour they nevertheless regretted, when acquired at the expense of such great sacrifices. If M. de Brienne had known how to profit by his position; if he had executed with activity the measures sanctioned by the notables; if he had presented them in the aggregate, and on the instant, to the parliament when the adhesion of the higher orders was beyond recall, all had been accomplished perhaps: the parliament, pressed on all sides, would have agreed to every thing; and this concession, though partial and forced, would have in all probability long retarded the impending struggle.

No such course, however, was adopted. By imprudent delays, time was given for zeal to cool; the edicts were presented one after the other, and thus the parliament had opportunity to discuss, take courage, and recover from the sort of surprise in which the notables had been caught. It registered, after long debates, the edict for the abolition of compulsory labour, and another for allowing the free exportation of corn. Its antipathy was principally directed to the land-tax; but it was apprehensive that by its refusal the public would too clearly perceive the interested motives of its opposition. It was hesitating, when the embarrassment was removed by the edict for the stamp-duty being laid before it at the same time as that for the land-tax, and by opening the discussion with the former. It was thus enabled to refuse the first, without pronouncing upon the second; and by attacking the stamp-duty, which affected the great majority of tax-payers, it seemed to be the champion of public interests. During a sitting in which the peers were present, it denounced the abuses, the profligacy, and the prodigality of the court, and demanded states of expenses. An advocate, playing on the word, exclaimed, "It is not *states*, but *states-general* that we want." This unexpected cry struck every body with astonishment. People had hitherto resisted because they suffered acutely; they had aided all kinds of opposition, whether favourable or not to the popular cause, provided they were directed against the court, to which

* "Calonne was confident and sanguine, brilliant and skilful, fertile in resources, calm, and indifferent. His system of administration, whether designedly or otherwise, was diametrically opposed to that of his predecessor. Necker had been the advocate of economy, Calonne preached up prodigality; Necker had fallen by the arts of courtiers, Calonne rested on them for support. His sophisms were backed by largesses; he won the queen by fêtes, the great lords by pensions, and seduced even capitalists themselves, by displaying at first exemplary regularity in his liquidations."—MIGNET.

* Calonne was banished in 1788 to Lorraine, and joined the emigrant princes at Coblentz in 1791, after a short sojourn in England. After running to and fro for several years, he died at Paris in 1802. He was born at Douay.

every evil was attributed. But they scarcely knew what they should seek; they had always been so devoid of influence over the government, and so accustomed to confine themselves to complaints, that they kept murmuring without entertaining any idea of acting or provoking a revolution. A single word, opportunely uttered, suggested an unthought-of object; every one repeated it, and the states-general were vociferously demanded.

D'Espremenil, a young advocate, an impassioned orator, an agitator without purpose, a demagogue in the parliaments, an aristocrat in the states-general, and who was declared in a state of madness by a decree of the Constituent Assembly, exhibited himself on this occasion as one of the most violent of the parliamentary declaimers. But the opposition was secretly directed by Dupont, a young man gifted with a capacious mind, and possessed of great firmness and perseverance, who alone, perhaps, amidst the present troubles, had a future in view, and designed to lead his class, the court, and the nation, to an end very different from a parliamentary aristocracy.

The parliament was divided into old and young councillors. The first desired to form a counterpoise to the royal authority, in order to give weight and importance to their own body; the last, more ardent and disinterested, desired to introduce liberty into the state, without, however, overturning the political system under which they were born. In the mean time, a serious admission was made by the parliament; it acknowledged that it had no power to sanction taxes, and that to the states-general alone belonged the right to impose them. It likewise demanded from the king official statements of receipts and expenses.

This avowal of incompetence, and even of usurpation, might be justly considered extraordinary, since the parliament had hitherto arrogated to itself the right of warranting taxation. The ministry, irritated at such an opposition, instantly summoned the parliament to Versailles, and caused the two edicts to be registered in a bed of justice (6th August 1787). The parliament, on its return to Paris, entered solemn protests, and ordered prosecutions on account of the prodigalities of Calonne. An immediate decree of the council annulled its resolutions, and exiled it to Troyes. (15th August.)

Such was the position of affairs on the 15th August 1787. The two brothers of the king, Monsieur and the Count d'Artois, were sent, the one to the court of accounts and the other to the court of aids, to procure by them the registration of the edicts. The first had become popular from the opinions he had manifested in the assembly of the notables, and was hailed by the acclamations of an immense concourse of people, who escorted him back to the Luxembourg amidst universal applause. The Count d'Artois, being known to have supported Calonne, was assailed with murmurs, his attendants were attacked, and an armed force was found necessary for his protection.

The parliaments had a numerous dependancy around them, composed of lawyers, functionaries of the courts of justice, clerks, and students; an active stirring population, always ready to exert itself for their behoof. To those natural allies of the parliaments were joined the capitalists, who dreaded a national bankruptcy; the enlightened classes, who took part with all opposers; and finally, the multitude, which always follows at the heels of agitators. The disturbances were of a most serious description, and the executive had great difficulty in repressing them.

The parliament, sitting at Troyes, assembled daily, and called causes. Neither advocates nor attorneys appeared, and the course of justice was suspended, as had often happened during the century. The magistrates, however, grew weary of their exile, and M. de Brienne was without funds. He boldly asserted that he wanted none, and calmed the court, anxious only upon that one point; but he was in fact utterly destitute, and, unable to terminate the difficulties of his position by an energetic determination, he entered into a negotiation with certain members of the parliament. His conditions were a loan of 440 millions (about eighteen millions sterling), distributed over four years, at the expiration of which period the states-general should be convoked. On these terms, Brienne abandoned the two imposts, the causes of so many feuds. Assured of a few members, he thought himself equally certain of the whole body; and the parliament was recalled on the 10th September.

A royal sitting was held on the 20th of that month. The king came in person to present the edict containing provisions for the successive loan, and for the convocation of the states-general in five years. No explanation had been vouchsafed as to the nature of this sitting, and none knew whether it were intended as a bed of justice or not. A deep gloom sat on every countenance, and a profound stillness reigned; when the Duke of Orleans rose, his features agitated, and evincing all the symptoms of strong emotion, and addressing himself to the king, he asked him if the sitting were a bed of justice or a free assembly. "It is a royal sitting," replied the king. The councillors, Freteau, Sabatier, and D'Espremenil, spoke after the Duke of Orleans, and declaimed with their accustomed vehemence. The registration was forthwith enforced; Freteau and Sabatier were exiled to the Isle of Hyères, and the Duke of Orleans to Villers-Cotterets. The states-general were prorogued for five years.

Such were the principal events of the year 1787. The year 1788 was ushered in by fresh hostilities. On the 4th January, the parliament passed a resolution against arbitrary imprisonments (*lettres de cachet*), and for the recall of the persons exiled. The king quashed this resolution, and the parliament confirmed it anew.

In the mean time the Duke of Orleans was impatient under his exile at Villers-Cotterets. This prince, by his quarrel with the court, had enlisted public opinion in his behalf, though it had been at first unfavourable to him. Deficient equally in the dignity of a prince and the firmness of a tribune, he could not endure even so slight a punishment; and to procure his recall he descended to solicitations, even towards the queen, his personal enemy.

Brienne was exasperated at obstacles which he lacked the energy to overcome. Inefficient abroad against Prussia, to which he sacrificed Holland, and inefficient at home against the parliaments and nobles of the kingdom, the queen was his only prop; and, to add to his griefs, his labours were often suspended by bad health. He was incapable either of repressing insurrectionary movements or putting the retrenchments in force which had been ordered by the king; yet in spite of the imminent exhaustion of the exchequer, he affected an inconceivable serenity. However, in the midst of all his difficulties, he was not so distracted as to forget heaping additional benefices on himself, and new dignities on his family.

Lamoignon, the keeper of the seals, less feeble, but also less influential than the Archbishop of Toulouse, concerted with that prelate a new plan for striking at the political power of the parliaments; for that was the main object of the executive at this period. It was of the last importance to preserve secrecy. All was prepared in silence; private instructions were forwarded to the commanders of provinces, and the office where the edicts were set in types was surrounded with guards. It was intended that the project should be made known only at the moment of its communication to the parliaments. The time drew near, and rumours were rife that a great political act was in agitation. The Councillor D'Espremenil succeeded in seducing by bribery a journeyman printer, and obtaining a copy of the edicts. He immediately proceeded to the Palace of Justice, called together his colleagues, and boldly denounced the ministerial

scheme. According to this plan, six great bailiwicks, established in the jurisdiction of the parliament of Paris, were destined to curtail its too extended authority; whilst the right of judging in the last resort, and of registering laws and edicts, was transferred to a plenary court, to be composed of peers, prelates, magistrates, and military officers, all selected by the king. The captain of the guards, even, was intended to have a deliberative voice in it. This project attacked the judicial functions of the parliament, and utterly annihilated its political power. The members, struck with amazement, knew not what course to adopt. They could not deliberate upon a project which had not been submitted to them, and yet it behoved them to take care they were not surprised. In this state of embarrassment, they decided upon a line of action at once strenuous and dexterous; this was to sum up and consecrate in a resolution all that they called the organic laws of the monarchy, not omitting to comprise in their number the existence and the rights of parliament. By this general declaration, they completely avoided any seeming anticipation of the government designs, and guaranteed all that they desired.

Consequently, on the 5th May, it was resolved by the parliament of Paris—

"That France was a monarchy governed by the king according to the laws; and that of these laws, several, which were fundamental, embraced and consecrated—1, the right of the reigning family to the throne, male after male, in the order of primogeniture; 2, the right of the nation freely to grant subsidies through the organ of the states-general, regularly convoked and composed; 3, the customs and capitulations of the provinces; 4, the irremovability of the magistrates; 5, the right of the courts to verify in each province the decrees of the king, and to ordain their registration when conformable to the constituent laws of the province, as well as to the fundamental laws of the state; 6, the right of every citizen never to be carried on any pretence before other judges than his natural judges, being those the law designed; and, 7, the right, without which all the others would be useless, of not being arrested, by any order whatsoever, unless to be handed over to the jurisdiction of the competent tribunal. And that the said court protested against every scheme which might be aimed at the principles above expressed."

The minister answered this energetic resolution by the usual expedient, always a bad and fruitless one; he wreaked his vengeance on certain members of the parliament. D'Espremenil and Goislart de Monsalbert, learning that they were personally menaced, sought an asylum in the bosom of the assembled body. An officer, Vincent d'Agoult, appeared at the head of a company, and not knowing the proscribed magistrates, called them by their names. At first a deep silence reigned in the assembly; but at length the councillors cried out that they were all D'Espremenils. The true D'Espremenil ultimately came forward, and followed the officer sent to arrest him. The tumult was then at its height; the people accompanied the magistrates, showering upon them benedictions. Three days afterwards, the king commanded the registration of the edicts in a bed of justice; and the assembled princes and nobles presented the image of that plenary court which was intended to supersede the parliaments.

The court of the Châtelet instantly passed a resolution against the edicts. The parliament of Rennes declared all those infamous who should enter the plenary court. At Grenoble, the inhabitants defended their magistrates against two regiments; the troops themselves, stimulated to mutiny by the nobles in the army, soon refused to act. When the commandant of Dauphiny assembled his colonels, to inquire if their soldiers might be trusted, they all preserved silence. The youngest, who was called upon to speak first, replied that he could not answer for his men, from the colonel downwards. The minister met all this resistance by decrees of the privy-council, which annulled the decisions of the sovereign courts; and he fulminated a sentence of exile against eight of them.

The court, goaded by the higher orders, who attacked it under cloak of the public welfare, abetting the intervention of the people, took counsel of its adversaries, and had recourse to the same expedient. It resolved to call the third-estate to its assistance, as the kings of France had formerly done to annihilate feudalism. It thereupon promoted, by all its influence, the convocation of the states-general. It instituted inquiries into the manner of assembling them; it invited authors and learned bodies to give their opinions; and, whilst the congregated clergy declared that it was necessary to hasten the period of their convocation, the court, entering the lists with promptitude, suspended the plenary court, and fixed the opening of the states-general for the 1st of May 1789 Then occurred the retirement of the Archbishop of Toulouse (24th August 1788), who, by his rash and feebly executed projects, had provoked a resistance, which he ought either never to have excited or to have boldly overcome. At his retreat from the administration, he left the exchequer in want, the dividends of the Hotel de Ville in suspension, all the authorities in antagonism, and all the provinces in arms. As to himself, invested with benefices yielding an income of 800,000 francs, with the archbishopric of Sens, and with a cardinal's purple, if he did not make the public fortune, he at all events made his own. As his last advice, he urged the king to recall Necker to the finance department, in order to take advantage of his popularity in meeting an opposition of so formidable a character.

It was during the two years 1787 and 1788, that the French people made the transition from vain theories to practical views. The contests amongst the high authorities had aroused the desire and presented the opportunity. In the course of the century, the parliament had assaulted the clergy, and exposed their papal tendencies; from the clergy it had proceeded to the court, proclaimed its abuses of power, and execrated its profligacy. Being threatened with reprisals, and rendered uneasy as to its own existence, it came at last to the determination of restoring to the nation those prerogatives the court would have torn from it, with the intention of conferring them on a new and extraordinary tribunal. After having thus apprised the nation of its rights, it had exerted its powers in stimulating and protecting insurrection. And on their respective parts, the dignified clergy, by issuing mandates, and the nobility, by fomenting the spirit of disobedience amongst the troops, had joined their efforts to those of the magistracy, and summoned the people to arms for the defence of their own peculiar privileges.

Pressed by so many enemies, the court had resisted but feebly. Alive to the necessity of acting, and yet always deferring the moment, it had occasionally removed certain abuses, rather to profit the treasury than the people, and had forthwith relapsed into inertion. At last, when stormed in its stronghold from every quarter, and when it perceived that the higher orders called the people to the combat, it had resolved to take the initiative in leading them to the field by convoking the states-general. Opposed during the whole course of the century to the philosophical spirit, it now made an appeal to that great antagonist, and gave up to its examination the constitutions of the realm. Thus, the first authorities in the state presented the singular spectacle of wrongous holders, disputing a possession in presence of the legitimate owner, and ending by appealing to him as their judge.

Affairs were at this pass when Necker returned to the ministry. Confidence attended him, credit was instantaneously restored, and the most pressing difficulties were got rid of. He provided by temporary

expedients for indispensable expenses, whilst waiting for the states-general, the universally anticipated panacea.

Already important questions relative to their organisation, began to be agitated. The part to be borne therein by the third-estate was the subject of lively discussion, involving the points, whether it should appear on a footing of equality or subordination; whether it should possess a representation numerically equal to that of the two first orders; whether the votes should be taken individually or by orders, and whether the commons should have only one voice against the two voices of the nobles and the clergy.

The first question to be settled was the number of the deputies. No philosophical controversy of the eighteenth century, however warm, had excited an agitation of equal violence. The vast actual importance of the point gave a zest to its discussion, which inflamed the whole nation. One concise, forcible, caustic writer, gained a rank in this contest which the great minds of the century had procured in philosophical warfare. The Abbé Sieyes, in a work which gave an extraordinary impulse to the public mind, inquired, "What is the third estate?" And he answered, "Nothing." "What ought it to be?—Everything."

The states of Dauphiny assembled in spite of the court. The two first orders, more sagacious and of more popular tendencies in that province than any where else, decided that the representation of the third-estate should be equal to that of the nobility and clergy. The parliament of Paris, already discerning the consequences of its imprudent provocations, clearly perceived that the third-estate would come, not as an auxiliary, but as a master; and on registering the edict of convocation, it enjoined by an express clause the observance of the forms of 1614, which utterly annihilated the influence of the third-estate. Having previously endangered its popularity by the difficulties it had opposed to the edict which restored civil immunities to the Protestants, it was on this occasion completely unmasked, and the court fully avenged. It was the first to experience the instability of popular favour; but if the nation, in after times, might appear ungrateful to the leaders whom it abandoned one after the other, it was now perfectly justified towards the parliament, for it stopped short before the nation had recovered any one of its rights.

The court, not venturing of itself to decide these important questions, or rather wishing to render the first orders unpopular for its own advantage, determined to ask their opinions, intending at the same time not to heed them should they be, as was probable, unfavourable to the third-estate. It therefore convoked a new assembly of notables, in which all the questions touching the constitution of the states-general were brought forward for discussion.* The debates were animated; on one side old traditions were relied upon, on the other, natural rights and reason. Even in appealing to traditions, the cause of the commons had the vantage-ground; for, to the forms of 1614, upon which such stress was laid by the higher orders, forms yet more ancient were opposed. Thus, in certain meetings, and upon certain points, the votes had been taken by tale; sometimes the deliberations had been by provinces instead of by orders; and frequently the deputies of the third-estate had equalled in number the deputies of the nobility and clergy. How then were these ancient usages to be reconciled? In truth, the powers of the state had been in a constant state of revolution. The royal authority itself, first supreme, then humbled and stripped, rising afresh by the aid of the people, and concentrating all powers in itself, presented an aspect of perpetual strife, and an ever-varying limit of possession. It was justly said to the clergy, that if reference to the olden time were decisive, they would be no longer an order; to the nobles, that the possessors of fiefs alone, by the same test, were eligible to sit, and that thus the majority of them would be excluded from the deputation; to the parliaments themselves, that they were but unfaithful officers of the crown;—in a word, to the whole of them, that the French constitution was but a long revolution, in the course of which each power had successively predominated; that all had been a series of innovations, and that in the present mighty conflict reason alone ought to decide.

The third-estate comprehended almost the entirety of the nation—all the productive, useful, and enlightened classes;* if it held only a portion of the lands, it at all events rendered the whole of them fruitful; and, according to reason, it was simply fair that it should have a numerical equality in the representation with the two other orders.

The assembly of notables pronounced against what it called the doubling of the third-estate. A single committee, over which Monsieur, the king's brother, presided, gave its suffrage for this doubling. Thereupon the court, taking into consideration, as it said, "the opinion of the minority and of several princes of the blood, the desire of the three orders of Dauphiny, the prayer of the provincial assemblies, the example of divers countries possessing similar institutions, *the opinion of various publicists*, and the hope expressed in a great number of addresses," ordained that the total number of the deputies should be at least one thousand; that they should be chosen upon a combined basis of population and contribution in each bailiwick: and that the number of deputies from the third-estate should be equal to that from the two higher orders united. (Decree in council, 27th December 1788.)

This declaration excited universal enthusiasm. Being attributed to Necker, it greatly augmented his favour with the nation, and his odium with the magnates. Still, nothing was decided in this document as to the vote by members or by orders; but it practically comprehended the solution of the question, for it was useless to increase the voices if they were not to be counted; and it left to the third-estate itself the charge of carrying, by a forcible demonstration, what was withheld for the moment. Thus it gave a striking idea of the weakness of the court and of Necker himself. In fact, this court was swayed by such a multiplicity of wills, that any decisive resolution was almost impossible. The king was moderate, just, well-disposed, and only too doubtful of his own judgment; really loving the people and forward to receive their complaints; he was, nevertheless, at times beset by panics and superstitious fears, and thought he saw anarchy and impiety stalking alongside of liberty and toleration. The philosophical spirit, at its first burst, was sure to wander into extravagance, and a timid and religious prince was equally sure to take alarm. Terrors, doubts, and imbecile emotions, perpetually working on his mind, the unfortunate Louis XVI., prepared for all sacrifices affecting himself, but incapable of imposing them on others, the victim of his easy disposition towards the court and his deference towards the queen, had to expiate numberless faults not of his own commission, but which became his because he had allowed them to be committed. The queen, fond of pleasure, and exerting around her the magic influence of her charms, was wishful that her husband should enjoy tranquillity, that the exchequer should be well filled, and that she herself should reign in all hearts. Sometimes she was in unison with the king upon the subject of reforms, when their necessity appeared urgent, and at other times, on the contrary when she imagined authority menaced, or her court-

* This assembly opened at Versailles on the 6th November, and closed its session on the 8th December following.


* "'The third-estate is the French nation, less the nobility and clergy.' In this phrase consists the whole groundwork of M Sieyes' pamphlet."—*Guizot's History of Civilisation.*

parasites despoiled, she stopped the king, dismissed the popular ministers, and destroyed every means and every hope of good. She was mainly swayed by the counsels of a part of the nobility, who clung around the throne and fattened on grants and abuses. This court nobility was unquestionably desirous, like the queen herself, that the king should not lack the means of prodigality; and from this motive it was highly indignant at the parliaments when they refused taxes, but became their upholder when they defended its own interests, by the rejection, under specious pretexts, of the land-tax. In the midst of these contrary influences, the king, afraid to face his difficulties, to condemn the abuses, or to abrogate them of his own accord, yielded alternately to the court and to opinion, and never satisfied either the one or the other.

If, in the course of the eighteenth century, when the philosophers, gathered in a passage of the Tuileries, were offering up vows for Frederick and the Americans, for Turgot and for Necker; if, when their ambition was not directed to govern the state, but simply to enlighten princes, and a glimpse of distant revolutions, which the symptoms of discontent and the absurdity of the institutions were sufficiently unequivocal to deduce as probable, was all that floated before them—if, at that period, the king had spontaneously established a certain equality in burdens, and given a few guarantees, all had been hushed for a long time, and Louis XVI. would have been adored as another Marcus Aurelius. But when all the authorities in the kingdom were degraded by a lengthened struggle amongst themselves, and all the abuses laid bare by the assembly of notables; when the nation, called into the quarrel, had conceived the hope, and formed the determination, of vindicating its own importance; the opportunity was suffered to pass away, and the national will became imperious. The states-general were then promised, and the nation insisted that the period of convocation should be hastened; the demand granted, it claimed to wield the preponderance therein; this was refused, but, by doubling its representation, the means of enforcing it were secured. Thus, therefore, concessions were always made ungraciously, and never but when they could be no longer withheld; but now the national strength was increased and felt, and it aspired to all it thought within its reach. A constant resistance, irritating its ambition, was sure in time to render it inexorable and insatiable. But even then, if a great minister, infusing some degree of vigour into the king, conciliating the queen, and awing the privileged classes, had forestalled and promptly satisfied the national demands, by proffering a free constitution; if he had occupied that craving for action felt by the nation, by calling it without delay, not to remodel the state, but to discuss its yearly affairs in an assembly already constituted, it is very probable the contest might have been averted. To be beforehand with the crisis, instead of having to succumb to it, was the essential point, and above all, to have sacrificed various obnoxious pretensions. A man of strong conviction, and of a determination equal to his conviction, would have alone sufficed for the emergency; and such a man, certainly audacious, potential, overbearing perhaps, would have scared the court out of its senses, and been treated to a speedy dismissal. But, as it was, in order to conciliate both opinion and old interests at once, half-measures were adopted by the reigning influence, and, as we have seen, a minister, something of a philosopher, and partially bold and energetic, was chosen, who undoubtedly enjoyed a prodigious popularity, since at that time moderately popular tendencies in an agent of power surpassed expectation, and excited enthusiasm amongst a people whom the most violent demagogues were shortly scarce able to satisfy.

The people were in an universal ferment. Assemblies were formed throughout France after the example of England, and under the English appellation, that of *clubs*. In them were canvassed the abuses to suppress, the reforms to effect, and the constitution to establish. The effect of a severe examination into the condition of the country was the more fiercely to exasperate the mind, for in truth its political and social state was perfectly intolerable. Every thing was monopoly in individuals, classes, towns, provinces, and even trades. Shackles were upon all that appertained to the industry and the genius of man. Civil, ecclesiastical, and military dignities were exclusively reserved to certain classes, and in those classes to certain individuals. No profession could be embraced, except upon certain qualifications and certain pecuniary conditions. The towns had their privileges for the settlement, the collection, and the quota of taxation, and for the choice of magistrates. The very sinecures were converted by reversions into family properties, and the monarch had but little power to indulge in preferences. Only a few pecuniary gifts remained at his disposition; and so trammelled was he in this respect, that the Duke de Coigny maintained against him that he had no power to suppress a useless office. Every thing, therefore, was stagnant in a few hands, and in every quarter the smaller number was in hostile array against the plundered mass. Burdens pressed upon a single class alone. The nobility and clergy possessed nearly two-thirds of the lands; the other third, held by the commons, paid taxes to the king, a multitude of feudal dues to the nobles, tithes to the clergy, and suffered, in addition, the devastations of noble sportsmen and of the game. Articles of consumption being heavily taxed, were enhanced in price, and injuriously affected the largest body, namely, the people. The collection likewise was vexatious: the nobles remained in arrear with perfect impunity, but the people, on the contrary, were maltreated, immured, and condemned to expiate in their persons a deficiency in fortune. Thus they sustained in affluence, by oppressive toil, and defended, at the expense of their blood, those higher classes of society which denied to them the very means of existence. The burgher class, industrious, enlightened, less unhappy, doubtless, than the people, but enriching the kingdom by industrial labours, and illustrating it by eminent talents, possessed none of those immunities to which it had so undoubted a right. Justice, administered in some of the provinces by the nobles, and in the royal jurisdictions by magistrates elevated to the judicial bench by purchase, was tardy, often partial, always ruinous, and in criminal prosecutions absolutely atrocious. Individual liberty was violated by arbitrary warrants of arrest (*lettres de cachet*), and the liberty of the press by royal censors. Finally, France itself, ill supported abroad, betrayed by Louis XV.'s courtezans, and compromised by the imbecility of Louis XVI.'s ministers, had been recently dishonoured in the eyes of Europe by the disgraceful sacrifice of Holland and Poland.

Already the popular masses began to be agitated: even during the parliamentary contest frequent riots had occurred, and at the retirement of the Archbishop of Toulouse such troubles became more serious. His effigy had been burnt, the armed force insulted and even assaulted, and the agitators feebly prosecuted by the magistracy. The minds of men, violently stimulated, and impressed with a confused idea of an impending revolution, were in a continual buzz of excitement. The parliaments and higher orders even thus early experienced the thrusts of those weapons they had given to the people. In Brittany, the nobility had declared against the doubling of the third-estate, and refused to nominate deputies. The burghers, who had so strenuously aided it against the court, thereupon rose against it, and bloody conflicts ensued. The court, not yet sufficiently avenged upon the Breton nobility, had not only denied it succour, but



even incarcerated some of its members who had come to Paris with complaints.

The elements themselves seemed unbridled. A hail-storm on the 13th July had laid waste the crops, and rendered the provisioning of Paris extremely difficult, especially amidst the troubles in agitation. All the activity of commerce scarcely sufficed to concentrate the necessary quantity of food in that immense metropolis, and just apprehensions were entertained that it would be shortly impossible to furnish subsistence to its population, when political conflicts should shatter confidence and interrupt the communications. Since the severe winter which followed the dismal reverses of Louis XIV., and immortalised the charity of Fénélon, none so rigorous had been witnessed as that of 1788-89. The benevolence, which was displayed in the most touching manner, was inadequate to mitigate the sufferings of the people. From all the corners of France a number of vagabonds, without profession or resources, had flocked to Versailles and Paris, and paraded their wretchedness and nakedness on the streets and highways. At the least disturbance they were seen to rush eagerly forward, to profit by chances always favourable to those who have all to gain, even to their daily bread.

Thus all things concurred to promote a revolution. An entire century had contributed to unfold abuses, and drive them to the pitch of aggravation. The last two years had served to excite revolt, and to accustom the popular masses to arms, by the appeal to their intervention in the quarrels of the privileged orders. Finally, the scourges of unpropitious nature, and a fortuitous concourse of adverse circumstances, provoked the catastrophe, the era of which might be retarded, but was sooner or later inevitable.

In the midst of these portents, the elections occurred. In some provinces they were tumultuous, in all active; but in Paris calm, since great unanimity of sentiment prevailed in that city. Lists were distributed, and endeavours made to act in unison, and in a spirit of mutual concession. Merchants, advocates, and men of letters, surprised at beholding themselves gathered together for the first time, gradually rose to the comprehension of liberty. At Paris, they themselves re-nominated the committees formed by the king, and, without changing the persons, gave efficacy to their authority by their own confirmation. The learned Bailly quitted his retreat at Chaillot; unused to intrigues, and profoundly moved at his noble mission, he proceeded alone and on foot to the assembly. As he went, he tarried for a moment on the terrace of the Feuillants: a young man unknown to him saluted the philosopher with respect. "You will be elected," said he. "I know not," replied Bailly; "the honour ought to be neither solicited nor refused." The modest academician resumed his walk, appeared in the assembly, and was successively named elector and deputy.

The election of the Count de Mirabeau was stormy: repudiated by the nobility, and welcomed by the third-estate, he convulsed Provence, the seat of his nativity, and soon exhibited himself at Versailles.

The court took no measures to influence the elections: it was not sorry to see a great number of parish priests chosen, as it made sure of their opposition to the great ecclesiastical dignitaries, and at the same time of their reverence for the throne. Besides, it was not overburdened with prescience; and the deputies of the commons appeared to it the opponents of the nobility rather than of itself. The Duke of Orleans was accused of strenuous efforts to procure the election of his partisans, as well as of himself. Already marked amongst the adversaries of the court, the ally of the parliaments, invoked as a leader, by his own connivance or otherwise, by the popular party, various intrigues were imputed to him. A deplorable scene took place in the faubourg Saint Antoine; and as an author must be found for every important event, he was held responsible for the present. A manufacturer of stained paper, by name Réveillon, who by his superior skill maintained large workshops, improved native art, and furnished subsistence to three hundred labourers, was charged with a design to reduce wages one-half. A mob threatened to burn down his house. It was dispersed, but collected again the following day (27th April), when the house was carried, set on fire, and completely gutted. Notwithstanding the menaces held out by the assailants on the previous day, and the open agreement to congregate on the morrow, the authorities interfered with great tardiness, and, when they did so, acted with excessive rigour. They waited until the mob was in possession of the house, then made a furious attack upon it, and were compelled to kill several of those ferocious and intrepid men, who afterwards showed themselves upon all occasions, and who received the name of *brigands*.

All the parties that had already taken form accused each other: the court was reproached with its early slowness and subsequent butchery; it was alleged that it had desired to draw the people into violence, in order to make an example, and give exercise to the soldiers. Money being found on the rioters, and certain words which fell from some of them, originated the suspicion that they were stimulated and led by a secret hand; and the enemies of the popular party charged the Duke of Orleans with having designed to make a trial of these revolutionary bandits.

This prince was born with many excellent qualities, and had inherited an immense patrimony; but, abandoning himself to evil habits, he had abused all these gifts of nature and fortune. Without consistency of character, alternately reckless of opinion and greedy of popularity, he was bold and ambitious one day, submissive and indifferent the next. Having quarrelled with the queen, he had declared enmity against the court. When parties began to be formed, he had allowed his name, and, as it was said, his wealth, to be made use of. Indulging in some vague future, he did enough to found accusations, not enough to succeed; and if his partisans really entertained any projects, he must have ruined them by his inconstancy of purpose.

CHAPTER II.

THE STATES-GENERAL.

THE moment for the assembling of the states-general was at last arrived. With a sense of their common danger, the higher orders, making their peace with the court, rallied round the princes of the blood and the queen. They endeavoured to gain the country gentlemen by a show of courtesy, whilst they laughed at their rusticity behind their backs. The clergy strove to captivate the plebeians of their order, and the military nobility to win those belonging to the army. The parliaments, which had looked forward to the post of chief influence in the states-general, began to fear that their ambition had miscalculated. The deputies of the third-estate, strong in the superiority of talent, and in the energetic language of their instructions, fortified by continual intercourse, and stimulated by the very doubts which were expressed of the success of their efforts, were resolute in their determination not to yield.

The king alone, who had not enjoyed an interval of repose since his accession to the throne, beheld in the states-general the termination of embarrassments. Although jealous of his authority, rather for his children, to whom he thought himself bound to leave an unbroken patrimony, than for himself, he was by no means loath to surrender a portion to the nation, and throw upon it some of the difficulties of government. Thus he made preparations for this great assembly with alacrity and joy. A hall was made ready with all haste. The costumes even were arranged, and

humiliating etiquette imposed upon the third-estate. Men are not less jealous of their dignity than of their rights; and with justifiable pride, the instructions forbade the deputies to demean themselves by any degrading ceremonial. This new fault of the court sprang, like all the others, from the wish to maintain the symbol at least, when the substance was already gone. It was certain to cause deep irritation at a moment when, before joining battle, the parties paused in a mutual survey.

A solemn procession took place on the 4th May, the eve of the opening. The king, the three orders, and all the dignitaries of the state, marched to the church of Notre-Dame in Versailles. The court manifested an extraordinary magnificence. The two first orders were superbly apparelled. All the princes, dukes, peers, gentry, and prelates, were clothed in purple, and wore plumed hats on their heads. The deputies of the commons, clad in simple black mantles, followed in the rear, and, in spite of their unpretending exterior, appeared formidable by their number and their anticipated might. It was remarked, that the Duke of Orleans, placed in the last rank of the nobility, affected to remain behind and mingle with the first deputies of the commons.

This national, military, and religious pomp, the solemn chants, the warlike instruments, and above all, the grandeur of the event, made a profound impression on the hearts of all. The discourse of the Bishop of Nanci, replete with generous sentiments, was applauded with enthusiasm, notwithstanding the presence of the king and the sanctity of the place. Such assemblies tend to elevate the soul, to wean men from selfishness, and draw them into closer brotherhood: a general rapture was diffused, and more than one heart felt an irresistible impulse to dispel its lurking animosities, and melt into emotions of philanthropy and patriotism.*

* I would not have cited the following passage from the Memoirs of Ferrières, if base detractors had not sought to misrepresent all the scenes of the French Revolution. The extract I am about to present will give an idea of the effect which the national solemnities of that great epoch produced on minds the least plebeian.

"I yield to the pleasure of here recording the impression that this august and touching ceremony made upon me; I will copy the account that I wrote down at the time, when still full of what I had felt. If this relation be not historical, it will possess with some readers perhaps a more lively interest.

The nobles in black coats, vests and facings of cloth of gold, silk mantles, lace cravats, plumed hats, turned up *à la Henri IV.*; the clergy in cassocks, large cloaks, square caps; the bishops with their purple robes and lawn sleeves; the commons dressed in black, cloaks of silk, and cambric cravats. The king was seated on a platform, richly decorated; Monsieur, the Count d'Artois, the princes, the ministers, and the great officers of the crown, were seated below the king; the queen sat opposite him; Madame, the Countess d'Artois, the princesses, and the ladies of the court, all superbly dressed and covered with diamonds, composed around her a magnificent cortége. The streets were hung with tapestries of the crown; the regiments of French and Swiss guards formed a line from Notre-Dame to St Louis; an immense concourse gazed at us passing in respectful silence; the balconies were ornamented with precious stuffs, the windows filled with spectators of both sexes and of all ages, with beautiful women elegantly attired. The variety of fashions and costumes, the amiable emotions depicted on every countenance, the joy sparkling in every eye, the clapping of hands, the expressions of sympathy, the eager looks which met us and followed us even after we were out of sight—all presented a ravishing, an enchanting picture, which I would vainly strive to embody in words. Bands of music, stationed at intervals, made the air resound with melodious tones; the martial tunes, the roar of drums, the clang of trumpets, the solemn chant of the priests, heard in turn without discordance, without confusion, animated the triumphant march to the temple of the Eternal.

Shortly plunged into the sweetest ecstacy, sublime but melancholy thoughts offered themselves to my mind. France, my country, I saw, leaning on religion, saying to us, 'Cease your puerile quarrels; now is the decisive moment which is to give me a new existence, or extinguish me for ever!' Love for my country, how thou spokest to my heart then! What! disturbers, ambitious fools, vile intriguers, seek in their crooked policy to disunite my country!—they will found their destructive systems on insidious pretences; they will say to thee, thou hast two interests; and all thy glory and all thy power, so envied by thy neighbours, will be scattered as a light vapour borne upon a southern breeze. No, I pronounce before thee the oath—may my withered tongue cling to my palate, if ever I forget thy grandeur and solemnities!

How religious ceremonies enhanced the lustre of this mere human pomp! Without thee, venerable religion, it had been but a vain parade of mortal pride; but thou purifiest and sanctifiest, thou aggrandisest grandeur itself! The kings, the mighty of the age, also render, if even with feigned reverence, their homage to the King of kings. Yes, to God alone belongs honour, empire, glory. These holy ceremonies, these songs, these priests in garbs of sacrifice, these perfumed odours, this glittering canopy, this sun streaming in golden and jewelled rays—I called to mind the words of the prophet: 'Daughters of Jerusalem, your king comes; take your nuptial garments and run to greet him.' Tears of joy gushed from my eyes. My God, my country, my countrymen had become *me*—one.

Arrived at St Louis, the three orders seated themselves on benches placed in the nave. The king and queen took their places under a canopy of azure velvet, sprinkled with golden *fleurs-de-lis*; the princes, princesses, great officers of the crown, and ladies of the palace, occupied the inclosure reserved for their majesties. The holy sacrament was borne upon the altar to the sound of the most impressive music. There was an *Oh Salutaris Hostia*. This hymn, so natural and truthful, melodious, freed from the noise of instruments which smother the expression; this exquisite harmony of voices, swelling and rising to the heavens, confirmed me that the simple is always beautiful, always grand, always sublime. Men are fools, in their vain wisdom, to treat with ridicule the worship that is offered to the Eternal. How can they behold with indifference that moral chain which unites man to God—which renders the deity visible to the eye, sensible to the touch? M. de la Fare, Bishop of Nanci, pronounced the discourse. Religion constitutes the strength of empires; religion causes the happiness of nations. This truth, which no wise man ever for a moment doubted, was not the important question to treat in this august assembly; the place, the circumstance, opened a yet vaster field: the Bishop of Nanci either durst or could not traverse it.

The following day the deputies met in the hall of the Menus. The assembly was not less imposing, or the spectacle less magnificent than the day before."—*Memoirs of the Marquis de Ferrières, vol. i. p.* 16.

The opening of the states-general occurred on the following day, the 5th May 1789. The king was seated on an elevated throne, the queen near him, the court in galleries, the two first orders on each side, the third-estate in the background of the hall and upon lower benches. A murmur arose at sight of the Count de Mirabeau; but his gaze and bearing awed the disturbers. The third-estate wore their hats as well as the other orders, contrary to established precedent. The king delivered a speech, in which he recommended disinterestedness to some, wisdom to others, and to all he spoke of his love for the people. The keeper of the seals, Barentin, afterwards pronounced a discourse, and was followed by Necker, who read a memorial upon the state of the kingdom, in which he descanted largely upon the finances, proclaimed a deficit of fifty-six millions, and wearied with his verbosity those who were not disgusted with his egotism.

It was prescribed that each order should, on the morrow, repair to the locality fixed for it. Besides the common hall, which was sufficiently capacious to contain the three united orders, two other chambers had been erected for the nobility and clergy. The common hall was appropriated to the third-estate, which had thus the advantage, whilst in its own locality, of being also in that of the states-general. The first operation to go through was the verification of the powers, and it was of importance to decide whether it should take place in common, or separately by orders. The deputies of the third-estate, alleging that it behoved each division of the states-general to be assured of the legitimacy of the other two, demanded the verification in common. The nobility and clergy, anxious

to maintain the division of the orders, argued that each ought to constitute itself separately. This question did not comprehend that of voting individually or otherwise, for the powers might be verified in common, and the deliberations be subsequently pursued apart; but still it bore considerable resemblance thereto, and from the very first day it provoked a dispute which it required little foresight to have anticipated, and small ability to have prevented, by deciding the question beforehand. But the court never had the courage to refuse or to grant what was just, and it furthermore flattered itself with the hope of ruling by promoting divisions.

The deputies of the third-estate remained assembled in the common hall, abstaining from all action, and waiting, as they said, for the junction of their colleagues. The nobility and clergy, seated in their respective chambers, proceeded to deliberate upon the verification. The clergy voted the separate verification by a majority of 133 to 114, and the nobility by one of 188 to 114. The commons, persisting in their inaction, continued on the following day their conduct of the preceding one. They adhered to the plan of avoiding every measure which might be construed into an acknowledgment of their constitution as a distinct order. Accordingly, when deputing certain of their members to the two other chambers, they took care not to give them any express commission. They were sent to the nobility and clergy simply to notify to them that they waited for them in the common hall. The nobility were not sitting at the moment, but the clergy were assembled, and offered to appoint commissioners to reconcile the disputes that had arisen. They consequently adopted that course, and invited the nobility to follow their example. In this preliminary contest, the clergy evinced a very different spirit from the nobles. Amongst all the privileged classes, they had suffered most from the attacks of the eighteenth century; their political existence had been disputed, and they were disunited from the numerous body of simple priests included in their delegation. Besides, their bounden part was to invoke moderation and the spirit of peace, and, in accordance therewith, they proffered, as we have seen, a species of mediation.

The nobility, on the contrary, rejected all negotiation by refusing to name commissioners. Less prudent than the clergy, less dubious of their rights, and not holding themselves bound to moderation, but rather to an overbearing demeanour, they fulminated repudiations and menaces. Those very men who pardoned no passion in others, gave unlimited play to their own, and obeyed the impulse, like most large bodies, of the most violent spirits. Cazales and D'Espremenil, recently ennobled, carried the adoption of inflammatory motions, which they drew up beforehand in private meetings. It was in vain that a minority, composed of men either more sagacious or more prudently ambitious, attempted to reason with these fiery nobles; they would listen to no remonstrance, but spoke of fighting and dying, as they asserted, for the laws and justice. The commons, immovable in their purpose, received all these outrages with exemplary calmness; they brooded in silence upon their injuries, exhibiting the prudence and firmness of all powers at their commencement, and gaining the applause of those galleries, first of all appropriated to the court, but soon usurped by the public.

Several days had already elapsed. The clergy had attempted to ensnare the commons, by proposing to draw them into certain acts, which would have given them the character of a constituted order. But they had constantly rejected the overtures; and, adopting only such measures as were indispensable to their internal regulation, they had limited their action to the choice of a dean and assistants, in order to collect the votes. They refused to open letters addressed to them, and declared themselves to form, not an order, but *an assembly of citizens met by virtue of a legitimate authority in expectation of other citizens.*

The nobility, after having declined to appoint negotiators, consented at last to delegate members to confer with the other orders; but the commission intrusted to them became inoperative, because they were charged to declare at the same time that the decision of the 6th May, which enjoined the separate verification, would be persisted in. The clergy, on the contrary, faithful to their function, had suspended the verification already commenced in their own chamber, and pronounced themselves unconstituted, until the issue of the conferences to be held by the commissioners. These conferences were opened; the clergy took no part in the discussion; the deputies of the commons exposed their reasons with calmness, those of the nobility with violence. They separated more embittered by the dispute; and the third-estate, with its determination to yield nothing, was certainly not displeased to learn that all arrangement was become impossible. The nobility heard its commissioners give daily assurance that they had been superior in argument, and its arrogance swelled at the reports. By a fleeting gleam of prudence, the two first orders passed a resolution that they renounced their pecuniary privileges. The commons accepted the concession, but swerved not from their inaction, still always claiming the common verification. The conferences were continued, and a proposition was at length made that, in order to accommodate the differences, the powers should be verified by commissioners chosen from the three orders. The delegates of the nobility declared, in the name of their order, its refusal to accede to this arrangement, and withdrew without fixing a day for any fresh conference. The negotiation was thus at an end. The same day, the nobility came to a resolution, by which it declared once more that the verification should, for this session, be made separately, leaving to the states the task of determining upon any other mode for the future. This resolution was communicated to the commons on the 27th May. The states had met on the 5th, therefore twenty-two days had elapsed without any thing being done. It was high time to determine this state of things. Mirabeau, who gave the impulse to the popular party, pressed upon attention that an immediate decision was incumbent, and that it was absolutely necessary to commence the public business, which had been too long delayed. He proposed, therefore, in consequence of the known resolution of the nobles, to summon the clergy to give an immediate explanation, and declare at once whether they would or would not join the commons. The proposition was instantly adopted. The Deputy Target set out at the head of a numerous deputation, and proceeded to the hall of the clergy. "The commons invite the clergy," said he, "*in the name of the God of peace*, and in that of the national interest, to unite with them in the hall of the assembly, to deliberate on the means of securing concord, so necessary at this moment to the safety of the commonwealth." The clergy were struck by these solemn words; many of them responded with acclamations, and wished to accept the invitation upon the instant; but they were prevented, and the members of the commons were answered that their message would be taken into consideration. On the return of the deputation, the third-estate, inexorable in its determination, resolved to prolong the sitting until the answer of the clergy was received. This answer not arriving, a message was sent, intimating that it was impatiently awaited. The clergy complained of being hurried, and demanded that the necessary time should be granted them. They were answered with moderation, that they could consume as much time as they thought fit, and that their decision would be waited for, if it were necessary, all day and all night.

The position was critical. The clergy were aware

that after their decision was pronounced, the commons would proceed to work, and take a decisive part. They wished to temporise, in order to concert measures with the court, and therefore asked until the next day, which delay was granted with reluctance. The following day, the king, now so desired by the two first orders, determined to interfere. At this period, all the enmities of the court and the higher orders began to be forgotten, at sight of that popular power which was rising with such formidable rapidity. The king, then, coming forward in the extremity, invited the three orders to resume the conferences in presence of his keeper of the seals. The third-estate, whatever may be said of its projects, which have been judged in reference to events, did not push its hopes beyond a limited monarchy. Knowing the intentions of Louis XVI., it was full of respect for him; and besides, being unwilling to injure its cause by any wrong, it answered that, from deference to the king, it consented to the resumption of the conferences, though, after the declarations of the nobility, they must be considered hopeless. To this reply it appended an address, which it deputed its dean to deliver to the monarch. This dean was Bailly, a man simple and virtuous, illustrious for his merit, learning, and modesty, who had been suddenly transported from the noiseless studies of his cabinet to the tumult of civil discord. Chosen to preside over a large assembly, he had felt alarm at so novel a task, believed himself unworthy to perform it, and submitted to it only from a sense of duty. But, rising at once to the exigences of the crisis, he found in himself an unexpected firmness and presence of mind; amidst so many conflicts, he vindicated the majesty of the assembly, and acted for it with all the dignity of virtue and reason.

Bailly had the greatest difficulty in reaching the king. When he insisted upon being introduced, the courtiers objected that he had not paid due respect to the grief of the monarch, afflicted by the demise of the dauphin. At last he was presented, avoided all humiliating ceremonial, and evinced equal firmness and respect. The king received him with kindness, but without explaining his intentions.

The government, having already decided upon submitting to some sacrifices to gain supplies, hoped, by keeping the orders in opposition, to become their arbiter, to wrest from the nobility its pecuniary privileges with the aid of the third-estate, and to curb the ambition of the latter by means of the nobility. As to the nobles, being supremely indifferent to the embarrassments of the administration, and thinking only of the sacrifices in store for themselves, they wished to provoke the dissolution of the states-general, and render their convocation fruitless. The commons, whom the court and higher orders refused to recognise under that title, and always styled the third-estate, continually acquired fresh strength, and, determined as they were to brave all dangers, were steadfast in their resolution not to allow an occasion which might never return to slip from their grasp.

The conferences requested by the king were held. The envoys of the nobility started difficulties upon every point, such as the title of *Commons*, which the third-estate had assumed, and the form and signature of the minutes. At last, they entered upon the discussion, and they were almost reduced to silence by the reasons brought against them, when Necker proposed, on the king's part, a new mode of reconciliation. By this project, each order was to examine its powers separately, and communicate them to the others; and in case difficulties arose, commissioners were to make a report of them to each chamber, and if the decision of the different orders were not uniform, the king was to judge in the last resort. Thus the court would have cut the knot very profitably for itself. The conferences were forthwith suspended, to obtain the adhesion of the orders. The clergy accepted the project simply and unconditionally. The nobility received it at first with favour; but, urged by its ordinary instigators, it contemned the counsel of the most prudent of its members, and ultimately modified the scheme. From that day all its misfortunes may be dated.

The commons, apprised of this resolution, waited until it should be formally communicated to them to explain themselves in their turn; but the clergy, with their ordinary astuteness, designing to throw them into a false position with the nation, sent a deputation to them, with a request that they would join with them in deliberation upon the misery of the people, which every day was aggravating, and devote their united energies, without further delay, to the mitigation of the scarcity and dearness of provisions. The commons, who would have been exposed to popular odium if they had appeared indifferent to such a proposition, retorted the manœuvre by another, and replied, that, deeply sensible of the same duties, they awaited the clergy in the great hall, for the purpose of entering with them upon those important objects. The nobility afterwards arrived, and solemnly communicated its resolution to the commons. It adopted, as it said, the plan of conciliation, but persisted in the separate verification, and deferred to the united orders and the supreme jurisdiction of the king, only so far as re spected any difficulties that might arise touching the aggregate deputations of an entire province.

This resolution put an end to all the embarrassments of the commons. If the plan of conciliation had been adopted, they would have been compelled either to yield or to declare themselves at war with the upper orders and the throne; but the acceptance of the plan being burdened with serious modifications, they were relieved from explanation altogether. The moment was decisive of events. To concede the separate verification was not, it is true, to concede the vote by orders; but once to evince weakness was to be always weak. It was necessary either to submit to a part utterly insignificant, giving supplies to the executive, and resting contented with the destruction of a few abuses, when the regeneration of the state itself was within grasp, or to take a strong position, and seize with violence upon a portion of legislative power. It was to take the initiative in a revolution; but the assembly hesitated not. Accordingly, all the minutes being signed, and the conferences closed, Mirabeau rose. "Any project of conciliation being rejected by one party," said he, "can no longer be entertained by the other. A month has passed, and some decisive course is imperative. A Parisian deputy has an important motion to make; let him be heard." Mirabeau, having opened the debate with his accustomed daring, introduced Sieyes to the tribune, a man of comprehensive intellect, systematic and rigorous in his deductions. Sieyes shortly recapitulated, and defended the conduct of the commons. They had waited for and lent themselves to all the conciliations proposed; their long deference had been of no avail; they could not longer delay without being wanting to their mission; consequently, they ought to direct a final invitation to the two other orders to unite with them for the purpose of commencing the verification. This proposition, the expediency of which was logically demonstrated,* was hailed with enthusiasm; in fact,

* I think it incumbent on me to record the motives upon which the assembly of the commons grounded the determination in question. This first act, which began the revolution, being of great importance, it is essential to demonstrate its necessity, and I believe that cannot better be done than by adhibiting the considerations which preceded the resolution of the commons. This preamble, as well as the resolution, was drawn up by the Abbé Sieyes.

"The assembly of the commons, deliberating upon the overture of conciliation made by the commissioners of the king, has thought it right to take into consideration at the same time the resolution that the members of the nobility have hastened to pass upon the overture in question.

an inclination was manifested to allow the two orders but a single hour to effect the junction; but the term was prolonged. This sitting occurred on the 10th June, and the next day, Thursday, being sacred to religious solemnities, an adjournment until Friday was fixed. On Friday the final invitation was communicated: the two orders replied, they would proceed to deliberate, and the king that he would make known his intentions. The calling of the bailiwicks commenced: the first day, three priests appeared, and were overwhelmed with acclamations; the second, six arrived; the third and fourth, ten, amongst whom was the Abbé Gregoire.

During the call of the bailiwicks and the verification of the powers, a weighty discussion arose upon the title the assembly ought to assume. Mirabeau proposed that of "Representatives of the French People;" Mounier, that of "the Majority deliberating in the absence of the Minority;" the deputy Legrand, that of "the National Assembly." The last was adopted after a long debate, which continued until the night of the 16th June. It was one o'clock in the morning, when the question was mooted whether the declaration of being constituted should be made in that sitting, or delayed until the following day. A part of the deputies maintained that not an instant should be lost in taking a legal character calculated to have an imposing effect on the court. A small number, desiring to interrupt the labours of the assembly, fell into a paroxysm of passion, and uttered furious cries. The two parties, ranged along the opposite sides of a long table, hurled menaces at each other in words and gestures. Bailly, seated in the centre, was called upon by some to break up the assembly, by others to put the motion for constitution to the vote. Calm amidst the shouts and tumult, he remained for upwards of an hour immovable and silent. The weather was stormy, the wind howled through the hall, and the violence of the elements added to the uproar. At length the outrageous members retired; whereupon Bailly, addressing the assembly, restored to tranquillity by the retreat of those who had disturbed it, urged it to adjourn until day the important act under proposition. It yielded to his counsel, and separated, applauding his firmness and prudence.

The next day, the 17th June, the motion was put to the vote, and by a majority of 491 voices to 90, the commons constituted themselves a *National Assembly*. Sieyes, again intrusted with drawing up the reasons for this decision, performed the task with his accustomed acumen.

"The assembly, on consideration, after concluding the verification of the powers, finds that it is already composed of representatives directly returned by at least ninety-six in a hundred of the nation. A deputation of such magnitude ought not to remain inactive on account of the absence of the deputies of some bailiwicks, or of certain classes of citizens; for the absentees who have been summoned cannot prevent those who have appeared from exercising their rights in full plenitude, especially when the exercise of those rights is an indispensable and imperative duty.

Moreover, as those representatives alone who have verified can concur in constituting the national voice, and as all the accredited representatives ought to be in this assembly, it likewise necessarily follows, that it belongs to it, and to it alone, to interpret and give expression to the general will of the nation.

There can exist between the assembly and the throne no *veto*—no rejecting power.

Accordingly, the assembly declares that the common labours for the national restoration may and ought to be commenced without delay by the deputies present; and that they ought to proceed therewith without intermission, as also without obstacle.

The title of 'National Assembly' is the only one suitable to the assembly in the present state of things, because the members who compose it are the only representatives legitimately and publicly known and accredited; because they are returned by almost the entirety of the nation, and because, the representation being one and indivisible, no deputy, in whatever order or class chosen, has the right to exercise any functions apart from this assembly.

The assembly will never relinquish the hope of gathering into its fold the deputies now absent, nor will it cease to call upon them to discharge the obligation they are under of concurring in the session of the states-general. It declares, that at whatever moment the absent deputies may present themselves during the session about to be opened, it will receive them with the utmost cordiality, and share with them, after the verification of their powers, the continuation of those weighty labours which are destined to accomplish the regeneration of France."

Immediately after this resolution, the assembly, desirous of giving a proof both of its power and of its disinclination to impede the course of administration, legalised the collection of taxes, although imposed without the national consent. Foreseeing the proba-

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It has seen that the nobility, notwithstanding the acquiescence originally announced, soon introduced a modification which almost entirely retracts the same, and that thus their resolution in this respect can only be regarded as a positive refusal.

With this impression, and seeing that the nobles have not even desisted from their preceding deliberations, contrary to the spirit of every project of union, the deputies of the commons think that it is absolutely useless to concern themselves further with a plan which can no longer be called conciliatory, since it has been rejected by one of the parties to be conciliated.

In this state of things, which replaces the deputies of the commons in their original position, the assembly is of opinion that it can no longer idly await the privileged classes, without rendering itself culpable towards the nation, which has an unquestionable right to demand from it a better employment of its time.

It is of opinion that it is the bounden duty of the representatives of the nation, to whatever class of citizens they may belong, to form themselves, without any delay, into an active assembly, capable of commencing and fulfilling the objects of their mission.

The assembly instructs the commissioners who have attended the various conferences called conciliatory, to prepare a recital of the long and fruitless efforts of the deputies of the commons to lead the privileged classes to an appreciation of just principles; it takes upon itself the task of proclaiming the motives which force it to pass from a state of expectation to one of action; lastly, it resolves that this recital and these motives shall be printed at the head of the present deliberative act.

But since it is not possible to constitute an active assembly, without a preliminary recognition of those who have the right to compose it—that is to say, those who possess the qualification to vote as representatives of the nation—the same deputies of the commons think it right to make a last experiment upon the members of the nobility and clergy, who have, nevertheless, hitherto refused to have themselves recognised.

Furthermore, the assembly being interested in placing on record the refusal of these two classes of deputies, in case they should persist in their wish to remain unacknowledged, judges it indispensable to make a final invitation, which shall be carried to them by deputies instructed to read it to them, and to leave them copies, in the following terms:—

'Gentlemen—We are instructed by the deputies of the commons of France to apprise you, that they cannot longer delay to satisfy the obligation imposed upon all the representatives of the nation. It is surely time that those who claim that character should be known by a verification of their powers in common, and at length begin to concern themselves with the national interest, which alone, and to the exclusion of all particular interests, presents itself as the object which all the deputies should promote with a common effort. In consequence, and from the necessity imposed upon the representatives of the nation to put their functions in activity, the deputies of the commons again entreat you, gentlemen, and their duty compels them to make to you, as well individually as collectively, a final summons to repair to the hall of the states, in order to attend, concur in, and submit, like them, to the common verification of powers. We are, at the same time, instructed to notify to you that the general call of all the bailiwicks will be made in one hour; that the verification will be then proceeded with, and default pronounced against absentees.'"

bility of its dissolution, it subjoined that they should cease to be exigible from the day on which it should separate. Furthermore, as bankruptcy was an expedient possible to the executive for terminating the financial embarrassments, and dispensing with a national appeal, it consulted both prudence and honour by putting the creditors of the state under the safeguard of French honesty. In conclusion, it announced that it would take into immediate consideration the causes of the scarcity and of the general distress.

These measures, which evinced equal courage and sagacity, produced a profound impression. The court and higher orders were astounded at their daring and energy. In the mean time, the clergy, in a tumultuous sitting, debated upon the expediency of joining the commons. An immense crowd waited without for the result of their deliberations; the inferior clergy ultimately prevailed, and it was announced that the junction had been carried by a majority of 149 to 115. Those who had voted in the affirmative were hailed with transports, the others were insulted and assailed by the people.

This crisis was calculated to cement the reconciliation of the court and the aristocracy. The danger was equal for both. The last resolutions affected the king as much as the first orders themselves, with whom the commons declared they could altogether dispense. The Duke of Luxembourg, the Cardinal de Larochefoucauld, and the Archbishop of Paris, threw themselves at the feet of the king, and entreated him to curb the audacity of the third-estate, and to support their threatened rights. The parliament offered to render the states unnecessary, by undertaking to sanction all the taxes. The king was surrounded by the princes and the queen; the emergency was too great for his weakness, and he was ultimately drawn to Marly, in order that a vigorous measure might be wrung from him.

The minister Necker, attached to the popular cause, made some representations, which the king thought just enough when his judgment was unfettered; but their effect was soon extirpated by the arts of the court. When Necker saw that the intervention of the royal authority was necessary, he conceived a project which seemed of marvellous boldness to his order of courage: he proposed that the monarch should hold a royal sitting, and ordain the junction of the orders, but only for measures of general interest; that he should assume to himself the sanction of all the resolutions passed by the states-general; that he should disallow beforehand every establishment contrary to a limited monarchy, such as that of a single assembly; and that he should promise the abolition of privileges, the equal admission of all Frenchmen to civil and military offices, &c. Necker, who had not had influence sufficient to precipitate the period for such a plan, had equally little now to enforce its execution.

The council had followed the king to Marly. There the plan of Necker, at first approved of, was again brought under discussion: whilst it was pending, a letter was suddenly handed to the king; the council was suspended, resumed, and adjourned until the morrow, notwithstanding the urgent necessity for dispatch. The next day, new members were added to the council, amongst whom were the king's brothers. The project of Necker was modified. The minister resisted; consented to certain concessions, but seeing himself outnumbered, he returned to Versailles. Thrice a royal page brought him letters announcing fresh modifications; his plan was completely altered, and the royal sitting was fixed for the 22d June.

It was only the 20th of the month, and the hall of the states was already closed, under the pretence of preparations being in progress for the presence of the king. These preparations might have been easily made in half a day; but the clergy had resolved the day before to join the commons, and it was determined to prevent the junction. An order of the king accordingly suspended the sittings until the 22d. Bailly, deeming himself obliged to obey the assembly, which on Friday the 19th had adjourned to Saturday the 20th, proceeded to the door of the hall. Some of the French guards were gathered around it, with orders not to admit any entrance. The officer on duty received Bailly with respect, and permitted him to advance into a court to record a protestation. Some young and ardent deputies attempted to force the guard; Bailly ran to the spot, appeased their fiery spirit, and led them away with him, in order that they might not compromise the generous officer who executed his orders with so much moderation. The members rushed tumultuously together, and persisted in holding a meeting. Some spoke of assembling under the very windows of the king; others proposed the hall of the tennis-court. They immediately proceeded thither, and the proprietor joyfully granted the use of it.

This hall was spacious, but its walls were dark and bare, and there were no seats. A chair was offered to the president, who refused it, preferring to remain on his legs with the general body. A bench served as a desk; two deputies were placed at the door as a guard, but were soon relieved by the attendants of the place, who came to offer their services. The people flocked in crowds, and the debates commenced. Exclamations arose from all sides against the suspension of the sittings, and various means were proposed for preventing it in future. The excitement increased, and extreme measures began to suggest themselves to the heated imaginations. It was proposed to proceed to Paris; this opinion, hailed with warmth, was eagerly discussed, and a motion was even made to march there in a body, and on foot. Bailly was fearful of the outrages that the assembly might experience on the road, and apprehensive likewise of originating a schism; therefore he opposed the project. Thereupon Mounier moved that the deputies bind themselves by oath not to separate before the establishment of a constitution. This motion was received with enthusiasm, and the form of the oath was instantly drawn up. Bailly solicited the honour of swearing first, and read the formula, thus couched—"You take a solemn oath never to separate, to assemble wherever circumstances may require, until the constitution of the kingdom shall be established and confirmed upon solid foundations." This formula, pronounced in a loud and distinct tone, was heard beyond the walls of the building. Immediately all mouths uttered the oath, all arms were stretched towards Bailly, who, erect and stern, received this solemn engagement to secure by laws the exercise of national rights. The whole body afterwards raised cries of "Long live the assembly! Long live the king!" as if to prove that it claimed the recovery of what was due to the nation, without anger or hatred, but from a sense of duty. The deputies subsequently proceeded to sign the declaration which they had just made by word of mouth. One alone, Martin d'Auch, added to his name the title of "opposer." Considerable tumult ensued around him. Bailly, in order to be heard, mounted on a table, addressed the deputy in a tone of moderation, and represented to him that he had an undoubted right to refuse his signature, but none to record his opposition. The deputy was obstinate, and the assembly, from respect for freedom of opinion, allowed the phrase, and let it remain on the minutes.

This new act of energy struck terror into the nobles, who the next day carried their sorrows to the foot of the throne, expressed their contrition in some degree for the restrictions wherewith they had shackled the royal plan of conciliation, and craved the king's assistance. The minority of the nobility protested against this step, alleging most reasonably that it was the height of folly to ask the royal intervention after having so indiscreetly spurned it. This minority, too little attended to by its colleagues, was composed of

forty-seven members, amongst whom were some military men and enlightened magistrates. It numbered the Duke de Liancourt, the faithful friend of his king and of liberty; the Duke de Larochefoucauld, distinguished for unshaken virtue and an accomplished mind; Lally-Tolendal, already celebrated from the misfortunes of his father, and his eloquent protestations; Clermont-Tonnerre, remarkable for his oratorical talent; the brothers Lameth, young colonels, known for their spirit and valour; Duport, already mentioned for his comprehensive intellect and the firmness of his character; and lastly, the Marquis de Lafayette, the defender of American liberty, who united to French vivacity the resolution and simplicity of Washington.

Intrigue paralysed all the energies of the court. The sitting, fixed originally for Monday the 22d, was postponed till the 23d. A note, written at a late hour to Bailly, and after the separation of the privy-council, informed him of this adjournment, and gave sufficient token of the agitation that prevailed. Necker had resolved not to attend the sitting, in order that he might not sanction by his presence projects he disapproved.

Petty expedients, the ordinary resource of weak authority, were resorted to for the purpose of preventing the assembly meeting on the 22d. The princes caused the tennis-court to be retained, in order to play on that morning. The assembly proceeded to the church of Saint Louis, where it received the majority of the clergy, at whose head appeared the Archbishop of Vienne. This junction, effected with imposing dignity, excited the liveliest emotions of joy. The clergy announced that they came there to submit to the common verification.

The next day, the 23d, was fixed for the royal sitting. The deputies of the commons were appointed to enter the hall by a side door, apart from the entrance reserved for the nobility and clergy. With the exception of violence, every species of indignity was heaped upon them. Exposed to a heavy fall of rain, they waited patiently for a long time; the president, compelled to knock at this door, which was kept closed, had to repeat his knocks several times, and the only reply he obtained was, that the time had not arrived for opening it. The deputies were about to retire in disgust, when Bailly gave another summons: at length the door was opened, the deputies entered and found the two orders in possession of their seats, which they had secured by the precaution of forestalling them. The sitting was not like that of the 5th May, at once majestic and affecting by a certain effusion of feelings and hopes. A numerous guard and a mournful stillness distinguished it from that first solemnity. The deputies of the commons had resolved to observe a profound silence. The king pronounced a harangue, and betrayed the influence that had worked upon him, by using expressions much too energetic for his character. He was made to deal out reproaches and impose injunctions. He commanded the separation into orders, annulled the previous resolutions of the third-estate, but promised to sanction the abolition of pecuniary privileges, when their possessors had declared it. He retained all the feudal rights, both practical and honorary, as inviolable possessions; and he ordained not the junction upon matters of general interest, although he held out hopes of its probability from the moderation of the higher orders. Thus he enforced the obedience of the commons, whilst he contented himself with taking that of the aristocracy for granted. He left the nobility and clergy sole judges of what concerned them peculiarly, and concluded by saying, that if he encountered fresh obstacles, he would take the welfare of the people into his own hands, and consider himself as their only representative. This tone and language exasperated all minds, not against the king, who had feebly vented passions not his own, but against the aristocracy, whose instrument he had consented to become.

The instant his discourse was finished, he ordered the assembly forthwith to separate. The nobility followed him, with a part of the clergy. The greater number of the ecclesiastical deputies remained, and the commons also continued stationary, still observing a profound silence. Mirabeau, who was always the first to take the lead, arose. "Gentlemen," said he, "I confess that what you have just heard might be for the safety of the country, if the gifts of despotism were not always suspicious. A parade of arms, a violation of the national temple, to command you to be happy! Where are the enemies of the nation? Is Catiline at our gates? I call upon you, by the investiture of your dignity and of your legislative functions, to respect the sacred obligation of your oath; recollect it does not permit you to separate until the constitution is established."

The Marquis de Brézé, grand-master of the ceremonies, entered at this moment, and addressed himself to Bailly. "Have you heard," he asked, "the orders of the king?" and Bailly answered: "I am about to take those of the assembly." Mirabeau advanced. "Yes, sir," he exclaimed, "we have heard the views wherewith the king has been prompted; but you have here no voice, or place, or right to speak. However, to avoid delay, go to your master, and tell him that we are here by the power of the people, and that we will not be driven forth but by the power of bayonets." M. de Brézé withdrew. Sieyes then uttered these words: "We are to-day what we were yesterday: let us deliberate." The assembly disposed itself to debate upon the maintenance of its previous resolutions. "The first of these resolutions," said Barnave, "declares what you are; the second refers to the taxes, which you alone have the right to sanction; the third is the oath to do your duty. None of these measures needs the royal assent. The king cannot abrogate what his consent would not fortify." At this instant, workmen came to remove the benches, armed soldiers traversed the hall, others encompassed it outside, and the body-guards advanced even to the door. The assembly, without concerning itself with the interruption, remained upon the seats and collected the votes; there was no dissentient voice against adhering to all the previous resolutions. Nor was this all. In the heart of a royal city, in the midst of court retainers, and deprived of the aid of that people afterwards so formidable, the assembly was exposed to intimidation. Mirabeau repaired to the tribune, and proposed to decree the inviolability of each deputy. The assembly, merely able to oppose a majestic expression to brute force, instantly declared each of its members inviolable, and all who should do injury to their persons, traitors, infamous, and guilty of a capital crime.

In the mean time, the nobility, who believed the state saved by this bed of justice, offered their congratulations to the prince who had suggested it, and carried them from the prince to the queen. The queen, holding her son in her arms, and showing him to these enraptured servants, received their homage, and gave way to a blind and fatal confidence. At that very instant shouts were heard; all hastened towards the noise, and the intelligence was soon spread that the people, gathered into a crowd, were applauding Necker for not appearing at the royal sitting. Alarm immediately succeeded to joy. The king and queen caused Necker to be called, and those august personages were compelled to entreat him to retain his portfolio. The minister consented, and restored to the court some portion of the popularity he had preserved by absenting himself from that disastrous sitting.

Thus was the first revolution brought about. The third-estate had obtained the legislative power, and its adversaries had lost it by too great eagerness to grasp it all. In a few days this legislative revolution was consummated. Certain petty annoyances were

again resorted to, such as impeding the internal communications in the halls of the states; but they were too contemptible to have any effect. On the 24th, the majority of the clergy repaired to the assembly, and demanded the verification in common, with the view of afterwards deliberating upon the propositions advanced by the king in the sitting of the 23d June. The minority of the clergy continued to occupy their peculiar chamber. The Archbishop of Paris, Juigné, a virtuous prelate, and charitable to the people, but obstinate in the cause of privileges, was attacked, and constrained to promise his junction. He proceeded in fact to the national assembly, accompanied by the Archbishop of Bordeaux, a prelate of popular tendencies, who afterwards became minister.

The greatest confusion prevailed in the ranks of the nobility. Its ordinary agitators inflamed its passions; D'Espremenil proposed to impeach the third-estate, and to order its prosecution by the attorney-general. and the minority, on the contrary, proposed the junction. This latter motion was rejected amidst deplorable tumult. The Duke of Orleans supported the motion, after having the day before promised the Polignacs to oppose it.* Forty-seven members, having resolved to join the national assembly in spite of this decision, repaired thither in a body, and were greeted with lively marks of public satisfaction. However, their countenances bore an expression of sadness even amidst the joy caused by their presence. "We yield to our sense of right," said Clermont-Tonnerre, "but we separate from our colleagues with grief. We come to take part in the public regeneration; each of us will make known to you the extent to which his mandate will permit him to go."

Every day brought with it fresh junctions, and the assembly saw the number of its members perpetually on the increase. Addresses poured in from all quarters, conveying the sympathy and approbation of the towns and provinces. Mounier stimulated those from Dauphiny; Paris originated its own; and even the Palais-Royal sent a deputation, which the assembly, still enveloped by dangers, received, in order not to alienate the populace. It did not then foresee its future excesses; it had need, on the contrary, to presume its energy and to hope for its support; many of the deputies were doubtful of both, for the resolution of the people was as yet but a pleasing anticipation. Thus the plaudits of the galleries, though often annoying to the assembly, had nevertheless served to animate it in its course, and it ventured not to forbid them. Bailly wished to pass a vote of censure, but his voice and motion were stifled amidst shouts of applause.

The majority of the nobility continued its sittings amid tumult and the most violent exasperation. Apprehensions spread amongst those who ruled that order, and the motion for a junction came from those very members who had formerly induced its resistance. But its passions, already too excited, were not easily controlled. The king was obliged to write a letter, the court and its high functionaries were reduced to entreat. "The junction will be but transitory," said they to the most stubborn; "troops are approaching: yield to save the king." Acquiescence was wrung from them in the midst of disorder, and the majority of the nobles, accompanied by the minority of the clergy, repaired, on the 27th June, to the general assembly. The Duke of Luxembourg, speaking in the name of all, said that they came to give the king a proof of respect, and to the nation an evidence of patriotism. "The family is now complete," answered Bailly. Assuming that the union was consummated, and that the question as to verification was disposed of, and that it remained for them only to deliberate in common, he added, "We shall now be able to proceed, without intermission and without distraction, with the regeneration of the kingdom and the public welfare."

More than one silly expedient was employed to support an appearance of not having done what necessity had superinduced. The new comers always entered after the opening of the sittings, all in a body, and so as to uphold their character as an order. They affected to remain standing behind the president, and in a manner to avoid the appearance of sitting. Bailly, with infinite address and firmness, succeeded in subduing their repugnance, and inducing them to take their seats. They wished likewise to dispute his right to the presidency, not by an open demonstration, but by secret intrigue, or by despicable trickery. Bailly was resolute in his retention, not from ambition, but from duty; and men beheld a simple citizen, known for no qualifications more imposing than virtue and talent, presiding over all the magnates of the kingdom and the church.

It ought to have been palpable to all understandings, that the legislative revolution was achieved. Although the preliminary dispute arose merely on the mode of verification and not on that of voting, although some had declared they joined only for the common verification, and others in obedience to the royal wishes as expressed on the 23d June—it was clear that the vote by voice was an inevitable implication, and that all opposition was consequently useless and impolitic. And yet the Cardinal de Larochefoucauld protested in the name of the clerical minority, and asserted that it had effected the junction simply to deliberate upon general questions, with a reservation of its right to form an order. The Archbishop of Vienne replied with vivacity, that the minority had no power to decide any thing in the absence of the majority, and could have no right to speak in the name of the entire order. Mirabeau expatiated with his usual vigour upon the absurdity of this pretension, saying it was strange that any should protest within the assembly against the assembly, and that it behoved all either to acknowledge its supremacy or to retire.

The question as to imperative mandates was then started. The greater number of the instructions expressed the views of the electors with regard to advisable reforms, and rendered those views obligatory on the deputies. Before acting, it was necessary to settle how far they could go; and this question, therefore, became the first. It was argued and re-argued several times. Some maintained that they should go back to their constituents, whilst others were of opinion that they could receive from their constituents the commission of voting for them only after the measures had been discussed and illustrated by the delegates of the whole nation, but that it was not competent for them to receive beforehand a prescribed judgment. If it were held, in fact, that the law should be made only in a general council, either because more enlightened views prevailed in an elevated body, or because a correct opinion could be formed only when all parts of the nation were mutually heard, it followed of course that the deputies ought to be unfettered, and without obligatory mandates. Mirabeau, sharpening reason with irony, exclaimed that those who considered the mandates imperative were wrong to come there at all, but should content themselves with laying their instructions on the benches, since those documents might sit as well as themselves. Sieyes, with his accustomed sagacity, foreseeing that, notwithstanding the most rational decision of the assembly, a great number of members would cling to their oaths, and that by intrenching themselves behind their consciences they would become invulnerable, moved the order of the day, on the ground that each was the judge of the force of the oath he had taken. "Those who feel themselves shackled by their instructions," said he, "can be regarded as absent, precisely as those who refused to have their powers verified in common

* See Ferrières.

assembly." If the assembly had constrained the malecontents, it would have furnished pretexts for faction, whilst, by leaving them at liberty, it was sure to induce their adhesion, for its victory was no longer dubious.

The object of the new convocation was the reform of the state, that is to say, the establishment of a constitution, of which France was utterly devoid, in spite of all that may be said to the contrary. If that name be applied to every species of relation between the governed and the governors, France unquestionably possessed a constitution; it had a king who commanded, and subjects who obeyed; ministers who imprisoned at pleasure; farmers of the revenue who wrung the last farthing from the people; and parliaments which condemned unfortunates to the wheel. The most barbarous nations have such orders of constitutions. There was in France an institution called States-General, but without precise functions, without fixed periods for assembling, and when convoked, invariably without result. There was a royal authority which had been alternately powerless and absolute. There were tribunals or supreme courts, which had often joined legislative to judicial power; but there was no law which secured the responsibility of the agents of power, the liberty of the press, the freedom of person, or any of those guarantees, in fine, which, in the social state, make amends for the fiction of natural liberty.*

The necessity for a constitution was confessed and generally felt; all the instructions had energetically asserted it, and had even formally laid down the fundamental principles upon which that constitution should be based. They had unanimously prescribed a monarchical government, hereditary descent from male to male, the exclusive attribution of executive power to the king, the responsibility of all his agents, the concurrence of the nation and the king in the enactment of laws, the voting of taxes, and individual liberty. But they were divided as to the creation of one or of two legislative chambers; as to the duration, the prorogations, and the dissolution of the legislative body; as to the political existence of the clergy and the parliaments; and as to the extent of the liberty of the press. So many questions, either solved or started by the instructions, show sufficiently how the public mind was then awakened in all quarters of the kingdom, and how general and emphatic was the determination of France for liberty.* But to frame

* I support by quotations and notes only what is susceptible of contradiction. This question, as to whether France had a constitution, seems to me one of the most important in the revolution, for it is the absence of a fundamental law that justifies the nation for desiring to obtain one. I imagine that it would be scarcely possible to cite an authority more respectable and less open to suspicion than the testimony of M. Lally-Tolendal. That excellent citizen delivered a speech on the 15th June 1789, in the chamber of nobles, of which the following is the greater portion:—

"Many reproaches, gentlemen, mingled with some bitterness, have been directed against those members of this assembly, who, with equal pain and reserve, have evinced certain doubts upon what is called our constitution. This subject had not perhaps a very direct connexion with that which is before us; but since it has been the ground of an accusation, it has become likewise one of defence, and I am justified in addressing a few words to the authors of those reproaches.

You have certainly no law which establishes the states-general as an integral portion of the sovereignty, for you are now demanding one; and hitherto, sometimes the decree of the council prohibited them from deliberating, and sometimes the decree of a parliament annulled their resolutions.

You have no law which compels the periodical convocation of your states-general, for you demand one; and 175 years have elapsed since they were assembled.

You have no law which places your individual safety and liberty under shelter from arbitrary attacks, for you demand one; and under the reign of a king whose justice is known to all Europe, and whose probity is universally reverenced, ministers have caused your magistrates to be driven from the sanctuary of the laws by armed myrmidons. Under the preceding reign, all the magistrates of the kingdom were also torn from their seats and their hearths, and dispersed in exile, some to the peaks of mountains, others to the mire of marshes, all into places more frightful than the most horrible of prisons. By ascending higher, you will discover *lettres de cachet* by the thousands, on account of wretched theological quarrels. By going still farther back, you perceive sanguinary commissions and arbitrary imprisonments in equal profusion, and you find no speck for repose but in the reign of your good Henry.

You have no law which establishes the liberty of the press, for you demand one; and hitherto your thoughts have been enslaved, your ideas chained, and the cry of your hearts in oppression has been stifled, now by the despotism of individuals, anon by the more terrible despotism of public bodies.

You have no law, or have none any longer, which renders your consent necessary for taxation, for you demand one; and for two centuries you have been charged with upwards of three or four hundred millions of taxes, without your having sanctioned a single unit.

You have no law which imposes responsibility upon all the ministers of executive power, for you demand one; and the originators of those sanguinary commissions, the issuers of those arbitrary orders of arrest, the spoilers of the public treasury, the violators of the sanctuary of justice—those who have deceived the virtues of one king, those who flattered the passions of another, those who have caused the disasters of the nation, have rendered no account, have undergone no punishment.

In fine, you have no general, positive, written law, at once a national and royal compact—no great charter, on which a fixed and invariable order may rest, in which each may learn what it behoves him to sacrifice of his liberty and his property to preserve the rest—which assures all rights, and defines all powers. On the contrary, the system of your government has varied from reign to reign, often from ministry to ministry; it has depended on the age and the character of a single mortal. During minorities, under a weak prince, the royal authority, which contributes to the happiness and dignity of the nation, has been indecently degraded, either by magnates, who with one hand shook the throne and with the other ground the people to the dust, or by bodies which at one time attacked with temerity what at another they had defended with courage. Under haughty princes who were basely flattered, under virtuous princes who were misled, this same authority has been pushed beyond all bounds. Your secondary or intermediate powers, as you call them, have been neither better defined nor more fixed. At times the parliaments have maintained the principle that they could not interfere in affairs of state, at others they have alleged that their discussion belonged to them as representatives of the nation. On one hand we have seen proclamations announcing the pleasure of the king, on the other, decrees in which the officers of the king prohibited, in the name of the king, the execution of the orders of the king. The courts have not agreed better amongst themselves; they have disputed each other's origin and functions, have mutually fulminated recriminatory decrees.

I limit these details, which I might extend to infinity; but if all these facts are certain—if you have none of those laws which you demand, and which I have now mentioned—or if, having them (and I beg your attention to this)—or if, having them, you have not that which compels their execution, that which guarantees their observance, and which maintains their stability, pray define to us, then, what you understand by the word constitution, and allow at least that some indulgence is due to those who cannot refrain from entertaining certain doubts upon the existence of ours. We are perpetually told to rally round this constitution; ah! rather let us lose sight of that phantom in order to substitute a reality. And as to that term of *innovations*, as to that epithet of *innovators*, with which we are unceasingly attacked, let us also grant that the first innovators are in our instructions; let us respect and bless that fortunate innovation which essays to put every thing in its place, to render all rights inviolable, all authorities beneficent, and all people happy.

It is for such a constitution, gentlemen, that I offer my prayers; it is such a constitution that is the object of all our mandates, and which ought to be the goal of all our labours; and such a constitution is repugnant to the very idea of the address which is proposed to us—an address which would compromise the king as much as the nation—an address, indeed, which appears to me so dangerous, that not only shall I oppose it to the utmost, but if it were possible it could be adopted, I should feel myself under the painful necessity of solemnly protesting against it."

* I think it useful to give the summary of the instructions presented to the National Assembly by M. de Clermont-Tonnerre.

a perfect constitution amidst the mouldering ruins of an antiquated legislation, in spite of all resistance, and with the unruly theories abroad, was a laborious and difficult task. Besides the dissensions inevitably

It is an admirable statistical record of the opinions entertained at that epoch in the whole extent of France. In this respect the summary is extremely important; and although Paris might have influenced the compilation of these instructions, it is not the less true that the provinces had the greatest share in them.

Report of the Constitution Committee, containing the Summary of the Instructions relative to that object, read to the National Assembly by the Count de Clermont-Tonnerre, in the sitting of the 27th July 1789.

"Gentlemen—You are called upon to regenerate the French empire; you carry to that great work both your own wisdom and the wisdom of your constituents.

We have thought it our duty, in the first place, to collect and present to you the opinions scattered in the major part of your instructions; we will afterwards present to you both the particular views of your committee, and those which it has been, or may hereafter be, enabled to gather from the various plans and observations which have been, or may be, communicated or remitted by the members of this august assembly.

It is the first portion of this task we are about to present to you.

Our constituents, gentlemen, are all agreed upon one point; they desire the regeneration of the state; but some have understood it as a simple reform of abuses, and the re-establishment of a constitution existing for fourteen centuries, which has seemed to them capable of revival, if the injuries are repaired which have been inflicted by time, and the numerous outrages of personal interest upon the public interest.

Others have considered the existing social system as so vicious, that they have demanded a new constitution; and with the exception of monarchical government and forms, which are cherished and reverenced in the heart of every Frenchman, and which they have ordered you to maintain, they have given you all the powers necessary to frame a constitution, and settle the prosperity of the French empire upon ascertained principles, and upon the regular distinction and constitution of all the powers. These are of opinion that the first chapter of the constitution ought to contain the declaration of the rights of man, of those imprescriptible rights, for the safeguard of which society was instituted.

The demand of this declaration of the rights of man, so incessantly contemned, is substantially the only difference which exists between the instructions which require a new constitution and those which seek merely for the re-establishment of what they deem the existing constitution.

Both have equally founded their ideas upon the principles of monarchical government, upon the stability of the power and upon the organisation of the legislative body, upon the necessity of the national consent to taxation, upon the organisation of the administrative bodies, and upon the rights of all citizens.

We shall go over these different objects, and present to you upon each of them, as decisive, the results, when uniform, and, as questions, the different or contradictory results which those of your instructions, an epitome of which it has been possible for us to make or to procure, have brought before us.

1. The monarchical government, the inviolability of the sacred person of the king, and the hereditary transmission of the crown from male to male, are equally acknowledged and consecrated by the greatest number of the instructions, and are not questioned in any.

2. The king is equally recognised as depositary of the full plenitude of executive power.

3. The responsibility of all the agents of authority is generally demanded.

4. Some instructions acknowledge in the king the legislative power, limited by the constitutional and fundamental laws of the kingdom; others acknowledge that the king, in the interval between one assembly of the states-general and another, may of himself make laws on matters of police and administration, which shall be only provisional, and for the validity of which they require the free registration in the supreme courts; one bailiwick has even required that the registration may not take place unless with the consent of two-thirds of the intermediate commissions of the district assemblies. The major part of the instructions recognises the necessity for the royal sanction in the promulgation of the laws.

As to the legislative power, the plurality of the instructions recognises it as residing in the national representation, under limitation of the royal sanction; and it appears that this ancient maxim of the capitularies, *Lex fit consensu populi et constitutione regis* (The law is made by the consent of the people and the fiat of the monarch), is almost universally consecrated by your constituents.

As to the organisation of the national representation, the questions upon which you have to pronounce have reference to the convocation, to the duration, and to the composition of the national representation, and to the mode of deliberation which your constituents propose for it.

As to the convocation, some have declared that the states-general ought to be dissolved only by themselves; others, that the right of convoking, proroguing, and dissolving, appertains to the king, under the sole condition, in case of a dissolution, of making immediately a new convocation.

As to the duration, some have demanded the periodical assembling of the states-general; and they have desired that the periodical returns should not depend on the will or the interest of the depositaries of power; others, but in smaller number, have demanded the permanency of the states-general, so that the separation of the members may not lead to the dissolution of the states.

The periodical system has given rise to a second question: shall there be, or not, an intermediate commission during the interval of the sessions? The majority of your constituents has regarded the establishment of an intermediate commission as dangerous.

As to the composition, some have adhered to the separation of the three orders; but on this point the extension of powers, which several representatives have already obtained, leaves doubtless a greater latitude in the solution of this question.

Some bailiwicks have demanded the junction of the two first orders in one chamber; others the suppression of the clergy, and the division of its members into the two other orders; others that the representation of the nobility should be double that of the clergy, and that both united should be equal to that of the commons.

One bailiwick, whilst demanding the union of the two first orders, has demanded the establishment of a third, under the title of the rural order. It has been also required that every person holding office, employment, or place at court, may not be eligible as a deputy to the states-general. Finally, the inviolability of the deputies is recognised by the greatest number of the bailiwicks, and contested by none. As to the mode of deliberation, the question of voting individually or by orders is already settled. Some bailiwicks demand two-thirds of the votes to render a resolution valid.

The necessity for the national consent to taxation is universally pronounced by your constituents, asserted in all the instructions; all limit the duration of taxes to the term you may fix—a term, however, never to be extended beyond the interval from one convocation to another; and this obligatory clause has appeared to your constituents as the surest guarantee of the perpetuity of your national assemblies.

Loans, being in fact but indirect taxation, seem to them undoubtedly subject to the same principles.

Some bailiwicks have excepted from the term taxes those which may be set aside for the liquidation of the national debt, and have held that they ought to be exigible until its complete extinction.

As to administrative bodies or provincial states, all the instructions demand their establishment, and the majority rely upon your wisdom for their organisation.

Finally, the rights of all citizens, liberty and property, are energetically asserted by the whole French nation. It claims for each of its members the inviolability of individual property, as it claims for itself the inviolability of public property; it demands individual liberty in all its extent, as it has established for ever national liberty; it calls for the liberty of the press, or the free communication of thought; it inveighs in terms of indignation against *lettres de cachet*, which disposed arbitrarily of persons, and against the violation of the secrecy of the post-office, as one of the most preposterous and infamous inventions of despotism.

Amidst this concourse of demands, we have remarked some peculiar modifications relative to *lettres de cachet* and the liberty of the press. You will weigh them in your wisdom; you will doubtless satisfy that sentiment of French honour, which, from horror of infamy, has sometimes overstepped justice, and which will doubtless be as eager to submit to the law when it affects the powerful, as it was to counteract it when it weighed only upon the weak. You will calm the apprehensions for religion, so frequently outraged by libels in the time of the prohibitive system; and the clergy, remembering that licentiousness was for ages the handmaid of slavery, will themselves acknowledge that the first and

arising from the diversity of interests, the natural divergences of opinion were likewise to be apprehended. An entire legislation to frame for a great people so powerfully excites all minds, inspires them with projects so vast, hopes so chimerical, that measures either vague or exaggerated, and often antagonistic, were to be anticipated. To infuse order into the labours, a committee was named, with instructions to investigate their extent, and to apportion their distribution. This committee was composed of the most moderate members of the assembly. Mounier, a sagacious though obstinate man, was its most indefatigable and influential member; he it was who arranged the order of proceeding.

The difficulty of framing a constitution was not the only one this assembly had to encounter. Between a government hostilely disposed and a people famishing, who required prompt relief, it was almost impossible to avoid interfering with administration. Distrustful of authority, and pressed to succour the people, it was impelled, without any impulse of ambition, gradually to encroach upon the executive power. The clergy had already given an example of this tendency, by its insidious proposition to the third-estate to enter forthwith upon the affair of provisions. The assembly was scarcely formed ere it named a committee on the necessaries of life, demanded from the minister information upon that subject, proposed to facilitate the circulation of produce from province to province, to transport it at the public charge to places where want prevailed, to make grants, and to provide for them by loans. The minister communicated the efficacious measures he had adopted, and which the king, as a solicitous administrator, had promoted with all his power. Lally-Tolendal proposed to pass decrees as to the free circulation, to which Mounier objected that such decrees would require the royal sanction; and that this sanction, not being yet regulated, would lead to serious difficulties. Thus all obstacles conspired to impede progress. An imperious necessity existed for laws before the legislative forms were settled, for controlling the administration without infringing upon the executive authority, and for grappling with an entire host of embarrassments, whilst fettered by the repugnance of power, by the opposition of particular interests, by the incongruity of opinions, and by the exigencies of a people recently aroused, and in agitation a few leagues from the assembly, in the heart of an immense capital.

A very short space separates Paris from Versailles, and it may be traversed several times in a day. All the movements in Paris were consequently immediately felt at Versailles, at court, and in the assembly. Paris at that time presented a new and extraordinary spectacle. The electors, collected into sixty districts, had refused to separate after the elections, and had remained assembled, either for the purpose of giving instructions to their deputies, or from that craving for union and agitation which is inherent in men, and which breaks out with a violence proportioned to the length of its suppression. They had experienced the same fate as the national assembly; the place of their sittings had been closed, and they were driven to seek another. They had ultimately obtained access to the town-hall (*hotel-de-ville*), and there they continued to meet, and to correspond with their deputies. No public journals yet existed which reported the debates of the national assembly, and it was necessary to collect together in order to discuss and be apprised of events. The garden of the Palais-Royal was the scene of the most crowded congregations. That magnificent garden, surrounded by the most gorgeous shops in Europe, and forming an appurtenance to the palace of the Duke of Orleans, was the general resort for strangers, for the idle, and the dissipated, but, above all, for the most furious demagogues. The most daring speeches were delivered in the coffee-houses, or in the garden itself. An orator was ever and anon seen to mount on a table, and, gathering a crowd around him, to inflame with words of the greatest violence—words always uttered with impunity, for the mob reigned there with sovereign sway. Men who were supposed devoted to the Duke of Orleans showed themselves the most ardent. The wealth of that prince, his known profuseness, his enormous loans, his vicinage, his ambition, though vague, all conspired to ensure his accusation. History, without designat-

natural effect of liberty is the restoration of order, decency, and respect for the objects of public veneration.

Such, gentlemen, is the account your committee has judged itself bound to render to you of that portion of your instructions which treats of the constitution. You will doubtless find therein all the foundation-stones of the edifice which you are instructed to raise to its height; but you will perhaps have to desire that order, that concentration of political combinations, without which the social system will always present numerous defects: the powers are indicated, but not distinguished with the necessary precision; the organisation of the national representation is not sufficiently laid down; the principles of eligibility are not adduced; it is from your labours that these results must spring. The nation has determined to be free, and it is you whom it intrusts with its enfranchisement; the genius of France has precipitated, so to speak, the march of the public mind. It has accumulated for you in a few hours the experience which could have been scarcely anticipated from many ages. You have it in your power, gentlemen, to give a constitution to France; the king and the people loudly demand it; both the one and the other have well deserved it.

RESULT OF THE ANALYSATION OF THE INSTRUCTIONS.

Principles Decided.

Art. 1. The French government is a monarchical government.
2. The person of the king is sacred and inviolable.
3. His crown is hereditary from male to male.
4. The king is the depositary of executive power.
5. The agents of authority are responsible.
6. The royal sanction is necessary for the promulgation of laws.
7. The nation makes the law with the royal sanction.
8. The national consent is necessary for loans and taxes.
9. The taxes can be granted only from one holding of the states-general to another.
10. Property is sacred.
11. Individual liberty is sacred

Questions upon which the whole of the Instructions have not given explanations in an uniform manner.

Art. 1. Has the king the legislative power, limited by the constitutional laws of the realm?
2. Can the king alone make provisional laws on matters of police and administration in the interval between the assemblies of the states-general?
3. Shall these laws be subjected to the free registration of the supreme courts?
4. Can the states-general be dissolved except by themselves?
5. Can the king alone convoke, prorogue, and dissolve the states-general?
6. In case of a dissolution, is not the king obliged to make immediately a new convocation?
7. Shall the states-general be permanent or periodical?
8. If they are periodical, shall there be or not an intermediate commission?
9. Shall the two higher orders be united in a single chamber?
10. Shall the two chambers be formed without distinction of orders?
11. Shall the members of the ecclesiastical order be distributed into the two other orders?
12. Shall the representation of the clergy, the nobility, and the commons, be in the proportion of one, two, and three?
13. Shall a third order be established, under the title of the rural order?
14. Can persons holding offices, employments, or places at court, be deputies to the states-general?
15. Shall two-thirds of the votes be necessary to pass a resolution?
16. Shall the taxes appropriated to the liquidation of the national debt be exigible until its entire extinction?
17. Shall *lettres de cachet* be abolished or modified?
18. Shall the liberty of the press be unrestricted or modified?"

ing individuals, can assert that gold was certainly distributed. If the sound part of the nation ardently desired liberty, if the uneasy and suffering populace were disposed to agitation, and anxious to better its condition, there were also instigators who sometimes excited that populace, and possibly directed some of its enterprises. But such an influence is not to be reckoned amongst the causes of the revolution, for it is not with a handful of gold and secret manœuvres that a nation of twenty-five millions of men is stimulated to action.

An occasion for troubles soon presented itself. The French guards, chosen troops destined to form the king's guard, were at Paris. Four companies were alternately detached, and proceeded to do duty at Versailles. In addition to the extreme severity of the new discipline, these troops had also reason to complain of that of their colonel. During the pillage of Reveillon's house, they had indeed exhibited some ferocity against the people, but had afterwards been touched with remorse on that account, and, mingling every day with the citizens, they had yielded to their blandishments. Furthermore, soldiers and sub-officers felt that every chance of promotion was closed against them; they were irritated at seeing their young officers perform scarcely any duty, appear only on days of parade, and after the reviews not even accompany them to barracks. There was in the army, as well as in civil life, a third-estate, which bore all burdens and participated in no benefit. A spirit of disobedience was not long in being manifested, and some of the guards were imprisoned in the Abbaye.

A general rush ensued to the Palais-Royal: "*To the Abbaye!*" was the universal shout; and the multitude hastened thither. Its gates were forced, and the soldiers being released, were borne away in triumph. (30th June.) Whilst the people were guarding them at the Palais-Royal, a letter was written to the assembly, demanding their liberty. Placed between the people on the one hand and the government on the other, which was suspected, since it evinced a resolution to act in its own cause, the assembly could not avoid interfering, and committing an encroachment by taking part in a matter of public police. Adopting a course at once adroit and prudent, it expressed to the Parisians its wishes for the maintenance of good order, recommending them not to disturb it; and at the same time sent a deputation to the king, to implore his clemency, as the infallible means of restoring concord and tranquillity. The king, moved by the moderation of the assembly, promised clemency when order should be re-established. The French guards were immediately conducted back to prison, and a royal pardon set them forthwith at liberty.

All was going well up to this time; but the nobility, when coalescing with the two orders, had succumbed with reluctance, and on the promise that the junction should be of short duration. The order still met every day, and entered into protests against the operations of the national assembly: its numbers, however, progressively dwindled: on the 3d July it counted 138 members present, on the 10th only 93, and on the 11th 80. Nevertheless, the most obstinate had persisted, and on the 11th had resolved on a protest, which ulterior events prevented them from drawing up. The court, on its part, had not yielded without regret, nor without designs in view. Emerging from its consternation after the sitting of the 23d June, it had urged the general junction with the idea of shackling the progress of the assembly by means of the nobles, and with the hope of soon dissolving the union by main force. Necker had been retained merely to cover by his presence the secret plots that were hatching. From a certain appearance of agitation, and from the reserve evinced towards him, he suspected some grand machination. The king himself was not informed of all that was projected; and it was doubtless intended to go farther than he was thought likely to sanction. Necker, who imagined that the entire action of a statesman should be limited to reasoning, and whose vigour was precisely of that order which expends itself in representations, proffered them to the smallest possible purpose. In conjunction with Mounier, Lally-Tolendal, and Clermont-Tonnerre, he meditated the establishment of the English constitution. Meanwhile, the court pursued its secret preparations; and the noble deputies having expressed a determination to withdraw, they were detained by cheering intimations of an approaching event.

Troops were drawing near; the old Marshal de Broglie had been named to the command in chief, and the Baron de Besenval had received the particular command of those which surrounded Paris. Fifteen regiments, for the most part foreign, were in the vicinity of the capital. The boasting of the courtiers revealed the danger, and those conspirators, somewhat too prompt in their menaces, compromised their own schemes. The popular deputies, acquainted, not with all the details of a plan which was not yet fully unmasked, and which the king himself knew but partially, still with enough to excite apprehensions of intended violence, were highly exasperated, and looked around for means of resistance. It is unknown, and will probably for ever remain unknown, what share secret arrangements had in the insurrection of the 14th July; but the matter is of trifling moment. The aristocracy were plotting, and the popular party might very naturally plot also. The means employed being the same, the only question is as to the justice of the cause; and justice was assuredly not with those who desired to subvert the union of the orders, to dissolve the national representation, and wreak vengeance on its most courageous deputies.

Mirabeau conceived that the surest means of intimidating the court was to compel it to a public discussion of the measures which it was palpably projecting. For this purpose it was necessary to make a public denunciation. If it hesitated to answer, if it evaded the subject, it was convicted, and the nation was apprised and roused.

Mirabeau caused the labours upon the constitution to be suspended, and moved that the king be requested to withdraw the troops. He mingled in his speech sentiments of respect for the monarch, with the most severe invectives against the government. He said that every day fresh troops were advancing; that all the communications were intercepted, the bridges and walks changed into military posts; that both notorious and secret facts, hurried orders and counter-orders, struck all eyes, and announced war. Adding bitter reproaches to these details, he exclaimed, "They bring more soldiers to intimidate the nation than an enemy would probably encounter upon an invasion, and a thousand times more, at least, than they were able to collect in aid of friends, martyrs to their fidelity, and especially to maintain that alliance with the Dutch, so valuable, so dearly acquired, and so shamefully lost."

His discourse was greeted with enthusiastic applause, and the address he proposed instantly adopted, modified only in one particular. When soliciting the removal of the troops, Mirabeau had proposed that they should be replaced by burgher guards, which paragraph was struck out. The address was then voted, only four voices dissenting. In this still celebrated document, which it is said he did not himself compose, but had furnished all its ideas to one of his friends, Mirabeau predicted almost all that was about to happen; the insurrection of the multitude, and the defection of the troops from their friendly intercourse with the citizens. As bold as he was sagacious, he dared to assure the king that his promises should not be vain. "You have called us," said he, "to regenerate the kingdom; your intentions shall be fulfilled in spite of snares, difficulties, perils," &c.

The address was presented by a deputation of

twenty-four members. The king, declining to explain himself, replied that this assembling of troops had no other object than the maintenance of public tranquillity, and the protection due to the assembly; and that, moreover, if that body had still any apprehensions, he would transfer it to Soissons or Noyon, and go himself to Compiègne.

The assembly could scarcely feel satisfaction at such a reply, especially at the offer to remove it to a distance from the capital, and plant it between two camps. The Count de Crillon argued that implicit faith should be placed on the word of a king and an honest man. "The word of an honest king," retorted Mirabeau, "is but a sad guarantee for the conduct of his ministry; our blind confidence in our kings has been our ruin: we asked the retreat of the troops, and not our flight before them. We must still insist on that measure without a moment's relaxation."

This opinion was not supported. Mirabeau sufficiently urged open operations to induce his secret machinations to be pardoned, if it be true that any such were employed.

Necker had repeatedly told the king that if his services were disagreeable to him, he would cheerfully resign. "I rely upon your word," the king had upon such occasions replied. On the afternoon of the 11th July, Necker received a note, in which the king called upon him to keep his word; urged him to depart; and added, that he had sufficient confidence in him to hope that he would conceal his departure from all the world. Necker, justifying the honourable confidence of the monarch, set off without saying a word to his friends, or even to his daughter, and in a few hours was several leagues from Versailles. The next day, 12th July, was a Sunday. A rumour was spread at Paris that Necker had been dismissed, as also Montmorin, La Luzerne, Puységur, and St Priest. As their successors, were announced De Breteuil, La Vauguyon, De Broglie, Foulon, and Damécort, almost all notorious for their opposition to the popular cause. Alarm became predominant in Paris. The Palais-Royal was thronged. A young man, afterwards known for his republican enthusiasm, naturally of a tender but excitable temperament, Camille-Desmoulins, sprang upon a table, drew forth pistols, with an exhortation to arm, tore a leaf from a tree, which he converted into a cockade, and induced every one to follow his example. The trees were instantaneously stripped, and the crowd repaired to a museum containing busts in wax. They seized upon those of Necker and the Duke of Orleans, who was said to be menaced with exile, and then spread themselves over the quarters of Paris. This mob was passing along the street St Honoré, when it met near the square Vendôme a detachment of the royal German regiment, which fell upon it, wounded several persons, and amongst others a soldier of the French guards. The latter, already disposed in favour of the people and against the royal Germans, with which regiment they had had a contest some days before, were quartered near the square Louis XV., and now fired upon their opponents. The Prince de Lambesc, who commanded the royal German regiment, immediately moved back upon the garden of the Tuileries, charged the peaceable crowd walking there, killed an old man in the tumult, and cleared the garden.

In the mean time, the troops which surrounded Paris concentrated on the field of Mars and the square of Louis XV. The alarm then became unbounded, and changed to fury. The people rushed through the town with cries of "*To arms!*" The town-hall was beset with applications for weapons. The electors composing the general assembly were collected there. They yielded the arms they had no power to refuse, and which were already seized, indeed, when they decided upon delivering them. These electors formed at that moment the only constituted authority. Deprived of all active power, they assumed such functions as circumstances required, and now summoned a convocation of the districts. All the citizens repaired thither to deliberate upon the means of preserving themselves—on the one hand, from the fury of the multitude, and on the other, from the attack of the royal troops. During the night, the populace, always attracted to what chiefly interests it, forced and burned the barriers,* put the keepers to flight, and threw all the avenues open and free. The shops of the gunsmiths were also broken into and rifled. Those brigands, already signalised by their activity at Reveillon's, and who were seen on all occasions starting forth as if from the bowels of the earth, now made their appearance, armed with pikes and clubs, and carried terror into all quarters. These events occurred in the course of Sunday the 12th July, and during the night following. On Monday morning, the electors, still sitting at the town-hall, deemed it expedient to give a more legal aspect to their authority, and consequently dispatched an invitation to the provost of the trades,† the ordinary administrator of the city. This functionary would not consent to join them, except upon a formal requisition. This was complied with, and a certain number of electors was united with him, thus composing a municipality invested with all necessary powers. This municipality summoned the lieutenant of police before it, and in a few hours digested a plan of enrolment for a burgher militia.

This militia was to be composed of 48,000 men, furnished by the districts. The distinguishing symbol selected was the Parisian cockade, red and blue, instead of the green one of Desmoulins. Every person found in arms and wearing this cockade, without having been enrolled by his district in the burgher guard, was ordered to be arrested, disarmed, and punished. Such was the origin of the national guards. This plan was adopted by all the districts, and they hastened to put it in execution. In the course of the same morning, the populace had plundered the convent of Saint Lazarus in search of corn, and had likewise broken into the *garde-meuble*, or armoury, in pursuit of arms, the antique and curious weapons with which it was stored being torn down and carried off. A motley crew, bearing helmets and pikes of by-gone times, issued forth and overspread the town. The populace showed itself upon this occasion opposed to robbery; with its usual fickleness, it affected disinterestedness, leaving money untouched, taking nothing but arms, and even assisting to apprehend the brigands. The French guards and soldiers of the watch had offered their services, and they were accordingly enrolled in the burgher guard.

More arms were still demanded with loud shouts. The provost, Flesselles, who had at first refused to co-operate with his fellow-citizens, now evinced great zeal, and promised 12,000 muskets that very day, and an additional number for the succeeding days. He asserted that he had made a contract with an unnamed gun-manufacturer. The thing appeared improbable, considering the shortness of the time that had elapsed. However, towards evening, the chests of arms announced by Flesselles were conveyed to the town-hall; they were eagerly opened, and found to be full of old linen. At this unexpected disappointment, the multitude growled indignantly at the provost, who stated, in exculpation, that he had been deceived. To appease

* At these barriers duties were collected on articles entering Paris.

† "The *prévôts des marchands*, or provosts of the trades, were officers of the highest antiquity. In 1357, they purchased, in conjunction with the *echevins*, or municipal magistrates, the house where, in ancient times, the dauphins resided, called *Maison de Grève*, which gave the name of *Place de Grève* to the area on which it stood; and on the site of that and some others round it they afterwards built the *hotel-de-ville*, or town-house. The provost was appointed by the king, sometimes for two years, or renewed every year at his pleasure."—*Bertrand de Moleville's Annals of the Revolution, vol. i. p. 127.*

them further, he directed them to the Carthusian monastery, with the assurance that they would find arms there. The astounded monks received the infuriated rabble, led them through their quiet domicile, and convinced them that they possessed no such articles as had been mentioned by the provost.

The people, more exasperated than ever, returned with cries of treachery. To satisfy them, the fabrication of 50,000 pikes was forthwith ordered. Some barrels of powder destined for Versailles were descending the Seine in boats; these were seized, and an elector distributed the contents amidst the greatest danger.

Horrible confusion prevailed at this same town-hall, the seat of the authorities, the head-quarters of the militia, and the centre of all operations. Simultaneous demands were made on all in authority to provide for external security menaced by the court, for internal security menaced by the brigands, for calming the suspicions of the people, who thought themselves every instant betrayed, and for saving from their fury those who were the objects of their distrust. Around the hall were accumulated arrested carriages, intercepted convoys of waggons, and travellers waiting for permission to resume their journey. During the night, it was again threatened by the brigands; an elector, the valorous Moreau de St Mery, intrusted with its defence, caused barrels of powder to be brought, and threatened to blow it up. The brigands were awed and withdrew. At the same time, the citizens, retired to their homes, held themselves in readiness for all attacks; they had unpaved the streets, dug trenches, and taken all possible measures for resisting a siege.

During these troubles in the capital, the assembly was a prey to the most serious alarms. On the morning of the 13th, the members repaired to the hall, full of apprehensions for impending events, and as yet ignorant of what had occurred at Paris. The deputy Mounier was the first to rise and exclaim against the dismissal of the ministers. Lally-Tolendal succeeded him in the tribune, pronounced a splendid eulogium upon Necker, and seconded Mounier's motion for an address in which the king should be solicited to recall the disgraced ministers. A deputy of the nobility, M. de Virieu, proposed to confirm the resolutions of the 17th June by a fresh oath. Clermont-Tonnerre opposed this proposition as unnecessary; and, recapitulating the engagements already taken by the assembly, exclaimed: "The constitution shall be, or we shall be no more!" The discussion was proceeding when information was brought of the disturbances at Paris on the morning of the 13th, and the evils with which the capital was threatened, between undisciplined Frenchmen, who, according to the expression of the Duke de Larochefoucauld, were in the hands of no one, and disciplined foreigners who were in the hands of despotism. It was instantly resolved to send a deputation to the king, for the purpose of laying before him the desolation of his capital, and entreating him to order the withdrawal of the troops and the enrolment of burgher guards. The king returned a cold and tranquil answer, little in accordance with his real feelings, and repeated that it was not possible for Paris to guard itself. Thereupon the assembly, exalted by the noblest heroism, passed a memorable resolution, in which it insisted upon the removal of the troops and the establishment of burgher guards, declared the ministers and all the agents of power personally responsible, put upon the counsellors of the king, *of whatever rank they might be*, the responsibility of the misfortunes which impended; consolidated the public debt, denounced the utterance of the execrable word bankruptcy, re-asserted its preceding resolutions, and ordained the president to convey its regret to M. Necker, as also to the other ministers displaced. After these measures, so indicative of prudence and energy, the assembly, in order to preserve its members from all personal violence, declared itself permanent, and named M. de Lafayette vice-president, for the purpose of relieving the estimable Archbishop of Vienne, whom his age did not allow to sit both day and night.

The night between the 13th and 14th was thus passed amidst excitement and alarm. Every instant some dismal intelligence was announced and contradicted. Though all the projects of the court were not fathomed, it was nevertheless sufficiently notorious that several deputies were threatened; that violence was about to be employed against Paris and the most distinguished members of the assembly. Suspended for a fleeting interval, the sitting was resumed at five in the morning of the 14th. With an imposing and truly dignified composure, the assembly returned to its labours on the constitution, and discussed with infinite judgment the means of accelerating its execution, and preparing for it with prudence. A committee was named to frame the resolutions, composed of the Bishop of Autun, the Archbishop of Bordeaux, Lally, Clermont-Tonnerre, Mounier, Sieyes, Chapelier, and Bergasse. The morning thus elapsed. Rumours more and more sinister were brought to the assembly; the king, it was said, would leave that night, and the assembly remain at the mercy of foreign regiments. The queen, the princes, and the Duchess of Polignac, had just been seen walking in the Orangery, cajoling the officers and soldiers, and ordering them refreshments. It appears that a grand scheme was prepared for the night of the 14th and 15th; that Paris was to be attacked at seven points, the Palais-Royal surrounded, the assembly dissolved, and the declaration of the 23d June carried to the parliament. The exigencies of the treasury were to be surmounted by bankruptcy and state-notes. It is certain that the commanders of the troops had received orders to advance on the 14th; that the state-notes had been fabricated; that the barracks of the Swiss were filled with munitions of war; and that the governor of the Bastille had removed a variety of articles, leaving in the place only some indispensable pieces of furniture. In the afternoon the terrors of the assembly were redoubled; the Prince de Lambesc had been seen passing at full gallop; the distant noise of a cannonade was heard, and the members laid their ears to the ground to catch the faintest sounds. Mirabeau moved that all further debate be suspended, and a second deputation be sent to the king. The deputation immediately set out to make fresh representations. At this moment, two members of the assembly, just arrived in all haste from Paris, brought intelligence that slaughter was at work in that city; one of them asseverated that he had seen a corpse with its head off, and wrapped in black. The night was beginning to fall, when the arrival of two electors was announced. The deepest stillness reigned in the hall; the noise of their steps was heard amid the darkness; and from their mouths was learnt that the Bastille had been attacked, cannon fired, and blood shed, and that the most frightful calamities threatened to ensue. A new deputation was immediately named before the preceding one had returned. Whilst preparing to depart, the first arrived and brought back an answer from the king. He had ordered, he said, the removal of the troops encamped in the field of Mars to a greater distance, and having been informed of the formation of burgher guards, he had nominated officers to command them.

Upon the arrival of the second deputation, the king, in great agitation, had addressed it in these words: "Gentlemen, you tear my heart more and more by the account you give me of the calamities of Paris. It is not possible that the orders given to the troops can have caused them." Only the removal of the army to a greater distance had been as yet obtained. It was two hours after midnight. The answer given to the city of Paris imported "that two deputations had been sent, and that the remonstrances would be renewed the next day until they met with that success which was to be justly anticipated from

the heart of the king, when its impulses should be no longer controlled by fatal counsels." The sitting was suspended for a short period, and in the interim the events of the 14th July were made fully known.

The people, so early as the night of the 13th, had congregated about the Bastille; some shots had been fired, and it seems that instigators had repeatedly shouted out, "To the Bastille!" But the wish for its destruction was expressed in several of the deputies' instructions, so that the public mind had evidently taken that direction at first, without any prompting. There was still a continual demand for arms. A report was spread that the Hotel des Invalides contained a considerable depôt. The people immediately flocked to that building. The governor, M. de Sombreuil, defended its entrance, saying that he must send for orders to Versailles. The crowd would listen to no such proposition, but at once rushed pell-mell into the hospital, and bore away the cannons and a great number of muskets. A considerable concourse was already in array against the Bastille. The insurgents alleged that the guns of the castle were pointed upon the town, and that they must be prevented from firing upon it. The deputy of a district stepped forward, and asked permission to inspect the fortress, which the commandant accorded. When admitted inside, he found thirty-two Swiss and eighty-two invalids, and took the word of the garrison not to fire unless attacked. During this parley, the people began to be uneasy and vociferous at not seeing their deputy return, and he was obliged to show himself from the ramparts to appease them. About eleven in the morning he withdrew. Half an hour had scarcely elapsed before a fresh crowd arrived in arms, rending the air with shouts of "We'll have the Bastille!" The garrison summoned the assailants to retire, but they paid no heed to the warning. Two men mounted with great intrepidity to the roof of the guard-house, and severed with their axes the chains of the drawbridge, which accordingly fell. The crowd rushed precipitately along it, and onwards to a second bridge. At this moment a discharge of musketry arrested their course; in a few seconds they recoiled, but returning the fire. The contest was thus maintained for a short interval. The electors, sitting at the town-hall, were greatly alarmed when they heard the report of the musketry, and sent forth two deputations, one after the other, to induce the governor to allow a detachment of the Parisian militia to be introduced into the fortress, on the ground that all the military force in Paris should be under the control of the city. These two deputations successively made their appearance on the scene of action. But it was extremely difficult to obtain a hearing amidst a siege conducted by popular undisciplined bands. The beating of a drum and the hoisting of a flag succeeded in suspending the fire for a time. The deputies advanced; the garrison listened to them; but it was impossible to make mutual explanations amidst the din. Shots were fired, from what quarter is unknown. The people, convinced that treachery was intended, ran forward to set the castle on fire: the garrison thereupon fired with grape-shot. The French guards came up with cannon, and commenced an attack in form.

Whilst these events were passing, a letter addressed by the Baron de Besenval to Delaunay, the governor of the Bastille, was intercepted and read at the town-hall. In this epistle Besenval urged Delaunay to hold out, assuring him that succours would be speedily sent to him. It was on the evening of that day, in fact, that the plans of the court were appointed for execution. In the mean time, Delaunay, perceiving no prospect of assistance, and observing the reckless daring of the people, seized a lighted match, with the intention of blowing up the fortress. The garrison opposed the desperate resolution, and compelled him to surrender. The signals were given, and a bridge lowered. The besiegers approached, promising to commit no mischief; but the crowd rushed tumultuously forward, and filled the courts. The Swiss succeeded in saving themselves. The invalids were assailed, and only wrested from the fury of the mob by the exertions of the French guards. At this moment a young and beautiful girl, trembling with terror, presented herself; she was imagined to be the daughter of Delaunay; the ruffians seized upon her, and she was about to be burnt, when a heroic soldier precipitated himself amongst the crew of wretches, tore her from their grasp, bore her to a place of safety, and then returned to the scene of commotion.

It was now half-past five. The electors were in a state of distressing anxiety, when they heard a dull and prolonged murmur. An excited multitude approached with cries of victory. The hall in which they were sitting was speedily thronged, and a French guardsman, covered with wounds and crowned with laurel, was carried in triumph on the shoulders of the crowd. The rules and keys of the Bastille were borne on the point of a bayonet; a bloody hand raised above the heads of the populace exhibited to view the tail of a peruke; it was that of Delaunay's, whose head had been just struck off. Two of the guards, Elie and Hullin, had defended him to the last extremity. Other victims had fallen, though heroically protected against the ferocity of the populace. A sort of maddened fury began to explode against Flesselles, the provost of the trades, who was accused of treachery. It was alleged that he had deceived the people, by repeatedly promising them arms, which he nevertheless withheld. The hall was full of men exasperated with a long contest, and pressed by thousands of others who, clustered around the building, strove to enter in their turn. The electors made an effort to justify Flesselles in the eyes of the multitude. He began to lose his presence of mind, and, his countenance pale with terror, exclaimed, "Since I am suspected, I will withdraw." "No," was shouted in reply; "come to the Palais-Royal to be tried." He then descended to repair thither. The crowd gave way, surrounded and closed upon him. When he had reached the Pelletier quay, an unknown hand laid him prostrate with a pistol-bullet. It was asserted that a letter had been found on Delaunay, in which Flesselles wrote to him, "Hold out, whilst I amuse the Parisians with cockades."

Such were the dismal occurrences of that day. An emotion of terror soon succeeded the intoxication of success. The conquerors of the Bastille, petrified at their own audacity, and anticipating the speedy vengeance of outraged authority, were afraid to confess their participation in the exploit. Every instant rumours were rife that troops were advancing to sack Paris. Moreau de St Mery, the same who the day before had threatened the brigands to blow up the town-hall, remained unshaken amidst the panic, and issued upwards of three thousand orders in a few hours. As soon as the conquest of the Bastille was known at the town-hall, the electors had sent to inform the assembly of the fact, and the intelligence reached Versailles in the middle of the night. The assembly was not sitting at the moment, but the news was quickly spread abroad. Hitherto the court, disbelieving in the energy of the people, and contemning the efforts of an ignorant multitude directed against a fortress vainly besieged by the great Condé in former times, had sat perfectly tranquil, indulging in lightsome raillery. The king, however, had begun to feel some uneasiness; his last answers had revealed his anguish. He had retired to bed when the final catastrophe was proclaimed in Versailles. The Duke de Liancourt, so distinguished for his noble sentiments, was the intimate friend of Louis XVI., and from his office of grand-master of the wardrobe, had always access to his person. When apprised of the events at Paris, he repaired in all haste to the monarch, awakened him in spite of his ministers, and informed him of

what had passed. "What, a revolt!" exclaimed the king. "Sire," replied the Duke de Liancourt, "rather say, revolution." The king, moved by his representations, consented to go in the morning to the assembly. The court also surrendered; and this act of confidence was resolved upon. In the interval, the assembly had resumed its sitting. The new dispositions wherewith the king had been inspired were unknown, and it was determined to send a last deputation to him, with the view of appealing to his feelings, and obtaining from him all that still remained to be granted. This was the fifth deputation since the commencement of these disastrous events. It was composed of twenty-four members, and was about to leave the hall, when Mirabeau, rising with greater vehemence than ever, stopped it. "Tell the king," he exclaimed, "tell him without quailing, that the foreign hordes with which we are encompassed were yesterday visited by the princes and the princesses, and their parasites of both sexes, who lavished upon them caresses, exhortations, and bribes. Tell him, furthermore, that all night these foreign myrmidons, gorged with gold and wine, have foretold in their impious carols the subjection of France, and that their brutal prayers were raised for the destruction of the national assembly. And tell him that in his own palace his courtiers danced to the sounds of that ferocious music, and that such was the prelude to the St Bartholomew! Tell him, in fine, that the Henry whose memory the universe reveres, he of all his forefathers whose model he would take, allowed provisions to pass into Paris in rebellion, when besieged by himself; and that *his* ferocious counsellors drive back the supplies that commerce bears to Paris when faithful and famished."


The deputation was then proceeding to the palace, when intelligence arrived that the king was on the way, of his own will, without guards and without escort. Shouts of applause rang through the hall. "Wait," resumed Mirabeau, with gravity, "until the king has communicated to us his gracious intentions. Let solemn reverence be the only welcome accorded to the monarch in this moment of affliction. The silence of nations is awful to kings."

Louis XVI. then presented himself, accompanied by his two brothers. His benignant and affecting discourse roused the greatest enthusiasm. He calmed the apprehensions of the assembly, which he called for the first time the national assembly, and complained with mildness of the suspicions that had been entertained. "You have been alarmed," he said; "and now it is I who put my trust in you." These words were received with the most animated plaudits. The deputies immediately arose, surrounded the monarch, and re-conducted him on foot to the palace. The crowd pressed around him, tears stood in all eyes, and he could scarcely thread his way through his numerous escort. The queen, seated on a balcony with the court, contemplated at a distance this touching scene. Her son was in her arms, and her daughter, standing at her side, was carelessly playing with the locks of her brother. The queen, greatly moved, beheld with visible complacency these proofs of Frenchmen's affection. Alas! how often a reciprocal emotion reconciled hearts during those frightful discords! For an instant all seemed forgotten; but on the morrow, on that very day, the court was restored to its pride, the people to their distrust, and implacable hatred resumed its sway.

Peace was thus concluded with the assembly, but it remained to be made with Paris. The assembly forthwith sent a deputation to the town-hall, to bear the news of the happy reconciliation effected with the king. Bailly, Lafayette, and Lally-Tolendal, were in the number of the envoys. Their presence caused the liveliest demonstrations of joy. The speech of Lally-Tolendal aroused transports so ardent, that he was carried in triumph to a window of the town-hall to be shown to the people. A garland of flowers was placed upon his head, and he received this homage in front of the very square in which his father had died with a gag upon his lips. The death of the unfortunate Flesselles, head of the municipality, and the refusal of the Duke d'Aumont to accept the command of the burgher militia, left a provost and a commander-in-chief for nomination. Bailly was proposed, and, amidst the loudest and heartiest acclamations, was named successor of Flesselles, under the title of "Mayor of Paris." The garland which had been on the head of Lally was placed on that of the new mayor; he attempted to remove it, but the Archbishop of Paris kept it on in spite of him. The eyes of the virtuous old man filled with tears, and he resigned himself to his novel functions. The dignified representative of a great assembly, in presence of all the majesty of the throne, he was less capable of ruling amid the storms of a large city, where the multitude was incessantly rising with tumultuary violence against the magistrates. Setting aside, however, all personal thoughts, he proceeded to devote himself to the difficult labours of providing food, and subsisting a people destined to repay him with so much ingratitude. A commander of the militia remained to be named. In the hall stood a bust which had been presented by emancipated America to the city of Paris. Moreau de Saint Mery stretched out his arm towards it, and all eyes followed in the direction: it was the bust of the Marquis de Lafayette. An universal shout proclaimed him commander. A *Te Deum* was immediately voted; and all passed in a crowd from the town-hall to the cathedral of Notre-Dame. The new magistrates, the Archbishop of Paris, the electors, mingled with the French guards and the soldiers of the militia, marching arm in arm, proceeded to the venerable edifice in a sort of intoxicated rapture. On the road, some foundling children fell at the feet of Bailly, who had signalised himself by exertions for the hospitals; they saluted him as their father, and Bailly pressed them in his arms, calling them his children. They reached the church; the ceremony was celebrated, and the congregation afterwards overspread the city, in which a delirium of gladness had succeeded the gloomy terrors of the eve. At that moment, the people went to visit the cavern, so feared for ages, the entrance to which was now thrown open. The Bastille was traversed with eager curiosity and a feeling of awe. Instruments of torture and deep dungeons were gazed upon with shudders. The chief object of attraction was an enormous stone placed in the middle of a dark and swampy cell, to the centre of which was fixed a ponderous chain.

The court, as blind in its fears as it had been in its presumption, was so dreadfully alarmed at the idea of the people, that it imagined every moment a Parisian army was marching on Versailles. The Count d'Artois and the family of Polignac, so dear to the queen, now quitted France, and were the first emigrants. Bailly waited on the king, to re-animate his drooping courage, and prevail on him to visit Paris, which journey was resolved on in spite of the opposition of the queen and the court.

The king prepared to depart. Two hundred deputies were nominated to accompany him. The queen bade him farewell in a strain of profound affliction. The body-guards escorted him as far as Sevres, where they awaited his return. Bailly, at the head of the municipality, received him at the gates of Paris, and presented to him the keys formerly brought to Henry IV. "That good king," said Bailly to Louis XVI., "had gained his people; to-day it is the people who have regained their king." The nation, simply legislative at Versailles, was armed at Paris. Upon his entrance, Louis saw himself encompassed by a multitude, preserving a solemn silence, and drawn up in regimental order. He reached the town-hall, passing under an archway of swords crossed above his head, as a mark of honour. The speech he delivered was



Benj.ⁿ Franklin

simple and affecting. The people, unable longer to restrain themselves, broke out at last, and lavished upon the king their usual acclamations. These in some degree relieved the prince's anxiety, though he could not conceal an emotion of joy when he again beheld the body-guards stationed on the heights of Sevres. On his return to Versailles, the queen, throwing herself into his arms, embraced him as if she had feared she should never see him more.

In order fully to satisfy the public wish, the king ordered the recall of Necker, and the dismissal of the new ministers. M. de Liancourt, the king's friend and trusty counsellor, was elected president of the assembly. The noble deputies, who, although appearing at the debates, had hitherto refused to take part in them, gave way at this juncture, and commenced voting. Thus was the fusion of the orders accomplished. From that moment the revolution might be considered as achieved. The nation, master of the legislative power through the assembly, of the public force through itself, was thenceforth able to realise all that was beneficial to its interests. The refusal to render taxation equal had made the states-general necessary; the refusal to yield an equitable partition of authority in these states had annihilated courtly and aristocratic influence; and finally, the attempt to restore that influence had convulsed Paris, and provoked the whole nation to seize upon the public force.

CHAPTER III.

TROUBLES IN PARIS—LAFAYETTE—MIRABEAU—PROCEEDINGS OF THE ASSEMBLY IN FRAMING THE CONSTITUTION.

All things were in commotion in the heart of the capital, where a new order of authority had so lately been established. The same spirit that had impelled the electors into action was equally urgent with all classes of men. The assembly had been followed by the town-hall, the town-hall by the districts, and the districts by all the incorporations; tailors, shoemakers, bakers, servants, assembling together at the Louvre, at the place Louis XV., or the Champs Elysées, pursued their deliberations in form, in spite of the repeated prohibitions of the municipality. Amid these contrary movements, the town-hall, opposed by the districts, pestered by the Palais-Royal, was beset with obstacles, and could with difficulty meet the labours of its multitudinous functions. It joined within itself alone the civil, judicial, and military administration. The head-quarters of the militia were there fixed. The judges, uncertain amidst the general confusion as to their jurisdiction, handed over the accused to it. It possessed even the legislative power, for it was intrusted with the framing of its own constitution. Bailly had summoned two commissioners from each district to effect that object, who, under the title of representatives of the *commune* (or common-council), might regulate the institution. To fulfil so many duties, the electors had divided themselves into several committees; one, called the committee of inquiry, took the department of the police; another, called the committee of subsistence, took that of provisioning Paris—a task the most difficult and dangerous of all. Bailly was obliged to devote both day and night to this latter subject. It was necessary to effect continual purchases of wheat; to have it ground, and then to transport it to Paris through the famished rural districts. The convoys were frequently stopped; and numerous detachments were requisite to prevent robberies on the road and in the markets. Although the state sold the corn at a loss, in order that the bakers might keep down the price of bread, the multitude was not satisfied; it was found necessary to lower this price every day, and the scarcity at Paris increased by means of this very diminution, for the country people flocked thither to buy food. Apprehensions for the morrow induced every one to furnish himself abundantly; and the accumulations in the hands of some caused others to be absolutely devoid. Confidence is the main impetus to commerce, brings forward produce, and renders its distribution equal and easy; but when confidence is at an end, commercial activity ceases; the markets being no longer supplied in anticipation of wants, those wants stimulate to exasperation, add confusion to scarcity, and prevent the beneficial distribution of the little that is exposed. Thus the care of providing subsistence was the most arduous of all. The bitterest anxieties preyed upon Bailly and the committee. A whole day of unremitting labour scarcely sufficed for the day's necessities, and the morrow brought with it the same distressing solicitude.

Lafayette, commander of the burgher militia,* had almost as many difficulties to encounter. In this militia he had incorporated the French guards devoted to the revolution, a certain number of Swiss, and a great many soldiers, who deserted from the army in the hope of better pay. The king had himself authorised such desertions. These united troops composed what was called the companies of the centre. The militia took the name of "*the national guard*," assumed an uniform, and added to the red and blue colours of the Parisian cockade, white, which was the king's colour. Thus was formed that tri-coloured cockade, of which Lafayette foretold the destinies, when he proclaimed that it would make the tour of the world.

It was at the head of this body that Lafayette strove for two consecutive years to maintain public tranquillity, and to secure the execution of those laws passed daily by the assembly. Lafayette, the descendant of an ancient family, which had preserved its purity of manners amidst the corruption of the nobles, gifted with an upright and firm heart, and a passion for true glory, had been disgusted with the frivolities of the court, and the pedantic discipline of the French armies. His own country offering nothing to stimulate an ambition such as his, he turned to the most noble enterprise of the age, and departed for America the day after that on which it was reported in Europe that she had succumbed. He there fought by the side of Washington, and decided the enfranchisement of the New World by the alliance of France. Returning to his native land with an European renown, and welcomed at court as a novelty, he there displayed the independence and simplicity of an American. When philosophy, which had been but a play of wit for the careless idle nobles, at length demanded sacrifices from them, Lafayette almost alone persisted in the opinions he had always professed, called for the states-general, powerfully contributed to the junction of the orders, and was nominated, as a recompense, to the command in chief of the national guard. Lafayette had neither the passions nor the genius which frequently lead to the abuse of power; with an even temper, a winning address, and unswerving disinterestedness, he was especially suited for the part which circumstances assigned him, namely, that of ensuring the execution of the laws. Adored by his troops without having captivated them by victories, calm and full of resources amid the ragings of the multitude, he maintained order with indefatigable vigilance. The parties which had found him incorruptible, assailed his talents, since his character was beyond attack. And yet his foresight was accurate with regard both to events and to men; he appreciated, at their just value, the court and the party-leaders; protected them, at the peril of his life, without esteeming them; and often struggled against factions almost without hope, but with the constancy of a man determined never to abandon the commonwealth, even when he has lost all hope for it.

* He had been named to this post on the 15th July, at the town-hall.

In spite of all his vigilance, Lafayette was not always successful in allaying popular storms. For however active force may be, it cannot be every where at once against a people every where in insurrection, who look upon every man in authority as an enemy. The most absurd reports were spread and believed each passing moment. Now it was alleged that the soldiers of the French guards had been poisoned; anon, that the flour had been designedly damaged, or intercepted on the road; and the persons who gave themselves the greatest trouble to bring supplies to the capital were obliged to appear before an insensate mob, which overwhelmed them with execrations or applauses, according to the caprice of the moment. At the same time, there is no doubt that the fury of the populace, who, generally speaking, are unable, for any length of time, to select and pursue victims, often seemed directed either by wretches paid, as was said, to render the troubles more serious by imbruing them with blood, or simply by men of deep remorseless malignity. Foulon and Berthier were pursued and arrested far from Paris, under circumstances which left no doubt as to the intention with which they were seized. There was nothing spontaneous in the proceedings against them; the rage of the multitude which killed them alone possessed that character. Foulon, a retired intendant, and a stern, avaricious man, had been guilty of horrible exactions, and was also one of the ministers appointed to succeed Necker and his colleagues. He was taken at Viry, though he had spread a report of his death. His captors conducted him to Paris, reproaching him with having said that the people ought to be made to eat hay. A wisp of nettles was twisted round his neck, a bunch of thistles put in his hand, and a truss of hay strapped to his back, in which state he was conveyed to the town-hall. At the same instant, his son-in-law, Berthier de Sauvigny, was arrested at Compiègne, upon pretended orders from the commune (common-council) of Paris, which had never been issued. The commune immediately wrote, commanding his release, which injunction was disregarded. He was dragged towards Paris at the time Foulon was at the town-hall, exposed to all the fury of the frenzied mob. They called loudly for his death; the representations of Lafayette calmed them a little, and they consented that Foulon should be tried, but demanded that the trial should take place that very instant, in order to enjoy the spectacle of an immediate execution. Some electors had been named to serve as judges, but, under various pretexts, had declined the terrible office. At length Bailly and Lafayette were designated, who found themselves reduced to the distressing alternative either of losing their own lives from the rage of the populace, or of sacrificing a victim to appease it. However, Lafayette still endeavoured, with infinite address and courage, to temporise, and spoke to the multitude several times with great effect. The wretched Foulon, placed on a seat by his side, had the imprudence to applaud his concluding words, whereupon a bystander exclaimed, "Look there, they understand each other!" At this phrase the crowd was exasperated, and rushed upon Foulon. Lafayette made heroic exertions to rescue him from the assassins, but he was finally torn from his protection, and hanged to a lamp-post. His head was cut off, stuck on the end of a pike, and paraded through the streets of Paris. At this moment Berthier arrived, under the conduct of guards, and surrounded by an enraged multitude. He was shown the bleeding head, which he could not doubt was that of his father-in-law. He was conducted to the town-hall, where he pronounced a few words expressive of courage and indignation. Seized again by the crowd, he escaped for a moment from their grasp, got possession of a weapon, defended himself with desperation, but soon fell like the unfortunate Foulon. These murders, which were perpetrated on the 22d July, were instigated by the enemies of Foulon, or of the public welfare; for if the fury of the people were spontaneously aroused at their appearance, like most of their movements, their arrest had been the result of design. Lafayette, filled with grief and indignation, resolved to give in his resignation. Bailly and the municipality, alarmed at this design, hastened to dissuade him from its execution. It was arranged that he should tender his resignation as a proof of his discontent with the people, but that he should allow himself to be overcome by the entreaties they would not fail to make him. In fact, the people and the militia gathered around him, and promised him implicit obedience for the future. He resumed the command on those conditions; and, thenceforth, he had the satisfaction of preventing numerous disorders, by means of his own energy and the devoted zeal of his soldiers.

During these occurrences, Necker had received at Basle the orders of the king and the assurances of the assembly. The Polignacs, whom he had left triumphant at Versailles, and met as fugitives at Basle, were the first from whom he learnt the disasters of the throne, and the speedy return of favour which awaited him. He departed and traversed France, drawn in triumph by the people, to whom he recommended peace and good order, as was usual with him. The king received him with embarrassment, the assembly with enthusiasm; and he determined to proceed to Paris, in order that he might there also have his day of triumph. Necker was inflamed with a desire to gain from the electors the pardon and freedom of the Baron de Besenval, although his enemy. It was in vain that Bailly, to whom measures of severity were not less abhorrent than to himself, but who formed a more just appreciation of circumstances, represented to him the danger of the project, and assured him that such a favour, procured in a moment of delirium, would be annulled the following day as illegal, because an administrative body could neither condemn nor pardon; Necker was obstinately bent upon making a trial of his influence over the capital. He repaired to the town-hall on the 30th July. His hopes were more than accomplished, and he had some reason to believe himself all-powerful, when beholding the transports of the people. In great emotion, his eyes filled with tears, he asked for a general amnesty, which was instantly granted by acclamation. The two assemblies of electors and representatives exhibited equal zeal; the electors decreed the general amnesty, the representatives of the commune ordered the liberation of Besenval. Necker retired intoxicated with delight, assuming to himself an enthusiasm which was simply owing to his disgrace by the court. But from this day forth the pleasing dream gradually vanished; Mirabeau was preparing to awaken him with a cruel shake. In the assembly and in the districts, the cry was general against the sensibility of the minister, excusable, it was allowed, but sadly misplaced. The district of L'Oratoire, instigated, as is confidently asserted, by Mirabeau, was the first to raise its voice. It was maintained on all sides, that an administrative body could neither condemn nor absolve. The illegal measure of the town-hall was revoked, and the detention of the Baron de Besenval sustained. Thus the prudent foresight of Bailly was proved, which Necker had been indiscreet enough to spurn.

Parties began, at this period, to be more distinctly marked. The parliaments, nobles, clergy, and court, all menaced with the same overthrow, had joined their interests and acted in concert. Neither the Count d'Artois nor the Polignacs were any longer at court. Amongst the whole body of the aristocracy, a species of consternation mingled with despair reigned paramount. Having vainly attempted to arrest what it stigmatised as "the evil," it now desired that the people might commit the greatest possible extent of mischief, so that its very excess might result in good. This system, composed in about equal proportions of

sullen malice and base perfidy, and known by the appellation of political pessimism, takes its rise amongst parties when they have suffered so many losses as to induce them to renounce what they still retain, in the hope of retrieving all. From this time, therefore, the aristocracy began to employ it, and was frequently seen voting with the most violent section of the popular party.

Events force men to the front ranks. The dangers that beset the nobility raised up a defender for it. The young Cazalès, captain in the queen's regiment of dragoons, had to his own surprise discovered within himself great strength of mind and facility of speech. Precise and simple, he delivered with promptitude and judgment what it behoved him to say; and it is certainly to be deplored, that so excellent an understanding as his should have been consecrated to a cause which had no reasons to allege in its behalf until it was exposed to persecution. The clergy had found an advocate in the Abbé Maury. This ecclesiastic, an expert and inexhaustible sophist, possessed infinite coolness and ready wit; none better than he could resist tumult with courage, evidence with audacity. Such were the organs and tendencies of the aristocratic classes.*

The ministry was without views and without projects. Necker, detested by the court, which endured him from compulsion, was the only minister who had, not indeed a plan, but a wish. He had always desired the English constitution, doubtless the best that could have been adopted when viewed as an accommodation between the throne, the aristocracy, and the people; but having been proposed by the Bishop of Langres previous to the establishment of a single assembly, and rejected by the first orders, it was become impracticable. The high nobility was opposed to two chambers, because that arrangement implied a concession; the petty nobles or gentry, because they would not be members of the upper house; the popular party, because, still suspicious of the aristocracy, it was indisposed to confer upon it any influence. Thus, only a few deputies, some from a spirit of moderation, others from having started the idea, advocated the English institutions, and composed the entire party of the minister; a party necessarily weak, since it presented conciliatory views only to heated passions, and had reasons alone, without means of action, to oppose to its adversaries.

The popular party began to be divided, because it began to conquer. Lally-Tolendal, Mounier, Mallonet, and the other partisans of Necker, approved of all that had been hitherto accomplished, inasmuch as the government had been thereby brought in harmony with their ideas, that is to say, to an approximation with the English constitution. At present they judged the progress sufficient; reconciled with the executive, they desired to stop. The popular party, on the contrary, was of opinion that the goal was far from being gained. The Breton Club* was the arena where this party agitated with the greatest vehemence. A sincere conviction was the moving impulse of the great majority of its members; but personal designs began, nevertheless, to be there deployed; and even thus early the pure and first emotions of patriotism were giving way to the baser motives of individual interest. Barnave, a young advocate of Grenoble, clear and ready in comprehension, and possessing in a supreme degree the talent of happily expressing his thoughts, in conjunction with the two Lameths, formed a triumvirate, which attracted interest from the youth of its members, and soon exercised influence by their activity and talents. Duport, that young parliamentary councillor whom we have already seen distinguishing himself, was likewise comprised in their association. It was a saying of the time, that Duport reflected upon what should be done, that Barnave promulgated it, and the Lameths executed it. These young deputies were in the mean time mutual friends, without being declared enemies of any one.

The boldest of the popular leaders, he who, ever in the van, led the way to the most daring discussions, was Mirabeau. The absurd institutions of the old monarchy had outraged men of sense, and irritated all possessed of correct feeling; and it was scarcely possible but that some ardent mind should have felt peculiarly aggrieved by them, and have had fierce passions stimulated. Such a mind was that of Mirabeau, who, encountering from his birth all orders of despotism, parental, kingly, and judicial, consumed his youth in combating and execrating them. He was born beneath the sun of Provence, and sprung from a noble family. At an early age, he became notorious for his disorders, his quarrels, and his impassioned eloquence. His travels, his spirit of observation, and his vast reading, had taught him much; and his memory was one of the most retentive. But reckless, eccentric, even sophistical when not roused by passion, he became quite a different being when under its influence. Prompt to excitement in the tribune, and in the presence of his opponents, his mind was speedily fired: at first his ideas were confused, his words broken, his frame tremulous; but the light soon broke, and then his intellect achieved in an instant the labour of years; all was discovered to him at the very moment he spoke, and its expression flowed from him with warmth and rapidity. Stimulated by fresh contradiction, he became still more energetic and lucid, and depicted the truth in startling and terrible colours. In difficult emergencies, when all were fatigued by a long debate, or intimidated by danger, an exclamation, an emphatic phrase, fell from his lips; his features grew terrific in hideousness and the glare of genius, and the assembly, enlightened or re-assured, enacted laws or passed resolutions worthy of its dignity and greatness.

Proud of his great powers, humorous upon his own vices, by turns haughty and ingratiating, he gained some by flattery, silenced others by sarcasms, and led all in his train by an extraordinary faculty of exciting enthusiasm. His party was every where—amongst the people, in the assembly, in the court itself—with all in fact to whom he addressed himself for the moment, and he mingled familiarly with all classes. Generous when necessary, he had applauded the rising talent of Barnave, though his young friends were distasteful to him; he appreciated the profound understanding of Sieyes, and soothed his truculent temper; he disliked in Lafayette too irreproachable a life; and in Necker he detested an excessive stiffness, a pride

* "Maury and Cazalès in a certain degree represented, the first the clergy, and the second the nobility. The first preserved at the tribune the habits he had contracted as a preacher and academician; he discoursed upon matters of legislation without understanding them, never seizing the real point of a question, nor even the most advantageous one for his party; exhibiting great boldness, erudition, tact, and a brilliant and unfailing readiness in debate, but never a profound conviction, strong judgment, or veritable eloquence. He spoke pretty nearly as soldiers fight. None could return more frequently or strenuously to the charge than he, or better supply the want of substantial arguments by quotations or sophisms, and of the emotions of the soul by oratorical formulas. Therefore, although possessed of considerable talent, he was deficient in that which imparts to it vitality—the earnestness of truth. Cazalès was the moral antipodes of Maury. His intellect was rapid and sound, his elocution equally easy but more animated; sincerity marked all his motives, and the reasons which he alleged were constantly the best that could be adduced. No rhetorician, the straightforward line was his in all questions of interest to his party, the declamatory line that of Maury. From the clearness of his views, the ardour of his character, and the skilful adaptation of his talents, his only failing arose from the falseness of his position, whereas Maury added his individual faults to those which were inseparable from the cause he espoused."—*Mignet*, vol. i. p. 89-90.

* This club had been formed in the last days of June. It was afterwards called "*The Society of the Friends of the Constitution.*"

of reason, and a pretension of governing a revolution which he knew to be his own work. He had little regard for the Duke of Orleans and his wavering ambition; and, as will be shortly demonstrated, he never had with him any common views. Thus, supported by his own genius alone, he attacked the despotism he had sworn to destroy. However, if he rejected the vanities of a monarchy, he was still more indisposed to the ostracism of a republic; but not being yet sufficiently avenged upon the great and upon royalty, he continued his course of annihilation. In fine, tormented by factitious wants, discontented with the present, he advanced towards a future, to himself dim and obscure, raising vague, uncertain suppositions from his various talents, his ambition, his vices, and his shattered fortunes; and accrediting by his contempt for opinion numberless suspicions and calumnies.

Thus were France and parties divided. The first dissensions amongst the popular deputies occurred on the subject of the excesses committed by the multitude. Mounier and Lally-Tolendal proposed a solemn proclamation to the people in reprobation of such outrages. The assembly, sensible of the inutility of the measure, and of the necessity of not indisposing the populace who had supported it, at first refused its concurrence; but afterwards yielding to the exhortations of some of its members, it ultimately issued a proclamation, which, as it had foreseen, was utterly disregarded, for words have but little effect in calming an excited people.

Universal agitation prevailed. A panic suddenly pervaded every quarter of the kingdom. The cry of those brigands who had been seen to start forth in the various disturbances, was in every mouth, and their aspect in every imagination. The court upbraided the popular party with their ravages, and the popular party retorted the reproach on the court. All at once, couriers were disseminated, who, traversing France in all directions, announced that the brigands were coming and cutting down the harvest before the crops were ripe. Meetings were held in every district, and in a few days the whole of France was under arms, in expectation of the brigands who never appeared. This stratagem, which rendered the revolution of the 14th July universal, by stimulating the nation to arms, was attributed at the time to all parties, and since chiefly to the popular party, which reaped its benefits. It is surprising that all should have been so eager to throw off the responsibility of a stratagem certainly more ingenious than criminal. It has been laid to the charge of Mirabeau, who was a person to have plumed himself upon being its author, but nevertheless always disavowed his participation therein. Such a proceeding was sufficiently congenial to the character of Sieyes's mind, and many have believed that he suggested it to the Duke of Orleans. Others, again, have imputed the manœuvre to the court, alleging that those couriers would have been stopped at every stage without the connivance of the government, and that the court, disbelieving the prevalence of the revolutionary spirit, and imagining it a mere explosion of the Parisians, had determined to arm the provinces in opposition to the capital. However the case might be, the fact itself conduced to the advantage of the nation, which it roused to arms, and to a state of watchfulness over its safety and rights.

The inhabitants of the towns had shaken off their fetters, and the rural population were likewise eager to be rid of theirs. They refused to pay the feudal dues, attacked those lords who had been guilty of oppression, set fire to their mansions, burned their title-deeds, and in some districts committed atrocious acts of vengeance. A melancholy accident had mainly contributed to incite this general exasperation. A certain Sieur de Mesmay, Lord of Quincey, gave an entertainment at his seat. All the people of the surrounding country had assembled, and were in the full enjoyment of careless gaiety, when a barrel of gunpowder, suddenly igniting, exploded with murderous consequences. This accident, afterwards ascertained to have been the consequence of imprudence, and not of treacherous design, was then charged upon the Sieur de Mesmay as a heinous crime. The rumour was soon spread abroad, and provoked peasants to the commission of cruelties, who were already hardened by a wretched existence, and rendered ferocious by long-continued sufferings. The ministers proceeded in a body to lay before the assembly a picture of the deplorable state of France, and to ask from it powers for re-establishing order. Ever since the 14th July, these disorders had manifested themselves in every shape. The month of August was now commencing, and it became indispensable to restore action to the government and the laws. But to attempt this task with any chance of success, it was necessary to begin the regeneration of the state by the reform of such institutions as were more particularly abhorrent to the people, and chiefly impelled them to disturbances. One part of the nation, in subjection to another part, was oppressed by a multitude of rights called *feudal*. Some of these, characterised as productive, imposed upon the peasants ruinous dues, whilst others, qualified as honorary, compelled them to humiliating obeisances and services towards their lords. They were the remnants of the feudal barbarism, the abolition whereof was due to humanity. These privileges, considered in the light of property, and indeed so styled by the king in his declaration of the 23d June, would perhaps never have been abolished by a regular discussion. It was necessary to excite their possessors, by a sudden and spontaneous movement, to propose their own despoilment.

The assembly was at the moment discussing the celebrated declaration of the rights of man. It had been originally debated whether any should be made, and it was not till the morning of the 4th August that it had been finally decided such a declaration should be framed and placed at the head of the constitution. In the evening sitting of the same day, the committee upon disturbances and the means of suppressing them, presented its report. The Viscount de Noailles and the Duke d'Aiguillon, both members of the nobility, immediately mounted the tribune, and represented that it was needless to employ force to bring the people back to order; that the causes of their misery should be removed, and then the agitation resulting therefrom would forthwith subside. Proceeding to further and more explicit explanations, they proposed to abolish all the vexatious rights, which, under the title of feudal rights, crushed the agriculturists. M. Leguen de Kerengal, a proprietor from Brittany, appeared in the tribune, habited in the garb of a farmer, and presented a frightful picture of the feudal system. Whereupon, generosity being stimulated in some, pride piqued in others, a certain paroxysm of disinterestedness was suddenly provoked; every one rushed to the tribune in order to lay down his privileges. The nobility gave the first example; and the clergy, not less fervid, hastened to follow it. A species of intoxication seized upon the assembly; dispensing with a superfluous discussion (which, indeed, under any circumstances, had been unnecessary to demonstrate the propriety of such sacrifices), all the orders, all the classes, all the possessors of any peculiar rights, flew to pronounce their respective renunciations. After the deputies of the first orders, those of the commons went in their turn to present their oblations. Having no personal privileges to sacrifice, they offered up those of provinces and towns. Equality of rights, instituted as respected individuals, was likewise established over all the districts of the country. Some members surrendered their pensions, and one, who was a member of the parliament, having nothing to give, proffered his devotion to the public welfare. The steps of the desk were thronged with deputies press-

ing to deposit their renunciations; all that could be done at the moment was to enumerate the various sacrifices, and the framing of the articles was adjourned to the following day. The fervour was general; but in the midst of this enthusiasm it was easy to observe that certain of the privileged classes were far from sincere, and were bent on pushing matters to an unreasonable extremity. Serious apprehensions might be justly entertained from the lateness of the hour, and the delirium pervading the assembly; and Lally-Tolendal, perceiving the danger, handed a note to the president, containing the words, "Every thing may be feared from the rapture of the assembly; break up the sitting." At the same instant a deputy rushed up to him, and pressing his hand with emotion, said, "Grant us the royal sanction, and we are friends." Lally-Tolendal, aware of the vast importance of linking the revolution to the king, moved that he should be proclaimed *Restorer of French liberty.* The proposition was hailed with rapture; a *Te Deum* was then decreed, and the members finally separated at an early hour in the morning.

During this memorable night there had been decreed—

The abolition of the title of serf;

The power of redeeming seignorial rights;

The abolition of seignorial jurisdictions;

The suppression of exclusive rights of chase, warren, dovecots, &c.;

The commutation of tithes;

The equality of taxation;

The admission of all citizens to civil and military employments;

The abolition of the sale of offices;

The destruction of all the privileges of towns and provinces;

The remodelling of guilds;

And the suppression of pensions granted without services.

These resolutions had been passed in a general form, but it remained to reduce them into decrees; and it was then that, the first ardour of generous impulse having subsided and each resumed his previous prepossessions, some strove to extend, others to restrict, the concessions pronounced. Stormy debates ensued, and a studied, ill-advised resistance chased away every sentiment of gratitude.*

* "I was not present at this sitting, but one of my friends who attended, related to me the next morning what had passed. As he spoke in a tone too serious for me to suppose he was in jest, I began to think he had lost his senses; but I soon found in the public papers a confirmation of the particulars he had mentioned. I could not help thinking I was reading an account of one of those frolics sometimes entered into by wild young fellows, who, after pushing the bottle freely, begin to break their glasses, decanters, and plates, then to contend who shall throw the most valuable furniture out of the window, and, before they have done, leave the room empty; but who next day, at sight of their bill, deplore their folly while they pay for the things destroyed. Unfortunately, the patriotic frolic of the 4th August did not end so; it ruined multitudes of individuals who had no share in it, and enriched nobody. The reducing all the articles then decreed, gave room for long debates in the following sittings. Our sobered legislators thought they had only dreamt what they had too surely decreed, and several of them laboured to interpret and give a turn to the decrees, so as to reduce the effect of them considerably; but the terms of them were too positive to be open to any restriction which the people would admit. The only article they found it possible to modify was that which condemned the pigeons to death or emigration. It was insisted the next day by the members of the right side, and particularly by D'Espremenil, that all the decrees had been previously drawn up, and the sitting purposely opened so late to convert it into a nocturnal and scandalous huddle, the more easily to alter the proceedings in accordance with the plan of the authors of the manœuvre, as amidst the tumult that prevailed it was equally impossible for the assembly to have passed as the secretaries to have written them. But the president (Chapelier) and the secretaries boldly asserted that all those decrees had been passed; and the majority of the assembly, thinking themselves bound by their attestation, confirmed this work of darkness and delirium."—*Bertrand's Memoirs*, vol. i. pp. 399, 400, 401.

The abolition of feudal rights had been agreed upon, but the mode still remained a question—whether by immediate suppression or redemption; and important distinctions were necessary to be drawn among the rights themselves. On first overrunning the country, the conquerors, progenitors of the nobility, had imposed services upon men and tributes upon lands. They had themselves occupied certain portions of the soil, which they had only restored by degrees to the cultivators, under covenants of perpetual rents. A lengthened holding, accompanied by numerous transmissions, constituting the essentials of property, all the burdens imposed on both men and lands had acquired that character. The Constituent Assembly was therefore in the predicament of being compelled to make an attack on subjects of property. In this position, it had to weigh their validity, not on the ground of their just or unjust acquisition, but as they were more or less onerous to society. It abolished personal services accordingly, and since many of those services had been commuted into acquittances, it abolished the acquittances. Amongst the payments charged upon the land, it suppressed those which were palpable relics of servitude, as the fine imposed on transmissions; and it declared all those perpetual rents redeemable, which had been the consideration on which the nobles had formerly granted to the cultivators portions of the soil. It was thus absurd to accuse the Constituent Assembly of having violated the rights of property, when every imaginable matter had been rendered so; but it was assuredly strange that the nobles, long inured to such violations, both by exacting tributes and refusing to pay taxes, should exhibit so sudden and rigorous a respect for principles, when their own prerogatives were the points at issue. The seignorial jurisdictions were likewise styled "property," since for many ages they had been handed down as inheritances; but the assembly was not weak enough to be awed by the phrase, and decreed their abolition, providing, nevertheless, that they should be retained until proper substitutions were found.

The exclusive right of chase was also a subject of warm disputes. Disregarding the idle objection that the whole population would be instantly in arms if the license to kill game were extended, the right was conferred on every cultivator within the limits of his own estate. A struggle was likewise made in behalf of the privileged dovecots. The assembly declared that any person might maintain them, but that at harvest-time the pigeons might be killed like ordinary game upon the lands they should scour. All the rangerships were abolished, under the condition, nevertheless, that the personal pleasures of the monarch should be secured by means compatible with liberty and property.

One article, above all, occasioned violent discussions, on account of the yet more important questions of which it was the prelude, and of the powerful interests it attacked—it was that referring to tithes. On the night of the 4th August, the assembly had proclaimed tithes redeemable. When the decree was about to be drawn up, it desired to abolish them without consideration, subjoining a stipulation that the support of the clergy should be adequately provided for by the state. Such a course was unquestionably contrary to form, because it was altering a resolution already passed. But Garat replied to this objection, that the modification was, in truth, an actual purchase, since it was the state instead of the individual payer who redeemed the tithe, by taking upon itself the burden of sustaining the clergy. The Abbé Sieyes, who astonished the community by appearing as an advocate of tithes, and was generally considered by no means a disinterested defender of such an impost, granted in reply that the state actually and truly

redeemed the tithe, but perpetrated a robbery on the mass of the nation, by burdening it with a debt which ought to weigh only upon the landed proprietors. This objection, presented in striking colours, was illustrated by that severe and oft-repeated phrase: "You desire to be free, and know not how to be just!" Although Sieyes imagined that it was not possible to repel his objection, nothing was more easy. The expense of public worship is chargeable upon all; whether it was expedient to make the landed proprietors alone, rather than the universal body of contributors, bear the charge, was purely a question for the state to determine. It robbed no person by making such a distribution of the impost as it judged proper. Tithes, by impoverishing the small proprietors, destroyed agriculture; the state was therefore bound to remove the burden, which position Mirabeau demonstrated by conclusive analogy. The clergy, who had a decided preference for tithes, because they had a clear presentiment that the stipends allowed by the state would be proportioned to their legitimate occasions, claimed to be proprietors of the tithes, by immemorial grants, and reproduced that stale argument of long possession, which proves nothing; for were it valid, every abomination, despotism itself, would be rendered legitimate by possession. They were answered, that tithes were but an *usufruct*, which was not transferable, and possessed none of the main features of property; that they evidently constituted an impost established in their favour, which impost the state now took upon itself to convert into another. The pride of the clergy took alarm at the idea of receiving salaries, and loud and vehement were their complaints at the indignity. Mirabeau, who was pre-eminent in hurling barbed shafts of reason and sarcasm, replied to the lamenters that he was acquainted with but three modes of deriving existence in a state of society, to wit—robbing, begging, or possessing a salary. The clergy were convinced that it behoved them to abandon with a good grace what it was impossible for them to defend. The parish priests especially, aware that they had every thing to gain from the equitable spirit that actuated the assembly, and that it was the overgrown wealth of the prelates against which the attacks were really levelled, were the first to recede from the conflict. The complete abolition of tithes was thereupon decreed, under condition that the state should impose upon itself the expenses of public worship, and that in the mean time the tithes should continue to be gathered. This last clause, which bespoke the considerate spirit of the assembly, became however of no avail. The people would pay no longer, but before the decree the same determination had been doggedly evinced; and when the assembly abolished the feudal system, it was already overturned in fact. On the 13th August, all the articles were presented to the king, who accepted the title of *Restorer of French liberty*, and gave his presence at the solemnization of the *Te Deum*, having the president on his right hand and all the deputies in his train.

Thus the most important reform during the revolution was consummated. The assembly had evinced equal resolution and prudence. Unfortunately, a people can never resume with moderation the exercise of its rights. Deplorable outrages were committed throughout the whole kingdom. The country-seats continued to be burnt, and the fields were inundated with sportsmen, eager to put in force their newly-acquired rights. They spread themselves over the lands hitherto exclusively reserved for the enjoyment of their oppressors, and committed frightful devastations. Every usurpation meets with a severe return, and he who exercises it would do well to reflect on the truth, if not for himself at least for his children, who almost always endure the punishment due to him. Numerous accidents occurred, as might be anticipated. On the 7th August, the ministers had again appeared before the assembly, to present a report upon the state of the country. The keeper of the seals had exposed the alarming disorders which had broken out, and Necker had displayed the wretched state of the finances. The assembly heard this double communication with sadness, but without discouragement. On the 10th, it passed a decree touching public tranquillity, in which the municipalities were enjoined to ensure the maintenance of order by dispersing all seditious assemblies. They were instructed to deliver simple rioters to the ordinary tribunals, but to imprison those who had disseminated alarming reports, produced forged orders, or excited disturbances, and to send the examinations to the National Assembly, to enable it to trace the troubles to their origin. The national guards and the regular troops were placed at the disposal of the municipalities, and they were ordered to take an oath of fidelity to the nation, the king, and the law. This was the oath which was afterwards called the *civic oath*.

Necker's report upon the finances was alarming to the last degree. The want of subsidies was the circumstance which had caused an appeal to a national assembly, which assembly, from its first meeting, had entered into a contest with power, and, providing merely for the pressing necessity of establishing guarantees and reviving confidence, it had neglected that of placing the revenues of the state upon a sure basis. Necker alone had all the disquietudes attending the financial department. Whilst Bailly, labouring to draw provisions to the capital, was a prey to the bitterest anxieties, Necker, harassed by wants less urgent indeed, but far more extended, immersed in most painful calculations, and devoured by a thousand agonies, attempted to find palliatives for the national distress; and whilst his mind was solely occupied with fiscal questions, he was incapable of reflecting that the assembly was solely engaged with political questions. Necker and the assembly, each preoccupied by a peculiar object, had optics for none besides. However, if the alarms of Necker were justified by the actual distress, the confidence of the assembly was equally so by the elevation to which its views soared. That assembly, holding France and its destiny in embrace, refused to believe that so fair a realm, although indebted for the instant, could be for ever paralysed with indigence.

Necker, on assuming the ministry in August 1788, found only 400,000 francs (£16,700) in the treasury. By great exertions, he had provided for the most pressing calls, but since that time, circumstances had augmented the demands and diminished the resources. It had been found necessary to purchase corn, to re-sell it below the current value, to distribute considerable sums in charity, and to prosecute public works as a means of giving employment to operatives. For this last object alone 12,000 francs (£500) had been drawn from the exchequer daily. At the same time that the expenses were thus increased, the receipts fell off. The reduction in the price of salt, the delay in payments, and often the positive refusal to discharge the taxes, smuggling by armed bands, the demolition of the barriers, the destruction of the registers and the assassination of the clerks, had annihilated a portion of the revenue. In consequence, Necker demanded a loan of 30,000,000 (£1,250,000). The first impulse was so favourable, that a cry arose to vote the loan by acclamation, but this warmth of feeling quickly subsided. The members testified a repugnance for fresh loans, and fell into some degree of inconsistency by appealing to the instructions they had already discarded, but which prohibited them from sanctioning taxation previous to the completion of the constitution; they even proceeded to calculate the sums received since the preceding year, as if they doubted the honesty of the minister. However, the necessity of providing for the exigencies of the state ensured the adoption of the loan; but the plan of the minister was altered, and the interest reduced to 4½ per cent.,

in groundless reliance upon a patriotism which certainly pervaded the nation, but was not to be expected amongst money-lenders by profession, the only persons who in ordinary cases embark in that description of financial speculations. This preliminary error was one of those which assemblies generally commit, when they substitute for the precise views of the practical minister the vague ideas of twelve hundred speculative minds. At the same time, it was easy to discern that public opinion already began to grow discontented with the timidity of the minister.

After these indispensable attentions bestowed on the public tranquillity and the finances, the assembly entered upon the declaration of rights. The first idea thereof had been suggested by Lafayette, who had himself borrowed it from the Americans. The discussion upon that subject, which had been interrupted by the revolution of the 14th July, resumed on the 1st August, again interrupted by the abolition of the feudal system, was once more taken up and definitively closed on the 12th August. The idea of such a declaration had something imposing in it, which enraptured the assembly. The prevailing bias of the era led men to embrace every thing that savoured of grandeur; this enthusiastic spirit drew forth their sincerity, their courage, their virtuous and their evil tendencies. They seized, therefore, upon this idea, and resolved to carry it into immediate execution. If the task had been simply to promulgate certain principles held in especial abhorrence by the power whose yoke had been so recently shaken off, such as the voting of taxes, religious freedom, the liberty of the press, or ministerial responsibility, nothing had been more easy. America and England had already performed it. France might have couched in certain clear and positive axioms the new principles which she imposed upon her government; but France, breaking with all the past, and reverting to the state of nature, must necessarily aspire to frame a complete declaration of all the rights of man and the citizen. Much was said in the first debates upon the necessity and the danger of such a declaration. Long and useless discussions ensued upon these points; useless, because there was neither advantage nor hazard in publishing a declaration composed of propositions far above the comprehension of the bulk of the people; a thing fitted only for a certain number of philosophic minds, about the last to take an important share in popular seditions. It was at length decided, however, that it should be framed, and placed at the head of the constitutional act. But it was still to draw up, and therein lay the great difficulty. What was a right?—that which was due to mankind. Now, all the good that could be done to men was due to them; therefore, that every measure of government should be wise was a right. Thus all the propounded forms contained a definition of the law, the mode in which it ought to be declared, the principle of sovereignty, &c. It was objected, that these were not rights but general maxims. Still it was essential to embody these maxims. Mirabeau, losing all patience, at last cried out, "Dispense with the word right, and say, 'In the interest of all it has been declared'——." Nevertheless, the more imposing title of a declaration of rights was preferred, and thereunder were confounded maxims, principles, and definitions. Out of the whole was composed the celebrated declaration standing at the head of the constitution of 1791. In truth, there was but one misfortune attending it, to wit, the loss of several sittings for a philosophical commonplace. But who may throw obloquy on those minds for too much fervour on a favourite object? Who has a right to despise a prepossession which was inevitable during the first moments of excitement?

It was felt that the labours of the constitution could be no longer postponed. The tediousness of the preliminary discussions caused a general sentiment of fatigue, and without the walls of the assembly the fundamental questions were first agitated. The English constitution was the model which naturally presented itself to numerous minds, since it was an arrangement concluded between the king, the aristocracy, and the people, at the close of a struggle similar in its characteristics. The essential features of that constitution consisted in the establishment of two legislative chambers, and the royal prerogative of assent. The minds of men, in their first impulse, cling to the most simple theories; a nation pronouncing its will and a king executing it, appeared to them the only legitimate form of government. Conferring on the aristocracy a power equal to that of the whole nation, by means of an upper chamber, and investing the king with the right to annul the national determination, by means of a royal assent, seemed to them the height of absurdity. "*The nation wills, the king executes:*" men refused to leave these simple elements, and they firmly believed they would have a monarchy, when they left a king as executor of the national resolves. A real monarchy, such as exists even in states accounted free, consists in the dominion of a single individual, on which curbs are laid by means of the national participation. The will of the prince, in such cases, really effects almost every thing, and that of the nation is limited to prevent evil, either by refusing taxes, or by its concurrent legislative functions as a third body. But so soon as the nation can ordain all it chooses, without the king being able to interpose a *veto*, the monarch dwindles into a mere magistrate. Such a form of government is a republic, with a single consul instead of several. The government of Poland, although it boasted a king, was never called a monarchy, but a republic; and there were kings likewise at Sparta.

A well-established monarchy, therefore, requires great concessions on the part of individuals. But it is not after a long political annihilation, and during their first enthusiasm, that they are disposed to make them. Consequently, a republic lurked in the opinions of most men without being pronounced, and they were republicans without being aware of the fact.

In debate the speakers did not explain themselves with distinctness; therefore, in spite of the genius and learning redolent in the assembly, the question was lamely discussed, and greatly misapprehended. The partisans of the English constitution, Necker, Mounier, Lally, could not perceive in what a monarchy must necessarily consist; and even had they had a distinct perception of it, they would not have ventured to state explicitly to the assembly, that the national will ought not to be all-powerful, and that it ought to be restrictive rather than active. Their arguments exhausted themselves in the summary, that it was necessary the king should have the power to check the usurpations of one assembly; that in order to assure his proper and cheerful execution of the law, he must concur in it; and that relations must of necessity exist between the executive and legislative powers. These reasons were illogical, or at all events weak. It was ridiculous, in fact, when recognising the national sovereignty, to desire to control it by the sole will of a king.*

* In the seventh chapter of this work, and at the opening of the history of the Legislative Assembly, the reader will find an opinion upon the faults attributed to the constitution of 1791, which seems to me a very just one. I have only one word to say here upon the project of establishing in France at that epoch the English form of government. That system is a compromise amongst the three interests which divide modern states, royalty, aristocracy, and democracy. Now, such an arrangement is feasible only after the exhaustion of their respective strength; that is to say, after combat; or, in other words, after revolution. In England, in fact, it was not effected until after a long struggle—after the triumph of democracy and usurpation. To attempt to compromise before the struggle, is to attempt to make peace before war. It is a mournful but nevertheless an incontestible truth, that men negotiate only when they have exhausted their strength.

They supported the two chambers with more effect, because there are, even in a republic, higher classes interested to oppose the too rapid progress of the surging classes, and which defend the old against the new institutions. But this upper chamber, though yet more indispensable than the royal prerogative, since there is no example of a republic without a senate, was repelled with greater vehemence than the right of veto, as indignation was more fierce against aristocracy than against royalty itself. An upper chamber was therefore out of the question, for in truth it was repudiated by all: the petty nobles opposed it, because they would find no seat therein; the magnates of the privileged orders, because they were rendered desperate, and desired to drive all things to the worst; and the popular party, because it was unwilling to place the aristocracy in a position whence it could control the national will. Mounier, Lally, and Necker, were almost the only advocates of this upper chamber. Sieyes, with the rashness of a positive theorist, rejected both the two chambers and the royal assent. He held society to be indivisible; according to him, the mass, without distinction of class, ought to be intrusted with ordaining, and the king, as sole magistrate, with executing. Thus he was perfectly sincere when he said, that a monarchy and a republic were identical, since the difference in his eyes consisted merely in the number of magistrates endowed with the executive. The characteristic of Sieyes's mind was concatenation, that is to say, a rigorous connexion between his own ideas. He was in perfect harmony with himself, but far from being so either with the eternal nature of things or with minds differently constituted from his own. He subdued them by the sway of his indefeasible axioms, but rarely persuaded them; thus, being equally incapable of severing his theories and of obtaining their adoption in full, he was pretty sure to be finally disgusted. Mirabeau, with his accurate, swift, and pliant genius, was not more proficient in matters of political science than the assembly itself. He repudiated the two chambers, not from conviction, but from foresight of their actual impossibility, and from hatred of the aristocracy. He defended the kingly assent from a monarchical bias, and he had pledged himself to its support from the opening of the states, by his saying that without that safeguard he would rather live at Constantinople than at Paris. Barnave, Duport, and Lameth, were of course differently disposed to Mirabeau. They admitted neither the upper chamber nor the royal assent; but, without the obstinacy of Sieyes, they consented to modify their opinion by according to an upper chamber and the king a simple suspensive veto, that is to say, a power of temporarily opposing the national will as expressed in the lower chamber.

The first debates occurred on the 28th and 29th August. Barnave's party was desirous of negotiating with Mounier, whom his inflexibility rendered leader of the English constitution party. The most stubborn is always the most important to win over, and accordingly it was to him that overtures were made. Conferences were in consequence held. When Barnave's party saw that it was impossible to change an opinion become a settled predilection, it consented to adopt those English forms which he cherished so dearly, but on condition that, when raising an upper chamber and the royal prerogative in opposition to the popular chamber, to the two should be granted only a suspensive veto, and that, furthermore, the king should not be empowered to dissolve the assembly. Mounier returned the answer of a man immoveable in his conviction; he said, that truth did not belong to him, and that he could not sacrifice a portion of it to secure the rest. He thus lost the two institutions, by refusing to modify them. And if it were true, which, as will be seen, it was not, that the constitution of 1791, by suppressing the upper chamber, destroyed the throne, Mounier would have had severe reproaches to make himself. Mounier was no zealot, but very stubborn; he was as positive in his system as Sieyes in his, and preferred the loss of all to the concession of a part. The negotiations were broken off with mutual feelings of irritation. The opposite party had threatened Mounier with the public opinion in Paris, and it departed, as he said, to exercise the influence at which he had been warned to tremble.*

The English constitution was, therefore, impracticable in France until after the revolution. No harm was done, certainly, by advocating it, but an erroneous course of action was pursued in furtherance thereof; but had the most advisable course been adopted, the same ill success would have attended the endeavour. For I have no doubt that had the English constitution, in its full integrity, been engraven on the table of our law, such a treaty would have failed to calm passions, the battle would have raged all the same, and all the horrors of war ensued in spite of the preliminary treaty. Such a reflection is in some sort consolatory, as it lessens regrets that might be otherwise felt. I repeat, therefore, that war, that is to say, revolution, was necessary and inevitable. It is only after long experience of the wretchedness of strife that justice makes its voice be heard amongst the children of men.

* I am far from blaming the obstinacy of the deputy Mounier, for nothing is more worthy of respect than conscientious opinion; but it is a fact sufficiently curious to place beyond doubt. On this account, I subjoin a passage taken from his "*Address to his Constituents.*"

"Several deputies," says he, "undertook to obtain from me the abandonment of that principle (the royal assent), or, by yielding it themselves, to bind me, from gratitude, to grant them some compensation. They conducted me to the residence of a zealous advocate of liberty, who was desirous of a coalition between them and me, in order that liberty might encounter fewer obstacles, and also of being present at our conferences without interfering in the decision. Anxious to convince them, or be enlightened myself, I accepted the offer of opening conferences. They declaimed vehemently against the alleged inconveniences of the unlimited right the king would have to prevent a new law, and they assured me that if such a right were recognised by the assembly, a civil war would be the consequence. These conferences, twice resumed, had no result. They were recommenced at the house of an American, well known for his intelligence and virtues, who had tested both the theory and practice of institutions proper to maintain liberty. His opinion was favourable to my principles. When they were sufficiently convinced that all their efforts to induce me to abandon my opinions were useless, they at length declared to me that they attached very little importance to the question of the *royal assent*, though they had represented it a few days before as a cause of civil war; they offered to vote for the unrestricted right of assent, as also for two chambers, but under a pledge that I should not support the royal prerogative of dissolving the assembly of representatives; that I should ask for the upper chamber only a suspensive *veto;* and that I should not oppose a fundamental law which should establish *national conventions* for fixed periods, or upon the requisition of the assembly of representatives, or on that of the provinces, to revise the constitution, and make in it all such alterations as might be judged necessary. They understood, by *national conventions*, assemblies in which all the rights of the nation should centre; which should comprise all powers, and consequently annihilate, by their mere convocation, the authority of the monarch and of the ordinary legislature; disposing arbitrarily of every description of constituted authority, upsetting the constitution at will, and establishing either despotism or anarchy. In a word, they would have in a certain sense abandoned to a single assembly, bearing the title of National Convention, the supreme dictatorship, and exposed the kingdom to a periodical return of factions and disorder.

I testified my surprise that they should wish to draw me into a treaty upon the interests of the kingdom, as if we were its absolute masters. I observed that, by leaving only a suspensive veto to the first chamber, although composed of eligible members, it would be difficult to form it of persons worthy of public confidence; in such case, all the citizens would prefer being named representatives; and that the chamber, which would be a tribunal for trying crimes against the state, ought to be invested with the highest dignity, and consequently that its authority ought not to be inferior to that of the other chamber. In conclusion, I added, that when I believed a principle true, I felt obliged to maintain it, and that I could not sell it, since truth was the inheritance of all the citizens."

These questions divided the people as well as the representatives, and, although incapable of comprehending them, they were not less strenuous in their opinions. They had included them all under the short and comprehensive term of *veto*. They were partisans or opponents of the veto, and that meant that they were supporters or denouncers of tyranny. The populace, not even understanding it in that sense, took the veto for an impost it was necessary to abolish, or for an enemy it behoved them to hang; and they were fierce in their determination to put the foe to the lantern.*

The Palais-Royal, especially, was in the greatest fermentation. There congregated men of heated tempers, who, unable to comply even with the forms imposed in the district-meetings, held forth from a chair at their own good pleasure, and were hooted or borne in triumph by vast mobs, which went forth to execute what they had suggested. Camille-Desmoulins, already mentioned in this work, was distinguished amongst these orators by the energy, the originality, and the cynicism of his mind; without being cruel, this man loudly demanded acts of cruelty. There likewise was beheld Saint-Hurugue, an old marquis, who had been long imprisoned in the Bastille on account of family feuds, and was exasperated to madness against all authority. All these declaimers repeated day by day that it behoved the people to go to Versailles, and make inquiry of the king and the assembly why they delayed to effect the public good. Lafayette had the greatest difficulty in restraining them by continual patrolling bands. The national guard was already accused of aristocracy. "There was no patrole at the Ceramicus," cried Camille-Desmoulins. The name of Cromwell, even, had been pronounced in conjunction with Lafayette's. One day (Sunday the 30th August), a motion was made at the Palais-Royal; Mounier was denounced, Mirabeau was represented as in danger, and it was proposed to march to Versailles for the purpose of guarding the precious life of the latter. And yet Mirabeau advocated the royal sanction, but without intermitting his part of a popular tribune, or without appearing less so in the eyes of the multitude. Saint-Hurugue, at the head of a few fanatics, proceeded towards the road to Versailles. They desired, as they alleged, to induce the assembly to cashier its faithless representatives, in order that others might be named, and to solicit the king and the dauphin to visit Paris and place themselves in safety amidst the people. Lafayette hastened to the spot, stopped them in their course, and compelled them to retrace their steps. The next day, Monday the 31st, they again gathered together. They presented an address to the commune, in which they demanded the convocation of the districts to denounce the veto and the deputies who supported it, to revoke their appointment, and nominate others in their place. The commune repelled them twice with exemplary firmness.

During this interval, the assembly was the scene of great agitation. The rioters had written letters to the principal deputies, filled with threats and invectives, one of which was signed with the name of Saint-Hurugue. As soon as the assembly met on Monday the 31st, Lally denounced a deputation he had received from the Palais-Royal. This deputation had urged him to separate from the wicked citizens who supported the veto, and had added that an army of 20,000 men was ready to march. Mounier likewise read letters he had received on his part, and concluded by proposing to prosecute the secret authors of these machinations, and pressing the assembly to offer a reward of 500,000 francs to any who should give evidence to lead to their discovery. A tumultuous debate ensued. Duport maintained that it was beneath the dignity of the assembly to occupy its time with such absurdities. Mirabeau read letters addressed to him also, in which the enemies of the popular cause treated him with as much rancour as Mounier had been in those he produced. The assembly passed to the order of the day, and Saint-Hurugue, the signer of one of the denounced letters, was imprisoned by order of the commune.*

The three questions, embracing the permanence of the representative assemblies, the two chambers, and the veto, were discussed at the same time. The permanence was voted almost unanimously. The long interruption to national assemblies had been too fatal not to ensure their being rendered permanent. Then came on the great question of the unity of the legislative body. The galleries were occupied by a numerous and noisy audience. A great many of the deputies withdrew. The president, on that occasion the Bishop of Langres, strove in vain to detain them: they left in crowds. From all sides vehement shouts arose for a division. Lally once more attempted to speak; he was refused to be heard, the president being taunted with having sent him to the tribune; one member even went so far as to ask the president if he were not weary of annoying the assembly. Offended at these words, the president quitted the chair, and the discussion was again adjourned. The following day, an address from the town of Rennes was read, in which the veto was declared inadmissible, and all those traitors to the country who should vote for it. Mounier and his friends evinced great indignation, and proposed that the municipality should be severely reprimanded. Mirabeau retorted that the assembly had other duties to perform than giving lectures to municipal functionaries, and moved the order of the day. The question upon the two chambers was at length put to the vote, and, amidst a roar of applause, the unity of the assembly was decreed: 499 votes were given for a single chamber, 99 for two chambers, and 122 were lost, from the apprehensions wherewith many of the deputies were inspired.

Finally occurred the question of the veto. A middle term had been invented, that of the *suspensive veto*, which put the law in abeyance during one or more legislatures. This mode was considered as an appeal to the people, because the king, having recourse to fresh assemblies, and yielding to them if they persisted, seemed to appeal in reality to the national authority. Mounier and his party opposed it. They were right according to the system of the English monarchy, where the king consults the national representation, and never obeys it; but they were wrong according to the position they had themselves assumed. They were desirous, as they were wont to allege, merely to prevent precipitate resolutions. Now, the suspensive veto was equally effectual in that respect as the absolute veto. If the representative body persisted, the

* Two inhabitants of the country were speaking of the veto. "Dost thou know what this veto is?" asked one. "Not I." "Then I'll tell thee. Thou hast thy porringer full of soup, the king tells thee to spill it, and spill it thou must—that's all."

["Putting to the lantern," it may be observed, was a revolutionary phrase, meaning "hanging at a lamp-post," a very usual mode of disposing of victims in Paris at that time. M. Bertrand remarks (vol. ii. p. 14), that having asked a peasant what he understood by the suspensive veto, against which he was pouring forth the most violent imprecations, he answered, that "if the *sipensive* (mispronouncing the word) should pass, the king and his ministers might hang whom they pleased." It was with difficulty that Bertrand removed the man's impression.]

* [One of the letters read on this occasion by the president of the assembly, which had been addressed to him personally, is, from its curious strain, worthy of being transcribed. It will also serve as a sample of the rest.

"The patriotic assembly of the *Palais-Royal* have the honour to make it known to you, that if the aristocratic faction, formed by some of the nobility, clergy, and 120 ignorant and corrupt members, continue to disturb the general harmony, and still insist upon the *absolute assent*, 15,000 men are ready to *enlighten* their country-seats and houses, and particularly your own."—*Bert.* vol. ii. p. 10.]

national will became manifest; and, since they admitted its sovereignty, it was absurd to resist it indefinitely.

The ministry, in fact, was sensible that the suspensive veto would in practice have the effect of the absolute veto, and Necker advised the king to take the credit of a voluntary sacrifice, by addressing a message to the assembly in favour of the suspensive veto. A rumour of this intention got abroad, and the design and spirit of the message were known beforehand. It was presented on the 11th September, every member being thoroughly acquainted with its purport. It might have been imagined that Mounier, advocating the cause of the throne, could not have views distinct from the occupier of that throne; but parties soon acquire interests apart from those they profess to serve. Mounier repudiated this communication, saying that if the king renounced a prerogative beneficial to the nation, it ought to be conferred upon him in spite of himself, and for the public weal. The usual parts were reversed, and the adversaries of royalty now supported the king's interference; but their exertions were fruitless, and the memorial was rudely rejected. Fresh explanations were entered into upon the meaning of the word "assent," and the question was raised whether such a right was essential to the constitution. After declaring that the constituent power was superior to the constituted powers, it was established that the assent was only to be exercised upon legislative acts, and to be entirely dispensed with upon constitutive acts, which latter were to be simply promulgated. 673 votes were given for the suspensive veto, and 325 for the absolute veto. Thus were the fundamental articles of the new constitution framed. Mounier and Lally-Tolendal immediately resigned their functions as members of the constitution-committee.

A multitude of decrees had by this time been passed, without any having been as yet presented for the royal acceptance. It was consequently resolved to lay the measures of the 4th August before the king. It was debated whether an assent or a simple promulgation should be asked, according as they might be deemed legislative or constitutive acts. Maury, and even Lally-Tolendal, had the folly to assert that they were legislative, and to demand the assent, as if they had anticipated some obstacle from the royal power. Mirabeau, with infinite tact, maintained that certain of them abolished the feudal system, and were eminently constitutive, whilst others were purely acts of munificence on the part of the nobility and clergy, and that it was an insult to imagine that those orders desired the king to recall their liberality. Chapelier added, that the formal consent of the king could be scarcely deemed necessary, since he had approved of them already by accepting the title of restorer of French liberty, and sanctioning the *Te Deum* by his presence. In consequence, the king was solicited to make a simple proclamation.*

A member suddenly moved resolutions that the crown was hereditary and the royal person inviolable. The assembly, sincerely desirous of recognising the king as the first hereditary magistrate, voted these two articles by acclamation. The inviolability of the heir-apparent was then proposed, but the Duke de Mortemart instantly objected that sons had sometimes attempted to dethrone their fathers, and that it was expedient to leave a power of punishing them. For this reason the proposition was rejected. With reference to the clause upon the hereditary transmission from male to male, and branch to branch, the deputy Arnoult moved that the renunciation of the Spanish branch, made in the treaty of Utrecht, should be confirmed. It was argued in reply, that there was no room for deliberation, since it was highly imprudent to alienate a faithful ally. Mirabeau declared himself of this opinion, and the assembly passed to the order of the day. In a few moments Mirabeau, desiring to make an experiment which has been improperly estimated, resolved upon re-opening the question which he had himself contributed to settle. The house of Orleans would be in competition with the house of Spain, in the event of the reigning branch becoming extinct. Mirabeau had perceived a malevolent eagerness to pass to the order of the day. Unconnected with the Duke of Orleans, though intimate with him, as he knew how to be with every body, he was anxious, nevertheless, to know the state of parties, and to ascertain who were the friends and who the enemies of the duke. The question of the regency presented itself; in a case of minority, the brothers of the king could not be guardians of their nephew, as they were the immediate heirs of the royal ward, and consequently but indifferently interested in his preservation. The regency, therefore, would fall to the nearest relation, who was the queen, the Duke of Orleans, or the Spanish branch. Mirabeau moved that the regency should be conferred only on a man born in France. "The acquaintance," said he, "that I have with the geography of this assembly, the regions from which the shouts for the order of the day have rolled, convince me that no less a question is at issue than one of foreign domination; and that the proposition not to deliberate, apparently Spanish, is possibly none other than *Austrian!*" At these words exclamations resounded through the hall; the debate was resumed with extraordinary vehemence; all the dissentients again lustily vociferated for the order of the day. Mirabeau fruitlessly repeated to them at every shout that they could be actuated by only one motive, a desire to introduce a foreign supremacy into France; they gave him no answer, for it was true enough that they preferred a foreigner to the Duke of Orleans. At last, after a debate of two days, it was again resolved that there was no room for deliberation. But Mirabeau had obtained his object, by forcing parties to develope themselves. His conduct on this occasion was certain to provoke accusations against him, and he was thenceforth stigmatised as an agent of the Orleans faction.*

* These decrees were presented to him on the 20th September.

* The particulars of Mirabeau's proceedings in regard to all parties are not yet sufficiently ascertained, but are intended to be illustrated ere long. I have obtained undoubted information from those charged with the publication; I have had in my possession several important documents, and especially the paper written in the form of a profession of faith, which constituted his secret treaty with the court. I am not permitted to give any of those documents to the public, nor even to specify their holders. I can only state what the future will sufficiently demonstrate, when all the proofs shall have been published. I am, however, enabled to affirm with distinctness, that Mirabeau never was concerned in the suspected plots of the Duke of Orleans. Mirabeau came from Provence actuated by a single design, namely, to battle with the arbitrary power from which he had suffered wrong, and which his reason as well as his feelings taught him to regard as detestable. When at Paris, he frequently visited a banker, then well known, and a man of considerable merit. In his house the usual topics of conversation were politics, finance, and political economy. Mirabeau there derived much information upon these matters, and formed a connexion with what was called the exiled Genevese colony, of which Clavière, afterwards minister of finance, was a member. However, Mirabeau contracted no strictly intimate ties. He had a great deal of familiarity in his manners, which he derived from a consciousness of power; a feeling he often carried to imprudent lengths. Owing to this familiar bearing, he was on easy terms with every body, and appeared closely united with all those whom he addressed. It was thus that he was repeatedly imagined the friend and accomplice of divers men with whom he had no interest in common. I have already said, and I now repeat, that he was of no party. The aristocracy could not endure his name; the party of Necker and Mounier was unable to come to an understanding with him. The Duke of Orleans alone was in a position to appear united with him. And they were believed to be so, in fact, because Mirabeau was on familiar terms with the duke, and because both being suspected of soaring ambition, the one as a prince, the other as a

Whilst still excited by this angry discussion, the assembly received the king's answer to the resolutions of the 4th August. The king signified his approval of their spirit, but gave to some only a conditional adherence, in the hope they would be modified when finally framed for execution, and to the majority of them he repeated the objections alleged in the debate, and disregarded by the assembly. Mirabeau mounted the tribune. "We have not thoroughly examined," said he, "the superiority of the constituent power over the executive power; we have in some sort cast a veil over such questions (the assembly in reality had explained in its own favour the manner in which they should be understood, without passing any regular decree on the subject); but if our constitutive authority be disputed, we shall be obliged to assert it. Let us act frankly and without prevarication. We confess there are difficulties in the execution, but we do not insist upon that execution. Thus we claim the abolition of offices, but at the same time assign reimbursement for the future, and the security for that reimbursement; we declare the impost, which serves to subsidise the clergy, destructive to agriculture, but until a substitute be found for it, we order the collection of tithes; we abolish seignorial jurisdictions, but leave them in existence until other tribunals are established. The same may be observed of the other articles; they all embody principles which it is essential to render irrevocable by giving them promulgation. But, indeed, were they false, the public mind is in possession of these resolutions, and it is no longer possible to refuse them. Let us repeat ingenuously to the king what Philip II.'s fool said to that despotic prince:—'What wouldst thou do, Philip, if all the world said yes, when thou saidst no?'"

The assembly directed its president to proceed again to the king, to solicit his promulgation. The king yielded to the demand. On its part, the assembly, deliberating on the duration of the suspensive veto, extended it to two legislatures; but it was wrong to let too strong an inference be drawn that it was in some degree a recompense granted to Louis XVI. for the concessions he had just made to public opinion.

Whilst the assembly pursued its way amidst the obstacles raised by the sullen animosity of the privileged classes and the popular outbreaks, other difficulties accumulated around it, and gave its enemies cause of exultation. These hoped it would be paralysed by the financial distress, as the court itself had been. The first loan of 30,000,000 had not succeeded; a second of 80,000,000, ordained on a fresh proposition from Necker,* had not been attended with a more fortunate result. "Go on and discuss," cried M. Degouy Darcy one day; "let time quietly slip away, and at the expiration of a certain period, we shall be in the final agony!—I am about to communicate to you some awful truths." "Order! order!" shouted several members. "No, no, speak!" responded others. A deputy arose: "Continue," said he to M. Degouy; "spread alarm and terror! What matter? what will happen?—we shall contribute a share of our fortunes, and all will be hushed." M. Degouy proceeded: "The loans that you have voted have yielded nothing; there are not 10,000,000† in the treasury." At these words he was again surrounded, remonstrated with, and silenced. The Duke d'Aiguillon, chairman of the finance committee, gave his statement a direct contradiction, by proving that there were 22,000,000 in the coffers of the state. However, it was resolved that Fridays and Saturdays should be especially devoted to financial matters.

Necker himself at length came forward. Oppressed with his continual struggles, he renewed his incessant complaint, reproaching the assembly with having done nothing to relieve the financial embarrassments, after sitting five months. The two loans had been unproductive, because the disorders had destroyed credit. Money was hidden, and foreigners had testified no disposition to invest their capitals in the proposed loans. Emigration and the departure of travellers had likewise lessened the circulating medium, and there scarcely remained sufficient currency for daily use. The king and queen had been obliged to send their plate to the mint. In consequence of this disastrous state of things, Necker asked for a contribution of a fourth of incomes, affirming that such a supply appeared to him sufficient for all purposes. A committee consumed three days in investigating this plan, of which it reported most favourably. Mirabeau, the known enemy of the minister, was the first to speak, pressing the assembly to sanction the plan without discussing it. "Not having time to weigh it," said he, "you ought not to take upon yourselves the responsibility of the event, by approving or condemning the proposed measure." On this ground he recommended the assembly to vote the project at once and in confidence. The assembly, moved by his reasons, adopted the proposition, and directed Mirabeau to retire and draw up the decree. During the interval, the sensation partially evaporated, and the opponents of the minister asserted resources to exist which had escaped the acumen of Necker. His friends, on the contrary, attacked Mirabeau, and complained that he designed to crush him by making him responsible for events. Mirabeau returned and read his decree. "You plant a dagger in the minister's plan," exclaimed M. de Virieu. Mirabeau, never recoiling without a vigorous rejoinder, frankly avowed his motives; he granted he laid himself open when he stated that it was his desire to throw upon M. Necker alone the responsibility of events; he said he had not the honour to rank as his friend, but were he his tenderest friend, being a citizen before all ties, he would not hesitate to compromise him rather than the assembly; that he was far from believing the kingdom would be in danger should M. Necker be deceived, but that, on the contrary, the public safety would be seriously compromised if the assembly staked its credit and failed in a decisive operation. He subsequently suggested an address to stimulate the national patriotism and support the ministerial project.

Cheers resounded from all sides, but still the debate was maintained. Multifarious amendments were proposed, and the time was consumed in frivolous subtleties. Irritated at such pertinacious opposition, and impressed with the urgent nature of the emergency, he scaled the tribune for the last time, worked himself

tribune, they seemed marked out for allies. The penury of Mirabeau, and the affluence of Orleans, likewise appeared a probable bond of union. Nevertheless, Mirabeau remained poor until his connexion with the court. He then kept watch on all parties, took every opportunity to drive them into explanations, and felt his own importance too sensibly to bind himself without full consideration. Once only he engaged in some distant relations with one of the supposed agents of the Duke of Orleans. He was invited to dinner by this alleged agent, and he, to whom risk was never a subject of thought, accepted the invitation more from curiosity than any other motive. Before proceeding to the entertainment, he communicated the matter to his confidential friend, and testified much satisfaction at the coming conference, in which he expected to elicit important revelations. The dinner passed over, and Mirabeau came to report what had occurred: he had been merely treated to vague expressions concerning the Duke of Orleans, the estimation in which he held the talents of Mirabeau, and the fitness he conceived him to possess for governing a state. This conference was, therefore, a very insignificant affair, and could at the most but indicate that the party would willingly make a minister of Mirabeau. Thus he did not fail to remark to his friend, with his accustomed gaiety: "I can scarcely avoid becoming a minister, for the Duke of Orleans and the king are equally bent on nominating me." Such observations were mere ebullitions of pleasantry, for Mirabeau never believed in the imputed projects of the duke. I will give in a subsequent note some further particulars.

* Decree of the 27th August.

† About £420,000.

into possession of it, exhibited the question in its proper aspect with admirable perspicuity, and demonstrated the impossibility of lightly shaking off the dire necessities of the moment. Then, his genius warming to inspiration, he depicted all the horrors of bankruptcy; he presented it under the guise of a pestilent impost, which, instead of pressing gently upon all, falls on a portion only, whom it grinds to the dust; he likened it to a yawning chasm, into which living victims are hurled, but which closes not even after it has engulfed them, for not the less is owing because a refusal is made to pay. Finally, wielding the effective engine of terror—"The other day," said he, "on occasion of a contemptible motion at the Palais-Royal, a voice exclaimed, 'Catiline is at the gates of Rome, and you deliberate!' and yet there was no Catiline, no peril, no Rome; but to-day hideous bankruptcy lowers on you, threatening to devour yourselves, your honour, your fortunes—and *you deliberate!*"

At these words the assembly, in a transport, rose, uttering shouts of enthusiasm. A deputy desired to reply; he advanced, but, terrified at his own temerity, he stood motionless and speechless. The assembly forthwith resolved that, having heard the report of its committee, it adopted the plan of the minister of finance in confidence. Such is the charm of eloquence; but only he could work similar marvels who possessed at once the intellect and the passions of Mirabeau.

CHAPTER IV.

INTRIGUES OF THE COURT—ATTACK ON THE PALACE OF VERSAILLES—THE KING AND THE ASSEMBLY REMOVE TO PARIS—FORMATION OF CLUBS.

WHILST the assembly was thus extending its care to all parts of the social edifice, great events were brooding. By the junction of the orders, the nation had regained legislative and constituent supremacy. As a consequence of the 14th July, it had taken arms to support its representatives. Thus the king and the aristocracy stood isolated and disarmed, having nothing more in their behalf than the feeling of their rights, which none partook, and brought in front of a nation prepared for combat and victory. Notwithstanding this position, the court, secluded in a small town almost solely peopled by its retainers, was in some sort beyond the popular influence, and might even attempt a sudden blow at the assembly. It was natural that Paris, situated at the distance of a few leagues from Versailles, the metropolis of the kingdom, and the abode of a prodigious multitude, should be wishful to draw the king within its walls, with a view to free him from all aristocratic influence, and secure the advantages which the residence of the court and government always confer on a town. After having reduced the authority of the king, it remained only to make sure of his person. Such was the inevitable tendency of events, and from all quarters the cry was heard: "*The king to Paris!*" The aristocracy no longer attempted to shield itself from additional losses. It was too disdainful of what still remained as its possession to take any pains to preserve it; hence it was quite as eager for a violent change as the popular party itself. A revolution is inevitable when two parties are coincident in promoting it. Both contribute to the catastrophe, and the strongest reaps the profit. Whilst the patriots were bent on conducting the king to Paris, the court meditated his transit to Metz. There, in an impregnable fastness, he might have ordered whatever his caprice prompted, or, to speak more correctly, whatever the caprice of those around him prompted. The courtiers were busy hatching schemes, devising plans, seeking to enlist partisans, and, beside themselves with empty hopes, betraying their own machinations by imprudent threats. D'Estaing, of recent renown, won in the van of French squadrons, commanded the national guard of Versailles. He wished to be faithful to the nation and the court—a difficult part, ever open to obloquy, and which almost unexampled firmness can alone render honourable. He became apprised of the intrigues of the courtiers. The highest personages were amongst the number of the plotters; witnesses the most worthy of credence had been cited to him, and he wrote that well-known letter to the queen, in which he spoke to her with respectful energy on the impropriety and danger of such manœuvres. He disguised nothing, and specified every name.* The letter was without

* The letter of the Count d'Estaing to the queen is a curious record, and ought always to be consulted with reference to the events of the 5th and 6th October. That honest sailor, full of loyalty and independence (two qualities seemingly contradictory, but which are often found in conjunction in the breasts of seamen), had preserved the habit of speaking his mind to princes whom he loved. His testimony is above all suspicion, when in a confidential letter he lays before the queen the intrigues he has discovered and been alarmed by. It will show whether the court was in reality without a scheme at that period.

"My duty and loyalty demand that I lay at the feet of the queen an account of the journey I have made to Paris. I have been praised for sleeping soundly on the eve of an assault or a naval combat. I may venture to assert that I am not prone to timidity in any affairs. Reared with the dauphin, who was partial to me, accustomed to speak the truth at Versailles from early boyhood, a soldier and a sailor, conversant with forms, I reverence them without allowing them to fetter my frankness or my firmness.

Thus am I bound to confess to your majesty that I have been unable to close my eyes all night. I have been told in high circles, in good society (what might be the consequence, gracious Heavens, should it spread amongst the people!)—ay, repeatedly told, that signatures are canvassed for amongst the clergy and the nobility. Some persons allege that it is in concert with the king; others maintain that it is without his knowledge. It is confidently asserted that there is a regular plan formed; that it is by Champagne or Verdun that the king will withdraw or be removed; that he will go to Metz. Bouillé is named, and by whom?—by M. de Lafayette, who mentioned it to me in a whisper at the table of M. Jauge. I shuddered lest a single domestic might overhear him; I remarked to him that one word from his lips might prove a signal of death. M. de Lafayette is a cold calculator; he answered me that at Metz, as elsewhere, the patriots were the strongest, and that it was better one man should die for the safety of all.

The Baron de Breteuil, who is so slow to depart, manages the plan. Money is taken up, and promises held out to furnish a million and a half per month. The Count de Mercy is unfortunately specified as acting in concert. Such are the reports; if they are disseminated amongst the people, the result is not to be calculated; as yet they are circulated in whispers. Good men have testified to me their terrors for the consequences; the mere suspicion of the fact may produce terrible ones. I visited the Spanish ambassador, and I shall assuredly not conceal from the queen that at his house my alarm was redoubled. M. Fernand Nunès talked with me concerning these false rumours, concerning the horror that was expressed at the bare idea of so inconceivable a plan, which would draw after it the most disastrous and humiliating of civil wars; which would occasion the partition or the total loss of the monarchy, given up as a prey to domestic rage and foreign ambition; and which would expose the personages the most dear to France to irreparable misfortunes. After speaking of a wandering, persecuted court, betrayed by those who have not supported it when they had it in their power, who wish simply to involve it in their own downfall—the nation struck by an universal bankruptcy, from that moment inevitable, and all things fearful to contemplate, I interrupted him by exclaiming, that at all events there could be no other mischief than that which this false intelligence might produce if it became prevalent, because it was an idea without any foundation. The Spanish ambassador cast his eyes to the ground at this last phrase. I then became urgent; he at length confessed that some one of rank and undoubted credibility had informed him he had been asked to sign an association. He persisted in refusing to name him; but either from inattention, or for the sake of good, he fortunately did not exact my word of honour, which it would have been imperative on me to keep. I made no promise not to mention the fact. It has impressed me with a greater degree of terror than I have ever experienced. It is not for myself that I feel this alarm

effect. When entering on such enterprises, the queen possibly anticipated remonstrances, or, at all events, could scarcely feel surprised at them.

At this period a crowd of strangers appeared in Versailles, and even unknown uniforms were seen. The company of the body-guards, whose period of duty had expired, was detained; some dragoons and chasseurs of the regiment "Trois-Evéchés" were summoned. The French guards, who had quitted the king's personal service, were mortified that the duty was intrusted to others, and resolved to repair to Versailles, in order to resume it. They had certainly no reason to complain, since they had themselves abandoned that service; but they were, as it is said, excited by others to the project. It was charged upon the court at the time, upon the allegation that it designed to alarm the king by this expedient, and draw him to Metz. One fact sufficiently demonstrates this intention. Since the riots of the Palais-Royal, Lafayette, in order to intercept the communication between Paris and Versailles, had fixed a post at Sèvres. He was compelled to withdraw it, on the demand of the deputies of the right side in the assembly. Lafayette succeeded in stopping the French guards, and dissuading them from their design. He wrote a confidential letter to the minister, Saint-Priest, informing him of what had occurred, and removing all apprehensions of danger. Saint-Priest, making an improper use of the letter, showed it to D'Estaing, who in his turn communicated it to the officers of the Versailles national guard, and to the municipality, for the purpose of apprising them of the calamities which had threatened the town, and of those which might threaten it again. It was proposed to call in the regiment of Flanders; many battalions of the Versailles guard opposed the measure, but the municipality persisted in sending its requisition, and the regiment was summoned. One regiment was but a feeble force against the assembly, but it was sufficient to carry off the king, and cover his flight. D'Estaing informed the national assembly of the measures that had been taken, and obtained its approval. The regiment arrived; the military parade which accompanied it, though not very formidable, did not fail to excite murmurs. The body-guards and the courtiers crowded round the officers, overwhelmed them with congratulations, and, as before the 14th July, they appeared in close confederacy and mutual understanding, and buoyed up by sanguine and lofty hopes.

The confidence of the court aggravated the distrust of Paris, and banquets ere long insulted the misery of the people. On the 2d October the body-guards were moved to give a feast to the officers in garrison. This festival was held in the saloon of the theatre. The boxes were filled with spectators from the court. The officers of the national guard were amongst the guests. A sprightly gaiety reigned throughout the entertainment, which wine soon fanned into fervour. The soldiers of the regiments were then introduced. The company, with drawn swords, drank to the health of the royal family; the toast of the nation was spurned, or at all events omitted; the trumpets sounded the charge, the boxes were scaled with vociferous shouts; the significant and well-known song of "*Oh Richard! oh my king! the universe abandons thee!*" was chanted in chorus; pledges were given to die for the king, as if he had been in the greatest danger; in a word, the delirium passed all bounds. White or black cockades, but all of a single colour, were distributed in profusion. The young of both sexes, glowing with chivalric recollections, animated each other with fervent phrases. It was at this moment that the national cockade was, as is alleged, trampled under foot. The fact was afterwards denied; but did not the intoxication render every thing credible, and every thing excusable? And besides, why hold such meetings, which raised on one side only transitory emotions of loyalty, and on the other a settled and vindictive exasperation? When the scene had reached this height, the queen was disturbed in her apartments, and she consented to grace the festival with her presence. The king was surrounded as he returned from the chase, and he too was drawn to the scene. The company threw themselves at the feet of both, and escorted them, as if in triumph, to their apartments. It is unquestionably sweet, when a man believes himself despoiled and menaced, to find friends; yet that is but a poor reason for self-deception, as regards duty, power, and means.

The report of this banquet was soon disseminated, and doubtless the popular imagination, in circulating the particulars, superadded its own exaggerations to those the festivity itself had caused. The promises given to the king were held as threats dealt out to the nation; the prodigality so ostentatiously displayed was regarded as a deliberate mockery of the public wretchedness, and the vociferations "*To Versailles!*" recommenced with greater violence than ever. Thus smaller causes combined to aggravate the effect of general causes. Some young men who appeared in Paris with black cockades were assaulted; one of them was dragged along by the populace, and the commune found itself compelled to prohibit cockades of a single colour.

The day after the fatal festival, a fresh scene, almost similar in its features, occurred on the occasion of a breakfast given by the body-guards in the circus of the riding-school. The company, as before, were presented to the queen, who expressed to them her satisfaction at the demonstration of Thursday. She was listened to with eagerness, because, being less reserved than the king, from her lips the sentiments of the court were gathered, and all her words were stored up and repeated. Irritation pervaded the public mind to a fearful extent, and the most deplorable consequences might justly have been anticipated. A commotion, as it chanced, was agreeable both to the people and the court; to the people, as a means of securing the person of the king, and to the court, as a means of terrifying him into a retreat to Metz. Neither was it repugnant to the Duke of Orleans, inasmuch as he hoped to obtain the lieutenancy of the kingdom if the king should withdraw himself; it has been even stated that his expectations aspired to the crown itself, which is scarcely credible, for he lacked boldness of mind sufficient for such lofty views. The advantages which he had grounds for anticipating from this new insurrection, have caused him to be accused of having participated in it; but the charge is groundless. He could not have imparted the impulse, for it resulted from the force of circumstances; he appears at the most to have seconded it; and, even in this respect, a multifarious investigation, and time, which unlocks all secrets, have brought to light no trace of a concerted plan. There is little doubt that the Duke of Orleans was then, as during the whole revolution, merely in the train of the popular movement, distributing perhaps a little gold, furnishing occasion to certain mob phrases, and indulging himself in vague hopes.*

I entreat the queen to reflect, in her wisdom, upon all that may result from a false step; the first cost sufficiently dear. I have seen the excellent heart of the queen melt into tears at the fate of victims given up to execution; in this case there would be torrents of blood shed uselessly, for vain regret. Mere indecision may be without remedy. It is only by anticipating the design, by appearing even to foster it, that it may be partially controlled. Nothing is as yet lost. The queen may re-conquer his kingdom for the king. Nature has lavished upon her the means; they of themselves are sufficient. She may imitate her august mother; if not, I am silent. I beseech your majesty to grant me an audience some day in the course of this week."

* ["The insurrection of the 5th and 6th October was a true popular movement. It is useless to search for secret motives to account for it, or to attribute it to hidden intrigues of ambition; it was provoked by the imprudence of the court. The banquet of the life-guards, rumours of flight, apprehensions of civil war, and

The populace, already agitated by the discussions on the veto, exasperated by the black cockades, annoyed by the constant patrols, and tortured by the pangs of hunger, was in open revolt. Bailly and Necker had neglected no means to render food abundant; but from the difficulties of transport, the spoliations endured on the route, and, above all, from the utter impossibility of acting with the same efficiency as the spontaneous movements of commerce, the supplies of flour fell short. On the 4th October the agitation was greater than ever. The departure of the king for Metz was bruited abroad, and the necessity of going to Versailles in search of him was openly canvassed; the black cockades were execrated; bread was vociferously demanded. Numerous bodies of patrol succeeded in restraining the populace from outrage, and the night passed over in comparative tranquillity. But from dawn on the following day mobs began again to gather. The women flocked to the bakers' shops; bread was wanting, and they rushed to the town-hall to pour forth their complaints to the representatives of the commune. Those functionaries had not yet assembled, and a battalion of the national guard was drawn up in the square. Men now joined the women, but they refused to receive them, crying out that men were merely an incumbrance. They then fell precipitately on the battalion, and drove it back with showers of stones. At this instant, a door having been forced, the town-hall was invaded; brigands with pikes forced their way in with the women, and attempted to set the edifice on fire. Their atrocious design was prevented, but they got possession of the door leading to the great tower, and sounded the tocsin. The faubourgs forthwith put themselves in motion. A citizen named Maillard, one of those who had signalised themselves at the capture of the Bastille, consulted the officer in command of the battalion of the national guard as to the means by which the town-hall might be delivered from these furious women. The officer durst not sanction the expedient he proposed, which was to draw them together again under the pretext of going to Versailles, but without actually leading them thither. However, Maillard decided for himself, took a drum, and soon gathered them around him. They were grotesquely armed with clubs, broomsticks, muskets, and cutlasses. With this extraordinary armament, he passed down the quay, traversed the Louvre, was forced in spite of himself to lead it through the Tuileries, and at last debouched on the Champs-Elysées. There he exhorted them to lay down their weapons, on the ground that they ought to present themselves to the assembly as suppliants, and not as rioters in arms. The women consented to follow his advice, and Maillard was then compelled to lead them to Versailles, for it was utterly impossible to dissuade them from the enterprise. To this point an irresistible current of opinion had set in. Bands of men departed, dragging cannon; others surrounded the national guard, which, again, surrounded its general, to draw him to Versailles, the object of all hopes.

Whilst the capital was thus convulsed, the court was at perfect ease; but the assembly was roused to anger by a message it received from the king. It had presented for his acceptance the constitutional articles and the declaration of rights. His reply ought to have been a pure and unconditional acceptation, with a promise to promulgate them. For the second time, the king, without explaining himself too lucidly, addressed a series of observations to the assembly; he gave his *accession* to the constitutional articles, but without expressing approval of them; he allowed divers good maxims to exist in the declaration of rights, but they required explanations; the whole, in fine, could only be judged of, as he said, when the entire body of the constitution was framed. This was unquestionably a defensible opinion, and indeed many jurisconsults partook it; but the prudence of expressing it at this period was more than doubtful. Scarcely had the answer been read ere murmurs arose. Robespierre said that the king mistook his functions when he wrote critiques to the assembly, and Duport, that the message ought to have been countersigned by a responsible minister. Pétion took the opportunity to introduce the banquet of the body-guards, and he denounced, in energetic terms, the imprecations levelled at the assembly. Grégoire spoke of the famine, and asked the reason why a letter had been addressed to a miller, promising him 200 livres (£8) a-week if he would grind no corn. Such a letter proved nothing, for it might have emanated from any party; but it nevertheless excited considerable tumult, in the midst of which M. de Monspey called upon Pétion to sign his denunciation. Thereupon Mirabeau, who had disapproved, even in the tribune, the speeches of Pétion and Grégoire, rose to answer M. de Monspey. "I was the first to express disapprobation at those impolitic denunciations," said he; "but since you insist upon driving matters to extremity, I will be myself the denouncer, and I will affix my signature, when it shall have been proclaimed that there is no inviolability in France but for the king alone." At this terrible menace immediate silence ensued, and the king's answer was again taken up. It was eleven o'clock in the morning, and intelligence of the commotions at Paris was at that moment brought. Mirabeau went up to the president, Mounier, who, having been recently elected to the chair in spite of the clamours of the Palais-Royal, and menaced with a glorious fall, displayed an indomitable firmness during that mournful day. Mirabeau drew near him, and said in a low tone—"Paris is marching on us: feign illness, hasten to the palace, and tell the king to accept purely and unconditionally." "Paris marches!" replied Mounier; "so much the better: let them kill us all—*all*, however—and the state will be vastly benefited!" "Your remark is truly profound!" retorted Mirabeau, and returned to his place. The debate continued until three o'clock, when it was decided that the president should wait upon the king, to solicit from him a pure and unconditional acceptation. As Mounier was preparing to leave the hall, in order to proceed to the palace, a deputation was announced. It was Maillard, and the women who had followed him. Maillard demanded permission to enter and address the assembly; he was accordingly introduced, the women rushing tumultuously at his heels and penetrating into the body of the house. He commenced an exposition of what had occurred at Paris, enlarging upon the want of bread and the desperate condition of the people; he spoke of the letter addressed to the miller, and pretended that some one whom he had met on the road had stated that a priest was prepared to denounce it. This priest was Grégoire, and, as has been already related, he had made his denunciation. A voice hereupon accused Juigné, Bishop of Paris, of being the author of the letter. Indignant cries arose, repelling the imputation upon so virtuous a prelate Maillard and his deputation were called to order. They were told that measures had been taken to provision Paris, that the king had omitted no precaution, that the assembly was about to entreat him to order additional exertions, that they must now withdraw, and that disorders were not the means for removing famine. Mounier then departed to visit the palace; the women crowded around him, and insisted upon accompanying him: he at first refused to listen to the proposal, but was ultimately obliged to admit six as his companions to the royal audience. He had to make his way through

famine, alone propelled Paris on Versailles. If particular instigators contributed to produce the movement, which the most indefatigable of prejudiced inquisitors have left in doubt, they changed neither its direction nor its object. The consequence of the event was the destruction of the ancient system of the court; it took away its guard, transported it from the royal residence of Versailles to the capital of the revolution, and seated it under the eye of the people."—*Mignet*, vol. i. p. 113.]



La Fayette

the hordes arrived from Paris, who were armed with pikes, hatchets, and iron-bound clubs. The rain poured in torrents. A detachment of the body-guards charged the mob surrounding the president, and drove it back; but the women soon rejoined Mounier, and he at length reached the palace, where he found the regiment of Flanders, the dragoons, the Swiss, and the national guard of Versailles, drawn up in battle array. Instead of six women, he was compelled to take twelve with him: the king received them with kindness, and commiserated their distress, which gracious deportment sensibly affected them. One of them, a young and pretty girl, was so overpowered at sight of the monarch, that she could scarcely ejaculate the word "*bread.*" The king, touched at her emotion, embraced her, and the women retired from the presence deeply moved by the interview.* Their companions awaited them at the gate of the palace: they refused to believe their report, saying, they had allowed themselves to be seduced, and prepared to tear them in pieces. The body-guards, commanded by the Count de Guiche, ran forward to disengage them; musket-shots rattled from various quarters, two guardsmen fell, and several women were wounded. Not far from this tumult, one of the mob, at the head of some women, pierced the ranks of the battalions and advanced to the railing of the palace. M. de Savonnières pursued this daring man, but he received a shot which broke his arm. These skirmishes engendered the worst feeling on both sides. The king, informed of the dangerous position of affairs, sent an order to his guards not to fire, and to retire to their barracks. Whilst they were withdrawing, some shots were exchanged between them and the national guard of Versailles, but from which side the first shots were fired has never been ascertained.†

During these deplorable conflicts, the king was holding a council, and Mounier was impatiently awaiting his determination. The latter sent repeated intimations to the king that his duties called him to the assembly, that the declaration of his acceptance would tranquillise the public mind, and that unless an answer were vouchsafed him, he must withdraw, as he could not longer absent himself from his post. It was debated in the council whether the king should leave Versailles; it continued in consultation from six till ten in the evening, and the king, as is said, was principally moved to remain, lest he should leave the place vacant for the Duke of Orleans. It was resolved that the queen and the children should be removed, but the crowd stopped the carriages the instant they appeared; and, furthermore, the queen had courageously determined not to separate from her husband. At length, about ten o'clock, Mounier received the pure and unconditional acceptation, and returned to the assembly. The deputies had left, and the hall was occupied by women. He announced to them the king's concession, which information they received with great composure, asking him, at the same time, whether their condition would be amended thereby, and especially whether they should have sufficient bread. Mounier returned as cheering an answer as he could, and caused to be distributed amongst them all the bread that it was possible to procure. That night, in which it is so difficult to fix the wrongs that were committed, the municipality assuredly was guilty of one in not providing for the wants of that famished crowd, which insufficiency of food had driven forth from Paris, and which could not have obtained any on the road after its departure.

At this moment the arrival of Lafayette was announced. He had struggled for eight hours against the national guard of Paris, which insisted upon repairing to Versailles. One of his grenadiers had addressed him in these words:—"General, you do not indeed deceive us, but you are yourself deceived. Instead of turning our arms against women, let us go to Versailles in search of the king, and make sure of his inclinations by placing him in the midst of us." Lafayette had resisted the entreaties of his army and the boisterous clamours of the multitude. His soldiers were attached to him by no illusion of victories won at their head, but by opinion; and if that opinion were withdrawn from him, he could no longer control them. And yet, in spite of that difficulty, he had succeeded in staying them until the evening; but his voice could be heard only at a short distance, and beyond its compass the popular fury raged without a check. His life had been several times threatened, and still he continued to resist. However, he became aware that bands were continually issuing out of Paris, and as the insurrection was transporting itself to Versailles, his duty was to follow it thither. The commune also ordered him to proceed to Versailles, and he accordingly departed. On the route he halted his army, and administered to it an oath of fidelity to the king: he did not reach Versailles until near midnight. He informed Mounier, as president of the assembly, that the Paris army had vowed to perform its duty, and that nothing should be done contrary to the law. He then hastened to the palace, testified to its inmates every sentiment of respect and concern, communicated to the king the precautions that had been adopted, and gave him assurances of his own and his army's fidelity to his person. The king seemed relieved from his anxieties, and retired to rest. The guard of the palace had been refused to Lafayette; only the outer posts were intrusted to him. The other posts were destined for the Flanders regiment, whose stanchness was not too sure, the Swiss, and the body-guards. These latter had originally received orders to retire, but had been afterwards recalled, and not having been able to effect a general junction, they mustered but sparingly at their post. In the disorder that reigned, all the accessible points were not defended; one of the iron gates even remained open. Lafayette caused the outer posts confided to his care to be occupied, and not one of them was forced, or indeed attacked.

Notwithstanding the prevailing tumult, the assembly had resumed its sitting, and it pursued a discussion on the penal laws in an attitude of tranquil dignity. From time to time the people interrupted the debate with demands for bread. Mirabeau, irritated at such unseemly conduct, exclaimed, in his stentorian voice, that the assembly would receive the law from no one, and would, if provoked, order the galleries to be cleared. The people responded to his appeal with loud applause; but it was useless for the assembly to persist much longer. Lafayette, having sent a message to Mounier that all appeared to him in perfect tranquillity, and that he might safely dismiss the members, the assembly broke up at an early hour in the morning, adjourning until the following day at eleven.

* ["The women who had gone into the palace with the deputation from the assembly, were extremely affected at the sensibility shown by the king on hearing the account of the pretended want of the metropolis. One of them, whose name was Louise Chabry, a young woman of seventeen years of age, who worked at a carver's, and who was commissioned to represent the grievances of the Parisians to his majesty, could not support the emotion of tenderness or timidity she felt, and fainted. Every thing was done to recover her: as she was going away, she wished to kiss the king's hand; but his majesty, saying kindly to her that she deserved better than that, did her the honour to kiss her lips. They all retired well satisfied, crying in the court, '*God bless the king and his family! To-morrow we shall have bread!*'"—*Bertrand*, vol. ii. p. 85.]

† [M. Bertrand, of course, charges the offence on the national guards, in the following indignant passage: "It is almost necessary to have been an eye-witness to these scenes of horror, to be able to believe that that base and unprovoked discharge was made by the national guard of Versailles *only*. Yes, by those very men on whom, three days before, the body-guards had lavished, and from whom they had received, the most affectionate marks of friendship and good-will.—Vol. ii. p. 91.]

The populace were scattered here and there throughout the town, and appeared sunk in slumber. Lafayette was justified in feeling confidence from the devotedness of his army, which in fact did not belie his expectations, and by the profound calm which seemed to pervade the whole town. He had made the barrack of the body-guards secure, and distributed numerous patrols. He was still on horseback at five in the morning. Convinced that all danger had subsided, he swallowed a draught, and threw himself on a bed, to enjoy a short repose, for he had not been refreshed by sleep for four and twenty hours.*

In this interval, the populace began to rouse themselves, and already groups were wandering in the vicinity of the palace. Some ribaldry was exchanged with a body-guardsman, who discharged his piece from a window: the brigands instantly sprang forward, passed the gate which had been left open, ascended a staircase which they found unguarded, and were at length stopped by two guardsmen, who heroically defended themselves, giving way only foot by foot as they retreated from door to door. One of these generous servants was called Miomandre. "Save the queen!" he shouted. The cry was heard, and the queen sought refuge, in terror, beside the king. Whilst she fled, the brigands rushed forward, found the royal couch abandoned, and attempted to proceed farther; but they were again stopped by the body-guards, intrenched in force upon that point. At this moment, the French guards belonging to Lafayette, and stationed near the palace, hearing the tumult, hastened to the spot, and dispersed the brigands. They presented themselves at the door behind which the body-guards were intrenched, and cried out, "Open: the French guards have not forgotten that at Fontenoi you saved their regiment!" The door was thrown apart, and the soldiers met in mutual embrace.

Without the precincts of the palace, violence and disorder raged uncontrolled. Lafayette, who had scarcely lain down for many minutes, and had not even sunk to sleep, heard the noise, sprang on the first horse he found, and galloped into the midst of the tumult, where he perceived several guardsmen on the point of being murdered. With the quickness of thought he rescued them from their peril, ordered his own soldiers to hasten to the palace, and remained almost alone in the midst of the brigands. One of them levelled his musket at him: Lafayette, without displaying any emotion, commanded the people to bring the man to him. The populace instantly seized the wretch, and dashed out his brains against the pavement, before the eyes of the general. Lafayette, after having thus saved the body-guards, proceeded at a rapid pace with them to the palace, and there met his grenadiers, who had already mustered on the scene of action. They all surrounded him, and volunteered their pledges to die for the king. At this moment, the body-guards, who had been rescued from the very jaws of death, rent the air with cries of "Long live Lafayette!" The whole court of the monarch, seeing itself saved by him and his troops, acknowledged that to him its preservation was owing; the evidences of gratitude were spontaneous and universal. Madame Adelaide, the king's aunt, ran forward, pressed him in her arms, and said to him, "General, you have saved us!"

The populace, at this instant, demanded with loud shouts that the king should proceed to Paris. A consultation was held. Lafayette, when invited to take part in the council, declined, from a feeling that his presence might be a check to free discussion. It was ultimately decided that the court should accede to the unequivocal wishes of the people. Pieces of paper, imparting this information, were thrown from the windows. Louis XVI. then presented himself on the balcony, accompanied by Lafayette, and was hailed with shouts of "Long live the king!" But a different feeling was manifested with regard to the queen; fierce anathemas were coupled with her name. Lafayette accosted her: "Madame," said he, "what are your intentions?" "To accompany the king," answered the queen, with courage. "Come with me, then," returned the general; and he thereupon led her, in amazement, to the balcony. Some menaces again assailed her from the more furious of the mob. The moment was critical: a sudden and fatal act might be perpetrated; it was impossible for words to be heard; through the eyes only could the populace be moved. Therefore, bowing lowly, and taking the hand of the queen, the general respectfully kissed it. That populace, so truly French, was transported at the sight, and confirmed the reconciliation by shouts of "Long live the queen! Long live Lafayette!" Peace remained to be sealed with the body-guards. "Will you do nothing for my guards?" said the king to

* History can never be unduly amplified when justifying even individuals, especially in a revolution where the parts, even the most important, are extremely numerous. M. de Lafayette has been so calumniated, and his character is so unsullied and consistent, that it is but sheer duty to consecrate a note to his vindication. His conduct during the 5th and 6th October was one unbroken act of self-devotion, and yet it has been represented as a criminal dereliction by those who owed their lives to his exertions. In the first place, he has been upbraided with the violence of the national guard, which drew him in spite of himself to Versailles. Nothing can be more unjust; for if a leader, by undaunted firmness, can awe troops at whose head he has often conquered, citizens recently and voluntarily enrolled, and whom a certain enthusiasm of opinion alone binds to their general, are not to be controlled when that very opinion stimulates them to resistance. M. de Lafayette struggled against them an entire day, and certainly more could not be desired. Besides, his ultimate departure was of essential benefit, for without the national guard the palace had been taken by assault, and none can predicate what might have been the fate of the royal family when exposed to the unbridled license of the populace. As has been already stated, the body-guards were forced before the national grenadiers arrived. It is an inevitable deduction, that the presence of Lafayette and his troops at Versailles was indispensable.

After heaping reproaches on him for going there at all, he has been assiduously attacked for going to sleep; and this slumber has been the subject of the most malevolent and unremitting taunts. Lafayette remained up till five o'clock in the morning, having employed the whole night in distributing patrols and establishing order and tranquillity; and sufficient proof exists that his precautions were judiciously taken, in the conclusive fact, that not one of the posts intrusted to his guardianship was assailed. All appeared calm; and he did what no one would have failed to do in his place—he threw himself on a bed to recruit the strength that was exhausted in an incessant contact with a tumultuary mob for twenty-four hours. His repose did not continue above half an hour; he was at the palace upon the first alarm, and early enough to rescue the body-guards from the slaughter that threatened them. What, then, can be justly charged upon him?—that he was not present at the first moment? But that absence might have been equally caused by some other contingency: an order to give, or a post to visit, might have withdrawn him for half an hour from the point where the first attack was made; and his appearance simultaneously with the onslaught could by no possible chance be assured. But did he arrive in sufficient time to deliver almost all the victims—to save the palace and its august inmates? Did he generously encounter the greatest dangers? These things none have the hardihood to deny, and they procured him at the period itself universal benedictions. There was then only one sentiment amongst those he had saved. Madame de Staël, who cannot be suspected of partiality towards M. de Lafayette, relates that she heard the body-guards cry—"*Long live Lafayette!*" Mounier, whose testimony is likewise above suspicion, from his known tendencies, lauds his zeal; and Lally-Tolendal regrets that a species of dictatorship had not been conferred upon him at that epoch, (see his *Address to his Constituents.*) These two deputies have inveighed with sufficient vehemence against the 5th and 6th October, to ensure them the character of faithful witnesses on such a point. In a word, not a single individual at the time ventured to deny a zeal and alacrity universally recognised. At a later date, the spirit of party, unwilling to allow virtues in a constitutional, was unscrupulous enough to deny the services of Lafayette; and then that long course of calumny, of which he has never ceased to be the object, had its beginning.

Lafayette. The general took one of them by the hand, conducted him to the balcony, embraced him, and decorated him with his shoulder-belt. The crowd again proclaimed its approval, and ratified by its applauses this fresh reconciliation.

The assembly had conceived it inconsistent with its dignity to attend the monarch, though he had requested its presence. It had contented itself with dispatching to him a deputation of thirty-six members. As soon as it was informed of his intended departure, it passed a decree importing that the assembly was inseparable from the person of the monarch, and nominated one hundred deputies to accompany him to Paris. The king received the decree, and entered his carriage.

The main body of the multitude had already departed. Lafayette had sent after it a detachment of the army to prevent it returning. He had given orders to disarm the brigands who bore on the ends of their pikes the heads of two guardsmen. Those horrible trophies were wrested from them, and it is false that they were carried before the king's carriage.

Louis XVI. arrived, encompassed by a considerable concourse of people, and was received by Bailly at the town-hall. "I return with confidence amongst my people of Paris," said the king. Bailly repeated these words to those who were unable to hear them, but he forgot the phrase "*with confidence.*" "Add *with confidence*," said the queen. "The words come more auspiciously from you, than if *I* had pronounced them," replied Bailly.

The royal family repaired to the palace of the Tuileries, which for a whole century had been uninhabited, and in which the necessary accommodations for the reception of the royal family were wholly incomplete. The guard of the palace was intrusted to the Parisian militia, and upon Lafayette was imposed the responsibility towards the nation of the king's personal safety, an object of dispute to all parties. The nobles would have conducted him to a strong fortress, in order to exercise despotism in his name; the popular party, to which the idea of dispensing with the royal station had not yet suggested itself, desired to keep him, in order to complete the constitution, and to take from civil war an important chief. Thus the malevolence of the privileged classes upbraided Lafayette with being a jailor, whereas his vigilance could bear only one interpretation, that he was sincerely anxious to maintain a king.

From this period, the course of parties took a new direction. The aristocracy, being repelled from the monarch, and unable to hatch schemes at his side, betook itself to the provinces and to foreigners. The emigration began thenceforth to be considerable. A great number of nobles fled to Turin, where the Count d'Artois had taken up his abode with his father-in-law. From that point, their policy consisted in exciting the departments of the south, and asserting that the king was not free. The queen, from her descent, and likewise from antipathy to the new court formed at Turin, turned her hopes towards Austria. The king, in the midst of these intrigues, beheld all that was going on, offered no interference, and awaited his deliverance from any quarter that might attempt it. At intervals, he made such disavowals as the assembly required, and in truth was not free, any more than he would have been at Turin or at Coblentz, any more than he had been under Maurepas, for it is the fate of weakness to be in all cases dependent.

The popular party, now in the ascendant, was itself divided: the Duke of Orleans, Lafayette, Mirabeau, Barnave, and the Lameths, represented different sections. The public voice accused the Duke of Orleans and Mirabeau of being the authors of the last insurrection. Witnesses, not altogether unworthy of credit, maintained that they had seen the duke and Mirabeau upon the deplorable battle-field of the 6th October. The facts alleged were subsequently disproved, but at the moment they were generally believed. The boldest of the calumniators asserted that the design of the conspirators was to carry off the king, and even to procure his death. The Duke of Orleans, they added, had indulged in hopes of his elevation to the lieutenancy of the kingdom, and Mirabeau of his to the ministry. As none of these projects had succeeded, and as Lafayette seemed to have counteracted them by his presence, he passed as the preserver of the king and the conqueror of Orleans and Mirabeau. The court, not having yet had time to become ungrateful, proclaimed Lafayette as its deliverer, and the power of that general appeared at the moment almost boundless. The enthusiastic patriots began to take alarm, and already the name of Cromwell was muttered in public places. Mirabeau, who, as we shall shortly see, had nothing in common with the Duke of Orleans, was envious of Lafayette, and called him Cromwell-Grandison. The aristocracy abetted him in his suspicions, and stimulated the odium by calumnies of its own fabrication. But Lafayette was determined, in opposition to all obstacles, to support the king and the constitution. With this view, he at once formed the resolution to remove the Duke of Orleans, whose presence gave rise to so many rumours, and might furnish, if not the means, at least the pretext, for disturbances. He sought an interview with the prince, intimidated him by his firmness, and wrung from him a pledge to withdraw himself. The king took part in this measure, but feigned, with his accustomed weakness, to be constrained to its adoption; and in a letter to the Duke of Orleans, he told him it was necessary that either he or Lafayette should retire; that in the state of public opinion the selection could not be doubtful, and that in consequence he gave him a mission to England. It has since become known that M. de Montmorin, the minister for foreign affairs, in his anxiety to get rid of the Duke of Orleans and his ambitious views, had urged him to repair to the Low Countries, then insurgent against the house of Austria, and given him grounds for anticipating the title of Duke of Brabant.* His friends, on learning the resolution of the duke, were indignant at his weakness. More ambitious than himself, they were averse to his yielding; they waited on Mirabeau, and pressed him to denounce in the tribune the violence used by Lafayette towards the prince. Mirabeau, sufficiently jealous of the general's popularity, communicated to the duke and to Lafayette that he would denounce them both in the tribune, if the departure to England were persisted in. The duke was staggered; a new appeal from Lafayette quickened his decision; and Mirabeau received in the assembly a note announcing the prince's retreat, whereupon he exclaimed with wrath—"*He is unworthy the trouble people take on his account!*"† This exclamation, and several others equally thoughtless, have often given rise to accusations that he was an agent of the Duke of Orleans; but it is certain he never was. His penury, the imprudence of his remarks, his familiarity with

* See the Memoirs of Dumouriez.

† I have previously explained how slender were the relations between Mirabeau and the Duke of Orleans. I will now give the true meaning of that celebrated phrase—"This —— is unworthy the trouble that people take on his account." The constraint imposed by Lafayette upon the Duke of Orleans was distasteful to the popular party in general, but especially annoying to the friends of the exiled prince. These thought of unchaining Mirabeau against Lafayette, by piquing the jealousy of the orator against the general. A friend of Orleans, Lauzun, visited Mirabeau one evening, and besought him to speak on the matter the next day. Mirabeau, who often gave way to entreaties, was about to yield, when his friends, more solicitous as to his conduct than himself, pressed him to refrain. He had accordingly resolved to preserve silence. The next day, as the sitting was opened, the departure of the duke was announced; and Mirabeau, who felt irritated at his submission to Lafayette, and reflected on the useless exertions of his friends, gave vent to the exclamation in question.

that prince, which was only such as he evinced towards all he came in contact with, his proposition regarding the Spanish succession, and, finally, his opposition to the duke's withdrawal, were unquestionably strong stimulants to such suspicions; but in despite thereof, it is not the less true that Mirabeau belonged to no party, and was indeed actuated by but one object, which was to uproot the aristocracy and destroy arbitrary power.

The propagators of these allegations against Mirabeau, must have known that he was at that time so straitened as to solicit loans of the most trifling sums, to which extremity he could not possibly have been reduced had he been the agent of a prince of such immense possessions—of one whom his partisans, as was said, had almost ruined. Mirabeau had always foreseen the impending dissolution of the state. A conversation with an intimate friend, held in the park of Versailles, and extending throughout the night, brought him to determine upon an entirely new plan, and he was convinced that for his own renown, the safety of the state, and even for his own fortune (for Mirabeau was a man to promote all these interests at once), his part was to remain in a firm position between the disorganisers and the throne, and to consolidate the monarchy whilst carving for himself a place under it. The court had attempted to gain him, but its emissaries had made their advances awkwardly, and without the delicacy suitable to a man of haughty temperament, who desired to preserve his popularity in default of a confidence not yet accorded him. Malouet, the friend of Necker, and connected with Mirabeau, was anxious to bring them into communication. Mirabeau had frequently declined the overture,* from a persuasion that he never could agree with the minister. At length, he consented. Malouet introduced him, and the incompatibility of the two characters was more fully demonstrated after the interview, in the course of which, by the admission of all who were present, Mirabeau displayed that superiority which he possessed in private life as well as in the tribune. It was rumoured that his design had been to sell himself, and that, Necker having made him no proposal, he had said on leaving, "*The minister shall hear of me.*" This was the interpretation of party spirit, and decidedly erroneous. Malouet had proposed to Mirabeau, who was known to be satisfied with the freedom that had been gained, to come to an understanding with the minister, and nothing more. Besides, at this very period, a direct negotiation was pending with the court. A foreign prince, connected with men of all parties, made the first advances. A friend, who officiated in an intermediate capacity, inculcated upon the court that no sacrifice of his principles would be obtained from Mirabeau, but that, if an adherence to the constitution was unequivocally manifested, he might be relied upon as an unshaken ally; that with regard to conditions, they were dictated by his situation; that it was essential, for the advantage of those who would employ him, to render that situation honourable and independent—that is to say, to discharge his debts; and that, in a word, it was of the greatest moment to attach him to the new social order, and without actually bestowing on him the ministry, to lead him to expect it at a future time.† These negotiations were not entirely terminated until two or three months afterwards—not till the beginning of 1790. Historians, from not being perfectly acquainted with these details, and deceived by the persevering energy of Mirabeau in combating the executive, have assigned a later date to this treaty. But it was almost fully concluded at the commencement of 1790. The fact will be demonstrated in the proper place.

Barnave and the Lameths could only compete with Mirabeau by a show of more austere patriotism. Apprised of the negotiations on foot, they supported the rumour already prevalent, that the ministry was about to be conferred upon him, in order thereby to take from him the power of accepting it. An opportunity of effectually debarring him from office soon presented itself. The ministers had not the right of speaking in the assembly. Mirabeau was naturally averse to divest himself, by acceding to the ministry, of a faculty which was his grand means of influence, and he was furthermore desirous of drawing Necker to the tribune, in order to have him more at his mercy. He consequently moved that participation in debate should be granted to the ministers. The popular party took alarm, and opposed the motion without any plausible reason, other than a seeming apprehension of ministerial seductions. But such fears were quite chimerical, for it is not in their public communications with the chambers that ministers can corrupt the national representation. However, Mirabeau's motion was rejected, and Lanjuinais, pushing the rigorous principle yet farther, moved that the present members of the assembly be interdicted from accepting office. A violent debate ensued. Although the motive of this proposition was well understood, it was not avowed, and Mirabeau, to whom dissimulation was impossible, at length cried out, that it was needless to pass a measure disastrous to the state, on account of one single individual, and that he supported the decree, on condition that the ministry should be forbidden, not to all the present deputies, but simply to M. de Mirabeau, deputy for the seneschalsea of Aix. Such singular frankness and audacity produced no effect, and the decree was unanimously adopted.

Thus we have shown how the state was distracted with the emigrants, the queen, the king, and the different popular chiefs, such as Lafayette, Mirabeau, Barnave, and Lameth. No decisive event, like that of the 14th July or of the 5th October, was possible for some time to come. Fresh vexations were needed to exasperate the court and the people, and to provoke a portentous rupture.

The assembly had transferred itself to Paris,* after having received repeated assurances on the part of the commune as to the tranquillity of the capital, and the promise of an entire freedom of debate. Mounier and Lally-Tolendal, indignant at the events of the 5th and 6th October, had sent in their resignation as members, saying, that they would be neither spectators nor accomplices of factious crimes. They must have deeply regretted this desertion of public duty, especially when they saw Maury and Cazalès, who had

* Malouet and Bertrand de Molleville have not scrupled to assert the contrary, but the fact we advance is attested by witnesses worthy of implicit belief.

† In Mirabeau, as in all superior men, there were many weaknesses in conjunction with great elevation of mind. He possessed an ardent imagination, which required to be fed with lofty hopes. It was impossible to give him the ministry without destroying his influence, and consequently without annihilating himself and all the aid that could be derived from him. On the other hand, this allurement was indispensable to his imagination. Those, therefore, who had placed themselves between him and the court, advised that at least the hope of a portfolio should be held out to him. However, the personal interests of Mirabeau were never made the objects of particular stipulation in the various conferences that were held; nothing was mentioned, in fact, concerning either money or offices, and great difficulty was felt in making Mirabeau understand what was intended he should at least surmise. To obviate this difficulty, an adroit expedient was suggested to the king. Mirabeau enjoyed so indifferent a reputation, that few persons would have consented to serve as his colleagues. The king, therefore, applied to M. de Liancourt, for whom he entertained a high esteem, and asked him whether, for the advancement of his service, he would accept a portfolio in company with Mirabeau. M. de Liancourt, devoted to the monarch, replied that he was prepared to do all that the good of his service might require. This interrogation being reported to Mirabeau, filled him with satisfaction, and he no longer had any doubt that, as soon as circumstances permitted, he would be nominated to the ministry.

* Its first sitting in Paris was held at the archiepiscopal palace on the 19th October.

absented themselves from the assembly, soon after return to it and courageously advocate, even to the end, the cause they had espoused. Mounier, having retired into Dauphiny, assembled the states of that province, but a decree shortly caused them to dissolve without any show of resistance. Thus Mounier and Lally, who, at the era of the junction of the orders and of the tennis-court oath, were the heroes of the people, had now become of no consequence in their eyes. The parliaments had been the first to sink in the rear when the popular energy was aroused; after them Mounier, Lally, and Necker; and many others were speedily to share the same fate.

The scarcity, the exaggerated and still real cause of the agitation, gave rise to a fresh crime. On the 20th October, the baker François was massacred by some brigands. Lafayette succeeded in apprehending the criminals, and delivered them to the Châtelet, a tribunal invested with an extraordinary jurisdiction over all offences relative to the revolution. Besenval, and all those accused of having taken part in the aristocratic conspiracy, counteracted on the 14th July, had been remitted there for trial. It was found necessary to use new forms of process at the Châtelet. Until the intervention of the jury, which institution was not yet established, the assembly had ordered publicity, examinations in defence, and all other guarantees of innocence, to be observed. The assassins of François were condemned, and tranquillity re-established. Lafayette and Bailly proposed, on this occasion, that martial law should be proclaimed. The motion was vehemently opposed by Robespierre, who from this time forward manifested a warm sympathy for the people and the poor; but it was, nevertheless, passed by the majority [Decree of the 21st October]. By virtue of this enactment, the municipalities were made responsible for the public tranquillity; when troubles broke out, they were empowered to call in the troops or the militia-guards; and after three summonses to disperse, they were justified in ordering the employment of force against seditious meetings. A committee of inquiry was established in the commune of Paris, and also in the National Assembly, for the purpose of more vigilantly watching the numerous enemies, whose intrigues were outspread into such countless ramifications. Nor were all these means too many to counteract the projects of the various foes leagued against the new revolution.

The constituent labours went forward with activity. Feudalism had been abolished, but there still remained a final measure to adopt for the destruction of those great bodies, which had been enemies within the state against the state. The church held immense possessions. It had received them from princes as feudal grants, or from the pious as bequests. If the property of individuals, the fruit and object of labour, ought to be respected, that which had been given to corporations for a specific object, might receive from the law another destination. It was for the good of religion that these possessions had been given, or at least under that pretext; now, religion being a public service, the law was entitled to regulate the mode of providing for it in any other manner. The Abbé Maury displayed upon this subject his inexhaustible fluency; he sounded the tocsin of alarm for proprietors, threatened them with imminent spoliation, and asserted that the provinces were to be sacrificed to the stock-jobbers of the capital. The sophistry of his argument is sufficiently extraordinary to merit notice. It was to pay the national debt that the possessions of the clergy were to be sold; the holders of that debt were the great capitalists of Paris; the possessions apportioned to them were in the provinces: thence, the intrepid logician deduced that the provinces were sacrificed to the capital; as if the provinces were not gainers, on the contrary, by a new division of those vast estates, hitherto exclusively appropriated to the luxurious enjoyment of certain lazy ecclesiastics. All his efforts were of no avail. The Bishop of Autun, the author of the project, and the deputy Thouret, speedily annihilated such idle sophisms. The decree was about to pass that the possessions of the clergy belonged to the state, when its opponents once more raised the question of property. In reply it was maintained, that, even granting the clergy to be proprietors, their possessions might be otherwise applied, since those possessions had frequently been used in cases of emergency for the good of the state. This fact they did not attempt to deny. Availing himself of the admission, Mirabeau moved an amendment, that the word "*belong*" should be altered into "*are at the disposition of the state.*" The debate was immediately closed, and the decree passed by a great majority [Law of the 2d November]. The assembly thus destroyed the formidable power of the clergy, suppressed the obnoxious luxury of the dignitaries of the order, and took into its own keeping those immense financial resources, which so long served to prop the revolution. At the same time it secured the subsistence of the parish priests, by enacting that their stipends should never be less than 1200 francs (£50 sterling), in addition to the enjoyment of a parsonage and garden. It declared that religious vows were no longer to be recognised, and restored liberty to all monastic personages, giving leave, however, to those who wished it, to continue the cloistered life; and as their possessions were appropriated, it assigned payments in lieu thereof. With an advisable discrimination, it observed a distinction between the wealthy and the mendicant orders, and proportioned the allowance to their respective members according to their pristine statutes. It adopted the same course with regard to pensions; and when the Jansenist, Camus, reverting to the bright example of evangelical simplicity, proposed to reduce all pensions to an identical and extremely meagre standard, the assembly, upon the motion of Mirabeau, reduced them in proportion to their actual amounts, and with a due regard to the former station of the pensioners. Considerate deference for usage and accustomed habits could not be more signally displayed, and in that consists the *true respect* for property. In the same manner, when the Protestants, exiled after the revocation of the edict of Nantes, reclaimed their estates, the assembly restored to them those only which had not been sold.

Cautious and full of consideration in its treatment of persons, it handled things with unscrupulous daring, and manifested a very different spirit in constitutive matters. The prerogatives of the different branches of power had been fixed; and now arose the question as to the division of the kingdom. It had always been divided into provinces, which had been successively united to the original France. These provinces, differing from each other in laws, privileges, and manners, formed a most heterogeneous compound. Sieyes conceived the idea of amalgamating them by a new subdivision, which should annihilate the ancient demarcations, and link all the parts of the kingdom under one system of laws and public feeling. This result was accomplished by the partition into departments. The departments, again, were divided into districts, and the districts into municipalities. In all these territorial gradations, the principle of representation in government was established. The administration of the department, the district, and the borough, was each intrusted to a deliberative and to an executive council, both equally elective. These separate authorities were in dependence upon each other, and had analogous functions, proportioned to the extent of their jurisdictions. The department settled the contribution to the taxes for the districts, the district for the boroughs, and the borough for individuals.*

* ["The provinces, which had viewed with regret the loss of their privileges, formed petty states, with too great an extent of

The assembly afterwards fixed the qualification of a citizen enjoying political rights. It settled the age at twenty-five, and the contribution at a marc of silver. Each individual combining these advantages had the title of *active citizen*, and those who had them not were named *passive citizens*. These denominations were turned into ridicule, for names are eagerly snatched at when a desire exists to depreciate things; but they were simple, natural, and admirably expressive. The active citizen took part in the elections for the formation of the administrations and of the assembly. The election of deputies had two processes. No condition of eligibility was required; for, as it had been inculcated in the assembly, a man was an elector by his existence in the society, and the only test of eligibility was naturally the confidence of the electors.

These labours, although interrupted by numerous occasional discussions, were prosecuted with exemplary zeal. The right side contributed only to impede them by studied obstinacy, whenever an opportunity occurred of contesting any portion of influence proposed for the nation. The popular deputies, on the contrary, though forming different parties, joined or separated without repugnance, according to their individual sentiments. It was clear that with them conviction overruled compact. Thouret, Mirabeau, Duport, Sieyes, Camus, Chapelier, were seen alternately uniting and dividing, as their opinions tended on each question. As to the members of the nobility and clergy, they rarely appeared except on party debates. When the parliaments had passed resolutions against the assembly, when deputies or writers had insulted it, they exhibited great alacrity in upholding them. They supported the military commanders in opposition to the people, the slave-dealers against the Negroes, and declared against the admission of Jews and Protestants to the enjoyment of civil rights. Finally, when Genoa arose against France, on account of the enfranchisement of Corsica and the union of that island to the kingdom, they were for Genoa in opposition to France. In a word, alien and indifferent to all useful discussions, heeding not, but talking amongst themselves, they were never roused but when rights or liberty might be crippled.*

It has been already stated, that an important conspiracy could no longer be hatched in the cabinet of the king, since the aristocracy was scattered in flight, and the court encompassed by the assembly, the people, and the national guard. Partial movements were therefore all that the malecontents could attempt. They fomented the dissatisfaction of the officers who were enamoured of the ancient order of things, whilst the soldiers, having every thing to gain, were eager for the new. Violent recriminations took place between the army and the populace; the soldiers often delivered their officers to the multitude, who massacred them; and at other times, distrust was happily subdued and tranquillity restored, when the commanders of towns knew how to employ a little address, and took the oath of fidelity to the new constitution. The clergy had inundated Brittany with protests against the alienation of their possessions. They strove to stimulate a remnant of religious fanaticism in the provinces, where blind superstition was still predominant. The parliaments likewise were used, and they essayed a last trial of their authority. Their sessions had been prorogued by the assembly, because, whilst in-

territory, and too independent an administration. It was expedient to lessen their dimensions, change their names, and subject them to an identical government. On the 22d December, the assembly adopted the project on this head conceived by Sieyes, and presented by Thouret in the name of a committee, which had been unceasingly occupied on the subject for two months.

France was divided into eighty-three departments, nearly equal in extent and population; each department was subdivided into districts, and each district into cantons. Their administration was regulated after an uniform and graduated system. Each department had an administrative council composed of thirty-six members, and an executive directory composed of five; as the titles indicate, the functions of the first were to decide and those of the last to act. Each district was organised in the same manner, but upon a smaller basis; it had a council and a directory, which were less in number, and subordinate to the departmental council and directory. Each canton, comprising five or six parishes, was an electoral and not an administrative division; the active citizens (and to become one a contribution equivalent to three days' labour was requisite) assembled in the canton to nominate their deputies and magistrates. Every thing was subjected to the elective principle in this new plan, but upon a certain scale. It was judged imprudent to intrust the multitude with the choice of delegates, and unlawful to deprive it of all concurrence therein, so the difficulty was obviated by a system of double election. The active citizens of the canton chose electors empowered to nominate the members of the National Assembly, the administrators of the department, those of the district, and the judges of the tribunals. A criminal court was established for the whole department, a civil court for each district, and a local peace-court for each canton.

Such were the institutions of the department: the borough organisation also required to be settled. The civic administration was intrusted to a council-general and a municipal body, composed of a varying number of members according to the population of the respective towns. The municipal officers were named immediately by the people, and they alone were qualified to call into action the armed force. The commune or borough formed the first step in the grand association, the kingdom the final one; and the department served as an intermediate stage between the commune and the state, or, in other words, between purely local and general interests."—*Mignet*, vol. i. p. 117-118.]

* It is interesting to ascertain the opinion of Ferrières upon the manner in which the deputies of his own party conducted themselves in the assembly. He says:—

"In the National Assembly there were nearly three hundred members, truly upright men, free from party spirit, enrolled in neither club, solicitous of good, desiring it for itself independently of the interests of orders or bodies, and always ready to embrace the most equitable and useful proposition, indifferent from whom it emanated or by whom supported. These were men worthy of the honourable functions to which they had been called; to them were owing the few good laws proceeding from the Constituent Assembly, and the prevention of all the evil that was not perpetrated. Always adopting that which was beneficial, and repudiating that which was mischievous, they often turned the scale in favour of propositions which, without them, would have been rejected by factious spirit; and they often negatived motions which, without them, would have been passed from motives of interest.

When on this subject, I cannot avoid remarking on the impolitic conduct of the nobles and bishops. As they desired merely to provoke the dissolution of the assembly, and to throw discredit on its measures, far from opposing improper decrees, they manifested an indifference concerning them quite inconceivable. They left the hall when the president put the question, inviting the deputies of their party to follow them; or, if they remained, they shouted to them not to vote. The clubbists, by this secession, became the majority of the assembly, and decreed whatever they pleased. The bishops and nobles, firmly believing that the new order of things would not be permanent, hastened, with a species of impatience, the downfall of the monarchy and their own ruin, in the insane hope of accelerating the desired overthrow. To this inconsiderate conduct they added a scornful indifference, both for the assembly and the people present at its sittings. They paid no attention to the proceedings, but laughed and talked loud, thus confirming the people in the unfavourable opinion they had conceived of them; and, instead of labouring to regain their confidence and esteem, they apparently laboured merely to secure their detestation and contempt. All these absurdities were owing to the nobles and bishops being unable to persuade themselves that the revolution had been long engendered in the opinions and the hearts of all Frenchmen. They flattered themselves that, by means of such defences, they could stem the torrent that was swelling with every sun. They did but accumulate its waters, and extend its ravages, by clinging with reckless tenacity to the antiquated system, the fundamental object of all their actions and all their opposition, but which no one would endure. By this stupid obstinacy they forced the revolutionists to extend their revolutionary views beyond the goal at which they had proposed to stop. Then the nobles and the bishops exclaimed against injustice and tyranny. They spoke of the antiquity and legitimacy of their rights to men who had sapped the foundation of all rights."—*Ferrières*, vol. ii. p. 122.

tending to dissolve them, it was unwilling to have discussions with them in the interim. The chambers of vacation administered justice during their recess. At Rouen, Nantes, and Rennes, these chambers passed resolutions, in which they deplored the ruin of the old monarchy, the violation of its laws, and, without naming the assembly, significantly alluded to it as the cause of all existing calamities. They were called to the bar, and reprimanded. That of Rennes, as most culpable, was declared incapable of performing its functions. That of Metz had insinuated that the king was not free, an allegation in conformity with the general policy of the malecontents, as has been previously observed. Unable to use the king for their own purposes, they sought to represent him as labouring under an oppressive thraldom, desiring by such means to nullify all the laws he apparently sanctioned. The king himself seemed to countenance this course of policy. He refrained from recalling his body-guards displaced on the 5th and 6th October, and had himself guarded by the national militia, in the midst of which he knew himself in safety. His intention was to appear as if held in captivity. The commune of Paris unmasked this petty device by a formal petition to recall his guards, which he declined under frivolous pretexts, by the mouth of the queen.*

The year 1790, which had just commenced, was ushered in with a general agitation. Three months of comparative tranquillity had elapsed since the 5th and 6th October, but disquiet was again returning. Periods of great agitation are followed by an interval of repose, and then begin again trifling demonstrations, which grow into mighty conflicts. The troubles which now disturbed the kingdom were charged upon the clergy, the nobility, the court, and even England, which instructed its ambassador to justify it from the accusation. The paid companies of the national guard were themselves affected by the prevailing spirit of disorder. Some soldiers collected in the Champs-Elysées, demanded an augmentation of their pay. Lafayette, ever on the alert, hastened to the mutineers, dispersed and punished them, and restored order amongst his troops, still faithful in spite of any slight interruptions of discipline.

Public attention was especially occupied with an alleged plot against the assembly and the municipality, the supposed leader of which was the Marquis de Favras. He was publicly apprehended, and lodged in the Châtelet. It was immediately rumoured abroad that Bailly and Lafayette were to have been assassinated; that 1200 horsemen were in readiness at Versailles to carry off the king; and that an army of Swiss and Piedmontese was organised to receive him and march on Paris. Terror pervaded the metropolis, it being universally reported that Favras was a secret emissary of certain elevated personages. Suspicion fell upon Monsieur, the king's eldest brother. Favras had been in his guards, and had furthermore negotiated a loan for his behoof. Monsieur, alarmed at the general agitation, appeared at the town-hall, repelled the insinuations directed against him, explained his relations with Favras, reminded his hearers of his popular tendencies, as formerly manifested in the assembly of notables, and claimed to be judged, not by idle rumours, but by his known and unbelied patriotism.* Loud and general cheers followed his speech, and he was escorted to his residence by the assembled crowd.

The trial of Favras was commenced. This person had travelled over all Europe, married a foreign princess, and been engaged in devising schemes for the purpose of re-establishing his fortune. He had been busied with machinations on the 14th July, the 5th and 6th October, and in the last months of 1789. The witnesses who appeared against him gave the details of his last plan. The assassination of Bailly and Lafayette, and the removal of the king, appeared to form part of this plan; but no proof was led that the 1200 horsemen were in readiness, nor that the Swiss and Piedmontese army was in motion. Circumstances were unpropitious for Favras. The Châtelet had just acquitted Besenval and other individuals implicated in the plot of the 14th July, whereat public opinion was sullen and discontented. Nevertheless, Lafayette encouraged the judges of the Châtelet, impressed upon them the duty of being just, and undertook that their judgment, whatever it might be, should be executed.

This trial caused fresh suspicions to be entertained of the court. These new projects made it seem incorrigible; for, in the very middle of Paris, it was seen still conspiring. The king, in consequence, was advised to adopt a striking expedient to remove the public impression.

On the 4th February 1790, the assembly was surprised to see some alterations in the arrangement of the hall. A carpet, embroidered with *fleurs-de-lis*, covered the steps of the platform. The seat of the secretaries was removed, and the president standing by the side of the chair in which he usually sat. "The king!" suddenly shouted the ushers, and Louis XVI. immediately entered the hall. The assembly arose on his appearance, and greeted him with loud applause. A crowd of spectators in eager haste filled the galleries, pressed into all parts of the hall, and awaited in breathless anticipation the royal words. Louis XVI. delivered his speech standing, whilst the assembly was seated. He first cast a glance at the troubles to which France was a prey, the exertions that he had made to subdue them, and to facilitate the subsistence of the people; he recapitulated the labours of the representatives, declaring that he had attempted the same measures in the provincial assemblies; he maintained, in short, that he had always manifested the wishes

* This subject, of the body-guards being recalled, gave occasion to an anecdote which deserves to be recorded. The queen was complaining to M. de Lafayette that the king was not free, alleging as a proof of the fact that the duty at the palace was performed by the national guard, and not by the king's body-guards. Lafayette thereupon asked her if the reinstatement of the latter would afford her pleasure. The queen at first hesitated to reply, but could not with any grace refuse the offer made her by the general to procure the recall in question. He immediately repaired to the municipality, which, at his instigation, made an official request to the king for the recall of his body-guards, offering to share with them the service at the palace. The king and queen perceived nothing hurtful in this demand; but they were soon made sensible of its consequences; and those whose policy it was that they should not seem free, persuaded them to refuse it. However, it was a somewhat difficult task to assign reasons for this refusal, and the queen, to whom delicate commissions were often intrusted, was appointed to inform M. de Lafayette that the proposition of the municipality would not be accepted. The motive she alleged for this determination was, that they were unwilling to expose the guards to massacre. But Lafayette had a few moments before met one of those very guards promenading at the Palais-Royal in full uniform. He communicated this striking fact to the queen, who was thrown into considerable embarrassment, but nevertheless persisted in the resolution she was instructed to convey.

* The speech of Monsieur at the town-hall contains a passage too important to be omitted:—

"As to my personal opinions," said that august personage, "I will speak of them with confidence to my fellow-citizens. From the day on which I declared my sentiments, in the second assembly of the notables, upon the fundamental question which divided all minds, I have never ceased to believe that a great revolution was inevitable; that the king, from his intentions, his virtues, and his supreme rank, was its natural chief, since it could not be beneficial to the nation without being equally so to the monarch; in fact, that the royal authority must always be the safeguard of the national liberty, and national liberty the basis of royal authority. Let any one of my actions, or even of my phrases, be cited, which belies these principles, or which shows that, in whatever circumstances I may have been placed, the happiness of the king, and that of the nation, have ever ceased to be the sole objects of my solicitude; until then, I have a right to be believed on my word, that I have never changed my sentiments and principles, and that I never will change them."

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that had been recently realised. He added, that he had thought himself specially called upon to coalesce in the most signal manner with the representatives of the nation, at a moment when decrees were submitted to him intended to establish an entirely new organisation in the kingdom. It was his determination, he said, to promote with all his power the success of that vast organisation; every contrary attempt would be criminal, and crushed by all means at his disposal. At these words, loud cheers resounded from all sides. The king proceeded; recalling to mind his own sacrifices, he urged all those who had suffered any loss to imitate his resignation, and solace themselves with the prospect of the benefits assured to France by the new constitution. And when, after having promised to defend that constitution, he added that he would do still more, and that, in concert with the queen, he would early train the heart and mind of his son to the new order of things, and accustom him to rest his happiness on that of all Frenchmen, cries of affection broke from all quarters of the hall, all hands were stretched towards the monarch, all eyes sought the mother and the son, all voices demanded them—the transports of the audience were tumultuous and unbounded. The king concluded his speech by recommending concord and peace to "*that good people of whose love he is always reminded when consolation is proffered him for his anxieties.*"* At these last words, all present evinced the most lively sentiments of esteem and gratitude. The president made a short reply, in

* The speech delivered by the king upon this occasion is too remarkable not to be quoted, with a few observations. That excellent and too unfortunate prince was for ever in a state of vacillation; but at certain moments he discerned with great judgment his own duties and the errors of the court. The tone which pervades his discourse of the 4th February sufficiently proves that the words were not dictated, but that he expressed himself with a deep feeling of his actual position.

"Gentlemen—Impelled by a sense of the serious situation of France at this moment, I am come amongst you. The gradual relaxation of all the bonds of order and subordination; the suspension or inertness of the course of justice; the discontents arising from private losses; the oppositions and unfortunate animosities, which are the unavoidable consequences of long dissensions; the critical situation of the finances, and the doubts respecting the national resources; the general agitation—all conspire to keep alive the anxiety of all real friends to the prosperity and happiness of the kingdom.

A grand object lies before you; but it must be attained without farther disturbances or new convulsions. I may be allowed to say, that it was my firm hope to have led you to that great end in a milder and more tranquil manner, when I formed the design of assembling you, and of collecting together for the public good the talents and opinions of the representatives of the nation; but my happiness and glory are not the less closely united with the success of your labours.

I have protected them, with unremitting vigilance, against the fatal influence which the unhappy circumstances of the times might have over them. The horrors of famine, which spread consternation over our country last year, have been mitigated by constant care and immense supplies. The disorder that might have naturally ensued from the former state of the finances, the absence of credit, the excessive scarcity of bullion, and the gradual decay of the revenue, has been, at least in all its nakedness and hideousness, as yet averted. I have every where, and especially in the capital, guarded against the dangerous consequences of the want of work, and notwithstanding the relaxed state of all the springs of authority, I have maintained the kingdom, not indeed in the tranquillity I could have wished, but in a condition of repose sufficient to receive lasting benefits from a wise and well-ordered liberty; and, furthermore, notwithstanding our domestic situation, too generally known, and the political storms that agitate other nations, I have not only preserved peace abroad, but maintained, with all the powers of Europe, those bonds of respect and friendship, which are the best guarantees of its stability.

Having thus secured you from obstacles which might so easily have obstructed your cares and your labours, I think the moment is arrived when the interest of the state requires that I should join in a manner yet more decisive and manifest in the execution and issue of all that you have planned for the good of France. I cannot seize a more suitable occasion than when you present for my acceptance decrees designed to establish a new system of organisation in the kingdom, which must have so important and propitious an influence on the welfare of my subjects, and the prosperity of this great empire.

You are aware, gentlemen, that more than ten years ago, and at a time when the wishes of the nation were not made known respecting the provincial assemblies, I had begun to substitute this kind of administration for that which immemorial usage had consecrated. Experience having convinced me that I was not mistaken in the opinion I had formed of the utility of such establishments, I sought to extend the benefit of them through all the provinces of my kingdom; and in order to ensure general confidence in the new modes of administration, I intended that the members of whom they were to be composed should be freely nominated by all the citizens. You have improved upon these views in several particulars, and the most essential is unquestionably that equal and well-designed subdivision, which by weakening the effect of the ancient separations between province and province, and establishing a general and complete system of equipoise, more perfectly unites all the parts of the kingdom in an uniform spirit and interest. This grand idea, this salutary contrivance, is entirely due to you; but unanimity in the representatives of the nation, and their just ascendancy over public opinion, are not the less necessary in order to undertake with confidence an alteration of such vital importance, and to overcome, by the power of reason, the resistance of habit and particular interests."

All that the king says here is perfectly just and well-considered. It is true that he had attempted all these ameliorations of his own motion, and that he had given a rare example amongst princes—that of anticipating the wants of subjects. The eulogy he pronounces on the new territorial division also bears the character of entire good faith, for it was certainly advantageous to the government, inasmuch as it destroyed the obstacles which local interests had often opposed to it. Every thing, therefore, induces us to believe that the king speaks on these subjects with perfect sincerity. He continues:

"I will promote and accelerate, by all the means in my power, the success of this vast organisation, on which depends the safety of France; and I think it necessary to declare, I am too much occupied with the internal situation of the kingdom, I have my eyes too open to the dangers of every kind that surround us, not to be fully impressed with the conviction that, in the present disposition of the public mind, and on an attentive consideration of the state of public affairs, it is indispensable that a new order of things be established, calmly and deliberately, or the kingdom will be exposed to all the calamities of anarchy.

Let true patriots reflect upon this matter as I have done, directing their minds solely to the good of the state, and they will perceive that, notwithstanding the different opinions that may prevail, they are urged by a high and commanding interest to cordially unite at this moment. Time will correct what may be found defective in the collection of laws framed by this assembly" (this indirect and delicate censure proves that the king was not disposed to flatter, but, on the contrary, to speak his real sentiments, observing the necessary circumspection); "but every enterprise tending to shake the principles of the constitution itself, every design formed to overthrow them or to weaken their happy influence, could only serve to introduce amongst us the frightful evils of discord; and even supposing the success of such an attempt against my people and me, the result would deprive us, without equivalent, of the many advantages held out to us in perspective by the new order of things.

Let us, then, with all sincerity, freely give in to the hopes we are justified in conceiving, and think only of realising them by unanimity and concord. Let it be every where known that the monarch and the representatives of the nation are united in interest and in purpose, so that the conviction, the firm assurance, may disseminate in the provinces a spirit of peace and good will; and so that all citizens distinguished for reputation, all those who are able to do the state essential service by their zeal and abilities, may evince due alacrity in affording their assistance in the different subdivisions of the general administration, the various links and the entirety of which ought to act concurrently and energetically in the restoration of order and prosperity to the kingdom.

We must not conceal from ourselves that much is required before that object can be fully attained. An unflinching determination, a general and common effort, are absolutely necessary to obtain complete success. Continue, then, your labours, without other passions than ardour for good; keep your attention invariably fixed upon the condition of the people and upon public liberty; but exert yourselves also to allay, to remove all distrust,

which he depicted the rapturous emotions that quickened all their hearts. The monarch was then escorted back to the Tuileries by the multitude. The assembly passed a vote of thanks both to him and the queen. At the same time, a new idea presented itself: Louis XVI. had just pledged himself to maintain the constitution, and it seemed fitting that the deputies should bind themselves in like manner. The civic oath was thereupon proposed, and each deputy ascended the tribune and swore to be faithful to "*the nation, the law, and the king; and to maintain with all his power the constitution decreed by the National Assembly, and accepted by the king.*" The attendants, and the deputies of the

and put an end, as soon as possible, to the different causes of anxiety which keep from France so many of its citizens, the effect whereof forms so sad a contrast to the laws of safety and liberty you design to establish: be assured, prosperity will only return when general contentment is produced. We every where perceive hopes; let us be impatient to see happiness every where also.

One day, it is my solace to believe, all Frenchmen, without distinction, will be convinced of the advantage sure to result from the entire suppression of all order and state privileges, when the only rivalry shall be in common exertions for the public good, and for that prosperity of the country which interests all citizens in an equal degree; and when every one shall perceive, without displeasure, that, for the future, a reputation for talents and virtues will be a sufficient qualification for appointment to the service of the state.

At the same time, however, whatever recalls to a nation the ancient and unbroken services of an honoured family, is a distinction which nothing can destroy, and as it is closely connected with the sacred duties of gratitude, those of every class in society who aspire to render their country essential service, and those who enjoy the felicity of having already done so, are interested in respecting that transmission of titles or memorials, the fairest inheritance that can be passed to descendants.

Neither can the respect due to the ministers of religion be obliterated; for as that reverence is principally connected with the holy truths which are the safeguards of order and morality, all good and enlightened citizens have an equal interest in maintaining and defending it.

Doubtless, they who have relinquished their pecuniary privileges, they who no longer form, as heretofore, a political order in the state, will find themselves subjected to sacrifices of which I know all the weight; but I am persuaded their generosity will lead them to find consolation in the public advantages to be anticipated from the establishment of national assemblies."

The king continues, as we see, to point out to all parties the benefits of the new laws, and, at the same time, the necessity of preserving something of the ancient system. The words he addresses to the privileged classes prove his real opinion upon the expediency and the justice of the sacrifices that had been imposed upon them, and their resistance will be eternally branded by the expressions contained in this discourse. It will be vainly said that the king was not free: the care which he takes throughout in balancing concessions, counsels, and even reproaches, proves that he spoke sincerely. He expressed himself very differently when he afterwards wished to display the state of constraint in which he believed himself to be. His letter to the diplomatic body, hereafter quoted, will sufficiently demonstrate the fact. The popular exaggerated style which reigns in it shows the intention to convey an idea that he was not free. But here the moderate tone leaves no doubt; and what follows is so touching, so exquisite, that it is impossible any man could consent to write and utter it without having felt it.

"I also should have many losses to enumerate, if, in the midst of the great interests of the state, I could linger on personal calculations; but I experience a consolation which rewards me; I find a full and complete compensation in the increased happiness of the nation; and this sentiment I here express from the bottom of my heart.

I will, then, defend and uphold the constitutional liberty, the principles of which have been consecrated by the national desire, manifesting itself in unison with mine. *I will do more; and in concert with the queen, who partakes all my sentiments, I will early train the mind and heart of my son to that new order of things which circumstances have wrought. I will habituate him from his earliest years to place his happiness on that of the French*, and ever to be aware that, in spite of the language of flattery, a wise constitution will preserve him from the dangers of inexperience, and that a rational liberty adds fresh value to those sentiments of love and fidelity, of which the nation, for so many ages, has given such affecting proofs to their kings.

I do not permit myself to doubt that, in completing your work, you will attend with wisdom and confidence to the strong support of the executive power, a condition indispensable to the maintenance of durable order at home, and respect abroad. You can have no reasonable distrust remaining; it is therefore your duty, as citizens and faithful representatives of the nation, to secure, for the advantage of the state and for public liberty, that stability, which can result only from an authority at once active and tutelary. You will assuredly keep present to your minds, that without such an authority the various parts of your constitutional system would be destitute at once of connexion and harmony; and while you are attending to the liberty you love, and which I love also, you will not forget that disorder in administration, by provoking confusion and contest amongst the different powers, often degenerates, through blind violence, into the most dangerous and most alarming of all tyrannies.

Thus, gentlemen, not for myself (for I throw aside personal considerations in speaking of laws and institutions that are to regulate the destiny of the empire), but for the happiness of our common country, for its prosperity and for its power, I call upon you to dismiss from your minds all those momentary impressions which might possibly divert you from a careful and comprehensive consideration of what a kingdom such as France requires, as well from its great extent and immense population, as from its indispensable relations beyond its limits.

Neither will you neglect to fix your attention upon what is also required of legislators, by the manners, character, and customs of a nation which has become too celebrated in Europe, from the peculiarity of its spirit and genius, to make it a matter of indifference whether the sentiments of mildness, loyalty, and honour, which have rendered it so renowned, should be upheld or weakened.

Give it, therefore, an example of that spirit of justice which is the safeguard of property, of that right respected by all nations, which is not the work of chance, nor indebted to opinion for privileges, but which is strictly connected with the essential relations of public order and the foundations of social harmony.

By what fatality is it that, when tranquillity was beginning to return, new troubles have arisen in the provinces? By what fatality does it come to pass that fresh excesses have been perpetrated? Unite with me to suppress them; let us use all our efforts to prevent criminal violences occurring to tarnish the era in which the happiness of the nation is zealously endeavoured. You, who can command by so many influences the public confidence, *enlighten the people who are misled as to their true interests; those good people who are so dear to me, and of whose love I am reminded when consolation is tendered me to alleviate my anxieties.* Ah! if they knew how unhappy it makes me to hear of attacks upon property, or acts of violence against persons, they would probably spare me such heavy afflictions.

I cannot speak to you of the great interests of the state, without pressing you to attend earnestly and decisively to all that concerns the re-establishment of order in the finances, and the comfort of the numerous body of citizens who are in various degrees connected with the public funds. It is time to relieve all uneasiness; it is time to restore this kingdom to the stability of credit it has a right to enjoy. You cannot undertake every thing at once; consequently, I invite you to reserve for another period some portion of those benefits, the idea of which the junction of your varied talents has suggested to you. But when you have added to what you have already accomplished, a wise and well-digested plan for the administration of justice; when you have placed on the basis of a perfect equilibrium the revenue and the expenditure of the state; in a word, when you have completed the work of the constitution, you will have acquired great and substantial claims to the national gratitude; and in the succession of national assemblies, a succession henceforth founded on the constitution itself, year after year will only need additional sources of prosperity to be developed. May this day, on which your monarch has united with you in the frankest and most cordial manner, be a memorable date in the history of this empire! It will be so, I hope, if my ardent wishes and my earnest exhortations suffice as a signal of peace and concord amongst you. *Let those who are yet reluctant to join in that spirit of union, now become so necessary, make for me the sacrifice of all the recollections that torture them; I will repay them by my gratitude and affection.*

From this day forth, let us all be actuated—and I give you the example—let us all be actuated by but one opinion, one sense of interest, one determination—attachment to the new constitution, and an ardent desire for the peace, the happiness, and the prosperity of France."

commune, asked permission to take the oath in their turn; the side and front galleries followed their example, and from all points nothing was heard but the words: "*I swear!*"

The oath was repeated at the town-hall, and from borough to borough throughout France. Public rejoicings were ordered; every thing gave token of a general and sincere joy. This unquestionably was the time to enter upon a new line of conduct, and to avoid rendering this reconciliation unavailing, like all the others; but that very evening, whilst Paris glittered with an illumination to celebrate the auspicious event, the court had already relapsed into its infatuation, and the popular deputies were received at it in a very different manner from the gracious reception accorded to the noble deputies. In vain did Lafayette, whose sensible and zealous counsels were disregarded, inculcate upon the court that the king could no longer waver; that he ought to connect himself unreservedly with the popular party, and attempt to gain its confidence; that to effect this important object, it was necessary that his intentions should not only be proclaimed in the assembly, but manifested in his most trifling actions; that he ought to repudiate the slightest equivocal expression used in his presence, and disavow the least doubt that might be expressed as to his real wishes; that he ought to exhibit neither constraint nor displeasure, nor leave any lurking hopes to the aristocrats; and finally, that his ministers ought to be united, not permitting themselves any unseemly rivalry with the assembly, and obliging it to make such incessant appeals to public opinion. Lafayette in vain reiterated these prudent counsels with respectful earnestness; the king perused his letters, and thought him a very honest man; the queen repelled him with ill humour, and even seemed indignant at the interest he evinced towards the royal family. She received Mirabeau with much more benignity—a man of greater capacity perhaps, but certainly of less irreproachable fame than Lafayette.

The communications between Mirabeau and the court had been continued. He had even entered into relations with Monsieur, whom his opinions rendered more accessible to the popular party, and to him Mirabeau had repeated what he had always impressed upon the queen and M. de Montmorin, namely, that the monarchy could be saved only by identifying itself with liberty. He at length made a compact with the court, through the channel of an intermediate agent. He digested his principles in a sort of profession of faith, from which he bound himself not to swerve, and to support the court so long as it adhered to the same line of policy. A considerable allowance was granted to him in return. Strict morality unquestionably condemns such treaties, and demands that duty be performed from a sense of duty alone. But did he in fact sell himself? An inferior man would, beyond doubt, have bargained away and sacrificed his principles, but the puissant Mirabeau, so far from abandoning his, brought power to embrace them, and received in reward the assistance which his great necessities and unbridled passions rendered so indispensable. Very different from those who prostitute for high gain feeble talents and a loose conscience, Mirabeau, unshaken in his principles, battled alternately with his own party and the court, as if he were independent of the former for his popularity, and of the latter for his means of expenditure; and this to such a point, that historians, unable to believe him in alliance with the court which he opposed, have not recorded the treaty as made until 1791, whereas in truth it was concluded in the early months of 1790. Mirabeau had an interview with the queen, charmed her by his superiority, and was greatly flattered by the reception vouchsafed him. This extraordinary man was prone to all seductions, to those of vanity as well as to those of passion. He was to be taken with his strength and his weaknesses, and, as he was, made serviceable to the cause held in common with him. Besides Lafayette and Mirabeau, the court had likewise Bouillé, whom it is time to introduce on the scene.

Bouillé, a man of courage, rectitude, and talent, had all the feelings of aristocracy, and was distinguished from its herd only by a less perfect blindness, and a greater aptitude for affairs. Stationed at Metz, where he commanded a vast extent of frontier, and a consi derable body of troops, he laboured to promote discord between his soldiers and the national guards, in order to preserve the former in fidelity to the court.* Assigned to the post he occupied as a resource in need, he was the terror of the popular party, being esteemed the general of the monarchy, as Lafayette of the constitution. Nevertheless, the conduct of the aristocracy dissatisfied him. and the weakness of the king disgusted him, and he would have quitted the service if he had not been entreated by Louis himself to remain. The honour of Bouillé was bright and scrupulous. His word pledged, the oath taken, no thought entered his head save fidelity to the king and the constitution. The natural policy of the court, therefore, was to unite Lafayette, Mirabeau, and Bouillé; for through them it would have had the national guards, the assembly, and the army, that is to say, the three powers of the day. Prejudices certainly existed, tending to divide those three influential personages. Lafayette, strong in his good intentions, was ready to coalesce with all who would serve the king and the constitution; but Mirabeau was jealous of Lafayette's influence, scowled at his much-vaunted purity, and affected to regard it as dangerous. Bouillé detested in Lafayette the enthusiastic tone of his opinions, and, perhaps, an irreproachable antagonist; he preferred Mirabeau, whom he believed more easy of management, and less rigorous in political faith. The court should have removed these particular grounds of alienation, and drawn the three men into an understanding. But only one means existed of cementing such a coalition—a limited monarchy. It ought, therefore, to have frankly resigned itself to that consummation, and strained all its powers to promote it. But for ever vacillating, without utterly discarding Lafayette, the court eyed him with aversion; subsidised Mirabeau, who attacked it at intervals; fomented the hatred of Bouillé against the revolution, directed upon Austria eyes of hope, and left in full activity the emigrants of Turin. Thus acts weakness: it seeks to flatter itself with hopes rather than to ensure itself of success, and in this manner proceeds to its own destruction, by inspiring suspicions which irritate opponents as much as reality itself; for it is better, after all, to strike than to threaten.

It was in vain that Lafayette, who attempted what the court ought to have executed, wrote to Bouillé, who was his relative, inviting him to serve the throne in conjunction, and by the only possible appliances, frankness and liberty. Bouillé, evilly inspired by the court, replied coldly and evasively, and, without moving against the constitution, continued to maintain an imposing attitude by his reserve, and the strength of his army.

This reconciliation of the 4th February, then, which might have been attended with such beneficial results, was quite abortive. The trial of Favras was concluded, and either from intimidation or conviction, the Châtelet condemned him to be hanged. Favras displayed, in the last moments of his life, the firmness becoming a martyr rather than an intriguer. He protested his innocence, and requested leave to make a declaration before he suffered death. The scaffold was raised on the Place de Grève. He was conveyed to the town-hall, where he was kept until nightfall. The populace desired with exceeding ardour to see a marquis hanged, and waited in the square with boundless impatience for the moment when so striking a proof of equality in punishments was to be exhibited. Favras

* It is himself who states this in his Memoirs.

avowed that he had held communications with a magnate of the state, who had engaged him to move the minds of men in favour of the king. As a certain expenditure was requisite in such a mission, this high personage had given him one hundred louis-d'ors (£80), which he had accepted. He asseverated that such were the limits of his crime, but named no confederate. He asked, however, whether the exposure of names would save him, and when the answer returned seemed unsatisfactory to him, he exclaimed, "In that case, I will die with my secret!" He walked to the place of execution with admirable serenity and presence of mind. Darkness reigned over the dismal Place de Grève; lamps glimmered here and there, and lights were attached to the gibbet. The populace were overjoyed at a spectacle in which their favourite equality was vindicated even on the scaffold; and they enhanced their delight with atrocious and unrelenting railleries, and with divers fanciful parodies on the ignominious fate of their unfortunate victim. The body of Favras was surrendered to his family, and new events soon obliterated the remembrance of his death, as well from the minds of those who had tortured as of those who had used him.

In the mean time the clergy, driven to desperation, continued to excite broils over the whole surface of France, which the nobility viewed with satisfaction, conceiving great hopes from clerical influence over the people. So long as the assembly had contented itself with placing by a decree the ecclesiastical possessions at the disposition of the nation, the clergy had indulged in hopes that the execution of the decree might be averted; and, to obviate its necessity, they suggested various modes of supplying the exigencies of the public treasury. The Abbé Maury had proposed a tax on luxury, and the Abbé de Salsède had retorted by proposing that no ecclesiastic should be allowed to possess above a thousand crowns of revenue. The wealthy abbé was silenced by this proposition. Upon another occasion, when debating upon the national debt, Cazalès had recommended that an examination should be instituted, not into the validity of the titles on which each loan rested, but into the loan itself, its origin and its necessity—a mode of colouring bankruptcy after the odious and repudiated fashion of the "*chambres ardentes*." The clergy, exasperated at the creditors of the state, to whom they imagined themselves sacrificed, had supported the motion, notwithstanding the rigour of their principles on the rights of property. Maury had worked himself into a fury, and thrown aside all respect for the assembly, by vociferating to a portion of its members that they possessed only "*the courage to face opprobrium.*" The assembly had taken offence at the expression, and manifested a desire to expel him. But Mirabeau, who had reason to believe himself alluded to, represented to his colleagues that each deputy belonged to his constituents, and that they had not the right to exclude him. Such moderation befitted incontestible superiority: it prevailed, and Maury was more severely punished by a censure than he would have been by expulsion. All these expedients, propounded by the clergy for the purpose of transferring the public creditors into their own predicament, were utterly unavailing; and the assembly directed the sale of four hundred millions of lands belonging to the royal domain and the church. Then, urged to desperation, the priests circulated writings amongst the people, and spread far and wide that the design of the revolutionists was to overthrow the Catholic religion. The provinces of the south presented to them the fairest prospect of agitating with success. We have seen that the first emigration had fixed its quarters at Turin, and its principal communications were maintained with Languedoc and Provence. Calonne, so celebrated at the era of the notables, was the minister of this fugitive court. Two parties divided it; the high nobility desired to maintain their exclusive sway, and rejected the intervention of the provincial gentry, and especially of the burghers. Hence they advocated an appeal to foreign force alone as a means of re-establishing the throne. Besides, to use religion as an engine, as the emissaries of the provinces proposed, seemed too ridiculous to men who had laughed for years at the witticisms of Voltaire. The other party, composed of petty nobles and expatriated burghers, upheld the policy of combating the passion of liberty with one still stronger, that of fanaticism, and of conquering by their own strength alone, without placing themselves at the mercy of foreigners. The former alleged the personal feuds engendered by civil war in exculpation of foreign interference; the latter argued that, though civil war meant desolation and bloodshed, it was not necessary they should sully themselves by treason also. These last, more courageous, more patriotic, but more ferocious than the others, were not likely to prevail in a court where Calonne ruled. However, as every aid was welcome, the communications were kept up between Turin and the southern provinces. It was finally decided that the revolution should be attacked both by foreign and civil war, and as a first step, that zealous endeavours should be made to arouse the old fanaticism of those districts.*

* The Memoirs of M. Froment supply so just an idea of the emigrants, and of the opinions that divided them, that I cannot do better than quote them. In a volume entitled "*A Collection of various Documents relative to the Revolution*," M. Froment thus expresses himself in the 4th and following pages:—

"I repaired secretly to Turin in January 1790, to solicit the approbation and countenance of the French princes. In a council held after my arrival, I explained to them that *if they would arm the partisans of the altar and the throne, and join the interests of religion with those of royalty, it would be easy to save both the one and the other.* Although firmly attached to the faith of my fathers, it was not against non-Catholics that I wished to wage war, but against the declared enemies of Catholicism and royalty; against those who boldly asserted that the world had heard too much of Jesus Christ and the Bourbons; against those who longed to strangle the last of kings with the entrails of the last of priests. The non-Catholics who have *remained faithful* to the monarchy have always found in me a most affectionate fellow-citizen, but *rebellious* Catholics a most implacable foe.

My plan tended merely to form a party, and to give it, as far as in me lay, extension and consistence. The grand argument of revolutionists being force, I felt that the grand rejoinder was force: *then, as at present*, I was convinced of this great truth, *that a strong passion cannot be stifled except by one still stronger, and that religious zeal alone could choke republican frenzy.* The miracles which zeal for religion has worked since that period, in La Vendée and Spain, prove that the philosophers and revolutionists of all grades would never have succeeded in establishing their anti-religious and anti-social system for so many years over the greater part of Europe, if the ministers of Louis XVI. had conceived such a project as mine, or if the councillors of the emigrant princes had sincerely adopted and honestly supported it.

But unhappily, the majority of the personages who directed Louis XVI. and the princes of his family, reasoned and acted only upon philosophical principles, though the philosophers and their disciples were the stimulators of the revolutionary agents. They thought they would have covered themselves with ridicule and dishonour if they had pronounced the single word "*religion*," if they had employed the powerful means it presents, and which the most profound politicians have used with success in all ages. Whilst the National Assembly sought to mislead the people, and to conciliate them by the suppression of feudal rights, tithes, the salt tax, &c. &c., they thought to bring them back to submission and loyalty by an exposure of the deficiencies in the new laws; by a picture of the kingly griefs; by writings above their comprehension. By such means they imagined they would revive in the hearts of all Frenchmen a pure and disinterested love for their sovereign; they believed that the clamours of malecontents would impede the enterprises of the factious, and permit the king *to march straight to the object he wished to attain.* The value of my counsels was estimated apparently by the weight of my station, and the opinions of the court magnates judged according to their titles and possessions."

Monsieur Froment continues his relation, and subsequently characterises the parties which divided the fugitive court, after the following fashion (page 33):—

The clergy warmly approved this plan, and neglected no means of promoting it. The Protestants in those parts were viewed with repugnance by the Catholics. The clergy took advantage of these prejudices, and especially at the solemnisation of Easter. At Montpellier, Nimes, Montauban, the slumbering fanaticism was awakened by all possible provocations.

Charles Lameth complained in the tribune that the Easter festival had been perverted into an occasion for misleading the people and exciting them against the new laws. At these words, the ecclesiastical members arose, apparently with the intention of quitting the assembly. The Bishop of Clermont threatened it; and many of the clergy were on the point of leaving, when Lameth was called to order, and the tumult subsided. In the mean time the sale of the church possessions was carried into execution, whereat the clergy were extremely wroth, and omitted no opportunity of openly testifying their resentment. Dom Gerle, a Carthusian, and sincere in his religious and patriotic sentiments, claimed one day the ear of the assembly, and moved that the Catholic religion be declared the sole religion of the state.* Several deputies immediately rose from their seats, and prepared to vote the proposition by acclamation, exclaiming that now was the time for the assembly to justify itself from the reproach that had been made against it of attacking the Catholic religion. But what was the meaning of such a proposition? Either the decree was designed to confer a monopoly on the Catholic religion, which none in particular ought ever to possess; or it was the promulgation of a fact, namely, that the majority in France were Catholics; and this fact needed no express announcement. The motion, therefore, could not be entertained, and in spite of the exertions of the nobility and clergy, the debate was adjourned to the following day. An immense concourse flocked to the hall that morning, and Lafayette, apprised that the malignants were exerting themselves to provoke disturbance, doubled the guard. The debate commenced one ecclesiastic threatened the assembly with a malediction; Maury vociferated his accustomed denunciations. Menou repelled with calmness all the reproaches levelled against the assembly, and demonstrated that it could not be reasonably charged with seeking to abolish the Catholic religion, at the very time it was engaged in assigning the expenses of its service as public burdens; he therefore moved that the order of the day be proceeded with. Dom Gerle, convinced by his reasons, withdrew his motion, and apologised for having originated such a contest. M. de Larochefoucauld brought forward a fresh motion, which was substituted for that of Menou. Suddenly a member on the right side complained they were not free, singled out Lafayette, and demanded of him wherefore he had doubled the guard. The motive of his precaution was above suspicion, for it was not the left side that had to fear the populace, nor was it his own friends that Lafayette was solicitous to protect. This episode augmented the confusion; however, the discussion was resumed. In its progress Louis XIV. was quoted as an authority, upon which Mirabeau

"Such honourable testimonies, and the attention which was generally shown me at Turin, would have made me forget the past, and indulge in the most flattering anticipations of the future, if I had discerned great resources in the counsellors of the princes, and perfect concord amongst the most influential men in our affairs; but I beheld with grief *the emigration divided into two parties*, of which one wished to attempt the counter-revolution *by the aid of foreign powers alone*, and the other *by the royalists of the interior*.

The first party argued that, by ceding certain provinces to the powers, they would furnish the French princes with armies sufficiently numerous to reduce the factious; that with time, it would be easy to re-conquer the dominions they should be forced to cede; and that the court, by not coming under any obligation to *any of the bodies of the state*, would be free to dictate laws to all Frenchmen indiscriminately. The courtiers trembled lest the nobility of the provinces and the royalists of the third-estate should have the honour of replacing on its pedestal the crumbling monarchy. They felt they would no longer be the dispensers of patronage and favour, and that their sway would be at an end, if the provincial nobility should re-establish, at the cost of their blood, the royal authority, and thereby merit the favour and the confidence of their sovereign. The apprehension of such a new order of things induced them to unite together, if not to divert the princes from employing in any way whatever the royalists of the interior, at all events to fix their attention principally on the cabinets of Europe, and lead them to place their greatest hopes on foreign aid. As a consequence of this presentiment, they *secretly* put in force the most efficacious means of ruining the internal resources, and of causing proposed plans to fail, several of which might have led to the re-establishment of order, if they had been prudently directed and honestly supported. Such are the facts of which I myself have been an eye-witness, the truth of which I shall demonstrate one day by authentic statements and vouchers; but the moment is not yet come. In a conference which was held at that period on the subject of the advantage to be drawn from the favourable dispositions of the inhabitants of Lyons and Franche-Comté, I stated explicitly the means that ought to be employed, *at the same time*, in order to assure the triumph of the royalists of Gevaudan, of the Cevennes, of Vivarais, of the Comtat-Venaissin, of Languedoc, and of Provence. During the heat of debate, Field-marshal the Marquis d'Autichamp, *a great partisan of the powers*, said to me: 'But will not the injured and the friends of victims seek to revenge themselves?' 'Well, what of it?' said I, 'provided we attain our object!' 'See!' he exclaimed, 'how I have wrung from him an avowal that particular vengeances would be wreaked!' More than astonished at such an observation, I remarked to the Marquis de La Rouzière, my neighbour—'I did not know that a civil war should be like a mission of monks!' It was thus by inspiring the princes with fear, lest they should render themselves odious to their most inveterate enemies, that the courtiers induced them to use only half measures—sufficient, doubtless, to stimulate the zeal of the royalists in the interior, but very insufficient, after having compromised them, to guarantee them from the wrath of the factious. Since that time it has happened that, during the stay of the army of the princes in Champagne, M. de la Porte, aid-de-camp to the Marquis d'Autichamp, having made a republican prisoner, imagined, according to his general's hypothesis, that he should win him back to his duty by a pathetic exhortation, and by restoring to him his arms and his liberty; but scarcely had the republican walked a few paces than he stretched his captor dead on the ground. The Marquis d'Autichamp, then forgetting the moderation he had manifested at Turin, set fire to several villages, by way of avenging the death of his imprudent missionary.

The *second party* argued that, inasmuch as the powers had several times taken up arms to humble the Bourbons, and especially to prevent Louis XIV. from securing the crown of Spain to his grandson, so far from calling them to our assistance, it behoved us, on the contrary, to reanimate the zeal of the clergy, the loyalty of the nobility, and the love of the people for the king, *and to use all possible speed in stifling a family quarrel*, by which foreigners might probably be tempted to profit.

It is to this fatal division amongst the leaders of the emigration, and to the ignorance or perfidy of the ministers of Louis XVI., that the revolutionists owed their first successes. I will go much farther, and I assert that it was not the National Assembly which made the revolution, but, in truth, those around the king and the princes; I assert that the ministers delivered up Louis XVI. to the enemies of royalty, as certain intriguers delivered up the princes and Louis XVIII. to the enemies of France; I assert that the majority of the courtiers who surrounded the kings, Louis XVI. and Louis XVIII., and the princes of their families, were and are *charlatans, true political eunuchs*; that it is to their imbecility, cowardice, or treachery, that must be attributed all the evils which have desolated France, and those which still threaten the civilised world. If I bore an illustrious name, and I had been of the council of the Bourbons, I should not survive the reflection that a horde of vile poltroons and brigands, not one of whom has shown either genius or superior talent of any kind, had succeeded in overthrowing the throne, in establishing a sway over the most powerful states of Europe, in making the whole universe tremble; and when this idea torments me, I bury myself in the obscurity of my existence, in order to place myself beyond the reach of censure, since it has rendered me powerless in arresting the progress of the revolution."

* Sitting of the 12th April.

expressed himself in energetic terms. "I am not surprised," said he, "that we are reminded of the reign in which the edict of Nantes was revoked; but know that, from this tribune in which I stand, I can perceive the fatal window whence a king, the assassin of his subjects, connecting the interests of this earth with those of religion, gave the signal of the St Bartholomew!" This terrible reminiscence failed to terminate the discussion, which accordingly proceeded. The motion of the Duke de Larochefoucauld was finally adopted. The assembly declared that its sentiments were well known, but that, from respect for liberty of conscience, it neither could nor ought to deliberate upon the proposition submitted to it.

A few days had scarcely elapsed before another plan for alarming and even dissolving the assembly was attempted. The new organisation of the kingdom was completed, and the people were about to be convoked for the purpose of electing their magistrates, which was deemed an excellent opportunity for getting new deputies nominated at the same time, to replace those who formed the existing assembly. This measure, once before proposed and discussed, had been already rejected. It was again brought forward in April 1790. Certain instructions limited the powers of deputies to one year, and as the assembly had been opened in May 1789, that period had very nearly expired. Although the instructions had been abrogated, though a solemn engagement had been entered into not to separate before the completion of the constitution, those men, in whose eyes no decree had been passed, no oath taken, when it suited the objects they aimed to accomplish, proposed to direct the election of other deputies, and give up their places to them. Maury, upon whom the brunt of this debate was laid, performed his part with as much confidence as ever, and with more than usual address. He appealed to the sovereignty of the people, and warned the assembly that it could not long usurp the prerogatives of the nation, nor indefinitely protract powers which were merely temporary. He asked by what title it had assumed sovereign attributes; he maintained that the alleged distinction between the legislative and constituent character was perfectly chimerical; that a sovereign convention can exist only in the absence of all other government; and that, if the assembly were such a convention, its only rational course was to dethrone the king, and declare the monarchy in suspension. Shouts of indignation interrupted him as he thus spoke, manifesting the general repugnance to such opinions. Mirabeau rose, with an air of dignified composure, to reply. "We are asked," said he, "when the deputies of the people became a national convention. To this I answer, upon that day when, finding the portals of their hall barricaded by soldiers, they proceeded to the first place in which they could assemble, to swear they would sooner perish than betray and abandon the rights of the nation. Our powers, whatever they might have been, were changed in their nature by that day. And whatever the powers may be that we have since exercised, our troubles, our labours, have legitimatised them; the adhesion of the whole nation has sanctified them. You all remember the words of that great man of antiquity, who had neglected legal forms in saving his country. Summoned by a factious tribune to aver whether he had observed the laws, he exclaimed, 'I swear I have saved the republic!' Gentlemen," cried Mirabeau, turning to the deputies of the commons, "I swear you have saved France!"

Upon this splendid adjuration, says Ferrières, the entire assembly, as if irresistibly moved by some spontaneous inspiration, declared the discussion at an end, and immediately decreed that the electoral bodies should not concern themselves with the choice of new deputies.

Thus this new expedient was equally fruitless as others that had preceded it, and the assembly was enabled to continue its labours. But troubles were not the less rife throughout France. The commandant, De Voisin, was massacred by the people; the forts of Marseilles were seized by the national guard. Movements of a contrary tendency took place at Nimes and Montauban. Emissaries from Turin had successfully appealed to bigotry; they had distributed papers, in which the monarchy was proclaimed in danger, and the Catholic religion claimed as the national creed. A royal proclamation had been vainly issued to dissipate illusions; the emissaries had replied by fresh invocations. The Protestants had been driven to arms against the Catholics; and the latter, disappointed in the succours promised them from Turin, had been ultimately subdued. Divers bodies of national guards had put themselves in motion to assist the patriots against the rebels. The battle was thus joined, and the Viscount de Mirabeau, the declared opponent of his illustrious brother, announcing the commencement of civil war from the tribune, seemed, by his warmth, his gestures, and his words, as if he would have provoked it in the assembly itself.

It was in this manner that, whilst the most moderate of the deputies laboured to appease the revolutionary ardour, an indiscreet opposition irritated the fever, which quietude alone could have calmed, and furnished topics for declamation to the most violent of the demagogues. The clubs were driven by the same cause into a more exaggerated tone. That of the Jacobins, the successor of the original Breton club, established first at Versailles and afterwards at Paris, rose above all the others, from the number of its members, as also from the talent and the violence displayed in it.* Its sittings were as regular as those of the assembly. It anticipated all the questions which were to be discussed by that body, and pronounced decisions which already operated as fetters upon the legislators themselves. The principal popular deputies resorted thither, and the most phlegmatic found in its exciting atmosphere energy and stimulus. Lafayette, as a counterpoise to this redoubtable influence, had concerted with Bailly and other enlightened men the formation of another club, called the *Club of* '89, and subsequently *The Feuillants.*† But the attempt was unavailing; a meeting of a hundred calm and well-informed men could not attract the multitude like the Jacobin Club, where all the fury of popular passions ran riot. Closing the clubs would have been the effectual course; but the court was too deficient in frankness, and inspired too many doubts, for the popular party to venture upon the adoption of such a plan. The Lameths reigned predominant at the Jacobin Club; Mirabeau appeared indifferently in both the one and the other; his position was evidently between the two parties. An occasion soon presented itself in which his part became more decided, and in which he gained a memorable advantage for the monarchy, as we shall shortly have occasion to relate.

CHAPTER V.

STATE OF EUROPEAN POWERS—FIRST ISSUE OF ASSIGNATS—FESTIVAL OF THE FEDERATION—RESIGNATION OF NECKER—CIVIL OATH IMPOSED UPON THE CLERGY.

At the period we have now reached, the French revolution began to attract the serious attention of foreign monarchs; its tone was so elevated and firm, and its predominant features of such universal applicability, that foreign princes were naturally in great alarm. They had hitherto imagined it a mere passing agitation; but the success of the assembly, its

* This club, styled that of "*The Friends of the Constitution*," was transferred to Paris in October 1789, and was then known under the name of the *Jacobin Club*, because it met in a hall of the Jacobin convent in the street St Honoré.

† Instituted on the 12th May.

unexpected firmness and constancy, and, above all, the future results that it proposed to itself, and indeed to all nations, drew upon it of necessity a greater degree of observation and abhorrence, and gained for it the honour of setting every cabinet actively on the watch. Europe was then divided into two great antagonistic leagues; the Anglo-Prussian on one side, and the imperial courts on the other.

Frederick-William had succeeded the great Frederick on the throne of Prussia. That fickle and weak prince, renouncing the policy of his illustrious predecessor, had abandoned the alliance of France for that of England. In close union with that power, he had concluded the famous Anglo-Prussian league, which attempted so many grand schemes and executed none; which roused Sweden, Poland, Turkey, against Russia and Austria; abandoned all those whom it had excited to arms, and contributed even to despoil them, as in the partition of Poland.

The project of England and Prussia united had been to weaken Russia and Austria, by instigating against them Sweden, over which the chivalric Gustavus reigned—Poland, groaning under its first partition, and Turkey, exasperated at Russian encroachments. England's principal view in this league was to avenge herself for the aid furnished her American colonies by France, without a formal declaration of war against the latter. It had found means to effect this object by provoking war between the Turks and the Russians.* France could not remain neuter between these two nations without a rupture with the Turks, who relied upon its assistance, and without likewise losing its commercial supremacy in the Levant. On the other hand, by taking part in the war, it lost the alliance of Russia, with which it had just concluded a highly advantageous treaty, which secured it timber and all the materials the north furnishes so abundantly for naval purposes. Thus in both alternatives France suffered loss. In the mean time, England got ready its forces, and disposed them for active participation when the occasion suited. But, perceiving the disordered state of the finances under the notables, and the popular excesses under the Constituent Assembly, it thought there was no need for actual war, and, according to general belief, it preferred prostrating France by fomenting internal troubles rather than by an open appeal to arms. Thus England was always accused of encouraging discord in France.

This Anglo-Prussian league had succeeded in getting battles fought, without producing any decisive results. Gustavus had extricated himself like a general from a predicament into which he had plunged like a knight-errant. Holland, in rebellion, had been subdued to the stadtholder by English intrigues and Prussian arms. Wary England had thus deprived France of a powerful maritime alliance; and the Prussian monarch, who merely sought the gratification of vanity, had revenged an outrage perpetrated by the states of Holland on the wife of the stadtholder, who was his own sister. Poland had taken consistence in its government, and was preparing for war. Turkey had been beaten by Russia. However, the death of Joseph II., the Emperor of Austria, in January 1790, changed the aspect of affairs. Leopold, an enlightened and pacific prince, on whose mild dominion Tuscany had heaped benedictions, succeeded him. Leopold, equally skilful and sagacious, wishing to put an end to the war, employed as the readiest means of success, with an imagination so unsteady as Frederick-William's, arguments of seduction. To that prince were described in moving terms the sweets of peace, the evils of war, so long pressing on his people, and the dangers of the French revolution, which proclaimed such disastrous principles. Ideas of absolute power were awakened in his breast, and the hope was even suggested to him of chastising the French revolutionists as he had already done those of Holland. He allowed himself to be gained over by such specious reasons, at the very time he was about to reap the advantages of that league which his minister Hertzberg had so boldly conceived and formed. The peace was signed at Reichenbach in July 1790. In August, Russia made peace with Gustavus, and got rid of all her enemies but Poland, which excited little alarm, and Turkey, which had been repulsed on all sides. We will allude to these events more particularly hereafter. The attention of the powers, therefore, was ultimately almost entirely concentrated upon France and its revolution. Some time before the conclusion of the peace between Prussia and Austria, whilst the Anglo-Prussian league threatened the two imperial courts, and secretly attacked France, and also Spain, the constant and natural ally of France, certain English ships had been seized in Nootka Sound by the Spaniards. Energetic remonstrances were made, accompanied by a general arming in the English ports. Spain immediately demanded the assistance of France, upon the strength of existing treaties, and Louis XVI. ordered the equipment of fifteen ships of war. On this occasion, England was accused of attempting to augment the embarrassments under which France laboured. It is true the clubs of London had several times complimented the National Assembly; but it was said the cabinet might permit a few philanthropists to express their amiable sympathies, and yet at the same time subsidise those astounding agitators, who appeared in every quarter, and gave such incessant occupation to the national guards throughout the kingdom. The internal troubles became still greater at the time of the general arming, and it was impossible to avoid perceiving a connexion between the threats of England and the renewal of disorder. Lafayette even, who rarely spoke in the assembly except upon occasions relative to the public tranquillity, denounced at the tribune a secret sinister influence. "I cannot help calling the attention of the assembly," said he, "to a fresh and simultaneous fermentation, exhibited from Strasburg to Nimes, and from Brest to Toulon, and which the enemies of the people would vainly fasten on them, when it bears all the characteristics of a secret influence. The question affecting the establishment of departments is mooted, and the country is devastated; neighbouring powers arm themselves, and disorders instantly break out in our arsenals." Several commanders, in fact, had been murdered, and by chance or design, the best marine officers had been sacrificed. The English ambassador was ordered by his court to repel these imputations. But it is well known what degree of credit such assurances deserve. Calonne likewise wrote to the king in justification of England; but Calonne, vouching for foreigners, was himself suspected. He vainly urged that every item of expenditure is known in a representative government; that even secret expenses are stated as such; and that in the English budgets there was no appropriation of that description. Experience has proved that funds are never wanting even to responsible ministers. What may be more satisfactorily alleged is, that time, the unfolder of all mysteries, has discovered nothing upon this subject, and that Necker, who was in a situation to form a correct opinion, never believed in this secret influence.*

The king, according to the fact that has been narrated, informed the assembly by message of the equipment of fifteen sail of the line, not doubting, as he said, that it would heartily approve the measure and vote the necessary supplies. The assembly received the notification most favourably, but it perceived a

* [This is scarcely a credible statement. M. Thiers has overlooked the fact, that Catherine II.'s ambition needed no prompting to have swallowed the whole Turkish empire if she could have got it.]

* See what Madame de Staël says in her *Reflections upon the French Revolution.*

constitutional question involved in the proceeding, which it judged expedient to solve before replying to the king. "The preparations are completed," said Alexander Lameth, "and our deliberations cannot retard them. We ought, however, to decide at once whether to the king or to the assembly the right of making peace and war should be delegated." This was in fact almost the last important attribute that remained to be fixed, and precisely one calculated to excite the most lively interest. The public mind was too fully impressed with the faults of courts, with their alternations of ambition and weakness, and hence greatly indisposed to leave the throne in possession of power to involve the nation in dangerous wars, or to dishonour it by shameful treaties. At the same time, of all the functions of government, the superintendence over war and peace is the one in which its action is the most appropriate, and in which the executive power ought to exercise the most influence; that, in fact, in respect of which the greatest extent of discretion should be left it, in order that it may act advantageously and with perfect good will. The opinion of Mirabeau, who was said to be gained by the court, was proclaimed previous to the discussion upon this important question. The occasion was deemed favourable for damaging the orator in that eminent popularity he enjoyed, and which so chagrined his rivals. The Lameths were not backward in seizing upon it, and they arranged that Barnave should lead the attack upon Mirabeau. The right side stood aloof, so to speak, and left the field of battle free to those combatants.

The debate was impatiently expected: it was at length begun.* After certain speeches had been delivered which scarcely touched the question, Mirabeau was heard, and argued it in a perfectly novel manner. War, according to him, is almost always an unforeseen catastrophe; hostilities are commenced before threats are given; the king, as charged with the public safety, must repel them; and thus war ensues before the assembly could possibly interfere. It is the same with treaties: the king alone can seize the critical moment for negotiating either in a friendly or a hostile spirit with foreign powers; it was the province of the assembly merely to ratify the conditions obtained. In both instances, the king alone can act, and the assembly approve or censure. Mirabeau, therefore, maintained that the executive power should be authorised to carry on effectively hostilities when once commenced, and that the legislative power, according to the circumstances of each case, should sanction the continuance of the war, or insist upon peace. This opinion was applauded, because the words of Mirabeau always were. Barnave afterwards entered the tribune, and passing aside the other speakers, applied himself to answer Mirabeau alone. He allowed that collisions often occurred before the nation could be consulted, but he denied that hostilities necessarily involved war, arguing that the king ought to repel them and immediately communicate with the assembly, which would then declare, as the sovereign authority, its definitive resolution. Thus the whole difference was little more than verbal; for Mirabeau granted to the assembly the right of disapproving a war and of insisting upon peace, and Barnave claimed for it the right of actually declaring the one or the other; but in both cases, the will of the assembly would be obligatory, and Barnave gave it no more than Mirabeau. Notwithstanding, Barnave was vociferously cheered and carried in triumph by the populace, whilst his opponent was upbraided with having sold himself. A pamphlet, entitled, *The Grand Treason of the Count de Mirabeau*, was hawked through all the streets by deep-mouthed itinerants. A critical moment for Mirabeau had arrived, and every one anticipated a mighty effort on the part of so unyielding a champion. He demanded leave to reply, obtained it, mounted the tribune in presence of an immense multitude gathered to hear him, and as he mounted declared he would descend only dead or victorious. "I likewise," said he, in commencement, "have been borne in triumph, and yet this day the streets resound with shouts of the 'grand treason of the Count de Mirabeau!' I did not need this example to be aware, that there is but a step from the Capitol to the Tarpæian Rock. But such revulsions shall not arrest me in my career." After this effective opening, he declared that it was his intention to answer Barnave only, and from the beginning to the end. "Explain yourself," said he, addressing that deputy; "you have in your speech maintained that the king should be compelled to notify the commencement of hostilities, and that to the assembly alone belongs the right of expressing the national will upon the point. To this I fix you, and ask if you have forgotten those principles of ours, by which the expression of the national will is left conjointly to the assembly and the king. In attributing it to the assembly alone, you have outraged the constitution. I call you, therefore, to order. You make no answer. I go on then."

Barnave could in fact allege nothing in reply to such a thrust. He remained during a long oration exposed to similar overpowering bursts of eloquence. Mirabeau dissected and triumphantly refuted his arguments point by point, and moreover demonstrated that he gave nothing more to the assembly than he himself had given; but that, by reducing the king to a simple notification, he had taken from him that concurrence declared necessary to the expression of the national will. He concluded by reproaching Barnave for stimulating idle rivalries between men who ought, as he said, to live like faithful companions in arms. In the course of his speech, Barnave had enumerated the supporters of his opinion, and Mirabeau, in his turn, mentioned those who thought with him. In the list he pointed especially to those moderate men, the first champions of the constitution, who sustained the cause of liberty for France, when his vile calumniators were picking up the crumbs of courts (he alluded to the Lameths, who had received favours from the queen); "such men," he added, "as will be honoured, even to the tomb, both by friends and foes."

Mirabeau descended from the tribune amid unanimous applause. The assembly contained a considerable number of deputies, belonging neither to the right nor to the left, but who, not having formed predeterminate opinions, decided upon the impressions of the moment. It was through them that genius and reason prevailed, because they turned the scale by joining either side. Barnave desired to answer, which the assembly opposed; and calls for a division became general. The decree of Mirabeau, as ably amended by Chapelier, had the priority, and was finally adopted on the 22d May, to the public satisfaction; for, after all, these rivalries scarcely extended beyond the circle in which they were engendered, and the great popular party deemed itself as victorious with Mirabeau as with the Lameths.

The decree conferred upon the king and the nation the right of making peace and war. The king was intrusted with the disposition of the force; he was to notify the commencement of hostilities, to convoke the assembly if not in session, and to propose the decree for war or peace; the assembly was to deliberate upon his express proposition, and the king to afterwards exercise his sanction upon its decision. It was Chapelier, who, by a most reasonable amendment, had required the express proposition, and the definitive sanction. As it passed, this decree, so conformable to sound sense and the principles already established, excited sincere joy amongst the constitutionalists, and absurd hopes amongst the counter-revolutionists, who imagined that the public mind was on the move to reaction, and that this victory of

* Sittings from the 14th to the 22d May.

Mirabeau would result in theirs. Lafayette, who upon this occasion was in unison with Mirabeau, wrote of it to Bouillé, gave him hopes of tranquillity and moderation, and strove, as was his invariable custom, to gain his cordial acquiescence in the new order of things.

The assembly still continued its financial labours. These consisted in making the best possible disposition of the church estates, the sale of which, long ago decreed, was not to be averted by protests, by episcopal charges, or by intrigues. To despoil a too potent body of large tracts of land; to distribute them to the best advantage, so as to improve their fertility by the division; by this process to constitute proprietors numberless individuals who were not so; and by the same operation to extinguish the debts of the state, and re-establish order in the finances—such were the objects of the assembly, and it was too deeply impressed with their utility to recoil before any opposing obstacles. The assembly had already ordered the sale of crown and church lands to the value of four hundred millions, but it was highly expedient to find means for selling those estates, without depreciating them by offering them for simultaneous disposal. Bailly proposed, in the name of the Paris municipality, a well-digested project, namely, to transfer those possessions to the municipalities, who should purchase them in a mass, in order to sell them out again in parcels, so that they should not be exposed to competition all at once. As the municipalities were without funds to pay immediately, he proposed they should form engagements for stipulated periods, and pay the national creditors with notes of the communes, which they should be enjoined to retire by instalments. Those notes, which were called in the discussion *municipal paper*, suggested the first idea of *assignats*. By following Bailly's plan, the ecclesiastical possessions were definitively appropriated; that is, their owners being displaced, they were divided amongst the municipalities, and the creditors brought more nearly in contact with their hypothec, by acquiring claims upon the municipalities, instead of those they held upon the state. The security was therefore increased, inasmuch as the payment was made more immediate; and the exaction of that payment, moreover, depended upon the creditors themselves, since with these notes or assignats they might purchase a proportionate amount of the estates exposed to sale. Thus a vast advantage was conferred upon them, nor was it the only or last one. It seemed possible they might not be disposed to convert their notes into lands, from scrupulous or other motives; and in that case, those notes, which they would be obliged to keep, as they were not allowed to circulate as currency, would become in their hands nothing more than simple undischarged claims. But one farther step, therefore, remained to be taken, which was to give those notes or claims the faculty of circulation, which converted them at once into an actual currency, and the state creditors, being enabled to transfer them in acquittances, would be in truth reimbursed. Another material consideration put the policy of the measure beyond doubt. Specie was excessively scarce, and its disappearance was attributed to the emigration, which bore away with it large amounts of coin; to payments which were necessarily made to foreigners; and finally to malignancy. The true cause was want of confidence, induced by the prevailing troubles. A profusion of specie is rendered apparent by circulation; for when confidence is unshaken, the activity of commercial exchange is pushed to its extreme limits; the medium of that commerce, the precious metals, passes with rapidity from hand to hand, is seen abundantly every where, and is believed to be considerably greater in amount than it actually is, because it is used to more purpose; but when political troubles fill the land with alarm, trade languishes, capital lies dormant, and money passes slowly and rarely, or is often perhaps buried, and the most unfounded accusations are made by popular prejudice as to the causes of its absence.

The desire of providing a substitute for the precious metals, which the assembly deemed exhausted, and of giving the creditors something more than a security to lie dead on their hands, besides the necessity that existed of meeting a vast variety of importunate wants, led to these notes or assignats being invested with a species of forced circulation, with the character of a legal tender. The public creditor was thereby paid, because he could insist upon the paper he had received being taken in return, and thus provide for all his engagements. If he had not thought fit to buy lands, those who had received the circulating paper from him would be ultimately driven to become purchasers. The assignats which came back in this way were destined to be burnt, and by this operation the church lands must necessarily soon be distributed and the paper money suppressed. The assignats bore an interest at so much per day, and increased in value by lying in the hands of capitalists.

The clergy, who were not slow to perceive that this project furnished a means of accomplishing the alienation of their possessions, opposed it with all their might. Their noble and other allies, ever inimical to any measure that facilitated the progress of the revolution, likewise opposed it, and expatiated on the evils of paper money. The name of Law was of course loudly resounded, and the recollection of his famous bankruptcy brought prominently forward. But the comparison was quite misplaced, because Law's paper was based merely on acquisitions of the India Company in expectancy, whilst the assignats rested on a territorial capital, at once substantial and easily available. Law had promulgated, in confederacy with the court, infamous exaggerations, and had prodigiously exceeded the actual capital of the company; the assembly, on the contrary, had no reason to surmise that any such spoliation could ensue from the new arrangements it had sanctioned. Besides, the amount of paper issues represented only a small portion of the capital which was pledged for them. But it was nevertheless true that paper, however safe it may be, is not, like bullion, a reality, or, according to Bailly's expression, *a physical materiality*. Specie carries with it an intrinsic value; paper, on the contrary, still needs an operation, an investment, a realisation. It must therefore bear a depreciation as compared with specie, and so soon as it is thus depreciated, the precious metals, which no one will exchange for paper, are concealed, and finally disappear altogether. If, in addition to this inherent evil, disorders in the administration of the estates, and immoderate emissions of paper, destroy the proportion between the circulating notes and the capital hypothecated, confidence is annihilated; the nominal value is preserved, but the real value exists no more; and he who pays away such a conventional currency robs him who receives it, and a deplorable crisis inevitably occurs. All this was possible, and with somewhat more experience would have appeared certain. As a financial measure, therefore, the issue of assignats was very blameable, but as a political measure it was indispensable, because it provided for pressing emergencies, and divided the property without having recourse to an agrarian law. With such inducements the assembly could not hesitate; and, in spite of Maury and his party, it decreed four hundred millions of forced assignats, with interest (April).

Necker had long ago lost the confidence of Louis XVI., the pristine deference of his colleagues, and the affection of the nation. Wrapped up in his calculations, he sometimes maintained disputations with the assembly. His reserve concerning extraordinary expenses had provoked a demand for the Red Book, a famous register, in which was recorded, as alleged, the list of all secret expenses. The king consented reluc-

tantly to its production, and sealed up the leaves which contained the expenditure of his predecessor, Louis XV. The assembly respected his delicacy, and confined its scrutiny to the expenses of the existing reign. No items personal to the king were found in it; the prodigality was all owing to courtiers. The Lameths were mentioned for a largess of 60,000 francs, disbursed by the queen for their education. They immediately carried the sum to the public treasury. The pensions were reduced with a twofold reference to services and former station. The assembly, in every instance, evinced exemplary moderation; it solicited the king to fix his civil list himself, and then voted by acclamation the twenty-five millions he asked.

This National Assembly, strong and confident in its numbers, its talents, its sway, and its determination, had undertaken the task of regenerating all departments of the state, and in execution thereof, had recently framed a new judicial organisation. It had distributed the tribunals in the same manner as the administrations, by districts and departments. The judges were left for popular election. This last provision had been vehemently opposed. Political metaphysics had been again employed to prove that the judicial power emanated from the executive power, and that the king ought to nominate the judges. Good reasons had been alleged on both sides of the question, but the material one for the assembly should have been, since it was desirous of constituting a monarchy, that royalty, thus successively denuded of all its attributes, would sink into a simple magistracy, and the state resolve into a republic. But it was too hazardous an experiment to define explicitly what functions were inherent in monarchy; it would have involved concessions which a nation invariably refuses in the first moments of its enthusiasm for liberty. The fate of nations is ever to insist upon too much or upon nothing. The assembly was sincerely attached to the king, entertaining for him a profound deference, and manifesting that spirit in repeated instances; but whilst it was cherishing the person, it seemed unsuspicious that it was destroying the thing.

After this uniformity had been introduced into the civil and judicial administrations, the service of religion remained to be regulated and constituted in harmony with all others. Accordingly, when a superintending administrative council and a tribunal of appeal were established in each department, it was natural to assign a bishopric for it likewise. How, in fact, could it be sanctioned, that certain dioceses should embrace fifteen hundred square leagues, when others stretched over scarcely twenty? that certain parishes should be ten leagues in circumference, and others contain but a score of hearths? that numerous incumbents should possess at the most seven hundred livres a-year, whilst, not far from them, were benefices yielding from ten to fifteen thousand livres? The assembly, whilst reforming abuses, did not encroach upon ecclesiastical doctrines, nor upon the papal authority, because territorial limitations had always belonged to the temporal power. It contemplated, therefore, a new division, and also to subject, as in early times, the incumbents and the bishops to popular election; nor in this last intention did it interfere with aught but the temporal power, since the ecclesiastical dignitaries were always chosen by the king, and confirmed by the pope. This measure, which was called "*The civil constitution of the clergy*," and which brought upon the assembly a greater load of calumny than all it had done besides, was nevertheless the offspring of the most religious members. It was Camus and other Jansenists, who, wishing to strengthen religion in the kingdom, endeavoured to bring it into harmony with the new institutions. Certainly, when the spirit of justice was infused every where, it would have been very strange that the ecclesiastical administration alone should remain without its influence. But for Camus and some others, the members of the assembly, reared in the school of the philosophers, would have regarded Christianity as any other creed admitted in the state, and paid no attention to it. They yielded to sentiments, which, in modern society, it is customary not to combat, even when not participated in. They therefore supported the religious and sincerely Christian project of Camus. The clergy denounced it, alleging that it encroached upon the spiritual authority of the pope, and appealed to Rome. The principal articles of the project, however, were finally adopted,* and presented to the king, who demanded time to refer them to the holy see. The king, whose enlightened piety allowed him to acknowledge the justice of this measure, wrote to the pope, in the earnest hope of gaining his consent, and thus removing all the objections of the clergy. We shall soon see to what intrigues the failure of his beneficent views is to be attributed.

The month of July drew near: shortly, a year would have passed since the capture of the Bastille, since the nation had seized upon power, pronounced its fiats by the agency of the assembly, and of itself put them into execution, or secured that execution under its own superintendence. The 14th July was considered as the day which had commenced a new era, and it was resolved to celebrate its anniversary by a great festival. The provinces and the towns had already offered an example of confederating, the better to resist by union the enemies of the revolution. The municipality of Paris proposed for the 14th July a general federation of all France, which should be celebrated in the midst of the capital, by deputations from all the national guards and all the detachments of the army. This proposal was hailed with enthusiasm, and immense preparations were made to render the festival worthy of its object.

Foreign nations, as we have already seen, had long directed their eyes upon France; the sovereigns hated and feared the revolution, their people looked upon it with favour. Some enthusiastic foreigners presented themselves to the assembly, each in the costume of his nation. Their orator, Anacharsis Clootz, a Prussian by birth, a man of wild imagination, asked permission, in the name of the human race, to take part in the federation. Such occurrences, apparently so ridiculous to those who have not witnessed them, are calculated deeply to move those who are exposed to their immediate impression. The assembly granted the request, and the president informed these strangers that they would be admitted, in order that they might recount to their countrymen what they had seen, and convey to them a just appreciation of the happiness and the blessings attendant upon liberty.

The emotion caused by this scene led to another An equestrian statue of Louis XIV. represented that monarch trampling upon the figures of certain conquered provinces. "We ought not to suffer such monuments of slavery in days of liberty," said one of the Lameths. "It is not fitting that the deputies from Franche-Comté, when they arrive at Paris, should behold an emblem of their native province thus enchained." Maury opposed a measure which, although of little importance, it was expedient to grant to the public enthusiasm. An instant afterwards, a voice proposed the abolition of titles, such as count, marquis, baron, &c.; the prohibition of liveries; and finally, the suppression of all hereditary titles. Young Montmorenci supported the motion. A noble deputy inquired what was intended to be substituted for the words, "Such an one was made a count for having served the state." "We will simply express," said Lafayette, "that such an one on such a day saved the state." The decree was adopted (19th June), notwithstanding the extravagant irritation of the nobles, who felt the loss of their titles more acutely than all the more substantial sacrifices they had been

* Decree of the 12th July.

compelled to make during the whole course of the revolution. The more moderate portion of the assembly would have been better pleased if, in abolishing titles, liberty had been left to those who might desire it still to retain them. Lafayette hastened to apprise the court of this tendency before the decree was sanctioned, and urged it to remit it to the assembly, which would make no difficulty in amending it. But the king somewhat eagerly affixed his sanction, and it was thought that such precipitancy demonstrated a malevolent intention to drive things to the worst.*

The object of the federation was to administer the civic oath. It was canvassed whether the federalists and the assembly should take it upon the hand of the king, or whether the king, in his character of first public functionary, should swear with all the others upon the altar of the country. The last mode was preferred. The assembly thus placed etiquette itself in harmony with the spirit of its laws, and the king ranked in the ceremony precisely as he stood in the constitution. The court, to which Lafayette was an object of perpetual suspicion, took alarm at a report then prevalent, according to which he was to be named commander of all the national guards of the kingdom. This suspicion was but natural, perhaps, in those who were not acquainted with Lafayette, and his enemies of all grades did their utmost to foster it. It was difficult, in fact, to be convinced that a man enjoying such boundless popularity, and at the head of so considerable a force, would not abuse the means at his disposal. And yet he had no desire to do so; he was resolved to be nothing but a citizen; and whether his moderation was the result of virtue or well-understood ambition, the merit is the same. The pride inseparable from human weakness will always have developement in some shape, and virtue consists in bending it to good. Lafayette, anticipating the apprehensions of the court, brought forward a motion that the same individual should not be competent to command the guard of more than one department. The resolution was passed with acclamations, and the self-denial of the general rewarded with heartfelt approbation. However, he was intrusted with all the arrangements for the festival, and named chief of the federation, in his character of commander of the Parisian guard.

The day approached, and the preparations were made with the greatest activity. The festival was appointed to be held in the Field of Mars, a vast space stretching between the Military Academy and the course of the Seine. The plan decided upon was to carry the earth from the middle of the field to the sides, so as to form an amphitheatre capable of holding the mass of spectators. Twelve thousand workmen laboured thereat without intermission, but fears began to be entertained that the work would not be accomplished by the 14th. The inhabitants thereupon determined to assist the workmen. In an instant the whole population was transformed into a body of labourers: priests, soldiers, men of all classes, assumed the shovel and the spade; even females in elegant apparel contributed their aid. The impulse soon became universal; the people proceeded to the works in sections, carrying banners of different colours, and cheered by the sounds of music. When they reached the field, they mingled promiscuously, and laboured in common. At nightfall, upon a given signal, each rejoined his section, and returned in procession to his own quarter. This pleasing union continued until the work was finished. During its progress, the federalists were continually arriving, and were received with the liveliest enthusiasm and the most engaging hospitality. A sincere joy, a general rapture prevailed, despite the sinister rumours which that small minority, who were inaccessible to such emotions, endeavoured to propagate. It was said that the brigands would seize the opportunity of the federation to pillage the town. The Duke of Orleans, also, who had just returned from London, was alleged to have some direful projects in contemplation. But the national gaiety was not to be disturbed, and all these malignant forebodings were disregarded.

The 14th at length arrived. All the federalist deputies from the provinces and the army, ranged under their banners, started from the site of the Bastille, and proceeded to the Tuileries. The deputies from Béarn, when passing along the street of the Ferronnerie, in which Henry IV. was assassinated, rendered a tribute of reverence for his memory, expressed, on so affecting an occasion, by shedding tears. When the federalists reached the garden of the Tuileries, they received into their ranks the municipality and the assembly. A body of youths, armed like their fathers, preceded the assembly; a group of old men followed it; thus recalling the ancient recollections of Sparta. The procession advanced, amidst the shouts and cheers of the people. The quays were covered with spectators, and the houses filled to the roofs. A bridge, constructed a few days before over the Seine, led by a way strewed with flowers from one bank to the other, and opened immediately upon the field of the federation. The procession traversed it, and each repaired to the place destined for him. A magnificent amphitheatre erected in the background was set apart for the national authorities. The king and the president were seated side by side, upon similar chairs, worked with *fleurs-de-lis* in gold. A balcony reared behind the king, contained the queen and the court. The ministers were at some distance from the king, and the deputies were ranged on each side. Four hundred thousand spectators filled the lateral amphitheatres; sixty thousand armed federalists performed their evolutions in the intermediate space; and in the midst arose, upon a base of twenty-five feet, the magnificent altar of the country. Three hundred priests, clad in white surplices and tricoloured scarfs, covered its steps, in readiness to celebrate mass.

The arrival of the federalists occupied three hours. During this period, the sky was obscured with dark clouds, and the rain fell in torrents. That sky, whose brightness harmonises so well with the buoyancy of human joy, refused at this eventful moment its serenity and its lustre. One of the arrived battalions laid down its arms and began to dance; all immediately followed the example, and in one short moment the whole intermediate field was pressed by sixty thousand men, soldiers and citizens, opposing vivacity and gaiety to the relentless storm. At length the ceremony commenced; the weather, by a happy chance, cleared up, and the sun shone in all his splendour upon the solemn spectacle. The Bishop of Autun began the mass; choristers accompanied the voice of the pontiff; cannon mingled its awful roar. The holy rite performed, Lafayette dismounted from his horse, ascended the steps of the throne, and awaited the orders of the king, who handed to him the formula of the oath. Lafayette carried it to the altar, and at that moment all the banners were waved, and all swords glanced in the air. The general, the army, the president, the deputies, exclaimed, "I swear!" The king, standing up and stretching his hand towards the altar, said; "*I, King of the French, swear to use the power delegated*

* [M. Bertrand de Moleville seems to avow some such intention. "The king," says he, "fearing to weaken the manifest nullity of the sanction which he had been forced to give to all the decrees passed since the outrages of the 5th and 6th October, sanctioned also, on the 23th June, the decrees of the 19th, notwithstanding the entreaties of M. Necker, who wished the king not to assent to the decree degrading the nobility till he had offered his observations to the National Assembly. The council did not approve of that step, and were of opinion that the sanction should be pure and unqualified. M. Necker did not the less persist in his opinion, and made a display of his opposition to his colleagues by a memorial which he published with the king's consent."—*Annals*, vol. ii. p. 476.]

to me by the constitutional act of the state, in maintaining the constitution decreed by the National Assembly and accepted by me." Whilst the king thus spoke, the queen, impelled by the general impulse, took in her arms the august infant, the heir to the throne, and, from the rails of the balcony in which she stood, showed him to the assembled nation. At this sight, rapturous shouts of satisfaction, love, and enthusiasm, were directed towards the mother and the child, and all hearts were theirs. It was at this very instant that all France, collected in the chief towns of the eighty-three departments, took the same oath to love the king who loved them. At such a time, hatred itself was softened, the exclusiveness of pride laid aside, and all were happy at the common bliss, and felt dignified in the common dignity. Alas! wherefore are the deep-seated pleasures of concord so soon forgotten?

This august ceremony being completed, the procession re-formed and resumed its march, the people giving way to unequivocal expressions of delight. The rejoicings lasted several days. A general review of the federalists afterwards took place; sixty thousand men under arms presented a most imposing spectacle, at once military and national. In the evening, Paris gave an appropriate entertainment. The chief places of resort were the Champs-Elysées and the Bastille. Upon the site of that ancient prison, then converted into a square, was to be read this phrase, "*Dancing here.*" Brilliant lustres, ranged in circlets, supplied the light of day. The rich had been prohibited from disturbing this peaceable fête by the use of carriages. Every one was to render himself of the people, and feel happy at being so. The Champs-Elysées presented a touching scene; a vast concourse in motion, without noise, or tumult, or rivalry, or discord. All classes, mixing freely together, promenaded under a soft artificial light, all hilarity and cheerfulness at the auspicious union. Thus, even in the heart of this our worn-out and selfish civilisation, the times of primitive fraternity seemed to have returned.

The federalists, after having witnessed the imposing aspect of the National Assembly in debate, the ceremonious pomp of the court, the magnificent wonders of Paris, and receiving ocular testimony of the virtues of the king, to whom they were all presented, and from whom they heard nothing but affecting expressions of benevolence, returned to their own homes in transports of rapture, and full of patriotic sentiments and illusions. After so many deplorable scenes, and when entering on so many still more terrible, the historian pauses with pleasure on these too fugitive hours, when all hearts beat with but one emotion, ardour for the public welfare.*

* I have already quoted some passages from the Memoirs of Ferrières, relative to the opening sitting of the states-general. As nothing is more important than to verify the real sentiments which the revolution evoked in men, I feel called upon to give the description of the federation by that same Ferrières. By his words it may be judged whether the enthusiasm were genuine, whether it were communicative, and whether that revolution were so hideous as it has been represented.

"In the mean time the federalists arrived from all parts of the kingdom. They were received at private houses, the owners of which vied with each other in furnishing beds, linen, wood, and all that might contribute to render agreeable and comfortable their residence in the metropolis. The municipality took measures proper to prevent so great an influx of strangers disturbing public tranquillity. Twelve thousand labourers worked without ceasing on preparations in the Champ de Mars. However great the activity displayed, the work advanced but slowly. Fears were entertained that it could not be finished for the 14th July, the day irrevocably fixed for the ceremony, because it was the anniversary of the insurrection of Paris and the capture of the Bastille. In this predicament, the districts invited good citizens, in the name of the country, to assist the labourers. This civic invitation electrified the imaginations of all; women partook and propagated the enthusiasm; seminarists, scholars, nuns, monks, grown old in solitude, were seen to quit their cloisters and speed

The festival of the federation, however imposing, left nevertheless but a transient emotion. The next day to the Champ de Mars, with spades on their shoulders, and bearing banners ornamented with patriotic emblems. There, all the citizens, promiscuously amalgamated, formed a vast and moving workshop, every point of which presented a varied group; the dishevelled courtesan strove by the side of the fastidious prude, the capuchin carried a bucket with the chevalier of St Louis, the porter with the exquisite of the Palais Royal, the brawny fish-woman wheeled a barrow filled by the elegant and perfumed damsel; the rich, the indigent, the well-attired, the tattered, the old, the adolescent, players, Swiss-guards, clerks, at labour or at rest, actors or spectators, offered to the astonished eye a scene replete with life and animation; taverns moved on wheels, portable shops, increased the charm and gaiety of the vast and ravishing picture; songs, shouts of joy, the beating of drums, the clang of martial music, the noise of pickaxes and of wheelbarrows, the voices of the labourers calling to and encouraging each other—the soul felt oppressed beneath the weight of a delicious intoxication, at sight of a people actuated by the gentle emotions of a primitive fraternity. When nine o'clock struck, the groups separated. Each citizen repaired to the place where his section was stationed, and rejoined his family and his acquaintances. The bands began their march to the sound of drums, returned to Paris, preceded by torches, spouting from time to time sarcasms against the the aristocrats, and singing the famous *Ca ira.*

At length the 14th July, the day of the federation, arrived, amid the hopes of some, the alarms and terrors of others. If that great ceremony had not the serious and august character of a festival at once national and religious, a character almost irreconcileable with French feeling, it presented those agreeable and lively features of joy and enthusiasm which are a thousand times more touching. The federalists, drawn up by departments, under eighty-three banners, started from the site of the Bastille; the deputies from the army and the marines, the Parisian national guard, drums, bands of music, the flags of the sections, led and closed the march.

The federalists traversed the streets St Martin, St Denis, St Honoré, and proceeded by the Cours-la-Reine to a bridge of boats laid across the river. They were greeted on the way by the acclamations of an immense multitude, thronging the streets, the windows, and the quays. The rain, which fell in torrents, neither deranged nor stayed the procession. The federalists, steeped in rain and perspiration, danced farandolas, and shouted, 'Long live our brethren of Paris!' The spectators handed them from the windows wine, hams, fruit, sweetmeats, and loaded them with benedictions. The National Assembly joined the procession at the Place Louis XV., and took their station between the battalion of veterans and that of the young pupils of the country—an expressive idea, which seemed to unite with it all ages and all interests.

The road which conducted to the Champ de Mars was covered with people, who clapped their hands, and chanted the *Ca ira.* The quay de Chaillot and the heights of Passy presented a long amphitheatre, in which the elegance of form and apparel, the charms and the graces of the women, enchanted and bewildered the eye, allowing it no resting-place or excuse for preference. The rain continued to fall, but no one seemed to perceive it: French gaiety triumphed over the bad weather, the bad roads, and the fatiguing length of the march.

M. de Lafayette, mounted on a superb charger, and surrounded by his aides-de-camp, gave orders, and received the homage of the people and the federalists. Perspiration rolled down his visage. A man, whom none knew, pierced the crowd, and came forward, holding a bottle in one hand and a glass in the other: 'My general,' said he, 'you are warm—drink!' The man raised his bottle, filled a large glass, and presented it to M. de Lafayette. The general received the glass, looked at the unknown for a moment, and swallowed the wine at a draught. The people applauded. Lafayette cast a smile of complacence and confidence upon the multitude, seeming to express: 'I will never conceive any suspicion, I will never have any disquieting apprehensions, so long as I am in the midst of you.'

Meanwhile, more than three hundred thousand people, male and female, from Paris and the environs, congregated since six in the morning on the Champ de Mars, seated on steps of turf forming an immense circle, drenched, bespattered, opposing parasols to the watery torrent descending upon them, drying their dripping countenances on the least glimpse of sunshine, and adjusting their head-dresses, awaited with laughter and small-talk the federalists and the National Assembly. A vast amphitheatre had been erected for the king, the royal family, the ambassadors, and the deputies. The federalists who arrived first began to dance farandolas; those who followed joined in the

passions were as urgent as the day before, and the war began again. Trifling disputes with the ministry recurred to keep the spirit of strife alive. Complaints were made that a passage had been allowed to the Austrian troops in their march to the district of Liege. Saint-Priest was accused of having connived at the flight of several persons accused of counter-revolutionary plots. The court, in return, had caused to be inscribed on the order of the day the proceedings commenced at the Châtelet against the authors of the 5th and 6th October. The Duke of Orleans and Mirabeau found themselves implicated therein. That singular inquisition, several times abandoned and resumed, gave palpable token of the various influences by which it had been instigated. It exhibited a huge contradictory mass of evidence, and warranted no charge of any weight against the two accused principals. The court, after concluding a reconciliation with Mirabeau, had not pursued any fixed plan regarding him. It evinced, by alternate starts, a disposition to approximate with or withdraw from him, and at the most, sought to silence him rather than to follow his counsels. In renewing the process concerning the 5th and 6th October, it was not he whom the court attacked, but the Duke of Orleans, who had been greatly applauded since his return from London, and whom it had harshly repulsed when he expressed a wish to regain the favour of the king.* Chabroud was appointed to draw up the report to the assembly, whereby it might judge whether or not there were grounds for an impeachment. The court desired that Mirabeau should preserve silence, and abandon the Duke of Orleans, against whom alone its rancour was excited. Nevertheless, he mounted the tribune, and showed how ridiculous were the imputations against him. He was accused of having apprised Mounier that Paris was marching on Versailles, and adding these words: "We must have a king, but it is of little moment whether he be Louis XVI. or Louis XVII!" likewise of having gone through the regiment of Flanders, sword in hand, and of exclaiming, on the sudden departure of the Duke of Orleans: "This —— is not worth the trouble that is taken about him." Nothing could be more childish than such complaints. Mirabeau did not fail to exhibit all their weakness and absurdity with his accustomed force; he said but a few words on the matter as it affected the Duke of

amusement, and formed a ring which soon embraced a large portion of the Champ de Mars. Here was a spectacle worthy the philosophic observer—a prodigious crowd of men, from the most distant parts of France, moved by the impulse of the national character, banishing all remembrance of the past, all idea of the present, all fear of the future, giving way to a buoyant carelessness; and three hundred thousand spectators, of every age and sex, following their movements, beating time with their fingers, oblivious of the rain, of hunger, of the tedium of long expectation. At length, the entire procession having passed into the field, the dance ceased, and each federalist rejoined his standard. The Bishop of Autun prepared to celebrate mass at an altar of antique form, erected in the middle of the field. Three hundred priests, in white surplices, relieved by wide tri-coloured sashes, ranged themselves on the four sides of the altar. The Bishop of Autun pronounced a benediction on the Oriflamme and the eighty-three banners; then he chanted the *Te Deum*. Twelve hundred musicians executed this anthem. Lafayette, at the head of the staff of the Parisian militia and of the deputies from the army and navy, ascended the altar and swore, on behalf of the troops and the federalists, to be faithful to the nation, the law, and the king. A discharge of four pieces of ordnance announced this solemn oath to France. The twelve hundred musicians rent the air with martial tunes; the flags and banners waved; the drawn swords glittered in the sun. The president of the National Assembly repeated the same oath. The people and the deputies responded in shouts of '*I swear!*' Then the king arose, and pronounced in a loud voice these words: '*I, King of the French, swear to use the power delegated to me by the constitutional act of the state, in maintaining the constitution decreed by the National Assembly and accepted by me.*' The queen took the dauphin in her arms, presented him to the people, and said, 'Behold my son!—he joins, as well as myself, in those sentiments.' This unexpected proceeding was the signal for a thousand shouts of 'Long live the king! Long live the queen! Long live the dauphin!' The guns continued to mingle their majestic roar with the warlike strains of the military instruments and the acclamations of the people. The weather had cleared up; the sun shone in all his splendour; it seemed as if the Eternal himself desired to witness this mutual engagement, and ratify it by his sanction. Yes: He saw it! He heard it!—and the frightful evils which, since that day, have not ceased to desolate France, oh Providence, omniscient and just! are the merited punishments of perjury. Thou hast stricken both the monarch and the subjects who have violated their oaths!

The enthusiasm and rejoicings were not limited to the day of the federation. There was a continued series of feasts, balls, and amusements, during the stay of the federalists in Paris. The Champ de Mars was again visited by crowds, who there drank, and sang, and danced. M. de Lafayette reviewed a part of the national guard from the departments, and of the army of the line. The king, the queen, and the dauphin, were present at this review, and were hailed with acclamations. The queen, with a graceful air, presented her hand to be kissed by the federalists, and showed the dauphin to them. Before quitting the capital, the federalists went to pay their respects to the king; all testified towards him the profoundest reverence, the most perfect devotion. The leader of the Bretons kneeled and presented his sword to Louis XVI., saying to him—'Sire, I deliver to you the sword of your faithful Bretons, pure and unsullied; it will be stained only with the blood of your enemies.' 'This sword cannot be in better hands than in those of my beloved Bretons,' answered the king, raising the leader of the Bretons and returning him his sword; 'I have never doubted their love and fidelity; assure them that I am the father, the brother, the friend of all Frenchmen.' The king, greatly affected, pressed the hand of the Breton leader, and embraced him. A mutual emotion prolonged for some seconds this touching scene. The Breton first found words. 'Sire,' said he, 'all Frenchmen, if I judge them by our hearts, cherish you, and ever will cherish you, because you are a citizen king.'

The municipality of Paris likewise determined to give a fête to the federalists. There were aquatic contests on the river, fireworks, an illumination, a ball and supper in the corn-market, and a ball on the site of the Bastille. At the entrance to the enclosure were inscribed in large characters, '*Dancing here;*' a happy motto, contrasting in a striking manner with the old ideas of horror and despair which the recollection of that odious prison suggested. The people moved to and fro from one scene of entertainment to the other, without annoyance or interruption. The police, by prohibiting the driving of carriages, prevented the accidents so common in public rejoicings, and also the tumultuous clatter of horses, wheels, and cries of 'Take care;' a noise which fatigues and stupifies the citizens, makes them fear every instant to be crushed, and gives the most brilliant and best-ordered festival the appearance of a flight. Public festivals are essentially for the people. It is they alone who ought to be attended to. If the rich wish to partake their pleasures, let them become part of the people on that day; they will imbibe unknown sensations, and not disturb the joy of their fellow-citizens.

It was at the Champs-Elysées that sentimental men enjoyed with the greatest satisfaction this delightful popular festival. Strings of lights hung on all the trees, garlands of small lamps connected them together, pyramids of flame, placed at regular distances, shed a clear brilliancy, which the towering mass of the surrounding gloom rendered more dazzling from contrast. The people filled the avenues and the lawns. The citizen, seated with his wife, and encompassed by his children, ate, talked, laughed, took a promenade, and exquisitely felt the charms of existence Here were young girls and boys dancing to the music of several orchestras stationed on the slopes, which had been railed off for the purpose. A little farther, some sailors, in close jackets and drawers, surrounded by numerous groups, regarding them with curious interest, were endeavouring to climb up high poles rubbed with soap, to gain a prize awarded to him who should succeed in bringing away a tri-coloured flag affixed to the summit. It was worth hearing the shouts of laughter provoked by those who were compelled to abandon the enterprise, and the words of encouragement given to those who, with more skill or fortune, seemed likely to attain the object. A mild and contemplative cheerfulness, spread over all countenances, sparkling in all eyes, pourtrayed, as it were, the quiet bliss of happy shades in the Elysian fields of the ancients. The white garments of numberless females, meandering under the foliage of the avenues, served to strengthen the illusion."—*Ferrières*, vol. ii. p. 89.

* See the Memoirs of Bouille.

Orleans, and exclaimed, as he concluded—"Yes! the secret of this infernal inquisition is at length discovered: it is altogether *there* (pointing to the right side); it is for behoof of those whose testimonies and calumnies have formed its groundwork; it is in the resources it has furnished to the enemies of the revolution; it is in the malevolence of judges, such as will be ere long marked in history by a just and implacable vengeance!"

Acclamations accompanied Mirabeau to his seat; the two inculpated persons were declared free from accusation by the assembly, and the court incurred the disgrace of an abortive enterprise.*

The principles of the revolution were destined to be universally developed, as well in the army as amongst the people. That army, the last prop of absolutism, was also the last object of alarm to the popular party. All the military officers were enemies of the revolution, because, having an exclusive right to rank and promotion, they perceived with disgust merit admitted to competition with them. By an opposite tendency, the soldiers were favourable to the new order of things, although, doubtless, hatred of discipline and expectation of increased pay, operated as powerfully upon them as the spirit of liberty. A dangerous insubordination was manifested throughout almost the entire army. The infantry especially, probably from its mingling more with the people, and having less military pride than the cavalry, was in a state of complete insurrection. Bouillé, seeing with grief his army slipping from his control, employed all possible means to stop this revolutionary contagion. He had received from Latour-du-Pin, minister of war, the most extensive powers, of which he took advantage to keep his troops perpetually shifting quarters, so as to prevent their forming familiar associations with the people, by long residence in the same place. He expressly prohibited them from attending clubs, and, in short, neglected no precaution to maintain military obedience. He himself, after a lengthened resistance, had ultimately taken the oath to the constitution; and as his honour was of the purest order, he appeared from that moment to have deliberately resolved to be faithful to the king and the constitution. His repugnance towards Lafayette, to whose disinterestedness he could not be insensible, was overcome, and he evinced greater readiness to unite with him. The national guards, in the vast district he commanded, had wished to nominate him their general; he had refused the offer in his earlier captiousness, and had afterwards cause for regret when he reflected upon the good he might have been enabled, by such a position, to have effected. In the mean time, in spite of certain denunciations at the clubs, Bouillé still held a high place in popular estimation.

The spirit of revolt displayed itself openly first at Metz. The soldiers imprisoned their officers, seized the flags and military chest, and even attempted to levy a contribution on the municipality. Bouillé exposed himself to the most imminent danger, and succeeded in repressing the sedition. Shortly afterwards, a similar revolt broke out at Nanci. Some Swiss regiments took part in it, and there were substantial grounds for fearing, if this example were followed, that the whole kingdom would soon be at the mercy, and delivered up a prey to the combined excesses, of the soldiery and the populace. The assembly itself trembled at the prospect. An officer was ordered to put in force the decree passed against the rebels. He was unable to procure its execution, and Bouillé received orders to march upon Nanci, in order that the power of the law might be vindicated. He had but a small body of soldiers upon whom he could implicitly rely. Fortunately, the troops formerly in revolt at Metz, feeling deeply humiliated that he did not venture to trust them, demanded to be led against the insurgents. The national guards likewise offered their services; and Bouillé advanced upon Nanci with these united forces, and a moderately numerous cavalry. His position was one of considerable embarrassment, because he could not bring his cavalry into effective action, and his infantry was not sufficient to attack the rebels aided by the populace. However, he addressed these infatuated men with great firmness, and succeeded in awing them into submission. They were on the point of laying down their arms, and leaving the town in conformity with his orders, when some shots were fired, from which side is unknown; and thereupon an engagement was inevitable. The troops under Bouillé, believing themselves exposed to treachery, fought with the greatest ardour; but an obstinate resistance was maintained, and they had to force their way step by step under a murderous fire. (31st August.) Master at last of the principal defences, Bouillé obtained the surrender of the regiments, and made them quit the town. He delivered from their incarceration the officers and magistrates, caused the ringleaders to be picked out, and handed them over to the National Assembly.

This success diffused a general joy, and lulled the fears that had been entertained for the tranquillity of the kingdom. Bouillé received from the king and the assembly congratulations and eulogies. At a subsequent period he was calumniated, and his conduct accused of cruelty. It was, nevertheless, quite irreproachable, and was universally applauded as such at the time. The king enlarged the limits of his command, which then became very considerable, for it reached from Switzerland to the Sambre, and comprehended the greatest portion of the frontier. Bouillé, placing greater reliance on cavalry than on infantry, chose for his cantonment the banks of the Seille, which falls into the Moselle; he had there wide plains to exercise his cavalry, forage to support it, places of sufficient strength to intrench behind, and above all, a scanty population to fear. He was determined not to attempt any thing against the constitution; but he was doubtful of the patriots, and took his measures for affording succour to the king if circumstances should render it necessary.

And now the assembly, having abolished the parliaments, instituted juries, and suppressed guilds, was preparing to make a new emission of assignats. The possessions of the clergy composing an enormous capital, and the assignats being the means by which that capital was made disposable, it was natural it should employ them. All the old objections were started with yet greater vehemence; the Bishop of Autun himself declared against this new issue, and foretold, with sagacious prescience, all the financial results of such a measure.* Mirabeau, looking principally at

* [It is amusing to read Bertrand's version of Mirabeau's speech on this occasion. He says: "Mirabeau then spoke and pleaded his own cause with the most arrogant confidence. According to him, the Châtelet and the witnesses were the only persons guilty in this affair, and he swore to pursue the authors of it *to the grave*. This blustering, as ridiculous as it was indecent, obtained the most lively applause. To overturn the depositions which accused him of having, at five in the afternoon of the 5th October, ran through the ranks of the regiment of Flanders, sword in hand, he referred to a deposition of a witness examined in the proceedings (De la Motte, 43th witness), who had said that the man seen in the ranks was M. de Gamaches, and that his person very much resembled Mirabeau's. He also adduced the testimony of M. de la Marck, a member of the assembly, at whose house he had passed the whole afternoon. 'Thus,' said he, 'all things being duly weighed and considered, the proceedings have in reality nothing unpleasant upon this head, but as they attack M. de Gamaches, who finds himself judicially and vehemently suspected of being very ugly, from his resemblance to me.' This expression, and that which I mentioned before, suffice to give a just idea of the style of Mirabeau's defence."—*Annals*, vol. iii. p. 116.]

* M. de Talleyrand (the Bishop of Autun) predicted in a very striking manner the financial consequences of the paper-money. In his speech on that question, he first enters into the nature

its political results, argued strenuously for its adoption, and succeeded. Eight hundred millions of assignats were decreed, and upon this occasion it was decided that they should not bear interest. It was preposterous, in fact, to allow interest upon an actual currency. It may be granted upon obligations which cannot circulate, but remain idle in the hands of the possessor, for nothing can be more proper; but to attach it to issues which become veritable acquittances by their forced currency, was an error the assembly was not disposed to commit a second time. Necker opposed this new emission, and sent a memorial which was not listened to. Times were sadly changed for him; he was no longer the minister upon whose restoration to office the people rested their hopes of happiness but a year before. Wanting the confidence of the king, at war with all his colleagues, except Montmorin, he was disregarded by the assembly, and treated with less consideration than he certainly had a right to receive. The misfortune of Necker was his belief in the sufficiency of reason in all cases, and that its demonstration, with an admixture of sentiment and logic, must of necessity triumph over the mulish stubbornness of aristocrats and the heated passions of patriots. Necker possessed that intellect which, with a certain haughtiness, sits in judgment upon, and censures the delusions of, passion; but he was deficient in that more lofty and less vain intellect, which stops not short at censuring, but knows how to mould them to its own suggestions. Thus, thrown into the midst of violent parties, he fretted all, but never curbed. Left without friends by the secession of Mounier and Lally, he had preserved only the useless Malouet He had irritated the assembly, by perpetually and reproachfully reminding it of the most embarrassing of all its cares, that of the finances; and he had furthermore incurred much ridicule by the manner in which he spoke of himself. His resignation was hailed with pleasure by all parties.* His carriage was arrested on the frontiers by that same people who had formerly drawn it in triumph, and an order of the assembly was required to procure him liberty to proceed into Switzerland. It was immediately granted; and he retired to Coppet, to contemplate at a distance a revolution which he was more fitted to observe than lead.†

The ministry was reduced to a nullity as complete as the king himself, and devoted itself, as the extent

of that money, characterises it with admirable precision, and unfolds the reasons of its early depreciation.

"Will the assembly order," said he, "an emission of two thousand millions of assignats? You judge of this second emission by the success of the first; but you close your eyes to the fact that the wants of commerce, slackened by the revolution, were calculated to have quickly absorbed our first conventional currency; and those wants were such, that, in my opinion, commerce would have adopted that medium of circulation even had it not been forced. To adduce this first success, which, after all, has not been complete, since the assignats are losing value, in favour of a second and much larger emission, is a course full of delusion and danger; for the empire of the law has its limits, and those limits are expressed by the interest which men have to respect or infringe it.

The assignats will unquestionably possess characteristics of safety which no paper-money ever previously possessed; none has ever been founded upon a pledge equally valuable, invested with an hypothecation of equal solidity; all this I am far from denying. The assignat, considered as an obligation of debt, has a positive and material value; that value being precisely the same as that of the domain it represents; but at the same time it must be borne in mind that no national paper ever circulated on a par with specie; the secondary emblem of the original representative emblem of wealth can never have the precise value of its model; the very obligation confesses the exigency, and exigency bears alarm and distrust as inherent concomitants.

Why will the paper-money always be below the precious metals in value? In the first place, because doubts will always exist as to the exact relation between the mass of assignats and that of the national domains; because there will be a protracted uncertainty as to the consummation of sales; because it is not to be predicated when two thousand millions of assignats, representing nearly the value of the domains, will be cancelled; because, specie being brought into competition with paper, both the one and the other become merchandise, and the more abundantly an article of merchandise is supplied, the more it sinks in price; because with specie it will be always possible to dispense with assignats, whilst it will be impossible with assignats to do without specie; and fortunately the absolute occasion for specie will preserve some portion in circulation, for the most dreadful of all evils would be its complete disappearance."

The orator subsequently added:

"The creation of an assignat currency is assuredly not to supply an equivalent for an intrinsically valuable commodity, but simply a substitute for a metallic currency. Now, a substance invested with the character of money cannot, whatever ideas may be attached to it, represent that which is at once money and commodity. An assignat currency, therefore, however safe, however solid it may be, is an abstraction of the metallic currency; it is but the free or enforced emblem, not of wealth, but simply of credit. It follows, as a necessary deduction, that to give paper the functions of money, by rendering it, like other convertible mediums, an agent for all operations of exchange, is to alter the quantity recognised as unity, or, as it is called in this matter, the *standard of value;* it is to effect in a moment what ages scarcely effect in a state gathering wealth; and if, to borrow the expression of a learned foreigner, money performs the same functions with regard to the value of commodities as degrees, minutes, and seconds, with regard to angles, or scales with regard to geographical charts or plans of any sort, I ask, what must be the result of this alteration in the common standard?"

After having shown the nature of this new currency, M. de Talleyrand foretells, with singular precision, the confusion that must ensue from it in private transactions:—

"But let us follow the assignats in their progress, and see what course they are destined to describe. The creditor thus paid will have to purchase domains with his assignats, or he will keep them, or he will employ them in other objects of acquisition. If he buys domains, then your views will be accomplished; and I will join you in applauding the creation of assignats, because they will not be forced into circulation—because, in fact, they will have merely effected what I propose you should give the public obligations, the faculty of being exchanged for the public domains. But if this creditor, in his distrust, prefers to lose interest by retaining an unproductive obligation; if he converts assignats into specie to hoard, or into foreign bills to transport; if instances of the latter operations should be more numerous than of the first; if, in a word, the assignats linger long in the circulation before falling into the exchequer to be cancelled; if they come forcibly and remain in the hands of men obliged to receive them at par, and who, owing nothing, can only make use of them at a sacrifice; if they are the cause of a great injustice perpetrated by all debtors towards former creditors, in paying assignats at the exchangeable value of specie, whilst they belie the amount they express, as it will be impossible to compel venders to take them at the metallic par, or, in other words, without raising the price of their articles on account of the depreciation of assignats—how much in such cases will this ingenious operation deceive the patriotism of those whose sagacity has conceived it, and whose sincere conviction upholds it; and to what inconsolable regrets shall we not be condemned?"

It cannot, therefore, be said that the Constituent Assembly was completely in the dark as to the possible consequences of its measures; but to these warnings one of those answers might have been opposed which are never hazarded at the moment, but which would be decisive, and which become so in the end; this answer was necessity—the necessity of providing for financial exigencies, and of dividing the national domains.

* [Necker resigned on the 4th September.]

† ["Necker, whom the recollection of his old ascendancy perpetually haunted, addressed memorials to the assembly, in which he combated its decrees, and complacently offered his advice. That minister could not accommodate himself to a secondary part; he refused to follow the expeditious plans of the assembly, which were so diametrically opposed to his ideas of successive reforms. At length, convinced or weary of the inutility of his exhortations, Necker departed from Paris, after giving in his resignation on the 4th September 1790, and he passed in obscurity through those provinces which a year before he had traversed as a triumphant hero. In revolutions men are easily forgotten, because the people have many before their eyes, and numberless events are crowded into little time—people live quick at such eras."—*Mignet*, vol. i. p. 140.]

of its action, to intrigues either useless or culpable. Saint-Priest corresponded with the emigrants; Latour-du-Pin gave way to all the desires of the military leaders; and Montmorin, enjoying the esteem of the court, had none of its confidence, and was employed in intrigues with the chief popular deputies, with whom his moderation brought him in relation. The ministers were all denounced on the occasion of fresh outbreaks. "I likewise," exclaimed Cazalès, "would denounce them, if it were generous to attack men so thoroughly weak; I would accuse the minister of finances for not having explained to the assembly the veritable resources of the kingdom, and for not taking measures to direct a revolution which he had incited; I would accuse the minister at war for having suffered the army to fall into disorganisation, and the minister of the interior for not having made the king's orders be obeyed—all of them, in short, for their utter incompetence, and their treacherous counsels to the king." Inertness is a high crime in the eyes of parties eager to attain their object; and accordingly the right side condemned the ministers, not for what they had done, but for what they had left undone. And yet Cazalès and his party, though overwhelming them with reproaches, opposed an address to the king for their removal, for they regarded it as an invasion of the royal prerogative. This dismissal was not demanded, but they successively gave in their resignations, except Montmorin, who alone maintained his office. Duport-du-Tertre, a simple advocate, was appointed keeper of the seals. Duportail, recommended to the king by Lafayette, replaced Latour-du-Pin in the war department, and exhibited a more favourable bias towards the popular party. One of the measures he took was to deprive Bouillé of the uncontrolled license he permitted himself in his command, and particularly of the power to displace the troops at his own will—a power much exercised by Bouillé, as we have already observed, to prevent the soldiers from fraternising with the people.

The king had pondered deeply on the history of the English Revolution. The fate of Charles I. had always particularly affected him, and he could not divest himself of certain gloomy presentiments. He had especially reflected that the motive for the condemnation of Charles was his having excited civil war. He had thus contracted an invincible repugnance for all measures calculated to provoke the effusion of blood; and had constantly opposed all the projects for flight suggested by the queen and the court.

During the summer of 1790, passed at St Cloud, he might have fled, but he was always disinclined to hear the proposal mooted. The friends of the constitution were as apprehensive as he of a measure which seemed certain to result in civil war. The aristocrats alone were strenuous for its adoption, because they flattered themselves that, rendered masters of the king by his removal from the assembly, they would govern in his name, and return with him at the head of a foreign army, little reflecting that they would but follow in its train. The aristocrats were possibly accompanied in their wishes by certain minds more rapid in conclusions, which already began to consider the feasibility of a republic, a thing as yet unthought of; the name of which had never been mentioned, unless by the queen in her passionate gusts against Lafayette and the assembly, whom she was wont to accuse of aiming at that object with all their might. Lafayette, as leader of the constitutional force, and of all the sincere friends of rational liberty, watched with unremitting zeal over the person of the monarch. The two ideas, the withdrawal of the king and civil war, had been so intimately associated in all minds from the commencement of the revolution, that the first event was universally regarded as the harbinger of the greatest calamity that can befall a nation.

However, the dismissal of the ministry, which, if it had not possessed the confidence of Louis XVI., was at least his own choice, irritated him against the assembly, and raised fears in his mind of the complete prostration of the executive power. The fresh debates on religion, which the hypocrisy of the clergy originated on the subject of their civil constitution, alarmed his timorous conscience, and serious thoughts of flight began to occupy his imagination. Towards the end of 1790, he wrote respecting it to Bouillé, who at first opposed the measure, but afterwards yielded, lest his zeal might seem suspicious to the unfortunate monarch. Mirabeau, on his part, had formed a plan for sustaining the cause of the monarchy. Although in constant communication with Montmorin, he had hitherto attempted nothing of serious moment, because the court, vacillating between foreign aid and the emigration on one hand, and the national party on the other, was really not disposed to be precipitate; and, perhaps, of all measures, feared that most which should submit it to a master so sincerely constitutional as Mirabeau. Nevertheless, it was upon a perfectly good understanding with him at this period. Every thing was promised him if he were successful, and all available resources were placed at his disposition. Talon, civil-lieutenant at the Châtelet, and Laporte, recently installed near the king's person as administrator of the civil list, had orders to communicate with him and aid in the execution of his plans. Mirabeau condemned the new constitution. For a monarchy it was, in his opinion, too democratical; and for a republic, there was one thing too much—a king. The popular agitation especially, which was always on the increase, operated on his mind, and he determined to arrest it. At Paris, against the sway of the multitude, and of an all-powerful assembly, no enterprise was feasible. He saw but one resource, which was to remove the king from Paris and fix him at Lyons. There the king would explain his views; he would energetically proclaim the reasons which induced him to condemn the new constitution, and would publish another, which was already framed. At the same moment, a first legislature would be convoked. Mirabeau, in corresponding by letter with the most popular members, had artfully succeeded in drawing from them all a disapproval of some particular provision in the actual constitution. By putting together these different avowals, the entire constitution was found to be condemned by its very authors.* He purposed appending them to the king's manifesto, in order to give it greater weight, and to demonstrate more fully the necessity for a new constitution. We are ignorant of all his means of execution; we are only aware that, through the police of Talon, the civil lieutenant, he had gained pamphleteers, and club and street orators; and that, through his extensive correspondence, he had reason to feel sure of thirty-six departments in the south. He unquestionably intended to avail himself of Bouillé's assistance, but he would not place

* It was not possible that, in a work collectively composed by a great number of individuals, there should be perfect uniformity of opinion. As unanimity prevailed only upon very few points, it follows that each article must have been disapproved by those who voted against it. Thus every clause in the constitution of 1791 must have had disapprovers amongst the very authors of that constitution; but, nevertheless, the whole was their real and incontestible work. What happened in this instance is inevitable as regards every deliberative body, and Mirabeau's manœuvre was but a trick. It may be even said that there was little honour in such a proceeding; but great allowances must be made for a powerful and reckless being, whom the morality of the end rendered very indifferent as to that of the means; I say designedly the morality of the end, for Mirabeau sincerely believed in the necessity of a modified constitution; and although his ambition, and his petty personal rivalries, greatly contributed to alienate him from the popular party, he was sincere in his detestation of anarchy. Others besides him feared the court and the aristocracy more than the people. Thus on all sides there were, according to positions, different apprehensions; and as genuine conviction changes with points of view, morality, that is to say, sincerity, is found equally in the most opposite parties.

himself at the mercy of that general. Whilst Bouillé was encamped at Montmedy, he designed that the king should remain at Lyons; and he himself, according to circumstances, would station himself at Paris or Lyons. A foreign prince, the friend of Mirabeau, saw Bouillé on the king's part, and communicated to him this project, but without the knowledge of Mirabeau,* who never thought of a retreat to Montmedy, whither the king subsequently proceeded. Bouillé, struck with the genius evinced by Mirabeau, declared that nothing should be omitted to make sure of such a man, and that, so far as he was concerned, he was ready to second him with all his power.

M. de Lafayette was unacquainted with this project. Although he was sincerely devoted to the person of the king, he enjoyed not the confidence of the court, and besides, he was viewed with envy by Mirabeau, who had no intention of giving himself such a comrade. Furthermore, M. de Lafayette was known to be favourable only to a straight course, and this plan was too unscrupulous, too apart from legal ways, to suit him. However, whether this were so or not, Mirabeau was determined to be the sole executor of his own plan, and, in fact, he conducted it quite alone during the winter of 1790-91. It is impossible to decide whether he would have succeeded; but it is certain that, although incapable of turning back the revolutionary torrent, he would at least have influenced its direction, and assuredly, without changing the inevitable result of a revolution such as the French, he would have modified its events by his powerful opposition. We may still be allowed to doubt whether, if he had succeeded in controlling the popular party, he would have been enabled to render himself master of the aristocracy and the court. One of his friends suggested to him this latter objection. "They have promised me all," said Mirabeau. "And if they should not keep their word?" "If they break their word, I will blow them into a republic."

The principal articles of the civil constitution of the clergy, such as the new limitations of dioceses, and the election of all the ecclesiastical functionaries, had been decreed. The king had referred them to the pope, who, after returning an answer in a mixed tone of severity and paternal mildness, had remitted the determination to the clergy of France. The clergy took advantage of this appeal, and raised a cry that the spiritual authority was compromised by the measures of the assembly. At the same time, they disseminated mandates, and declared that the deposed bishops would not retire from their sees unless by constraint and force; that they would hire houses and continue their ecclesiastical functions; and that those who remained true to their faith should attend only to them. The clergy prosecuted their intrigues especially in La Vendée, and in certain departments of the south, where they acted in concert with the emigrants. A federative camp was formed at Jallez,† where, under the alleged pretext of federations, the pretended federalists designed to establish a centre of opposition to the measures of the assembly. The popular party was greatly exasperated at these plots; and, resolute in its power, weary of its moderation, it determined to adopt a decisive step. We have already seen what motives influenced it in the enactment of the civil constitution. The authors of that constitution were the most sincere Christians in the assembly; and these, provoked at so unjust an opposition, resolved to vanquish it.

It has been already stated that an express decree obliged all public functionaries to take an oath to the new constitution. When the question concerning this civic oath was discussed, the clergy had strenuously laboured to establish a distinction between the political and the ecclesiastical constitution; nor had they stopped at that point. In the present case, the assembly resolved to exact a rigorous oath from the ecclesiastics, which should place them under the necessity either of retiring if they declined to take it, or of faithfully performing their pastoral functions if they took it. The assembly was careful to declare that it compassed no violence to consciences; that it would pay all respect to those who, believing that religion was injured by the new laws, were indisposed to take the oath; but that it was anxious to ascertain who were imbued with such ideas, in order that it might avoid intrusting to them the new bishoprics. In this respect, its declarations were just and candid. It subjoined to the decree, that those who refused to swear should be deprived of their functions and stipends; and furthermore, as an example to others, that all ecclesiastics who were deputies should take the oath in the assembly itself, within eight days after the sanction of the act.

The right side opposed the measure: Maury gave way to frantic violence, and laboured diligently to stimulate interruptions to his harangue, so that he might have grounds for publishing complaints. Alexander Lameth, who occupied the chair, preserved order whilst he spoke, and deprived him of the pleasure of being driven from the tribune. Mirabeau defended the assembly with greater eloquence than ever. "You," he exclaimed, "persecutors of religion! You who have paid it so noble and affecting an homage in the most illustrious of your decrees! you who consecrate to its service a public grant, when your justice and prudence rendered you so watchful of economy! you who have brought religion to interfere in the division of the kingdom, and who have planted the sign of the cross on the boundaries of all the departments! you, in fine, who acknowledge that God is as necessary to men as liberty!"

The assembly decreed the oath.* The king immediately referred it to the pope. The Archbishop of Aix, who had originally opposed the civil constitution, feeling now the urgent necessity for a pacification, joined the king and some of his more moderate colleagues in earnestly soliciting the pope to grant his consent. The emigrants at Turin, and the recusant bishops of France, wrote to Rome in an entirely opposite strain; and his holiness, under divers pretexts, withheld his determination. The assembly, irritated at these studied delays, insisted upon having the king's sanction; and he, though prepared to yield, put in use the ordinary devices of imbecility. He wished to have himself constrained, so as to appear acting without freedom. Consequently, he awaited a riot, and then hastened to give his sanction. The decree thus made law, the assembly resolved to put it into execution, and accordingly called upon its ecclesiastical members to take the oath within its walls. Then men and women, whose previous lives had manifested but a small regard for religion, suddenly commenced a movement to provoke the refusal of the ecclesiastics.†

* Bouillé, in his Memoirs, seems of opinion that it was on the part both of Mirabeau and the king that overtures were made to him. But it is a mistake. Mirabeau was ignorant of this double plot, and never thought of putting himself into the hands of Bouillé.

† This camp was formed in the early days of September.

* Decree of the 27th November.

† Ferrieres, an eye-witness of the intrigues of this period, relates those which were employed to prevent the oath of the priests. This account appears to me too characteristic not to be quoted.

"The bishops and the revolutionists agitated and intrigued, some to promote the taking of the oath, others to prevent its being taken. The two parties were sensible of the influence which the conduct pursued by the ecclesiastics in the assembly would have in the provinces. The bishops became on intimate terms with their clergy; devotees of both sexes were in active motion. Conversation in all societies turned only on the oath of the priests. It might have been thought that the destiny of France and the fate of all its inhabitants depended on the priestly adjuration or non-adjuration. Men of the greatest latitude in their religious opinions, women the most notorious for their dissolute manners,

Certain bishops and incumbents took the oath. The greater number resisted, with an affected resignation and an alleged attachment to principles. The assembly not the less persisted in the nomination of new bishops and incumbents, and was energetically aided by the departmental administrations. The old ecclesiastical functionaries had full liberty to celebrate worship where they chose, but those who were recognised by the state took possession of the churches. The dissenters hired the church of the Théatins at Paris to pursue their exercises. The assembly did not interfere, and the national guards protected them as much as possible against the fury of the populace, who were not always disposed to allow them the tranquil exercise of their isolated ministrations.

The assembly has been condemned for having occasioned this schism, and for having added a new cause of division to those which existed before. Now, first, with regard to its functions, it must appear evident to every impartial mind that the assembly did not exceed them when it legislated upon the temporalities of the church. Next, with regard to considerations of prudence, it assuredly added but partially to the difficulties of its position. And in fact, the court, the nobility, and the clergy, had lost, and the people gained, enough to become irreconcileable enemies, and for the revolution to take its inevitable course, even without the consequences of the new schism. Besides, when all abuses were destroyed, could the assembly suffer those of the old ecclesiastical organisation? Could it sanction lazy prelates living in abundance, whilst the really useful pastors had scarcely common necessaries?*

suddenly became austere theologians and ardent vindicators of the purity and integrity of the Roman faith. The *Journal de Fontenay*, the *Ami du Roi*, and the *Gazette de Durosoir*, employed their ordinary weapons, exaggeration, falsehood, calumny. A legion of pamphlets was disseminated, in which the civil constitution of the clergy was treated as schismatical, heretical, and destructive to religion. The devotees hawked these writings from house to house; they prayed, entreated, threatened, according to different feelings and characters. They showed to some the clergy triumphant, the assembly routed, the perjured ecclesiastics despoiled of their benefices, and shut up in houses of correction; and, on the other hand, the faithful ecclesiastics covered with glory, loaded with riches. The pope, said they, was about to hurl his thunders upon a sacrilegious assembly and upon apostate priests. The people, deprived of the sacraments, would rise, foreign powers would enter France, and this edifice of iniquity and abominations would crumble on its own foundations."—*Ferrières*, vol. ii. p. 198.

* ["In its desire to dissolve this clerical league, the assembly unwittingly strengthened it. If it had left the malecontent priests to themselves, regardless of their fumes, they would have failed in their machinations to rake up the elements of a religious war. But the assembly decreed that all ecclesiastics should swear fidelity '*to the nation, the law, and the king*,' and to maintain the civil constitution of the clergy. The refusal to take the oath was to be followed by the dismissal of the incumbents from their sees or benefices. The assembly expected that the dignified clergy, from self-interest, and the inferior clergy, from ambition, would yield to this measure. The bishops, on the other hand, anticipated that the whole ecclesiastical body would follow their example, and that if they refused to swear, they would leave the state without religious worship, and the people without ghostly comfort. The result was in accordance with the ideas of neither party. The majority of the bishops and priests in the assembly refused the oath, but some bishops and many priests took it. The dissenting incumbents were deprived, and the electors named successors to them, who received canonical institution from the Bishops of Autun and Lida. But the deprived ecclesiastics refused to surrender their functions, and proclaimed their successors intruders, the sacraments administered by them of no avail, and such Christians as ventured to recognise them under excommunication. They remained steadfast in their dioceses, issued mandates, and excited disobedience to the laws within them; and thus a mere affair of temporal interest became first of all an affair of religion, and afterwards one of party. There were thenceforth two orders of clergy, the constitutional and the refractory; and they had each their sectaries, and stigmatised each other as rebels and heretics. Religion became, according to the passions and interests of parties, an instrument or an incumbrance; and if the priests made fanatics, the revolutionists made infidels. The people, whom that evil of the upper classes had not previously infected, abandoned, especially in the towns, the faith of their fathers, on account of the imprudence of those who forced them to choose between the revolution and their creed. 'The bishops,' says the Marquis de Ferrières, whose censure cannot be suspected, 'refused to listen to any arrangements; and by their culpable intrigues blocked up every avenue to conciliation, sacrificing the Catholic religion to an insane obstinacy and a disgraceful love of riches.'"—*Mignet*, vol. i. pp. 143, 144.]

CHAPTER VI.

PROGRESS OF THE EMIGRATION—DEATH OF MIRABEAU—FLIGHT OF THE KING, AND HIS CAPTURE—DECLARATION OF PILNITZ—TERMINATION OF THE CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY.

The long and final struggle between the national party and the privileged order of the clergy, the principal circumstances of which we have just related, resulted in an universal discord. Whilst the clergy stirred up the provinces of the west and the south, the refugees at Turin made various demonstrations, which their weakness and divisions rendered futile. A conspiracy was attempted at Lyons. The arrival of the princes was announced, and a profuse distribution of largesses; promises were even made that Lyons should become the capital of the kingdom, instead of Paris, which had deserved so ill of the court. The king was informed of these intrigues, and not very sanguine of their success, perhaps not too anxious for it; since he might rationally despair of controlling the victorious aristocracy, he did all he could to defeat them. This conspiracy was unmasked at the end of 1790, and its principal agents delivered over to the tribunals. This last reverse decided the emigrants to remove from Turin to Coblentz, where they established themselves in the territory of the Elector of Treves, to the no small diminution of his authority, which they entirely usurped. We have already seen that the members of the nobility in emigration were divided into two parties; the one (comprising old servants, feeding on bounty, and composing what was called the court, who were not at all inclined to grant a participation of influence to the provincial nobility, even whilst they accepted their aid) regarded the appeal to foreigners as the only feasible resource; the other, formed of men who relied more upon their own swords, looked to a rising in the southern provinces, by stimulating fanaticism, as the advisable course to be pursued. The first party prevailed, and a move to Coblentz ensued, where, upon the northern frontier, the march of the powers was awaited. It was in vain that those who desired to combat in the south had insisted upon the expediency of calling to their aid Piedmont, Switzerland, and Spain, faithful and disinterested allies, and of leaving in the immediate neighbourhood of those powers some distinguished leader. The aristocracy which Calonne ruled would not listen to them. That aristocracy had not changed on quitting France; frivolous, haughty, incapable, and prodigal, at Coblentz as at Versailles, it made its vices only the more prominent amid the difficulties of exile and civil war. "You need *burgher* in your commissions," it answered to those intrepid men who offered to fight in the south, and who asked under what title they were to serve.* Only some

* M. Froment relates the following fact in his work already quoted:—

"Under these circumstances, the princes projected the formation in the interior of the kingdom, as early as they could effect it, of legions composed of all the faithful subjects of the king, to be used until the troops of the line were entirely re-organised. Desirous of being at the head of the royalists whom I had directed and commanded in 1789 and 1790, I wrote to the Count d'Artois, to entreat his royal highness to grant me a commission of lieutenant-colonel, framed in such terms that every royalist who, like me, should collect under his orders a sufficient number of

subaltern agents were left at Turin, who, a prey to mutual jealousies, passed their time in recriminations, and thwarting every chance of success. The Prince of Condé, who seemed to have inherited all the energy of his race, was not in favour with a certain portion of the nobility; he stationed himself near the Rhine, with all those who, like himself, were more disposed to fight than intrigue.

The emigration became every day more considerable, and the roads were covered with nobles, who seemed to think they fulfilled a sacred duty in flying to take arms against their country. Women even thought it necessary to testify their abhorrence of the revolution by abandoning the soil of France. In a nation where every thing is done by impulse, emigration became the rage; farewells were scarcely taken, so prevalent was the idea that the journey would be short, and the return speedy. The revolutionists of Holland, betrayed by their general and abandoned by their allies, had succumbed in a few days; those of Brabant had not held out much longer; consequently, according to the deductions of these short-sighted emigrants, the French revolution was sure to be subdued in one short campaign, and absolute power flourish once more over enslaved France.

The assembly, more irritated than alarmed at their presumption, had projected measures, but they had always been postponed. The king's aunts, finding their consciences troubled at Paris, deemed it essential to seek salvation under the wing of the pope. They departed for Rome (19th February 1791), and were stopped on the route by the municipality of Arnay-le-Duc. The people immediately flocked to the residence of Monsieur, who was said to be on the eve of flight. Monsieur came forward, and promised not to abandon the king. The people were satisfied, and the assembly entered into deliberation upon the departure of the king's aunts. A long debate ensued, which Menou terminated by a witty remark: "Europe," said he, "will be much astonished, when it learns that an august assembly has consumed several days in deciding whether two old women should hear mass at Rome or at Paris." The committee on the constitution, however, was instructed to present a law as to the residence of public functionaries and as to emigration. This decree, adopted after violent discussions, obliged public functionaries to reside in the seat of their functions. The king, as the highest of all, was bound not to remove from the legislative body during each session, and at all other times not to go beyond the limits of the kingdom. In case of this law being violated, the penalty upon all functionaries was deprivation. A separate decree upon emigration was left to the committee.

loyal citizens to compose a legion, might flatter himself with obtaining the same rank. The Count d'Artois approved of my suggestion, and listened favourably to my request; but the members of the council were not of his opinion; they thought it so strange that a burgher should pretend to a military commission, that one of them said to me with disdain, '*Why don't you ask for a bishopric?*' I replied to the speaker by a burst of laughter, which somewhat disconcerted his gravity. However, the question was again debated at M. de Flaschlanden's; the deliberators were of opinion that these legions should be called *burgher legions*. I observed to them, 'that under this denomination they would simply organise national guards; that the princes would be unable to make them march wherever necessity called, because they would allege they were only bound to defend their own hearths; that it was to be apprehended the factious might succeed in sowing discord between them and the troops of the line; that with empty phrases they had roused the people against the depositaries of public authority; that it would be, therefore, more politic to follow their example, and to give those new regiments the denomination of *royal militia*; that' ——

The Bishop of Arras, roughly interrupting me, said, 'No, no, sir, it is fitting you should have *burgher* in your commission;' and the Baron de Flaschlanden, who drew it out, inserted the word *burgher*."—*Collection of various Documents relative to the French Revolution*, p. 62.

In the mean time, the king, unable any longer to endure the constraint that was imposed upon him, and the reductions of power that the assembly forced from him, above all, having terrors upon his conscience since the last decrees touching the priests, had determined to fly. The whole winter had been devoted to preparations; the zeal of Mirabeau was stimulated —he was loaded with promises if he succeeded in placing the royal family at liberty, and on his own part he prosecuted his plan with the greatest activity.

Lafayette had recently quarrelled with the Lameths. They found him too steady in his attention to the court; and as his integrity was not to be suspected, like that of Mirabeau, they reproached him with want of intellect, and with allowing himself to be grossly played upon. The enemies of the Lameths, on the other hand, accused them of envying Lafayette's military power, as they had envied Mirabeau's oratorical power. The brothers coalesced, or appeared to coalesce, with the friends of the Duke of Orleans; and it was alleged that they desired to obtain for one of them the command of the national guard. It was Charles Lameth who had the ambition to aspire to it, as was said; and to this cause were attributed the perpetually recurring difficulties henceforth raised in the path of Lafayette.

On the 28th February, the populace, stimulated by the emissaries of the Duke of Orleans, as was alleged, proceeded to the castle of Vincennes, which the municipality had prepared for the reception of prisoners, who were growing somewhat too numerous for the jails of Paris. This castle was attacked as a new Bastille. Lafayette reached the scene in good time, and afterwards dispersed the faubourg Saint-Antoine, headed by Santerre, flocking to that expedition. Whilst he re-established order in that part of Paris, difficulties of another kind were preparing for him at the Tuileries. Upon the report of a riot, many of the frequenters of the palace had resorted thither, to the number of some hundreds. They bore concealed arms, such as hunting-knives and poniards. The national guard, at a loss to account for this sudden concourse, deemed it suspicious, and accordingly disarmed and maltreated some of those men. Lafayette arrived, cleared the palace, and took possession of the weapons seized. Rumours of the occurrence soon spread; it was said that men bearing daggers had been found, whence they were afterwards called "Knights of the Dagger." They asserted, on their part, that they had attended at the palace merely to defend the king's person, which was threatened. They were reproached with a design to carry him off; and, as usual, the event was terminated by mutual calumnies. This day displayed the actual position of Lafayette. It was made more palpable than ever, that, placed between extreme parties, his functions were to protect both the king's person and the constitution. His twofold victory augmented at once his popularity, his influence, and the hatred of his enemies. Mirabeau, who is open to censure for instigating the suspicions of the court respecting him, represented this conduct as profoundly hypocritical. Under the mask of moderation and of resistance to all parties, it tended, according to his version, to usurpation. In his ill humour, he stigmatised the Lameths also as traitors and fools, in league with Orleans, and commanding scarcely thirty partisans in the assembly. As to the right side, he declared it was impossible to make any thing of it, and that he relied altogether upon the three or four hundred members who were free from party ties, and always prepared to decide upon the impressions which he conveyed at the moment by his reason and eloquence.

The only true points in these representations were his estimate of the respective strength of parties, and his opinion upon the means of directing the assembly. He exercised control over it, in fact, by swaying all who had no positive engagements. That very day, the 28th February, he evinced, almost for the last

time, his empire, signalised his hatred against the Lameths, and brought all his formidable powers to bear upon them.

The law respecting emigration was appointed for discussion. Chapelier presented it, as the reporter of the committee. That committee partook, he said, the general indignation against those Frenchmen who abandoned their country; but after several days' consideration, it had come to the conclusion that it was impossible to frame a law upon emigration. There is no doubt that many difficulties opposed the passing of such a law. It was necessary to settle, first of all, whether any right existed for pinning men, as it were, to the soil. If the safety of the country demanded such a measure, it was unquestionably just and expedient; but then the motives of travellers would require to be ascertained, a process involving a species of inquisition; it would be also necessary to determine their quality, whether of Frenchmen or foreigners, of emigrants or simple commercial wayfarers. A law upon the subject was therefore very difficult, if not altogether impossible. Chapelier added, that the committee, in obedience to the assembly, had nevertheless framed one, which, if it were wished, he would then read, but he declared beforehand that it violated every fundamental principle. "Read"—"Don't read"—resounded from all quarters. A number of deputies attempted to speak. Mirabeau demanded to be heard in his turn, obtained the right, and, what was of more consequence, imposed silence. He read a very eloquent letter, formerly addressed to Frederick-William, in which he asserted the liberty to emigrate as one of the most sacred rights of men, who, not being rooted to the earth, were held in attachment to it by happiness alone. To gratify the court, perhaps, but more especially from conviction, he rejected as tyrannical every measure against the freedom of locomotion. Doubtless, this freedom was abused at that moment; but the assembly, relying upon its strength, had disregarded so many outrages of the press perpetrated on itself, had stood the shock of so many futile conspiracies, and had so victoriously repelled them all by mere contempt, that a continuance in the same course was eminently advisable. Mirabeau's opinion was applauded, but it did not succeed in suppressing the desire to have the project of law read. Chapelier at length read it: it proposed, in case of disturbances, to institute a dictatorial commission, composed of three members, with power to designate by name, and at their own pleasure, those who should have liberty to travel without the limits of the kingdom. Upon hearing this extravagant proposition, which bespoke at once the impossibility of legislation, violent murmurs arose. "Your murmurs re-assure me," exclaimed Mirabeau; "your hearts beat in unison with mine, and repudiate this absurd tyranny. As for me, I hold myself freed from all oath towards those who shall be infamous enough to sanction a dictatorial commission." —Shouts arose from the left side—"Yes," he resumed, "I swear"—he was again interrupted—"That popularity," he cried, in a voice of thunder, "for which I have longed, and which I have enjoyed as well as others, is not a feeble reed: I will dig it deeply into the earth; I will make it flourish on the soil of justice and reason." Cheers broke forth from all sides. "I swear," added the orator—"if an emigration law be passed—I swear to disobey you!"

He descended from the tribune, after electrifying the assembly and awing his enemies. However, the debate was still proceeded with; one party wished an adjournment, to afford time for digesting a better law, whilst others demanded that a resolution of the intention to enact none should be at once passed, in order to calm the people and put an end to agitation. Murmurs, shouts, applauses, were mingled in strange confusion. Mirabeau again claimed to be heard, and seemed to insist upon it as a right. "By what name is the dictatorship exercised here by M. de Mirabeau known?" exclaimed M. Goupil. Mirabeau, without listening to him, sprang up the tribune. "I have not granted liberty to speak," said the president; "let the assembly decide." But the assembly disposed itself to hear him without any formal decision upon the point. "I beg the interruptors to remember," said Mirabeau, "that I have combated tyranny all my life, and that I will combat it wherever it may be seated;" and as he pronounced these words, he cast his eye from right to left. Loud cheers greeted the expression. He resumed: "I beg M. Goupil to recollect, that he once before egregiously erred as to a certain Catiline, whose dictatorship he this day denounces;* I beg the assembly to reflect, that the question of adjournment, apparently so simple, involves others, and that, for example, it supposes a law to make." Fresh murmurs interrupted him from the left. "Silence to those thirty voices!" exclaimed the orator, fixing his eyes on the benches of Barnave and the Lameths. "In a word," added he, "if you desire it, I will also vote for the adjournment, but on condition that it be decreed that from this moment to the expiration of the adjournment there shall be no seditious movement." Unanimous applause followed these words. However, the adjournment was carried, but by so small a majority that the result was contested and a second division demanded.

In this debate, Mirabeau drew more than ever upon the audaciousness of his character; never, perhaps, had he so imperiously overawed the assembly. But his end was approaching, and these were his final triumphs. Presentiments of death mingled with his vast projects, and occasionally prevented their developement. But his conscience was satisfied; the public esteem was united with his own, and assured him that if he had not yet done enough for the good of the state, he had at all events done enough for his own glory. With his countenance deadly pale, and his eyes deeply sunk, his appearance in the tribune was greatly altered, and he was often seized with sudden fainting-fits. Pleasure and labour, both pushed to excess, and the exhausting emotions of the tribune, had prematurely worn out his powerful frame. Baths, containing sublimate of mercury in solution, had produced that greenish tint which was attributed to poison. The court was in consternation, all parties in amazement, and, some time before his death, its cause was a subject of general conversation. Upon a last occasion, he spoke at five different intervals, left the hall exhausted, and never re-appeared. The deathbed received him, and gave him up only for the Pantheon. He had insisted with Cabanis, his friend, that no physicians should be called; but his injunction was disobeyed, and when they came they found death upon him; it had already seized his feet. The head was affected last, as if nature were desirous to leave his genius brilliant to the final moment. An immense crowd flocked around his dwelling, and blocked up all the avenues, awaiting the issue in profound silence. The court sent messenger after messenger; the bulletins of his condition were passed from mouth to mouth, and disseminated the grief, at each advance of the malady, into every quarter of the city. He himself, surrounded by his friends, expressed regret for his unaccomplished labours, and some feeling of pride for those he had achieved. "Sustain this head," said he to his servant, "the strongest in France!" The proofs of popular concern greatly moved him; and the visit of Barnave, his enemy, who presented himself at his bedside in the name of the Jacobins, caused in him an agreeable emotion. He still bestowed some thoughts on public affairs. The assembly was shortly to discuss the subject of testamentary dispositions: he beckoned to M. Talleyrand, and put in his hands a speech he had prepared. "It will be amusing," said he to him, "to hear a man speak against

* M. Goupil, on a previous occasion attacking Mirabeau, had exclaimed with the members of the right side, "Catiline is at our gates!"

testaments who is no more, and who has already made his own." The court had desired that he should make a will, promising to discharge all the legacies. Recurring to the state of Europe, and divining the projects of England: "That Pitt," said he, "is the minister for preparations: he governs by threats; I would give him some trouble if I lived!" The priest of his parish coming forward to offer his services, he thanked him with cordiality, and told him, with a smile, that he would have willingly accepted them if his superior ecclesiastic, the Bishop of Autun, were not in the house. He ordered his windows to be opened: "My friend," said he to Cabanis, "I will die to-day; there remains nothing more but to be wrapped in perfumes, crowned with flowers, and surrounded with music, in order to glide peaceably into the eternal sleep." Acute pains interrupted from time to time his resigned and touching phrases. "You promised," said he to his friends, "to spare me from useless anguish." With these words, he asked earnestly for opium. As they refused it him, he demanded it with his accustomed violence. To satisfy him, they practised deception, and presented him a cup, with the assurance that it contained opium. He calmly grasped it, swallowed the draught he deemed mortal, and seemed satisfied. An instant afterwards he expired. His death occurred on the 2d April 1791. The news was immediately conveyed to the court, the assembly, the whole city. All parties had placed hopes upon him, and every one, except the envious, was overwhelmed with sorrow. The assembly intermitted its labours; a general mourning was ordered, and a magnificent funeral was prepared. Those charged with the ceremonial begged the presence of some deputies: "We will all go!" they exclaimed. The church of St Geneviève was constituted a Pantheon, with this inscription, which is effaced at the moment I record these facts:

TO GREAT MEN, A GRATEFUL COUNTRY.*

Mirabeau was the first deposited there by the side of Descartes. On the 4th April, the funeral obsequies were celebrated. All the authorities, the department, the municipalities, the popular clubs, the assembly, and the army, accompanied the procession. To this simple orator were accorded more honours than the pompous burials at St Denis were ever wont to receive. Thus the scene closed upon this extraordinary man, who, after having daringly attacked and subdued the men of an effete system, had the surprising boldness to turn his efforts against the new men who had assisted him to conquer, to arrest their course by his voice, and make them respect it even when employed against themselves; upon a man, in short, who performed his duty under the impulses of reason and genius, but not for a handful of gold cast to his passions, and who enjoyed the singular felicity, when all popularities finish by popular disgust, to see his yield only to death. But would he have infused resignation into the mind of the court, moderation into the hearts of the ambitious? Would he have said to the popular tribunes, struggling for supremacy in their turn: "*Remain in your obscure alleys?*" Would he have said to Danton, that other Mirabeau of the populace: "*Confine yourself to your section, and aspire no higher?*" We cannot tell: but at the moment of his death, all uncertain interests were centred in his hands, and dependent upon him. His departure was long regretted. In the confusion of discord, all eyes were turned to the place he was wont to occupy, and seemed to invoke him who used to end it with a victorious phrase. "Mirabeau is no longer here," cried Maury one day, as he ascended the tribune; "there is none to prevent me from speaking."

The death of Mirabeau paralysed the energies of the court. New events occurred to stimulate its resolution to fly. On the 18th April, the king desired to pay Saint-Cloud a visit. A rumour was spread that, not wishing to employ a constitutional priest for the Easter devotions, he had determined to remove from Paris during passion week; another report asserted that it was his intention to fly. The people forthwith assembled in crowds, and seized the horses' heads. Lafayette hastened forward, and entreated the king to remain in his carriage, assuring him he would open a passage. The king, however, immediately alighted, and refused to allow any attempt to proceed; it was in accordance with his old policy of appearing under constraint. Pursuant to the advice of his ministers, he repaired to the assembly, in order to complain of the outrage he had just encountered. The assembly received him with its accustomed marks of respect, and promised to take all such measures as depended upon it to assure his perfect freedom. Louis XVI. left the hall amidst cheers from all sides except from the right. On the 23d April, upon advice tendered him, he wrote, by means of M. de Montmorin, a letter to the foreign ambassadors, in which he denied the intentions attributed to him out of France, declared to the powers of Europe that he had sworn fidelity to the constitution, which oath he was determined to keep, and denounced as his enemies all who should insinuate to the contrary. The terms of this letter were designedly exaggerated, in order that it might appear extorted by violence, which in fact the king himself avowed to the envoy of Leopold. This monarch was then travelling in Italy, and at that identical moment was staying in Mantua. Calonne was engaged in negotiations with him. An envoy, M. Alexandre de Durfort, came from Mantua, accredited to the king and queen, to ascertain their dispositions. He first interrogated them upon the letter written to the ambassadors, and they replied, that from the language none could doubt it had been extorted; he afterwards questioned them upon their hopes, and they answered that they no longer entertained any since the death of Mirabeau; he finally inquired as to their dispositions towards the Count d'Artois, and they assured him they were most friendly.

To understand the reason of these questions, it ought to be mentioned that the Baron de Breteuil was the declared enemy of Calonne, which enmity had not subsided in emigration; and that he, being accredited to the court of Vienna, with full powers from Louis XVI.,* counteracted all the operations of the princes. He assured Leopold that the king was not anxious to be saved by the emigrants, because he feared their future demands, and that the queen had personally quarrelled with the Count d'Artois. He always proposed, as a means of saving the throne, the direct contrary to what Calonne projected, and omitted no expedient to destroy the effect of the latter's more recent negotiation. The Count de Durfort returned to Mantua; and, on the 20th May 1791, Leopold promised to march 35,000 men into Flanders, and 15,000 into Alsace. He declared that an equal number of Swiss would proceed towards Lyons, as many Piedmontese into Dauphiny, and that Spain would assemble 20,000 men. The emperor undertook for the co-operation of Prussia and the neutrality of England. A protestation, drawn up in the name of the house of Bourbon, was to be signed by the King of Naples, the King of Spain, the Infant of Parma, and the expatriated princes. Until the promulgation of that document, the most profound secrecy was imposed. It was also recommended to Louis XVI. not to think of removing, although he had testified a strong desire to do so; whilst Breteuil, on the contrary, advised the king to depart from Paris. It is quite possible that on both sides the counsel was given in good faith; but it must be at the same time observed, that each gave such advice as suited best his own interests.

* The revolution of 1830 has re-established this inscription, and restored the monument to the destination decreed by the National Assembly.

* See on this subject Bertrand de Moleville.

Breteuil, who wished to nullify Calonne's negotiation at Mantua, urged the departure; and Calonne, whose reign would have ceased if Louis XVI. had stationed himself on the frontier, conveyed suggestions inducing him to remain. However the case may be, the king resolved upon leaving; and he often said with some sourness of temper, "It was Breteuil who would have it."* He therefore wrote to Bouillé that he was determined to defer his flight no longer.

His intention was not to leave the kingdom, but to retire to Montmedy, where he could, in case of necessity, fall back on Luxumbourg, and receive foreign aid. The Châlons route, by Clermont and Varennes, was preferred, in spite of Bouillé's counsels. All the preparations were in readiness for departure on the 20th June. The general assembled those troops upon which he placed the firmest reliance; formed a camp at Montmedy, amassed stores of forage, and accounted for all these dispositions by movements which he alleged to be making on the frontier. The queen had taken upon herself the charge of the progress from Paris to Châlons; and from that town to Montmedy was under the care of Bouillé. Small detachments of cavalry were to be stationed upon various points, under pretext of escorting a treasure, but in reality to receive the king on his passage. Bouillé himself proposed to advance some distance from Montmedy. The queen had secured a secret door for the purpose of escaping out of the palace. The royal family was to travel under an assumed name, and with a false passport. Every thing was ready for the 20th; but some apprehension caused the journey to be delayed till the following day, a delay which was fatal to the unfortunate family. M. de Lafayette was in complete ignorance of the journey, and M. de Montmorin himself, notwithstanding the confidence the court reposed in him, was left in absolute ignorance likewise; no one was intrusted with the secret of the project but the persons indispensable to its execution. Some rumours of flight were nevertheless current in Paris, either from the plan having transpired to some partial extent, or from their originating in one of those alarms so common at the time. Howsoever it may have been, the committee of inquiry had been apprised of it, and the vigilance of the national guard was stimulated in consequence.

On the 20th June, at midnight, the king, the queen, Madame Elizabeth, and Madame de Tourzel, governess of the children of France, disguised themselves, and successively issued from the palace. Madame de Tourzel, with the children, proceeded to the Petit Carrousel, and got into a carriage driven by M. de Fersen, a young foreign nobleman, disguised as a coachman. The king soon joined them; but the queen, who had left the palace with a life-guardsman, caused them the most lively solicitude. Neither she nor her guide was acquainted with the streets of Paris; she mistook the way, and did not find the Petit Carrousel for a whole hour; on the road, she encountered the carriage of M. de Lafayette, whose servants were walking with torches. She concealed herself under the gateway of the Louvre, and, saved from that danger, she reached the carriage, where she was so impatiently expected. After being thus united, the whole family proceeded forward, and arrived, after a long circuit, and a second mistake in the route, at the gate St Martin, where a coach drawn by six horses awaited them, into which they all transferred them-

* See Bertrand de Moleville. [Bertrand's Annals are, in all matters affecting the king and queen personally, very admirable authority. He himself was much trusted by the king, was one of his ministers, was intimate at this time with all who formed the court, and afterwards in exile with M. de Calonne and others, who were prominently concerned in these important negotiations. Bertrand's details as to the mission of Durfort are extremely curious, and are faithfully embodied in M. Thiers's text. Their length, however, forbids us to insert them fully here; but the questions propounded by M. de Durfort, and the answers given to them, present so singular a record, as to render them eminently worthy of being transcribed. M. Bertrand says—"The following is an exact copy of those questions and answers; the answers are supposed to be addressed to the Count d'Artois:—

1st Question. Do your majesties confide in the intentions and in the zeal of the Count d'Artois? Is there any ground for the anxiety he has been made to suffer as to your sentiments in respect to him, and as to your intentions to put yourselves into the hands of the factious in the assembly, rather than owe your safety, and the re-establishment of your authority, to the efforts and success of the princes, in conjunction with the nobility of the kingdom?

Answer (dictated by the queen). You are deceived. Your situation is that which occupies their majesties most. How can it be believed, that with the exalted spirit you know they possess, they prefer remaining under the yoke of infamous villains, to being succoured by their near relations and faithful servants?

2d Question. What do your majesties think of M. de Lafayette?

Answer. We consider him as a fanatical, weak, factious man, in whom we can never have the least confidence.

3d Question. What do you think of M. de Montmorin?

Answer. His will is good, but he has no power.

4th Question. Has the Archbishop of Sens any influence on the determinations of your majesties?

Answer. None. He is generally abhorred and despised by all parties. We concur in this public opinion. He has, besides, deceived us.

5th Question. Why did the king go to the assembly, after being prevented from going to St Cloud?

Answer. He was forced by his ministers, on whom he could not rely.

6th Question. In what state is the mind of the people? Have your majesties any persons in the assembly on whom you can rely?

Answer. The mind of the people is detestable; they are for no king. We have no person in the assembly. The only deputy who made overtures to us is dead.

7th Question. How is the letter addressed to all the ambassadors to be justified?

Answer. The date proves the necessity of it. The king did not sign it; and he made no alteration in it, that it might appear as monstrous as it really was; it was drawn up by the members of the assembly, who thought this step indispensably necessary, and who expected great success from it.

8th Question. Have your majesties a desire or intention of leaving Paris?

Answer. The greatest desire; but the means of effecting it appear to us almost impossible. In case the opportunity should offer, we wish to know beforehand in what place we should be most secure—by Valenciennes or Metz. We are very anxious on this head."

The Count de Durfort subsequently brought a plan, dictated and corrected by the Emperor Leopold, in which, after specifying the assistance to be afforded by himself and the other foreign powers, it is stated:

"Though hitherto it had been wished that their majesties might themselves procure their liberty, the present situation of affairs makes it necessary to entreat them earnestly to drop the idea. This is the emperor's opinion. He depends solely on this plan of conduct for the success of the measures which he has adopted, and particularly requests that every other may be given up. What might happen to their majesties, if in their flight they should not be able to escape a barbarous vigilance, makes him shudder with horror. His imperial majesty thinks that their majesties' surest course is the movement of the armies of the allied powers, preceded by threatening manifestos."—"The plan being read," proceeds Bertrand, "their majesties, without entering upon a minute discussion of the different articles of it, only observed, that with respect to the parliaments, after the declarations contained in their last resolutions, they could not, and ought not, to be more than judges. The king did not deliver his sentiments concerning the last article of the plan; but the queen appeared very much dissatisfied with it, and said with warmth, 'We ought to attempt every thing in order to leave Paris; but to go only to the frontiers, for a king ought never to leave his kingdom. Confess,' added she, addressing herself to Count de Durfort, 'that my brother was hurt that we employed the Baron de Breteuil. We did it because he was the only person acquainted with the court of Vienna, where he resided; and because he was known to the Prince de Kaunitz, who has so long held the reins there.' Several other questions relative to the Count d'Artois terminated this conversation."—*Bertrand's Annals*, vol. iv. pp. 58-77.]

selves. Madame de Tourzel, under the name of Madame de Korff, was to pass for a mother travelling with her children; the king was to be supposed her valet-de-chambre; three body-guardsmen in disguise were to precede the carriage as couriers, or to follow it as domestics. They at length departed, accompanied by the earnest hopes of M. de Fersen, who reentered Paris to take the road to Brussels. At the same time, Monsieur directed his course towards Flanders, with his wife, pursuing a different route, in order to avoid exciting suspicions, and causing a failure of horses for relays.


The king and his family travelled all night without any alarm being given at Paris. M. de Fersen repaired to the municipality, to observe if any thing were known; but at eight in the morning all were still in profound ignorance. However, the news soon transpired, and circulated with rapidity. Lafayette summoned his aides-de-camp around him, saying to them that he feared there was no hope of their overtaking the fugitives, but that some effort must be made in the emergency; he took upon himself the responsibility of the orders he issued, and in drawing up those orders, acted upon the idea that the royal family had been carried off by the enemies of the public welfare. This respectful supposition was admitted by the assembly, and adopted throughout by all the authorities. At the moment, the tumultuous populace reproached Lafayette with having favoured the flight of the king, and at a later date the aristocratic party accused him of having allowed the king to fly, in order afterwards to arrest him, and by so futile an attempt to ruin him. But if Lafayette had been disposed to wink at Louis XVI.'s flight, would he have dispatched, without any orders from the assembly, two aides-de-camp in pursuit? And if, as the aristocrats alleged, he only permitted him to escape in order to re-capture him, would he have given a whole night's start to the carriage? The people were speedily undeceived, and Lafayette was again established in their previous good opinion.

The assembly met at nine in the morning. Its appearance on that momentous occasion was as imposing as during the first days of the revolution. The received idea was that Louis XVI. had been carried off. The greatest calmness, the most perfect union, reigned during the whole sitting. The measures spontaneously adopted by Lafayette were approved. The populace had stopped his two aides-de-camp at the barriers; the assembly, every where obeyed, caused the gates to be opened for them. One of them, young Romeuf, took with him the decree confirming the orders already given by the general, and enjoining all public functionaries "to arrest, by all possible means, the persons implicated in the said abduction, and to prevent the journey being continued." Following the wish and indications of the people around him, Romeuf took the route of Châlons, which was the true one, and which the marks of a carriage with six horses pointed out as such. The assembly called the ministers to its bar, and decreed that they should receive orders from none but itself. On departing, Louis XVI. had left orders for the minister of justice to send him the state seal. The assembly decided that the seal should be retained, and appended to its own decrees. At the same time, it passed a resolution that the frontiers should be put in a state of defence, and directed the minister for foreign affairs to assure the powers that the dispositions of the French nation with regard to them were in no wise altered.

M. de Laporte, intendant of the civil list, was then heard. He had received various communications from the king, amongst which were a note, which he besought the assembly not to open, and a memorial containing the motives of his departure. The assembly, anxious to respect all rights, restored, without opening, the note which M. de Laporte was indisposed to render public, and ordered the memorial to be read. It was listened to with the greatest tranquillity, and produced a very slight impression. The king complained therein of his curtailments of power with a marked want of dignity, and seemed to feel as acutely the reduction of his civil list to thirty millions, as the loss of all his prerogatives. The grievances of the monarch were heard in silence, his weakness was pitied, and the assembly passed to the affairs before it.

Few persons in the National Assembly were desirous of the king's arrest. The aristocrats saw in his flight the oldest of their hopes realised, and flattered themselves with an immediate civil war. The extreme members of the popular party, already beginning to grow weary of a king, perceived in his absence an opportunity for dispensing with him, and formed the idea, as well as the hope, of a republic. All the moderate party, at this moment the governing party in the assembly, wished that the king might reach Montmedy in safety; and, relying upon his equity, it entertained little doubt that an accommodation would from thence become more easy between the throne and the nation. Less apprehension prevailed now than formerly at the prospect of the monarch threatening the constitution from the midst of an army. The people alone, upon whom terror at this event had been sedulously inculcated, were still affected by it when the assembly had shaken off its influence, and they put up many ardent vows for the arrest of the royal family. Such was the state of opinion and of things at Paris.

The royal carriage, departing in the night of the 20th and 21st, had happily traversed a considerable part of the route, and had reached Châlons without impediment about five in the afternoon of the 21st. At that town, the king, who was indiscreet enough to put his head several times out of the window, was recognised; the person who made this discovery was eager to give it immediate proclamation, but he was prevented by the mayor, who was a steady royalist. When the royal family arrived at Pont-de-Sommeville, the detachments which ought to have received it there were not visible: those detachments had been in waiting for several hours, but the ferment of the people, who were alarmed at this military display, had obliged them to retire. However, the king proceeded to Sainte-Menehould. There, still persisting in thrusting his head out of the carriage, he was perceived by Drouet, the postmaster's son, and a zealous revolutionist. This young man, not having time to procure the arrest of the carriage at Sainte-Menehould, instantly started for Varennes. A loyal quartermaster, who had observed his eagerness, and suspected his design, hastened in pursuit to stop him, but was unable to overtake him. Drouet used such diligence, that he reached Varennes before the unfortunate family. He immediately aroused the municipality, and caused the necessary measures for the arrest to be taken without delay. Varennes is built on the banks of a narrow but deep stream. A detachment of hussars was placed there on guard; but its officer, seeing no prospect of the money arriving for which he had been sent to watch, had permitted the soldiers to retire into quarters. The carriage at length arrived, and passed the bridge. So soon as it came under an arch beneath which it could move but slowly, Drouet, seconded by another individual, seized the horses' heads: "Your passport!" he exclaimed, and presenting a musket, he threatened to fire if the travellers persisted in advancing. They obeyed the call, and the passport was delivered. Drouet took possession of it, and saying that the attorney of the commune was the proper person to examine it, the royal family was conducted to the house of that personage, whose name was Sausse. This official, after inspecting the passport, pretended to find it regular, and, with many polite expressions, begged the king to wait. He had to wait in truth a pretty long time. When Sausse was at length assured that a sufficient number of



national guards had been collected, he threw off all dissimulation, and declared to the king that he was known and under arrest. A dispute ensued: Louis alleged he was not the person they supposed; and the contest growing somewhat too warm —"Since you acknowledge him for your king," exclaimed the queen, losing all patience, "speak to him with the respect you owe him."

The king, finding all denial useless, ceased to dissemble any longer. The little room was full of people; he spoke to them, and expressed himself with more energy than was usual with him. He made protestation of his good intentions, assuring them that his only object in going to Montmedy was to learn with more freedom the wishes of the people, by removing from the thraldom of Paris; in conclusion, he urged them to allow him to continue his progress, and even to conduct him to the end of his journey. The unfortunate prince, in the deepest emotion, embraced Sausse, and asked at his hands the safety of his consort and his children: the queen joined her entreaties to the king's, and taking the dauphin in her arms, conjured Sausse to save them. The attorney was touched, but he resisted the impulse, and begged them to return to Paris in order to prevent a civil war. The king, on the contrary, dismayed at the idea of returning, was urgent in his desire to proceed towards Montmedy. In the mean time, Messieurs de Damas and de Goquelas had arrived with the detachments stationed at various points. The royal family looked upon itself as delivered; but the hussars proved that the confidence reposed in them was misplaced. The officers drew them up, and announced to them that the king and his family were arrested, and that it was their duty to rescue them; but they answered that they were for the nation. At this juncture, the national guards, summoned from all the surrounding districts, poured in and filled Varennes. The whole night was passed in this state. At six in the morning, young Romeuf arrived, bearing the decree of the assembly: he found the carriage harnessed with six horses, and turned towards Paris. He ascended to the room occupied by the captives, and delivered the decree. Exclamations from the whole family arose against M. Lafayette, that he should thus provoke their arrest. The queen seemed even astonished, perhaps sorry, that he had not perished at the hands of the people. Romeuf observed that his general and he had only done their duty in pursuing them, but they had hoped not to overtake them. The queen snatched hold of the decree, threw it upon her children's bed, and then caught it off again, saying it would defile them. "Madam," said Romeuf, who was much devoted to her, "would you rather prefer that some other than I should witness these passionate emotions?" The queen immediately resumed all her self-possession and dignity. At the same moment, the arrival of various detachments, placed in the vicinity by Bouillé, was announced. But the municipality ordered the instant departure; and the royal family was obliged to seat itself in the carriage, and retake the route to Paris—that fatal and so dreaded route.

Bouillé, having learnt what had occurred at Varennes in the middle of the night, had immediately called a regiment to horse, and set off with shouts of "Long live the king!" This brave and faithful general proceeded in great disquietude, at a rapid pace, and covered nine leagues in four hours. He reached Varennes, where he found several detachments assembled; but the king had left an hour and a half before. The town itself was barricaded, and likewise defended by certain excellent precautions, for the bridge had been broken down, and the river was not fordable. Thus, to effect the king's rescue, Bouillé must first of all have made a vigorous assault to carry the barricades, then have crossed the river, and after so great a loss of time have succeeded in overtaking the carriage, which was already an hour and a half in advance. These obstacles rendered any effort impossible; and nothing less was needed than such an impossibility to stop a man so devoted and so enterprising as Bouillé. He consequently retreated to his quarters, with a heart torn by deep regret and sorrow.

When the arrest of the king was known at Paris, he was imagined to have been beyond the reach of pursuit. The people experienced an indescribable joy at the intelligence. The assembly deputed three commissioners, taken from the three sections of the left side, to accompany the monarch, and reconduct him to Paris. Those commissioners were Barnave, Latour-Maubourg, and Petion. They repaired to Châlons; and from the moment of their junction with the royal family, all orders emanated from them alone. Madame de Tourzel removed into another carriage, and followed, in company with Latour-Maubourg. Barnave and Petion got into the royal carriage. Latour-Maubourg, a man of distinguished merit, was a friend of Lafayette, and, like him, equally attached to the king and the constitution. In yielding to his two colleagues the honour of sitting with the royal family, he was actuated by a wish to interest them in behalf of fallen greatness. Barnave seated himself in the back of the carriage, between the king and the queen; Petion in the front, between the Princess Elizabeth and the princess-royal. The young dauphin rested alternately upon the knees of his relatives. How striking an evidence of the rapidity with which events had flowed! A young advocate, twenty and some years old, remarkable only for his talents; another, distinguished by his acquirements, but especially by the rigorous sternness of his principles, were sitting alongside a prince, shortly ago the most absolute in Europe, and commanding all his motions!

The journey was performed very slowly, because the carriage followed the march of the national guards. Eight days were consumed between Varennes and Paris. The weather was extremely sultry, and a scorching dust, raised by the crowd, suffocated the wretched travellers. At first a dead silence prevailed as the coach moved tediously along, and the queen took little pains to disguise her annoyance. The king at length began a conversation with Barnave. Their discourse referred to various topics, and ultimately to the flight of the monarch. Both were astonished at the discovery of each other's qualities. The queen was greatly surprised at the superior intellect and delicate politeness of the young Barnave; she shortly threw back her veil, and took part in the conversation. Barnave, on his part, was touched with the goodness of the king, and the graceful dignity of the queen. Petion displayed infinite surliness; he evinced and obtained much less consideration. On concluding their journey, Barnave had become attached to this unfortunate family; and the queen, charmed with the merit and good sense of the young tribune, had formed for him a high esteem.* Consequently, in the rela-

* The particulars of the return from Varennes, as related to Madame Campan by the queen herself, are interesting enough to be recorded.

"On the very day of my arrival, the queen called me into her cabinet to tell me she would require my assistance in the communications she had established with Barnave, Duport, and Alexander Lameth. She informed me that M. J—— was her agent with these remnants of the constitutional party, whose good intentions were unfortunately so tardily evinced; and said that Barnave was a man calculated to command esteem. I was astonished at hearing the name of Barnave pronounced with so much good feeling. At the time I left Paris, many persons spoke of him only with horror. I made this remark to the queen; she was not surprised at it, but told me he was much changed; that this young man, of high accomplishments and noble sentiments, was of that class of men distinguished for education, and only misled by an ambition which springs from real merit. 'A feeling of pride, which I can scarcely blame in a young man of the plebeian order,' said the queen, with reference to Barnave, 'has led him to applaud all that might smooth the road to honours

tions she afterwards had with the constitutional deputies, she always placed the most confidence in Barnave. Parties would often forgive each other, if they could come to mutual and frank explanations.

and glory for the class in which he was born: if power should ever return to us, the pardon of Barnave is written beforehand in our hearts.' She added that it was far different with regard to the nobles who had taken part in the revolution—men who obtained all favours, and often to the detriment of those in an inferior grade, amongst whom were found talents of the highest order; in short, that the nobles, born to be the rampart of the monarchy, were too culpable in betraying its cause to deserve forgiveness. The queen astonished me more and more by the warmth with which she justified the favourable opinion she had conceived of Barnave. She then told me that his conduct on the journey had been singularly meritorious, whilst the republican harshness of Petion had been disgusting; that he ate and drank in the coach with excessive vulgarity, throwing chicken-bones out of the window with such unconcern as to risk hitting the king's face; raising his glass, without saying a word, when the Princess Elizabeth poured him out wine, to indicate that he had sufficient: that this offensive behaviour was designed, inasmuch as the man had received a liberal education; and that Barnave had been greatly shocked at it. When pressed by the queen to take some refreshment: 'Madame,' answered Barnave, 'the deputies of the National Assembly, in so solemn a conjuncture, ought to fatigue your majesties with their mission only, and not with their wants.' In fine, his respectful demeanour, his delicate attentions, and his whole discourse, had gained him not only the queen's regard, but that of the Princess Elizabeth.

The king had begun to speak with Petion on the situation of France, and on the motives of his conduct, which were founded on the necessity of securing to the executive power a strength indispensable to its action for the advantage even of the constitutional act, since France could not be a republic. 'Not yet, I own,' answered Petion; 'because the French are not ripe enough for it.' This audacious and unfeeling reply imposed silence on the king, which he never broke until he arrived at Paris. Petion upon one occasion held the dauphin on his knees, and amused himself by passing his fingers through the beautiful fair hair of the interesting child: speaking with energy, he pulled his locks with such force as to make the boy cry out. 'Give me my son,' said the queen; 'he is accustomed to treatment—to respect—that little inclines him to such familiarity.'

The Chevalier de Dampierre had been killed near the king's carriage on leaving Varennes. A poor village priest, some leagues from the spot where the murder had been committed, had the imprudence to approach with the view of speaking to the king. The cannibals who surrounded the carriage flew upon him: 'Tigers!' cried Barnave to them, 'have you then ceased to be Frenchmen? From a nation of brave men have you become a nation of assassins?' These words alone saved the curate, already on the ground, from immediate death. Barnave, in uttering them, had thrown himself almost out of the window, and the Princess Elizabeth, moved by his noble transport, held him by the coat. The queen said, in speaking of this circumstance, that in moments of the greatest crises, odd contrasts always peculiarly attracted her mind; and that, upon this occasion, the pious Elizabeth supporting Barnave by the coat-tails, had struck her as an occurrence in the highest degree surprising.

This deputy had experienced another species of astonishment. The discourses of Madame Elizabeth upon the situation of France, her mild and persuasive eloquence, the noble simplicity with which she addressed Barnave, without departing in the least from her dignity, all appeared to him divine in that amiable princess; and his heart, disposed to noble sentiments, if it had not been led astray by error, was subdued into a most heart-felt admiration. The conduct of the two deputies taught the queen how total was the separation between the republican and the constitutional parties. In the inns at which they alighted, she had some confidential conversations with Barnave. He spoke much of the faults of the royalists in the revolution, and said that he had often seen the interests of the court so feebly and so ill defended, that he had several times been tempted to offer her a courageous champion, who knew the spirit of the age and that of the nation. The queen asked him what means he would have advised her to employ. 'Popularity, madam.' 'And how could I have any?' retorted the queen; 'it was wrested from me.' 'Ah! madam,' replied Barnave, 'it was much more easy for you to regain it than for me to win it.' This observation might furnish matter for commentary; but I restrict myself to relating this curious conversation."—*Memoirs of Madame Campan*, vol. ii. p. 150, *et seq.*

The reception intended for the royal family at Paris had been expressly arranged. A notice was circulated and affixed every where to this effect:—"*Whoever applauds the king will be beaten; whoever insults him will be hanged.*" The order thus intimated was punctually obeyed; and neither cheers nor hootings were heard. The carriage took a circuit in order to avoid traversing Paris. It was made to enter by the Champs-Elysées, which lead directly to the palace. A prodigious crowd received it in silence, and with covered heads. Lafayette, attended by a numerous guard, took all possible precautions to prevent disturbance. The three guardsmen, who had assisted the flight, were on the box-seat of the carriage, exposed to the view and the rage of the multitude; but they sustained no injury. The instant the carriage reached the palace, it was surrounded by national guards. The royal family precipitately descended, and walked between a double row of national guards, drawn up as a protection. The queen, who was the last to alight, was almost carried in the arms of Messieurs de Noailles and d'Aiguillon, enemies of the court, but generous friends of misfortune. When she saw them approach, she was at first doubtful of their intentions; but she gave herself up to them, and gained the palace portals in full security.

Such was that famous journey, the fatal termination of which can be justly attributed to none of those who had arranged it. An accident caused it to miscarry; an accident might have equally caused it to succeed. If, for instance, Drouet had been overtaken, and stopped by the man who pursued him, the carriage had experienced no obstacle. The king, perhaps, was deficient in energy when he was recognised. However that may be, the journey itself is a subject of reproach to no person—neither to those who strenuously advised it, nor to those who attempted its execution; it was an expedient resulting from that fatality which pursues weakness in the midst of revolutionary crises.

The effect of the flight to Varennes was to destroy all respect for the king, to accustom the minds of men to his absence, and to stimulate the idea of a republic. Previous to the morning of his arrival, the assembly had provided for the emergency of the case by a decree.* Louis XVI. was suspended from his functions, and a guard assigned for his person, for that of the queen, and for that of the dauphin. This guard was made responsible for their safety. Three deputies, D'André, Tronchet, and Duport, were deputed to receive the declarations of the king and queen. The greatest nicety was observed in the expressions, for never did that assembly betray a want of attention to delicacy: but the fact itself was not to be disguised—the king was provisionally dethroned.

The responsibility imposed upon the national guards rendered them severe and sometimes harassing in their duty at the palace. Sentinels were constantly stationed at the doors of the royal apartments, and they kept the objects of their solicitude always in view. The king, wishing one day to ascertain whether he were really a prisoner, presented himself at a door; the sentinel opposed his progress: "Do you know who I am?" said Louis XVI. to him. "Yes, sire," answered the sentinel. There only remained to the king the privilege of walking in the Tuileries, early, before the garden was thrown open to the public.

Barnave and the Lameths now did what they had so bitterly upbraided Mirabeau with doing—they lent their aid to the throne, and came to an understanding with the court. It is true they received no money; but it was much less the price of the alliance than the alliance itself with which they had reproached Mirabeau; and after having been formerly so severe, they now came under the law common to all popular leaders, which drives them to successively ally them-

* Decree of Saturday the 25th June.

selves with power, in proportion as they touch upon it. Nevertheless, nothing was more praiseworthy, in the state of affairs, than the service afforded the king by Barnave and the Lameths; and never did they evince more address, courage, and talent. Barnave dictated the king's answer to the commissioners named by the assembly. In that document, Louis XVI. grounded his flight upon the desire to learn more accurately the state of public opinion, which he alleged to have closely studied during his journey; and he demonstrated by a series of facts that it was never his intention to leave France. As to the protests contained in his memorial delivered to the assembly, he said, with much reason, that they bore, not upon the fundamental principles of the constitution, but upon the means of execution which were permitted him. "Now," he added, "that the general desire was made manifest to him, he did not hesitate to submit to it, and to make all the sacrifices necessary for the general welfare."*

* The following is the answer itself, the production of Barnave, and a fine model of argument, tact, and dignity:—

"I find, gentlemen," said Louis XVI. to the commissioners, "an examination is not involved in the objects of the mission confided to you; but I am anxious to meet the wishes of the assembly. I shall never be afraid of declaring publicly the motives of my conduct.

The outrages and threats, then, which were heaped on my family and myself, on the 18th April, were the causes of my departure from Paris. In various publications attempts were made to excite violence against my person and my family. I thought that neither safety nor decency could be expected by me if I remained any longer in this city. It was never my intention to quit the kingdom. For such an object I had no plan concerted, either with foreign powers, or with my relatives, or with any of the emigrant Frenchmen. I can allege, as a proof of my intentions, that apartments were prepared for my reception at Montmedy. I had selected that town, because, being fortified, my family would be there in greater security, and because, being near the frontier, I would have been in a better position to oppose every species of invasion, if any had been attempted, of France.

One of my principal motives in quitting Paris was to destroy the argument founded on my not being free, which might furnish an occasion for troubles. If I had designed to leave the kingdom, I would not have published my memorial the very day of my departure; I would have waited until I was beyond the frontiers: but I always retained the desire of returning to Paris. It is in this sense that the last phrase of my memorial is to be understood, in which it is said: 'Frenchmen, and you Parisians especially, what pleasure shall I not experience in being again amongst you!'

I had in my carriage only three thousand livres in gold, and fifty-six thousand livres in assignats. I apprised Monsieur of my intended departure but a very short time previously. Monsieur has proceeded into a foreign country only because it was agreed between us that we should not pursue the same route—he was to return into France and join me.

The passport was necessary to facilitate my journey. It was made out for a foreign country only because passports are not given at the foreign office for the interior of the kingdom. The road to Frankfort was, in fact, not followed.

I have not made any protest except in the memorial which I left before my departure. That protest does not refer, as the context proves, to the fundamental principles of the constitution, but to the form of the sanctions; that is to say, to the little liberty I seemed to enjoy, and to the fact that, forasmuch as the decrees had not been presented altogether, I could not judge of the entire constitution. The principal objection adduced in the memorial refers to the difficulties of administration and execution. I have ascertained, in the course of my journey, that public opinion has decided in favour of the constitution; I think I could not have fully learned this public opinion in Paris; but, from the ideas that I have personally gathered during my journey, I am convinced how necessary it is to the maintenance of the constitution to give strength to the powers established for the preservation of public order. The moment I ascertained the general will, I did not hesitate, nor have I ever hesitated, to make the sacrifice of all that personally concerned me. The happiness of the people has ever been the object of my wishes. I will willingly bury in oblivion all the annoyances I have suffered, if I can secure peace and prosperity to the nation."

Bouillé, with the view of drawing on his head the whole rage of the assembly, addressed to it a letter, which might be called insane, if the generous motive which prompted it were not considered. He avowed himself the sole instigator of the king's journey, whilst he had in fact opposed it; and he declared, in the name of the allied sovereigns, that Paris should answer for the safety of the royal family, and that the least injury perpetrated on it should be avenged in a signal manner. He added, what he knew to be inconsistent with fact, that the military resources of France were utterly exhausted; furthermore, that he was acquainted with the ways of invasion, and would himself conduct the foreign armies into the bosom of his country. The assembly lent itself to this generous bravado, and threw the whole odium upon Bouillé, who had nothing to fear, as he had already passed to the enemy.

The court of Spain, apprehensive that the slightest hostile demonstration might exasperate the French, and expose the royal family to greater dangers, stopped an enterprise prepared on the southern frontier, and which the Knights of Malta were to assist with two frigates. It subsequently declared to the French government that its friendly dispositions were unchanged. The northern powers conducted themselves with less reserve: excited by the emigrants, they assumed a threatening tone. Envoys were dispatched by the king to Brussels and Coblentz, whose mission was to attempt an understanding with the emigrants, to communicate to them the friendly spirit of the assembly, and the hope that had been generally conceived of the possibility of an advantageous arrangement. But no sooner had they arrived, than they were outrageously insulted, and they immediately returned to Paris. The emigrants levied troops in the king's name, and thus compelled him to give a formal disavowal. They pretended that Monsieur, then with them, was regent of the kingdom; and that the king, being a prisoner, had no longer a will of his own; and that what he stated was merely the forced expression of his oppressors' suggestions. The peace between Catherine and the Turks, which was concluded in the month of August, tended to raise their joy to still more absurd heights; and they concluded that all the powers of Europe were at their disposition. When they reflected on the dismantling of the fortified places, and the disorganisation of the army, abandoned by all its officers, they could not doubt that an invasion must be speedily made, and must succeed. And yet, nearly two years were gone since they had quitted France; and in spite of their daily sanguine hopes they had not yet returned as conquerors, according to their flattering anticipations. The powers seemed to promise much: but Pitt was waiting events; Leopold, exhausted by war, and discontented with the emigrants, was disposed to peace; the King of Prussia, certainly, held out hopes, but he had little interest in gratifying them; Gustavus was eager to lead an expedition against France, but was at an inconvenient distance; and Catherine, who might have assisted him, though delivered from the Turks, had Poland to keep in subjection. Besides, in order to effect such a coalition, so many interests required to be brought into harmony, that it needed a sanguine temperament to anticipate success in such a scheme.

The declaration of Pilnitz ought especially to have opened the eyes of the emigrants as to the zeal of the sovereigns.* That declaration, published conjointly by the King of Prussia and the Emperor Leopold, imported that the situation of the King of France was a matter of common interest to all monarchs, and that they were imperiously called upon to exert their united powers to assure Louis XVI. the means of establishing a government conformable to the interests of the throne and the people. Upon that principle, the King of Prussia and the emperor expressed their

* The declaration of Pilnitz is dated the 27th August 1791.

readiness to co-operate with other princes to effect that desirable object. In the mean time, their forces were to be prepared for offensive operations when the emergency arrived. It was afterwards known that this declaration contained certain secret articles, to the effect that Austria should oppose no obstacle to the pretensions of Prussia to a part of Poland. Such an inducement was needed to draw Prussia into an abandonment of her ancient principles, and into a league with Austria against France. What could be expected from a zeal which it was necessary to stimulate by such bribes? And if it were so reserved and cautious in the expressions, was it not sure to be equally so in the acts whereby it should manifest itself? France, it is true, was disarmed, but a whole nation on the alert is soon in arms; and, as the celebrated Carnot said somewhat later, "What is there impossible to twenty-five millions of men?" True it was, the officers were retiring; but they for the most part were beardless youths, promoted by favour, utterly without experience, and objects of hatred and contempt to the soldiers. Besides, the spirit imparted to all minds was soon to produce officers and generals. But, at the same time, it must be confessed that, without possessing the presumption so rife at Coblentz, it was not unreasonable to doubt that the resistance to be made by France to invasion would be so powerful as it subsequently proved.

The assembly, in the interim, sent commissioners to the frontiers, and ordered great preparations. All the national guards demanded to be led against the enemy; several generals offered their services, and, amongst others, Dumouriez, who subsequently saved France in the defiles of the Argonne.

Whilst directing its serious consideration to the external safety of the state, the assembly did not intermit its labours in perfecting the constitutional act, nor the less hasten to restore to the king his functions, and, if it might be possible, some of his prerogatives.

All the subdivisions of the left side, except the men who had recently taken the new name of Republicans, had merged into one party of moderation. Barnave and Malouet walked hand in hand, and worked in companionship. Petion, Robespierre, Buzot, and some others, had adopted the republic as their motto; but they were few in number. The right side continued its imprudent course, and, instead of joining the moderate majority, exacerbated by protests. That majority, however, was the predominant power in the assembly. Its enemies, who would have so fiercely accused it if it had dethroned the king, have nevertheless reproached it for having brought him back to Paris and replaced him on a tottering throne. But what could it do? To displace the king for a republic was an experiment too full of hazard. To change the dynasty was worse than useless, for if a king were to be, the one they had was as good as any other: the Duke of Orleans was certainly unworthy to be preferred to Louis XVI. In either case, to dispossess the actual monarch, was to contemn recognised rights, and dispatch to the emigration a chief most precious for its purposes, since he would have borne it sanctions which it had not. On the other hand, to restore his authority to Louis XVI., to confer on him as great an extent of prerogative as was expedient, was to fulfil the constitutional intent, and remove all pretext for civil war; in a word, it was to perform its duty, for the duty of the assembly, according to the engagements by which it had become bound, was to establish a free, but monarchical, government.

The assembly did not hesitate, but it had great obstacles to overcome. The new word Republic, had quickened the minds of men, already somewhat sickened of the old phrases, Monarchy and Constitution. The absence and suspension of the king had, as we have previously stated, shown that he was not indispensable. The newspapers and the clubs soon laid aside the respect with which his person had been hitherto treated. His departure, which, according to the terms of the decree upon the residence of functionaries, rendered forfeiture exigible, supplied the argument that he was actually dethroned. Still, according to that decree, withdrawal beyond the kingdom and contumacy to the summons of the legislative body were necessary for absolute forfeiture; but such distinctions were little heeded by enthusiastic minds; and they unhesitatingly asserted that the king was an offender against the law, and had incurred its penalty. The Jacobins and Cordeliers agitated the question with extreme violence, and refused to understand how, after getting rid of the king, the nation should again and voluntarily impose him on itself. If the Duke of Orleans had formed expectations, now was the time for their realisation. But he could not avoid perceiving what little influence his name possessed, and how little in accordance with the state of opinion was a new sovereign at all, howsoever popular he might be. Some pamphleteers in his interest, probably without his sanction, endeavoured, like Antony towards Cæsar, to put the crown upon his head: they proposed to give him the regency; but he felt himself obliged to repudiate the proposition by a declaration which was as little regarded as his person. "No more kings!" was the general cry at the Jacobins', at the Cordeliers', in public places, and in the journals.

Numerous addresses were published. Amongst the rest was one affixed to all the walls of Paris, and even to those of the assembly. It bore the signature of Achille Duchâtelet, a young colonel. It was addressed to the French; it reminded them of the tranquillity they had enjoyed during the absence of the monarch, whence it drew the inference that it was more advantageous than his presence; adding that his desertion was an abdication, and that the nation and Louis XVI. were relieved from all obligation towards each other; finally, that history was full of the crimes of kings, and that it behoved them to avoid giving themselves one again.

This address, attributed to young Achille Duchâtelet, was the production of Thomas Paine, an Englishman, and a principal actor in the American revolution. It was denounced to the assembly, which, after warm debates, deemed it expedient to pass to the order of the day, and treat with indifference seditious appeals and attacks, as it had always done.

The commissioners charged to report upon the affair of Varennes, at length presented the result of their deliberations, on the 16th July. The journey, they said, involved nothing of a criminal nature, and, had it done so, the king was inviolable. Nor could forfeiture be judged to have resulted, since the king had not remained absent for a sufficient length of time, and had not resisted the summons of the legislative body.

Robespierre, Petion, and Buzot, reiterated all the usual arguments against inviolability; Duport, Barnave, and Salles, replied to them; and it was ultimately decreed that the king could not be brought under accusation for the offence of flight. Two articles were merely added to the decree of inviolability. So soon as this decision was pronounced, Robespierre arose, and entered his solemn protest in the name of humanity

On the evening which preceded this decision, there was a great tumult at the Jacobins. A petition was drawn up, addressed to the assembly, calling upon it to declare the king deposed, as a traitor faithless to his oaths, and to provide for his substitution by all constitutional means. It was resolved that this petition should be carried the next day to the Champ de Mars, and laid on the altar of the country for signatures. Accordingly, it was borne in the morning to the place agreed upon; and the crowd of the seditious was swelled by that of the curious, who desired to witness

the ceremony. By this time the decree was already passed, and therefore no occasion existed for any petition. Lafayette arrived, broke down the barricades already raised, had execrations and threats hurled abundantly at his head, and, finally, a shot fired at him, which, although discharged with deliberate aim, passed harmlessly by. The municipal officers having come to his aid, ultimately prevailed on the populace to disperse. The national guards were placed so as to observe their retreat, and for a moment hopes were entertained they would quietly separate; but the tumult shortly recommenced. Two invalids standing, it is unknown for what purpose, under the altar of the country, were massacred, and thereupon the disorder became universal and boundless. The assembly summoned the municipality, and charged it to watch over public order. Bailly repaired to the Champ de Mars, and unfolded the red flag, in token of martial law. The employment of force, whatever may have been alleged, was just and indispensable. New laws were desired, or they were not: if they were desired, it was necessary they should be executed; that some fixed and settled order should prevail; that insurrection should not be perpetual, and that the determinations of the assembly should not be open to modification by the *plebis-scita** of the multitude. Bailly was, therefore, justified in adopting all means to secure the execution of the laws. He advanced with that calm courage which he had always evinced, received without injury some shots, and attempted in vain, amidst the din and uproar, to make the necessary summonses. Lafayette at first ordered the national guards to fire in the air; at this menace the crowd abandoned the altar, but soon rallied again. Thus reduced to extremity, he issued his orders to fire on the multitude. The first discharge laid low certain of the most seditious. Their number was exaggerated. Some have reduced it to thirty, others have raised it to four hundred, and the furious to some thousands. The latter were believed at the time, and a general terror was infused. So severe an example silenced the agitators for a period.†

As usual, all parties were accused of having excited this movement; and it is probable that several had co-operated in provoking it, for it was convenient for several. The king, the majority of the assembly, the national guard, the municipal and departmental authorities, were all in concert to establish the constitutional order of things; and they had to combat democracy within and aristocracy without. The assembly and the national guards composed that middle class, wealthy, enlightened, and prudent, who desired order and the supremacy of law; and under existing circumstances, they were naturally disposed to ally closely with the king, who, on his part, appeared cordially resigned to a limited authority. But if it suited them to stop at the point already reached, it was far otherwise with the aristocracy, which rested its hopes on discord and confusion; and with the populace, which was eager to gain more and rise higher. Barnave, as formerly Mirabeau, was the orator of that well-informed and moderate burgher class, and Lafayette its military chief. Danton and Camille-Desmoulins were the orators, and Santerre the general, of that multitude, anxious for supremacy in its turn. A few ardent or fanatical spirits were its representatives, as well in the assembly as in the new administrative bodies, and accelerated the era of its reign by their declamations.

The massacre of the Champ de Mars was the occasion of much obloquy to Lafayette and Bailly. But both, placing their duty on the observation of the law, and ready to sacrifice their popularity and lives in its enforcement, felt neither remorse nor fear for what they had done. The energy which they manifested awed the factious. The most prominent sought to shelter themselves from the punishment they deemed in store for them. Robespierre, who had hitherto supported the most violent propositions, trembled in his obscure dwelling; and, notwithstanding his inviolability as a deputy, besought an asylum from all his friends. Thus the example was not without effect; and, for a time, all the turbulent spirits were kept in check by their fears.

The assembly adopted at this period a determination which has been since greatly censured, but which was not so disastrous in its consequences as has been thought. It decreed that none of its members should be re-elected. Robespierre was the author of the proposition; and it was accounted for in him by the envy he felt towards colleagues amongst whom he had never distinguished himself. It was at least natural that he should bear them no good will, since he had been always embroiled with them; and in his feelings on the question, there might be at once conviction, envy, and malice. The assembly, accused as it was of a desire to perpetuate its power, and, furthermore, out of favour with the multitude for its moderation, hastened to repel all attacks by a disinterestedness perhaps too exaggerated, by deciding that its members should be excluded from the succeeding legislature. The new assembly was thus deprived of men whose enthusiasm was somewhat sobered, and whose legislative science had ripened in an experience of three years. But, when we treat of the causes of the subsequent revolutions, we shall be better enabled to judge what weight should be attached to that measure so often reprobated.

The time was at length arrived for concluding the constitutional labours, and closing in tranquillity so stormy a career. Certain members of the left side entertained the project of agreeing to a compromise, in order to remodel certain parts of the constitution. It had been resolved that the whole should be read over, so that it might be judged of in the aggregate, and its various articles made to harmonise; this was called the revision, and afterwards, in the days of republican fervour, was regarded as a culpable proceeding. Barnave and the Lameths had agreed with Malouet to modify certain articles framed in a hostile spirit to the royal prerogative, and to what was styled the stability of the throne. It was even alleged that they designed to re-establish the two chambers. It was arranged that, immediately after the perusal was finished, Malouet should make his attack, and that Barnave should afterwards reply to him with vehemence, the better to mask his real views; but that, whilst defending the major part of the articles, he should give up some as palpably dangerous, and condemned by the test of experience. Such were the stipulated conditions of this compact, when the ridiculous and irritating protests of the right side were made, in which it resolved to abstain from giving any future votes. Thenceforth all accommodation was out of the question: the left side would listen to no further overtures; and when the attempt was made, according to agreement, the shouts which rose from all parts prevented Malouet and his friends from proceeding.* The constitution

* [Laws made by the people alone, without the senate, in the Roman republic, were thus called.]

† This event occurred on the evening of Sunday the 17th July.

* Bouillé had an intimate friend in the Count de Gouvernet; and although their opinions were far from completely coinciding, they had a great esteem for each other. Bouillé, who pays little respect to the constitutionalists, expresses himself in the most honourable terms when he speaks of M. de Gouvernet, and seems to place entire confidence in him. To give an idea of what was passing in the assembly at this period, he cites the following letter in his memoirs, written to himself by the Count de Gouvernet, on the 26th August 1791:—

"I had given you hopes which I have now lost. That fatal constitution, which was intended to be revised, ameliorated, will not be so. It will remain as it is, a code of anarchy, a source of calamity; and our unfortunate destiny wills it that at the moment the democrats themselves become sensible of a portion of their errors, it is the aristocrats who, by refusing their aid, oppose the reparation. To enable you to understand the matter, and to justify myself in your eyes for having possibly given you

was therefore concluded with some haste, and presented to the king for his acceptance. From that moment his liberty was restored, or, if the phrase be more suitable, the strict guard on the palace was relaxed, and he had power to go where he chose to study the constitutional act, and accept it with free will. But what course was open to Louis XVI.? To refuse the constitution was to abdicate in favour of a republic. The most sure, even upon his own system, was to accept, and trust to time for those restitutions of power which he conceived due to him. Accordingly, after the lapse of some days, he declared that the constitution was accepted by him (13th September). An extraordinary joy was evinced when this intelligence was promulgated, as if any real obstacle had been feared on the part of the king, or as if his sanction had been some unhoped-for concession. He repaired to the assembly, where he was hailed with the enthusiasm of better days. Lafayette, who never omitted an opportunity of healing the inevitable maladies of political troubles, proposed a general amnesty for all offences relative to the revolution. That amnesty was voted amidst shouts of joy, and the prisons were instantly thrown open. Finally, on the 30th September, Thouret, the last president, declared that the Constituent Assembly had terminated its sittings.

false hopes, I must recur to things somewhat stale, and tell you all that has passed, since I have to-day a safe opportunity for writing to you.

On the day and the morrow of the king's departure, the two sides of the assembly remained in observation upon their respective movements. The popular party was in great consternation; the royalist party in great uneasiness. The least indiscretion might arouse the fury of the people. All the members of the right side kept silence, and those of the left side intrusted to their leaders the proposition of measures which they called '*of safety*,' and which were opposed by no one. The second day after the departure, the Jacobins became threatening, and the constitutionalists moderate. They were then, and still are, much more numerous than the Jacobins. They spoke of accommodation, and of a deputation to the king. Two of them proposed a conference to M. Malouet, which was to have been opened the next day; but in the mean time the king's arrest became known, and the idea was dropped. However, their sentiments having been thus manifested, they saw themselves more than ever separated from the furious. The return of Barnave; the respect he had evinced towards the king and queen, whilst the ferocious Petion insulted their misfortunes; the gratitude their majesties testified to Barnave, changed in some sort the heart of that young man, hitherto steeled to pity. He is, as you know, the most culpable,* and one of the most influential in his party. He had, therefore, rallied around him four-fifths of the left side, not only to save the king from the fury of the Jacobins, but to restore him a portion of his authority, and likewise to give him means for defending himself in future, whilst adhering to the constitutional line of conduct. Of this latter part of Barnave's plan, only Lameth and Duport were apprised, for the constitutional mass still inspired sufficient distrust to render them uncertain of the majority of the assembly, except they could reckon on the right side; and they thought they might reasonably rely on it, when, in the revision of their constitution, they should grant more latitude to the royal authority.

Such was the state of things when I wrote to you. But fully convinced as I was of the infatuation and continual blunders of the aristocrats, I confess I did not forcsee to what lengths they could push their absurdity.

When it was known that the king had been stopped at Varennes, the right side, in secret council, resolved to vote no more, nor to take any further part in the deliberations or debates of the assembly. Malouet was opposed to that determination. He represented to them that so long as the session lasted, and they assisted in its labours, they were under an obligation to give active opposition to measures dangerous to public order, and inimical to the fundamental principles of the monarchy. All his arguments were thrown away: they persisted in their resolution, and secretly drew up a protest against all that had been done. Malouet stated that he would continue to protest in the tribune, and ostensibly to use all his efforts to prevent the mischief. He told me that he was unable to bring over to his opinion more than thirty-five or forty members of the right side, and that he was very apprehensive this injudicious measure of the more zealous royalists would be productive of the most fatal consequences.

The general feeling of the assembly was at that time so favourable to the king, that, whilst he was on the road to Paris, Thouret having ascended the tribune to propose the manner in which the king should be guarded (I was at the sitting), a profound silence reigned in the hall and in the galleries. Almost all the members, even of the left side, bore an expression of dismay on hearing that infamous decree read; but not an individual spoke a word. The president was about to put it to the vote, when Malouet suddenly rose, and with an air of dignity, exclaimed, 'What are you about to do, gentlemen? After having arrested the king, it is proposed that you constitute him a prisoner by decree! Where does such a step lead you? Have you well considered it? You would order the imprisonment of the king!' 'No, no!' exclaimed several members of the left side, rising tumultuously. '*We do not mean that the king should be a prisoner;*' and the decree would have been rejected almost unanimously, had not Thouret hastened to add—

'The member has misconceived the terms and the object of the decree. We have no more than himself an intention to imprison the king; it is for his safety and for that of the royal family that we propose these measures.' And it was only after this explanation that the decree passed; although the imprisonment has become real, and is shamelessly continued to this very day.

To the end of July the constitutionalists, who suspected the intended protest of the right side, without being quite certain of it, slowly prosecuted their plan of revision. They were more distrustful than ever both of Jacobins and aristocrats. Malouet appeared in their committee of revision. He spoke at first as to men who were perfectly aware of the dangers and faults of their constitution; but he found them little disposed to great reformations. They were afraid of losing their popularity. Target and Duport argued against him in defence of their work. The next day he met Chapelier and Barnave, who disdainfully refused to answer his animadversions, but ultimately acceded to a plan of attack, all the risk of which was to be incurred by him. He proposed to discuss, in the sitting of the 8th, all the principal articles of the constitutional act, and to demonstrate their vices. 'You, gentlemen,' said he, 'answer me; discharge upon me the full force of your indignation; defend your work successfully on the least dangerous articles, even on the majority of the points against which my censure shall be directed; and as to those which I designate as anti-monarchical, as impeding the action of government, say that neither the assembly nor the committee needed my observations in that respect; that you meant, in fact, to propose their amendment, and immediately move accordingly. Believe me, that such a course is possibly our only chance of maintaining the monarchy, and of making time available to give it all the props which are indispensable to it.' It was thus agreed; but the protest of the right side having transpired, and its dogged determination to vote no longer, depriving the constitutionalists of all hope of succeeding in their project of revision, which the Jacobins thwarted with all their power, they renounced it. Malouet, who had not regular communications with them, nevertheless made his attack. He solemnly repudiated the constitutional act as anti-monarchical, and in several particulars impracticable in execution. The developement of his reasons was beginning to make considerable impression, when Chapelier, who had given up all idea of the agreement being observed, at once broke through it with cries of blasphemy, interrupting the speaker, and demanding that he be made to descend from the tribune; which was ordered. The following day, he confessed he had been wrong; but he said that he and his friends had given up all hope, the moment they were assured that no assistance was to be anticipated from the right side.

It was necessary that I should give you this long history, to prevent you losing all confidence in my prognostics. They are at the present moment most mournful; the evil is extreme; and to remedy it, I see but one resource, either at home or abroad, and that is the alliance of force with reason."—*Mémoires de Bouillé*, p. 282, *et seq.*

* [The text has been followed, but it is probable the word should be *capable*.]

CHAPTER VII.

THE LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY.

THE Constituent Assembly had closed its long and laborious career; and, notwithstanding its heroic

courage, its scrupulous equity, its vast labours, it was execrated as revolutionary at Coblentz, and as aristocratical at Paris. To form a correct judgment upon that memorable assembly, in which the aggregate of talents was so rich and varied, the determination so bold and inflexible, and in which, for the first time perhaps, all the enlightened men of a nation were assembled together, with the will and the power to give reality to the theories of philosophy, it is necessary to consider the state in which it had found France and that in which it left her.

In 1789, the French nation was sensible and cognisant of all the evils that oppressed it, but the possibility of removing them was scarcely within the range of thought. Then, upon the unexpected demand of the parliaments, the states-general are convoked, the Constituent Assembly is formed, and marches into presence of the throne, majestic from its ancient supremacy, and disposed in its utmost condescension to sacrifice a few prized grievances. But that body is impressed with a sense of its own rights, proclaims itself the nation, and dares thunder it in the ear of an astounded government. Menaced by a powerful aristocracy, a court, and an army, and not yet foreseeing popular demonstrations, it declares itself inviolable, and warns power to respect that sanction; convinced of its undoubted rights, it has to address enemies who are not so assured of theirs; and it prevails, by the simple expression of its will, over a sway of several centuries, and over an army of thirty thousand men. Therein is the whole revolution; it is its first and most glorious act; it is just, it is heroic; for never did a nation stand forth more legitimately or more perilously.

Power vanquished, it became necessary to reconstruct it on an equitable and expedient basis. But beholding that social ladder, at the top of which all good things are in such plentiful store—power, honours, riches; whilst at the foot, all is wanting, even the bread indispensable to life—the Constituent Assembly experienced a violent reaction in its sentiments, and was moved to level grades. Consequently, it decided that the mass of the citizens, perfectly equalised, should express its will, whereof the king should stand intrusted simply with the execution.

The error that it committed here did not consist in reducing royalty to a simple magistracy, for the king was still left with sufficient authority to maintain the laws, and with more than is wielded by the magistrates in republics, but in believing that a king, with the recollections of what he had been, could resign himself to the change, and that a people but just aroused from a long lethargy, and in so recent possession of a portion of public power, would not insist upon its exclusive monopoly. All history proves, in fact, that an infinite subdivision of magistracies is indispensable; or, if a single chief be instituted, he should be so liberally endowed as to remove all desire for usurpation.

When nations, almost exclusively occupied with their private interests, feel a necessity for throwing the cares of government upon a chief, they do well to give themselves one; but in such case it is expedient that this chief, like the English sovereign, being empowered to convoke and dissolve national assemblies, not compelled to receive the law, but consenting to it only as it suits him, and impeded solely in perpetrating evil, should practically possess the greatest portion of the sovereignty. The dignity of man can easily comport with such a government, where the law is rigorously observed, where each citizen has a full sense of his own value, and knows that the high prerogatives invested in the monarch have been left to him only as an avowal of human weakness.

But it is not at the moment a nation suddenly springs to an appreciation of its dormant rights that it can consent to assume a secondary part, and voluntarily remit supremacy to a chief, in order that he may have no temptation to usurp it. The Constituent Assembly was no more capable of such an abdication than the nation itself. It consequently reduced royalty to a simple hereditary magistracy, hoping that the king would content himself with that position, still resplendant with honours, riches, and authority, and that the people would willingly leave it in that possession.

But whether the assembly formed that hope or not, could it, in the emergency, escape the difficulty? Could it suppress the king? or, on the other hand, could it give him all the power that England yields to its monarchs?

In the first place, it could not depose Louis XVI.; for, if it be always essential to observe justice in a government, it was not consulted in changing its form, when justice prevailed therein, and abruptly converting a monarchy into a republic. Besides, possession is entitled to respect; and if the assembly had despoiled the dynasty, what epithets would not its enemies have indulged in, when they accused it of violating property because it attacked the feudal abominations?

On the other hand, it could not grant the king an absolute veto, the nomination of judges, and other similar prerogatives, because public opinion was inimical to such concessions; and that opinion constituting its only strength, it was obliged to submit to its dictates.

With regard to the establishment of a single chamber, its error was more undoubted, perhaps, but equally inevitable. If it were dangerous to leave but the semblance of power to a king who had enjoyed its unlimited substance, and in front of a people eager to tear from him its last shred, it was much more false in principle to disregard social inequalities and gradations, when even republics admit them—when we find in all democracies a senate, either hereditary or elective. But it is vain to exact from men and from intelligence all they ought to have done at every epoch. How, in the midst of a revolt against the injustice of orders, was their necessity to be recognised? How constitute an aristocracy at the very instant of a crusade against aristocracy? To establish royalty would have been more easy, because, placed far from the people, its oppressions had been less galling, and because, in addition, it fulfilled functions which seemed more necessary.

But, I repeat, if these errors had not prevailed in the assembly, they were predominant in the nation; and the detail of subsequent events will demonstrate, that if the king and the aristocracy had been left all the prerogatives which were taken from them, the revolution would not the less have run its course, even to its last excesses.

To be convinced of the truth of this deduction, we ought to draw a line of distinction between revolutions which break out amongst populations long held in thraldom, and those which occur amongst free populations, that is to say, in possession of a certain political activity. At Rome, Athens, and elsewhere, we perceive nations and their rulers disputing for greater or less degrees of authority. With modern nations, long defrauded of their rights, the progress is quite different. Completely enslaved, they slumber long. The lethargy is shaken off by the enlightened classes, who arise and recover a portion of power. The process is successive; ambition is contagious, and finally spreads to the lowest classes; and the entire mass is stimulated into movement. Then, satisfied with what they have obtained, the enlightened classes desire to stop; but their efforts to stem the current are futile, and they are trodden under foot by those who press behind them. Such as would stop, be they but a remove from the lowest, are for the last an aristocracy; and in this contest of classes, surging tumultuously against each other, the simple burgher is ultimately called an aristocrat by the artisan, and assailed as such.

The Constituent Assembly presents to us that race of men who, urged by intelligence, first enters the lists against the yet overbearing power; sufficiently moderate to appreciate what is due to those who held all, and to those who possessed nothing, it desires to leave to the first a portion of what they possess, because they have always possessed it, and above all, to procure for the last knowledge, and the rights which are its consequence. But regrets torment the old possessors, ambition stimulates the rising classes: on the one hand, the object is to recover all, and on the other, to conquer all; and thus a war of extermination results. The members of this assembly, then, were those early patriots, who, shaking off slavery, attempt to institute an equitable order of government, prosecute the attempt unmoved by the difficulties that surround them, even achieve their mighty task, but fail at last by seeking to induce the one party to yield a portion, and the other to abstain from insisting upon all.

The Constituent Assembly, in its equitable adjustment, had manifested fitting respect for the old possessors. Louis XVI., with the title of King of the French, thirty millions a-year, the command of the armies, and the prerogative of suspending the national decrees, still enjoyed fair and enviable possessions. The remembrance of his absolute power can alone excuse him for not being satisfied with so brilliant a remnant of supremacy.

The clergy, deprived of immense estates which they had formerly received on condition of cherishing the poor whom they did not cherish, and of administering the gospel, the care of which they abandoned to indigent curates, no longer formed a political order; but their ecclesiastical dignities were preserved, their creed venerated, their scandalous affluence converted into a sufficient, and, indeed, it may be said, an abundant allowance, since it permitted a considerable parade of episcopal luxury. The nobles no longer formed an order, nor did they now enjoy the exclusive right of sporting, and other privileges of a like nature; they were likewise no longer exempt from taxes: but could they adduce such matters as objects of rational regret? Their immense possessions were left them, and instead of being dependent on court favour, they had the more certain and manly foundation of merit to rely upon for distinction. They were eligible to be elected by the people, and to represent it in the state, on the easy terms of evincing good feeling and resignation. The bar and the army were open to their talents: wherefore were they not actuated by a generous emulation? And why make so degrading a confession of incapacity, by lamenting the times of favouritism?

The Constituent Assembly had paid due consideration to old pensioners, had re-endowed the ecclesiastics, and, in a word, had treated every one with a regard as tender as the circumstances warranted; and we may ask, whether the lot it had accorded was, after all, so vastly insupportable?

The constitution being consummated, no hope remained to the king of recovering by deliberative means the prerogatives he so much regretted. Only one course was open to him, namely, to rest satisfied and observe the constitution, unless he relied upon foreign powers; but anticipating little from their zeal, and being distrustful of the emigrants, he at once decided for resignation; and what proves his sincerity is, that he wished frankly to express his opinion to the assembly upon the defects he perceived in the constitution. But from that desire he was dissuaded, and he resolved to expect from time the restitutions of power which he deemed due to him. The queen was not less resigned. "Courage!" said she to the minister Bertrand, as he entered her presence; "all is not yet lost. The king is determined to adhere to the constitution; that system is certainly the best." And we may be permitted to believe, that if she had really entertained any other sentiments, she would not have hesitated to express them in the presence of Bertrand de Molleville.*

The old assembly, then, had finally separated; its members had returned to the bosom of their families, or had spread themselves over the city of Paris. Some of the most eminent, such as Lameth, Duport, Barnave, kept up a communication with the court, and gave it the benefit of their counsels. But the king, all decided as he was to observe the constitution, could not bring himself to follow the advice tendered to him, for he was recommended not only not to violate that constitution, but also to make it clear to all minds, by

* The minister Bertrand de Molleville has exhibited the dispositions of the king and queen at the commencement of the Legislative Assembly, in terms which leave little doubt of their sincerity. He relates his first interview with those august personages in the following manner:—

"After having replied to some general observations which I had made upon the difficulties of the times, and on the numberless faults I must needs commit in a department with which I was unacquainted, the king said to me, 'Well—have you still any objection?' 'No, sire; the wish to obey and gratify your majesty is the only sentiment I feel; but, in order that I may know whether I can serve you usefully, it is necessary your majesty should have the goodness to communicate to me what plan you have determined upon relative to the constitution, and what conduct you desire your minister should pursue.' 'That is but proper,' replied the king. 'I do not regard this constitution as a masterpiece—far from it: I think it has very considerable faults, and that if I had enjoyed the liberty of addressing some observations to the assembly, very advantageous amendments might have resulted; but now the opportunity is past, and I have accepted it, such as it is. I have sworn to cause it to be executed, and I am bound to be strictly faithful to my oath, the more especially as I believe the most scrupulous execution of the constitution is the most certain means of making it understood by the nation, and of bringing it to perceive the alterations that ought to be made in it. I have not, nor can have, any other plan than that: I shall certainly not depart from it, and I desire that my ministers conform to it.'

'This plan appears to me extremely prudent, sire: I feel cordially disposed to follow it, and I incur the obligation. I have not sufficiently studied the new constitution, either in the aggregate or in the details, to have formed a settled opinion, and I shall abstain from adopting one, whatever it may be, until its execution has enabled the nation to appreciate it by its effects. But may I be permitted to ask your majesty, whether the opinion of the queen, on this point, be conformable to the king's?' 'Yes, perfectly—she will tell you so herself.'

I proceeded to the queen's apartment, and she, after expressing to me with great benignity her sense of the obligation she, as well as the king, had incurred towards me for having accepted the ministry under circumstances so critical, added these words, 'The king has informed you of his intentions relative to the constitution; do you not think that the only plan he ought to follow is to be faithful to his oath?' 'Yes, undoubtedly, madam.' 'Very well; be assured we shall not be made to swerve from our resolution. Come, M. Bertrand, let us take courage; I hope that with patience, firmness, and consistency, all is not yet lost.'"—*Bertrand de Molleville*, vol. vi. p. 22; in the English edition, vol. i. p. 214, of his *Private Memoirs*.

With the testimony of Bertrand de Molleville coincides that of Madame Campan, who, although sometimes a suspicious authority, has upon this occasion a great appearance of truth:—

"The constitution was, as I have said, presented to the king on the 3d September. I return to this presentation, because it afforded a subject for very grave deliberation. All the ministers, except M. de Montmorin, insisted upon the necessity of accepting the constitutional act in its entirety. This was also the advice of Prince Kaunitz. Malouet wished that the king should explain his views with sincerity upon the vices and dangers he remarked in the constitution. But Duport and Barnave, alarmed at the spirit that reigned in the Jacobin Club, and even in the assembly, where Robespierre had already denounced them as traitors to the country, and fearing great disasters, joined their voices to those of the majority of the ministers and of Prince Kaunitz. Those who were cordially desirous to maintain the constitution, advised that it should not be accepted purely and simply; of this number were, as I have said, Messieurs Montmorin and Malouet. The king seemed to prefer their opinion, and this is one of the greatest proofs of the unfortunate monarch's sincerity."—*Memoirs of Madame Campan*, vol. ii. p. 161.



his simplest actions, that he was sincerely attached to it. These three members of the late assembly, in coalition with Lafayette since the revision, were the leaders of that revolutionary generation which had given the first rules to liberty, and now desired that they might not be departed from. They were supported by the national guard, which long service under Lafayette had completely attached to that general and his principles. The members of the Constituent Assembly committed the indiscretion of holding in disdain the new assembly, and of irritating it by frequent sarcasms. A species of aristocratic vanity had already seized upon these first legislators, and they seemed to imagine that all legislative science had disappeared with them.

The new assembly was composed of different classes of men. It included many enlightened partisans of the first revolution, Ramond, Girardin, Vaublanc, Dumas, and others, who denominated themselves constitutionalists, and occupied the right side, where not one of the old privileged classes was found. Thus, in the natural and progressive march of the revolution, the left side of the first assembly became the right side of the second. Next to the constitutionalists was a numerous body of distinguished men, whose imaginations the revolution had heated, and enlarged the scope of their desires. Witnesses of the constituent labours, and tormented by the impatience common to those who contemplate others in action, they were of opinion that not sufficient had been accomplished; they dared not avow themselves republicans, because from all parts came recommendations to be faithful to the constitution; but the republican essay made during the flight of Louis XVI., and the suspected intentions of the court, perpetually brought the idea to their minds; and the state of constant hostility in which they found themselves with respect to the court, was calculated to attach them more strongly to it every day.

In this new generation of talents, those who principally attracted observation were the deputies from the department of the Gironde, whence the whole party, though formed by men from all the departments, was called the *Girondist.* Condorcet, an author distinguished for great comprehensiveness of ideas, and for the extremely rigorous cast of his mind and character, was its journalist; and Vergniaud, a ready, elegant, and seductive speaker, was its orator. This party, continually augmented by all who gave up the court in despair, was far from looking forward to such a republic as fell to it in 1793; it dreamt of a republic with all its alluring concomitants, its virtues, and austere manners. Enthusiasm and vehemence may be said to have been its chief characteristics.

This party likewise was destined to have its extreme members. These were, Bazire, Chabot, Merlin de Thionville, and others; inferior in talent, they surpassed the other Girondists in audacity. They became the party of *the Mountain*, when, after the overthrow of the throne, they seceded from the Gironde. Finally, this second assembly had, like the first, an intermediate mass, which, without any fixed engagement, voted first with one and then with the other. Under the Constituent Assembly, in which liberty really reigned, a similar body had remained independent; but since it had done so not through energy but from a spirit of indifference, in the subsequent assemblies, where violence raged uncontrolled, it became cowardly and despicable, and received the contemptuous and disgraceful epithet of "*the Belly.*"

The clubs acquired at this period still greater importance. Agitators under the Constituent, they became dominators under the Legislative Assembly. The National Assembly not being numerous enough to embody all the ambitious spirits in the community, they had flocked to the clubs, where they found a tribune and scenes of excitement. To those resorts thronged all who were eager to speak, to agitate, to stimulate—that is to say, almost the entire nation. The people ran to so novel a spectacle; they occupied the galleries of all the meetings, and began about this time to find it a lucrative occupation, since the system of paying for applauses was now introduced. The minister Bertrand confesses that he himself had paid for them.

The oldest of the clubs, that of the Jacobins, already exercised an extraordinary influence. A whole church scarcely sufficed to contain the crowd of members and auditors. An immense amphitheatre was reared in form of a circus, and occupied all the great nave of the Jacobin church. A desk was placed in the centre, at which a president and secretaries were seated. A regular system of voting was pursued, and the decisions were recorded in a register. An active correspondence kept up the zeal of the societies spread over the whole surface of France, which were styled affiliated societies. This club, from its longer existence and its persevering violence, had invariably succeeded over all those who had attempted to inculcate more moderate, or even more vehement, counsels. The Lameths, together with all the distinguished men it contained, had abandoned it after the return from Varennes, and joined the Feuillants. In this latter were amalgamated all the essayists at moderate clubs, the attempts to form which had always been unsuccessful, inasmuch as they proceeded in direct contradiction to the spirit which prompts recourse to clubs, that of agitation. To the Feuillants were at that time joined the constitutionalists, or partisans of the first revolution. Hence the name of Feuillant became a passport to proscription, when that of *moderate* was one.*

Another club, that of the Cordeliers, had endeavoured to rival the Jacobins in violence. Camille-Desmoulins was its journalist, and Danton its leader. This latter, who had failed at the bar, had nevertheless known how to win the favour of the multitude, whom he strongly interested by his athletic frame, his sonorous voice, and his passions, so essentially popular. The Cordeliers had not been able, even by the aid of superior exaggeration, to prevail over their rivals, to whom custom secured a great concourse; but they were at the same time almost all members of the Jacobin club, and when any important point rendered it necessary, they repaired thither at the heels of Danton, to determine the majority in his favour.

Robespierre, whom we have seen during the Constituent Assembly distinguished for the rigorous violence of his principles, was excluded from the Legislative Assembly by the decree of non re-election, which he had himself contributed to have passed. He thenceforth confined himself to the Jacobins, where he ruled without a rival, from the dogmatism of his opinions, and from a reputation for integrity, which had procured him the name of "the incorruptible." Paralysed with terror, as we have seen, at the time of the revision, he had since plucked up fresh courage, and now prosecuted with unremitting attention the work of popularity. He had encountered two competitors whom he began to hate with great cordiality, namely, Brissot and Louvet. Brissot, who had mingled with all the most distinguished members

* [Bertrand gives the following account of the Feuillant Club:—"It was chiefly composed of the remains of the constitutional party of the first assembly, of the members of the Legislative Assembly, who had adopted similar opinions, and of a small number of moderate royalists, who, although they did not in this association find principles as pure as their own, considered it nevertheless as favourable to royalty, from the mere circumstance of its being opposed to Jacobinism, hoping that it might one day become a rallying point to the royalists who had not emigrated, and who, having no means of uniting, could offer to the king only a barren zeal and unavailing wishes. The motto of the club was, *The constitution, the whole constitution, and nothing but the constitution.*"—Vol. v. p. 200. Such a rallying cry has been known in the history of other countries besides that of France.]

of the first assembly, being the friend of Mirabeau and Lafayette, known as a republican, and one of the most eminent members of the Legislative, was fickle in character, but remarkable for certain intellectual qualities. Louvet, possessing great warmth of temperament, high mental powers, and unflinching boldness, formed one of those, who, overstepping the constitution, looked forward to a republic; he, therefore, naturally found himself drawn towards the Girondists. His contests with Robespierre soon attached him more closely to them. This party of the Gironde, gradually formed, as it were unintentionally, by men who had too much loftiness of mind to propitiate the populace, but were sufficiently distinguished to raise its envy and that of its leaders, and who were rather united by similarity of position than from actual concert, was, from its composition, sure to be brilliant but likewise weak, and incapable of standing before the more real factions which sprung up around it when the day of battle came.

Such, then, was the state of France. The old privileged classes had retired beyond the Rhine; the partisans of the constitution filled the right of the assembly, the national guard, and the Feuillant club; the Girondists had the majority in the assembly, but not in the clubs, where vulgar violence reigned supreme; finally, the hotheads of this new epoch, seated on the highest benches in the assembly, and on that account called the Mountain, were all-powerful in the clubs and over the populace.

Lafayette, having resigned all military rank, had been accompanied to his estate by the esteem and regret of his companions in arms. The command had not been delegated to a new general, but six heads of legions commanded in turns the whole national guard. Bailly, the faithful friend of Lafayette during these three painful years, likewise abdicated the mayoralty. The votes of the electors were divided between Lafayette and Pétion; but the court, determined to support Lafayette upon no consideration, although his sentiments were favourable to it, preferred Pétion, although an avowed republican. It anticipated much good from a sort of coldness which it took for stupidity, but was something very different; and it lavished large sums to secure him a majority.* He obtained it in consequence, and was nominated mayor of Paris (17th November). Pétion, with a cultivated mind, cold but deliberate in conviction, and possessed of much address, invariably aided the republicans in opposition to the court, and became linked to the Gironde from conformity of views, and the envy his new dignity excited amongst the Jacobins.

However, notwithstanding these dispositions of parties, if the king could have been relied upon, it is possible that the distrust of the Girondists might have been subdued, and the pretext of troubles being removed, that the agitators would have thenceforth been deprived of topics to exasperate the populace into acts of violence.

The intentions of the king were certainly formed, but owing to his feebleness of character, they were never irrevocable. It behoved him to demonstrate them in some signal manner before they could be trusted; and, whilst that proof was withheld, he was exposed to more than one outrage. Although the disposition of Louis XVI. was amiable, it was not without a certain dash of irritability; thus his resolutions might very easily be shaken by the first operations of the assembly. That body was formed, and with much ceremony took the oath upon the book of the constitution. Its first decree, relative to etiquette, abolished the titles of "sire" and "majesty," generally used towards the king. It furthermore ordered that, when he appeared in the assembly, he should be seated on a chair exactly similar to that occupied by the president.* These were the first bursts of the republican spirit, and the pride of Louis XVI. was acutely wounded. To escape from what he regarded as a humiliation, he resolved not to enter the assembly, and to send his ministers to open the legislative session. The assembly, repenting of its first hostility, revoked the decree the following day, thereby giving a rare example of contrition. The king accordingly proceeded thither, and was extremely well received. Unfortunately, it had been decreed that the deputies should remain seated if the king did so; this they carried into practice, and Louis XVI. esteemed it a fresh insult. The applauses wherewith he was covered were insufficient to heal the wound. He returned to the palace, pale, and with his countenance agitated. When alone with the queen, he threw himself on a sofa, sighing deeply. "Ah! madam," he exclaimed, "you have been a witness to this degradation! What! to come into France to see"—— The queen endeavoured to soothe him, but his heart was profoundly afflicted, and his good intentions were grievously shaken.†

But if he thenceforward turned his eyes to foreign succour alone, the dispositions of the powers were not calculated to afford him much hope. The declaration of Pilnitz had remained without effect, as well from deficiency of zeal in the sovereigns, as also from regard to the danger to which Louis XVI. was exposed, he being, since the return from Varennes, a prisoner of the Constituent Assembly. The acceptance of the constitution was an additional reason for waiting the course of events before proceeding to action. Such was the opinion of Leopold and his minister Kaunitz. Accordingly, when Louis XVI. had notified to the European courts that he accepted the constitution, and that his intention was to faithfully observe it, Austria returned a very pacific answer; Prussia and England did the same, and conveyed assurances of their amicable views. It is observable that neighbouring powers acted with more reserve than those at a distance, such as Sweden and Russia, because they were more immediately compromised by war. Gustavus, who contemplated a brilliant expedition against France, replied to the notification that he did not consider the king free. Russia delayed to explain herself. Holland, the principal Italian states, and especially Switzerland, gave satisfactory rejoinders. The Electors of Treves and Mayence, in whose territories the emigrants were located, used evasive expressions. Spain, besieged by emissaries from Coblentz, was equally cautious in her statements, alleging that she desired time to be convinced of the king's liberty; but she gave assurances, nevertheless, that she did not purpose to disturb the tranquillity of the kingdom.

Such replies, of which not one was decidedly hostile, the assured neutrality of England, the uncertainty of Frederick-William, the pacific and well-known dispositions of Leopold, all conduced to the supposition of peace. It is difficult to surmise what might be passing in the vacillating mind of Louis XVI., but his evident interest, and the fears with which war at a later date inspired him, must lead to the conclusion

* [The court, acting upon that spirit of infatuation which seems common to all ages, factions, and ranks, prompting political parties to prefer a man of extreme opinions to one more nearly approximating to their own principles, opposed Lafayette upon this occasion, according to the avowal of Bertrand de Molleville himself. "The court," says he, "detesting M. de Lafayette, and fearing above all his ambition and intrigues, openly favoured Pétion. 'M. de Lafayette,' said the queen to me on this occasion, 'only desires to be Mayor of Paris, with the view of being soon after Mayor of the palace. Pétion is a republican and a Jacobin, but he is a fool, incapable of ever being the leader of a party; he will be a nullity of a mayor!'"—*Bertrand's Annals*, vol. v. p. 106. Pétion was elected mayor on the 17th November, by a majority over Lafayette of 6728 to 3126.]

* Decree of the 5th October.

† See Madame Campan, vol. ii. p. 129.

that he was likewise anxious for the preservation of peace. Amidst this general concert, the emigrants alone persisted in wishing for war, and in making preparations for it.

They still resorted in crowds to Coblentz. There they armed with activity, collected magazines, outbid competition for munitions, formed regiments (which were certainly not filled up, since none were disposed to become private soldiers), established grades which were exposed to sale, and, if they attempted nothing really dangerous, they nevertheless made great preparations, which they themselves deemed formidable, and which tended very naturally to alarm the popular imagination.

The important point was to ascertain whether Louis XVI. was countenancing them or not; and it was difficult to believe that he was not well disposed towards relatives and servants who were taking arms to restore him his ancient powers. There needed the most perfect sincerity, and its continual demonstration, to corroborate a contrary opinion. The king's letters to the emigrants conveyed an invitation, and even an order, to return; but he had, it was rumoured, a secret correspondence which belied his public correspondence, and counteracted its effects. It is doubtless impossible to deny a secret intercourse with Coblentz, but I am far from believing that Louis XVI. used it for the purpose of contradicting the injunctions which he had publicly addressed to the emigrant princes.* It was his clear and incontestible interest that they should return. Their presence at Coblentz could only be useful in as far as they designed to invade; now, Louis XVI. shuddered above all things at the idea of a civil war. Not desiring, therefore, to employ their swords upon the Rhine, it was better that he should have them near him, in order that they might assist him in emergency, and join their efforts to those of the constitutionalists in protecting his person and throne. Besides, their continuance at Coblentz provoked severe laws, which he was unwilling to sanction; his refusal would compromise him with the assembly, and we shall in fact see that it was the use he made of the veto which completely turned the popular feeling against him, by rendering him suspected as an accomplice of the emigrants. It would be strange if he had not perceived the force of these reasons, with which all his ministers were impressed. They were unanimously of opinion that the emigrants ought to return, in order to defend the person of the king, to put an end to alarm, and to remove all pretext for agitation. Such was even the opinion of Bertrand de Molleville, whose principles were not peculiarly constitutional. "It was necessary," says he, "to use all possible means for increasing the popularity of the king. The most efficacious and certain of all, at this moment, was to recall the emigrants. Their return, so generally desired, would have revived in France the royalist party, which the emigration had completely disorganised. This party, strengthened by the odium into which the assembly had fallen, by the numerous deserters from the constitutional party, and by all the discontented, would have speedily become sufficiently powerful to render decisive the explosion which might, sooner or later, be certainly anticipated."*

Louis XVI., conforming to this counsel of his ministers, addressed exhortations to the principal officers of the army and navy, recalling them to a sense of their duty, and to the retention of their commands. But such exhortations were utterly disregarded, and the desertion continued uninterruptedly. The minister of war came forward to announce the desertion of nineteen hundred officers. The assembly could not moderate its wrath, and resolved to take most vigorous measures to stop the evil. The Constituent had restricted itself to pronouncing deprivation against all public functionaries leaving the kingdom, and levying on the possessions of emigrants a triple contribution, to indemnify the state for the services of which their absence deprived it. The new assembly proposed more severe penalties.

Various motions were submitted. Brissot distinguished three classes of emigrants—the leaders of the desertion, the public functionaries who forsook their duties, and, lastly, those whom fear had impelled to fly their native country. The full measure of punishment should be meted to the first classes, said he, but the last might be contemned and pitied.

It is quite certain that the liberty of man does not consist with his being chained to a particular soil; but when positive knowledge is acquired from a number of concurrent circumstances, that citizens are abandoning their country in order to collect together without its limits and stir up war against it, in such cases it is clearly allowable to adopt precautions against projects so fraught with danger.

A long and obstinate debate ensued upon the question. The constitutionalists opposed all the proposed measures, and maintained that futile schemes ought to be held in contempt, according to the plan always pursued by their predecessors. However, the opposing party prevailed, and a preliminary decree was passed, enjoining Monsieur, the king's brother, to return within two months, or in default thereof, condemning him to forfeit his eventual right to the regency. Another more severe decree was passed against the emigrants in general; it declared that the French assembled beyond the frontiers of the kingdom were suspected of a conspiracy against France; that if, on the first day of the ensuing January, they should still continue assembled, they should be deemed guilty of conspiracy, prosecuted as such, and punished with death; and that the incomes of those in contumacy should be during their lives received for the national benefit, without prejudice to the rights of wives, children, and legitimate creditors.†

The act of emigrating not being in itself reprehensible, it is difficult to assign the point distinctly at which it becomes so. What the law could equitably do, was to publish beforehand who would be held culpable in certain cases; and all those who were desirous of not being so held, had only to yield obedience. Those who, after notice of the period at which absence from the kingdom would become a crime, did not return, thereby voluntarily consented to pass for criminals. Those who, without warlike or political motives, were beyond the kingdom, were bound to hasten their return; it was but a slight sacrifice to

* It is Madame Campan who has favoured us with the information that the king kept up a secret correspondence with Coblentz:—

"Whilst the couriers were on the road with the confidential letters of the king to the princes his brothers, and to the foreign princes, the assembly invited the king to address the princes, urging them to return into France. The king directed the Abbé de Montesquiou to draw up the letter which he ought to send. This letter, admirably written, expressed in a simple and touching style, so analogous to the character of Louis XVI., and replete with strong arguments upon the advantage of rallying to the principles of the constitution, was intrusted to me by the king, with orders to make him a copy.

At this period, M. Mor——, one of the intendants of Monsieur's household, obtained a passport from the assembly, enabling him to visit the prince, on account of some matter of essential interest to his affairs. The queen selected him to bear this letter; she determined upon giving it him herself, and explaining to him its purport. The choice of such a courier surprised me: the queen assured me it was the best in the world, that she reckoned upon his indiscretion, and that it was merely essential the public should be made acquainted with the king's letter to his brothers. *The princes were, doubtless, forewarned in the private correspondence.* Monsieur, however, showed some surprise; and the messenger returned more afflicted than satisfied with such a mark of confidence, which nearly cost him his life during the reign of terror."—*Madame Campan*, vol. ii. p. 172

* Vol. vi. p. 42. † Decrees of the 28th October and 9th November.

the safety of a state, that a traveller for pleasure or business should curtail the extent of his journey.

The king, with the view of gratifying the assembly and public opinion, sanctioned the decree which ordered Monsieur to return, under penalty of losing his right to the regency; but he affixed his veto to the law against the emigrants. The ministers were ordered to repair in a body to the assembly, with the announcement of the king's resolves.* They first read over various decrees to which the sanction was given. When that upon the emigrants came in its turn, a marked silence pervaded the assembly; and upon the keeper of the seals pronouncing the official formula, "*the king will examine*," great discontent was manifested on all sides. He desired to detail the reasons of the rejection, but several voices rose against this course, exclaiming to the minister, that the constitution granted the king the right of opposing, but not that of assigning motives. The minister was accordingly obliged to desist, leaving behind him a rankling feeling of irritation. This first resistance on the king's part to the measures of the assembly was a definitive rupture; for, although he had sanctioned the decree which deprived his brother of the regency, his refusal of the second was deemed an incontestible proof of his partiality towards the insurgents of Coblentz. None forgot at such a moment that he was their relative, their friend, and, in some sort, their copartner in interest; and it was held impossible for him to abstain from making common cause with them against the nation.

On the following day, Louis XVI. gave publication to a proclamation against the emigrants, and two individual letters to his brothers. The reasons which he urged upon both the one and the other of these parties were excellent, and apparently advanced in good faith. He solicited them to put an end, by their return, to the suspicions which the malevolent took such pains to disseminate; he entreated them not to reduce him to the necessity of employing harsh measures against them; and as to his want of liberty, upon which such stress was laid to disregard his injunctions, he adduced as a proof of the contrary, the veto he had just exercised in their favour.† However cogent these reasons might be, they produced neither at Coblentz nor at Paris the effect they were calculated, or appeared calculated, to have wrought. The emigrants did not return; and in the assembly the tone of the proclamation was judged too mild, and even the power of the executive to issue one at all was contested. It, in fact, was too deeply irritated to be contented with a proclamation, and especially to suffer a useless measure to be substituted by the king for the energetic measures it had resolved to adopt.

Another trial of a similar description was imposed on Louis XVI. at the same period, and led to an equally unfortunate result. The first religious troubles had broken loose in the west, and the Constituent Assembly had sent thither two commissioners, one of whom was Gensonné, subsequently so celebrated in the Girondist party. Their report had been made to the Legislative Assembly, and, though drawn up with great moderation, had filled it with indignation. It will be remembered that the Constituent Assembly, when suspending from their functions the priests who refused to take the oath, had nevertheless left them a pension, and liberty to celebrate divine worship apart. Since then they had never ceased to excite the people against their conforming brethren, and to uphold them as impious persons, whose ministry was null and dangerous. They dragged the peasants after them for long distances to hear the ritual of mass. These latter were

* Sitting of the 12th November.

† LETTER OF THE KING TO LOUIS-STANISLAUS-XAVIER, FRENCH PRINCE, BROTHER OF THE KING.

"*Paris*, 11*th November* 1791.

I wrote to you, my brother, on the 16th of October last, and you could have no reason to doubt my real sentiments. I am astonished that my letter has not produced the effect I was justified in anticipating. To recall you to your duties, I have urged all the motives which must most nearly touch you. Your absence is a pretext for all the malevolent, a sort of excuse for all the misguided French, who think they are serving me by keeping all France in a disquiet and agitation which form the torments of my life. The revolution is finished, the constitution consummated, France eager for it, and I determined to maintain it; the safety of the monarchy depends at this moment upon its stability. The constitution has given you rights; it has imposed a condition upon their enjoyment which you ought to hasten to fulfil. Believe me, my brother, and discard the doubts that are sought to be impressed upon you regarding my liberty. I am about to prove, by a very solemn act, and in a matter affecting you, that I may act freely. Prove you to me that you are my brother and a Frenchman, by yielding to my wishes. Your proper place is by my side; your interest, your feelings, equally move you to return and resume it. I invite you to do so, and, if necessary, I order you.

(Signed) LOUIS."

MONSIEUR'S REPLY TO THE KING.

"*Coblentz*, 3*d December* 1791.

SIRE, MY BROTHER AND LORD—The Count de Vergennes has delivered to me, on the part of your majesty, a letter, the superscription on which, notwithstanding it contained my baptismal names, was so different from my address, that I thought of returning it to him unopened. However, upon his positive assurance that it was for me, I opened it, and the name of brother, which I there found, having removed from my mind all doubt, I read it with the respect I owe to the writing and signature of your majesty. The order which it contains for me to repair to your majesty's side is not the free expression of your will, and my honour, my duty, my affection even, equally debar me from obeying it. If your majesty seeks to know all my motives more in detail, I entreat you to refer to my letter of the 10th of last September. I likewise entreat your majesty to graciously receive the expression of those sentiments, as affectionate as respectful, with which I am," &c. &c.

LETTER FROM THE KING TO CHARLES-PHILIP, FRENCH PRINCE, BROTHER OF THE KING.

"*Paris*, 11*th November* 1791.

You are undoubtedly aware of the decree which the National Assembly has passed relative to Frenchmen out of the country; I do not think it incumbent on me to give my consent thereto, fondly persuading myself that gentle means will more effectually attain the object that is proposed, and which the interest of the state demands. The various overtures I have made to you, must remove all doubt from your mind as to my intentions and desires. Public tranquillity and my personal comfort are dependent on your return. You cannot continue a line of conduct which distracts France and afflicts me, without disregarding your most essential duties. Spare me the pain of sanctioning severe measures against you; consult your true interests; allow yourself to be guided by the attachment you owe to your country; in a word, yield to the wish of the French nation and to that of your king. Such a resolve on your part will be a proof of your sentiments towards me, and will assure you the continuance of those I have always entertained towards you. (Signed) LOUIS."

ANSWER OF THE COUNT D'ARTOIS TO THE KING.

"*Coblentz*, 3*d December* 1791.

SIRE, MY BROTHER AND LORD—The Count de Vergennes delivered me yesterday a letter which he assured me had been addressed to me by your majesty. The superscription giving me a title which I cannot admit, led me to believe that this letter was not intended for me; but, having recognised your majesty's seal, I opened it, and I respected the writing and the signature of my king; but the total omission of the name of brother, and more than all, the decisions referred to in that letter, have given me an additional proof of the moral and physical captivity in which our enemies dare to retain your majesty. After this avowal, your majesty will expect that, faithful to my duty and the laws of honour, I should pay no obedience to orders evidently wrested by violence.

Furthermore, the letter which I had the honour of transmitting to your majesty, in conjunction with Monsieur, on the 10th of last September, contains the sentiments, principles, and determinations from which I shall never swerve; to it, therefore, I unreservedly refer; it will be the basis of my conduct, and I here repeat the oath it sets forth. I humbly entreat your majesty to receive the homage of those feelings, as tender as respectful, with which I am, sire, &c. &c."

exasperated at seeing their church occupied by a worship which they believed evil, and at being obliged to seek, so far from their homes, the one they believed good. They frequently even attacked the conforming priests and their followers. Civil war thus became imminent.* Additional information was gathered by the assembly, which exhibited the danger in a yet more alarming light. It thereupon resolved to adopt, against these fresh enemies of the constitution, mea-

* The report of Messrs Gallois and Gensonné is, without contradiction, the best historical evidence of the beginning of the troubles in La Vendée. The origin of those troubles is its most interesting part, because it demonstrates their causes. I have, therefore, deemed it necessary to give that report. It appears to me to illustrate one of the most curious portions in that disastrous history.

Report of Messrs Gallois and Gensonné, Civil Commissioners, dispatched into the departments of La Vendée and of the Deux-Sevres, by virtue of decrees of the Constituent Assembly, rendered to the Legislative Assembly on the 9th October 1791.

Gentlemen—The National Assembly decreed on the 16th of last July, on the Report of its Committee of Inquiry, that civil commissioners should be dispatched into the department of La Vendée, to obtain all the information they could procure as to the causes of the late troubles in that quarter; and to assist the administrative bodies in the re-establishment of public tranquillity.

On the 23d July we were intrusted with this mission, and we departed two days afterwards for Fontenoy-le-Comte, the chief town of that department.

After a few days spent in conferences with the administrators of the Directory upon the situation of affairs and the state of public feeling, and after agreeing with the three administrative bodies upon certain preliminary measures for the maintenance of public order, we determined to proceed into the different districts which composed that department, in order to examine how much of truth or falsehood, how much of reality or exaggeration, there existed in the complaints which had already reached us; in short, to enable us to ascertain, with the greatest possible precision, the situation of that department.

We have traversed it in almost its whole extent, sometimes for the purpose of gaining information which was necessary to us, at other times for the purpose of maintaining peace, suppressing public disturbances, or preventing violences to which certain citizens believed themselves exposed.

We have heard in several district-directories all the municipalities of which each of them is composed; we have paid the greatest attention to all the citizens who had either facts to communicate or views to suggest; we have carefully collected and compared all the details which have come to our knowledge; but as our information has been more bulky than varied—as throughout, the facts, complaints, and observations have been similar—we shall present to you, under a general point of view, and in an abridged but exact form, the result of this mass of particular facts.

We consider it unnecessary to lay before you the details which we gleaned concerning anterior troubles; they do not, in our judgment, appear to have any very direct influence upon the actual condition of that department; besides, the law of amnesty having stayed the different proceedings to which those troubles had given rise, we could only present you with vague conjectures and uncertain deductions upon those matters.

The period for administering the ecclesiastical oath was in the department of La Vendée the first era of its troubles; previously, the people had enjoyed profound tranquillity. At a distance from the great centre of action and strife, disposed by their natural character to a love of peace, to a disposition for order, and to respect for the law, they reaped the benefits of the revolution without undergoing any of its storms.

In rural districts, the difficulty of intercourse, the simplicity of a life purely agricultural, the lessons of infancy, and the inculcation of religious emblems calculated to keep regard alive, have disposed their minds to a multitude of superstitious impressions, which, in the present state of things, no species of instruction can either destroy or modify.

Their religion, that is to say, such as they conceive religion, is become the most powerful, and, so to speak, the only moral observance of their lives. The most essential object it presents to them is the worship of images; and the minister of that worship, he whom the inhabitants of the country regard as the dispenser of celestial favours, as able, by the power of his prayers, to mitigate the severity of seasons, and as disposing of happiness in a future state of existence, has centred upon his own person all the most tender as well as the most energetic affections of their souls.

The constancy of the people of this department in the established order of their religious actions, and the unlimited confidence enjoyed by the priests to whom they are accustomed, form one of the principal elements of the troubles which have agitated, and may still continue to agitate, it.

It is easy to conceive with what activity mistaken or factious priests have brought these dispositions of the people into play for their own advantage; they have neglected nothing to stimulate zeal, alarm consciences, strengthen irresolute characters, and sustain those of a more decided cast; into some have been instilled feelings of disquietude and remorse, into others hopes of happiness and salvation; upon almost all has been tried successfully the influence of seduction or fear.

Several amongst these ecclesiastics are themselves sincere; they seem deeply imbued both with the ideas they disseminate and the sentiments they inspire; others are accused of covering with zeal for religion interests much more dear to their hearts. These last assume a political activity which increases or moderates according to circumstances.

A formidable coalition has been formed between the late Bishop of Luçon and a part of the old clergy of his diocese; a plan of opposition has been arranged to the execution of decrees intended to be put in force in any of their parishes; charges and inflammatory writings sent from Paris, have been addressed to all the priests to strengthen them in their resolutions, or to urge them into a confederation which is represented as general. A circular letter from M. Bauregard, grand-vicar to M. de Merci, late Bishop of Luçon, deposited at the register of the tribunal of Fontenay, and which that ecclesiastic has since acknowledged in his interrogatory, will enable you to form an exact opinion, both upon the secret of that coalition and upon the skilfully combined movements of those composing it. We consequently include it:—

Letter dated from Luçon, the 31*st May* 1791, *under cover to the address of the Incumbent of La Réorthe.*

"A decree of the National Assembly, sir, under date of the 7th May, grants to the ecclesiastics whom it has pretended to supersede for refusing the oath, the use of the parish churches merely to say mass within. The same decree authorises Roman Catholics, as well as all dissenters, to assemble together for the exercise of their religious services in any place they may select for such purpose, upon condition that in public discourses nothing shall be said against the civil constitution of the clergy.

The privilege granted to the legitimate pastors by the first article of this decree, must be regarded as a snare, the more dangerous, inasmuch as the faithful will not meet in the churches upon which the intruders have seized, with other instructions than those of their false pastors; inasmuch as they will not be able to receive the sacraments from any but their hands, and thus they must have with these schismatic pastors a communication which the laws of the church forbid. In order to obviate so great an evil, the incumbents will perceive the necessity of securing, with all possible haste, a place in which they may, by virtue of the second article in this decree, exercise their functions and gather into one fold their faithful parishioners, after their pretended successors have seized upon their churches; without this precaution, the Catholics will be drawn, by the fear of losing the celebration of mass and the divine offices, and by listening to the voice of false pastors, into communication with them, and exposed to the almost inevitable perils of seduction.

In parishes where there are few wealthy proprietors, it will be, doubtless, difficult to find a suitable locality, and to procure sacred vases and ornaments; but a simple granary, a portable altar, a vesture of calico, or some other common stuff, and pewter vases, will suffice, in such cases of necessity, to celebrate the holy mysteries and the divine offices.

Such simplicity and poverty, by recalling to us the first ages of the church, and the dawn of our holy religion, may be a powerful means of exciting zeal in ministers, and fervour in the faithful. The first Christians had no other temples than their houses; there were gathered together the shepherds and the flock to celebrate the holy mysteries, to hear the word of God, and to sing the praises of the Lord. During the persecutions wherewith the church was afflicted, forced to abandon their temples, they were seen retiring into caverns, and even into tombs; and these times of trial were the eras of greatest fervour to the true faithful. There must be very few parishes in which the incumbents will be unable to procure a place and ornaments such as I have just described; and, until they are provided with the necessary articles, those of their neighbours, who shall not be superseded, will be able to assist them with what they have at disposal in their

sures similar in character to those it had taken against the armed enemies beyond the Rhine, and also to make a further trial of the king's real dispositions.

The Constituent Assembly had enjoined all priests to take the civic oath. Those who refused to take it, although deprived of their character as ministers of

own churches. We shall be provided with a continual supply of sacred stones for all who may need them, and, from the present time, we are enabled to authorise the cups or vases to be consecrated which may be used in lieu of them.

The Bishop of Luçon, in a separate communication which he has transmitted to us as supplementary to the charge of the Bishop of Langres, and which will be distributed in like manner through the different dioceses, proposes to the incumbents:—

1st, To keep a two-fold register, in which shall be inscribed the baptisms, marriages, and burials of the Catholics in the parish; one of these registers will remain with themselves, the other will be deposited every year in the hands of a trustworthy person.

2d, Independently of this register, the incumbents will keep another, likewise two-fold, in which shall be recorded the acts of dispensation concerning marriages, which they may have granted by virtue of the powers which are given them by the 18th article of the charge; these acts shall be signed by two sure and faithful witnesses; and to give them greater authenticity, the registers intended to record them shall be approved, indorsed, and signed by the bishop, or, in his absence, by one of his vicars-general. A counterpart of this register shall be placed, as is said above, in the hands of a trustworthy person.

3d, The incumbents will delay, if it be possible, retiring from their churches and manses, until their pretended successors have notified to them the certificate of their nomination and institution, and let them protest against all that may be done in consequence.

4th, They will draw up in secret a report of the installation of the pretended incumbent, and of the invasion by him effected of the parochial church and manse. In this report, of which I subjoin a model, they will formally protest against all acts performed under the jurisdiction which he claims to exercise as incumbent of the parish; and to give this document all possible authenticity, it shall be signed by the incumbent, his curate, if he have one, and a neighbouring priest, and even by two or three pious and discreet laymen, using all precautions, nevertheless, not to betray the secret.

5th, Those of the incumbents, whose parishes may be declared suppressed without the intervention of the legitimate bishop, will put in use the same means; they will always consider themselves as the only legitimate pastors of their parishes; and if it were absolutely impossible to remain therein, they shall endeavour to procure a residence in the vicinity, and within reach of administering to the spiritual wants of their parishioners; and they will take great care to forewarn and impress upon the faithful their duties in that respect.

6th, If the civil power opposes the faithful Catholics having a common cemetery, or if the relatives of deceased persons evince too great a repugnance to their being buried in a separate place, though specially blessed, as is mentioned in the 19th article of the charge, after the legitimate pastor, or one of his representatives, shall have repeated at the house the prayers prescribed by the ritual, and shall have drawn up the mortuary certificate, which is to be signed by the relatives, the body of the deceased shall be borne to the door of the church, and the relatives may accompany it so far, but they shall be warned to retire the moment the intrusive incumbent or his curates come to lift the body, so that they may not participate in the ceremonies and prayers of those schismatic priests.

7th, In all documents, when their title of incumbent shall be denied, the superseded incumbents will sign with their christian and surnames, without adding any quality.

I beg you, sir, and those of your brethren to whom you may deem it fitting to communicate my letter, to have the goodness to inform us the instant of your displacement, if it take place, of the installation of your pretended successor, and of the most remarkable circumstances, of the dispositions of your parishioners upon the event, of the measures you think it proper to take for the service of your parish, and of your residence, if you are absolutely forced to quit it. You can have no doubt that all these details will greatly interest us; your troubles are ours; and our most ardent wish is to be able, by participating them, to alleviate their weight.

I have the honour to be, with respectful and inviolable attachment, your very humble and very obedient servant."

These manœuvres have been powerfully assisted by certain missionaries established in the town of Saint-Laurent, district of Montaigu; it is, indeed, to the activity of their zeal, to their furtive intrigues, to their indefatigable and secret exhortations, that we are led principally to attribute the dispositions of a considerable portion of the people throughout the department of La Vendée, and in the district of Châtillon, department of the Deux-Sevres. It is of essential importance to fix the attention of the National Assembly upon the conduct of these missionaries, and the spirit of their institution.

This establishment was founded about sixty years ago, for a society of secular priests living on alms, and intended, in the capacity of missionaries, to preach. These missionaries, who have gained the confidence of the people by artfully distributing chaplets, medals, and indulgences, and by planting on the roads of all this part of France Calvaries of all forms, have since become sufficiently numerous to form new establishments in other parts of the kingdom. They are found in the late provinces of Poitou, Anjou, Bretagne, and Aunis, devoted with the same energy to the success, and to the in some sort perpetual duration, of this species of religious practices, rendered by their assiduous labours the only religion of the people. The town of Saint-Laurent is their chief seat; they have recently built there a large and handsome convent, and have acquired, it is said, other territorial property.

This congregation is connected, by the nature and spirit of the institution, with an establishment of grey sisters, founded in the same town, and known under the name of "*Daughters of Wisdom.*" Devoted in this department, and in several others, to the service of the poor, and particularly of hospitals, they form a highly active medium of correspondence for these missionaries with almost the whole kingdom. The house at Saint-Laurent has become the place of their retreat, where the intolerant fury of their zeal, or other circumstances, have compelled the administrators of hospitals which they attended, to dispense with their aid.

To enable you to form an opinion upon the conduct of these hot-headed missionaries, and upon the moral tendency of the religion they profess, it will be sufficient to lay before you an abridged summary of the maxims contained in different manuscripts, seized upon them by the national guards of Angers and Chollet.

These manuscripts, drawn up in the form of a catechism for the country people, establish as axioms that constitutional priests, stigmatised as intruders, cannot be applied to for the administration of the sacraments; that all those who participate in such celebration, even by presence alone, are guilty of a mortal crime, and that only ignorance or weakness of intellect can be pleaded in forgiveness; that those who shall have the audacity to get married by the intruders, will not be married, but will draw down upon themselves and their children the divine curse; that matters will be so arranged as to ensure the validity of marriages performed by the old incumbents, but that, in the mean time, they must submit to all extremities; that if the children are not deemed legitimate, they shall be so nevertheless; that, on the contrary, the children of those who shall have been married before the intruders, will be truly *bastards*, because God will not have ratified their union, and that it is better a marriage should be held null before men than before God; that they must not apply to the new incumbents for burials; and that if the former incumbent cannot perform them without endangering his life and liberty, the relatives or friends of the deceased must themselves inter them secretly.

It is furthermore observed that the old incumbent will take care to keep an exact register for recording these different ceremonies; that it is certainly possible the civil tribunals will pay no regard to them, but such an evil is one which must be endured; that the civil registration is a precious advantage which must nevertheless be dispensed with, because it is better to be deprived of it than to apostatise by applying to an intruder.

Finally, all the faithful are exhorted to hold no communication with the intruder, or take any part in his intrusion. It is declared that the municipal officers who shall instal him will be apostates like himself, and that, at the same moment, the sacristans, choristers, and bell-ringers, are bound to throw up their employments.

Such, gentlemen, is the absurd and seditious doctrine which these manuscripts embody, and of which the public voice accuses the missionaries of Saint-Laurent of having rendered themselves the most zealous propagators.

They were denounced at the time to the Committee of Inquiry of the National Assembly; and the silence which was observed regarding them has but added to the activity of their efforts and augmented their fatal influence.

We have deemed it indispensable thus to bring under your con-

the national religion, and of their stipends as paid by the state, preserved their pensions as simple ecclesiastics, and the liberty of privately exercising their ministry. Nothing could be more mild and moderate than such a system of repression. The Legislative Assembly now again required the oath, and deprived

sideration the abridged analysis of the principles contained in these writings, such as is promulgated in a resolution of the department of Maine-and-Loire, of the 5th June 1791, because it is sufficient to compare them with the circular letter of the grand vicar of the late Bishop of Luçon, to be convinced that they belong to a general system of opposition to the decrees respecting the civil organisation of the clergy; and the actual state of a majority of the parishes in that department, is simply the result of the developement of that system, and the principles of that doctrine put almost universally into action.

The too tardy displacement of the incumbents has greatly contributed to the success of this coalition. This delay was at first rendered unavoidable by the refusal of M. Servant, who, after being named to the bishopric of the department, and accepting the office, declared, on the 10th April, that he withdrew his acceptance. M. Rodrigue, the present bishop of the department, whose moderation and firmness are almost his sole supports in a position surrounded by turmoil and alarm, could not be nominated earlier than the first days in May. By that time, measures of resistance had been calculated and determined according to an uniform plan; the opposition was avowed, and in full activity; the grand-vicars and incumbents had come together and were firmly united by a common tie; the jealousies, rivalries, and quarrels of the old ecclesiastical hierarchy had had time to disappear, and all interests were merged in one common interest.

The displacement could only be effected in part; the great majority of the old ecclesiastical functionaries still continue in the parishes, invested with their ancient functions; the later nominations have scarcely any where been successful; and the newly-elected persons, alarmed at the prospect of the numberless disputes and annoyances which their nomination holds out to them, answer only by refusals.

This division into juring and non-juring priests has established a veritable schism amongst the people of their parishes; families are divided, women have been seen, and in fact are seen daily, separating from their husbands, and children abandoning their fathers. The state of the citizens is only transmitted, generally speaking, upon loose sheets, and the person who receives them, not being invested with any public character, is unable to give to such a description of proof a legal authenticity.

The municipalities have fallen into disorganisation, and the greatest number of them purposely avoid taking part in the displacement of the non-juring incumbents.

A considerable portion of the citizens have renounced the service of the national guard, and that which remains could not be employed without risk, in any movements which should have for principle or object acts concerning religion, because the people would then look upon the national guards, not as the impassible instruments of the law, but as the agents of a party opposed to their own.

In several districts of the department, an administrator, a judge, a member of the electoral body, are viewed with aversion by the people, because they concur in the execution of the law relative to ecclesiastical functionaries.

This disposition of the popular mind is the more to be deplored, since the means of enlightenment become every day more difficult. The people, confounding the general laws of the state with the particular laws for the civil organisation of the clergy, render both the reading and the publication useless.

The malcontents, those who are disinclined to the new order of things, and those who, in the new order, are indisposed to the laws relative to the clergy, studiously encourage this aversion on the part of the people; strengthen, by all the means in their power, the credit of the non-juring priests, and weaken the credit of the others; the indigent obtains no relief, the artisan can hope for no employment of his talents and industry, but as he engages not to attend the mass of the constitutional priest; and it is by this general confidence in the old incumbents on the one hand, and the threats and seduction at work on the other, that the churches served by the conforming priests are deserted, and crowds resort to those where, from want of substitutes, the displacements have not as yet been effected.

Nothing is more common than to see in parishes of five to six hundred persons, ten or twelve only going to the mass of the conforming priest; the proportion is the same in all the districts of the department; on Sundays and holidays the inhabitants of whole villages and hamlets are seen deserting their hearths, to go one, and sometimes two, leagues to hear the mass of a non-juring priest. These habitual peregrinations have appeared to us the most powerful cause of the fermentation, sometimes secret, sometimes palpable, which exists in nearly the whole of the parishes ministered to by conforming priests. It is easily to be imagined, that a multitude of individuals, believing themselves obliged for conscience' sake to travel a great distance in quest of the spiritual consolation desired by them, will regard with aversion, when they return home exhausted with fatigue, the five or six persons who find at their threshold the priest of their choice; they look with envy, and treat with sullenness, often with violence, men who seem in their eyes to have an exclusive privilege in the affair of religion. The comparisons which they make between the facility which they formerly enjoyed of seeking at home priests who possessed their confidence, and the difficulty, the fatigue, and the loss of time, consequent upon these repeated expeditions, greatly diminish their attachment to the constitution, upon which they charge all the annoyances of their new position.

To this general cause, more influential at this moment, perhaps, than the secret provocations of the non-juring priests, we are inclined to believe may be mainly attributed the state of internal discord, in which we have found the majority of the parishes where conforming priests are installed.

Several parishes have presented to us, as also to the administrative bodies, petitions praying for authority to hire particular edifices for the celebration of their religious service; but as these petitions, which we knew to be stimulated with great activity by persons who did not sign them, appeared to us as part of a more generalised and secret system, we thought ourselves not warranted in sanctioning a religious separation, which, according to our opinion at that period, and under the circumstances of the department, was fraught with all the characteristics of a civil schism amongst the citizens. We thought, and openly stated, that it was for you, gentlemen, to determine, in a distinct manner, how, and under what union of moral influences, laws, and modes of execution, the exercise of liberty in religious opinions might in this case, under actual circumstances, be made consistent with the maintenance of public tranquillity.

It is, doubtless, matter of surprise that the non-juring priests who remain in their old parishes, do not take advantage of the privilege the law gives them of saying mass in the church served by the new incumbent, and do not exhibit alacrity in the use of this liberty so as to spare their old parishioners, all who remain attached to them, the loss of time and annoyances of so many and such tedious journeys. To explain this conduct, apparently so extraordinary, it behoves us to remark, that one of the things which has been most strongly recommended to the non-juring priests, by the able men who are in the direction of this great religious movement, is to abstain from all communication with the priests, whom they call intruders and usurpers, for fear the people, who are affected only by sensible signs, should become ultimately impressed with the idea that there is in reality no difference between priests performing in the same church the ceremonies of the same worship.

Unfortunately, this religious division has produced a political division amongst the citizens, and this separation is rendered more marked by the denomination bestowed on each of the two parties; the small number of persons who go into the church of the conforming priests, call themselves, and are called, *patriots*; those who go into the church of the non-juring priests, are called, and call themselves, *aristocrats*. Thus, to these poor country people, love or hatred of their country consists at the present day, not in obeying the laws, or respecting the legitimate authorities, but in going or not going to the mass of the conforming priest; design, ignorance, and prejudice, have thrown out such deep-seated misconceptions on this subject, that we had the greatest difficulty in making them understand that the political constitution of the state was not the civil constitution of the clergy; that the law did not tyrannise over consciences; that each was at liberty to attend the mass which was most agreeable to himself, and the priest who enjoyed his confidence; that they were all equal in the eye of the law, and that it imposed upon them no other obligation, in a religious point of view, than to live in peace, and mutually tolerate the differences of their opinions. We neglected no means of effacing from the minds, and banishing from the discourses, of the country people, those absurd denominations; and we directed our attention thereto with the more energy, since it was no difficult matter to estimate the deplorable consequences of such distinctions, in a department where those pretended aristocrats form more than two-thirds of the entire population.

Such, gentlemen, is the summary of the facts which have come

those who refused it of all allowances. As they abused the liberty allowed them by exciting civil war, it ordered that, according to particular circumstances, they should be transported from one place to another, and even subjected to a detention if they refused to obey. Finally, it prohibited them from the free exer-

to our knowledge, as existing in the department of La Vendée, and of the reflections to which those facts have given rise.

We have pursued in this matter such measures as we found practicable, both for the purpose of maintaining the public tranquillity, and obviating or repressing attempts against public order; as organs of the law, we have made its language every where heard. At the same time that we instituted safeguards for order and tranquillity, we directed our attention to the explaining or illustrating before the administrative bodies, the tribunals, and individuals, the difficulties springing from the misunderstanding of the decrees, and from the mode of their execution; we exhorted the administrative bodies and tribunals to redouble their vigilance and zeal in the execution of the laws which protect personal safety and the rights of property; in a word, to put in force, with the firmness which is one of their duties, the authority the law has conferred upon them. We distributed a part of the public force at our disposal, into localities where serious and imminent dangers were announced to us; we proceeded in person into all such localities, upon the first rumour of disturbances; we ascertained the state of affairs with calmness and deliberation; and after having, either by words of peace and conciliation, or by the firm and just vindication of the law, subdued this momentary disorder of individual passions, we considered that the mere presence of the public force would thenceforth suffice. It is for you, gentlemen, since you are alone competent, to take really efficacious measures in a matter which, from the relations it holds with the constitution of the state, exercises upon that constitution at this moment an influence incomparably greater than might be surmised from the simple assumptions of reason apart from the experience of facts.

In all our operations relative to the distribution of the public force, we have been signally and most actively aided by a general officer well known for his patriotism and talents. No sooner was he apprised of our arrival in the department, than M. Dumouriez came to share our labours, and take part with us in the maintenance of public peace; we were on the point of being totally deprived of troops of the line, at a moment when we had good grounds for believing they were more than ever necessary; in such conjuncture, it was to the zeal and activity of M. Dumouriez that we were indebted for an immediate succour, which, from the backward organisation of the national guards, was in some sort the only safeguard for the tranquillity of the country.

We had concluded our mission in the department of La Vendée, when the decree of the National Assembly of 8th August, which empowered us, upon the requisition of the administrators of the department of the Deux-Sevres, to proceed into the district of Châtillon, was transmitted to us, as also to the directory of that department.

It had been announced to us, on our arrival at Fontenay-le-Comte, that this district was in the same state of religious disturbance as the department of La Vendée. A few days before our receipt of the decree last mentioned, several citizens, electors, and public functionaries of that district, had lodged with the directory of the department of the Deux-Sevres a written denunciation upon the troubles which they stated to exist in various parishes; they asserted that an insurrection was on the eve of breaking out; the mode of prevention which seemed to them the most certain and prompt, and which they supported with great force, was to expel from the district, within three days, all the non-juring and displaced incumbents, and all the non-juring curates. The directory, after long hesitating to adopt a measure which appeared to it contrary to the principles of strict justice, at last concluded that the public character of the denouncers was sufficient to authenticate both the reality of the evil, and the pressing necessity for a remedy. An order was resolved upon in consequence, on the 5th September, and the directory, commanding all the ecclesiastics to leave the district in three days, invited them to repair within that period to Niort, the chief town of the department, *assuring them that they would there find every protection and safety for their persons.*

The order was already printed, and about to be put into execution, when the directory received a copy of the decree of commission which it had solicited; it immediately passed a resolution whereby it suspended the execution of the first, and left to our prudence the task of confirming, modifying, or suppressing it.

Two administrators of the directory were, by the same resolution, named commissioners to make us acquainted with all that had passed, to proceed to Châtillon, and there take, in concert with us, all the measures that might be deemed necessary.

Upon our arrival at Châtillon, we assembled the fifty-six municipalities of which that district is composed, and called them successively into the hall of the directory. We consulted each of them upon the state of its parish; all the municipalities expressed an uniform desire: those in which the incumbents had been replaced, demanded the restoration of those priests; those in which the non-juring incumbents were still in possession, demanded their conservation. There was also another point on which all this rural population insisted unanimously, namely, liberty of religious opinions, which, it alleged, had been granted to it, and which it was anxious to enjoy. The same and the following day, the neighbouring parishes sent us numerous deputations of their inhabitants reiterating the same prayer. "We ask no other favour," said they to us with one accord, "than to have priests in whom we put our trust." Several of them, indeed, attached so great a value to this concession, that they assured us they would willingly pay, in order to obtain it, a double contribution.

A very great majority of the ecclesiastical functionaries in that district have not taken the oath; and whilst their churches scarcely suffice to contain the throng of citizens, the churches of the conforming priests are almost deserted. In this respect, the state of the district appeared to us the same as that of the department of La Vendée; there, as in other parts, we found the designations of *patriot* and *aristocrat* completely established amongst the people, with the same meanings, and, if possible, in a yet more general manner. The public feeling in favour of the non-juring priests, appeared to us even more decided than in the department of La Vendée; the attachment evinced towards them, the confidence reposed in them, have all the characteristics of the most energetic and profound sentiment; in some of these parishes, the conforming priests, and citizens friendly to them, have been exposed to threats and insults; and although there, as elsewhere, these violent manifestations appeared occasionally exaggerated, we are convinced (and the simple statement of the public feeling is sufficient to found the conviction) that the greater part of the complaints were based on substantial grounds.

At the same time that we recommended to the judges and administrators the greatest vigilance upon this subject, we omitted no expedient calculated to inspire the people with ideas and sentiments more conformable to respect for the law and to the rights of individual liberty.

We are bound to state, gentlemen, that these same men, who had been represented to us as such furious characters—as deaf to every appeal of reason—left us with minds full of peace and satisfaction, when we made them understand that it was the essence of the principles of the new constitution to respect liberty of conscience: they were moved with grief and remorse for the faults that some amongst them had been induced to commit; they promised us, with much emotion, to follow the counsels we gave them, to live in peace, notwithstanding the difference of their religious opinions, and to respect the public functionary established by the law. They were heard, as they went out, congratulating each other upon having seen us, repeating, amongst themselves, all that we had said to them, and fortifying each other in their resolutions of peace and good-will.

On the same day it was announced to us that several of these country people, on returning home, had affixed placards, in which they declared, that each of them bound himself to denounce and to apprehend the first person who should do injury to another, and especially to the constitutional priests.

We ought to draw attention to the fact, that in this same district, so long distracted with religious differences, the taxes in arrear for 1789 and 1790, amounting to 700,000 livres, have been almost entirely discharged. We have proved it by reference to the directory of the district.

After having carefully studied the tone of public feeling, and the situation of affairs, we were of opinion that the order of the directory ought not to be put in execution, and the commissioners of the department, as well as the administrators of the directory of Châtillon, were of the same opinion.

Setting aside all the determining motives to be drawn from things and persons, we deliberated whether the measure adopted by the directory was just in its nature, and whether it would be efficacious in execution.

We judged that those priests who have been displaced cannot be considered in a state of revolt against the law, because they continue to reside in the place of their abrogated functions, the more especially as amongst these priests there are some who notoriously confine themselves to a life such as befits charitable and peaceable men, far removed from all public and private discussions; we judged that, in the eye of the law, none could be

cise of their separate worship, and directed that the administrative bodies should cause to be transmitted to it a list, with notes upon the conduct of each of them.*

This measure, as well as that which had recently been adopted against the emigrants, was evidence of the fear which possesses governments violently menaced, and which induces them to resort to measures of extreme precaution. It is no longer the realised attempt they punish, it is the apprehended attack they would repel; and their proceedings often become as arbitrary and cruel as suspicion itself.

The bishops and priests who had remained at Paris and preserved relations with the king, immediately addressed a memorial to him against the decree. He, already somewhat conscience-striken for having sanctioned the earlier decree of the Constituent Assembly, did not need encouragement to withhold his consent. "As to this one," said he, speaking of the new law, "they shall rather take my life than oblige me to sanction it." The ministers coincided to a great extent in this opinion. Barnave and Lameth, whom the king consulted occasionally, advised him to refuse his sanction; but to this counsel they added another, which the king could not bring himself to follow, namely, that whilst opposing the decree, he should obviate all doubt as to his own dispositions, and for that purpose remove from his person all priests who had not taken the oath, and compose his chapel of constitutional ecclesiastics alone. But of all the counsels that were given him, the king adopted merely that part which comported with his own weakness or devout tendency. Duport-Dutertre, the keeper of the seals, and the organ of the constitutionalists in the ministry, successfully upheld the course they recommended with his colleagues; and when the council had decided, to the great satisfaction of Louis XVI., that the veto should be affixed, he added as a suggestion, that it would be advisable to surround the person of the king with priests who were not suspected. Against this proposition, Louis XVI., generally so yielding, manifested an invincible repugnance, and said, that religious liberty being decreed for all, it should be extended to him as well as his subjects, and that he ought to be allowed to call such priests around him as were agreeable to his own feelings. The matter was not pressed; and without giving the assembly any intimation of the intention, the veto was decided upon.

The constitutional party, to which the king seemed at this moment to surrender himself, brought him an additional support—it was that of the directory of the department. This directory was composed of some of the most distinguished members of the late assembly, such as the Duke of Larochefoucault, the Bishop of Autun, Baumetz, Desmeuniers, Ansons, &c. It sent a petition to the king, not as an administrative body, but as a meeting of petitioners, and prayed for the affixing of the veto to the decree against the priests. "The National Assembly," said the petition, "has unquestionably acted with the best intentions; we desire here to vindicate it from its base detractors; but its laudable designs have urged it to the adoption of measures which the constitution, justice, and prudence, alike disclaim. It makes the payment of the pensions to all superseded ecclesiastics dependent on their taking the civic oath, whereas the constitution has expressly and literally placed those pensions in the list of national obligations. Now, can the refusal to take any oath whatsoever destroy the validity of an acknowledged debt? The Constituent Assembly enacted all that was expedient with regard to the non-juring priests: they refused the prescribed oath, and it deprived them of their functions; upon dispossessing them, it assigned to them a pension. The Legislative Assembly desires that the ecclesiastics who have not taken the oath, or have retracted it, should be liable, in the event of religious troubles, to be provisionally removed, and then imprisoned, if they refuse obedience to the orders that may be intimated to them. Is this not to renew the system of arbitrary orders, inasmuch as it would allow to be punished with exile, and shortly after with imprisonment, individuals who are not convicted of being refractory to any law? The National Assembly refuses to all those who shall not take the civic oath the free profession of their faith. Now, this liberty can be taken away from no one; it is consecrated for ever in the declaration of rights."

These were, doubtless, very excellent reasons; but it is not with arguments that the irritation or apprehensions of parties are appeased. By what logic could the assembly be persuaded that it ought to leave unmolested a body of stubborn priests, actually exciting discord and civil war? The directory was assailed with reproaches, and its petition to the king met by a multitude of counter-addresses to the legislative body. Camille-Desmoulins presented one of singular hardihood in its expressions, at the head of a section. An increasing violence of language, and a repu-

deemed in a state of revolt, unless opposing it by precise, ascertained, and verified facts; finally, we judged that acts of resistance to the laws relative to the clergy, and to all the laws of the kingdom, ought, like all other offences, to be punished by legal forms.

Upon the second question as to the efficacy of such a measure, we held, that if the faithful have no confidence in the conforming priests, it is not the mode for inspiring them with more to remove in this manner those of their choice; we held, that in the districts where the great majority of the non-juring priests continue the exercise of their functions, according to the sanction of the law, until they are replaced, it would certainly not, in such a system of repression, diminish the evil to remove so small a number of individuals, when it is necessary to leave in the same localities a greater number imbued with identical opinions.

Such, gentlemen, are some of the reasons which influenced our conduct upon this occasion, independently of all those derived from local circumstances, which would alone have induced us to pursue a similar course; such, in fact, was the general feeling that the execution of that order in those parts would infallibly have become the signal of civil war.

The directory of the department of the Deux-Sevres, informed, first by its own commissioners, and subsequently by us, of all that we had done upon this subject, did us the honour to offer us an expression of its gratitude, by a resolution of the 19th of last month.

We will add, with respect to that measure for the removal of the non-juring priests who have been displaced, that it was constantly recommended to us by almost all of the citizens in the department of La Vendée who are attached to the constitutional priests, and who form, as we have already stated, but a small fraction of the inhabitants. In laying this wish before you, we do but acquit ourselves of a commission that has been intrusted to us.

Nor will we on the other hand conceal from you that some of the conforming priests whom we have seen were of a contrary opinion; one of them, in a letter which he addressed to us on the 12th September, after pointing out the causes of the troubles, and mentioning the annoyances to which he was every day exposed, observes, that the only means of remedying all these evils is (we quote his expressions) "to conciliate the opinion of the people, whose prejudices should be removed with patience and prudence; for we must avoid all war on account of religion, the wounds from which are still bleeding. It is to be feared that rigorous measures, needful under the circumstances against the disturbers of the public repose, might appear more as a persecution than a punishment inflicted by the law. What prudence will it not be necessary to observe! Mildness, exhortation, are the weapons of truth."

Such, gentlemen, is the general result of the details we have gathered, and of the observations we have made, in the course of the mission which has been confided to us. The sweetest recompense of our labours would be to have facilitated the means of establishing upon solid foundations the tranquillity of those departments, and to have proved worthy, by the activity of our zeal, of the confidence with which we have been honoured.

* Decree of the 29th November.

diation of all the accustomed terms of respect towards the authorities and the king, were already distinctly visible. Desmoulins said to the assembly that a great example was required; that the directory ought to be put under impeachment; that the leaders were those whom it was necessary to attack; that it was at the head the blow should be struck, and the thunderbolt hurled at all conspirators; that the power of the royal veto had its limits; and that the capture of the Bastille had not been prevented by a veto.

Louis XVI., although determined to refuse his sanction, delayed, nevertheless, his announcement to the assembly. He wished in the mean time to conciliate opinion by some popular acts. He selected his ministers from the constitutional party. Montmorin, wearied by his laborious career under the constituent body, and by his irksome negotiations with all parties, had resolved not to brave the storms of a new legislature, and had consequently retired, in spite of the king's entreaties. The ministry for foreign affairs, refused by divers persons, was ultimately accepted by Delessart, who quitted that of the home department. Delessart, a man of integrity and ability, was under the influence of the constitutionalists or Feuillants; but he was too feeble to fix the mind of the king, to have weight with foreign powers, or awe internal factions. Cahier de Gerville, a decided patriot, somewhat more rough than engaging in his eloquence, was placed in the home-office, as an additional bait for public confidence. Narbonne, a young man of great activity and ardour, a zealous constitutionalist, and skilful in gaining popularity, was intrusted with the ministry at war by the party then predominant in the cabinet. He might have exercised a beneficial influence upon its determinations, and reconciled the assembly with the king, if he had not had as an adversary Bertrand de Molleville, a counter-revolutionary minister, and possessing the ear of the court in preference to all his colleagues. Bertrand de Molleville detesting the constitution, and artfully clinging to its text for the purpose of marring its spirit, was really desirous, nevertheless, that the king should attempt to execute it—"but in order," as he said, "that its impracticability might be demonstrated." The king could not resolve to dismiss him; and it was with this mixed ministry he once more set forward on his course. After thus striving to win opinion by his ministerial selections, he essayed other means to gain it still more decidedly; appearing at this time cordially disposed to second all the diplomatic and military measures proposed against the armed assemblages on the Rhine.

The last repressive laws had been defeated by the veto, and yet every day fresh denunciations apprised the assembly of the preparations and threats of the emigrants. The records of the municipalities and departments bordering on the frontier, and the accounts of commercial travellers coming from beyond the Rhine, bore testimony that the Viscount de Mirabeau, brother of the celebrated Constituent, was at the head of six hundred men in the bishopric of Strasburg; that in the territory of the Elector of Mayence, and close to Worms, were numerous corps of deserters, under the orders of the Prince of Condé; that the same state of things existed at Coblentz and in the whole electorate of Treves; that excesses and injuries had been perpetrated on French subjects; and, finally, that a proposition had been made to General Wimpfen for delivering up Neuf-Brisach. These reports, coming in confirmation of all that was known from public rumour, drove the assembly to the highest pitch of exasperation. A project for a decree was instantly proposed, embodying a demand upon the electors to disband the emigrants. The question was prorogued for two days, in order that the assembly might not appear too precipitate. That term expired, and the debate was opened.

The deputy Isnard ushered in the discussion. He expatiated on the necessity of securing the tranquillity of the kingdom, not in a loose and fleeting manner, but upon durable foundations, and of commanding it by prompt and vigorous measures, which should attest to all Europe the patriotic resolutions of France. "Fear not," said he, "to provoke the great powers to declare war against you; interest has already decided their intentions; your measures will not alter them, but they will oblige them to explain themselves. The conduct of France must respond to its new destiny. Enslaved under Louis XIV., it was nevertheless valorous and great; to-day free, shall it be timid and weak? It is a mistake, says Montesquieu, when it is imagined that a nation in a revolution is prone to be conquered; it is ready, on the contrary, to conquer others." Loud applause followed these words. He continued:

"Capitulations are proposed to you! You are asked to augment the royal prerogative, to augment the power of the king—of a man whose fiat can paralyse the energies of a whole nation—of a man with a revenue of thirty millions, whilst tens of thousands of our citizens perish in distress! You are asked to restore the nobility! Let all the nobles of the earth assail us, and we, the French, dispensing our gold with one hand and grasping our steel with the other, will meet this haughty caste face to face, and compel it to undergo the torture of equality!

Speak to the ministers, to the king, and to Europe, the language which befits the representatives of France! Tell the ministers that hitherto you have been dissatisfied with their conduct, and that by responsibility you mean death!" Loud and long-continued applause interrupted the speaker. "Tell Europe that you will respect the institutions of all kingdoms, but that if her cabinets stir up a war of kings against France, we will stir up a war of nations against kings!" Here the cheers of the auditors were renewed. "Interrupt not my enthusiasm," exclaimed Isnard, "for it is that of liberty! Tell Europe, then, that the battles fought by nations on the mandate of despots resemble the blows which two friends may deal each other in the dark, when stimulated by some perfidious villain! Let the light but appear, they instantly embrace, and take vengeance on him who has deceived them. So also, if at the moment the armies of enemies contend with ours, the light of philosophy should strike their eyes, the nations would embrace in the face of dethroned tyrants, of a comforted world, and of an applauding Heaven!"*

The enthusiasm excited by these words was such, that all thronged around the orator to press him in their arms. The decree which he supported was adopted upon the moment. M. de Vaublanc was charged to carry it to the king, at the head of a deputation of twenty-four members. By this decree, the assembly declared that it was imperative upon the executive to require the electors of Mayence and Treves, and other princes of the empire, to disperse the assemblages formed on the frontier. It besought the king, at the same time, to expedite the negotiations set on foot for settling the indemnities exigible by the princes holding possessions in Alsace.

M. de Vaublanc presented this decree in a firm and respectful address, much applauded by the assembly. "Sire," said he, "if the French, expelled from their country by the edict of Nantes, had assembled in arms on the frontiers—if they had been protected by the princes of Germany, we ask you, sire, what would have been the conduct of Louis XIV.? Would he have permitted such assemblages? What he would have doubtless done for his authority, may your majesty do for the maintenance of the constitution!"

Louis XVI. having resolved, as we have previously stated, to correct the ill effects of the veto by acts soothing to public opinion, determined to proceed in

* Sitting of the 29th November.

person to the assembly, and reply to its message by a speech calculated to give it satisfaction.

On the evening of the 14th December, the king repaired to the hall, in accordance with a notification he had transmitted that morning by a simple note. He was received with profound silence. He said that the message of the assembly demanded high consideration; and that upon an occasion in which the honour of France was at stake, he deemed it expedient to come amongst them in person; that participating the sentiments of the assembly, but wishful to avoid the scourge of war, he had endeavoured to lure back the deluded emigrants; that friendly solicitations having been unavailing, he had anticipated the message of the representatives, and already notified to the electors, that if before the 15th January all warlike preparations had not ceased, they would be considered enemies of France; that he had written to the emperor claiming his intervention as head of the empire; and that, in case satisfaction should not be obtained, he would propose a declaration of war. He concluded by observing, that all attempts to render the exercise of his authority displeasing to his mind would be fruitless; that he would faithfully guard the integrity of the constitution; and that he was deeply sensible how glorious it was to be the king of a free people.

Applauses succeeded the silence, and indemnified the king for the sombre reception that had marked his entrance. The assembly, having resolved in the morning sitting that he should be answered by message, could not immediately express its satisfaction, but it decided that his discourse should be sent to the eighty-three departments. Narbonne shortly afterwards entered, to communicate the measures that had been taken to ensure the effect of the notifications addressed to the empire. One hundred and fifty thousand men were intended to be assembled on the Rhine, which, he added, was by no means impossible. Three generals were named to command them—Luckner, Rochambeau, and Lafayette. Great applause greeted the last name. Narbonne furthermore stated, that he purposed leaving Paris to visit the frontiers, to inquire into the state of the fortified places, and to impart activity to the preparations for defence; that the assembly would doubtless grant the necessary supplies, and that it would not be niggardly in defence of liberty. "No! no!" responded from all sides. In conclusion, he asked if the assembly, although the legal number of marshals was complete, would not permit the king to confer that distinction on the two generals, Luckner and Rochambeau, thus intrusted with the preservation of liberty. Acclamations testified the consent of the assembly, and the high satisfaction the energy of the young minister gave it. It was by such conduct Louis XVI. might have gained popularity, and conciliated the republicans, who desired a republic only because they believed a monarch incapable of loving and defending freedom.

Advantage was taken of the satisfaction produced by these measures to notify the veto affixed to the decree against the priests. In the morning, care had been taken to publish in the journals the dismissal of the former diplomatic agents accused of aristocracy, and the nomination of successors. Owing to these precautions, the communication was heard without a murmur. The assembly had already expected it, and the effect was not so unfavourable as might have been apprehended. We see how many manœuvres the king was obliged to adopt in making use of his prerogative, and what dangers he incurred in employing it. Had, then, the Constituent Assembly, which was accused of having annihilated him by its limitation, granted him the absolute veto, would it have been more efficient on that account? Did not the suspensive veto produce all the effect of the absolute veto? What was it that failed the king?—legal power, or the power of opinion? We perceive which by the result; it was not a deficiency in effectual prerogatives that ruined Louis XVI., but the indiscreet use of those which he still wielded.

The activity promised to the assembly was manifested in acts. The propositions for the expenses of war, and for the nomination of the two marshals, Luckner and Rochambeau, were brought forward without delay. Lafayette, called from the privacy into which he had retired, after his three years of turmoil, presented himself at the bar of the assembly, and was most favourably received. Battalions of the national guard accompanied him on his exit from Paris; and all proved to him that the name of Lafayette had not fallen into oblivion, and that he was still regarded as one of the founders of liberty.

However, Leopold, naturally of a pacific temperament, was not anxious for war, as he was well aware it would be detrimental to his interests; but he desired a congress, backed by an imposing force, as a means of leading to an accommodation, and enforcing some modifications in the constitution. The emigrants, indeed, were eager, not for its modification, but for its destruction; the emperor, more sagacious and enlightened, felt that great concessions were needful to the new opinions; and that the utmost that could be desired was the restoration to the king of certain prerogatives, and an amendment in the composition of the legislative body, by its being established in two chambers instead of one.* This last project was the one most

* I have already had occasion to refer, upon several occasions, to the intentions of Leopold, Louis XVI., and the emigrants. I shall here present several extracts, which will show them in the clearest manner. Bouillé, who had gone abroad, and whose reputation and talents caused him to be much sought after by the sovereigns, had better opportunities than any one else of ascertaining the sentiments of the various courts, and his testimony cannot be at all suspected. The following are the terms in which he expresses himself in different parts of his Memoirs:—

"It may be judged from this letter that the King of Sweden was in great uncertainty touching the real designs of the emperor and his allies, who then seemed indisposed to interfere any further in the affairs of France. The Empress (Catherine), no doubt, was aware of them, but she had not communicated them to him. I knew that, at this moment, she was employing all her influence with the emperor and the King of Prussia, to induce them to declare war against France. She had even written a very strong letter to the first of those sovereigns, in which she represented to him that the King of Prussia, on account of a simple breach of politeness towards his sister, had caused an army to enter Holland, whilst he calmly suffered the insults and affronts that were heaped on the Queen of France, the degradation of her rank and dignity, and the annihilation of the throne of a king, his brother-in-law and ally. The empress spoke with the same energy to Spain, which had adopted pacific sentiments. However, the emperor, after the king's acceptance of the constitution, had again received the French ambassador, whom he had previously forbidden to appear at his court. He was even the first to admit the national flag into his ports. The courts of Madrid, Petersburg, and Stockholm, were the only ones which, at this period, withdrew their ambassadors from Paris. All these circumstances tend to prove, therefore, that the views of Leopold were inclined to peace, and that they resulted from the influence of Louis XVI. and the queen."—*Memoirs of Bouillé*, p. 314.

Again, Bouillé says:—

"Several months elapsed, in the mean time, without my perceiving any issue to the projects entertained by the emperor of assembling armies on the frontier, of holding a congress, and of entering upon a negotiation with the French government. I presumed, that the king had formed hopes that his acceptance of the constitution would restore to him his personal freedom, which an armed negotiation might have endangered, and that he had consequently urged the emperor, and the other sovereigns his allies, to take no step which might provoke those hostilities he had constantly laboured to avoid. I was confirmed in this opinion by the reserve of the court of Spain, as to the proposition for furnishing the King of Sweden with fifteen millions of livres *tournois*, which it had engaged to pay him in aid of the expenses of his expedition. That prince had instructed me to write on his behalf to the Spanish ministry, from whom I received only vague answers. I then advised the King of Sweden to open a loan in Holland, under the guarantee of Spain, the dispositions of which

deprecated, and that with which the Feuillant or constitutional party was most frequently reproached. It is certain, that if this party had, in the early times of the Constituent Assembly, repudiated an upper chamber, from its rational apprehensions that the nobility would take up an offensive attitude in it, its fears were now no longer the same; on the contrary, it had well-grounded hopes of itself almost solely composing such a chamber. Numbers of the old Constituents, at present fallen into complete nullity, would have found it an opportunity for re-entering on the political stage. If, therefore, this upper chamber was not precisely in their plans, it was perfectly consistent with their interests. It is certain, also, that the journals frequently spoke of it, and that it was an universal topic of discourse. How rapid had been the march of the revolution! The right side of this era was composed of adherents of the old left side; and the feared and stigmatised views of the day tended no longer to a return to the old system, but merely to the establishment of an upper chamber. What a difference from 1789! and how an insane resistance had precipitated events!

Leopold saw, then, but this measure of mitigation possible for Louis XVI. In the interim, his object was to spin out the negotiations, and without coming to a rupture with France, to awe her by a show of firmness. But he defeated his purpose by the reply he made. This reply consisted in notifying the resolutions of the diet of Ratisbon, refusing to accept any indemnity for the princes holding possessions in Alsace. Nothing could be more preposterous than such a decision, for surely all the territory comprised under one domination ought to be subject to the same laws: if princes of the empire had estates in France, they were bound to submit to the abolition of feudal customs, and the Constituent Assembly had fully met the justice of the case by granting them indemnities. Several of them having already entered into treaties on the subject, the diet annulled their agreements, and prohibited them from accepting any compromise. The empire thus disclaimed a recognition of the revolution so far as its members were concerned. With regard to the assemblages of emigrants, Leopold, without vouchsafing any explanation touching their dispersion, intimated to Louis XVI. that the Elector of Treves being exposed, according to the menaces of the French government, to immediate hostilities, General Bender had been ordered to afford him prompt succour.

It was impossible for this reply to have been more imprudent. It compelled Louis XVI., to avoid compromising himself, to take vigorous measures, and to propose a declaration of war. Delessart was forthwith dispatched to the assembly for the purpose of communicating this answer, and of expressing the amazement wherewith the conduct of Leopold had struck the king. The minister suggested that the emperor had probably been deceived, and that he had been most erroneously persuaded the elector had acquitted himself of the imperative duties of good neighbourhood. He furthermore laid before the assembly the rejoinder addressed to Leopold. He was therein given to understand that, notwithstanding his reply and the orders given to Marshal Bender, if the electors had not, by the prescribed term, that is to say, by the 15th January, satisfied the demands of France, force of arms would be used against them. "If this declaration," said Louis XVI., in his message of the 31st December, to the assembly, "does not produce the effect I am justified in hoping—if it be the destiny of France to be driven into combat with her sons and allies, I will make known to Europe the justice of our cause; the French people will sustain it by their heroism, and the nation will perceive that I have no other interest than such as it participates, and that I will always regard the maintenance of its dignity and security as the most essential of my duties."

These expressions, in which the king seemed to unite with the nation in their common danger, were vehemently applauded. The documents were referred to the diplomatic committee, with instructions to render a speedy report thereon to the assembly.

The queen was once again applauded at the opera as in the days of her splendour and power, and she returned all joyous to her husband, to tell him she had been hailed with the transports of more happy times. But it was the last testimony of regard she received from a people formerly so enraptured with her royal charms. The sentiment of equality which remains so long dormant in mankind, and rises so fierce when

power appeared to me nevertheless greatly changed with respect to France.

I learnt that anarchy was increasing every day in France, which was but too well proved by the crowds of emigrants from all parts, who were taking refuge on the foreign frontiers. Arms were given them, they were formed into regiments on the banks of the Rhine, and a small army was thus composed, which threatened the provinces of Alsace and Lorraine. These proceedings aroused the fury of the people, and promoted the destructive projects of the Jacobins and anarchists. The emigrants had even determined to make an attempt on Strasburg, in which they relied on having sure intelligence, and partisans who were prepared to open them the gates. The king, who was apprised of this scheme, employed commands, and even entreaties, to stop them; and to prevent them from performing any act of hostility, he dispatched for this purpose, to the princes his brothers, the Baron de Viominil and the Chevalier de Cogny, who testified to them, in his name, his disapprobation of the arming of the French nobility, to which the emperor opposed all possible obstacles, but which continued nevertheless."—*Ibid.* p. 309.

Finally, Bouillé relates, after Leopold himself, his plan of a congress:—

"On the 12th September, at length, the Emperor Leopold desired me to wait upon him and to bring him the plan of military dispositions he had previously requested from me. He made me enter his cabinet, and told me he had not been able to speak with me sooner upon the subject for which he had summoned me, because he was waiting for the answers of Russia, Spain, England, and the Italian principalities; that he had now received them; that they were conformable to his plans and wishes; that he was assured of their assistance in the execution, and of their conjunction, with the exception of the cabinet of St James's, which had declared a determination to observe the most scrupulous neutrality. He had taken the resolution of assembling a congress to treat with the French government, not only touching the redress of grievances on the part of the Germanic body, whose rights in Alsace, and in other parts of the frontier provinces, had been violated, but also touching the means of re-establishing order in the kingdom of France, whose anarchy disturbed the tranquillity of all Europe. He added, that this negotiation would be supported by formidable armies with which France would be encompassed; that he hoped this expedient would be successful and prevent a bloody war, the last resource to which he would apply. I took the liberty of asking the emperor whether he were informed of the veritable desires of the king. He was acquainted with them; he knew that prince's repugnance to the adoption of violent measures. He told me he was likewise informed that the charter of the new constitution was to be presented to him within a few days, and that he supposed the king could not avoid accepting it without reservation, from the danger he ran of losing his own life and the lives of his family, if he evinced the least hesitation, or permitted himself the smallest observation; but that his sanction, forced upon the occasion, was of no consequence—it being possible to rescind all that might be done, and to bestow on France a good government, which would at once satisfy the nation, and leave to the royal authority an extent of power sufficient to maintain tranquillity within, and ensure peace without. He then asked me for the plan of disposition for the armies, assuring me that he would examine it at leisure. He added that I might return to Mayence, where the Count de Brown, who was to command his troops, and who was then in the Low Countries, would send to apprise me, as also the Prince de Hohenlohe, who was proceeding to Franconia, so that we might confer together when the proper time should arrive.

I concluded that the emperor had only resolved upon this pacific and extremely moderate plan, since the conferences at Pilnitz, after consulting Louis XVI., whose voice was constantly for an arrangement, and for employing the medium of negotiations rather than the violent expedient of arms."—*Ibid.* p. 289.

once awakened, now became the predominant manifestation. The year 1791 was on the point of expiring; the assembly abolished the ancient ceremonial observed on the first day of the new year, and decided that the compliments paid the king on that solemn era should not be repeated for the future. About this time, also, a deputation lodged a complaint that the door of the council-chamber had not been thrown widely open to it. A disgraceful discussion ensued, and the assembly, in addressing Louis XVI., suppressed the titles of *sire* and *majesty*. On another occasion, a deputy entered the presence of the king with his hat on, and otherwise in very unsuitable apparel. Such conduct was, however, frequently provoked by the repulsive demeanour of the court officials towards the deputies, and the pride of both parties was piqued into retaliation.

Narbonne, meanwhile, pursued his tour of inspection with rare activity. Three armies were established on the menaced frontier. Rochambeau, a veteran general, who had in former times often conducted a war with skill, but was now diseased, morose, and captious, commanded the army located in Flanders, and called the army of the north. Lafayette had the army of the centre, and was encamped towards Metz. Luckner, an old warrior, an indifferent general, a brave soldier, and very popular in camps from his truly military manners, commanded the corps which occupied Alsace. These were all the generals a long peace and a general desertion had left to France.

Rochambeau, discontented with the new order of things, and irritated at the want of discipline prevalent in the army, was incessant in his complaints and forebodings to the minister. Lafayette, young, buoyant, and eager to distinguish himself in defending his country, established discipline amongst his troops, and overcame all the difficulties thrown in his way by the refractory dispositions of the officers, who were the aristocrats of the army. He called them together, and speaking to them in the language of honour, told them they ought to quit the camp if they were not inclined to serve with loyalty; that if there were any who wished to retire, he pledged himself to procure for all such either retirements in France, or passports for abroad; but that if they determined to remain, he expected from them zeal and fidelity. He had by such means succeeded in infusing a higher degree of order into his army than was manifest in the others. As to Luckner, without political bias, and consequently indifferent to systems of government, he held out great expectations to the assembly, and had certainly succeeded in securing the attachment of the soldiers.

Narbonne travelled with the greatest celerity, and came on the 11th of January to give an account to the assembly of his rapid expedition. He announced that the repairs of all the fortifications were already in a very advanced state; that the army, from Dunkirk to Besançon, presented a mass of two hundred and forty battalions and one hundred and sixty squadrons, with artillery necessary for two hundred thousand men, and supplies for six months. He bestowed the highest eulogiums on the volunteer national guards, and gave assurances that in a short period their equipment would be complete. The young minister yielded, doubtless, to the illusions of a zealous mind; but his views were so noble, his labours so prompt and indefatigable, that the assembly loaded him with applause, recommended his report to the public gratitude, and sent it to all the departments, the ordinary mode of testifying its approbation of all who gave it satisfaction.

CHAPTER VIII.

THE EMIGRANT PRINCES IMPEACHED.—FORMATION OF A GIRONDIST MINISTRY.—DECLARATION OF WAR AGAINST AUSTRIA.—FLIGHTS OF QUIEORAIN AND TOURNAY.

At the commencement of the year 1792, the question of war had become that of greatest moment; upon it, indeed, the very existence of the revolution depended. Its enemies having transferred themselves into foreign countries, it was there they were to be sought and conquered. But would the king act with sincerity against his own relatives and former courtiers? Such was the doubt upon which the national fears needed assurance. This subject of war was debated at the Jacobin Club, which allowed no topic to pass without pronouncing a sovereign judgment. It will be deemed singular that the ultra Jacobins, with Robespierre at their head, were disposed towards peace; and the moderate Jacobins or Girondists, with Brissot and Louvet as their leaders, were inclined for war. Brissot supported the cause of war with all his talents and influence. He thought, with Louvet and the whole of the Girondists, that war was essential to the nation, because it would terminate a dangerous uncertainty, and test the real intentions of the king. Judging of the result from the dictates of their own enthusiasm, they deemed it out of the question that the nation could be vanquished, and held it certain that, if by the king's connivance it should suffer any partial check, it would immediately appreciate the cause, and depose a faithless chief. How was it that Robespierre and the other Jacobins were unfavourable to a course which promised so prompt and decisive an issue? We can clear up this point only by conjecture. The timid Robespierre might be afraid of war, or he might oppose it simply because Brissot, his rival at the Jacobins', advocated it, and because the young Louvet had argued for it with great applause. Whatever might be the reason, it is undoubted he strove for peace with extreme obstinacy. Those members of the Cordelier Club who belonged also to the Jacobin, attended the debate, and supported Robespierre. Their principal apprehension seemed to be that war would confer too many advantages on Lafayette, and speedily elevate him to a military dictatorship: this was the constant dread of Camille-Desmoulins, who was perpetually haunted with the idea of that general, at the head of a victorious army, overwhelming, as on the Champ de Mars, all Jacobins and Cordeliers. Louvet and the Girondists attributed a different motive to the Cordeliers, thinking that they were actuated against Lafayette only as the enemy of the Duke of Orleans, with whom it was understood they were closely allied.

The Duke of Orleans, whom we perceive once more appearing rather in the suspicions of his enemies than in the revolution, was almost entirely eclipsed at this period. In the beginning, his name may have been used with advantage, and he himself may have placed expectations on those to whom he lent it; but all was now much changed. Becoming himself sensible how incongruous his position was in the popular party, he had attempted to obtain pardon from the court during the latter days of the Constituent Assembly, but had been repulsed. Under the Legislative Assembly, he was retained in the list of admirals, and he renewed his overtures to the king. Upon this occasion, he was admitted to the king's presence, had an interview of some duration, and met, upon the whole, a somewhat favourable reception. It was agreed that he should revisit the palace, and he consequently, upon a particular day, repaired thither. The queen's table was laid out, and the courtiers were assembled in great number. Scarcely was the duke perceived, than the most insulting expressions were repeated. "Look to the dishes!" they cried from all sides, as if they feared

he would throw poison upon them. They hustled him, trod upon his toes, and compelled him to retire. Whilst descending the staircase, he was exposed to fresh injuries, and he left the palace highly exasperated, concluding that the king and queen had purposely arranged this humiliating scene for him. But they were, on the contrary, deeply concerned at the imprudence of their courtiers, of which they had not the slightest previous cognisance.* The duke was naturally more irritated than ever, although he certainly became neither a more active nor a more able party-leader than formerly. Such of his friends as belonged to the Jacobin Club and the assembly unquestionably made a little more stir, whence his faction was thought to be again rearing its head, and many concluded that his pretensions and hopes were reviving with the perils of the throne.

The Girondists considered that the Cordeliers and ultra Jacobins advocated peace merely to deprive Lafayette, the rival of the Duke of Orleans, of the renown it might procure him. Whether their conjecture were right or not, the war party was sure to prevail in the assembly, where they had the predominance. That body commenced by placing under impeachment, on the 1st of January, Monsieur, the king's eldest brother, the Count d'Artois, the Prince of Condé, Calonne, Mirabeau the younger, and Laqueuille, as guilty of hostility against France. A decree of impeachment not being dependent on the royal sanction, the veto was not to be apprehended upon this occasion. The sequestration of the possessions of emigrants, and the collection of their revenues for the good of the state, already enacted by the unsanctioned decree, were prescribed anew by a fresh decree, to which the king offered no opposition. The assembly confiscated the revenues as indemnities for the charges of war. Monsieur was deprived of the regency by virtue of the decision previously pronounced.

The report upon the last official note of the emperor was presented to the assembly, on the 14th January, by Gensonné. In it he insisted that France had constantly lavished her treasures and her blood in behalf of Austria, without ever receiving any return; that the treaty of alliance, concluded in 1756, had been violated by the declaration of Pilnitz and those that followed it, the object of which had been to compass an armed coalition of sovereigns; that it had been again broken by the arming of the emigrants, allowed, and even aided, by the princes of the empire. Gensonné furthermore alleged, that although orders had been recently given for the dispersion of the emigrant assemblages, those apparent orders had not been executed; that the white cockade had not ceased to be worn beyond the Rhine, the national cockade to be outraged, and French travellers to be ill-treated; and that, in consequence, it was necessary to demand from the emperor a final explanation with reference to the treaty of 1756. The printing of this report, and the postponement of its consideration, were ordered.

On the same day, Guadet mounted the tribune. "Of all the circumstances," said he, "which have been communicated to the assembly, that which has caused the greatest sensation is the plan of a congress, with the design of obtaining a modification in the French constitution—a plan long suspected to be in agitation, and finally denounced as probable by the committees and ministers. If it be true that this intrigue is conducted by men who see in it a means of escaping from the political nullity into which they have recently sunk; if it be true that certain agents of the executive power are abetting, with all the influence of their stations, this abominable plot; if it be true that hopes are entertained we shall be drawn by procrastination and discouragement to accept this disgraceful mediation, ought the national assembly to close its eyes to such dangers? Let us all swear to die here, rather" —— He was not allowed to finish the sentence; the whole assembly rose, with the unanimous cry, "Yes, yes—we swear!" And it enthusiastically declared every Frenchman infamous, and a traitor to his country, who should concur in a congress assembled with the design of modifying the constitution. This decree was principally levelled against the old constitutionalists and the minister Delessart. The latter was especially obnoxious, being accused of purposely lengthening out the negotiations. On the 17th, the debate upon Gensonné's report was resumed; and it was decreed that the king should no longer treat but in the name of the French nation, and that he should require the emperor to give a definitive explanation before the 1st of March ensuing. The king replied that he had already, a fortnight before, demanded positive explications from Leopold.

In the mean time, it was communicated that the Elector of Treves, alarmed at the resolute tone of the French cabinet, had given fresh orders for the disbanding of the armed bodies, for the sale of the magazines collected in his territory, and for the prohibition of recruiting and disciplining; and that these orders were actually enforced. In the prevailing disposition of men's minds, such intelligence was coldly received. It was held to convey mere vain and abortive demonstrations; and the definitive reply of Leopold was not the less strenuously called for.

Divisions existed in the ministry between Bertrand de Molleville and Narbonne. Bertrand was envious of the popularity enjoyed by the minister at war, and censured his ingratiating demeanour towards the assembly. Narbonne complained of the conduct and unconstitutional tendencies of Bertrand de Molleville, and demanded that the king should dismiss him from the administration. Cahier de Gerville held the balance between them, but unavailingly. It was alleged that the constitutional party desired to raise Narbonne to the post of prime minister; and it seems certain that the king was misled, that the popularity and ambition of Narbonne were represented to him in alarming colours, and that he was brought to consider him as a presumptuous young man, scheming to govern the cabinet. These divisions were soon known to the journalists: Brissot and the Gironde zealously defended the minister threatened with disgrace, and fiercely attacked his colleagues and the king. A letter, written by the three generals of the northern armies to Narbonne, in which they expressed

* Bertrand de Molleville relates this circumstance in the following manner:—

"I gave an account at the council the same day of the visit which the Duke of Orleans had paid me, and of our conversation. The king determined to receive him, and had an interview with him on the following day, which lasted more than half an hour, with which his majesty appeared to have been well satisfied. 'I think with you,' said he, addressing me, 'that he sincerely repents, and will do all he can to repair the mischief he has effected, in which it is possible he has not had so great a share as we believed.'

The succeeding Sunday he came to the king's levee, where he met with the most insulting reception from the courtiers, who were ignorant of what had passed, and from the royalists, who were accustomed to attend in crowds at the palace that day, to pay their court to the royal family. They pressed around him, affecting to tread upon his feet, and to drive him towards the door, with the view of preventing him from entering. He proceeded to the queen's apartment, where the table was already spread: as soon as he was perceived, cries arose from all sides, 'Gentlemen, take care of the dishes!' as if all present had been firmly persuaded he had his pockets full of poison.

The abusive murmurs his presence excited forced him to retire without seeing the royal family. He was followed to the queen's staircase, and as he descended, he received a discharge of spittle on his head, and several on his coat. Rage and vexation were depicted on his countenance. He left the palace, with the conviction that the instigators of the outrages he had received were the king and queen, who had no knowledge of them, and were indeed much annoyed at them. He swore an implacable hatred to them, and he showed himself only too faithful to that horrible oath. I was at the palace that day, and witnessed all the facts I have just mentioned."—*Bertrand de Molleville*, vol. vi. p. 209.



to him the apprehension they felt respecting his dismissal, which they understood to be imminent, was published. The king immediately superseded him; but, as a counterpoise to the effect of this step, he announced the dismissal of Bertrand de Molleville also. Nevertheless, the sensation excited by Narbonne's displacement was not thereby lessened; an extraordinary agitation forthwith broke out, and the assembly was moved to declare, according to the formula previously employed towards Necker, that Narbonne possessed the confidence of the nation, and that the whole ministry had lost it. It was intended, however, to except from this sweeping condemnation Cahier de Gerville, a steady opponent of Bertrand de Molleville, and who had very recently had with him a violent dispute. After much confusion, Brissot undertook to prove that Delessart had betrayed the confidence of the nation. That minister had communicated to the diplomatic committee his correspondence with Kaunitz. It was undignified; it even gave Kaunitz an unfavourable idea of the state of France, and seemed to have authorised the conduct and language of Leopold. We must bear in mind that Delessart, and his colleague Duport-Dutertre, were the two ministers who belonged to the Feuillants, and who had become the more obnoxious from the belief that they favoured the project of a congress.

During one of the most stormy sittings of the assembly, the unfortunate Delessart was formally accused by Brissot of having compromised the dignity of the nation; of not having apprised the assembly of the concert amongst the powers, or notified the declaration of Pilnitz; of having professed in his dispatches unconstitutional doctrines; of having given to Kaunitz a false idea of the state of France; of having protracted the negotiations, and conducted them in a manner opposed to the interests of the country. Vergniaud supported Brissot, and added fresh complaints to those already charged against Delessart. He reproached him for having, when minister of the interior, kept too long in his portfolio the decree which united the Comtat to France, and being thus the cause of the massacres at Avignon. He then subjoined: "From this tribune in which I speak, I perceive the palace where perverse counsellors mislead and deceive the king whom the constitution has given us; I see the windows of the palace where the counter-revolution is plotting—where the means are canvassing to replunge us into slavery. Terror has often stalked from that famous palace in times of old, and in the name of despotism; now let it enter in the name of the law, let it penetrate all hearts within its walls—let all who dwell there know that our constitution grants inviolability to the king alone."

The motion for impeachment was immediately put to the vote, and adopted.* Delessart was sent to the high national court established at Orleans, and empowered, in terms of the constitution, to judge state-criminals. The king experienced profound sorrow at his departure. He had possessed his entire confidence, and gained his esteem by the moderate and pacific views he advocated. Duport-Dutertre, the minister of the constitutional party, was likewise threatened with impeachment; but he anticipated it; demanded to be heard in justification; was absolved by passing to the order of the day, and immediately afterwards tendered his resignation. Cahier de Gerville also gave in his; and in this manner the king found himself deprived of the only one of his ministers who had any reputation for patriotism with the assembly.

Severed from the ministers whom the Feuillants had given him, and at a loss where to seek support amidst the storm, Louis XVI., who had dismissed Narbonne because he was too popular, resolved to unite himself with the Gironde, which was republican.

* Sitting of the 10th March.

It is true, it was only so from distrust of the king, who might, by placing himself in its hands, have succeeded in attaching it to his person; but it was necessary that his surrender should be cordial and sincere, and the eternal question of his good faith arose in this instance as upon all previous occasions. Doubtless, Louis XVI. was honest when he yielded himself to a party, but he did so with chagrin and reluctance. Consequently, so soon as the party proposed some unpalatable but indispensable condition, he rejected it; distrust was immediately generated, alienation ensued, and a speedy rupture was the issue of those misplaced alliances between minds too exclusively occupied by opposing interests. It was thus that Louis XVI., after admitting to his council the Feuillant party, had splenetically repudiated Narbonne, who was its most decided leader, and found himself compelled, as the only means of composing the storm, to give himself up to the mercy of the Gironde. The example of England, where the sovereign often selects his ministers from the opposition, weighed with the king in inducing his present course. The court thereupon conceived a hope, for human ingenuity always discovers one even in the most dismal conjunctures. It flattered itself, then, that Louis XVI., by taking incapable and ridiculous demagogues into the cabinet, would destroy the reputation of the party from which he had chosen them. However, the result was far different, and the new ministry belied the malevolent prophecies of the courtiers.

Upwards of a month previously, Delessart and Narbonne had called to them a man whose talents they judged most precious, and placed him near them, to be rendered serviceable as emergencies might arise. This man was Dumouriez, who, alternately commanding in Normandy and in La Vendée, had every where distinguished himself for firmness and ability. He had offered himself first to the court, then to the Constituent Assembly; for every party was to him the same, so long as he was allowed to exercise his active spirit and his extraordinary powers. Dumouriez, repressed as it were by the age, had passed his early years in diplomatic intrigues. With all his enterprise, his military and political genius, and his half century of years, at the commencement of the revolution he was still nothing but a brilliant adventurer. He had preserved, however, the fire and vigour of youth. So soon as a war or a revolution broke out, he formed his plans, laid them before all parties, ready to act for all, provided only action was accorded him. He had thus accustomed himself to make light of the nature of a cause; but although too deficient in conviction, he was generous, feeling, and capable of attachment, if not to principles, at least to persons. But with a mind thus dazzling, prompt, and capacious, with a courage by turns calm and impetuous, he was admirable as an instrument, but incapable of swaying. He possessed neither the dignity of a profound conviction, nor the stubborn pride of an arbitrary disposition, and he was capable of commanding none but soldiers. If to his genius had been joined the passions of Mirabeau, the determination of a Cromwell, or even the dogmatism of a Robespierre, he would have domineered over the revolution and France.

Dumouriez, on taking his place by the side of Narbonne, forthwith formed a vast military plan. He embraced at once an offensive and defensive war. Where France stretched to her natural limits, the Rhine, the Alps, the Pyrenees, and the ocean, he advised she should stand on the defensive. But on the side of the Low Countries, where the French territory did not reach the Rhine, and on that of Savoy, where it fell short of the Alps, he maintained that sudden attacks should be made until the natural boundaries were attained, when the defensive should be resumed. This plan consulted both interest and principles, framed as it was to take advantage of a war which France had not provoked, to return, with respect to

boundaries, to the simple landmarks of nature. He furthermore proposed the formation of a fourth army, destined to occupy the south, and craved the command of it, which was promised him.

Dumouriez had ingratiated himself with Gensonné, one of the civil commissioners sent into La Vendée by the Constituent Assembly, since a deputy in the Legislative, and one of the most influential members of the Gironde. Having remarked, also, that the Jacobins were the predominant faction, he had appeared in their club, read divers memorials amidst great applause, and not the less continued his ancient friendship with Delaporte, intendant of the civil list, and a devoted adherent of Louis XVI. Thus connected with the different parties upon the point of coalescing, Dumouriez could not fail to rise, and to be called to the ministry. Louis XVI. offered him the portfolio of foreign affairs, left on his hands by the decree of impeachment against Delessart; but still attached to the impeached minister, the king tendered it to him only *ad interim*. Dumouriez, feeling himself powerfully supported, and unwilling to appear as if keeping the office for a Feuillant minister, refused the portfolio upon those terms, and obtained it unconditionally. He found in the administration only Cahier de Gerville and Degraves. Cahier de Gerville, although he had given in his resignation, had not yet relinquished office. Degraves had replaced Narbonne; he was young, flexible, and inexperienced; Dumouriez understood how to win him over, and he thus held in his own hands the foreign relations and the military administration—that is to say, the provocatives and the organisation of war. Less would have scarcely satisfied his enterprising genius. No sooner was he installed in the ministry, than Dumouriez assumed the red cap in the Jacobin Club, a new head-dress borrowed from the Phrygians, and now become the emblem of liberty. He promised its members that he would govern for and by them. When presented to the king, he contrived to satisfy him as to his conduct at the Jacobins'; he removed the ill impressions that conduct had naturally inspired; he had the art to excite his feelings by protestations of devotedness, and to dissipate his sombre sadness by dint of humour. He persuaded him that he sought popularity only for the good of the monarchy, and to ensure its stability. In spite of all his deference, however, he took care to impress upon the monarch that the constitution was not to be avoided, endeavouring to console him at the same time by demonstrating that a king might still be very powerful even with its restrictions. His first dispatches to the powers, distinguished for their strength of argument and their firmness of tone, changed the nature of the negotiations, and placed France in a perfectly new attitude, but rendered war imminent. It was natural that Dumouriez should desire war, since he had all its genius, and had meditated upon that great art for thirty-six years; but it must be allowed, likewise, that the conduct of the cabinet of Vienna and the irritation of the assembly had already rendered it inevitable.

Dumouriez, by his behaviour at the Jacobins, and by his known alliance with the Gironde, was sure, even without any peculiar animosity against the Feuillants, to become embroiled with them; but he had, in addition, displaced them. He was, consequently, in constant opposition with the leaders of that party. Braving, however, the sarcastic and scornful epigrams they launched against the Jacobins and the assembly, he determined to pursue his own course with the assurance that was usual to him.

It was necessary to fill up the vacancies in the cabinet. Pétion, Gensonné, and Brissot, were consulted upon the selections to be made. According to the existing law, the ministers could not be taken from the present or preceding assembly, therefore the range of choice was extremely limited. For the marine, Dumouriez proposed Lacoste, an old official in that department, experienced, industrious, and an ardent patriot, but nevertheless attached to the king, esteemed by him, and remaining longer in his councils than all the others. The ministry of justice was designed for that young Louvet who had recently distinguished himself at the Jacobins, and obtained the good opinion of the Girondists since he had so ably supported the opinion of Brissot in favour of war; but the bilious Robespierre caused him to be immediately denounced. Louvet justified himself with perfect success; but it was judged inexpedient to select a man whose popularity was doubtful, and Duranthon was chosen. He was an advocate from Bordeaux, an enlightened and upright man, but too feeble in character. The finance and home departments remained open to candidates. The Gironde proposed Clavière, known by some highly esteemed works on subjects of finance. Clavière had abundance of ideas, all the obstinacy of a meditative theorist, and great alacrity in business. The minister intrusted with the home department was Roland, formerly inspector of manufactures, and known by excellent publications on the industrial and mechanical arts. This man, with austere manners, inflexible principles, and a cold, harsh exterior, yielded, without being aware of it, to the superior ascendancy of his wife. Madame Roland was young and handsome. Educated in deep seclusion, in philosophical and republican ideas, she had become imbued with sentiments superior to her sex, and, from the principles then paramount, had formed for herself a stern political creed. Living in the closest confidence with her husband, she lent him her pen, imparted to him some of her own vivacity, and communicated her enthusiasm not alone to her husband, but to all the Girondists, who, passionately attached to liberty and philosophy, admired her for her beauty, her wit, and for her principles, which were identical with their own.*

The new ministry comprised men of qualifications sufficiently eminent to succeed; but it needed to be guarded, lest it should too far displease Louis XVI., and to take care that it maintained its alliance with the Gironde. It was therefore quite capable of fulfilling its task; but it might reasonably be apprehended that all would be at an end whenever, to the

* As Madame Roland fills an important part in the revolution, it may be interesting to give an account of her from the pen of one of the most striking writers on that event.

"Roland was a man of ordinary capacity, but he obtained the reputation of genius by means of his wife, who thought, wrote, and spoke for him. She was a woman of most superior mind; with as much virtue as pride, as much ambition as domestic virtue. Daughter of an engraver, she commenced her career by wishing to contend with a queen; and no sooner had Marie Antoinette fallen, than she seemed resolute to maintain the combat, no longer against a person of her own sex, but with the men who pretended to rival the reputation of her husband.

Madame Roland had great talent, but she wanted tact and moderation. She belonged to that class in the middling ranks that scarcely knows what good breeding is; her manners were too *brusque*; she trusted implicitly to her good intentions, and was quite indifferent in regard to external appearances, which, after all, are almost every thing in this world. Like Marie Antoinette, she was master in her own family; the former was king, the latter was minister; her husband, whom she constantly put forward, as often disappeared in her presence, which gave rise to the *bon mot* of Condorcet—'When I wish to see the minister of the interior, I never can see any thing but the petticoat of his wife.' This was strictly true: persons on business uniformly applied to Madame Roland instead of the minister; and whatever she may have said in her Memoirs, it is certain that unconsciously she opened the portfolio with her own hand. She was to the last degree impatient under the attacks of the tribune, to which she had no means of reply, and took her revenge by means of pamphlets and articles in the public journals. In these she kept up an incessant warfare, which Roland sanctioned with his name, but in which it was easy to discover the warm and brilliant style of his wife."—*Graphic History of National Convention*, by M. L. Vol. i. p. 38; French edition.

inherent incompatibility of distinct parties, the faults of individuals should be superadded; and this could scarcely fail to happen very speedily. Louis XVI., struck with the activity of his ministers, with their honest zeal, and with their aptitude for affairs, was charmed for the instant; their economical reforms especially delighted him, for he had always been attached to that species of improvement which required no sacrifice of power or principle. If he could have been always satisfied as he was at first, and have separated himself from the parasites of the court, he would have easily brought himself to endure the constitution. He reiterated his resolution in that respect with pure sincerity to the ministers, and succeeded in convincing the most incredulous, Roland and Clavière. A perfect persuasion prevailed on both sides. The Gironde, which was republican only from distrust of the king, ceased at that time to be so, and Vergniaud, Gensonné, and Guadet, entered into communication with Louis XVI., which afterwards formed a head of accusation against them. The inflexible spouse of Roland was alone in doubt, and restrained her too easy friends, as she thought them, from committing themselves too far. The cause of her distrust is obvious; she was not accustomed to see the king. The ministers, on the contrary, conversed with him every day, and honest men often meeting together soon feel at ease as to each other's intentions; but this confidence could not last long, because unavoidable questions were coming on, certain to evoke all the discrepancies in their sentiments.

The courtiers sought to cast ridicule upon the somewhat republican simplicity of the new administration, and upon the uncouth rudeness of Roland, who presented himself at the palace without buckles in his shoes.* Dumouriez retorted their sarcasms; and mingling gaiety of humour with assiduous devotion to business, he pleased the king, won upon him by his superior mind, and perhaps, also, was more agreeable than the others from the flexibility of his opinions. The queen, finding that of all the ministers he had the most influence over the mind of her consort, desired to see him. He has presented us in his Memoirs with an account of that singular interview, which painfully depicts the agitated state of that unfortunate princess, worthy of a more auspicious reign, of better friends, and of a less dismal fate.

Introduced, says he, into the queen's apartment, he found her alone, greatly flushed, walking rapidly to and fro, with an agitation that presaged a somewhat warm explanation. He leaned upon the corner of the mantelpiece, sorrowfully affected at the destiny of the princess, and at the fearful sensations under which she seemed labouring. She advanced to him with an air of majesty and anger, and said to him—"Sir, you are omnipotent at this moment, but you are so by the favour of the people, who soon break their idols. Your life depends upon your conduct. They say you have great talent. You ought to know that neither the king nor I can endure all these encroachments—nor the constitution. I tell you so frankly; take your own part."

He answered her, "Madam, I am much grieved at the painful avowal which your majesty has just made to me. I will not betray your confidence; but I stand between the king and the nation, and I belong to my country. Permit me to assure you that the safety of the king, your own, that of your august offspring, are linked with the constitution, as well as the re-establishment of the king's authority. I should fail in my duty to you and to him likewise, if I held a different language. You are both encompassed by enemies, who sacrifice you to their own interest. Were the constitution once in full activity, so far from rendering the king miserable, it would form his felicity and glory. It behoves him to concur unreservedly in its prompt and solid establishment." The unfortunate queen, offended that Dumouriez thus frankly combated her ideas, said to him, raising her voice into an acrimonious tone, "It will not last—take care of yourself."

Dumouriez replied with an unassuming firmness—"Madam, I am more than fifty years old; my life has been beset by many perils; and on taking the ministry, I was well aware that responsibility was not the greatest of my dangers." "There wanted nothing more," she cried, with anguish, "but to calumniate me! You seem to think, then, I am capable of having you assassinated!" And tears flowed from her eyes.

Equally agitated with herself, he said, "God preserve me from doing you so cruel an injustice! The character of your majesty is great and noble; you have given heroic proofs of it, which I have admired, and which have attached me to you." She became calm at these words, and drew near him. He continued—"Believe me, madam, I have no interest in deceiving you: I abhor as much as you anarchy and crimes. I am fortified by experience. I am better able than your majesty to judge of events. This is not a transitory popular movement, as you seem to imagine. It is an almost universal insurrection of a great nation against inveterate abuses. Factions heighten the conflagration: in all of them there are wretches and madmen. I consider in the revolution only the king and the entire nation; all that tends to separate them leads to their mutual ruin; I am striving with all my power to unite them—it is for you to assist me. If I be an obstacle to your designs, if you persist in adhering to them, tell me so; I will instantly bear my resignation to the king, and retire to some corner to lament over my country's and your fate."

The conclusion of these remarks completely established the queen's confidence. They passed in review together the different factions; he pointed out faults and crimes on all parts; he proved to her that she was betrayed in her privacy; he quoted to her certain words uttered in the most intimate confidence. The princess appeared to him in the end to be perfectly convinced, and she dismissed him with a serene and affable air. She was quite sincere; but those around her, and the horrible excesses of Marat's journal, and of the Jacobins, soon drove her back into her fatal resolutions.

Another day she said to him before the king, "You see me in deep affliction: I dare not look out of a window fronting the garden. Last evening, wishing to breathe the air, I went to a window of the court: an artilleryman on guard apostrophised me with a gross expression, adding, 'How I should like to have your head on the point of my bayonet!' In that frightful garden, on one side we see a man mounted on a chair, reading in a loud voice horrible calumnies against us; on another side is an abbé whom they are dragging in a pond, bestowing on him blows and execrations. At the same time, others are playing at foot-ball, or promenading in perfect tranquillity. What a residence! What a nation!"*

* ["The court called this ministry, which was formed in the month of March, 'the *sans-culotte* (breechless) ministry.' The first time Roland appeared at the palace with strings in his shoes and a round hat, contrary to the rules of etiquette, the master of the ceremonies refused to admit him. But obliged to give him entrance, he said to Dumouriez, pointing at Roland, 'Ah! sir, no buckles on his shoes!' 'Ah! sir, all is lost!' replied Dumouriez, with the greatest gravity. Such were still the objects of court solicitude!"—*Mignet*, vol. i. p. 196.]

* Dumouriez's Memoirs, book iii. chap. 6. Madame Campan gives a different account of this interview:—

"All parties were on the alert," she says, "to ruin the king or to save him. One day I found the queen extremely uneasy: she told me she no longer knew where she was; that the Jacobin leaders offered themselves to her through the medium of Dumouriez, or that Dumouriez, abandoning the Jacobin party, had offered himself to her; that she had granted him an audience; that when alone with her, he had thrown himself at her feet,

Thus, by a sort of fatality, the presumed intentions of the palace aroused the suspicion and fury of the people, and the vociferations of the multitude augmented the sorrows and the imprudence of the palace. Despair consequently reigned within and without. But why, it may be asked, did not a frank explanation put an end to so many evils? Why did not the palace comprehend the real apprehensions of the people? Why were not the people made to understand the actual misery of the palace?—But why are men but mortals? At this last query we must stop, bowing with a sigh to human nature, and proceed with our mournful tale.

Leopold II. was dead. The pacific dispositions of that prince rendered the event a subject of regret with regard to the peace of Europe, for the same moderation could not be anticipated from his nephew and successor, Francis, King of Bohemia and Hungary. Gustavus, King of Sweden, had been recently assassinated at a ball. The enemies of the Jacobins charged them with the murder; but it was sufficiently proved to be the crime of the nobility, humbled by Gustavus in the last Swedish revolution. Thus nobility, which denounced the revolutionary fury of the people in France, gave in the north an example of what it had formerly been itself, and of what it still was in countries where civilisation was less advanced. What an example, what a lesson, for Louis XVI., if he could have dispassionately surveyed it! The death of Gustavus frustrated the enterprise he had projected against France, for which Catherine was to have furnished soldiers, and Spain subsidies. It is, however, very doubtful whether the faithless Catherine would have fulfilled what she had undertaken; and the death of Gustavus, so exaggerated as to its consequences, was in reality an occurrence of but slight importance.†

Delessart had been impeached for the imbecility of his dispatches: it was consistent neither with the taste nor the interests of Dumouriez to negotiate feebly with foreign powers. His latter dispatches had appeared to satisfy Louis XVI., from their appropriate and firm tenor. M. de Noailles, French ambassador at Vienna, and an agent of doubtful sincerity, forwarded his resignation to Dumouriez, alleging that he despaired of inducing the head of the house of Austria to listen to the language he had been instructed to employ. Dumouriez hastened to lay the communication before the assembly, which, moved to exasperation at the circumstance, instantly voted an impeachment against M. de Noailles. Another ambassador was dispatched with fresh instructions. Two days subsequently, Noailles recalled his resignation, and sent the categorical answer he had demanded from the cabinet of Vienna. The note of M. de Cobentzel, containing this answer, is, amid all the signal faults of the powers, one of the most impolitic they ever committed. Cobentzel required, in the name of his court, the re-establishment of the French monarchy upon the foundations laid down in the royal declaration of the 23d June 1789. This went to impose the re-institution of the three orders, the restitution of the church lands, and the restoration of the Comtat-Venaissin to the pope. This Austrian minister likewise demanded the restoration of their lands in Alsace to the princes of the empire, with all their feudal rights. France must have been judged through the passions of Coblentz, to induce the proposition of such conditions. It was requiring at once the annihilation of a constitution sworn to by the king and the nation, the revocation of a solemn resolution touching Avignon, and national bankruptcy, by restoring the church possessions already alienated. And besides, by what authority was so abject a submission asked? By what right was any interference hazarded in the internal affairs of France? What just complaint could be proffered on behalf of the princes in Alsace, since their estates were comprehended within the circuit of French sovereignty, and were necessarily subject to its laws?

The first impulse of the king and of Dumouriez was to repair to the assembly and apprise it of this note. That body received it with a burst of indignation, and deservedly so; a general cry for war rung through the hall. There was a circumstance, however, which Dumouriez did not impart to the assembly, namely, that Austria, which he had threatened with a fresh insurrection at Liege, had dispatched an agent to treat with him upon that subject; that the language of this agent was completely at variance with that of the Austrian minister, and that the last note was very evidently the result of some sudden and suggested resolution. The assembly revoked the decree of impeachment passed against Noailles, and gave instructions for a prompt report. The king was now unable to recede; the fatal war was at last about to be declared; and in no possible case could it be favourable to his interests. If victors, the French would become yet more urgent and inexorable as to the observation of the new law; if vanquished, they would be incensed against the government, and accuse it of having inadequately supported the war. Louis XVI. was perfectly sensible of this alternative peril; and the determination for war was one of those which cost him the severest pangs.*

assuring her that though he had drawn the red cap over his ears, he neither was nor could be a Jacobin; that the revolution had been allowed to progress until the mob of disorganisers, who were eager only for pillage, were capable of any extremity, and could give the assembly a formidable army prepared to undermine the remnants of a throne already too shattered Speaking with great warmth, he had seized the queen's hand, and, kissing it with transport, exclaimed, 'Allow yourself to be saved!' The queen told me that no reliance could be placed on the protestations of a traitor; that his whole conduct was so well known, that the wisest course, unquestionably, was to put no trust in him; besides, that the princes emphatically recommended no confidence to be put in any proposition emanating at home—*et cetera.*"—Vol. ii. p. 202.

The account of this interview is here, as we see, different in many particulars; but the groundwork is the same; only, passing through the mouth of the queen and that of Madame Campan, it of course assumed a tone unfavourable to Dumouriez. That of Dumouriez depicts in a very natural manner the agitation of the unfortunate Marie Antoinette; and as he relates nothing derogatory to that princess, and nothing incompatible with her character, I have preferred it. It is possible, nevertheless, that the vanity of Dumouriez has led him to select with partiality such details as were most flattering to himself.

† Bouillé, whose Memoirs I have previously cited, and who was in a position to form a correct opinion upon the real intentions of the powers, put no trust whatever in the zeal and sincerity of Catherine. Upon this subject he thus expresses himself:—

"We see that this prince (Gustavus) reckoned greatly upon the dispositions of the Empress of Russia, and upon the active part she was prepared to take in the confederation, she having hitherto restricted herself to demonstrations. The King of Sweden was in error, and I doubt that Catherine would have ever intrusted him with the 18,000 Russians she had promised. I am persuaded, besides, that the emperor and King of Prussia had not communicated to him either their projects or views. Personally, both entertained more than repugnance towards him; and they desired that he should not assume any active part in the affairs of France."—*Bouillé*, p. 319.

* Madame Campan informs us, in one and the same passage, of the construction of the iron-chest and of the existence of a secret protest framed by the king against the declaration of war. The terror of the king for war partook of the extraordinary, and he strove by all means to throw its odium upon the popular party.

"The king had a prodigious quantity of papers, and, unfortunately, conceived the idea of having secretly constructed, by a locksmith whom he had employed for more than ten years, a safe in an interior corridor of his apartment. This safe, but for the denunciation of that man, would have been long unknown. At the spot where it was placed, the wall was painted to resemble large stones, and the aperture was perfectly concealed in the dark grooves which formed the shaded part of those painted stones. But before the locksmith had denounced to the assembly what has since been called the *iron-chest*, the queen was aware that he had

Dumouriez drew up the report with his accustomed celerity, and carried it to the king, who kept it for three days. It was a question whether the king, upon whom was thrown the initiative with regard to the assembly, should urge it to declare war, or whether he should content himself with consulting it upon the subject, by the announcement that France, in accordance with the prescribed emergencies, was *in a state of war*. The ministers, Roland and Clavière, declared for the first course. The orators of the Gironde likewise supported that opinion, and desired to dictate the speech from the throne. It was a sad task for Louis XVI. to declare war, and he desired rather to declare a state of war. The distinction was of little importance; but it was more consonant to his feelings. So slight a deference to his peculiar position could do no injury. Dumouriez, more easily moved, paid no attention to the two ministers, and, supported by Degraves, Lacoste, and Duranthon, secured the adoption of the king's opinion. This was his first difference with the Gironde. The king himself composed his speech, and repaired in person to the assembly, accompanied by all his ministers. A vast concourse of spectators added to the effect of that day's sitting, which was to decide the fate of France and of Europe. The countenance of the monarch was agitated, and bespoke profound solicitude. Dumouriez read a detailed report of the negotiations of France with the empire; he demonstrated that the treaty of 1756 was *de facto* broken, and that, according to the last ultimatum, France was *in a state of war*. He added, that the king having no other legal mode of consulting the assembly than by a *formal proposition of war*, he was content to consult it in that form.

Louis XVI. then spoke with much dignity, but in a nervous voice:—"Gentlemen," said he, "you have heard the result of the negotiations which I have pursued with the court of Vienna. The conclusions of the report express the unanimous opinion of my council, and I have myself adopted them. They are conformable to the wishes often manifested by the National Assembly, and to the sentiments conveyed to me by numerous citizens in different parts of the kingdom. All prefer war to longer beholding the dignity of the French people outraged, and the national safety menaced. I have felt it incumbent on me previously to use all possible means to preserve peace. I now come, according to the constitution, to propose to the National Assembly war against the King of Hungary and Bohemia."

The most favourable reception was given to this proposition, and cries of "Long live the king!" resounded from all sides. The assembly answered the king that it would forthwith enter upon deliberation, and would communicate the result to him by message. A very stormy debate then commenced, and was continued into the dead of night. The reasons already stated were repeated for and against; but at last the decree was passed, and war resolved on by a great majority.

"Considering," ran the assembly's decree, "that the court of Vienna, in contempt of treaties, has not ceased to grant avowed protection to French rebels; that it has urged and formed an alliance with several European powers against the independence and safety of the French nation:

That Francis the First, King of Hungary and Bohemia,* has, by his notes of the 18th March and 7th April last, refused to renounce this alliance:

That, notwithstanding the proposal made to him by the note of the 11th March last, to reduce on either side the troops upon the frontiers to the peace establishment, he has persisted in and increased his hostile preparations:

That he has formally outraged the sovereignty of the French nation, by declaring his determination to support the pretensions of the German princes holding possessions in France, to whom the French nation has constantly offered indemnities:

That he has endeavoured to sow discord amongst French citizens, and to arm them against each other, by offering to malecontents a support in the union of the powers:

Considering, lastly, that the refusal to answer the last dispatches of the King of the French destroys all hope of obtaining, by the course of an amicable negotiation, any redress for these multifarious grievances, and is equivalent to a declaration of war,—

The assembly declares there is the requisite urgency."†

It must be granted that this cruel war, which so long desolated Europe, was not provoked by France, but by the foreign powers. France, in declaring it, did but record by a decree the state in which they had placed her. Condorcet was selected to compose an exposition of the motives of the French nation. History ought to cherish this document, so exquisite a model is it of clear and temperate reasoning.‡

spoken of it to some of his companions, and that this man, in whom the king from habit placed too much confidence, was a Jacobin. She apprised the king of what had thus come to her knowledge, and induced him to fill a very large portfolio with all the documents he was most interested in preserving, and to intrust it to my care. She urged him, in my presence, to leave nothing in that safe, and the king, to tranquillise her, assured her that he had left nothing in it. I wished to take the portfolio, and carry it into my apartment; but it was too heavy for me to lift. The king told me he would carry it himself; I went before him to open the doors. When he had deposited the portfolio in my inner cabinet, he merely said to me, 'The queen will tell you what this contains.' Upon returning to the queen, I questioned her respecting it, judging from the king's words that it was expedient I should be let into the secret. 'They are,' the queen replied, 'documents which would be most fatal to the king, if they should proceed to the extremity of putting him on his trial. But what he desires especially that I should tell you is, that the portfolio contains the minutes of a privy-council, in which the king pronounced an opinion against the war. He caused them to be signed by all the ministers, and, in the event of such a process, he is confident that this document will be very useful.' I asked to whom she thought I ought to intrust the portfolio. 'To whom you please,' answered the queen; 'you are *alone responsible* for it. Do not remove from the palace, even in your relief months; there are circumstances in which it may be of great consequence to have it forthcoming upon the instant.'"—*Madame Campan*, vol. ii. p. 222.

* Francis I. was not yet elected emperor.

† [M. Thiers has omitted the concluding and main terms of this momentous decree. It proceeds: "The National Assembly —— deliberating on the king's formal proposition, and having declared that there is urgency, DECREES war against the King of Hungary and Bohemia."]

‡ *Exposition of the motives which have determined the National Assembly to declare, upon the formal proposition of the King, that there are grounds for declaring war against the King of Hungary and Bohemia; by M. Condorcet.*—(*Sitting of the 20th April* 1792.)

"Impelled to consent to war by the most imperious necessity, the National Assembly is aware that it will be accused of having hastened or provoked it.

It feels that the insidious course of the court of Vienna has been framed solely with a view to give a shadow of foundation to this imputation, which is precious to the foreign powers as a blind to their people upon the real motives of their unjust attack against France; it knows that this reproach will be repeated by the internal enemies of our constitution and our laws, in the criminal hope of wresting from the representatives of the nation the public confidence.

A simple exposition of their policy is their sole vindication, and they address it with equal composure to aliens and Frenchmen, since nature has planted the same sentiments of justice in the hearts of all men.

Every nation has the sole power to frame laws for itself, and the inalienable right to alter them. This right belongs to none, or it belongs to all in perfect equality; to attack it in one, is to declare that it is recognised in none other; a design to ravish it by force from a foreign nation, is an announcement that the intervener does not respect it in that of which he is a citizen or the chief; it is to betray his own country, to proclaim himself

The proclamation of war caused general joy. The patriots saw in it an end to the fears which the emigration and the uncertain conduct of the king caused them. The moderates, chiefly alarmed at the danger of intestine divisions, hoped that the common peril would stifle them, and that the camps would absorb

the enemy of the human race! The French nation might justly conclude, that truths so simple would prevail with all princes, and that, in the eighteenth century, none would venture to oppose them with the antiquated maxims of tyranny; but its hopes have been falsified; a league has been formed against its independence, and there is left to it but the alternative of convincing its enemies of the justice of its cause, or of opposing them by force of arms.

Apprised of this threatening league, but anxious to preserve peace, the National Assembly first inquired what object was embraced in this union of powers so long rivals, and an answer was given that its motives were the maintenance of general tranquillity, the security and honour of crowns, the fear of witnessing a renewal of events which certain epochs of the French revolution have brought forth.

But how did France menace the general tranquillity, when it had taken a solemn resolution to attempt no conquest, to attack the liberty of no people—when, during the long and sanguinary strife which raged in the Low Countries and in the states of Liege between governments and citizens, it observed the most rigorous neutrality?

Doubtless, the French nation has openly proclaimed that sovereignty belongs only to the people, who, restricted in the exercise of their will by the rights of posterity, cannot delegate irrevocable power; doubtless, it has distinctly asserted that no usage, no express law, no consent, no convention, is of efficacy to subject a society of men to any authority which they have not the right to recall; but what idea do these princes entertain of the legitimacy of their own power, or of the justice with which they exercise it, if they regard the enunciation of these maxims as an enterprise against the tranquillity of their states?

Will they allege that this tranquillity must be surely troubled by the works and discourses of certain Frenchmen? This would be tantamount, again, to a demand under threat of arms for a law against the liberty of the press, a declaration of war against the progress of reason; and when it is notorious that the French nation has been every where scandalised with impunity, that the presses of neighbouring countries have never ceased from pouring into our departments works designed to stimulate treason, to counsel revolt; and when the evidences of protection and favour to their authors are remembered—will it be believed that a sincere love of peace, and not a hatred of liberty, has inspired these hypocritical reproaches?

Objections have been made to endeavours, on the part of the French, to excite neighbouring nations to break their fetters, to reclaim their rights. But the ministers who have dilated on these imputations, without daring to cite a single fact in support of them, knew well how groundless they were; and had they even been real, powers which have permitted the assemblages of our emigrants, have afforded them succours, have received their envoys, have publicly admitted them to their conferences, and have not blushed to exhort the French to civil war, would have no right to complain; otherwise, it has become an axiom, that to extend servitude is allowable, to propagate liberty is criminal; that all expedients are legitimate against nations; and that kings alone have actual rights. Never, surely, did the pride of monarchs so audaciously insult the majesty of nations!

The French people, free to settle the form of their own constitution, could not endanger, by using that prerogative, either the security or the honour of foreign crowns. Do the chiefs of other countries rank amongst their attributes the power to compel the French nation to confer on the chief of its government an authority equal to what themselves exercise in their states? Would they, because they have subjects, interdict free men from elsewhere existing? And do they not perceive, that, by permitting all means for ensuring what they denominate the security of crowns, they declared legitimate all that a nation may undertake in favour of universal liberty?

If violences, if crimes, have tarnished certain epochs of the French revolution, to the depositaries of the national will alone belonged the power to punish them or bury them in oblivion; every citizen, every magistrate, whatever may be his title, ought to claim justice only from the laws of his country, and can expect it from them alone. Foreign powers, inasmuch as their subjects have been uninjured by such events, can have no just ground either for remonstrating, or for taking hostile measures to prevent their recurrence. The relationship or personal alliance between kings is nothing in the sight of nations; enslaved or free, common interests unite them; nature has placed their happiness in peace, in the mutual succours of an amiable fraternity; she would be outraged should any presume to weigh in the same balance the destiny of twenty millions of men, and the affections or pride of a few individuals. Are we, then, again doomed to witness the voluntary serfage of populations—heap with human victims the altars of the earth's false deities?

Thus, all these alleged motives for a league against France, were but fresh assaults on her independence. She was justified in demanding a renunciation of injurious projects, and in regarding the refusal as an act of hostility; such are the principles which have actuated the proceedings of the National Assembly. It has continued to desire peace, but it must prefer war to a patience perilous to liberty; it could not conceal from itself, that changes in the constitution, subversive of the equality upon which it is based, were the sole design of the enemies of France—that they purposed to chastise her for having recognised, in their full extent, the rights common to all mankind; and it was then that it took the oath, reverberated throughout France, to perish rather than suffer the least infringement upon the liberty of citizens, upon the sovereignty of the nation, and, above all, upon that equality without which there is neither justice nor happiness for societies.

Are the French reproached for not sufficiently respecting the rights of others, by offering only pecuniary indemnities to the German princes, proprietors in Alsace, and to the pope?

Treaties had recognised the sovereignty of France over Alsace, and, for more than a century, it has been peaceably exercised. The rights which those treaties had reserved, were simply privileges; the meaning of that reservation, therefore, was, that the holders of fiefs in Alsace should retain them with the ancient prerogatives, so long as the general laws of France should permit the various forms of feudalism; that reservation also signified, that if the feudal rights were included in one common abrogation, the nation would owe a satisfaction to the possessors, for the substantial advantages resulting therefrom; for such is all that the right of property can demand, when it is in opposition to the law, in contradiction to the public weal. The citizens of Alsace are Frenchmen, and the nation could not, without disgrace and injustice, allow them to be deprived of the smallest portion of rights common to all whom that appellation ought equally to shelter. Will it be said, that, in order to indemnify the princes, a part of the territory should be abandoned to them? No; a free and generous nation traffics not with men; it condemns not to slavery, nor delivers up to masters those whom it has once admitted to a participation of its liberty.

The citizens of the Comtats were in a position to give themselves a constitution; they might have declared themselves independent—they preferred being Frenchmen; and France will not abandon them after having adopted them. Had she refused to grant their request, their district is enclosed by her territory, and she could not have permitted their oppressors to traverse a land of liberty when bent upon punishing men for daring to render themselves independent, and to resume their rights. All the pope possessed in that country was a revenue for gubernatorial functions; the people, when they relieved him from those functions, made use of a privilege which long servitude had suspended but could not take away; and the indemnity proposed by France was not even exigible in justice.

Thus, what is arrogantly demanded in the name of the pope and the princes holding possessions in Alsace, involves further violations of natural right. It is still for the pretensions of a few men that the blood of nations is to flow! And if the ministers of the house of Austria had resolved to declare war against reason in the name of prejudices, against populations in the name of kings, they could have held no other language!

It has been asserted that the voice of the French people for the maintenance of its equality and its independence, is that of a faction. But the French nation has a constitution; that constitution has been acknowledged and adopted by the general body of the citizens; it cannot be altered but by the will of the people, and according to forms which itself has prescribed; so long as it subsists, the powers established under it have alone the right to promulgate the national determination, and it is through them that such determination has been made known to foreign states. It is the king, who, at the request of the National Assembly, and in fulfilment of the functions conferred on him by the constitution, has complained of the protection afforded to the emigrants, and has fruitlessly demanded that it should be withheld; it is he who has asked for explanations concerning the league formed against France; it is he who has insisted that this league should be dissolved; and it is a just matter of astonishment to hear the solemn resolve of a nation, publicly expressed by its legitimate

all those turbulent spirits hatched by the revolution. A few Feuillants alone, well-inclined to impute faults to the assembly, reproached it with having violated the constitution, according to which France was debarred from ever being in a state of aggression. But it was too palpable that, in the present instance, France did not attack. Consequently, putting aside the king and certain malecontents, war was the general desire.

Lafayette prepared courageously to serve his country in this new career. It was he who was principally charged with the execution of the plan laid down by Dumouriez and apparently ordered by Degraves. Dumouriez had reasonably flattered himself, and had led the patriots confidently to anticipate, that the invasion of Belgium would be an easy operation. That country, recently agitated by a revolution which Austria had suppressed, was naturally judged disposed to rise at the first appearance of the French; and then would be realised that warning of the assembly to sovereigns, "*If you send us war, we will return you liberty.*" Furthermore, such an expedition was in execution of Dumouriez's great plan, which consisted in extending France to her natural boundaries. Rochambeau commanded the army nearest the intended scene of action, but it was impossible to intrust him with the enterprise, on account of his peevish and sickly temperament, and above all, because he was less suitable than Lafayette for an invasion half-military and half-popular. It was desired that Lafayette should have the command-in-chief, but Dumouriez refused to consent, doubtless from envy. He alleged in excuse that the supreme command in this expedition could not be conferred upon a simple general in presence of a field-marshal. He likewise asserted, and this motive was better founded, that Lafayette was distrusted by the Jacobins and the assembly. It is quite certain that he, young, active, and the only one of the generals who was beloved by his army, alarmed the heated imaginations of the time, and gave, by his great influence, an air of probability to the calumnies of the malignant. However, he frankly and freely offered to execute the joint diplomatic and military plan of the minister; he demanded fifty thousand men, with whom he proposed to proceed by Namur and the Meuse to Liege, where he would become master of the Low Countries. This well-conceived project was approved by Dumouriez; war in fact not having been declared beyond a few days, Austria had not had time to cover her possessions in Belgium, and success seemed inevitable. Accordingly, Lafayette had orders to march at once with ten thousand men from Givet to Namur, and from Namur upon Liege or Brussels; he was to be immediately followed by all his army. Whilst he executed this movement, Lieutenant-General Biron was to set off from Valenciennes with ten thousand men, and proceed in the direction of Mons. Another officer was ordered to march upon Tournay, and occupy it by surprise. These movements, to be effected by officers of Rochambeau, were merely intended to support and mask the real attack intrusted to Lafayette.

The period fixed for the execution of the plan was between the 20th April and the 2d May. Biron commenced his march, passed through Valenciennes, seized upon Quiévrain, and fell in with some hostile detachments near Mons. All at once, two dragoon regiments, without even having the enemy in sight, cried out, "We are betrayed!" took to flight, and carried the whole army in their train. The officers attempted in vain to stop them; they threatened to shoot them, and continued to fly. The camp was abandoned, and all the military stores became the prey of the Imperialists.

Whilst this event was passing at Mons, Theobald Dillon, in pursuance of the arrangement, left Lille with two thousand infantry and one thousand horse. In the very hour of Biron's disaster, this cavalry, at sight of some Austrian troops, retreated, shouting that it was betrayed; it drew the infantry after it, and all the baggage was again abandoned to the enemy. Theobald Dillon, and an officer of engineers, named Berthois, were massacred by the soldiers and the people of Lille, who accused them of treachery. In the mean time, Lafayette, apprised too late, had passed

representatives, stigmatised as the cry of a petty faction. What title equally worthy of respect can those kings invoke who coerce deluded nations to combat against the interests of their own freedom, and to take up arms against rights which are their's also—to choke, under the ruins of the French constitution, the germs of their own felicity and the common hopes of the human race?

And, again, is it but a faction they would accuse of conspiring for the universal liberty of mankind? It is, then, all humanity these cringing ministers presume to brand with that odious term!

But, say they, the king of the French is not free. What! is it inconsistent with freedom to respect the laws of a country? Liberty to counteract or evade them, to oppose to them an alien force, is not a right, but a criminal usurpation.

Hence, in repudiating all these insidious propositions, in contemning these flagrant declamations, the National Assembly has manifested, with reference to external relations, equal love of peace and care of popular liberty; hence, the continuance of a hostile toleration towards the emigrants, the open violation of promises to disperse their gatherings, the refusal to renounce a league palpably offensive, the insulting motives of such refusal, indicating a desire to annihilate the French constitution, are sufficient to authorise hostilities which would have always been but acts of legitimate defence; for it is not so much to attack, as to deprive our enemies of leisure to exhaust our resources by continuous preparations, to plant all their snares, to assemble all their forces, to tighten their present alliances, to contract others, to form further relations in the very midst of us, and to multiply conspiracies and intrigues in our provinces. Does he deserve the name of aggressor, who, threatened, outraged, by an unjust and perfidious foe, forestals him in the advantage of striking the first blow! So far from provoking war, the National Assembly has done every thing to avert it. By seeking fresh explanations upon intentions which could not be dubious, it has shown that it reluctantly departed from the hope of a return to a sense of justice, and that if kings in their pride are reckless of their subjects' blood, the representatives of a free nation, in their humanity, are careful even of enemies' blood. Indifferent to all provocations, to all slanders, to the disregard of long-standing engagements, to the violations of recent pledges, to the dastardly duplicity concerning plots hatching against France, to the perfidious complaisance designed to shroud the succours and encouragement lavished on Frenchmen who have betrayed their country, it would still have accepted peace, had that which was offered been compatible with the maintenance of the constitution, the independence of the national sovereignty, and the safety of the commonwealth.

But the veil which concealed the intentions of our enemy is at length torn! Citizens! which of you would subscribe to these disgraceful propositions? Feudal servitude and a humiliating inequality, bankruptcy and imposts payable by you alone, tithes and the inquisition, properties, purchased upon the public faith, wrested from you and given to their old usurpers, wild beasts restored to the right of ravaging your fields, your blood wasted for the ambitious views of a hostile dynasty—such are the conditions of the treaty between the King of Hungary and faithless Frenchmen!

Such is the peace that is offered to you! No; you will never accept it! The cowards are at Coblentz, and France no longer contains in her bosom any but men worthy of liberty!

He announces in his own name, in the name of his allies, the purpose of exacting from the French nation an abandonment of its rights; he gives notice that he will wring from it sacrifices, which the fear of its extermination could alone obtain from it. So be it!—it will never succumb! This insulting pride, far from intimidating it, will but stimulate its courage. Time is needed to discipline the slaves of despotism; but every man is a soldier when he combats tyranny; gold will leave its dark retreats at mention of the country in danger; those vile and ambitious men, those veterans in corruption and intrigue, those base calumniators of the people, from whom our enemies scruple not to promise themselves a despicable aid, will lose the support of those short-sighted or pusillanimous citizens whom they may have deceived by their hypocritical declamations; and the French empire, in its vast extent, will present to our enemies but one single determination—to conquer or to perish together with the constitution and the laws!"

from Metz to Givet, after incredible toil, and by roads almost impassable. He was solely indebted to the ardour of his troops for clearing in so short a time the considerable distance he had to traverse. There learning the misfortunes of Rochambeau's officers, he judged it prudent to halt. These fatal events occurred in the latter part of the month of April 1792.

CHAPTER IX.

FROM APRIL TO THE EVENTS OF THE 20TH JUNE.

THE intelligence of the unfortunate issue that had marked the skirmishes of Quiévrain and Tournay, and of the murder of General Dillon, created an universal sensation. It was but natural to surmise that the two events had been concerted, when their simultaneousness and identity of character were considered. Recriminations passed on all sides. The Jacobins and ardent patriots asserted that a design had been formed to betray liberty. Dumouriez, not accusing Lafayette, but suspecting the Feuillants, conceived that his plan had been made to miscarry with the view of injuring his popularity. Lafayette complained, but less acrimoniously than his party, that he had been apprised too tardily to get under march, and that he had not been furnished with the means necessary to convey his army. The Feuillants exclaimed, furthermore, that Dumouriez had purposed ruining Rochambeau and Lafayette in public opinion, by imposing upon them a plan without giving them the means to execute it. Such an intention was out of the question, for Dumouriez, thus drawing up plans of campaign, and to this extent exceeding his functions as minister for foreign affairs, was gravely compromised in case of ill success. Besides, the project of securing Belgium for France and liberty, formed part of a plan he had long meditated, and it was not to be supposed that he should desire it to fail in execution. It was evident that neither the generals nor the ministers could possibly have been actuated by bad faith, because they were all interested in success. But parties always judge men instead of circumstances, so that they may fasten upon some one such disasters as occur.

Degraves, dismayed at the outcry raised on account of these military events, determined to resign a charge which had long been burdensome to him; and Dumouriez had the weakness to shun it. Louis XVI., still under the sway of the Gironde, gave the department to Servan, an old soldier, distinguished for his patriotic sentiments. This appointment gave additional strength to the Gironde, which had now almost a majority in the council, having Servan, Clavière, and Roland in its interest. From this period, disunion began to creep into the ministry. The Gironde became daily more distrustful, and consequently more importunate for evidences of sincerity on the part of Louis XVI. Dumouriez, whom opinions little swayed, and whom the confidence of Louis XVI. had moved, always supported his views; and Lacoste, who was strongly attached to the monarch, did the same. Duranthon remained neutral, and evinced no marked preference except for the weakest counsels. Servan, Clavière, and Roland, were inflexible; fully impressed with the apprehensions of their friends, they became day by day more stubborn and inexorable in the cabinet.

An additional circumstance tended to embroil Dumouriez with the principal members of the Gironde. When taking office as minister for foreign affairs, he had demanded six millions of francs for secret expenses, for which he should not be held liable to account. The Feuillants had opposed the request; but the Gironde had exerted their weight in its support, and the six millions were voted. Pétion having solicited funds for the Parisian police, Dumouriez had assigned him 30,000 francs a-month; but, ceasing to be a Girondist, he refused to pay them more than once. On the other hand, it was learnt or suspected that he had appropriated 100,000 francs to his own pleasures. Roland, at whose residence the Girondists were wont to assemble, joined his friends in their indignation at this conduct. The ministers were accustomed to dine by turns with each other, to converse upon public affairs. When they met at Roland's, it was in presence of his wife and of all his friends; and it might be truly said, that upon those occasions the council was held by the Gironde alone. At one of these meetings remonstrances were made to Dumouriez upon the nature of his secret disbursements. At first he replied in a sprightly and careless mood, then became soured and irritated, and ultimately had a decided altercation with Roland and the Girondists. He discontinued attending the usual meetings, giving as his motive that he was unwilling to treat of public affairs either before a woman or before the friends of Roland. However, he occasionally returned to the latter's house, but without entering upon matters of business, or at least very partially. Another discussion completed his alienation from the Girondists. Guadet, the most petulant of all his party, read a letter which he desired the ministers to adopt, urging the king to take a constitutional priest as his spiritual director. Dumouriez maintained that the ministers were not justified in interfering with the religious services of the king. He was supported, it is true, by Vergniaud and Gensonné; but the dispute was not the less warm, and the rupture became definitive.

The journals forthwith commenced attacks upon Dumouriez. The Feuillants, who were already incensed against him, now found themselves aided by the Jacobins and Girondists. Dumouriez, assailed on all sides, opposed an undaunted front to the storm, and took vengeance on some of the journalists.

A decree of impeachment had been previously directed against Marat, editor of "The Friend of the People"—a detestable production, in which he openly demanded slaughter, and heaped the most villanous accusations on the royal family, and on all men who, to his delirious imagination, seemed open to suspicion. As a counterpoise to this step, Royou, editor of "The Friend of the King," who inveighed against the republicans with the same violence that Marat exhibited against the royalists, was also impeached.

For some time the existence of a certain "Austrian committee" had been universally mooted. The patriots spoke of it in the city, as the Orleans faction formed the staple conversation at court. To this committee was attributed a secret and blighting influence, which was exercised through the agency of the queen. If something resembling an Austrian committee had existed during the Constituent Assembly, certainly nothing of the sort prevailed under the Legislative. At that time a high personage, stationed in the Low Countries, communicated to the queen, in the name of her family, very prudent counsels, to the effect of which the French intermediary added by discreet commentaries. But under the legislative body these private communications had ceased; the family of the queen still continued to correspond with her; but she was always exhorted to patience and resignation. However, Bertrand de Molleville and Montmorin often visited the palace after their dismissal from the ministry. Upon them all suspicions were centred; and there is no doubt they were the agents of all secret commissions. They were publicly denounced by the journalist Carra. Having resolved to prosecute him for calumny, they summoned him to produce the documents upon which he founded his denunciation. The journalist appealed to three deputies, naming Chabot, Merlin, and Bazire, as authors of the information he had published. The justice-of-peace Larivière, who, being zealously attached to the cause of the king, prosecuted this affair with extraordinary courage, had the boldness to issue a warrant against

the three designated deputies. The assembly, exasperated at this daring attempt to infringe the inviolability of its members, answered the judge by a decree of impeachment, and sent the unfortunate Larivière to Orleans.

This abortive endeavour was only instrumental in augmenting the general agitation, as well as the detestation with which the court was viewed. The Girondists no longer looked upon themselves as directors of Louis XVI., since Dumouriez had so completely gained his confidence, and they returned to their part as violent oppositionists.

The new constitutional guard of the king had been recently formed. According to the law, the civil household ought likewise to have been composed: but the nobility refused to enter it, in order to avoid recognising the constitution, by accepting employments created under it. On the other hand, a repugnance was felt to constitute it of plebeians; and it was given up altogether. "Why do you desire, madam," wrote Barnave to the queen, "to give the least doubt to these people as to your sentiments? When they decree you a military and a civil household, like Achilles amongst the daughters of Lycomedes, you eagerly grasp the sword to repel simple ornaments."* The ministers, and even Bertrand, urged the same course as Barnave; but their endeavours were in vain; and the composition of the civil household was abandoned.

The military household, arranged according to a plan originating with Delessart, had been formed in the proportion of a third by troops of the line, and the remaining two-thirds by young citizens chosen from the ranks of the national guard. This composition was calculated to ensure satisfaction. But the officers and soldiers of the line had been selected in a manner tending to alarm the patriots. Coalescing against the young men taken from the national guard, they heaped infinite insults upon them, and compelled most of them to retire. The vacancies thus created were instantly filled up with men more surely to be relied upon. Besides, the number of these guards had been singularly augmented, for instead of eighteen hundred, as fixed by the law, it rose, as was stated, to nearly six thousand. Dumouriez had acquainted the king with these circumstances; but he always replied that the old Duke de Brissac, the commander of this corps, could not be looked upon in the light of a conspirator. However, the conduct of this new guard at the palace and elsewhere was such, that suspicions were universally engendered, and the clubs at length took up the subject. At the same period, twelve Swiss mounted the white cockade at Neuilly; divers heaps of paper were burnt at Sèvres,† and gave rise to weighty suspicions. The alarm then became general; the assembly declared itself permanent, as if the days had returned when thirty thousand men threatened Paris. But in truth, multifarious grounds of apprehension existed: the non-juring priests were exciting the people in the southern provinces, and abusing the secrecy of the confessional to stimulate fanaticism; the union of the powers was made manifest; Prussia was on the point of joining Austria, the hostile armies were swelling into most formidable hosts, and the inscrutable disasters of Lille and Mons haunted all minds. And, furthermore, the efficacy of popular force is little trusted, and is never indeed believed in until actually tested; for an irregular multitude, howsoever numerous it may be, is but a weak counterpoise to six thousand men armed and disciplined. The assembly consequently declared itself permanent (sitting of the 28th May), and called for an exact report upon the composition of the king's military household, upon the number, character, and conduct of those who constituted it. After having incontestibly demonstrated that the constitution had been violated, it passed a decree of disembodiment against the guard, another of impeachment against the Duke de Brissac, and sent both for the royal sanction. The king was at first disposed to affix the veto, but Dumouriez reminded him of the dismissal of his body-guards, who were much older in his service than his new military household, and entreated him to repeat a sacrifice much less painful. He likewise convinced him of the infractions involved in the composition of his guard; and finally prevailed upon him to sanction the decree. Dumouriez, however, insisted upon its immediate re-formation; but the king, whether he had relapsed into his former policy of appearing under oppression, or placed reliance upon this disbanded guard, to which he secretly continued its pay, refused to have it replaced, and thus left himself without protection against popular outrage.

The Gironde, meanwhile, giving up all hope of his good faith, pursued its attacks with perseverance. Already it had carried a decree against the priests, in lieu of that which the king had refused to sanction. Reports upon their factious conduct being incessantly forwarded to the assembly, it had fulminated against them a decree of exile. The exact description of the culpable being difficult, and the measure, like all those of safety, being based on suspicion, it was in some sort upon notoriety that the priests were to be arraigned and driven forth. Upon the denunciation of twenty active citizens, backed by the approval of the district directory, the departmental directory was to pronounce banishment; the condemned priest was to leave the canton in twenty-four hours, the depart-

* Memoirs of Madame Campan, vol. ii. p. 154.

† Madame Campan gives the following explanation upon the secret of the papers burnt at Sèvres:—

"At the commencement of 1792, a highly esteemed clergyman solicited a private interview with me. He knew in whose hands was the manuscript of a new libel of Madame Lamotte. He told me that the people who had come from London to get it printed at Paris were perfectly venal, and ready to surrender him the manuscript for a thousand louis, if he could find any friend of the queen disposed to make such a sacrifice for her tranquillity; that he had thought of me, and that if her majesty would give him the 24,000 francs, he would deliver me the manuscript upon receiving them.

I imparted this communication to the queen, who refused to entertain it, and ordered me to reply that, even at the time when it was possible to punish the hawkers of these libels, she had deemed them so atrocious and despicable as to disdain the use of measures to stop their circulation; that, if she were imprudent and weak enough to buy up one of them, the active espionnage of the Jacobins might discover it; that the purchased libel would not be the less printed, and would become more dangerous when the public was informed of the expedient that had been adopted to suppress it.

The Baron d'Aubier, gentleman in ordinary to the king, and my particular friend, had a capacious memory, and an accurate and condensed manner of imparting to me the tenor of the deliberations, debates, and decrees of the National Assembly. I entered the queen's apartment every day, to give an account of them to the king, who used to say on seeing me, 'Ah! here is the Calais courier!'

One day, M. d'Aubier said to me, 'The assembly has been much engaged with a denunciation made by the workmen in the manufactory at Sèvres. They have carried to the president's desk a bundle of pamphlets which they describe as the life of Marie-Antoinette. The director of the manufactory was summoned to the bar, and he has declared that orders were given him to burn these printed sheets in the stoves used for hardening the moulds of his porcelain.'

Whilst I was giving this account to the queen, the king reddened and drooped his head over his plate. The queen said to him, 'Have you any knowledge of this, sir?' The king gave no reply. Madame Elizabeth requested him to explain what this might mean; he kept the same silence. I immediately retired. A few moments afterwards, the queen came into my room, and informed me that the king, from regard to her, had caused the whole edition printed from the manuscript I had offered her, to be bought up; and that M. de Laporte had thought of no more mysterious mode of destroying the entire work than getting it consumed at Sèvres amongst two hundred workmen, nine-tenths of whom were known to be Jacobins. She told me she had dissembled her distress whilst with the king, for he was greatly alarmed; and she could say nothing when his tenderness and concern for her were the causes of the accident."—*Madame Campan*, vol. ii. p. 196.

ment in three days, and the kingdom in a month. If he were poor, three livres (half-a-crown) a-day were granted him until he reached the frontiers. This severe law gave token of the increasing exasperation of the assembly.* Another decree speedily followed it. The minister Servan, without being ordered by the king, and without consulting his colleagues, proposed to form, on occasion of the approaching federation of the 14th July, a camp of 20,000 federalists, for the purpose of protecting the assembly and the capital. It is easy to conceive with what joy this project was received by the majority of the assembly, composed as it was of Girondists. At this moment their power was at its height. They completely governed the assembly, where the constitutionalists and republicans were in a minority, and where the pretended "impartials" were, as in all times, simply waverers, submissive in proportion as the majority waxed in strength. Besides, they ruled in Paris through Pétion, the mayor, who was entirely devoted to them. Their design, with reference to the proposed camp, was, (not from any personal ambition, but as a means of securing preponderance to their party and opinions,) to render themselves masters of the king, and provide against his suspected intentions.

So soon as Servan's proposition was known, Dumouriez questioned him in full council, with much acrimony, under what character he had brought forward such a proposal. He answered, "Under that of an individual." "In that case," exclaimed Dumouriez, "the title of minister of war should not be attached to the name of Servan." So warm a dispute ensued, that, but for the king's presence, blood might have stained the council-board. Servan offered to withdraw his proposition; but that would have been of no avail, since the assembly had eagerly adopted it; and the only gain to the king would have been the belief that he had violently coerced his minister. Dumouriez consequently opposed that course; the motion stood, and was deprecated in a petition signed by eight thousand national guards, who expressed indignation that their services were held insufficient to protect the assembly. It was nevertheless carried, and the decree embodying it dispatched to the king. There were thus two important decrees awaiting the sanction, and already doubts were entertained that the king would refuse it. If so, a decisive resolution was intended to be passed against him.

Dumouriez maintained at the council-board that the encampment would be fatal to the throne, and even to the Girondists, because the new army would be formed under the influence of the most violent Jacobins. He argued, nevertheless, that it must be adopted by the king; because, if he refused to convoke 20,000 men regularly chosen, 40,000 would rise spontaneously, and overrun the capital. He furthermore gave it to be understood, that he knew of an expedient for rendering the measure abortive, which he would bring forward at a suitable time. With regard to the decree for the banishment of the priests, he was likewise of opinion it should be sanctioned, inasmuch as they were culpable, and as their exile would shelter them from the outrages of their enemies. Louis XVI. still hesitated, alleging that he needed further reflection. At the same council, Roland insisted upon reading, in the king's presence, a letter he had already forwarded to him, which was certainly a work of supererogation, since the king was acquainted with its contents. This letter had been resolved upon at the instigation of Madame Roland, and composed by her. It had been previously mooted whether one should not be written to the king in the name of all the ministers. They having refused, Madame Roland had exercised her influence over her husband, and induced him to adopt the step in his own name. Duranthon, who was a weak, but nevertheless a sagacious man, vainly and rationally objected that the tone of his letter, far from winning over the king, would embitter him against ministers who enjoyed the public confidence, and that it would produce a fatal rupture between the throne and the popular party. Roland obstinately persisted, in obedience to the counsels of his wife and his friends. The Gironde, in fact, was desirous of coming to an explanation, and preferred a quarrel to longer uncertainty.

Accordingly, Roland read his letter to the king, and inflicted upon him, in full council, a category of the most severe remonstrances.

This famous letter ran as follows:—

"Sire—The present state of France cannot long continue; it is a state of crisis, the violence whereof is at its height; it must terminate in a convulsion calculated to interest your majesty as deeply as it concerns the whole empire.

Honoured by your confidence, and invested with duties which impose truth on me as an obligation to you, I will venture to give it unrestricted utterance, for you yourself have laid the injunction on me.

The French have given themselves a constitution, which has generated malecontents and rebels; but the majority of the nation is resolute for its maintenance; it has sworn to defend it at the cost of its blood; and it has joyfully hailed war, for it presented an efficacious means of securing it. The minority, however, sustained by hopes, has left no expedient untried to regain the ascendancy. Hence, this intestine struggle against the laws, this anarchy whereat good citizens lament, and which the malignant fail not to use in calumnious deprecation of the new system; hence this disunion every where prevailing and every where excited, for in no quarter is there indifference or neutrality; the triumph or the revocation of the constitution is imperiously desired, and all action is for its support or its overthrow. I will abstain from an examination of its tenor and spirit, in order to consider solely what circumstances require; and, divesting myself of partiality as much as possible, I will inquire what it is rational to anticipate, and what it is expedient to encourage.

Your majesty enjoyed high prerogatives, which you believed appurtenant to royalty: reared in the idea of preserving them, you could not behold them torn from you with complacency; the desire of recovering them was as natural as the regret at their loss. These feelings, which are natural to the human heart, have been estimated by the enemies of the revolution, and they have consequently relied upon a secret approval, until circumstances should permit an avowed protection. Nor could these tendencies be unappreciated by the nation itself; and they have necessarily tended to keep it in a state of distrust.

Your majesty has, therefore, been continually exposed to the alternative of yielding to first impressions, to private feelings, or of making sacrifices dictated by philosophy, and urged by necessity; hence, either to embolden rebels whilst keeping up alarm in the nation, or to calm the latter by cordially uniting with it. All things have their term, and that of uncertainty is at length arrived.

Is your majesty disposed at the present moment to form an open alliance with those who aim at remodelling the constitution, or will you nobly and unreservedly devote yourself to ensure its final triumph? Such is the veritable question which the present state of things irresistibly drives to a solution. As to the metaphysical inquiry whether the French are ripe for liberty, its discussion may be deferred, for we are not called upon to determine what we shall be a century hence, but of what the actual generation is capable.

What has come to pass amidst all the agitations in which we have had our being for the last four years? Privileges onerous to the people have been abolished; ideas of justice and equality have been universally disseminated, have penetrated every bosom; the theory

* This decree bears date the 27th May; the subsequent one, relative to the camp of 20,000 men, the 8th June.

of the rights of the people has justified the consciousness of those rights, and their recognition, solemnly pronounced, has become a sacred doctrine; hatred of the nobility, long ago inspired by feudalism, has been rendered more inveterate by the undisguised opposition of the majority of the nobles to the constitution which levels their order.

During the first year of the revolution, the people beheld in these nobles men odious from the oppressive privileges they enjoyed, but whom they would have ceased to abhor after the destruction of those privileges, if the conduct of the order of nobility since that period had not quickened all the reasons for dreading and combating it as an irreconcilable enemy.

In like progression has attachment to the constitution grown: not only do the people owe to it many evident benefits, but they deem it has many greater in store for them, since those who were wont to throw all burdens upon them strive so vehemently to destroy or modify it.

The declaration of rights is consecrated as a political gospel, and the French constitution as a religious code, for which the people are prepared to die.

Thus zeal has already sometimes aided the execution of the law; and when its restraints were insufficient to curb the refractory, the citizens have been impelled to inflict chastisement of themselves.

Thus have the estates of emigrants been exposed to ravages in the spirit of vengeance, and thus have so many departments been compelled to treat priests with rigour whom public opinion had proscribed, and to which they would have fallen victims.

In this clash of interests, all sentiments have taken the accent of passion. The country is not a word upon which the imagination has simply delighted to dwell; it is a thing for which all have made sacrifices, to which all are daily more closely bound by the very solicitude it causes, which has been created by prodigious efforts, which has arisen amidst mortal disquietudes, and which is beloved as much for the sufferings it costs as for the hopes it gives. All attacks made upon it but tend to inflame enthusiasm in its behalf. To what a height must this feeling rise at a moment when confederated foes without are conspiring with internal traitors to inflict the most fatal injuries! In all parts of the empire, the agitation is extreme; it will assuredly burst forth in some terrible shape, unless a reasonable confidence in the intentions of your majesty should definitively calm it. But the confidence needed in the emergency will not be established by promises; it must have its basis on facts.

It is evident to the French nation that its constitution can progress, that the government will possess all the strength that is needful for it, so soon as your majesty, truly disposed to give efficacy to that constitution, shall support the legislative body with all the influence of the executive, and shall remove all grounds for uneasiness to the people and for hope to the disaffected.

For example, two important decrees have been passed: both essentially interest the public tranquillity and the safety of the state; the delay in sanctioning them creates distrust; if it be prolonged, it will provoke irritation; and I am bound to state, that, in the present ferment of the nation, irritation may lead to all extremities.

The time for receding is past; even the means of temporising are at an end. The revolution is accomplished in the public mind; it will be worked out in blood, and cemented by it, if prudence does not prevent misfortunes which it is still possible to obviate.

I am aware it may be suggested that extreme measures will suffice to effect all purposes, to repress all dangers; but should force be displayed to overawe the assembly, terror be spread through Paris, discord and dismay through its environs, all France would rise with indignation, and plunging into the horrors of civil war, develope that gloomy energy, the parent of virtues and of crimes, which is always fatal to those who provoke it.

The safety of the state and the happiness of your majesty are intimately connected; no power can separate them; pangs and calamities will assuredly beset your throne, if it be not made to rest by your own determination upon the foundations of the constitution, and consolidated by the tranquillity which its maintenance will ultimately ensure us.

Thus the state of public opinion, the course of events, the reasons of good policy, the very interests of your majesty, all render it obligatory upon you to unite with the legislative body, and comply with the wish of the nation; they convert into a necessity what principle enjoins as a duty. But the sensibility natural to this affectionate people is disposed to find in this obligation a cause of gratitude. You were cruelly deceived, sire, when your mind was alienated from and inspired with distrust of a people so easily affected; it was, doubtless, by perpetual instigations that you were betrayed into a conduct calculated to excite its alarm. Let it see that you are resolved to give efficacy to that constitution upon which it builds its happiness, and you will speedily become the object of its benedictions!

The conduct of the priests in various parts, and the pretexts which fanaticism furnishes to the disaffected, have led to the enactment of a wise law against the disturbers of the public peace; let your majesty give it the necessary sanction; the public tranquillity demands it, and the welfare of the priests themselves urges it. If this law be not put in force, the departments will be compelled to substitute violent expedients, as indeed they are universally doing, and the exasperated people will supply its want by unbridled excesses.

The schemes of our enemies, the disturbances that have been manifested in the capital, the deadly disquietude occasioned by the conduct of your guard, and still kept up by the testimonies of satisfaction conferred upon it by your majesty in a proclamation singularly impolitic under the circumstances, and the position of Paris in its proximity to the frontiers—all have demonstrated the necessity of a camp in the vicinity. This measure, the wisdom and exigency of which have struck all discerning minds, simply awaits your majesty's sanction. Why should delay give an aspect of regret to your determination, when dispatch would make all hearts your own?

Already have the attempts of the staff of the Parisian national guard evoked suspicions that it was impelled by a superior influence; already the declamations of certain extravagant demagogues are arousing a belief in their connexion with parties interested in the overthrow of the constitution; already the intentions of your majesty are called in question by public opinion. A little more delay, and the reluctant nation will deem its king the friend and accomplice of the conspirators!

Just Heaven! have you then struck the great ones of the earth with blindness, and are they never to have other counsel than such as drags them to ruin?

I know that the austere language of truth is rarely welcome near a throne; I know, also, that it is because it scarcely ever is heard there, that revolutions become necessary; I know, furthermore, that I am bound to speak it to your majesty, not only as a citizen submissive to the laws, but as a minister honoured with your confidence, or invested with functions which imply it; and I am not aware of any thing which forbids me to fulfil a duty my conscience dictates.

In the same spirit I will reiterate my representations to your majesty on the duty and expediency of executing the law which enjoins the appointment of a secretary to the council. The mere existence of the law speaks so authoritatively, that the execution ought apparently to follow without delay; but it is,

moreover, of importance to adopt all means for ensuring the requisite gravity, knowledge, and preparation, to the deliberations; and for responsible ministers, especially, there ought to be a mode of authenticating their counsels. If any such had existed, I should not now be addressing your majesty in writing.

Life is of no moment to a man who holds his duty as superior to all concerns; but, next to the happiness of fulfilling it, is the gratification of feeling that he has acted with fidelity, and that also is an obligation upon public characters.

Paris, 10*th June* 1792, *the* 4*th year of liberty.*

(Signed) ROLAND."

The king listened to this lecture with wonderful equanimity, and left the council saying he would make known his intentions.

Dumouriez was summoned to the palace. The king and queen were together. "Ought we," said they, "to endure the insolence of these three ministers any longer?" "No," replied Dumouriez. "Will you take it upon yourself to get us rid of them?" asked the king. "Yes, sire," responded the undaunted minister; "but in order to succeed, your majesty must yield to one condition. I am unpopular, and will become more so by dismissing three colleagues, leaders of a powerful party. There is only one mode of persuading the public that they are not displaced on account of their patriotism." "What is that?" inquired the king. "To sanction the two decrees," replied Dumouriez. And he reiterated the arguments that he had already advanced at the council-board. The queen exclaimed that the condition was too severe; but Dumouriez proceeded to show her that the twenty thousand men were not to be feared; that the decree did not designate the place where they were to encamp; that they might be sent, for example, to Soissons, where they would be occupied with military exercises, and gradually drafted off to the armies as the necessity for reinforcements became manifest. "But in that case," said the king "you must be minister at war." "Notwithstanding the responsibility, I consent," replied Dumouriez; "but it is indispensable that your majesty sanction the decree against the priests; I can fill it only on those terms. That decree, far from injuring the ecclesiastics, will save them from popular fury; besides, your majesty should have opposed the first decree of the Constituent Assembly ordaining the oath; now you cannot recede." "I was wrong then," exclaimed Louis XVI.; "I must take care not to do wrong a second time." The queen, who did not participate in the religious scruples of her consort, joined with Dumouriez, and for the moment the king seemed to give his consent.

Dumouriez suggested to the king the new ministers to be nominated in lieu of Servan, Clavière, and Roland. Mourgues had the home, Beaulieu the finance department. That of war was confided to Dumouriez, who temporarily held two ministries, until that of foreign affairs was filled. The ordinance was forthwith published; and on the 13th June, Roland, Clavière, and Servan, received their official dismissal. Roland, who had all the self-possession requisite for executing what the bold spirit of his wife might plan, immediately repaired to the assembly, and read the letter he had written to the king, and on account of which he was displaced. This proceeding was certainly allowable, now that hostilities were declared; but after the promise given to the king to keep the letter secret, it displayed a sad want of generosity to give it a public reading.

The assembly showered enthusiastic plaudits upon Roland's letter, and ordered that it should be printed and sent to the eighty-three departments. It declared, moreover, that the three disgraced ministers carried with them the esteem of the nation. It was at this very moment that Dumouriez dauntlessly appeared in the tribune, under his new character of minister-at-war. He had expeditiously prepared a circumstantial report upon the state of the army, and upon the errors of the administration and of the assembly. In this document he was not sparing in severity upon those whom he well knew were disposed to give him the most unfavourable reception. As soon as he was descried, the Jacobins discharged upon him a volley of hisses; the Feuillants observed a profound silence. He gave an account, in the first place, of a slight advantage gained by Lafayette, and of the death of Gouvion, an officer, a deputy, and an estimable personage, whom the calamitous condition of his country had driven to despair, and voluntarily to incur the most imminent perils. The assembly testified its regret at the loss of this generous citizen, but listened coldly to that evinced by Dumouriez, and especially to the desire he expressed of escaping the same sorrows by a like fate. But when he commenced his report as minister-at-war, a refusal to hear him was manifested on all sides. He calmly insisted on his right of speech, and ultimately obtained silence. His remonstrances irritated some of the deputies. "Do you hear him?" exclaimed Guadet; "he is giving us a lecture." "And why not?" retorted the intrepid minister, with perfect coolness. Tranquillity was re-established; he proceeded with his report, and was alternately hooted and applauded. When he had concluded, he folded up his memorial to take away with him. "He is flying!" was loudly vociferated. "No!" he lustily retorted; and he forthwith placed his memorial on the table, confidently affixed his signature, and passed through the assembly with imperturbable composure. As they pressed upon his way, some deputies said to him—"You will be sent to Orleans." "So much the better," answered he; "I will there take baths, and whey, which I much need, and I will get some repose."

His firmness gave assurance to the king, who testified to him his satisfaction; but the unfortunate monarch was already shaken in his resolution, and tormented with scruples. Besieged by false friends, he had reconsidered his determination, and finally resolved not to sanction the decrees.

The four ministers assembled at the council-board entreated the king to give the sanction, as he was understood to have promised. The king answered sharply, that he could only consent to the decree as to the 20,000 men; but with reference to that concerning the priests, he was determined to give it his opposition; that his part was taken, and no threats could scare him from it. He then read the letter in which he purposed to announce his intention to the president of the assembly. "One of you," said he to his ministers, "will countersign it;" and he uttered those words in an accent which he had never been known to use.

Dumouriez hastened to write to the king soliciting leave to resign. "This man," exclaimed the king, "has induced me to dismiss three ministers for insisting upon my adopting the decrees, and he now maintains that I should sanction them!" This reproach was unjust; for it was only on condition of the double sanction that Dumouriez had consented to survive his colleagues. Louis XVI. admitted him to an interview, and inquired whether he persisted. Dumouriez was inflexible. "In that case," said the king, "I accept your resignation." All the ministers had likewise sent in their resignations. However, the king retained Lacoste and Duranthon, whom he constrained to remain. Lajard, Chambonas, and Terrier de Montciel, selected from the Feuillants, filled the vacant ministries.

"The king," says Madame Campan, "fell at this period into a depression of spirits which amounted to a physical torpor. He was for ten days together without articulating a syllable, even in the bosom of his family, unless it were at a game of backgammon, which he played with the Princess Elizabeth after

dinner, when he was obliged to utter the words necessary in the game. The queen drew him from this state, so perilous in a critical period, when each minute brought with it a necessity for action, by throwing herself at his feet, and sometimes making use of representations calculated to alarm him, at other times of expressions of her own tenderness for him. She thus recalled him to the duty he owed his family, and went so far as to tell him that, if he must perish, it should be with honour, and without waiting until they came to strangle both himself and her on the floor of their chamber."*

It is easy to surmise what must have been the feelings of Louis XVI. when he threw off this dejection of mind, and resumed attention to affairs. After having once abandoned the Feuillant party to give himself up to the Girondists, it is impossible he could return to the first with much satisfaction or hope. He had tested by a double experience his own incompatibility with both, and, what was more deplorable, he had made them conscious of it. Thenceforth, it was natural he should turn more than ever to foreigners, and put all his hopes in them. This tendency became evident to all, and alarmed those who saw in the invasion of France the fall of liberty, the chastisement of its defenders, and possibly the partition or dismemberment of the kingdom. Louis XVI. saw nothing of this in foreign intervention, for we are always ready to gloss over the ill consequences of what we desire. When under the panic of the commotion excited by the flights of Mons and Tournay, he had dispatched Mallet-du-Pan into Germany, with instructions under his own hand. In them he recommended the sovereigns to advance with caution, to observe the utmost forbearance towards the inhabitants of the provinces they might traverse, and to precede their progress by a manifesto avouching their pacific and conciliatory intentions.†

* See Madame Campan, vol. ii. p. 205.

† The mission given by the king to Mallet-du-Pan is a fact of the utmost importance to verify, and it cannot be subjected to doubt, after the Memoirs of Bertrand de Molleville. Minister at this period, Bertrand de Molleville must have been perfectly cognisant of the fact, and, as a counter-revolutionary minister, his bias would have led him rather to conceal than avow it.* The mission itself attests the moderation of Louis XVI., but also his communications with the enemy.

" The king, far from yielding to this patriotic security, saw, with the deepest sorrow, France engaged in an unjust and sanguinary war, which the disorganisation of her armies seemed to render it impossible to carry on, and which more than ever exposed our frontier provinces to invasion. His majesty dreaded above all a civil war, which he doubted not would break out on the news of the first advantage gained over the French troops by the emigrant corps which formed part of the Austrian army. It was, indeed, but too much to be feared that the Jacobins and populace in their fury would make bloody reprisals on the priests and nobles remaining in France. These apprehensions, which the king expressed in his daily correspondence with me, were the occasion of my proposing to him to send a person of confidence to the emperor and the King of Prussia, to endeavour to prevail on them not to allow their armies to act offensively against France but in the last extremity; and in that case to let the entrance of their armies into France be preceded by a carefully-worded manifesto, in which it should be declared, ' that the emperor and the King of Prussia, forced to take arms by an unjust aggression upon them, did not impute either to the king or to the French nation, but to a criminal faction which oppressed both, the declaration of war which had been notified to them; that, consequently, adhering to the sentiments of amity which united them to the king and to France, their only intention, on the contrary, was to deliver them from the yoke of the most atrocious tyranny on record, and to aid them in re-establishing legitimate authority violently suppressed, order, and tranquillity; that in all this they had no design to interfere with the form of government, but merely to secure the nation liberty to adopt that which should be most suitable for it; that all idea of conquest was foreign to their thoughts; that private property should not be less respected than national property; that their majesties took all peaceable and faithful subjects under their especial protection; that their only enemies were those of France, namely, the factious and their adherents, and these only their majesties desired to combat,' &c. Mallet-du-Pan, whose talents and integrity were favourably known to the king, was intrusted with this mission. He was the more fitted for it from never having been seen at the palace, and from having no intimacy with persons attached to the court; and by taking the route to Geneva, whither he was accustomed to make frequent journeys, his departure would give rise to no suspicion."

The king gave Mallet-du Pan instructions drawn up in his own handwriting, and published by Bertrand de Molleville.

" 1st, The king not only exhorts but beseeches the princes and French emigrants to abstain from giving to the present war, by hostile and offensive demonstrations on their part, any other character than that of a foreign war waged between different powers.

2d, He expressly recommends them to leave to him and the intervening courts the consideration and care of their interests, when the time for entering upon them shall arrive.

3d, It is expedient that they should simply appear as parties, and not as arbiters in the dispute, the award resting of right with his majesty, when restored to liberty, and with the powers who shall insist upon its fulfilment.

4th, Any other conduct would produce a civil war in the interior, endanger the lives of the king and his family, overturn the throne, cause a massacre of the royalists, rally around the Jacobins all the revolutionists who had abandoned, and who are daily abandoning them, rekindle a flame that is dying away, and give greater obstinacy to a resistance which will succumb under the first reverses, when the fate of the revolution shall not appear exclusively at the mercy of those against whom it was directed, and who have been its victims.

5th, To represent to the courts of Vienna and Berlin the utility of a manifesto, issued jointly by them and the other states who have entered into the confederation; the importance of drawing up this manifesto in such a manner as to distinguish the Jacobins from the rest of the nation, to encourage all those who may return from their error, or who, without wishing for the present constitution, desire the suppression of abuses and the establishment of a rational liberty, under a monarch with an authority limited by law.

6th, To give emphatic utterance in the manifesto to the fundamental truth that the war is directed against an anti-social faction, and not against the French nation; that it is undertaken in defence of legitimate governments and of nations against a frenzied anarchy which destroys amongst men all ties of social intercourse, and all the compacts on which depend liberty, peace, and public safety at home and abroad; to give assurances against all fear of dismemberment and the imposition of laws, but energetically to impress upon the assembly, the administrative bodies, the municipalities, and the ministers, that they will be held personally and individually responsible, in life and property, for all outrages committed upon the sacred person of the king, upon that of the queen and her family, and upon the persons and property of all citizens whatsoever.

7th, To express the king's wish, that on entering the kingdom, the powers should declare that they are ready to give peace, but that they neither can nor will treat with any but the king; that, consequently, they require his restoration to the fullest liberty, and, afterwards, the convocation of a congress in which the different interests shall be discussed on the principles already laid down, to which the emigrants shall be admitted as complaining parties, and the general settlement of affairs be negotiated under the auspices and the guarantee of the powers."—*Bertrand de Molleville*, vol. viii. p. 39.

* [M. Thiers has here slightly erred. Bertrand had ceased to be an ostensible minister, but, as he himself relates, was in daily communication with the king.]

However moderate the views manifested in this project, it was nevertheless an invitation to advance into the country; and although such might be the spirit actuating the king, what guarantee was there that the designs of foreign monarchs, rivals of France, or those of the infuriated emigrants, were equally temperate? Was Louis XVI. assured he would not be drawn far beyond his intentions? The ministers of Austria and Prussia themselves expressed to Mallet-du-Pan the fears with which the violent tone of the emigrants inspired them; and it would seem he had some difficulty in tranquillising them on that point.*

* Bertrand de Molleville, from whom I have borrowed the facts relative to Mallet-du-Pan, gives the following account of the reception he met with, and of the dispositions he encountered :—

The queen was equally suspicious of them; she was especially apprehensive of Calonne, whom she viewed as the most dangerous of her enemies;* but she did not the less conjure her family to act with the greatest promptitude for her deliverance. From this moment the popular party came to regard the court as an enemy the more to be feared from its directing all the forces of the state; and the struggle which ensued became one of life or death. In composing his new ministry, the king selected no man of note. Anticipating a speedy deliverance, he thought only how to get over a few days more, and for that purpose a ministry of the most insignificant character was judged sufficient.

The Feuillants sought to profit by the opportunity to form a coalition with the court, less, it must be granted, from party or personal ambition, than from sympathy for the king. They placed no reliance on the benefits of invasion; on the contrary, they for the most part viewed it as a criminal outrage, and, furthermore, as a measure equally hazardous for the court as for the nation. They wisely foresaw the king would fall before the succours could arrive; and after the invasion was perpetrated, they feared a course of unrelenting vengeance, perhaps the dismemberment of France, and certainly the abolition of all liberty.

Lally-Tolendal, whom we have seen quit France when the establishment of two chambers had become impossible, Malouet, who had made a further attempt to gain that object at the revision, Duport, Lameth, Lafayette, and others, who were anxious to preserve what still remained, coalesced for the purpose of making a last effort. This party, like all others, was not in perfect harmony with itself, but it was held together by a single purpose, that of saving the king from his errors, and with him the constitution. Every party obliged to act in the shade is reduced to adopt steps which are called intrigues when they are not successful. In this meaning the Feuillants intrigued. When they perceived Servan, Clavière, and Roland displaced by means of Dumouriez, they made advances towards him, and offered him their alliance, on condition that he signed the veto to the decree against the priests. Dumouriez, perhaps from pique, perhaps from want of confidence in their means, and certainly likewise from the obligation he had contracted to procure the sanction to that decree, repudiated their alliance, and departed for the army, with the hope, as he wrote to the assembly, that a cannon-ball might unite all opinions concerning him.

Lafayette remained to the Feuillants. He, without taking part in their secret overtures, had shared in their former repugnance to Dumouriez, and was chiefly actuated by anxiety to save the king without infringing the constitution. But their means of action were very trifling. In the first place, the court, which they were striving to rescue, refused to be rescued by them. The queen, who cheerfully trusted Barnave, had always used the greatest precautions in seeing him, and never received him but in secret. The emigrants and the court would not have pardoned her for holding intercourse with the constitutionalists. She was urged, in fact, not to treat with them, but rather to prefer the Jacobins; because, said they, it would be necessary to settle terms with the first, whilst nothing would be binding with the latter.* Let us add to these counsels, perpetually inculcated, the personal hatred of the queen for Lafayette; and we shall be at no loss to understand wherefore the court was little disposed to accept services from the constitutionalists or Feuillants. Besides this court repugnance towards them, we must furthermore consider the feebleness of the means they could bring to bear against the popular party. Lafayette, it is true, was adored by his soldiers, and might reasonably count on his army; but he had the enemy in front, and he could not uncover the frontier to march into the interior. The aged Luckner, upon whom he depended, was irresolute, fickle, and easily intimidated, though of infinite valour on the field of battle. But even allowing them ample military means, the constitutionalists possessed no civil means. The majority of the assembly was swayed by the Gironde. The national guard was partly disposed in their favour, but it was disunited and almost disorganised. The constitutionalists would be consequently compelled, in order to turn their military resources to account, to march from the frontier on Paris, that is to say, attempt an insurrection against the assembly; and insurrections, though advantageous for a violent party assuming the offensive, are but deplorable expedients for a moderate party on the defensive, under invocation of the law.

However, they crowded round Lafayette, and concerted with him the project of a letter to the assembly. This letter, to be written in his name, was intended to convey his sentiments towards the king and the constitution, and his disapprobation of all that tended

" The different letters which Mallet-du-Pan wrote to me at this period (July 1792), were in substance as follows:—On the 15th and 16th July, he had had long conferences with Count Cobentzel, Count Haugwitz, and M. Heyman, ministers of the Emperor and the King of Prussia. After examining the proofs of his mission, and listening with profound attention to the reading of his instructions and his memorial, they found that the views he recommended were in perfect accordance with those formerly manifested by the king to the courts of Vienna and Berlin, who had respectively adopted them. They had, in consequence, expressed entire confidence in him, and approved, in every point, the draft of the manifesto he had proposed to them. They had declared to him, in the most positive terms, that there was no view of ambition, of personal interest, or of dismembering the kingdom, in the plan of the war; and that the powers had no other purpose or interest than to restore order in France, because there could be no peace between that country and its neighbours, until it was delivered from the anarchy prevailing in it, and which obliged them to keep up lines of troops on all the frontiers, and to take extraordinary precautions, which were very expensive; but that, far from pretending to impose any form of government whatever on the French, the king would be left at perfect freedom to act on that point in concert with the nation. They had asked from him the most circumstantial information respecting the dispositions prevalent in the interior, respecting public opinion upon the old system, the parliaments, the nobility, &c. They had confided to him that it was intended to form the emigrants into an army, to be given to the king when he was set at liberty. They had spoken to him with displeasure and condemnation of the French princes, whom they supposed to have intentions quite the reverse of the king's, and particularly those of acting independently, and of appointing a regent. (Mallet-du-Pan strongly combated this supposition, and observed, that the intentions of the princes ought not to be gathered from the light or eager language of some of those around them.) In short, after thoroughly discussing the different requests and propositions which Mallet-du-Pan was charged to urge, the three ministers had unanimously acknowledged their prudence and propriety, had each solicited a copy or summary of them, and had given the most positive assurances that the king's views, being perfectly in accordance with those of the powers, should be strictly followed."—*Bertrand de Molleville*, vol. viii. p. 320.

* " The princes' party," says Madame Campan, " having been informed of the good understanding between the queen and the remnants of the constitutional party, was greatly alarmed at it. On her part, the queen always stood in apprehension of the princes' party, and of the pretensions held by the Frenchmen who formed it. She rendered justice to the Count d'Artois, and frequently said that his party would act in a spirit opposed to his own feelings towards the king his brother and herself, but that he would be over-persuaded by persons over whom Calonne exercised the most fatal ascendancy. She upbraided the Count Esterhazy, upon whom she had heaped favours, with having joined Calonne's party, to such an extent as to regard him even in the light of an enemy."—*Memoirs of Madame Campan*, vol. ii. p. 193.

* " In the mean time, the emigrants evinced great solicitude as to what might be done in the interior by the coalition with the constitutionalists, whom they described as no longer existing but in idea, and utterly devoid of means to repair their faults. The Jacobins were preferable to them, because, said they, there would be no necessity for treating with any one, when the king and his family shall be extricated from the abyss into which they had been plunged."—*Memoirs of Madame Campan*, vol. ii. p. 194.

to attack either the one or the other. His friends were divided in opinion; some stimulated, others repressed his zeal. But, looking only to what might benefit the king, to whom he had sworn fidelity, he wrote the letter, and braved all the dangers he might incur. The king and queen, although resolved not to be served by him, allowed him to write it, because they saw in such a proceeding nothing but an exchange of reproaches between the partisans of liberty. The letter reached the assembly on the 18th June. After having, at the commencement, censured the conduct of the last ministry, which he intended, as he said, to have denounced at the moment he had learnt its dismissal, Lafayette continued in these terms:—

"It is not enough that this branch of the government be delivered from a disastrous influence; the common weal is in danger. The fate of France depends almost exclusively on her representatives; from them the nation expects its safety; but by bestowing on itself a constitution, it has prescribed to them the only course by which they are entitled to save it."

Then protesting his inviolable attachment to the law consecrated by oath, he proceeded to descant on the state of France, which he held placed between two orders of enemies, those abroad and those at home.

"Both the one and the other must be repressed, but you will possess the power to do so only as you shall be constitutional and just. Look around you: can you dissemble from yourselves that a faction, and, to avoid all vague denominations, that the Jacobin faction has caused all the disorders? It is that faction which I openly accuse of them! Organised as a distinct empire, in its centre and its affiliations, blindly directed by a few ambitious leaders, this sect forms a separate corporation in the midst of the French people, whose powers it usurps by overawing its representatives and mandatories.

There, in public sittings, is respect for the laws stigmatised as aristocracy, and their infraction lauded as patriotism; there the assassins of Desilles are honoured with triumphs, and the crimes of Jourdan find panegyrists; there the recital of the murder that polluted the town of Metz has recently excited fiendish acclamations!

Will these reproaches be averted by pointing to an Austrian manifesto, in which these factionists are named? Are they become sacred because Leopold has mentioned them? And because we are called upon to combat aliens who intrude themselves into our disputes, are we to be prevented from delivering our country from a domestic tyranny?"

Subsequently reminding the assembly of his former services in the cause of liberty, and enumerating the guarantees he had given the country, the general answered for himself and his army, and declared that the French nation, if it were not the vilest in the universe, could and must resist the conspiracy that kings had formed against it. "But," he added, "to enable us, the soldiers of liberty, to combat for her with success, it is necessary that the number of the country's defenders be forthwith proportioned to that of its assailants; that the supplies of all kinds be augmented, and our movements thereby facilitated; that the comfort of the troops, their accoutrements, their pay, the care of their health, be no longer subjected to ruinous delays." Other exhortations followed, of which the following is the principal and concluding one:—

"Let the reign of the clubs, annihilated by you, give place to the reign of the law; their usurpations to the firm and independent action of the constituted authorities; their disorganising maxims to the true principles of liberty; their wild fury to the calm and constant courage of a nation that knows its rights and defends them; in fine, their factious projects to the real interests of the country, which, at this moment of peril, ought to unite all to whom its subjugation and ruin are not grounds for atrocious joy, and objects of infamous speculation!"

This was saying to boiling passion, *Be calm;* to parties, *Voluntarily destroy yourselves;* to a torrent, in short, *Cease to flow!* But although the counsel was fruitless, it was not on that account the less a duty to give it. The letter was greatly applauded by the right side. The left was silent. Scarcely was its perusal finished, than a motion was made for its being printed and sent to the departments.

Vergniaud claimed attention and obtained it. According to him, it was of consequence to the liberty which M. de Lafayette had hitherto so ably defended, that a distinction should be drawn between the petitions of mere citizens volunteering an opinion or invoking a measure of justice, and the castigations of an armed general. The latter ought to express his sentiments only through the medium of the ministry, otherwise liberty was at an end. He maintained, in consequence, that it was expedient for the assembly to pass to the order of the day. Thevenot replied that the assembly ought to welcome truths from the pen of Lafayette which it had not dared to say of itself. This last observation caused considerable agitation. Some members denied the authenticity of the letter. "Even were it not signed," exclaimed M. Coubé, "none but M. de Lafayette is capable of having written it." Guadet demanded leave to speak on a question of fact. He alleged that the letter could not be from M. de Lafayette, because it spoke of Dumouriez's resignation, which was not given in till the 16th, and it bore the date of that very 16th. "It is, therefore, impossible," he added, "that the signer of that letter should speak of a fact which could not be known to him. Either the signature is not his, or it was sent here on a blank sheet, at the disposal of a faction which might use it as it thought proper." Loud murmurs followed these words. Guadet, continuing, furthermore asserted that Lafayette was incapable, from his known sentiments, of having penned such a letter. "He must be aware," said he, "that when Cromwell"—— The deputy Dumas, unable longer to restrain his feelings at this last word, claimed to be heard. A prolonged agitation ensued in the assembly. However, Guadet kept possession of the tribune, and resumed: "I was saying"—— He was again interrupted. "You were at Cromwell," shouted some of the members. "I will return to him," he observed. "I was saying that M. de Lafayette ought to know that when Cromwell held similar language, liberty was prostrated in England. It is incumbent on you either to satisfy yourselves that some coward has sheltered himself under the name of Lafayette, or to prove to the French nation, by a signal example, that you have not taken an idle oath, in swearing to maintain the constitution."

A number of the members proved that they recognised the signature of Lafayette; but his letter, notwithstanding their testimony, was remitted to the committee of twelve to inquire into its authenticity. It was thus prevented from being printed and sent to the departments.

This generous proceeding was therefore utterly fruitless, and was sure to be so in the actual state of men's minds. From this moment, the general was almost as unpopular as the court; and if the leaders of the Gironde, more enlightened than the people, did not believe Lafayette capable of betraying his country because he had attacked the Jacobins, the mass implicitly believed it, from having the denunciation perpetually harped upon in the clubs, the newspapers, and the public thoroughfares.

Thus, to the alarms with which the court had inspired the popular party, were now added those to which Lafayette gave rise by his peculiar acts. Hence that party gave way to all the violence of despair, and resolved to assail the court before it could put in execution the plots with which it was charged.

We have already seen how the popular party was composed. As it took a more decided development, its characteristics grew more violent, and new personages rendered themselves remarkable in it. Robespierre had already made himself renowned at the Jacobins', and Danton at the Cordeliers'. The clubs, the municipality, and the sections, contained many men who, from the ardour of their tempers and opinions, were ready for any enterprise. Of this number were Sergent and Panis, who somewhat later connected their names with a fearful event. In the faubourgs resided several heads of battalions who had rendered themselves formidable, amongst whom the principal was a brewer named Santerre. From his stature, his voice, and a certain readiness of speech, he gained the popular favour, and had acquired a species of supremacy in the Faubourg St Antoine, the battalion of which he commanded. Santerre had already distinguished himself at the assault on Vincennes, repelled by Lafayette in February 1791; and, like all reckless characters, he was capable of becoming dangerous according to the instigations of the moment. He took part in all the meetings held in the distant suburbs. In them were united with him the journalist Carra, prosecuted for having attacked Bertrand de Molleville and Montmorin; a certain Alexandre, commandant of the Faubourg St Marceau; an individual well known under the name of Fournier the American; the butcher Legendre, who was afterwards a deputy in the convention; a journeyman jeweller called Rossignol; and several others, who, by their connexion with the populace, swayed all the faubourgs. Through the more distinguished amongst them, they communicated with the leaders of the popular party, and were thus enabled to direct their movements according to a superior impulse.

It is impossible to designate very precisely those deputies who contributed to give that impulse. The most conspicuous amongst them were strangers in Paris, and possessed no other influence than that gained by their eloquence. Guadet, Isnard, and Vergniaud, all provincials, kept up a closer communication with their departments than with Paris itself. Besides, although very energetic in the tribune, they displayed little activity out of the assembly, and were not fitted for moving a populace. Condorcet and Brissot, representatives of Paris, were not more active than the preceding; and from their conformity of opinion with the deputies of the west and south, they had become Girondists. Roland, since the dismissal of the patriot ministry, had returned to private life, dwelling in a modest and obscure residence in the Rue St Jacques. Convinced that the court had a design to deliver up France and liberty to foreigners, he deplored the calamities of his country with some of his friends, members of the assembly; but it does not appear that an attack upon the court was discussed in his society. He merely assisted the publication of a placarded journal, called *The Sentinel*, which Louvet, well known at the Jacobins' by his controversy with Robespierre, edited in a truly patriotic spirit. Roland, during his ministry, had allotted funds to enlighten public opinion through the press, and it was with a remnant of these funds that the Sentinel was printed.

At this period there was a young Marseillese at Paris, full of ardour, courage, and republican illusions, who was called the Antinoüs, from his singular comeliness. He had been dispatched by his commune to the Legislative Assembly for the purpose of complaining of the directory of his department; for such divisions between inferior and superior authorities, between municipalities and departmental directories, were general throughout France. The name of this young Marseillese was Barbaroux. Possessed of intelligence and great activity, he was well fitted to become useful to the popular cause. He saw Roland, and lamented with him the catastrophes wherewith the patriots were menaced. They agreed that as the danger was becoming every day more imminent in the north of France, it would be expedient, when reduced to the last extremity, to retire into the south, and there found a republic, which might be one day extended, as Charles VII. had formerly extended his kingdom from the walls of Bourges. They surveyed the map of the ex-minister Servan, and said to each other that, when beaten on the Rhine, liberty could retreat behind the Vosges and the Loire; that, charged in those entrenchments, it would still have in the east, the Doubs, the Ain, and the Rhone; in the west, Vienne and Dordogne; and in the centre, the rocks and streams of the Limousin. "Farther still," adds Barbaroux himself, "we had Auvergne, its rugged precipices, its ravines, and its aged forests, and the mountains of Velay, formerly scorched by fire, now covered with firs—wild localities, where men till in snow, but where they live independent. The Cevennes also offered us an asylum too renowned not to be formidable to tyranny; and at the extremity of the south, we found as barriers the Isère, the Durance, the Rhone from Lyons to the sea, the Alps, and the ramparts of Toulon. Finally, if all these points had been forced, there remained to us Corsica—that Corsica in which neither the Genoese nor the French have been able to naturalise tyranny; which only needs arms to render it fertile, and philosophers to become enlightened."*

It was natural that the inhabitants of the south should resolve upon taking refuge in their provinces if the north were overrun. They did not, however, neglect the north, for they agreed to write to their departments, urging the spontaneous formation of the camp of twenty thousand men, although the decree relative to that camp had not been sanctioned. They relied greatly on Marseilles, a flourishing, populous, and singularly democratic city. It had sent Mirabeau to the states-general, and since then it had disseminated through all the south the spirit with which itself was animated. The mayor of this city was a friend of Barbaroux, and partook all his opinions. Barbaroux wrote to him to collect magazines of corn, to send trusty emissaries into the neighbouring departments, as well as to the armies of the Alps, of Italy, and of the Pyrenees, in order to give opinion its tone in all of them; to sound Montesquiou, general of the army of the Alps, and to render his ambition profitable to the cause of liberty; finally, to concert with Paoli and the Corsicans, so as to secure a last aid and a last asylum. It was, moreover, recommended to this same mayor to retain the produce of the taxes, in order to deprive the executive power of the corresponding benefit, and, in case of need, to use the funds against it. What Barbaroux did with respect to Marseilles, others did with their departments, and took measures to prepare them as places of refuge. Thus distrust, converted into despair, was preparing a general insurrection, and in these insurrectionary preparations, a difference was already perceptible between Paris and the departments.

The mayor Pétion, intimate with all the Girondists, and at a later date ranked and proscribed with them, was, from the nature of his functions, more in connexion with the agitators of Paris. He was a man of infinite coolness, with an appearance of indifference which his enemies mistook for stupidity, and of an honesty which was lauded in exaggerated terms by his partisans, but which his detractors have never called in question. The populace, who give by-names to all who strongly excite their interest, usually called him *Virtue Pétion*. We have already spoken of him on the occasion of the flight to Varennes, and of the preference which the court gave him over Lafayette for the mayoralty of Paris. The court purposed to bribe him, and certain knaves undertook to effect its design. They demanded a sum of money, and kept

* Memoirs of Barbaroux, pp. 38, 39.

it for themselves, without even making any overtures to Pétion, which, indeed, his known character rendered needless. The joy of the court at securing a defender, and its glee at corrupting a popular minister, were of short continuance; it speedily learnt the trick that had been played upon it, and also that the virtues of its adversaries were not so marketable as it had surmised.

Pétion had been amongst the first to hold that the tendencies of a king, born to an absolute throne, can never be modified. He was a republican before a republic was even dreamt of by any; and in the Constituent Assembly, he was, from sincere conviction, what Robespierre was from acerbity of temper. Under the Legislative, he became more convinced than ever of the incorrigible faithlessness of the court; he felt assured it would call in foreigners; and having been originally a republican from principle, he was fortified in his tendency by motives of safety. From that period, consequently, he began to think, as he said, of favouring a new revolution. He arrested movements badly planned, aided those, on the contrary, which were well directed, and strove above all things to keep them in conformity to the laws, of which he was a rigid observer, and which he was determined not to violate but in the last extremity.

Without affirming the participation of Pétion in the movements which were preparing, without knowing whether he consulted his friends of the Gironde as to countenancing them, we are justified in stating, from his conduct, that he did nothing in the way of opposing obstacles to their execution. It is alleged, that towards the middle of June, he visited Santerre at his house, together with Robespierre; Manuel, the official solicitor of the commune; Sillery, an ex-deputy; and Chabot, a deputy and ex-capuchin;—that the latter harangued the section of the Quinze-Vingts, and told it that the assembly expected its assistance. Whatever may be the truth of these particular allegations, it is certain that secret conclaves were held; and it is not probable, from their known opinions and subsequent conduct, that the persons whom we have just named should scruple to attend them.* At this period the faubourgs were rife with the idea of a festival for the 20th June, the anniversary of the tennis-court oath. It was intended, as was bruited abroad, to plant a tree

* Among the depositions given in the process instituted against the conspirators of the 20th June, is one extremely curious from its details, namely, that of the witness Lareynie. It alone contains almost all what the others repeat, on which account it is here quoted. The process itself has been published in quarto.

"Before us —— appeared Sieur Jean-Baptiste-Marie-Louis Lareynie, a volunteer private in the battalion of the Isle St Louis, decorated with the military cross, and residing at Paris, on the Quay Bourbon, No. 1.—

Who, profoundly grieved at the disorders which have recently occurred in the capital, and believing that it is the duty of a good citizen to give to justice the information which it may require under the circumstances, for the purpose of punishing the schemers and instigators of all manœuvres against the public tranquillity and the integrity of the French constitution, declares that, about eight days ago, he was aware, by the relations he has with the Faubourg St Antoine, that the citizens of that faubourg were agitated by the Sieur Santerre, commanding the battalion of the Enfants-Trouvés (Foundlings), and by other persons, amongst whom were the Sieur Fournier, styling himself an American, and an elector of 1791 in the department of Paris; the Sieur Rotondo, styling himself an Italian; the Sieur Legendre, butcher, residing in the Rue des Boucheries (Slaughter-house Street), in the Faubourg St Germaine; and the Sieur Cuirette Verrières, residing above the Café du Rendezvous, Rue du Théâtre-Français—who nightly held meetings at the Sieur Santerre's, and sometimes in the committee-room of the section of the Enfants-Trouvés; that there they deliberated, in presence of a select body of the trusty in the faubourg, such as the Sieur Rossignol, lately a journeyman jeweller; the Sieur Nicolas, a sapper in the aforesaid battalion of the Enfants-Trouvés; the Sieur Brierre, wine merchant; the Sieur Gonor, calling himself a conqueror of the Bastille; and others whom he might name;—that they settled in such meetings the questions intended to be agitated in the mobs of the Tuileries, the Palais-Royal, the Place de Grève, and especially of the Gate St Antoine, Place de la Bastille; that they wrote out the incendiary placards affixed at intervals in the faubourgs, and the petitions intended to be carried by deputations to the patriotic societies of Paris; and, finally, that it was there the famous petition was fabricated, and the plot of the 20th June hatched. That, on the eve of that day, a secret committee meeting was held at the Sieur Santerre's, which began at midnight, at which witnesses, whom he will be able to adduce when they return from the mission given to them by the Sieur Santerre for the neighbouring districts, asseverate they saw present Messieurs Pétion, Mayor of Paris; Robespierre; Manuel, solicitor of the commune; Alexandre, commander of the battalion of Saint-Michel; and Sillery, ex-deputy of the National Assembly. That, on the day of the 20th, the Sieur Santerre, seeing that several of his people, and especially the leaders of his party, from alarm at the decree of the directory of the department, refused to come forth armed, under pretext they would be fired upon, assured them they had nothing to fear—*that the national guard would have no orders, and that M. Pétion would be there.* That at eleven in the forenoon of the said day, the crowd did not exceed fifteen hundred persons, including the curious, and that it was only when the Sieur Santerre had put himself at the head of a detachment of invalids, which came out of his house, and with which he marched to the square, and had excited on the way the spectators to join him, that the multitude swelled considerably upon his progress to the passage of the Feuillants; that when there, not daring to attack the post, he retired into the court of the Capuchins, where he caused the Maypole to be planted which he had destined for the palace of the Tuileries; that thereupon he, the witness, asked several people in the train of the said Sieur Santerre, why the Maypole was not erected on the terrace of the palace, as had been fixed; and that those people replied to him, *that they would take care how they did so, that such was the snare into which the Feuillantins wished them to fall, because there were cannon pointed in the garden—but that they were not to be trapped.* The witness observed that at this moment the crowd was almost entirely scattered, and that it was only when the drums and music were heard in the enclosure of the national assembly, that the rioters, then sprinkled here and there, rallied, joined the other spectators, and quietly defiled three abreast before the legislative body; that he, the witness, remarked that those people, when passing into the Tuileries, gave way to nothing offensive, and did not attempt to enter the palace; that, when even assembled on the Place du Carrousel, which they had reached by making a circuit along the quay of the Louvre, they manifested no intention of penetrating into the courts, until the arrival of the Sieur Santerre, who was at the National Assembly, and did not leave it until the sitting broke up. That then the Sieur Santerre, accompanied by several persons, amongst whom he, the witness, remarked the Sieur de Saint-Hurugues, addressed his troop, hitherto quite tranquil, and demanded of them *why they had not entered the palace; that they must go there, and had come out only for that purpose.* That he immediately commanded the artillerymen of his battalion to follow him with a piece of ordnance, and said, that if the gate were closed against him, he would break it in with balls; that he subsequently presented himself with this array at the gate of the palace, where he experienced a feeble resistance on the part of the horse gendarmerie, but a firm opposition on the part of the national guard; that this occasioned considerable uproar and confusion, and they were apparently on the point of coming to blows, when two men, wearing scarfs of the national colours, one of whom he, the witness, recognised as the Sieur Boucher-Réné, and the other, who was named by the spectators as the Sieur Sergent, came up through the courts, *and ordered them*, he must say, in a very imperious if not insolent tone, prostituting the sacred name of the law, *to open the gates*, adding, *that no one had a right to close them, and that every citizen had that of entering;* that the gates were in fact opened by the national guard, and that then Santerre and his troop rushed pell-mell into the courts; that the Sieur Santerre, who caused the cannon to be dragged to force the doors of the king's apartments if he found them closed, and to fire upon any of the national guard who should oppose his inroad, was stopped in his progress in an inner court on the left, at the foot of the pavilion staircase, by a group of citizens, who spoke to him in the most reasonable terms, to moderate his fury, and threatened to hold him responsible for every mischief that might happen on that disastrous day, because, they said to him, '*You alone are the author of this unconstitutional assemblage, you alone have misled these honest people, and you are the only malefactor amongst them.*' That the tone in which these respectable citizens spoke to the Sieur Santerre made him turn pale, but that, encouraged by a look from the Sieur Legendre, butcher as before men

of liberty on the terrace of the Feuillants, and to address a petition to the assembly, as also to the king. This petition was designed to be presented under arms. Hence it is sufficiently clear that the real object of this plan was to scare the palace by an array of forty thousand pikes.

On the 16th June, a formal demand was laid before the council-general of the commune, soliciting authority for the citizens of the Faubourg Saint Antoine to assemble on the 20th in arms, and present a petition to the assembly and the king. The council-general of the commune passed to the order of the day, and directed that its resolution in that respect should be communicated to the directory and the municipal body. The petitioners did not deem themselves interdicted by this course, and openly stated they would assemble notwithstanding. The mayor Pétion only imparted on the 18th the communications ordered on the 16th, and then merely to the department, and not to the municipal body.

On the 19th, the directory of the department, which had upon all occasions signalised itself in opposition to agitators, passed a resolution prohibiting armed assemblages, and charging the commander-in-chief and the mayor to take the necessary steps for dispersing them. This resolution was signified to the assembly by the minister of the interior, and an immediate question arose whether it should be allowed a reading.

Vergniaud opposed its being heard; but he was overruled. The reading was voted, but all ulterior proceedings were thereon stopped by the order of the day.

Two important events had just occurred at the assembly. The king had sent to signify his opposition to the two decrees, the one relative to the non-juring priests, and the other to the establishment of a camp of twenty thousand men. This communication had been heard in the deepest silence. At the same time some Marseillese had appeared at the bar, to read a petition. We have seen what relations Barbaroux maintained with them. Stimulated by his counsels, they had written to Pétion, offering him all their forces, and adding to this offer a petition intended for the assembly. In it they said amongst other things—

"French liberty is in danger, but the patriotism of the south will save France. —— The day of popular wrath is come. —— Legislators! the strength of the people is in your hands: make use of it: French patriotism asks of you permission to march with more imposing force towards the capital and the frontiers. —You will not refuse a legal sanction to those who are prepared to perish in defence of the law."

The reading of this petition gave rise to long debates in the assembly. The members of the right side argued, that to send a copy of it to each of the departments was to invite insurrection. But the transmission was ordered, in spite of these remarks, doubtless very just, but unavailing under the present firm persuasion that a new revolution alone could save France and liberty.

Such were the events that passed on the 19th. The agitation meanwhile continued in the faubourgs, and Santerre, as is alleged, said to his associates, somewhat intimidated by the decree of the directory, "*What do you fear? The national guard will not have orders to fire, and M. Pétion will be there.*"

At midnight, the mayor, either because he believed the movement irresistible, or because he deemed it fitting to foster it, as he did afterwards on the 10th August, wrote to the directory, and requested it to throw a legal sanction over the rising, by permitting the national guard to receive the citizens of the faubourgs into its ranks. This measure would have perfectly fulfilled the views of those who desired, without resorting to a commotion, to overawe the king; and every thing proves that such were actually the views of Pétion and the popular leaders. The directory answered at five in the morning (20th June), that it persisted in its previous resolutions. Pétion thereupon ordered the general officer on duty to keep the posts at their complement, and to double the guard at the Tuileries; but he did nothing more; and unwilling either to have the scene of the Champ de Mars repeated, or to suppress the gathering, he waited until nine in the morning for the meeting of the municipal body. At this meeting he allowed a decision to be taken contrary to that of the directory, and it was enjoined upon the national guard to open its ranks to the armed petitioners. Pétion, in not opposing a resolution subversive of the legal administrative subordination, laid himself open to a charge of contravention, which did not fail to be subsequently made against him. But whatever might be the character of this resolution, its provisions were useless, for the national guard had not time to form; and the assemblage speedily became so considerable, that it was no longer possible to vary its form or direction.

The hour was eleven in the forenoon. The assembly had just met, in anticipation of some great event. The members of the departmental directory appeared at the bar to inform it of the inutility of their efforts. The attorney-syndic Rœderer obtained leave to speak. He stated that an extraordinary gathering of citizens had taken place, in contravention of the law and of various injunctions issued by the authorities; that this popular concourse seemed to have for object the celebration of the anniversary of the 20th June, and the tender of a fresh tribute of respect to the assembly; but that if such were the purpose of the majority, it was to be apprehended that evil-disposed persons would endeavour to use this multitude in support of an address to the king, who ought not to have any presented to him except under the peaceable form of a petition. Then recapitulating the orders of the directory and the council-general of the commune, the laws decreed against armed gatherings, and those fixing at twenty the number of citizens competent to present a petition, he exhorted the assembly to enforce their execution; "for," he added, "armed petitioners resort hither to-day from a civic impulse, but to-morrow a crowd of malignants may assemble, and I ask you, gentlemen, what you could say to them?"

Amid the applauses of the right, and the murmurs of the left, which, from its disapproval of the alarm and foresight of the department, evidently looked with favour on the insurrection, Vergniaud mounted the tribune, and called to recollection that the abuse at which the attorney-syndic was so alarmed as a future precedent, was an already established custom; that on several occasions armed petitioners had been received, and permitted to defile through the hall; that it was possibly very wrong; but that the petitioners of to-day would have good reason to complain if they were treated differently from others; that if, as was said, they wished to present an address to the king, they would doubtless delegate to him unarmed petitioners; and that, in sooth, if the assembly were apprehensive of danger to the king, it had but to form a bulwark around him, by sending a deputation of sixty members to the palace.

Dumolard admitted all that Vergniaud had advanced, and acknowledged that the abuse was established; but maintained that it ought to be abolished especially upon this occasion, unless it were desired that the assembly and the king should appear, in the eyes of Europe, the slaves of a destructive faction.

tioned, he had recourse to a hypocritical subterfuge, turning to his troop, and saying to it, '*Gentlemen, draw up an account of the refusal I make to march at your head into the king's apartments;*' that, for answer, the crowd, accustomed to understand the Sieur Santerre, pushed aside the group of honest citizens, entered with their cannon and their commander, Santerre, and penetrated into the apartment by all the inlets, after having broken in the doors and windows."

He recommended, like Vergniaud, that a deputation should be sent, but required, in addition, that the municipality and the department should be held responsible for the measures taken to ensure the maintenance of the laws. The uproar meanwhile increased with every moment. A letter from Santerre was announced; it was read amidst the acclamations of the galleries. The inhabitants of the Faubourg St Antoine, according to the purport of this letter, were celebrating the 20th June; they had been calumniated, and they requested to be admitted to the bar of the assembly to confound their detractors, and to prove that they were still the men of the 14th of July.

Vergniaud replied to Dumolard, that if the law had been violated, the case was not unprecedented; that an attempt to put the present movement down would assuredly renew the sanguinary scene of the Champ de Mars; and that, after all, the sentiments of the petitioners were not reprehensible. "Justly uneasy as to the future," he added, "they wish to demonstrate that, in spite of all the intrigues hatching against liberty, they are ever ready to defend it." In these words, arising from the natural course of a debate, it may be observed, the real motive of the occurrence was proclaimed. The tumult still continued. Ramond claimed to speak, and an express resolution was needed to secure him the privilege. At the same moment, it was announced that the petitioners were eight thousand in number. "They are eight thousand," said Calvet, "and we are but seven hundred and forty-five: let us retire." "Order! order!" was shouted from all sides. Calvet was formally called to order, and Ramond urged to speak, as eight thousand citizens were in waiting. "If eight thousand citizens are waiting," said he, "twenty-four millions of Frenchmen are not less so." He then proceeded to repeat the arguments adduced by his friends of the right side. Suddenly the petitioners rushed into the hall. The assembly rose indignantly, the president put on his hat, and the petitioners retired with respectful submission. The assembly, satisfied at this proof of docility, consented to receive them.

Their petition, conceived in the most audacious spirit, expressed the opinions of all the petitions of that period. "The people are ready; they wait only for you; they are determined to use strong means to give execution to the second article in the declaration of rights—*resistance to oppression;* let the minority amongst you, at variance with your sentiments and ours, purge the land of liberty, and begone to Coblentz. Investigate the cause of the evils that threaten us: if it originate with the executive power, let it be annihilated!"

The president, after pronouncing a reply in which he promised the petitioners unremitting vigilance on the part of the representatives of the people, and exhorted them to give obedience to the laws, granted them, in the name of the assembly, permission to defile before it. The doors were then thrown open, and the crowd, which at this moment amounted to at least thirty thousand, passed in procession through the hall. What the wild imagination of a populace all abandoned to itself, is likely to exhibit, may be easily imagined. Enormous tables bearing the declaration of rights preceded the march; women and children danced around these tables, brandishing branches of olive and pikes, intended to intimate peace or war at the option of the enemy; and all repeated in chorus the famous air, *Ca ira.* Then came the porters of the markets and workmen of all denominations, with rusty muskets, swords, and bludgeons, with sharp steel points. Santerre, and the Marquis de Saint-Hurugues, already mentioned as a distinguished actor on the 5th and 6th October, marched, sword in hand, at their head. Some battalions of the national guard followed in good order, to restrain the tumult by their presence. After them came more women, followed by other armed men. Floating streamers bore the words: "The constitution or death." A pair of tattered breeches was raised aloft, amidst cries of "The *sans-culottes* (the breechless) for ever!" Finally, an atrocious symbol added ferocity to the grotesqueness of the scene. At the point of a pike was borne a calf's heart, with this inscription: "Heart of an aristocrat." Abhorrence and indignation broke loose at this exhibition; instantly the dismal emblem disappeared, but only to be again reared at the gates of the Tuileries. The acclamation of the galleries, the shouts of the populace traversing the hall, the civic songs, the confused uproar, the silence mixed with anxiety of the assembly, composed a scene of the strangest character, and one afflictive even to those members who viewed the multitude as an auxiliary. Alas! that reason is so powerless in times of discord! Alas! that those who invoked the disciplined barbarians of the north obliged their adversaries to call upon those undisciplined barbarians, of alternate gaiety and ferocity, who multiply in the heart of cities, and stagnate beneath the most progressive civilisation!

This scene lasted three hours. In conclusion, Santerre, reappearing to return thanks to the assembly on behalf of the people, presented it with a flag as a token of gratitude and devotion.

The multitude then attempted to enter the garden of the Tuileries, the gates of which were barred. Numerous detachments of the national guard surrounded the palace, and stretching in line from the terrace of the Feuillants to the river, presented an imposing front. An order from the king caused the garden gates to be opened. The populace immediately rushed in, marched under the windows of the palace, and before the ranks of the national guard, without any hostile demonstration, save repeatedly shouting, "Down with the veto!—the sans-culottes for ever!" A few individuals, however, alluding to the king, exclaimed, "Why does he not show himself? We don't intend him any harm." The old phrase, "He is deceived," was still heard, but very rarely. The people, prompt to imbibe the impressions of their leaders, had likewise given up the idea in despair.

The multitude issued from the garden by the gate opening on the Pont-Royal, passed up the quay, and, traversing the avenues of the Louvre, proceeded to the Place du Carrousel. This square, now so open and spacious, was then filled with numberless streets, which formed, as it were, covered ways through it. Instead of that immense court which at present extends between the palace and the railing, and from one wing to the other, were several small courts, separated by walls and houses, old-fashioned posterns giving them access to the Carrousel. The populace occupied all the surrounding space, and advanced to the royal gateway. An entrance through it was denied: some municipal officers here addressed them, and seemed to have prevailed on them to retire. It is alleged that, at this moment, Santerre, coming out of the assembly, where he had remained to the last for the purpose of presenting his flag, reanimated the already flagging dispositions of the crowd, and brought cannon to bear on the gate. It was now almost four o'clock; suddenly two municipal officers raised the bars,* whereupon the troops, who were gathered at this point in considerable numbers, consisting of battalions of the national guard and detachments of gendarmerie, were completely paralysed. The people rushed precipitately into the court, and thence into the vestibule of the palace. Santerre, threatened, it is said, by two witnesses with impeachment for this violation of the royal abode, exclaimed, turning to the assailants, "Be witnesses that I refuse to proceed into the king's apartments!" The populace had received too powerful an impulse to be stopped by such an

* All the witnesses examined were agreed upon this fact, and were at variance only as to the names of the municipal officers.

appeal; they spread into all parts of the palace, pressed up all the staircases, and transported in their arms a piece of ordnance even to the first floor. In the mean time the assailants began to hack, with swords and axes, the doors which were closed against them.

Louis XVI., at this moment, had dismissed many of his dangerous friends, who, without ability to save him, had so often tended to compromise him. They had flocked around him on this day, but he ordered them to leave the Tuileries, where their presence would only exasperate without awing the people. He had remaining with old Marshal de Mouchy, Acloque, commander of a battalion,* some servants of his household, and several devoted officers of the national guard. At length the shouts of the populace, and the blows of the hatchets, were heard. The officers of the national guard immediately surrounded the king, and entreated him to show himself, promising to die by his side. He did not hesitate, and ordered the doors to be opened. At that very instant, the panel of the one before him fell beneath his feet, under some vehement blow. At length all impediments to the crowd were removed, and a forest of pikes and bayonets bristled to the view. "Here I am!" said Louis XVI., showing himself to the unbridled mob. His attendants pressed around him, and formed a rampart for him with their persons. "Respect your king!" they exclaimed; and the multitude, who had assuredly no settled object, the design of a threatening inroad being all that had been marked out for them, slackened in their irruption. Several voices announced there was a petition, and demanded it might be heard. Those who surrounded the king urged him to pass into a larger saloon, in order that this petition might be conveniently read. The populace, gratified at seeing its wishes attended to, followed the monarch, whom his attendants had the wisdom to place in the recess of a window. They induced him also to mount a bench, whilst some of them drew up others in front of him; a table, likewise, was added, and all who accompanied him stood around. Some grenadiers of the guard and officers of his household came to increase the number of his defenders, and composed a rampart behind which he could listen with less of imminent danger to the popular demands. In the midst of the tumult and the shouts, these words were often heard repeated: "No veto!—no priests!—no aristocrats!—the camp near Paris!" Legendre, the butcher, drew near, and demanded, in popular phraseology, the sanction of the decrees. "This is neither the place nor the time to ask it," said the king, with firmness; "I will do all that the constitution requires." This resistance produced its effect. "The nation for ever!—the nation for ever!" shouted the assailants. "Yes," resumed Louis XVI., "the nation for ever! I am its fastest friend." "Indeed!—let us see!" said one of these men, holding out to him a red cap at the end of a pike. Rejection was pregnant with danger; and surely the dignity of the king did not require him to immolate himself from repugnance for a vain symbol; but, on the contrary, as he in sooth did, to repel with composure the assault of the multitude. He put the cap on his head, and general approbation was expressed. Panting from the heat of the season and the crowd, one of the men, in a half-intoxicated condition, holding in his hands a glass and a bottle, asked him to drink. The king had for some time been apprehensive of poison; however, he drank without hesitation, and was vociferously applauded.


During this interval, the Princess Elizabeth, who was attached to her brother by the tenderest affection, and who alone, of all his family, had been able to reach him, followed him from window to window, in order to share his dangers. When the people saw her, they took her for the queen. Yells of "There's the Austrian!" resounded in a fearful manner. The national guards who had surrounded the princess wished to undeceive the people. "Leave them," said that generous relative, "in their error, and save the queen!"

The queen, accompanied by her children, had been unable to join her royal consort. She had fled from the lower apartments, and gained the council-chamber, but could not penetrate to the king, on account of the crowd which obstructed every room in the palace. She was extremely anxious to join him, and earnestly entreated to be conducted to the room in which he was. With great difficulty she was dissuaded from attempting it; and standing behind the council-table, with some grenadiers, she surveyed the mob as it moved along, her heart palpitating with terror, and her eyes moist with suppressed tears. At her side, her daughter was weeping bitterly; and her young boy, at first greatly terrified, had soon regained confidence, and was smiling with the happy unconsciousness of tender age. Some of the populace had thrust a red cap into his hand, which the queen put upon his head. Santerre, who was stationed in this quarter, enjoined respect upon the people, and attempted to comfort the princess. He repeated to her the usual but unfortunately disregarded phrase—"Madam, you are misled—you are deceived;" and seeing the young prince oppressed by the red cap, "This child is smothered," said he, and freed him from the burlesque head-dress.

Upon learning the dangers of the palace, some deputies had hastened to the king, and addressed the people, urging them to respect. Others had repaired to the assembly to communicate what was passing; and the excitement within the hall had risen to the highest pitch, from the indignation of the right side, and the endeavours of the left to excuse this irruption into the palace of the monarch. A deputation had been decreed without dissent, and twenty-four members departed to surround the king. The deputation was ordered to be renewed every half hour, in order that the assembly might be always kept apprised of events. The deputed members harangued by turns, having themselves supported on the shoulders of grenadiers. Pétion afterwards appeared, and was accused of being too tardy in his arrival. He asserted he had not been informed until half-past four of the inroad effected at four; that he had taken half an hour to reach the palace, and had afterwards encountered so many obstacles as to be unable to penetrate to the king before half-past five. He approached the monarch; "Fear nothing," said he to him, "you are in the midst of the people." Louis XVI, upon these words, took the hand of a grenadier, and placed it on his heart, saying, "Feel if it beats faster than usual." This noble observation was greatly applauded. Pétion mounted on a chair, and addressing the crowd, told it, that having made its representations to the king, the only duty left for it to perform was to retire without disturbance, and in such a manner as not to sully the day. Some of the witnesses allege that Pétion said, "its *just* representations." These words would only prove at the most an anxiety not to irritate the multitude. Santerre united his influence with Pétion's, and the palace was speedily evacuated. The crowd retired peaceably and orderly. The palace was cleared about seven in the evening.

The king, the queen, his sister, and his children, immediately assembled together, mingling their tears. The king, stupified by the scene, still had the red cap on his head; he was now made sensible of the ill-omened ornament he had worn for several hours, and hurled it from him with indignant wrath. At this moment, fresh deputies arrived to take cognisance of the state of the palace. The queen, accompanying

*["A brewer of the Faubourg Saint-Marceau. The virtues and misfortunes of the king had made such an impression on this worthy man, that his majesty had not a more zealous partisan."—*Bertrand's Annals*, vol. vi. p. 337.]



The Capture of the Caribou.

them through it, pointed out to them the shattered doors and the broken furniture, expressing herself with anguish upon the enormity of the outrages. Merlin de Thionville, one of the most ardent republicans in the assembly, was amongst the deputies present; and the queen perceived tears in his eyes. "You weep," said she to him, "at seeing the king and his family so cruelly treated by a people whom he has always desired to render happy." "It is true, madam," replied Merlin, "I weep at the misfortunes of a beautiful and sensitive lady, the mother of a family; but do not misconstrue them, for not one of my tears is shed for the king or the queen. I detest kings and queens."*

CHAPTER X.

CONSEQUENCES OF THE 20TH JUNE, AND EVENTS SUBSEQUENT TO AUGUST 1792.

On the morning following this insurrectional day of the 20th, the principal events of which we have just recounted, Paris still wore a threatening aspect; and the different parties were moved with more than wonted violence. Indignation, of course, was general amongst the partisans of the court—they regarding it as atrociously outraged; and among the constitutionalists, who considered the invasion of the palace as an attack upon the laws and the public tranquillity. The disorder had been doubtless great, but it was now unduly exaggerated: it was alleged there had been a project to assassinate the king, and that the plot had only failed by a fortunate chance. Thus, by a very natural reaction, the feeling of the moment was entirely in favour of the royal family, exposed the day before to so many dangers and insults; and great disapprobation was expressed against the presumed instigators of the insurrection.

In the assembly, mournful countenances occupied the benches. Several deputies inveighed with force against the events of the previous day. M. Bigot proposed a law against armed petitions, and the usage of allowing bands to march through the hall. Although laws already existed upon these points, they were renewed by a decree. M. Daveirhoult maintained that informations should be taken against the perturbators. "Informations!" said some of the members, "against forty thousand men!" "Well," he retorted, "if it be impossible to distinguish the guilty amongst forty thousand, punish the guard for making no defence; but at all events act in some manner." The minister subsequently came to make a report on what had passed; and a discussion arose upon the nature of the facts. A member of the right side urged, on the ground that Vergniaud could not be suspected, and had been an eyewitness of the scene, that he should speak to what he had personally witnessed. But Vergniaud did not rise to this appeal, and preserved strict silence. However, the more undaunted of the left side shook off this constraint, and resumed courage towards the end of the sitting. They even ventured to move that an inquiry should be made, whether to decrees of urgency the sanction was necessary. But this motion was rejected by a large majority.

Towards evening, a renewal of the scenes of the preceding day was feared. The populace on retiring had stated that they would return, and it was generally imagined they would keep their promise. But, whether it were merely a remnant of the yesterday's excitement, or any fresh attempt were judged inexpedient at the moment by the leaders of the popular party, all tendency to riot was easily suppressed; and Pétion ran incontinently to the palace to assure the king that order was re-established, and that the people, after having made their representations to him, were calm and satisfied. "That is not true," said the king to him. "Sire"—— "Be silent." "The magistrate of the people is not called upon to be silent when he does his duty and tells the truth." "The tranquillity of Paris rests upon your head." "I know my duties: I will observe them." "Enough: go and perform them. Retire."

Notwithstanding his extreme amiability, the king was susceptible of splenetic emotions, which the courtiers used to call "fits of snorting." The sight of Pétion, who was accused of having stimulated the scenes of the 20th, irritated him, and provoked the conversation we have just related. All Paris was speedily acquainted with its terms. Two proclamations were forthwith published, one emanating from the king and the other from the municipality, demonstrating, significantly, that those two authorities were coming into conflict.

The municipality told the citizens to remain quiet, to respect the king, to respect and *make respected* the national assembly; and not to congregate in arms, because the laws prohibited it; and, above all, to distrust those evil-disposed persons who strove to put them again in motion.

It was rumoured at the moment, that the court was seeking to arouse the people a second time, to have an opportunity of shooting them down. Thus, the palace was haunted with the idea of an assassination, and the faubourgs with that of a massacre.

In his proclamation the king said, "The French will not have learnt without indignation that a multitude, deluded by certain factious individuals, has invaded, by force of arms, the habitation of the king. The king opposed to the menaces and insults of the factious nothing but the rectitude of his conscience and his love for the public weal.

He is ignorant to what extremity it is their purpose to restrict themselves; but, whatever excesses they may perpetrate, they will never wring from him a consent to what he believes opposed to the public interest, *et cetera.*

If those who labour to overthrow the monarchy have occasion for one more crime, they may commit it.

The king commands all the administrative bodies and municipalities to watch over the safety of persons and property."

Such opposite language was in accordance with the two opinions then prevalent. All whom the conduct of the court had driven to despair, were only the more exasperated against it, and more determined to contravene its schemes by all possible means. The popular societies, the municipalities, the men of pikes,* a portion of the national guard, and the left side of the assembly, applauded the proclamation of the Mayor of Paris, and vowed to use forbearance only so far as might be necessary to avoid being mowed down by artillery without effecting any decisive result. Still uncertain as to the means they should employ, they awaited events, full of their former distrust and aversion. Their first proceeding was to oblige the ministers to appear before the assembly, to give an account of the precautions they had adopted upon two essential points:—

1st, Upon the religious troubles excited by the priests;

2d, Upon the safety of the metropolis, which the camp of twenty thousand men, refused by the king, was intended to cover.

Those who were called aristocrats, the sincere con-

* See Madame Campan, vol. ii. p. 215.

* [With regard to pikes, there is a curious passage quoted by Bertrand in his Annals, and attributed to Brissot in his journal. It is as follows:—"Where will these pikes go?" asks an aristocrat. "Wherever ye shall be, ye enemies of the people," is the reply. "Will they dare go to the palace of the Tuileries?" "Yes, certainly, if ye be there." "Who shall command these pikes?" "Necessity." "Who shall distribute them?" "Patriotism. Pikes began the revolution; pikes shall end it."]

stitutionalists, a part of the national guards, several of the provinces, and especially the departmental directories, declared their opinions upon this occasion in a very energetic manner. The laws having been violated, they had all the advantage in argument, and used it to good purpose. A multitude of addresses came to the king. At Rouen and at Paris, a petition was prepared, to which twenty thousand signatures were attached, and which was associated in the detestation of the people with that formerly signed by eight thousand Parisians against the camp below Paris. Finally, an inquiry was ordered by the department against the mayor Pétion, and the attorney of the commune, Manuel, who were both accused of having encouraged, by their inertness, the insurrection of the 20th June. At this period, the conduct of the king on that fatal day was spoken of with admiration; there was a general relapse from the opinion respecting his character, which it was thought had been too harshly judged when suspected of weakness. But it was soon seen that the passive courage which can resist is far removed from that active, enterprising courage which anticipates dangers instead of awaiting them with composure.

The constitutional party likewise bestirred itself with extreme activity. All those who had flocked around Lafayette to concert with him the letter of the 16th June, again assembled, in order to arrange a grand demonstration. Lafayette had been roused to indignation on learning the events that had occurred in the palace, and they found him perfectly disposed to coincide with their views. Several regiments were induced to send addresses to him, testifying the same feelings of abhorrence. Whether these addresses were prompted or were spontaneous, he interdicted them by an order of the day, promising to convey, himself and in person, the sentiments of the whole army. He resolved accordingly to visit Paris, and repeat to the legislative body what he had written to it on the 16th June. He came to an understanding with Luckner, who was easily led, as an old warrior who had never been out of a camp. He prevailed on him to write a letter addressed to the king, expressive of the same sentiments he was about to proclaim *viva voce* at the bar of the Legislative Assembly. He then made all the necessary dispositions to prevent his absence being injurious to the military operations, and tearing himself from the affectionate solicitude of his soldiers, he repaired to Paris at the risk of imminent personal danger.

Lafayette relied upon his faithful national guards, and upon new energy on their part. He likewise relied upon the court, whose enmity he could scarcely anticipate when he was exposing himself to serve it. After having proved his chivalric love for liberty, he was anxious to prove his sincere attachment to the king; and in his heroic mood, it is probable he was not insensible to the glory of this double devotion. He arrived on the morning of the 28th June. The intelligence was rapidly diffused, and it was every where repeated with amazement and curiosity that General Lafayette was at Paris.

Before his arrival, the assembly had been agitated by the presentation of numerous contrary petitions. Those from Rouen, Havre, the Ain, the Seine and Oise, the Pas de Calais, and the Aisne, inveighed against the excesses of the 20th June; whilst those from Arras and Herault seemed almost to approve of them. On the one hand, Luckner's letter to the king had been read, and on the other, vindictive placards against him. The reading of these different documents had caused great excitement for several days.

On the 28th, a considerable crowd repaired to the assembly, in the hope that Lafayette, whose purpose was as yet unknown, would appear there. In fact, about half-past one it was announced that he requested to be admitted to the bar. Upon his entrance, he was received with the cheers of the right side, and the silence of the galleries and the left side.

"Gentlemen," said he, "I ought in the first place to assure you that, consequent upon dispositions concerted between Marshal Luckner and myself, my presence here in no respect compromises either the success of our arms, or the safety of the army I have the honour to command."

He then proceeded to unfold the reasons which brought him to Paris. It had been asserted that his letter was not from him; he came to avow it, and for that purpose had left the intrenchments of his camp, where the attachment of his soldiers was his greatest security. A more powerful motive had impelled him to this step; the 20th June had excited the indignation of his army, which had presented to him a multitude of addresses. He had interdicted them, and undertaken to become the organ of his troops with the National Assembly. "Already," said he, "the soldiers ask themselves whether it is really the cause of liberty and the constitution that they are defending."

He entreated the National Assembly:

1st, To prosecute the instigators of the 20th June;

2d, To annihilate a faction which usurps the national sovereignty, and whose public debates leave no doubt as to the atrocity of its projects;

3d, To ensure respect to the authorities, and to give the armies assurance that the constitution will receive no injury at home, whilst they are shedding their blood to defend it abroad.

The president answered him that the assembly would be faithful to the sworn law, and would consider his petition. He was invited to the honours of the sitting.

The general took his seat on the benches of the right. The deputy Kersaint remarked that he ought to take his place on the bench for petitioners. "Yes!" "No!" was shouted from all parts. The general modestly arose, and proceeded to the petitioners' bench. Long-continued cheers accompanied him to this new seat. Guadet was the first to speak, and, with infinite tact, asked if their enemies were subdued, if their country were delivered, since M. Lafayette was at Paris. "No," said he, "the country is not delivered—our situation has not changed, and yet the general of one of our armies is at Paris! I will not stop to inquire whether M. de Lafayette, who sees in the French people only creatures of faction, surrounding and threatening the authorities, be not himself surrounded by a staff which circumvents him; but I will observe to M. de Lafayette, that he infringes the constitution by becoming the organ of an army, legally incapable of deliberating, and that in all probability, likewise, he has infringed upon military subordination, by coming to Paris without authority from the minister at war."

In consequence, Guadet moved that the minister be called upon to state whether he gave leave of absence to M. de Lafayette, and also that the extraordinary commission should make a report on the question whether a general was competent to address the assembly upon matters purely political.

Ramond came forward to answer Guadet. He commenced by a very natural and often an apposite observation, that the interpretation of laws varies according to circumstances. "Never," said he, "have you been so scrupulous upon the existence of the right of petitioning. When very recently an armed multitude appeared, you did not ask what its mission was, nor reproach it with invading, by the display of arms, the independence of the assembly; and yet when M. de Lafayette, who, from the whole course of his life, is the very standard of liberty both for America and for Europe, presents himself, suspicions are awakened! If there be two weights and measures, if there be two modes of considering things, let the respect to persons be observed in favour of the first-born of liberty!"

Ramond then moved the reference of the petition to the extraordinary commission, for the purpose of examining, not the conduct of Lafayette, but the petition itself. After considerable tumult, and a double vote, the motion of Ramond was adopted. Lafayette left the assembly encompassed by a numerous concourse of deputies and soldiers of the national guard, all of them his partisans and old companions in arms.

This was the critical moment for all—for himself, for the court, and for the popular party. He repaired to the palace. The most insulting expressions were circulated in his hearing by the crowd of courtiers. The king and queen also accorded a cold reception to the man who had just taken so perilous a step in their behalf. He quitted the palace, afflicted, not on his own account, but on that of the royal family itself, at the dispositions evinced towards him. As he issued from the Tuileries, a considerable assemblage was waiting for him, which followed him with cries of "Lafayette for ever!" to the door of his residence, and even fixed a Maypole before the house. These testimonies of continued attachment affected the general, and intimidated the Jacobins. But it was necessary to turn these remnants of affection promptly to account, and to give them increased stimulus, if it were wished to render them efficacious. Certain officers of the national guard, particularly devoted to the royal family, addressed themselves to the court for an intimation of what ought to be done. The king and queen were both of opinion that it was not expedient to second M. de Lafayette.*

He therefore found himself abandoned by the only portion of the national guard upon which any hope of support could still be placed. Nevertheless, determined to serve the king in spite of himself, he held consultations with his friends. But their sentiments were far from harmonising together. Some, and especially Lally-Tolendal, desired that he should act with promptitude against the Jacobins, and attack them by main force in their club. Others, all members of the department and the assembly, taking their position on the law, upon which alone their influence rested, refused to sanction its violation, and strenuously opposed any open attack. Lafayette, however, gave the preference to the boldest of the counsels, and fixed a rendezvous with his partisans, with the view of expelling the Jacobins from their hall, and walling up the doors. But although the place of meeting was duly appointed, few made their appearance, and Lafayette found it impossible to strike the blow. In the mean time, whilst he was in despair at seeing himself so ill supported, the Jacobins, ignorant of the defection of his friends, were seized with a panic, and abandoned their hall. They hastened to Dumouriez, who had not yet departed for the army, and urged him to put himself at their head and march against Lafayette; but their proposal was not accepted. Lafayette remained another day at Paris, amidst denunciations, menaces, and plans of assassination, and finally departed in disgust at his own fruitless solicitude and the deplorable infatuation of the court. And yet this is the man, so completely abandoned, when he came to confront the most imminent dangers to save the king, who is accused of having betrayed Louis XVI.! The writers of the court pretend that his measures were ill combined: doubtless it was more easy and more sure, at least in appearance, to be served by eighty thousand Prussians; but in Paris itself, and with a determination of not appealing to foreigners, what more could be done than to place himself at the head of the national guard, and overawe the Jacobins by dispersing them?

Lafayette returned to his army with the intention of still serving the king, and arranging for him, if it were possible, the means of quitting Paris. He wrote to the assembly a letter in which he reiterated with yet greater energy all that he had said in person against those he called the factious.

Scarcely was the popular party freed from the alarms which the presence and purpose of the general had caused it, than it resumed its attacks upon the court, and persisted in demanding a rigorous account of the measures it was taking to defend the country. It was already known, although the executive power had sent no notification to the assembly, that the Prussians had broken their neutrality, and were advancing by Coblentz to the number of eighty thousand men, all veterans of the great Frederick, and commanded by the Duke of Brunswick, a general of celebrity. Luckner, having too few troops, and relying little upon the Belgians, had been obliged to retreat upon Lille and Valenciennes. On evacuating Courtray, an officer had burnt the suburbs of that town, with the intention, as it was believed, of alienating the Belgians by so remorseless a proceeding. The government was taking no steps to augment the force of the armies, which amounted at the most, upon the three frontiers, to scarcely two hundred and thirty thousand men. It was adopting none of those energetic steps which arouse the zeal and enthusiasm of a nation. In short, the enemy might easily reach Paris in six weeks.

The queen reckoned upon it, and imparted her confidence to one of her ladies. She had the itinerary of the emigrants and the King of Prussia. She knew that upon such a day they would be at Verdun, on such another at Lille, and that they designed to lay siege to that latter fortress. The unfortunate princess hoped, as she said, to be delivered in a month.* Alas! that she did not rather credit those sincere friends who represented to her the evil consequences of foreign aid, and its inutility, inasmuch as it would arrive too soon to compromise, too late to save her! —that she did not credit her own fears in this respect, and the gloomy presentiments which sometimes assailed her!

We have seen that the measure upon which the national party laid greatest stress was a reserve of twenty thousand federalists under the walls of Paris. The king, as has been already stated, had opposed this project. He was summoned, in the persons of his ministers, to give explanations on the precautions he had taken in substitution of those ordained by the unsanctioned decree. He answered by proposing a new plan, which consisted in directing upon Soissons a reserve of forty-two battalions of national volunteers, to replace the old reserve, which was exhausted by draughts to the two main armies. This was in some sort the first decree, with one difference, which the patriots regarded as highly important, namely, that the reserved camp was to be formed between Paris and the frontier, and not near Paris itself. This plan was received with murmurs, and remitted to the military committee.

Several departments and municipalities, excited thereto by their correspondents at Paris, had previously resolved to carry into execution the decree for the camp of twenty thousand men, although it remained unsanctioned. The departments of the Bouches-du-Rhone, the Gironde, and L'Herault, set the first example, and were speedily imitated by others. Such was the commencement of the insurrection.

So soon as these spontaneous levies were known, the assembly, modifying the project relative to forty-two new battalions, as proposed by the king, decreed that the battalions which, in the ardour of their zeal, had begun their march before being legally summoned, should pass through Paris, in order to be inscribed at the municipality of that city; that they should be afterwards directed upon Soissons for the purpose of encamping there; and, finally, that such of them as

* See Madame Campan, vol. ii. p. 224; a letter from M. de Lally to the King of Prussia; and all the authorities.

* See Madame Campan, vol. ii. p. 230.

should reach Paris before the 14th July, the anniversary of the federation, should assist at that national solemnity. This festival had not been observed in 1791, on account of the flight to Varennes, and it was determined to celebrate it this year with great splendour. The assembly subjoined to their decree that, immediately after the celebration, the federalists should take the road to the place of their destination.

These provisions tended at once to authorise the insurrection, and to re-enact, almost in terms, the unsanctioned decree. The only difference was that the federalists were merely to pass through Paris. But the important point was to bring them there, for, once arrived, a thousand circumstances might retain them. The decree as thus amended was immediately sent to the king, and was sanctioned on the morrow.

To this important measure was added another. A feeling of repugnance existed against a portion of the national guards, and especially against the staffs, which, after the example of the directories of departments, had a considerable leaning in favour of high authority, from being drawn into relation with it by their superior rank. The staff of the Parisian national guard chiefly excited the popular ire; but the assembly, considering it unsafe to make a direct attack upon it, decreed that all staffs, in towns of more than fifty thousand souls, should be dissolved and re-elected.* The state of agitation which prevailed in France securing to the most ardent an ever-increasing influence, this re-election was certain to bring forward characters devoted to the popular and republican party.

These were great measures, carried by pure energy against the right side and the court. But nothing seemed sufficiently effective to the patriots against the imminent dangers wherewith they believed themselves threatened. Forty thousand Prussians, as many Austrians and Sardinians, advancing on the frontiers; a court apparently in unison with the enemy, employing no means to augment the armies and stimulate the nation, but, on the contrary, applying the veto to thwart the measures of the legislative body, and the civil list to procure itself partisans in the interior; a general, who was certainly not deemed capable of uniting with the emigrants to deliver up France, but was, nevertheless, evidently disposed to support the court against the people;—all these circumstances struck the public mind with affright and profound emotion. "The country is in danger!" was the universal cry. But how prevent this danger?—there was the difficulty. Its causes even were matters of dispute. The constitutionalists and the partisans of the court, equally terrified with the patriots themselves, imputed the dangers solely to the factious, trembled only for royalty, and perceived peril in disunion alone. The patriots, on the contrary, held the peril to lie in the invasion, and charged it solely upon the court, its refusals, its delays, and its secret plots. Cross petitions were presented; some attributing every mischief to the Jacobins, others to the court, which was alternately designated under the appellations of "the palace," "the executive power," "the veto." The assembly heard, and remitted them all to the extraordinary commission of twelve, some time previously appointed to reflect upon and propose measures of safety. Its plan was impatiently desired. In the interim, threatening placards every where covered the walls; and the public journals, as daring as the placards, spoke openly of a forced abdication and dethronement. This was the subject of all conversations; and it was only in the assembly that any measures seemed to be preserved. There the attacks against royalty were as yet but indirect. It had been proposed, for example, to suppress the veto on decrees of urgency, and several times questions had been raised on the civil list and its criminal appropriation, with the view of either reducing it, or subjecting its outlay to public scrutiny.

The court had never refused to act upon the demands addressed to it by the assembly, and to materially augment the means of defence. It could not have done so, indeed, without compromising itself too openly; and, furthermore, it must have been indifferent to the numerical reinforcement of armies which it deemed completely disorganised. The popular party, on the other hand, desired those extraordinary measures, which evince a grand determination, and frequently render the most desperate cause triumphant. Such were the measures conceived by the commission of twelve, after a long inquiry, and proposed by it to the assembly. They were contained in the following project:—

When the danger became extreme, the legislative body was to promulgate the fact, by this solemn declaration—*The country is in danger.*

Upon this proclamation, all local authorities, the communal, district, and departmental councils, and the assembly itself, as the first of the authorities, were to be permanent, and to sit without interruption. All the citizens were bound, under the severest penalties, to surrender to the authorities the arms they possessed, in order that a suitable distribution might be made of them. All the men, young and old, capable of service, were to be enrolled in the national guards Some were to be kept disposable, and transferred to the seats of the district and departmental bodies; whilst others were to be dispatched into all quarters where the danger of the country should require, either at home or abroad. A uniform was not to be made imperative on those too poor to afford the expense of one. All the national guards, when removed from their places of abode, were to receive the pay of volunteers. The authorities were to be chargeable with the providing of munitions. A rebellious symbol, hoisted intentionally, was to be punished with death. All cockades and banners were reputed seditious except those of the tricolour.

According to this project, the nation was to be on the alert and in arms; it would possess the means of deliberating, and of fighting on all sides and at all moments; and could disregard the government by amply compensating for its inertness. The agitation of the masses, hitherto without a specific object, would be regulated and directed. If, in fine, after the appeal was made, the French did not respond to it, nothing more would be due to a nation which did nothing for itself. A debate of the most stirring character did not fail, as may be well imagined, to ensue upon such a project.

The deputy Pastoret made the preliminary report on the 30th June.

He gave satisfaction to no one, laying blame on all parties, then flattering them at each other's expense, and failing to illustrate in a decisive manner the measures for meeting the public dangers. After him, the deputy Jean de Bry gave a clear and calm exposition of the reasons on which the plan of the commission was founded. The discussion, once commenced, soon became a mere interchange of reproaches. It gave play to those hot and hasty imaginations which fly incontinently to extreme measures. The great law of public safety, that is to say, a dictatorship, or, in other words, the power of doing any thing, with the chance of using it cruelly but efficiently—a law, in fact, which was suitable only for the convention, was proposed, nevertheless, in the Legislative Assembly.

M. Delaunay d'Angers moved that the assembly declare that, until after the cessation of danger, *it would consult only the imperious and supreme law of public safety.*

This was, under an abstract and vague formula, evidently intended to suppress royalty, and declare the assembly absolute sovereign. M. Delaunay said that the revolution was not accomplished, that they de-

* Decree of the 2d July.

ceived themselves if they thought otherwise, and that fixed laws were for a revolution saved, not for a revolution to save; in short, he said all that is usually said in favour of a dictatorship, the idea of which invariably presents itself in moments of imminent danger. The reply of the deputies on the right side was, naturally, that the oaths taken to the constitution would be violated by instituting an authority to absorb the legal and established powers. Their opponents retorted by asserting, that the example of the violation had been given, and that it behoved them to take care they were not surprised in a defenceless state. "But prove," responded the partisans of the court, "that this example has been given, and that the constitution has been betrayed." This defiance was met by renewed accusations against the court, and these accusations, again, were opposed by invectives against agitators. "You are factious!" "You are traitors!"—such was the mutual and incessant reproach, and it involved the question to be solved.

M. de Jaucourt moved that Delaunay's proposition be dismissed to the club of Jacobins, so extravagant did he deem it. M. Isnard, to whose impetuous temperament it was acceptable, demanded that it be taken into consideration, and that the speech of M. Delaunay be sent to the departments, as an antidote to that of M. Pastoret, which was only "*a dose of opium administered to one in agony.*"

M. de Vaublanc succeeded in obtaining a hearing, and said that the constitution might be saved by the constitution; that the project of M. Jean de Bry was a proof of it; that the speech of M. Delaunay might be printed, if it were desired, but certainly not sent to the departments; and that the assembly ought to revert to the proposition of the commission. The debate was finally adjourned to the 3d July.

One deputy had not yet spoken, and that was Vergniaud. A member of the Gironde, and its greatest orator, he was nevertheless independent of it. Either from coolness or true elevation of mind, he seemed superior to the passions of his friends; and, whilst participating their ardent patriotism, he did not always yield to their prejudices and violence. When he spoke upon a question, he carried with him, by his eloquence and a certain acknowledged impartiality, that undecided portion of the assembly which Mirabeau was formerly wont to sway by his vehement and logical outbursts. Wavering masses every where obey the impulse of talent and the force of reason.*

It had been announced that he would speak on the 3d July, and an immense crowd attended to hear the great orator, on a question which was regarded as decisive.

He rose accordingly,† and cast a preliminary glance at the state of France. "If we did not trust," said he, "in the imperishable love of the people for liberty, we might doubt whether the revolution was retrograding, or had reached its limit. Our armies in the north were advancing into Belgium, and suddenly they gave way; the theatre of the war is carried to our own territory, and the unfortunate Belgians preserve of us only the remembrance of the conflagrations which illumined our retreat! At the same time a formidable army of Prussians menaces the Rhine, although we had been led to expect that their march would not be so immediate.

How comes it that this was the moment chosen to dismiss the popular ministers, to break the chain of their labours, to deliver up the empire to inexperienced hands, and to repudiate the measures we had found it our duty to propose? Can it be true that our triumphs are viewed with fear? Is it the blood of Coblentz, or yours, for which consideration is felt? Is it wished to reign over depopulated towns, over devastated fields? Where, in a word, are we? And you, deputies, what are you doing for the public safety?

You, whom they flatter themselves with having intimidated; you, whose consciences they think to alarm by stigmatising your patriotism as the spirit of faction, as if they had not called those factious who took the oath in the tennis-court; you, whom they have so calumniated because you are not of a haughty caste, which the constitution has humbled to the dust; you, upon whom they charge criminal designs, as if you, invested with a power alien to that of the law, had a civil list at disposal; you, whom, in their hypocritical moderation, they would have relax in attention to the dangers of the people; you, whom they have succeeded in dividing, but who, in this moment of peril, will lay aside your animosities, your miserable dissensions, and will not feel mutual hatred so sweet as to prefer the fiendish gratification to the safety of the country;—you, I say, listen to me: what are your resources?—what does necessity enjoin upon you?—what does the constitution permit you?"

During this exordium, vociferous cheers frequently drowned the voice of the speaker. He continued, and unfolded two orders of dangers, the one internal, the other external.

"To obviate internal dangers, the assembly proposed a decree against the priests; and whether that the genius of a Medicis still lingers under the arches of the Tuileries, or that a La Chaise or a Letellier still troubles the mind of the monarch, the decree was refused by the throne. It is not permitted us to believe, without doing wrong to the king, that he desires religious commotions. Therefore he deems himself sufficiently powerful—he finds sufficient in the old laws to secure public tranquillity. Let his ministers, then, answer for it with their heads, since they have the means of preserving it!

To obviate external dangers, the assembly had devised a reserve camp: the king rejected it. It would be an outrage on him to believe that he desired to deliver up France: he must, therefore, have armies sufficient to protect her: his ministers must answer to us with their heads for the safety of the country." Hitherto the orator restricts himself, as we see, to ministerial responsibility, and to investing it with a more threatening character. "But," he added, "it is not enough to hurl the ministers into the abyss their malignancy or their impotence may have prepared. I pray you listen to me with calmness; be not too hasty in interpreting my meaning."

At these words, attention was excited to the highest pitch; the deepest silence reigned in the assembly.

"It is in the name of *the king*," said he, "that the French princes have striven to rouse Europe; it is to vindicate *the dignity of the king* that the treaty of Pilnitz was concluded; it is to bring *succour to the king* that the sovereign of Bohemia and Hungary makes war upon us—that Prussia marches to our frontiers. Now, I read in the constitution: 'If the king puts himself at the head of an army, and directs its strength against the nation, or if he does not oppose, by a formal act, any such enterprise that may be undertaken in his name, he shall be adjudged to have abdicated the throne.'

What is a formal act of opposition? If a hundred thousand Austrians march upon Flanders, a hundred thousand Prussians upon Alsace, and the king opposes to them ten or twenty thousand men, would he perform *a formal act* of opposition?

If the king, being bound to notify impending hostilities, and well aware of the movements of the Prussian army, gave no knowledge thereof to the national assembly; if a camp of reserve, necessary to arrest

* This justice was allowed to Vergniaud by the *Journal de Paris*, then so well known for its opposition to the majority of the assembly, and for the high talents which presided over its editorial department, especially in the unfortunate and immortal André Chénier. (See the number of the 4th July 1792.)

† It is scarcely necessary to state that I analyse, and do not give the speech of Vergniaud in its precise words.

the progress of the enemy into the interior, were proposed, and the king substituted for it a plan ill-defined and tedious to execute; if the king left the command of an army to an intriguing general, suspected by the nation; if another general, reared far from the corruption of courts, and familiar with victory, demanded a reinforcement, and by a refusal of the king, the king virtually said to him, *I enjoin thee not to conquer;* can it be alleged that the king has given *a formal act* of opposition?

I have purposely exaggerated several points, to remove all pretext for applications purely hypothetical. But if, whilst France were swimming in blood, the king said to you, It is true that enemies pretend to act for me—for my dignity, for my rights; but I have proved that I was not their accomplice: I have brought armies into the field; these armies are too weak, but the constitution does not fix the amount of their strength; I have assembled them too tardily, but the constitution does not fix the period for their junction; I have stopped a general who was going to conquer, but the constitution does not enjoin victories; I have employed ministers who deceived the assembly and disorganised the government, but their nomination belonged to me; the assembly has passed useful decrees which I have not sanctioned, but I had a right so to do; I have done all that the constitution prescribes to me; it is not possible, therefore, to doubt my fidelity to it."

Vehement cheers burst from all sides. "If, then," he resumed, "the king held this language to you, would you not be justified in replying to him, 'Oh, king! who, like the tyrant Lysander, have held that truth was not more estimable than falsehood—who have feigned to love the laws only that you might preserve the power enabling you to brave them—was it defending us to oppose foreign soldiers with forces whose inferiority left not even a doubt as to their inevitable defeat? Was it defending us to discard the plans calculated to fortify the interior? Was it defending us to abstain from repressing a general who violated the constitution, and to chain down the courage of those who were serving it? Does the constitution leave you the choice of ministers for our prosperity or our ruin? Does it make you chief of the armies for our glory or our shame? Does it give you, in a word, the right of veto, a civil list, and so many high prerogatives, in order constitutionally to ruin the constitution and the empire? No! no! as a man whom the generosity of the French people has failed to touch with sensibility, whom the love of despotism alone can actuate, you are no longer fit for that constitution you have so unworthily violated—for that people whom you have so basely betrayed!'

But, no," continued the orator; "if our armies be not complete, the king is doubtless not culpable; he will doubtless take the necessary measures to save us; doubtless the march of the Prussians will not be so triumphant as they anticipate; but, at the same time, it was essential to conceal nothing in apprehension or in speech, for frankness can alone save us."

Vergniaud concluded by proposing a message to Louis XVI., in firm but respectful language, which should compel him to choose between France and foreigners, and impress upon him that the French were resolved to perish or to triumph with the constitution. He recommended, furthermore, that the country should be pronounced in danger, in order to awaken in all hearts those lofty emotions which have often animated great nations, and which would be unquestionably found in the French people; "for it will not be," said he, "in the regenerated French of '89 that nature will show herself debased." He urged, in fine, that an end should be put to dissensions, the character of which was pregnant with gloomy forebodings, "and that those should be joined together who were in Rome and on Mount Aventine."

In pronouncing these last words, the voice of the orator faltered, and a general emotion prevailed. The galleries, the left side, the right side, the whole audience applauded. He quitted the tribune, and was surrounded by a crowd eager to congratulate him. He alone had hitherto ventured to speak in the assembly of the dethronement, which was talked of by every one in public, but he had only presented it in a hypothetical manner, and under forms still respectful, when compared with the language instigated by the passions of the time.

Dumas essayed to reply. He laboured under the disadvantage of speaking on the spur of the moment, after Vergniaud, and before auditors with minds still affected with all the sensations he had aroused. He repeatedly claimed silence and attention, which were as repeatedly refused to him. He lingered on the reproaches dealt out against the executive power. "The retreat of Luckner was owing," said he, "to the fortune of war, which cannot be regulated in the depths of cabinets. You certainly have confidence in Luckner?" "Yes! yes!" exclaimed all; and Kersaint forthwith proposed a resolution declaring that Luckner had preserved the national confidence. The resolution was passed, and Dumas continued. He alleged with reason, that if they had confidence in that general, they could not consider the motive of his retreat as criminal or suspicious; that as to the deficiency of force inveighed against, the marshal himself allowed that all the troops then disposable were collected for the enterprise in question; that besides, all the preparations must have been made by the late Girondist ministry, the authors of the offensive war, and that if the means were insufficient, the fault rested with that administration solely; that the new ministers could not repair all defects by a few couriers; and, finally, that they had given unlimited discretion to Luckner, and left him power to act according to circumstances and the nature of the country.

"The decree for the camp of twenty thousand men," added Dumas, "has been refused; but, in the first place, the ministers are not responsible for the veto; and, secondly, the plan which they have substituted is better than that proposed by the assembly, inasmuch as it does not paralyse the means of recruiting. The decree against the priests has been refused, but there is no need of new laws to secure the public tranquillity; nothing is required but peace, security, and respect for individual and religious liberty. Wherever those franchises have been held inviolable, the priests have not been seditious." Dumas concluded by justifying the king, under the allegation that he had not desired war, and Lafayette, by reminding his hearers that he had always been the friend of liberty.

The decree proposed by the commission of twelve, for regulating the measures consequent upon the country being declared in danger, was passed amidst vehement cheering. But the declaration itself was adjourned, because the assembly did not deem itself yet called upon to take that decisive step. The king, stimulated doubtless by all that had been said, notified to the assembly imminent hostilities on the part of Prussia, the proofs of which he grounded on the declaration of Pilnitz, on the welcome given to rebels, on the violences committed towards French merchants, on the dismissal of the French minister, and on the departure of the Prussian ambassador from Paris; in short, on the march of Prussian troops to the number of 52,000 men. "Every thing proves to me," added the king's message, "an alliance between Vienna and Berlin." (Much laughter was elicited by these words.) "In terms of the constitution, I give advice thereof to the legislative body." "Yes," replied several voices, "when the Prussians are at Coblentz!" The message was remitted to the commission of twelve.

The discussion upon the articles of the declaration of the country being in danger was resumed. The assembly decreed that this declaration should be con-

sidered as a simple proclamation, and consequently not subject to the royal sanction; a decision not particularly just, since the declaration was to involve legislative provisions. But, without venturing to proclaim it, the assembly already followed the law of public safety.

The controversies in the chamber became every day more envenomed. The hope of Vergniaud, as to uniting those in Rome and on Mount Aventine, was not realised; the fears reciprocally inspired were converted into irreconcilable hatred.

In the assembly was a deputy named Lamourette, constitutional Bishop of Lyons, who had ever viewed liberty but as a return to primitive fraternity, and who was equally afflicted and astonished at the divisions amongst his colleagues. He had no idea of a real hatred existing between them, but surmised that they were all labouring under groundless suspicions. On the 7th July, at the moment the debate on the danger of the country was about to be resumed, he claimed to be heard upon a motion of order; and addressing his colleagues in the most persuasive tone, and with the most benignant aspect, he said to them that every day propositions were submitted to them for the severest measures, intended to obviate the dangers of the country; but that, for his part, he put faith in milder and more efficacious means. It was the division amongst the representatives that caused all the evils; and to this dissension it was needful to apply a remedy. "Oh!" exclaimed the worthy pastor, "he who should succeed in uniting you, would be the veritable conqueror of Austria and Coblentz. It is daily said that your union is impossible in the present posture of affairs. Alas! I shudder to hear it!—but it is a calumny. Nothing is irreconcilable but vice and virtue. Honest men dispute with warmth, because they are sincerely convinced of the rectitude of their opinions; but they cannot hate each other. Gentlemen, the public safety is in your hands; what retards you from accomplishing it?

What do the two parties in the assembly charge upon each other? One accuses the other of designing to modify the constitution by means of foreigners, and the latter accuses the first of designing to overthrow the monarchy to establish a republic. Well, my friends, hurl one and the same anathema at the republic and the two chambers—devote them both to common execration by a last and irrevocable oath! Let us swear to have but one spirit, one sentiment; let us swear an eternal fraternity! Let the enemy know that what we determine is the determination of all, and the country is saved!"

The speaker had scarcely concluded these words, than the two sides of the assembly were on their feet, applauding his generous sentiments, and eager to throw off the weight of their respective animosities. Amidst universal acclamation, they devoted to public execration every project for altering the constitution, either by two chambers or by a republic, and then flew from the opposing benches to embrace each other. Those who had attacked and those who had defended Lafayette, the veto, and the civil list—the *factious* and the *traitors*—were clasped in each other's arms; all differences were merged; and Pastoret and Condorcet were seen in a close embrace, although they had but the day before indulged in reciprocal abuse in the public prints. There was no longer a right side or a left side; and all the deputies took their seats without distinction of place or party: Dumas was by the side of Bazire, Jaucourt close to Merlin, and Ramond to Chabot.

It was immediately resolved that the provinces, the army, and the king, should be informed of this happy event. A deputation, headed by Lamourette, repaired to the palace. Lamourette shortly returned to announce the king's approach, who was coming, as on the 4th February 1790, to testify his gratification to the assembly, and tell it that he could not brook the delay of a deputation, since it retarded his being in the midst of the representatives.

The enthusiasm was carried to the highest pitch by these words; and, if the unanimous acclamation were to be credited, the country was saved. Were there then a king and eight hundred deputies forming on the instant a scheme for mutual deception, and hypocritically feigning an oblivion of wrongs for the purpose of afterwards betraying each other with more certainty? No, unquestionably not; such a scheme is not formed by so large a body of men, suddenly, and without premeditation. But hatred is oppressive to the mind, and it is sweet to cast off the encumbrance. Besides, with reference to the most threatening emergencies, which was the party that, in the uncertainty of victory, would not have willingly consented to maintain the present, such as it was, provided it were well assured? This scene proves, as well as many others, that distrust and apprehension produced all the animosities, that a moment of confidence dispelled them, and that the party which was called republican did not look towards a republic from principle but from despair. Why, when he had returned to the palace, did not the king write without a moment's delay to Austria and Prussia? Why did he not join to that secret proceeding some public and decisive measure? Why did he not say, like his ancestor Louis XIV., at the approach of the enemy, "*We will all go!*"

But the same evening, the result of the proceedings instituted by the department against Pétion and Manuel was communicated to the assembly, and this result was the suspension of those two magistrates. From what has been since ascertained, and from the mouth of Pétion himself, it is probable he might have prevented the movement of the 20th June, more especially as he prevented others at a later date. Still his connivance with the agitators was not then authenticated, but it was strongly suspected; in addition to which, he was open to the charge of certain infractions of the law, as, for example, of having purposely studied delay in his communications to the different authorities, and of having permitted the council of the commune to pass a resolution in opposition to that of the department, by deciding that the petitioners should be received into the ranks of the national guard. The suspension pronounced by the department was consequently legal and energetic, but impolitic. After the reconciliation of that morning, was there not in reality great imprudence in signifying, the same evening, the suspension of two magistrates enjoying such boundless popularity? True, the king referred the matter to the assembly, but that body did not conceal its dissatisfaction, and surlily remitted the decision to his own judgment. The galleries recommenced their accustomed cries; numerous petitions were presented with the burden of "Pétion or death;" and the deputy Grangeneuve, whose person had been insulted, demanded a report against the author of the outrage. Thus the reconciliation was already forgotten. Brissot, whose turn had come to speak on the question of the public danger, asked for time to modify the terms of his speech, on account of the reconciliation that had taken place since he had prepared it. Nevertheless, he was unable to restrain himself from recapitulating all the crimes of negligence and tardiness laid to the charge of the court; and, despite the chimerical harmony, he concluded by demanding that the question of forfeiture should be solemnly discussed; the ministers impeached for having so reluctantly notified the hostilities of Prussia; a secret committee appointed, composed of seven members, and charged to watch over the public safety; the possessions of emigrants exposed to sale; the organisation of the national guards accelerated; and, finally, the declaration made without delay of *The country in danger.*

Intelligence was at the same period brought of the

conspiracy of Dussaillant, a member of the old nobility, who, at the head of some insurgents, had seized upon the fortress of Bannes, in the department of L'Ardèche, and kept all the surrounding country in alarm. The dispositions of the powers were likewise detailed to the assembly by the ministry. The house of Austria, drawing Prussia into its snares, had determined that power to march against France, although the disciples of Frederick the Great murmured against the impolitic alliance. The electorates were all open or secret enemies. Russia had been the first to declare against the revolution; she had acceded to the treaty of Pilnitz, had stimulated the projects of Gustavus, and assisted the emigrants; all which was designed to mislead Austria and Prussia, and to impel them both upon France, whilst she pursued her schemes against Poland. At present, she was negotiating with the Counts de Nassau and d'Esterhazy, emigrant leaders; but, notwithstanding her ostentatious promises, she had simply granted them a frigate, to get rid of their presence at St Petersburg. Sweden was quiet since the death of Gustavus, and received French vessels. Denmark promised a strict neutrality. France might consider herself at war with the court of Turin. The pope was preparing his thunderbolts. Venice was neutral, but seemed disposed to cover Trieste with its fleets. Spain, without openly joining in the coalition, gave no symptom of an intention to fulfil the family compact, and to render to France the aid she had often received. England was bound to neutrality, and gave fresh assurances of it. The United States would gladly assist France with all their might, but were unable to afford the most trifling aid, from their distance and the paucity of their population.

Upon this picture being laid before it, the assembly was anxious instantly to declare the country in danger; but on reflection, the declaration was delayed for a new report from all the committees united. On the 11th July, after hearing such reports, in the midst of an awful silence, the president pronounced the solemn declaration:—"CITIZENS! THE COUNTRY IS IN DANGER!"

From this moment the sittings were declared permanent; minute guns announced the momentous crisis; all the municipalities, all the district and departmental councils, sat without intermission; all the national guards put themselves in motion. Amphitheatres were erected in the middle of the public squares, and municipal officers received there on a table, supported by drums, the names of those who came to enrol themselves as volunteers. The enrolments amounted to fifteen thousand in one day.

The reconciliation of the 7th July, and the oath which accompanied it, had failed, as we have seen, to dissipate any one suspicion. The necessity of guarding against the schemes of the palace was still the prevailing sentiment; and the idea of declaring the king dethroned, or of forcing him to abdicate, was present to all minds as the only possible remedy for the calamities which impended over France. Vergniaud had but alluded to that course, and in a hypothetical form; others, and especially the deputy Torné, insisted that the supposition of Vergniaud should be held as a positive proposition. Petitions from all parts of France arrived to give the aid of public opinion to that desperate resource of the patriotic deputies.

The city of Marseilles had already sent a threatening petition, read in the assembly on the 19th June, and reported above. At the period the country was declared in danger, several others were presented. One asked for the impeachment of Lafayette, the suppression of the veto in certain cases, the reduction of the civil list, and the reinstatement of Manuel and Pétion in their municipal functions. Another demanded, with the suppression of the veto, the publicity of council meetings. But the town of Marseilles, which had given the first example of these daring remonstrances, soon proceeded to still greater audacity. It transmitted an address in which it urged the assembly to abolish royalty in the reigning branch, and to substitute for it a royalty elective and without a veto—that is to say, a mere executive magistracy, as in republics. Amazement stunned the assembly for a moment as these sentiments were read aloud; but it was speedily aroused by the bravoes of the galleries, and a motion for printing made by one of the members. But the address was referred to the commission of twelve, to receive the application of the law which declared infamous every project for altering the constitution.

Consternation, meanwhile, pervaded the palace; nor was it unfelt by the patriot party, which spirited petitions were far from altogether encouraging. The king believed that designs were formed against his person; he considered that the 20th June was a foiled project of assassination, which was assuredly a grievous error, for nothing would have been more easy than the perpetration of such a crime, if it had been projected. Fearing poison, he and his family took their meals with a lady on confidential terms with the queen, where they partook of other food than that prepared in the kitchens of the palace.* As the day of the federation drew nigh, the queen got prepared for the king a cuirass, composed of quiltings of stuff capable of resisting the sudden stab of a dagger However, as time passed away, and the popular audacity increased, without any attempt at assassination being detected, the king began more fully to comprehend the nature of his danger; he already discerned that it was no longer the point of a dagger, but a judicial condemnation he had to fear; and the fate of

* Madame Campan gives an interesting statement respecting the fears of the royal family, which is as follows:—

"The spies of M. de Laporte, intendant of the civil list, apprised him, about the end of 1791, that a man belonging to the king's offices, who had established himself as a confectioner in the Palais-Royal, was about to enter upon the duties of his post, which the death of a former holder had secured to him by reversion; that he was so desperate a Jacobin as to have daringly stated, that a great benefit would be conferred on France if the king's days were shortened. His functions were confined simply to the details of confectionery; he was narrowly watched by the culinary superintendants, persons perfectly devoted to his majesty; but a subtle poison may be so easily introduced into dishes, that it was decided the king and queen should no longer eat of any thing but roasts; that their bread should be brought by M. Thierry de Ville d'Avray, intendant of the private apartments, who should likewise take upon himself to provide wine. The king was fond of pastry, and I had directions to order supplies, as if for myself, first from one confectioner, and then from another. The soft sugar was, likewise, kept in my room. The king, the queen, and the Princess Elizabeth, took their meals together, and no one remained in waiting. They had each a dumb-waiter of mahogany, and a little bell to summon attendance when they desired it. M. Thierry came himself to deliver to me their majesties' bread and wine, and I locked those articles in a private closet in the king's cabinet, on the ground floor. As soon as the king was seated at table, I carried to him the pastry and the bread. Every thing was concealed under the table, lest there should be any need for calling in the servants. The king thought that it was as dangerous as distressing, to evince this fear of attempts against his life, and this distrust of the cookery department. As he never drank a whole bottle of wine at his repasts (the princesses drank nothing but water), he filled that from which he had drunk nearly half up from the bottle furnished by the officers of his butlery. I carried it away after dinner. Although they partook of no pastry but that which I had brought, they took care, in the same manner, to make it appear as if they had eaten of that served at table. The lady who succeeded me, found this secret service organised, and executed it in like manner: these details were never known in public, nor the apprehensions which had given rise to them. At the end of three or four months, the advices brought by the same spies, were to the effect that this sort of plot against the king's life was no longer to be feared; that the plan was entirely changed; and that the blows intended would be as much directed against the throne as the person of the monarch."—*Memoirs of Madame Campan*, vol. ii. p. 188.

Charles I. continually haunted his agonised imagination.

Although repulsed by the court, Lafayette had not the less resolved to save the king, and he caused a project of flight to be submitted to him, very boldly conceived. He had, in the first place, made sure of Luckner, and even wrung from the simple-minded old marshal a promise to march upon Paris. In consequence, Lafayette recommended that the king should procure an order for him and Luckner to visit Paris, under the pretext of having their presence at the federation. The appearance of two generals seemed to him calculated to overawe the people, and prevent all the dangers apprehended upon that day. On the morrow of the ceremony, he urged that Louis XVI. should publicly leave Paris, under pretext of going to Compiègne, in order to give a proof of his liberty to all Europe. In case of resistance, he asked for but five* devoted cavaliers to carry him out of Paris. From Compiègne, squadrons duly stationed would convey him to the midst of the French armies, where Lafayette would trust to his probity for the preservation of the new institutions. Finally, in case none of these plans succeeded, the general was determined to march upon Paris with all his forces.†

* [It is probable that this is a misprint in the French edition for "fifty."]

† When M. de Lafayette was imprisoned at Olmütz, M. de Lally-Tolendal wrote a very eloquent letter in his behalf to the King of Prussia. He there enumerated all that the general had done to save Louis XVI., and gave proofs in support. Amongst the documents he adduced are the following letters, which make known the plans and the efforts of the constitutionalists at this period :—

COPY OF A LETTER FROM M. DE LALLY-TOLENDAL TO THE KING.

"*Paris, 9th July* 1792, *Monday.*

I am authorised by M. de Lafayette, to propose directly to his majesty, for the 15th of this month, the same project he had proposed for the 12th, and which cannot be executed at that period since the engagement contracted by his majesty to be present at the ceremony of the 14th.

His majesty must have seen the project as sent by M. de Lafayette, for M. Duport was to carry it to M. Montciel, in order that he might show it to his majesty.

M. de Lafayette purposes being here on the 15th, together with old General Luckner. They have recently seen each other, have exchanged pledges, and have but one sentiment and one plan.

They propose that his majesty publicly leaves the city between them, previously writing to the National Assembly, assuring it that he will not overstep the constitutional line, and stating that he was proceeding to Compiègne.

His majesty and all the royal family will be in a single carriage. A hundred trusty horsemen to escort it will be easily found. The Swiss, in emergency, and a part of the national guard, will protect the departure. The two generals will remain near his majesty. When arrived at Compiègne, he will have as a guard a detachment from that town, which is excellent in spirit, one from the capital, which will be picked, and one from the army.

M. de Lafayette, all his fortresses being garrisoned as well as his reserve-camp, has disposable for this purpose in his army ten squadrons and the horse-artillery. Two forced marches can bring all this division to Compiègne.

If, contrary to all probability, his majesty be prevented leaving the city, the laws being then evidently violated, the two generals will march upon the capital with an army.

The consequences of this project are manifest :—

Peace with all Europe through the mediation of the king ;

The king re-established in all his legitimate power ;

A large and necessary extension of his sacred prerogatives ;

A real monarchy, a real monarch, a real state of liberty ;

A real national representation, of which the king will be the head and an integral part ;

A real executive power ;

A real national representation, chosen from those holding property ;

The constitution revised, abolished in part, and in part amended, and established on a better basis ;

The new legislative body holding its sittings only three months in the year ;

Either because this project required too great a stretch of boldness on the part of the king, or because the repugnance of the queen for Lafayette prevented

The old nobility reinstated in its former privileges, not political but civil, dependent on opinion, such as titles, arms, liveries, &c.

In fulfilling my commission, I dare not allow myself to proffer either counsel or reflection. My imagination is too keenly alive to the rage which will seize upon all those bewildered heads at the first town which shall be taken from us, not to doubt even of myself ; so much so, indeed, that the scene of Saturday, which seems so tranquillising to many persons, has doubled my solicitude. All these kisses have reminded me of Judas.

I merely ask to be one of the eighty or a hundred horsemen who shall escort his majesty, if he sanction the project ; and I flatter myself, I do not need to assure him that he will not be reached, nor any member of his royal family, except over my corpse.

I will add one word : I was the friend of M. de Lafayette before the revolution. I broke off all intercourse with him after the 22d March of the second year ; at that epoch I wished him to be what he is now ; I wrote to him, that his duty, honour, and interest, all prescribed to him that course ; I detailed to him, at length, the plan such as my conscience suggested to me. He promised me ; I saw no result from his promise. I will not speculate whether it were owing to incapacity or evil purpose ; I became a stranger to him ; I declared to him my sentiments, and from none could he have ever heard more severe truths than from me and my friends, who were also his. At present, those same friends have reopened my correspondence with him. His majesty knows what has been the object and the nature of that correspondence. I have seen his letters ; I have had a two-hours' conference with him the night before he left Paris. He acknowledges his errors ; he is ready to devote his energies for liberty, but, at the same time, for the monarchy ; he will immolate himself, if it be necessary, for his country and his king, two objects he no longer separates ; he is imbued, in short, with the principles I have laid down in this note ; he gives himself wholly to them, with candour, conviction, feeling, fidelity to the king, oblivion of self ; I answer for it on my faith.

I forgot to say he requests that nothing of this shall be discussed with those officers who may be in the capital at this moment. All may suspect that there are certain projects in agitation ; but not one is acquainted with the actual design. It will be enough that they know it on the morning of execution ; he fears indiscretion, if it be mentioned to them beforehand, and none of them is excepted from the scope of this observation.

P. S.—I venture to remark, that this project appears to me proper to be meditated upon by him alone, who, on a day for ever memorable, vanquished by his heroic courage an entire army of assassins ; by him who, on the morrow of that unexampled triumph, dictated a proclamation as sublime as his actions had been the day before ; and not under the influence of the counsels which suggested the letter written in his name to the legislative body, announcing that he would be present at the ceremony of the 14th ; not under the influence of counsels which induced him to sanction the decree upon feudal rights—a decree equivalent in criminality to a theft on the pocket or on the highway.

M. de Lafayette does not admit the idea that the king, once emerged from the capital, will be under any other direction than that of his conscience and free judgment. He conceives that the first operation of his majesty ought to be the creation of a guard for his person ; he conceives, likewise, that his project may be modified in twenty different ways. He gives the preference to a retreat towards the north over one to the south, as being more in a capacity to afford succour on that side, and feeling apprehensive of the southern faction. In a word, *the liberty of the king*, and *the destruction of the factions*—such his objects in all the sincerity of his heart. What ought to follow, will follow."

COPY OF A LETTER FROM M. DE LAFAYETTE.

"*30th July* 1792.

I had disposed my army in such a manner, that my best squadrons of grenadiers, and the horse artillery, were under the orders of M——, in the fourth division ; and if my proposition had been accepted, I would have marched fifteen squadrons, and eight pieces of ordnance, to Compiègne in two days, the rest of the army being placed in progressive stations at a march's interval ; and every regiment, howsoever backward at first, would have come to my aid, if my comrades and I had been engaged.

I had overcome Luckner so far, as to make him promise to march on the capital with me, if the safety of the king required it, and he had given the necessary orders ; and I have five squadrons of his army, of which I dispose absolutely, Languedoc

him from accepting his aid, the king again refused it, and returned him a chilling answer, unbefitting the zeal evinced by the general. "The best advice," this

and ——; the command of the horse artillery is also exclusively mine; I relied upon these also marching to Compiègne.

The king has come under an engagement to be present at the federal festival. I regret that my plan has not been adopted; but we must do the best with the one that has been preferred.

The steps which I have taken, the adhesion of several departments and communes, that of M. Luckner, my influence over my army, and even over the other troops, my popularity in the kingdom, which is rather augmented than diminished, although much contracted in the capital; all these circumstances, combined with several others, have given cause of anxiety to the factious, by putting honest men on the alert, and I hope that the physical dangers of the 14th July are much reduced. I think, indeed, that they will be nullified altogether if the king be accompanied by Luckner and myself, and surrounded by picked battalions, which I can get ready for him.

But if the king and his family remain in the capital, are they not still in the hands of the factious? We will lose the first battle; it is impossible to doubt it. The disaster will produce a great sensation in the capital. I say, moreover, that the bare supposition of a correspondence between the queen and the enemy, will suffice to provoke the last excesses. At the very least, the king will be carried to the south; for this idea, which is repudiated at present, will appear natural when the allied kings are approaching. I see plainly, therefore, that immediately after the 14th, a train of dangers will begin.

I once more repeat, the king must leave Paris. I am aware that if his good faith were not undoubted, such a course might have unpleasant consequences; but when we are asked to confide in the king, who is a man of honour, can we hesitate? I am tormented with a desire to see the king at Compiègne.

The two points, therefore, upon which my present project hangs, are as follow:—

1st, If the king has not yet summoned Luckner and me, it must be done forthwith. *We have Luckner;* and he must be committed more and more. He will say, we are identified together; I will say all the rest. Luckner can take me on his way, so that we may be in Paris on the evening of the 12th. The 13th and 14th may supply offensive chances; at all events, the defensive will be made sure by your presence, and who knows what effect mine may have on the national guard?

We will accompany the king to the altar of the country. The two generals, representing two armies known to be much attached to them, will hinder the outrages that might otherwise be attempted on the dignity of the king. As to myself, I may give fresh force to the habit which some have long had of obeying my voice; the terror I have always inspired in others since they became factious, and possibly some personal resources for taking advantage of a crisis, may render me useful, at least to ward off dangers. My request will be deemed the more disinterested, when the unpleasantness of my situation is viewed in comparison with the position I occupied on the grand federation; but I consider it as a sacred obligation to be with the king upon that occasion, and my mind is so decided in this respect, that I *imperatively require* the minister at war to summon me, and that this first part of my proposition be adopted, and I beg you to let it be known by common friends to the king, his family, and his council.

2dly, As to my second proposition, I believe it equally indispensable, and it is thus I explain it: the oath of the king, and ours, will have tranquillised all but the evil-minded, and the knaves will be for some days deprived of that pretext. I would suggest that the king write privately to M. Luckner and myself a letter common to both, and which would meet us on the way by the evening of the 11th or the morning of the 12th. The king will say in it, "That, after having taken our oath, means should be adopted to prove his sincerity to foreigners; that the best plan would be for him to pass a few days at Compiègne, where he charges us to have in readiness some squadrons to join the national guard of the place and a detachment from the capital; that we are to accompany him to Compiègne, whence we will rejoin our armies; that he desires us to select squadrons whose officers are known for their attachment to the constitution, and a general-officer, who is likewise above all doubt on that head."

In compliance with this letter, Luckner and I will intrust M—— with this expedition; he will take with him four pieces of artillery—eight, if desired; but it is necessary the king should not speak of this, because the odium of the cannon must be borne by us. On the 15th, at ten in the forenoon, the king should go to the assembly, accompanied by Luckner and me; and whether we may have a battalion, or only fifty horsemen, persons devoted to

answer bore, "to give M. de Lafayette, is to continue a terror to the factious, by ably performing his duty as a general."*

The day of the federation was approaching. The people and the assembly were clamorous that Pétion should not be wanting to the solemnity of the 14th. The king had already endeavoured to throw upon the assembly the task of approving or disapproving the sentence of the department, but the assembly, as we have seen, had constrained him to take the matter on himself, and it urged him day by day to make known his decision, in order that the question might be disposed of before the 14th. On the 12th the king confirmed the suspension. The intelligence of this event greatly increased the discontent. The assembly hastened to adopt a step in its turn, and it is not difficult to surmise its nature. The next day, that is to say, on the 13th, it reinstated Pétion. But, from a remnant of respect, it adjourned its decision relative to Manuel, who had been seen moving in the midst of the tumult on the 20th June, wrapped in his scarf, but making no use of his authority.

At length the 14th July 1792 arrived. How times were changed since the 14th July 1790! No longer that magnificent altar tended by three hundred priests; nor that vast plain covered by sixty thousand national guards, richly clad and regularly organised; nor those lateral tiers thronged by a countless multitude, exu-

the king or friends, we shall see if the king, the royal family, Luckner, and me, will be stopped.

I will suppose that we are stopped. Luckner and I would return to the assembly to exclaim against the proceeding, and menace it with our armies. And if the king has to turn back, his position will not be a whit the worse, for he will not have departed from the constitution; he will have against him only the enemies of that constitution, and Luckner and I might easily draw detachments from Compiègne. Observe, that this does not endanger the king nearly so much as he must necessarily be by the events in preparation.

The funds of which the king can dispose have been so wasted in aristocratic imbecilities, that doubtless little remains in store. But there is no question he might borrow enough, if it be necessary, to take advantage of the three days of the federation.

There is also another thing to anticipate, namely, a decree of the assembly, that the generals are not to enter the capital. This difficulty can be obviated by the king promptly refusing his sanction.

If, by an inconceivable fatality, the king has already given his sanction, and, appointing us to meet him at Compiègne, he should be stopped on setting off, we would open for him the means of coming thither *free and triumphant*. It is needless to observe, that, under all circumstances, once arrived at Compiègne, he will there establish his personal guard such as the constitution gives him.

I assure you that when I see myself surrounded by inhabitants of the country, who come ten leagues and more to see me, and to swear that they have no confidence but in me, that my friends and foes are theirs; when I see myself beloved by my army, over which the efforts of the Jacobins have no influence; when I see proofs of adhesion to my opinions arrive from all parts of the kingdom, I cannot deem all to be lost, or that I have no means of rendering myself useful."

* The following answer is taken from the collection of documents mentioned in the preceding note:—

ANSWER HOLOGRAPH OF THE KING.

"He must be answered that I am infinitely sensible of the attachment for me which would urge him to take so prominent a part, but that the mode appears to me impracticable. It is not from personal fear, but all would be at stake at once, and, whatever he may say, this project failing, would render all things worse than ever, and more and more under the rod of the factious. Fontainebleau is but a blocked alley, it would be a bad retreat; and to the south, to the north, would seem as if going to meet the Austrians. As to the summons to Paris, he will have an answer; consequently, I have nothing to say here. The presence of the generals at the federation might be advantageous: it might, besides, have for motive the seeing the new minister, and arranging with him for the wants of the army. The best advice to give M. de Lafayette is to continue a terror to the factious, by ably performing his duty as a general. He will thereby secure more and more the confidence of his army, and will be enabled to make use of it as he may desire in emergency."

berant with joy and pleasure; nor that balcony where the ministers, the royal family, and the assembly, appeared at the first federation! All was changed. Hatred usurped all hearts as after a faithless reconciliation; and all the emblems proclaimed inveterate hostility. Eighty-three tents represented the eighty-three departments. By the side of each was a poplar, from the summit of which floated tricoloured streamers. A large pavilion was appropriated to the assembly and the king, and another to the administrative bodies of Paris. Thus all France seemed as if encamped in the presence of the enemy. The altar of the country was nothing but a stunted column, placed on the top of those steps which still remained in the Champ de Mars since the period of the first ceremony. On one side was seen a monument to those who were dead, or going to die on the frontiers; on the other, an immense tree called the tree of feudalism. It arose from the midst of a vast pile, and bore on its boughs coronets, blue ribbons, tiaras, cardinals' hats, the keys of St Peter, ermine mantles, doctors' caps, lawyers' bags, patents of nobility, escutcheons, coats-of-arms, *et cetera*. The king was to be invited to apply the torch.

The oath was appointed to be taken at mid-day. The king had repaired to the rooms of the Military School, and there awaited the national procession, which had gone to lay the foundation-stone of a column intended to be reared on the site of the Bastille. The king preserved a calm dignity, and the queen strove to suppress emotions only too visible. The king's sister and his children accompanied them. Those present in the rooms were moved by some affecting expressions, and tears moistened the eyes of more than one of them. At last the procession made its appearance. Hitherto the Champ de Mars had been almost empty, when the crowd suddenly poured into it. Beneath the balcony on which the king was placed, women, children, and drunken men, rushed pell-mell past, vociferating "Pétion! Pétion or death!" and bearing on their hats the words they had on their lips. Then came federalists arm-in-arm, carrying a model of the Bastille, and a press, with which they stopped from time to time to throw off and distribute patriotic ballads. After them appeared the legions of the national guard and regiments of the line, maintaining with difficulty the order of their ranks amidst this rolling populace; lastly, the authorities and the assembly. The king then descended, and, stationed in the centre of a square of troops, he walked with the procession to the altar of the country. The crowd was prodigious in the middle of the Champ de Mars, and permitted but a very slow advance. After great exertions on the part of the regiments, the king reached the steps of the altar. The queen, still standing on the balcony the king had left, viewed the whole scene with an eye-glass. The tumult seemed to increase an instant about the altar, and the king to fall down a step: at this sight the queen uttered a piercing cry, and terrified all around her. However, the ceremony was concluded without any accident. Scarcely had the oath been taken, than a general rush was made towards the tree of feudalism. The people desired to draw the king there, in order that he might set fire to it; but he rid himself of their clamours by objecting very appositely that there was no longer any feudalism. He thereupon resumed his march towards the Military School. The troops, overjoyed at having saved him, uttered reiterated cries of "Long live the king!" The multitude, always irresistibly acted upon by the spirit of sympathy, also took up those cries, and was thus as prompt to cheer the monarch as it had been a few moments before to insult him. The unfortunate Louis XVI. appeared beloved a few hours more; the people and himself believed it for a moment; but even illusions were become faint and evanescent, and it was already no longer possible to gloss over the mutual distrust. The king returned to the palace, gratified at having escaped from perils he deemed great, but in deep sadness at those he descried in the distance.

The news which came every day from the frontiers redoubled alarm and agitation. The declaration of *The country in danger* had put all France in commotion, and accelerated the departure of numerous federalists. There were only two thousand of them at Paris on the day of the federation; but they were incessantly arriving, and their manner of conducting themselves justified at once the fears and the hopes that their anticipated presence in the capital had excited. All volunteers, they were composed of the most hot-brained spirits in the clubs of France. The assembly ordered them an allowance of thirty sous a-day, and reserved the galleries for them exclusively. They soon imposed law upon the legislative body itself by their shouts and cheers. Associated with the Jacobins, and gathered into a club, which in a few days surpassed all the rest in violence, they were ready to rise in insurrection at the first signal. They even stated so in an address presented to the assembly. They would not depart, they said, until the internal enemies were silenced. Thus the plan for collecting at Paris an insurrectional force was, despite the opposition of the court, completely realised.

To this resource were added others. The soldiers of the former French guards were distributed amongst the regiments; the assembly ordained that they should be united into a corps of gendarmerie. Their tendencies were of course well appreciated, for they had commenced the revolution. It was vainly objected that those soldiers, being almost all non-commissioned officers in the army, composed its main strength. The assembly listened to no remonstrances, fearing the enemy at home infinitely more than the one outside. After having formed its own forces, it was expedient to decompose those of the court, for which purpose the assembly ordered the removal of all regiments. So far it was within the terms of the constitution; but not contented with expelling them, it enjoined them to betake themselves to the frontiers, and in this it usurped the disposing power of the king over the public force.

The object of this measure was more particularly to remove the Swiss, whose fidelity could not be doubted. To ward this blow, the minister put in motion M. d'Affry, their commanding officer. He appealed to the terms of his engagement as a warrant for refusing to quit Paris. The assembly made a show of taking the reasons he adduced into serious consideration, but ordered in the meanwhile the departure of two Swiss battalions.

It is true the king had his veto as an opposition to these measures, but all his influence was prostrated, and he was no longer in a capacity to exert his prerogative. The assembly itself could not always resist the motions brought forward by certain of its members, and vigorously supported by the applauding shouts of the galleries. It never failed to declare for moderation when possible; and if it yielded to measures of a highly insurrectional character on the one hand, it was found approving and welcoming petitions of a moderate tendency on the other.

But the measures adopted, the petitions presented, and the tenor of all conversations, gave token of an approaching revolution. The Girondists both foresaw and desired it, without, however, clearly discerning the means or being easy as to the issue. Those below them complained of their inertness, and accused them of effeminacy and incapacity. The leaders of the clubs and sections, weary of an unproductive eloquence, called in violent terms for an active and precise direction to the popular efforts, in order that they might not prove for ever fruitless. At the Jacobin Club was a room set apart for the management of correspondence, and a central committee of federalists was there installed to deliberate and arrange in concert. To

secure greater secrecy and energy to its resolutions, this committee was limited to five members, and received the name of *the Insurrectional Committee*. These five members were Vaugeois, a grand vicar; Debessé, from La Drôme; Guillaume, a professor at Caen; Simon, a journalist at Strasburg; and Galissot, from Langres. To these were shortly added Carra, Gorsas, Fournier the American, Westermann, Kienlin of Strasburg, Santerre; Alexandre, commander of the Faubourg St Marceau; a Pole named Lazouski, captain of artillery in the battalion of the same St Marceau; Antoine of Metz, an ex-member of the Constituent Assembly, and two electors, Lagrey and Garin. Manuel, Camille-Desmoulins, and Danton, were subsequently united with them, and exercised a paramount influence over their colleagues.* The committee thus constituted was in confederacy with Barbaroux, who promised the co-operation of his Marseillese, whose arrival at Paris was impatiently expected. It was in communication, also, with Pétion the mayor, and obtained from him a pledge not to interfere with the insurrection. It promised him in return that his house should be guarded, and himself detained in it, so that his inaction might be justified by an appearance of constraint if the enterprise were not successful. The plan definitively fixed upon was to resort in arms to the palace, and depose the king. For its execution, the populace must be stimulated to movement, and some extraordinary circumstance was indispensable to effect this essential point. Exertions were made with this view, and the subject was anxiously discussed at the Jacobins'.

There the deputy Chabot expatiated, with all the ardour of his temperament, on the necessity of a grand resolution; and said, it was greatly to be desired that the court should attempt the life of a deputy. Grangeneuve, himself a deputy, heard this oration: he was a man of mediocre intellect, but of an enthusiastic character. He took Chabot aside. "You are right," said he; "it is necessary that a deputy should be sacrificed, but the court is too sly to afford us so excellent a pretext. It must be done for it, and I killed as soon as possible in the vicinity of the palace. Preserve secrecy, and prepare the means of execution." Chabot, roused to enthusiasm, offered to share his fate. Grangeneuve agreed, saying that two deaths would make a greater sensation than one. They settled the day, the hour, and the means for getting killed and *not maimed*, as they said, and separated, resolved to sacrifice themselves for the benefit of the common cause. Grangeneuve, who was fully bent on keeping his word, put his private affairs in order, and at half-past ten in the evening walked to the place of meeting. Chabot was not there. He waited. Still Chabot came not, and he concluded that he had changed his determination, but trusted that the murder would be at least perpetrated on himself. He promenaded to and fro for some time, awaiting the mortal blow; but was ultimately obliged to return home safe and sound. much chagrined that he had been disappointed in laying down his life to feed a calumny.*

The occasion, then, so anxiously desired was not forthcoming, and mutual accusations passed of lack of courage, capacity, and unity of purpose. The Girondist deputies, the mayor Pétion, and, in fact, all the more eminent personages who, either in the tri-

* DETAIL OF THE EVENTS OF THE 10TH AUGUST.

This is taken from a document signed "Carra," and entitled, "An Historical and exact Commentary upon the Origin and the real Authors of the celebrated Insurrection of the 10th August, which saved the Republic." The author affirms that the mayor had not the smallest share in its success, but that he was where he should be upon the occasion, showing himself an undoubted guardian to the patriots. The piece itself is found in the "Political Annals" for the 30th of November.

"'The men,' said Jerome Pétion, in his excellent speech upon the impeachment moved against Maximilian Robespierre, 'who have taken to themselves the glory of that day, are those to whom it least belongs. It is due to those who prepared it; it is due to the inevitable nature of things; it is due to the brave federalists, *and their secret directory, who long before conceived the plan of the insurrection;* it is due, in short, to the tutelary genius which has constantly presided over the destinies of France since the first meeting of her representatives.'

It is concerning this secret directory, of which Jerome Pétion speaks, that I am about to speak in my turn, both as a member of that directory and as an actor in all its proceedings. This secret directory was formed by the central committee of federalists, which met in the correspondence-room at the Jacobins, Rue Saint-Honoré. It was from the forty-three members who had daily assembled in that room from the beginning of July, that five were selected for the directory of insurrection. Those five members were Vaugeois, grand-vicar of the Bishop of Blois; Debessé, from the department of La Drôme; Guillaume, professor at Caen; Simon, a journalist from Strasburg; and Galissot, from Langres. I was added to these five members, at the very period of the formation of the directory; and a few days afterwards they invited to it Fournier, the American; Westermann; Kienlin, from Strasburg; Santerre; Alexandre, commander of the Faubourg Saint-Marceau; Lazouski, captain of the artillery of Saint-Marceau; Antoine, from Metz, an ex-constituent; Lagrey; and Garin, an elector of 1789.

The first meeting of this directory was held in a small tavern, the Golden Sun, in the street Saint-Antoine, near the Bastille, during the night between Thursday and Friday, 26th July, after the civic festival given to the federalists on the site of the Bastille. The patriot Gorsas also appeared in the tavern, which we left at two in the morning to proceed to the column of liberty on the site of the Bastille, and there to die, if necessary, for the country. It was in this tavern of the Golden Sun that Fournier, the American, brought us the red flag, the adoption of which I had proposed, and on which I had caused these words to be inscribed, '*Martial law proclaimed by the sovereign people against the rebellion of the executive power.*' It was likewise to this tavern that I carried five copies of a placard, whereon were these words, '*Those who fire on the columns of the people shall be instantly put to death.*' This placard, which was printed at Buisson the publisher's, had been taken to Santerre's house, whence I went to fetch it at midnight. Our plan failed this time through the prudence of the mayor, who felt doubtless that we were not sufficiently prepared at this moment; and the second active sitting of the directory was adjourned to the 4th August.

Nearly the same persons attended that sitting, and, in addition, Camille-Desmoulins; it was held at the *Cadran-Bleu*, on the Boulevards; and at eight in the evening, it was transferred to the room of Antoine, the ex-constituent, Rue Saint-Honoré, opposite the Assumption, in the very house where Robespierre resides. Robespierre's landlady was so alarmed at this conclave, that she came, about eleven o'clock at night, to ask Antoine if it were his object to get Robespierre murdered. 'If any one is to be murdered,' said Antoine, 'we will be the victims, doubtless; Robespierre has nothing to do with the matter—he has only to keep himself in concealment.'

It was in this second active sitting that I wrote out, with my own hand, the entire plan of the insurrection, the march of the columns, and the attack on the palace. Simon made a copy of this plan, and we sent it to Santerre and Alexandre about midnight; but our project miscarried a second time, because Santerre and Alexandre were not yet sufficiently prepared, and several wished to wait for the debate fixed for the 10th August on the suspension of the king.

Lastly, the third active sitting of this directory was held during the night of the 9th and 10th August last, precisely as the tocsin was rung, and in three different places at once, namely, Fournier the American, with some others, at the Faubourg Saint-Marceau; Westermann, Santerre, and two others, at the Faubourg Saint-Antoine; Garin, the Strasburg journalist, and I, in the Marseillese Barrack, and in the very chamber of the commander, where we were seen by the whole battalion.

From this account, which is strictly accurate, and which I defy any one whomsoever to impugn in the smallest particular, it is seen that nothing was heard of Marat, or of Robespierre, or of many others, who want to pass as actors in that enterprise; and that those who alone are justified in directly assuming the glory of the famous 10th August, are such as I have named, and who formed the secret directory of the federalists."

* [This extraordinary anecdote is related somewhat differently, and with more spirit, by Madame Roland in her Memoirs, called "An Appeal to impartial Posterity," under the head of Grangeneuve.]

bune or in their official stations, felt it incumbent to speak the language of the law, shrunk more aside, and condemned these continual agitations, which compromised them without leading to any result. They reproached the subordinate agitators with exhausting their strength in partial and useless movements, which exposed the people without producing a decisive consequence. These latter, on the contrary, who were doing in their respective spheres all they could, retorted upon the deputies and the mayor on account of their public discourses, and accused them of restraining the energy of the people. Thus the deputies blamed the mass for not being organised, and it threw back the allegation upon themselves. The want of a leader was the great necessity of the moment. "A man is needed!" was the universal cry: but who? None was eligible amongst the deputies. They were all orators rather than conspirators; and, besides, their rank and course of life removed them too far from the multitude which it was necessary to influence. The same objection applied to Roland, Servan, and all those men whose courage was indisputable, but whom their stations elevated too much above the people. Pétion might, from the nature of his functions, have more easily communicated with the populace; but Pétion was cold, stiff, and more fitted to endure than to act. His system consisted in discountenancing petty movements for the advantage of a decisive insurrection; but by pursuing it too rigorously, he threw obstacles in the way of every manifestation, and lost all favour with the agitators, whom he paralysed without overawing. They required a leader who, not having yet emerged from the ranks of the populace, had not lost all influence over it, and had received from nature the rare faculty of swaying others.

A vast field for activity had opened in the clubs, the sections, and the revolutionary press. Numbers had gained notoriety, but none had acquired a marked superiority. Camille-Desmoulins was distinguished for his vehemence, his cynicism, his audacity, and his promptitude in assailing all those who seemed to grow lukewarm in the revolutionary career. He was well known to the lowest classes; but he had neither the lungs necessary for a popular speaker, nor the activity and stimulating power indispensable for a party leader.

Another journalist had obtained a fearful celebrity. This was Marat, known under the name of "The Friend of the People," and, from his exhortations to murder, an object of horror to all who still preserved any respect for moderation. Born at Neufchâtel, and devoted to the study of the physical and medical sciences, he had daringly attacked the best-established systems, and evinced an activity of mind partaking of the convulsive, so to speak. He was veterinary surgeon in the stables of the Count d'Artois when the revolution commenced.* He rushed unhesitatingly into the new career it presented, and soon made himself remarkable in his section. His height was below the middle standard, his head of great bulk, his features strongly marked, his complexion sallow, his eyes fiery, his person slovenly. He would have been looked upon as something merely ludicrous or hideous; but from that strange form were suddenly heard issuing fantastic and atrocious doctrines, urged in a harsh accent, and with a vulgar familiarity. It was necessary to strike off several thousands of heads, he was wont to say, and to exterminate all the aristocrats who rendered liberty impossible. Marks of abhorrence and contempt cumulated around him. He was hooted, his feet trod upon, his miserable appearance derided; but, accustomed to scientific contests, and to uphold the most singular paradoxes, he had learned to despise those who despised him, and scorned them as incapable to comprehend him. He thenceforth made his journal the organ of the frightful dogmas with which his brain was stocked. The skulking life to which he was condemned, in order to escape the penalties of the law, had infuriated his moody spirit, and the evidences of public horror only tended to inflame him the more. The polished manners of the times were in his eyes vices inconsistent with republican equality; and in his delirious exasperation at obstacles, he saw but one medium of safety—wholesale slaughter. His studies and experiments upon the physical man had naturally habituated him to view pain with indifference; and his ardent mind, unfettered by any instinct of sensibility, went directly to its purpose by the ways of blood. This idea of acting by extermination had gradually become systematised in his head. He advocated a dictatorship, not to obtain for its possessor the delights of supreme power, but to lay upon him the terrible burden of purifying society. His dictator was to have a cannon-ball attached to his feet, in order that he might always be under the control of the people; and only one faculty he judged essential to be vested in him, that of indicating victims, and ordering the undeviating penalty of death. Marat knew only this punishment, for he had no idea of simply chastising—he would obliterate his obstacle.

Perceiving all around him aristocrats conspiring against liberty, he collected all the facts which accorded with his passion, denouncing with fury, and with a recklessness which resulted from that very fury, all the names suggested to him, and frequently such as had no existence. He denounced them without personal hatred or fear, and even without danger to himself, for he was beyond the pale of human relations, and those of the wronged towards the wrong-doer had ceased to prevail between him and his fellow-creatures.

A decree had been recently pronounced against him and Royou, "the friend of the king;" and he had concealed himself with an obscure and indigent lawyer, who had given him shelter. Barbaroux was invited to visit him. Barbaroux had pursued the study of physical science, and had formerly known Marat. He could scarcely refuse to attend him upon his request, and concluded, as he listened to him, that his mind was deranged The French, according to this appalling man, were but dastardly revolutionists. "Give me," said he, "two hundred Neapolitans, armed with poignards, and bearing muffs on their left arms by way of bucklers, and with them I will traverse France and consummate the revolution." In order to distinguish the aristocrats, he desired that the assembly should enjoin them to wear a white ribbon round the arm, and authorise their slaughter when found together to the number of three. Under the name of aristocrats he included royalists, Feuillants, and Girondists; and when, at times, the difficulty of recognising them was objected to him; "There is no chance of being deceived," he was accustomed to reply; "we may fall on those who have carriages, servants, clothes of silk, and who come out of theatres; they are aristocrats beyond doubt."

Barbaroux left him, terror-stricken. Marat, exclusively possessed with his atrocious system, cared little about means of insurrection, and was in fact incompetent to lay them in train. During his bloody reve-

* [Marat (J. P.), born in 1744, of Calvinist parents, was not five feet high; his face was hideous, his character of countenance horrible, and his head monstrous for his size. From nature he derived a daring mind, an ungoverned imagination, a vindictive temper, and a ferocious heart; and the mode of life he pursued till the revolution, added yet more to his natural wildness and cruelty. It has been said that he studied medicine before he settled in Paris, where he was long in indigence, devoting his attention to anatomy, acting as an empiric, and vending simples and a specific which healed all diseases; nay, many assert that he was for a time reduced to absolute beggary. At last he obtained the title of veterinary surgeon to the Count d'Artois; but at the period of the revolution, his enthusiasm rose to delirium, he set up a journal, and became as great a charlatan in politics as he had been in medicine.—*Biographie Moderne.*]

ries, he hung with complacency on the idea of retiring to Marseilles. The republican enthusiasm of that city led him to hope that he would be better understood and more prized there than he found himself at Paris. He thought, therefore, of taking refuge in Marseilles, and was anxious that Barbaroux should send him thither under his auspices; but that personage had no desire to make such a present to his native city, and he left in his concealment the madman whose apotheosis he assuredly had not the foresight to discern.

The systematic and sanguinary Marat, consequently, was not the active chief capable of concentrating masses widely scattered and confusedly heaving. Robespierre seemed more suited to the task, inasmuch as he had secured for himself at the Jacobin Club the partisanship of many hearers, generally more energetic than readers in their prepossessions; but he likewise had not all the indispensable qualities. Robespierre, an indifferent advocate at Arras, had been deputed by that town to the states-general. He had there connected himself with Pétion and Buzot, and supported with churlish violence the opinions they upheld with a deep and calm conviction. He was ridiculed at first for the heaviness of his style and the poverty of his ideas; but his obstinacy drew some attention towards him, especially at the period of the revision. When, after the tragical scene of the Champ de Mars, it was rumoured that a prosecution would be instituted against the signers of the Jacobin petition, his terror and his youth* inspired Buzot and Roland with a degree of interest in his behalf, and they tendered him an asylum. But he speedily recovered courage, and the assembly being dissolved, he intrenched himself amongst the Jacobins, upon whom he perseveringly inflicted his dogmatical and inflated harangues. Having been elected public accuser, he refused that office, and laboured exclusively to gain for himself the twofold reputation of an incorruptible patriot and an eloquent speaker.

His early friends, Pétion, Buzot, Brissot, and Roland, received him in their families, and viewed with pain the morbid egotism which pourtayed itself in all his looks and movements. Those, indeed, who took any interest in him regretted that he, a man so much occupied with the public weal, should also think so much of himself. However, he was of too little importance to excite any serious animosity on account of his repulsive pride, and it was overlooked in consideration of his mediocrity and zeal. It was frequently remarked, that although silent in society, and rarely expressing an opinion, he took the lead the following day in propounding from the tribune the ideas he had heard drop from others. This usage was observed upon in his presence, but not at all in a reproachful strain; nevertheless, he speedily took disgust at a society in which he met men superior to himself, as he had formerly held in sullen detestation that of the constituent members. He then betook himself altogether to the Jacobins, where, as we have seen, he differed in opinion with Brissot and Louvet upon the question of war, and called them, possibly believed them, bad citizens, because they thought differently from himself, and supported their sentiments with eloquence. Whether he were sincere in his prompt suspicions of those who opposed him, or maliciously calumniated them, is one of those mysteries hid from human intelligence. There is no doubt that, with a narrow and vulgar mind, and an extreme susceptibility, he was greatly prone to irritation, and vastly difficult to enlighten; and it is not impossible that the soreness of pride may have turned into an abhorrence upon principle, and that he really believed those wicked who had roused his wrath.

Be that as it may, in the inferior circle in which he was placed he succeeded in exciting enthusiasm by his unrelenting dogmatism, and by his reputation for disinterestedness. His popularity thus rested materially on irreflective passions and weak understandings. Self-denying austerity and stern tenacity captivate warm imaginations, and sometimes even superior minds. There were, in fact, many men disposed to invest Robespierre with an energy more real, and with talents greater, than he in truth possessed. Camille-Desmoulins styled him his Aristides, and found him eloquent.

Others again, without discrimination, but subjugated by his audacious egotism, went about repeating that he was the man to place at the head of the revolution, and that, without this dictator, it could not progress. As for himself, permitting his partisans to disseminate such opinions, he never showed himself in the conclaves of the conspirators. He even complained of being compromised, because one of them, an inmate in the same house with him, had occasionally assembled in his room the insurrectional committee. He held back, therefore, and left the field of action open to his trumpeters, Panis, Sergent, Osselin, and others, members of the sections and municipal councils.

Marat, who was in search of a dictator, resolved to satisfy himself whether Robespierre was fitted for the office. The slovenly and regardless attire of Marat contrasted strongly with that of Robespierre, who was full of attention and study for his appearance. Secreted in an elegant cabinet, where his portrait was multiplied in all fashions, painted, engraved, and sculptured, he there devoted himself to unremitting labour, pondering diligently upon the writings of Rousseau, and assiduously preparing his harangues. Marat saw him, found in him only petty personal hatreds, no great system, none of that sanguinary daring which worked in his own distorted fancy, no genius in short; he left him full of contempt for the *little man*, pronounced him incapable of saving the state, and more than ever persuaded that he alone possessed the great social system.*

The admirers of Robespierre beset Barbaroux, and besought him to accompany them to their idol, saying that *a man* was needed, and that Robespierre alone could fill the vacuum. This language displeased Barbaroux, whose proud spirit little brooked the idea of a dictatorship, and whose exalted imagination was already captivated by the virtue of Roland and the talents of his friends. He went, nevertheless, to the house of Robespierre. In their interview, the conversation turned on Pétion, whose popularity hung heavily on Robespierre, and who, it was alleged, was incapable of serving the revolution. Barbaroux replied with warmth to the reproaches levelled at Pétion, and strenuously defended a character which had won his admiration. Robespierre spoke of the revolution,

* [Robespierre Maximilian Isidore was born at Arras in 1759. His father, a barrister in the Superior Council of Artois, having ruined himself by his prodigality, left France long before the revolution, established a school at Cologne, went into England, and thence to America, where he suffered his friends to be ignorant of his existence.—*Biographie Moderne.*]

*[Robespierre and Marat—enemies in secret, to external appearance friends—were early distinguished in the convention; both dear to the mob, but with different shades of character. The latter paid his court to the lowest of the low—to the men of straw or in rags, who were then of so much weight in the political system. The needy, the thieves, the cut-throats—in a word, the dregs of the people, the *caput-mortuum* of the human race, to a man supported Marat.

Robespierre, albeit dependent on the same class to which his rival was assimilated by his ugliness, his filth, his vulgar manners, and disgusting habits, was nevertheless allied to a more elevated division of it—to the shopkeepers and scribes, small traders, and the inferior rank of lawyers. These admired in him the *politesse bourgeoise*; his well-combed and powdered head, the richness of his waistcoats, the whiteness of his linen, the elegant cut of his coats, his breeches, silk stockings carefully drawn on, bright knee and shoe buckles; every thing, in short, bespoke the *gentlemanly* pretensions of Robespierre, in opposition to the *sans-culottism* of Marat.—*Graphic History of French National Convention.*]

and repeated, according to his wont, that he had accelerated its march. He concluded by declaring, in the usual language of the time, that a man was needed. Barbaroux retorted that he wanted neither a dictator nor a king. Fréron recriminated by saying that Brissot was labouring to become one. Thus they fell into mutual upbraidings, and arrived at no understanding. When the interview was ended, Panis, wishing to correct the bad feeling engendered in it, observed to Barbaroux that he had misconceived the purpose; that a mere momentary authority was all that they designed; and that Robespierre appeared to them the only man to whom it could possibly be given. These vague expressions, and these proofs of petty rivalry, were what erroneously induced the Girondists to believe that Robespierre was bent upon usurping power. A moody jealousy was taken for ambition; but it was one of those mistakes which the clouded eye of party invariably commits. Robespierre, capable at the utmost of detesting merit, had neither the energy nor the genius of ambition, and his partisans formed for him pretensions which he himself shrunk from imagining.

Danton was more competent than any other to be that leader whom all imaginations invoked for the purpose of infusing unity into the revolutionary movements. He had formerly appeared at the bar, but had not succeeded. Indigent and teased with passions, he had thrown himself into the political troubles of his era with ardour, and probably with hopes. He was uninformed, but endowed with a superior understanding and great powers of imagination. His athletic form, his sunken and somewhat negro features, his stentorian voice, his strange yet lofty images, took captive the auditories of the Cordelier Club and of the sections. His countenance would express by turns passion in all its brutality, a jovial recklessness, and even simple benevolence. Danton neither hated nor envied mortal, but his daring in attack had no limits; and, in certain moments of enthusiasm, he was capable of executing all that the atrocious mind of Marat was capable of conceiving.

A revolution, the unforeseen but inevitable consequence of which had been to rouse the lower classes of society against the higher, was sure to stimulate jealousies, to bring forth systems, and unchain the brutal passions. Robespierre was the man of envy, Marat the man of system, and Danton the man of passion—violent, fickle, and by fits cruel or generous. If the two first, occupied, the one by a gnawing hate, the other by demoniac reveries, were calculated to have but few of those wants which render men accessible to corruption, Danton, on the contrary, full of unbridled impulses and greedy for enjoyment, was but badly fitted to resist its snares. Under pretext of recompensing him for a former post of advocate to the council, the court gave him some rather considerable sums; but whilst it succeeded in bribing, it failed to gain him. He did not the less continue, on that account, to harangue and excite the multitude of the clubs against it. When he was reproached for not fulfilling his contract, he replied, that in order to preserve the means of serving the court, he must in appearance treat it as an enemy.

Danton, therefore, was the most redoubtable leader of those bands which are gained and moved by rough oratory. But, audacious and stimulating at the critical moment, he was not fitted for those assiduous labours which the desire of dominion needs for realisation; and although wielding great influence over the conspirators, he did not govern them. He was capable simply, in a moment of hesitation, to re-animate them and drive them to their object by imparting a decisive impulse.

The members of the insurrectional committee, meanwhile, had not yet arrived at a final determination amongst themselves. The court, advertised of their slightest movements, adopted on its own side certain measures calculated to shelter it from any sudden attack, and to secure it time and safety until the arrival of the coalesced powers. It had originated and established a club in the vicinity of the palace, called "The French Club," which was composed of artisans and soldiers of the national guard. They all had arms concealed in their place of meeting, and were in a position to fly on a pressing emergency to the succour of the royal family. This single establishment was a charge on the civil list to the extent of 10,000 francs a-day. A native of Marseilles, named Lieutaud, had besides a body of men under his orders, who alternately filled the galleries, the public places, the cafés, and the taverns, to support a diversion in favour of the king, and to resist the riotous proceedings of the patriots.* Disputes consequently ensued in all quarters, and from words the parties generally proceeded to blows. But, despite all the efforts of the court, its partisans were few and weak, and that portion of the national guard which was devoted to it sunk into the greatest discouragement.

A great number of faithful retainers, who had hitherto kept apart from the court, now came forward to defend the king and make a rampart round him with their bodies. Their meetings at the palace were numerous and frequent, and they augmented the public distrust. They had been called "knights of the dagger" ever since the scenes of February 1791. Orders had likewise been issued to secretly assemble the constitutional guard, which, although disembodied, had continued to receive its pay.

In the mean time, confusion and disagreement prevailed in the counsels of the king, and produced in his feeble and naturally indecisive mind the most agonising perplexity. Some prudent friends, and, amongst others, Malesherbes,† advised him to abdicate; others, and they were the more numerous, supported a project of flight, but they were in harmony neither as to the means, the place, nor the result of the flight. To infuse some uniformity into their different plans, the king desired that Bertrand de Molleville should consult with Duport, the ex-constituent. Louis XVI. had great confidence in the latter, and he was obliged to lay positive injunctions on Bertrand upon the subject, as that personage pretended to have scruples against maintaining any relation with a constitutionalist such as Duport. With them were also associated in council Lally-Tolendal, Malouet, Clermont-Tonnerre, Gouvernet, and others, all devoted to Louis XVI., but, beyond that point, differing widely in opinion upon the part to be adopted by the king, if royalty itself should be saved. In this committee the monarch's flight was fixed upon, and the Castle of Gaillon in Normandy as the place of his retreat. The Duke de Liancourt, a friend of Louis XVI., and enjoying his full confidence, commanded that province. He answered for his troops and the inhabitants of Rouen, who had declared by a forcible address against the events of the 20th June. He offered to receive the royal family, and conduct it to Gaillon, or to transfer it to Lafayette, who would carry it into the midst of his army. He furthermore tendered his whole fortune to facilitate the execution of the scheme, asking only a reservation of one hundred louis a-year for behoof of his children. This plan was agreeable to the constitutional members of the committee, because, in lieu of placing the king in the hands of the emigrants, it consigned him to the care of Liancourt and Lafayette. But from a similar motive, it was repugnant to the others, and was also likely to prove distasteful to the king and queen. The Castle of Gaillon had the great advantage of not being above thirty-six leagues from the sea, and of presenting an easy retreat into England through Normandy, a province favourably inclined to the royal cause. It likewise possessed another, in being scarcely twenty

* See Bertrand de Molleville, vols. viii. and ix.

† Ibid

leagues from Paris, on which account the king could proceed to it without infringing the constitutional law; and that was an important consideration with him, for he clung with singular tenacity to the desire of not assuming a position of open contravention.

M. de Narbonne and Madame de Staël, the daughter of Necker, also engendered a project of flight. On their side, the emigrants propounded their plan, which proposed the transport of the king to Compiègne, and hence to the banks of the Rhine by the forest of Ardennes. All are eager to pour advice into the ear of a feeble monarch, because all aspire to impress upon him a will which he has not of himself. So many contrary exhortations added materially to the natural vacillation of Louis XVI.; and that unfortunate prince, worried by opposing counsels, convinced by the arguments of some, carried away by the passions of others, tortured with fears for the fate of his family, and wrung with the scruples of conscience, hesitated amidst the multitude of projects, and beheld the popular storm rolling towards him without daring either to brave or to fly it.

The Girondist deputies, who had so boldly raised the question of forfeiture, remained nevertheless indecisive on the eve of an insurrection. Although the court was almost disarmed, and positive supremacy on the side of the people, still the approach of the Prussians, and the dread which ancient authority always inspires, even after it has been stripped of its strength, induced them to believe that it might yet be better to negotiate with the court than risk the chances of an attack. On the supposition even that the attack were successful, they feared that the speedy arrival of a foreign army might destroy all the consequences of a victory over the palace, and visit a terrible vengeance for the momentary success. However, notwithstanding this disposition to treat, they opened no negotiations upon the subject, nor ventured to take the initiative; but they hearkened to one Boze, the king's painter, who was on intimate terms with Thierry, valet-de-chambre to Louis XVI. This painter Boze, filled with alarm at the dangers hovering over the state, besought them to transcribe what they deemed essential in the conjuncture to save the king and liberty. They did, in consequence, indite a letter, signed by Guadet, Gensonné, and Vergniaud, and commencing with these words, "You ask from us, sir, our opinion upon the present situation of France." This exordium proves sufficiently that the explanation had been requested. "The time was past," said the three deputies in substance to Boze, "for the king to deceive himself upon any point; and he would be strangely blinded if he did not perceive that his own conduct was the occasion of the general excitement, and of that violence in the language of the clubs of which he so incessantly complained. New protestations on his part would be fruitless, and seem derisory; in the extremity to which things had come, nothing less would be available than measures incontestibly calculated to calm the public apprehension. Every one, for example, firmly believed that it was in the power of the king to remove the foreign armies, hence it was advisable he should begin by ordering such withdrawal; then he ought to select a patriotic ministry; dismiss Lafayette, who, in the present state of affairs, could no longer serve beneficially; propose a law for the constitutional education of the young dauphin; submit the civil list to a public superintendence; and declare in solemn form that he would not accept for himself any augmentation of power but with the free concurrence of the nation. By such steps," added the Girondists, "it was reasonable to hope that the feeling of exasperation would subside, and that with time and perseverance in this system, the king would redeem the confidence he had now utterly lost."

Let us pause for an instant.

The Girondists were at this time very near the attainment of their object—if they had really been conspiring so long, and up to this moment, for the realisation of a republic—and yet we are told that they might have been suddenly stopped, when on the very point of success, by having the ministry given to three of their friends! Such cannot be the correct version. It has been rendered manifest that a republic was desired only from despair of the monarchy; that it was never a positive object; and that even when it was to be had for grasping, those who are accused of having long laboured for it refused to sacrifice the public welfare to the triumph of their system, but consented to preserve the constitutional monarchy, provided it were defended by sufficient guarantees. The Girondists, by demanding the retirement of the troops, gave sufficient proof that the impending danger mainly occupied their thoughts; and the care they evinced for the education of the dauphin likewise demonstrates that a future monarchy was not to them an insupportable contemplation.

It is alleged that Brissot, on his part, had submitted propositions with a view to avert the forfeiture of the crown, and that in them he had inserted a condition of a large pecuniary payment. This assertion rests upon the authority of Bertrand de Molleville, who has always dealt in calumny for two reasons—malevolence of heart, and obliquity of mind. Besides, he produces no proof of the fact; and the known poverty of Brissot, and his powerful conviction, ought to answer for his purity. It is not impossible, doubtless, that the court may have told out money on the account of Brissot, but such disbursement would not prove that the money had been either asked or received by him. The circumstance already recorded in these pages concerning the corruption of Pétion, so confidently promised to the court by certain knaves, in conjunction with other facts of the like nature, shows evidently that no confidence ought to be placed in these imputations of venality, so frequently and so easily hazarded. And, furthermore, howsoever the case might stand with Brissot, the three deputies, Gensonné, Guadet, and Vergniaud, have not even been accused, and they alone undersigned the letter transmitted to Boze.

The lacerated mind of the king was less capable than ever of appreciating their sagacious counsels. Thierry presented the letter to him, but he cast it angrily from him, making his two accustomed responses, that it was not he but the patriotic ministry who had provoked the war, and that, as to the constitution, he was scrupulously observing it, whilst others were labouring with all their might to destroy it.* These allegations were not strictly to the pur-

* COPY OF THE LETTER WRITTEN TO CITIZEN BOZE BY GUADET, VERGNIAUD, AND GENSONNE.

"You ask from us, sir, our opinion upon the present situation of France, and the suggestion of such measures as might extricate the state from the imminent dangers wherewith it is menaced: such, indeed, are the causes of disquiet to all good citizens, and the objects of their deepest meditations.

When you question us concerning interests of such magnitude, we will not hesitate to explain ourselves with frankness.

It ought not to be dissembled, that the conduct of the executive power is the immediate cause of all the calamities which afflict France, and of the perils which beset the throne. They deceive the king who seek to persuade him that exaggerated doctrines, the effervescence in clubs, the manœuvres of certain agitators and powerful factions, have engendered and sustain these disorganising movements, of which every day may increase the violence, and of which it may soon be impossible to calculate the consequences: it is to place the cause of the malady in its symptoms.

If the people were assured of the stability of a revolution so dearly purchased, if public liberty were no longer in danger, if the conduct of the king aroused no distrust, opinions would find their level of themselves; the great mass of the citizens would think only of enjoying the benefits which the constitution promises to them; and if, in such a state of things, factions still existed, they would cease to be dangerous, for they would have neither pretext nor object.

pose, because, although he had not provoked the war, it was a duty not the less incumbent on him strenuously to support it; and so far as his scrupulous adherence to the letter of the law was concerned, a text observance was of little moment, the important point consisting in not endangering the whole substance by an appeal to foreign aid.

But so long as public liberty is in peril—so long as the alarms of the citizens are stimulated by the conduct of the executive power, and the conspiracies hatched in the interior and the exterior of the kingdom appear more or less openly favoured by the king, the condition of affairs necessarily evokes commotions, disorder, and factions. In states the best constituted, and constituted for ages, revolutions have no other principle; and their effect must be for us so much the more prompt, as there has been no interval between the movements which induced the first, and those which seem now to announce a second, revolution.

It is therefore only too evident that the existing state of things must inevitably lead to a crisis, in which nearly all the chances will be against royalty. In fact, opinion now separates the interests of the king from those of the nation; it views the first public functionary of a free nation as a party leader, and, as the consequence of so disastrous a policy, it heaps on him the odium of all the evils which desolate France.

Alas! what will be the success of the foreign powers, should they even enable the king, by their intervention, to augment his authority, and give a new form to the government? Is it not evident, that those men who formed the idea of that congress, have sacrificed to their prejudices and their personal interest the interest of the king himself; that the success of those attempts would give a character of usurpation to powers which the nation alone delegates, and which its confidence alone can support? How is it not seen that the force which produces this change will long be necessary for its maintenance, and that thus will be sown in the bosom of the country the germ of divisions and discord, which the lapse of many ages may scarcely suffice to eradicate?

As sincerely as invariably attached to the interests of the nation, from which we will never sever those of the king, except so far as he himself dissevers them, we think that the means of averting the calamities wherewith the empire is threatened, and of re-establishing tranquillity, will be for the king to remove, by his conduct, all grounds of suspicion, to declare his purpose in a manner at once frank and unequivocal, and, in short, intrench himself in the confidence of the people, which alone can constitute his strength and assure his happiness.

And it is not now by fresh protestations that he can gain this object; they would be derisory, and, in the present state of circumstances, would seem so truly ironical, as, instead of dissipating alarm, to cause an increase of danger.

There is only one from which any good result might be anticipated; and that would be a declaration under the most solemn sanctions, that in no case will the king accept an augmentation of power, unless voluntarily conceded to him by the French people, without the concurrence or interference of any foreign power, and freely deliberated upon in the constitutional forms.

Upon this subject it is observable, that several members of the national assembly are aware that such a declaration was proposed to the king when he made the proposition for war against the King of Hungary, and that he declined to promulgate it.

But what would probably suffice to recover him the national confidence, would be for the king successfully to impress upon the allied powers a sense of the independence of the French nation, to obtain a cessation of all hostilities, and the withdrawal of the cordons of troops which menace our frontiers.

It is impossible but a very considerable portion of the nation should be convinced that the king has it fully in his power to procure an abandonment of the coalition; and so long as it puts public liberty in peril, the king's friends need not flatter themselves that confidence will revive.

Should any exertions of the king to effect this object be fruitless, he ought at least to aid the nation, by all the means which are in his power, to repel the external attack; and should omit nothing to free himself from the suspicion of favouring it.

In this supposition, little judgment is required to perceive that the suspicions and distrust spring from unfortunate circumstances, which it is impossible to change.

To consider them as criminal, when the danger is real and cannot be gainsaid, is the surest mode of redoubling them; to complain of exaggeration, inveigh against clubs, and attribute all to agitators, when the effervescence and the agitation are the natural effects of circumstances, is to give them a new force—to increase the tumult of the people by the very means adopted to calm it.

To the hope the Girondists entertained of finding their counsels heeded, we must unquestionably attribute the moderation they observed when an attempt was made to raise the question of forfeiture, daily agitated in the clubs, in the public groups, and in petitions. Every time they came in the name of the committee of twelve to speak of the dangers of the country, and the means of meeting them, "Go back *to the cause* of the danger!" was shouted to them; "*To the cause!*" loudly responded the galleries. Vergniaud,

So long as there shall be a subsisting and ascertained action against liberty, a reaction is inevitable; and the development of both the one and the other will have an identical progress.

In so deplorable a situation, tranquillity can be established only by the cessation of all dangers; and, until that auspicious moment arrives, the point of chief interest to the nation and the king is, that those melancholy circumstances be not continually rendered more exasperating by a conduct on the part of the agents of the executive, to be characterised in the mildest term as equivocal.

1st, Wherefore does the king not select his ministers amongst men the most emphatic in favour of the revolution? Wherefore, in moments the most critical, is he surrounded only by men unknown or suspected? If it were the policy of the king to increase distrust, and excite the people to commotions, could a more certain plan be pursued to foment them?

The choice of a ministry has been at all times one of the most important functions of the authority vested in the king; it is the thermometer by which public opinion has always judged the dispositions of the court; and it cannot be a matter of conjecture what effect the present selections must now have, when they, even at any other time, would have excited the most violent murmurs.

A ministry essentially patriotic, would, therefore, be one of the great means the king may use to recover confidence. But it would be an inconceivable blindness to imagine, that, by a single step of this nature, it could be promptly regained. It is only by time, and by constant efforts, that an expectation may be indulged of effacing impressions too profoundly stamped to be dissipated on the moment to the last vestige.

2d, At a time when all means of defence should be forthcoming—when France cannot arm all her defenders—wherefore has the king not offered the muskets and the horses of his guard?

3d, Wherefore does not the king himself solicit a law to subject the civil list to a form of scrutiny, calculated to satisfy the nation that it is not perverted from its legitimate purposes and applied to other uses?

4th, One decisive mode of tranquillising the people as to the personal dispositions of the king, would be for him to request a law regulating the education of the prince-royal, and thus accelerate the period at which the care of that young prince should be transferred to a governor possessing the confidence of the nation.

5th, It is still a subject of complaint, that the decree on the disembodiment of the staff of the national guard is not sanctioned. These multiplied refusals of the sanction to legislative provisions, which public opinion strenuously calls for, and the urgency of which cannot be denied, provoke inquiry into the constitutional question as bearing upon the application of the *veto* to laws of emergency, and are assuredly not calculated to dissipate alarms and discontent.

6th, It would be advisable that the king withdraw the command of the army from the hands of M. de Lafayette. It is at all events evident he cannot in that capacity beneficially serve the public good.

We will conclude this simple sketch by a general remark, namely, that every thing which may obliterate suspicions, and reanimate confidence, neither can nor ought to be neglected. The constitution is saved if the king adopt this resolution with courage, and act upon it with firmness. We are," &c.

COPY OF THE LETTER WRITTEN TO ROZE BY THIERRY.

"I have just been scolded a second time for having received the letter which my zeal determined me to present.

However, the king has permitted me to answer:—

1st, That he was always careful in the choice of his ministers;

2d, That the declaration of war was owing solely to the ministers, self styled patriots;

3d, That he had used every exertion at the time to prevent the coalition of the powers, and that now, to remove the armies from the frontiers, there are none but general means;

4th, That, since his acceptance, he has most scrupulously observed the laws of the constitution, but that many other persons are at present labouring in a contrary spirit."

Brissot, and the Girondists, replied that the committee had its eyes on the cause, and that when the time should arrive they would unmask it; but that for the present it was not expedient to introduce a new topic of discord.

But it was irrevocably fixed that all the means and projects of negotiation should fall to the ground; and the catastrophe, long foreseen and dreaded, came hastily on, as we shall shortly see.

CHAPTER XI.

INSURRECTION OF THE 10TH AUGUST, AND SUSPENSION OF THE KING.

In continuation of a festival given to the federalists, the insurrectional committee decided that the people should move, early on the morning of the 26th July, in three columns upon the palace, and march with the red flag bearing this inscription: "*Those who fire on the columns of the people shall be instantly put to death!*" The object was to constitute the king a prisoner, and to incarcerate him in Vincennes. The national guards of Versailles were canvassed to assist the movement; but they had been apprised so late, and the Parisians were so little in concert with them, that their officers came to the town-hall of Paris, on the very morning appointed, to inquire what they were expected to do. The secret, besides, was so ill guarded, that the court was fully aware, the whole royal family arisen, and the palace full of people. Pétion, perceiving that the measures had been badly taken, apprehending some treachery, and, above all, reflecting that the Marseillese had not yet arrived, repaired in all haste to the faubourgs, in order to arrest a movement which must ruin the popular party if it were not successful.

A frightful tumult prevailed in the faubourgs: the tocsin had been sounded the whole night. The more to infuriate the people, a report was spread that a pile of arms was hoarded in the palace, which must be thence reclaimed. Pétion succeeded, with infinite difficulty, in restoring order. The keeper of the seals, Champion de Cicé, who had accompanied him, received some sabre-cuts; but the populace ultimately consented to disperse, and the insurrection was adjourned.

The petty acerbities and disputes, which are the ordinary preludes to a definitive rupture, kept the excitement from subsiding. The king had ordered the garden of the Tuileries to be closed since the 20th June. The terrace of the Feuillants, contiguous to the hall of assembly, was the only part left open, and sentinels were placed to prevent any one passing from that terrace into the garden. D'Espremenil was there encountered, conversing energetically with a deputy. He was hooted, pursued into the garden, and carried to the Palais-Royal, where he received several wounds. The lines which prevented access to the garden having thus been violated, it was proposed that a decree should supply a more efficient safeguard. The decree, however, was not passed, but in lieu thereof it was moved that a paper should be exhibited bearing these words: "*Prohibition against entering a foreign territory.*" The placard was planted, and sufficed to prevent the people from overstepping the limits, although the sentinels had been removed by orders from the king.* Thus the last vestiges of outward regard were cast away. To exemplify the feeling more, a letter from Nanci, detailing several civic manifestations which had taken place in that town, was immediately copied out and transmitted to the king.

At length, on the 30th, the Marseillese arrived. They were five hundred in number, and counted in their ranks all the most enthusiastic spirits of the south, and all of the most turbulent character whom an active trade drew to the port of Marseilles. Barbaroux went as far as Charenton to meet them. On this occasion a new project was concerted with Santerre. Under pretext of going to welcome the Marseillese, it was resolved to collect the faubourgs, march in rank to the Carrousel, and there encamp without tumult, calmly to await the suspension of the king by the assembly, or his voluntary abdication. This plan was agreeable to the philanthropists of the party, who would have wished the revolution terminated without effusion of blood. It failed nevertheless, because Santerre did not succeed in assembling the faubourgs, and could only muster a small number of men to meet the Marseillese. Santerre thereupon offered them a repast, which was served in the Champs-Elysées. It happened that, on the same day, and at the same hour, a company composed of national guards of the battalion Filles Saint-Thomas, and other individuals, civilians or military, all partisans of the court, were dining near the place where the Marseillese were regaled. This entertainment could certainly not have been arranged with a design to disturb that of the Marseillese, inasmuch as the invitation given to the latter had been quite sudden, for instead of a banquet an insurrection had been in contemplation. It was, however, scarcely possible that persons of such opposite principles should peaceably conclude their carousals in the immediate vicinity of each other. The populace insulted the royalists, who came out to defend themselves; the patriots, called to assist the populace, rushed to the scene with ardour, and battle was forthwith joined. The contest was not of long duration; the Marseillese, falling on their adversaries, put them to flight, slew one, and wounded several. In a moment Paris was in universal uproar. The federalists traversed the streets, and tore away all cockades of ribbon, exclaiming that they ought to be of woollen.

Some of the fugitives arrived, all bleeding, at the Tuileries, where they were received with open arms, and treated with an attention quite natural under the circumstances, since they were viewed as friends who had fallen victims to their loyalty. The national guards on duty at the palace reported these details, exaggerated them perhaps; and thus were propagated fresh rumours and fresh animosities against the royal family and the ladies of the court, who had, it was said, wiped away the perspiration and the blood of the wounded with their kerchiefs. It was even concluded from these facts that the scene had been prepared; and the ground of a new accusation against the palace was hence supplied.

The national guard of Paris immediately demanded the removal of the Marseillese; but it was hooted by the galleries, and its petition met with no attention.

It was in the midst of these events that a document was disseminated, professing to emanate from the Duke of Brunswick, and shortly ascertained to be authentic. We have already spoken of the mission of Mallet-du-Pan. He had presented in the king's name the form of a manifesto, but its spirit was speedily scouted. Another manifesto, dictated by the passions of Coblentz, and sanctioned by the name of Brunswick, was published in advance of the Prussian army. This document was conceived in the following terms:—

"Their majesties the emperor and the King of Prussia having confided to me the command of the combined armies which they have assembled on the frontiers of France, I deem it fitting to apprise the inhabitants of that kingdom of the motives which have influenced the measures of the two sovereigns, and the views which guide them.

* ["A line traced on the ground at the two extremities of the terrace, and tricoloured ribbons tied across all the passages, with the device of *Ne plus ultra* suspended to them, sufficed to keep on the terrace the immense populace that crowded it, while the rest of the garden was deserted."—*Bertrand's Annals*, vol. vii. p. 71.]

After having arbitrarily confiscated the rights and possessions of the German princes in Alsace and Lorraine, disturbed and overthrown the established order and legitimate government in the interior of the kingdom, directed against the sacred person of the king and his august family attacks and outrages which are still continued and renewed from day to day, those who have usurped the reins of government have at last filled the measure of iniquity by declaring an unjust war against his majesty the emperor, and invading his provinces situated in the Low Countries. Some of the possessions of the German empire have been comprised within the scope of this oppression, and several others have escaped the like danger only by yielding to the imperious menaces of the dominant party and its emissaries.

His majesty the King of Prussia, united with his imperial majesty in a close and defensive alliance, and himself a preponderant member of the Germanic body, has consequently felt himself imperatively called upon to march to the succour of his ally and his co-estates; and it is in this double relation that he assumes the defence of that monarch and of Germany.

To these paramount interests is joined an object equally momentous and dear to the hearts of the two sovereigns, namely, to put an end to the anarchy prevailing in the interior of France, to suppress the attacks levelled at the throne and the altar, to re-establish the legal power, to restore the king to the security and liberty of which he is deprived, and to place him in a condition to exercise the legitimate authority rightfully his.

Assured that the sound part of the French nation abhors the excesses of a faction which holds it in thraldom, and that the majority of the inhabitants impatiently await the moment of assistance to declare openly against the odious enterprises of their oppressors, his majesty the emperor and his majesty the King of Prussia summon and exhort them to return without delay to the paths of reason and justice, of order and peace. With such views it is that I, the undersigned, the general commanding in chief the two armies, declare,

1st, That drawn into the present war by irresistible circumstances, the two allied courts propose to themselves no other object than the happiness of France, without any pretension of aggrandisement by conquests.

2d, That they have no intention of interfering in the internal government of France; but that they desire simply to deliver the king, the queen, and the royal family, from their captivity, and to procure for his most christian majesty the security necessary to enable him to make, without danger and without hindrance, such convocations as he shall judge expedient, and to devote himself to the welfare of his subjects according to his promises and to the utmost of his power.

3d, That the combined armies will protect the towns, hamlets, and villages, and the persons and property of all those who submit to the king, and will assist in the immediate re-establishment of order and police throughout France.

4th, That the national guards are summoned to watch provisionally over the tranquillity of towns and rural districts, and the security of the persons and property of all the French, until the arrival of the troops of their imperial and royal majesties, or until it be otherwise ordered, under pain of being held personally responsible; that, on the other hand, those national guards who shall fight against the troops of the two allied courts, and shall be taken with arms in their hands, will be treated as enemies, and chastised as rebels to their king and disturbers of the public peace.

5th, That the generals, officers, non-commissioned officers, and soldiers of the French troops of the line are, in like manner, summoned to return to their former allegiance, and immediately to submit to the king, their legitimate sovereign.

6th, That the members of departments, districts, and municipalities, shall be in like manner responsible, in life and estate, for all breaches of the peace, burnings, assassinations, robberies, and acts of violence, which they shall allow to be committed, or shall not have notoriously attempted to prevent in their jurisdictions; and that they, furthermore, shall be bound to continue the provisional exercise of their functions until his most christian majesty, when restored to full liberty, have otherwise provided, or it have been otherwise ordered in the interval.

7th, That the inhabitants of towns, hamlets, and villages, who shall dare defend themselves against the troops of their imperial and royal majesties, and fire upon them, whether in the open country or from the windows, doors, and apertures of their dwellings, shall be instantly punished according to the rigour of martial law, and their dwellings demolished or burnt. On the contrary, all the inhabitants of the said towns, hamlets, or villages, who shall evince alacrity in submitting to their king, by opening their gates to the troops of their majesties, will be from that moment under their immediate protection; their persons, estates, and effects will be under the ægis of the laws; and means will be taken to assure the general safety of all and each of them.

8th, The city of Paris and all its inhabitants, without distinction, are held bound to submit instantly, and without any delay, to the king, to restore that prince to full and entire liberty, and to ensure him, as well as all the royal personages, the inviolability and reverence which the laws of nature and society impose upon subjects towards their sovereigns; their imperial and royal majesties rendering personally responsible for all events, at the risk of their heads, according to martial trial, without hope of pardon, all members of the national assembly, the department, the district, the municipality, and the national guard of Paris, justices of peace, and all others whom it may concern; their said majesties furthermore declaring, on their imperial and royal faith and word, that if the palace of the Tuileries be forced or insulted, if the least violence or outrage be perpetrated towards their majesties the king and queen, and the royal family, if their safety, preservation, and liberty be not immediately provided for, they will exact an exemplary and ever-memorable vengeance, by delivering up the city of Paris to military execution and total destruction, and the rebels guilty of resistance to the dire chastisement they will have merited. Their imperial and royal majesties promise the inhabitants of the city of Paris, on the other hand, to employ their good offices with his most christian majesty to obtain pardon for their wrongs and errors, and to take the most vigorous measures to secure their persons and property, if they promptly and strictly conform to the injunctions heretofore proclaimed.

Finally, their majesties, refusing to recognise as laws in France any but such as shall emanate from the king, in the enjoyment of undoubted freedom, protest in advance against the authenticity of all the declarations which may be made in the name of his most christian majesty, so long as his sacred person, and the persons of the queen and all the royal family, shall not be in security; in pursuance of which, their imperial and royal majesties invite and entreat his most christian majesty to name a town in his kingdom contiguous to the frontiers, most eligible in his opinion for his retiring to with the queen and his family, under a strong and sure escort, which shall be sent to him for that purpose, in order that his most christian majesty may call around him, in full security, the ministers and counsellors whom it shall please him to designate, make such convocations as shall appear to him suitable, provide for the re-establishment of order and regulate the administration of his kingdom.

In fine, I declare and promise, in my own name, and in my above-mentioned quality, to cause a faithful and strict discipline to be observed by the troops intrusted to my command, undertaking to treat with mildness and moderation those well-disposed people who shall evince a peaceable and submissive spirit, and to employ force only against those who shall be guilty of resistance and of evil intentions.

For these sufficient reasons, I require and exhort all the inhabitants of the kingdom, in the strongest and most earnest terms, not to oppose the march and operations of the troops I command, but rather to grant them every where free access, and all the countenance, succour, and assistance which circumstances may need.

Given at Head-quarters at Coblentz, the 25th July 1792. (Signed) CHARLES WILLIAM FERDINAND, Duke of Brunswick-Luneburg."

With regard to this declaration, it is somewhat surprising that, although dated on the 25th at Coblentz, it was in Paris on the 28th, and published in all the royalist journals. It produced an extraordinary sensation, causing all the effects of highly wrought passions coming to inflame other excited passions. On all sides pledges were exchanged to resist to the last an enemy whose language was so haughty and threats so vindictive. In the existing state of feeling, it was natural that the king and the court should be accused of this new fault. Louis XVI. hastened to disavow the manifesto by a message; and he could do so, doubtless, with perfect sincerity, since it was so different from the model he had proposed; but he might have seen by this example how his intentions would be exceeded by his party, if that party ever became the dispenser of fate. Neither his disavowal, nor the expressions with which he accompanied it, were available to satisfy the assembly. In speaking of the welfare of that people, whose happiness had been ever dear to his heart, he added, "How many sorrows would be effaced by the slightest mark of its return!"

These affecting terms no longer elicited the enthusiasm they were once wont to evoke; they were viewed only as words of perfidy, and many deputies supported the motion for printing the king's message, on the express ground of displaying to the public the contrast they held to exist between the language and the conduct of the king. From this moment the agitation rapidly increased, and circumstances assumed a more portentous character. Intelligence was brought of a resolution by which the department of the Mouths of the Rhone determined to retain the taxes, in order to pay the troops it had sent against the Savoyards, and accused of insufficiency the measures adopted by the assembly. This daring act was owing to the instigations of Barbaroux. The resolution was annulled by the assembly, but without being effective to prevent its execution. It was reported, at the same time, that the Sardinians, who were advancing, numbered fifty thousand. The minister for foreign affairs found it necessary to come in person, and assure the assembly that the armament did not exceed at the utmost ten or twelve thousand men. To this rumour succeeded another. It was asserted that the small body of federalists actually at Soissons had been poisoned by glass being mixed with their bread. Assurance was even positive that one hundred and sixty had already expired, and that eight hundred were stretched in sickness. Informations were taken, and it was ascertained that the flour being deposited in a church, some of the panes had been broken, and pieces of the glass found in the bread; but there were none either dead or ill.

On the 25th July, a decree had constituted all the sections of Paris in permanence. They had assembled and charged Pétion to propose in their name the dethronement of Louis XVI. On the morning of the 3d of August, the Mayor of Paris, emboldened by this energetic expression of opinion, presented himself at the bar of the assembly to urge a petition in the name of the forty-eight sections of Paris. He inveighed against the conduct of Louis XVI. since the commencement of the revolution, and recapitulated, according to the language of the era, the benefits conferred by the nation upon the king, and the proofs of his ingratitude. He descanted upon the dangers with which all minds were oppressed—the approach of the foreigner, the inefficiency of the means of defence, the revolt of a general against the assembly, the opposition of many departmental directories, and the terrible and monstrous threats uttered in the name of Brunswick; in consequence whereof, he concluded for the deposition of the king, and requested the assembly to put that important question in the order of the day.

This demand, which had been hitherto made only by clubs, federalists, and communes, assumed a very different character when presented in the name of Paris, and by its mayor. It was heard with a feeling of astonishment rather than of favour in the morning sitting. But in the evening, the debate was opened, and one part of the assembly gave way to the full current of passion. Some called eagerly for an instant discussion of the question, and others urged its adjournment. The assembly finally delayed it till Thursday the 9th August, and continued to receive and read the various petitions expressing, with still more energy than the mayor, the like desires and sentiments.

The section of Mauconseil, surpassing all the others, was not contented with demanding the deposition, but pronounced it of its own plenary authority. It declared that it no longer recognised Louis XVI. as King of the French, and that it intended shortly to come and ask of the assembly whether it really designed to save France. Furthermore, it invited all the sections of the empire (no longer using the word kingdom) to follow its example.

From what has been already stated, it is manifest that the assembly did not yield to the insurrectional movement so swiftly as the inferior authorities; and for this reason—it was obliged, from its position as guardian of the laws, to pay them more respect. It consequently found itself frequently outstripped by the popular bodies, and its power violently shaken. It therefore annulled the resolution of the section of Mauconseil. Vergniaud and Cambon made use of the most severe expressions against that proceeding, which they stigmatised as an usurpation of the sovereignty of the people. It would seem, however, that they did not so much condemn in this act the violation of principles as the precipitation of the resolutionists, and especially the impropriety of their language with reference to the national assembly.

But now the term of all uncertainties was drawing rapidly nigh. The same hour saw meetings of the insurrectional committee of the federalists, and of the king's friends discussing his flight. The committee deferred the insurrection to the day appointed for the debate on the deposition, that is to say, to the evening of the 9th August, in readiness for the morning of the 10th. On their part, the king's friends deliberated on his flight in the gardens of M. de Montmorin. Liancourt and Lafayette renewed their propositions. Every thing was arranged for the departure; money alone was deficient. Bertrand de Molleville had fruitlessly exhausted the civil list in subsidising royalist clubs, orators of assemblies, orators of mobs, and pretended corrupters, who corrupted nobody, but appropriated to themselves the largesses of the court. The want of funds was met by loans, which generous subjects were eager to offer their king. The proposals made by M. de Liancourt have been already mentioned; he gave all the money he had been able to raise. Other persons supplied what was in their power. Devoted adherents volunteered to accompany the carriage which was to convey the royal family, and if necessity arose, to die at its side. All being arranged, the meeting at Montmorin's finally settled the depar-

ture, after a consultation which lasted for some hours. The king, who was immediately afterwards waited upon, gave his consent to this determination, and directed that a consultation should be held with Messieurs de Montciel and de Sainte-Croix. However much the opinions of the men who had joined to effect this enterprise might differ, it was to them all a moment of happiness, when they believed the monarch's deliverance so near at hand.*

But the following day all was changed. The king caused an intimation to be given that he would not depart, because he was not disposed to commence a civil war. All those who, in spite of their dissimilar principles, took an equal interest in his welfare, were thrown into consternation. They were aware that his real motive was not the one he had assigned. The veritable reasons that weighed with him were, in the first place, the approach of Brunswick, which was announced as immediate; and in the next, the adjournment of the insurrection; but, above all, the refusal of the queen to trust herself with the constitutionalists. She had manifested her repugnance in the most emphatic terms, saying that it was better to perish than be beholden to men who had done the king so much mischief.†

Thus all the efforts of the constitutionalists, and all the dangers they incurred, were completely thrown away. Lafayette had seriously compromised himself. It was known that he had prevailed on Luckner to march, in case of emergency, against the capital. That general, being called before the assembly, had confessed all to the extraordinary committee of twelve. The old man was weak and fickle. When he passed from the hands of one party into those of another, he was easily brought to avow all he had heard or said on the previous occasion, afterwards excusing himself for his breach of confidence by alleging his ignorance of the French language, and weeping, and complaining that he was surrounded by none but factious men.

* The following document is amongst those quoted by M. de Lally-Tolendal in his letter to the King of Prussia:—

"COPY OF THE MINUTES OF A MEETING HELD ON THE 4TH AUGUST 1792, WRITTEN IN THE HAND OF LALLY-TOLENDAL.

4th August.

M. de Montmorin, ex-minister of foreign affairs; M. Bertrand, ex-minister of the marine; M. de Clermont Tonnerre; M. Lally-Tolendal; M. Malouet; M. de Gouvernet; M. de Gilliers.

Three hours' deliberation in a secluded part of M. Montmorin's garden. Each gave an account of what he had learnt. I had received an anonymous letter, in which I was apprised of a conversation held at the house of Santerre, settling a project for marching upon the Tuileries, killing the king in the fray, and seizing upon the prince-royal, to make of him what circumstances might suggest; or if the king were not killed, for making all the royal family prisoners. We all resolved that the king should leave Paris, at whatsoever cost, escorted by the Swiss, by ourselves, and by our friends, who were in good number. We relied upon M. de Liancourt, who had offered to come from Rouen to meet the king, and afterwards upon M. de Lafayette. As we ended our consultation, M. de Malesherbes arrived, who came to urge Madame de Montmorin, and Madame de Beaumont, her daughter, to withdraw, stating that the crisis was approaching, and that Paris was no longer a place for women. From what M. de Malesherbes told us in addition, we determined that M. de Montmorin should go immediately to the palace, to inform the king what we had learnt and resolved. The king appeared to consent that evening, and told M. de Montmorin to consult with M. de Sainte-Croix, who, in conjunction with M. de Montciel, was likewise occupied with a scheme for the flight of the king. We went the next day to the palace: I had a long conversation with the Duke de Choiseuil, who was entirely of our opinion, and greatly desired that the king should depart, whatever might be the consequence, but that he preferred *exposing himself to the extremes of danger rather than be the first to open a civil war.* It was announced that the deposition would be pronounced the following Thursday. I could think of no other resource than the army of Lafayette. I dispatched to him on the 8th the draft of a letter I advised him to write to the Duke of Brunswick, as soon as he had tidings of the dethronement." *et cetera.*

† See the Memoirs of Madame Campan, vol. ii. p. 125.

Guadet had the address to make him confess the propositions of Lafayette, and Bureau de Puzy, accused of having been the intermediate agent, was ordered to the bar. He was one of the friends and officers of Lafayette. He denied all with resolute boldness, and with an air of sincerity which was conclusive of his innocence as to the negotiations of his general. The motion for deciding whether Lafayette should be put under impeachment was again adjourned.

The day fixed for the debate on the king's dethronement was drawing nigh, and the plan of the insurrection was definitively settled and known. The Marseillese, quitting their more distant barrack, had moved to the section of the Cordeliers, where the club of that name was held. They were thus placed in the centre of Paris, and in the immediate vicinity of the scene of action. Two municipal officers had been sufficiently daring to distribute cartridges amongst the conspirators. In short, all was ready for the 10th.

The 8th was devoted to deliberation on the fate of Lafayette. A great majority declared against his impeachment. Some deputies, exasperated at the acquittal, demanded a call of votes; and upon this second trial, 446 members had the courage to pronounce in favour of the general against 224. The populace rose in fury at the intelligence, flocked to the door of the hall, insulted the deputies as they came out, and grossly maltreated those, more especially, who were known to belong to the right side of the assembly, such as Vaublanc, Girardin, Dumas, &c. Indignation was loudly expressed in all quarters against the national representation, and Paris rang with the clamour that all hope of safety was at an end with an assembly capable of absolving *the traitor Lafayette.*

The following day, the 9th August, an extraordinary agitation prevailed amongst the deputies. Those who had been insulted the evening before, complained in person or by letter. When it was stated that M. Beaucaron had been nearly hanged, a barbarous laugh ran through the galleries. When it was added that M. de Girardin had been struck, those who were well aware of the indignity offered to him, asked him, sneeringly, where and how. "Ah! do you not know," retorted M. de Girardin, with dignified asperity, "that cowards never strike but from behind?" At length a member called for the order of the day. But the assembly decided that the procurator-syndic of the commune, Rœderer, should attend at the bar, to be specifically charged, upon his individual responsibility, to vindicate the freedom and inviolability of the members of the assembly.

A motion was made to summon the Mayor of Paris, and insist upon his declaring, yea or nay, whether he could preserve the public tranquillity. Guadet replied to this proposition by one for summoning the king also, and obliging him in his turn to declare, yea or nay, whether he could answer for the safety and inviolability of the French soil. However, amid these conflicting propositions, it was very evident that the assembly dreaded the decisive moment, and that the Girondists themselves would have preferred obtaining the deposition by a debate to having recourse to a doubtful and sanguinary attack.

Rœderer arrived in this state of affairs, and announced that a section had determined to sound the tocsin, and march upon the assembly and the Tuileries, if the deposition were not adjudged. Pétion entered in his turn: his explanations were far from being positive, but he confessed that sinister projects were in agitation; he enumerated the precautions taken to prevent the movements which were threatened, and undertook to co-operate with the department in giving effect to its measures, if they appeared to him more advisable than those of the municipality.

Pétion, like all his Girondist friends, would have rather had the deposition pronounced by the assembly than incur the risks of an uncertain assault upon the palace. A majority in favour of deposition being

almost secure, he would have willingly foiled the projects of the insurrectional committee. He accordingly appeared before the committee of superintendence at the Jacobins', and urged Chabot to suspend the insurrection, assuring him that the Girondists had determined upon the dethronement, and the immediate convocation of a national convention; that they were certain of a majority, and that it was useless to hazard an attack with a very doubtful result. Chabot replied that there was nothing to hope from an assembly which had absolved *the wretch Lafayette;* that he, Pétion, allowed himself to be played upon by his friends; that the people had at last taken the resolution to save themselves, and that the tocsin would ring that very evening in all the faubourgs.

"You will always be *headstrong*, then," said Pétion, in answer. "Evil betide us, if they rise in insurrection! I know your influence, but I have also some, and I will employ it against you." "You will be arrested," observed Chabot, "and prevented from doing any harm."

The passions were in truth too highly excited for the fears of Pétion to be participated, or his influence of any avail. An universal uproar prevailed throughout Paris; drums beat to arms in all the quarters; the battalions of the national guard assembled and repaired to their posts, with various dispositions. The sections were filled, not by the majority, but by the most furious of the citizens. The insurrectional committee had formed at three points. Fournier and some others were in the Faubourg St Marceau; Santerre and Westermann occupied the Faubourg St Antoine; finally, Danton, Camille-Desmoulins, and Carra, sat at the Cordeliers', with the battalion of Marseilles. Barbaroux, after stationing informants at the assembly and the palace, had prepared couriers in readiness to take the route to the south. He had, as an additional precaution, provided himself with a dose of poison, so dubious was the hope of success; and he awaited at the Cordeliers' the result of the insurrection. It is not known where Robespierre lurked: Danton had concealed Marat in a cellar of the section, and then taken possession of the tribune at the Cordelier Club. Every one felt oppressed, as always on the eve of a momentous crisis; but Danton, rising in boldness with the greatness of the enterprise, exalted his sonorous voice to its highest pitch; he enumerated what he styled the crimes of the court; he recalled its hatred for the constitution, its deceitful words, its hypocritical promises, always belied by its conduct, and its palpable machinations to introduce foreigners. "The people," said he, "can no longer rely upon any but themselves, for the constitution is insufficient, and the assembly has absolved Lafayette; therefore, there remain for you only yourselves to save you. Make haste, then, for this very night satellites concealed in the palace are appointed to make a sally on the people, and complete a massacre before quitting Paris to join Coblentz. Save yourselves, therefore. To arms! to arms!"

At this moment a musket-shot was fired in the Court of the Commerce. The cry "to arms!" instantly became general, and the insurrection was proclaimed. The time was half-past eleven. The Marseillese formed at the door of the Cordeliers', appropriated some pieces of cannon, and swelled their numbers by a vast concourse falling in at their sides. Camille-Desmoulins and others rushed away to have the tocsin sounded; but they did not meet with the same ardour in all the sections. They strove without loss of time to arouse their zeal; speedily succeeded in assembling them together, and getting commissioners named to take possession of the town-hall, displace the existing municipality, and concentrate in themselves all authority. Then they flew to the bells, seized upon them by main force, and commenced ringing the tocsin. Its mournful knell resounded through the immense city, reverberating from street to street, and from edifice to edifice, summoning deputies, magistrates, and citizens to their posts, and reaching at length the palace, there to announce that the fatal night was come—a night of terror, of agitation, and of blood, the last appointed for the monarch to pass in the palace of his fathers.

Its emissaries hastened to apprise the court that the critical moment was at hand, bearing with them the phrase of the president of the Cordeliers, who had said to his followers that a simple civic promenade was not now in contemplation, as on the 20th June; or, in other words, that if the 20th June had been the warning demonstration, the 10th August was intended to be the decisive catastrophe. No doubt, indeed, was entertained upon the subject. The king, the queen, their two children, and their sister the princess Elizabeth, instead of retiring to rest after supper, had passed into the council-room, where all the ministers and a great many superior officers were assembled. There they deliberated with troubled minds upon the means of saving the royal family. The means of resistance were but small, having been almost annihilated, either by the decrees of the assembly, or by the ill-judged measures of the court itself.

Thus, the constitutional guard, dissolved by a decree of the assembly, had not been replaced by the king, who had preferred continuing its pay to forming a new one. By this loss the palace was deprived of eighteen hundred men at least.

The regiments which had evinced favourable dispositions towards the king during the last federation, had been removed from Paris by the accustomed method of a decree.

The Swiss could not be sent to a distance, by virtue of their capitulations; but they had been denuded of their artillery; and the court, when it had decided for a moment upon fleeing into Normandy, had dispatched thither one of those faithful battalions, under pretext of watching over the landing of corn. This battalion had not been yet recalled. Merely a few Swiss, cantoned at Courbevoie, had returned, under the sanction of Pétion, and altogether they did not amount to more than eight or nine hundred men.

The gendarmerie had been recently composed of the old soldiers of the French guards, the authors of the 14th July.

Lastly, the national guard had neither the same leaders, nor the same organisation, nor the same attachment, as on the 6th October 1789. Its staff, as we have already remarked, had been reconstructed. A multitude of citizens had grown disgusted with the service; and those who had not actually deserted their colours, were intimidated by the fury of the populace. The national guard was therefore composed, like all the bodies in the kingdom, of a new revolutionary generation. It was divided, as all France was divided, into constitutionalists and republicans. The entire battalion of the Filles Saint-Thomas, and part of that of the Petits-Peres, were devoted to the king, whilst the others were indifferent or hostile. The artillery, which constituted their principal strength, were all decided republicans. The fatigues attendant upon that branch of the service had scared from it the rich *bourgeoisie;* thus locksmiths and farriers became masters of the cannon, and they participated in all the feelings of the populace, inasmuch as they formed part thereof.

Consequently there remained to the king but eight or nine hundred Swiss, and something more than one battalion of the national guard.

Since the retirement of Lafayette, the command of the national guard had passed alternately to the six legionary leaders. On this day it devolved on the commander Mandat, an old soldier, in bad odour with the court on account of his constitutional opinions, but inspiring it with entire confidence from his firmness, talents, and attachment to his duties. Mandat, general-in-chief during that fatal night, had hastily made the only possible dispositions.

The floor of the grand gallery which joined the Louvre to the Tuileries had been sawn asunder to a certain extent, by way of debarring the assailants from that approach. Mandat therefore gave no further heed to the protection of that wing, but devoted all his attention to the courts and the garden. Notwithstanding the call to muster, but few of the national guards had congregated. The battalions had not been completed, and the most zealous of the body repaired individually to the palace, where Mandat embodied and distributed them conjointly with the Swiss, in the courts, the garden, and the apartments. He fixed a piece of ordnance in the court of the Swiss, and three in that of the princes.

These pieces were unfortunately intrusted to the gunners of the national guard, and the enemy was thus already within the walls. But the Swiss, full of ardour and fidelity, kept an eye upon them, ready at the first hostile movement to seize upon the cannon and expel the artillerymen from the enclosure of the palace.

Mandat had furthermore planted some advanced posts of gendarmerie at the colonnade of the Louvre, and at the town-hall; but this gendarmerie, as we have just remarked, was composed of the former French guards.

To these defenders of the palace must be added a crowd of old retainers, whom their age or their moderation had prevented from emigrating, and who, in the moment of danger, had hastened thither, some with a view to gain absolution for not having gone to Coblentz, and others with the generous intention of dying at the feet of their king. They had hastily snatched up all the weapons they could find at the palace, some appearing with antique sabres, others with pistols attached to their belts by kerchiefs, and some even with the tongs and shovels of the fire-places. Witticisms were not wanting in this dismal moment, when the court had surely enough to make it serious for once. This concourse of useless persons, far from being capable of any service, incommoded the national guard, which regarded them with suspicion, and only tended to increase a confusion already too great.

All the members of the departmental directory had repaired to the palace. The virtuous Duke of Larochefoucauld was there, as likewise Rœderer, the procurator-syndic. Pétion had been summoned also, and he arrived, accompanied by two municipal officers. Pétion was urged to sign an order to repel force by force; and he signed it, to avoid appearing an accomplice of the insurgents. The court congratulated itself on having him within the palace walls, and holding in his person a hostage dear to the people. The assembly, advertised of this purpose, ordered him to the bar by a decree. The king, who was strongly advised to detain him, refused to do so; and he accordingly left the Tuileries without molestation.

The order to repel force by force once obtained, various opinions were volunteered on the manner of using it. In such a state of excitement, it was but natural that extravagant notions should be suggested. There was one of great boldness, and which probably might have been attended with success, namely, to anticipate the assault by dispersing the insurgents, who had not yet assembled in great force, forming, even with the Marseillese, at the utmost a mob of a few thousand men. At this moment, in fact, the Faubourg Saint-Marceau had not congregated; Santerre was hesitating in the Faubourg Saint-Antoine; Danton and the Marseillese alone had been daring enough to meet at the Cordeliers', and they were waiting impatiently on the Saint-Michael bridge for the junction of the other assailants. A vigorous sally might have dislodged and scattered them; and in this moment of hesitation, a sudden panic would have infallibly prevented the insurrection.

Mandat acted upon a more certain and legal plan, which consisted in awaiting the march of the faubourgs, but attacking them on two decisive points as soon as they were in movement. He purposed that when one body debouched on the square in front of the town-hall, by the arcade of Saint-Jean, it should be suddenly charged, and the same tactics adopted at the Louvre against those who should advance by the Pont-Neuf (the New Bridge), along the quay of the Tuileries. With this view, he had ordered the gendarmerie stationed at the colonnade to allow the insurgents to defile past, and afterwards to charge them in the rear, whilst the gendarmerie placed in the Carrousel should fall upon them through the wickets of the Louvre, and make the attack in front. The success of such measures was almost certain. The commanders of the different posts, and especially the one at the town-hall, had already received from Mandat the necessary orders.

It has been previously stated that a new municipality had been formed at the town-hall. Danton and Manuel were the only members of the old body retained. The orders given by Mandat were shown to this insurrectional committee. It instantly summoned that commander to give attendance at the town-hall. The summons was taken to the palace, where the formation of a new commune was unknown. Mandat hesitated to obey; but those around him, and the members of the department themselves, being profoundly ignorant of what had passed, and of opinion that it was not yet time to infringe the law by a refusal to appear, urged him to go. He yielded to their arguments, and delivering to his son, who was with him at the palace, Pétion's order to repel force by force, he departed, in accordance with the summons of the municipality. It was about four o'clock in the morning when he left the palace. The moment he entered the town-hall, he was struck with amazement at finding a new authority installed there. He was immediately surrounded, interrogated respecting the orders he had given, and then dismissed; but in dismissing him, the president made a sinister gesture, indicative of a judgment of death. The unfortunate commander, accordingly, had scarcely reached the street, when he was seized, and laid prostrate by a pistol-ball. His clothes were torn off, but the assassins were disappointed in finding Pétion's order, which he had taken the precaution to leave with his son; and his body was thrown into the river, whither so many corpses were destined speedily to follow.

This bloody deed paralysed all the measures of defence taken at the palace, destroyed all unity of operation, and completely prevented the execution of Mandat's plan. However, affairs were not even yet quite desperate, and the insurrection was far from being entirely organised. The Marseillese, after long and impatiently awaiting the Faubourg Saint-Antoine, without its appearing, had concluded, for a time, that the enterprise had proved abortive. But Westermann, placing his sword on Santerre's breast, had compelled him to march. The faubourgs had then successively come forward, some arriving by the Street Saint-Honoré, others by the New Bridge, the Royal Bridge, and the passages of the Louvre. The Marseillese marched at the head of the columns, with the Breton federalists, keeping their cannon pointed on the palace. To the numerous body of insurgents, swelling with every instant, was added a multitude of curious; and thus the enemy appeared, from the Tuileries, in greater force than it really was. Whilst they were bearing towards the palace, Santerre repaired to the town-hall to receive his nomination as commander-in-chief of the national guards, and Westermann remained on the field of battle to direct the assailants. Thus an extraordinary confusion prevailed in all quarters, and to such an extent, indeed, that Pétion, who, according to the plan fixed upon, was to have been put under the guard of an insurrectional force, was still waiting for the troop intended to shield him from responsibility by an appearance of constraint.

He was obliged to send a communication to the town-hall, when at length a few hundred men were dispatched to his door, in order to support the pretence of his being under arrest.

The palace was by this time effectually blockaded. The assailants were on the square, and visible in the dawning light through the antique gates of the courts, and from the windows of the edifice. Their artillery was descried pointing directly on the palace, and within the walls their confused shouts and relentless yells struck its inmates' ears with consternation. The project of anticipating their attack had been again suggested; but when the murder of Mandat was known, the ministers and the directory of the department were of opinion that the assault should be waited for, so that in using force they might be within the strict limits of the law.

Rœderer went through the ranks of the garrison, and issued to the Swiss and the national guards the legal order, enjoining them to refrain from attacking, but to repel force by force. The king was urged to review in person the brave men who were drawn up to defend him. The unfortunate monarch had passed the night in listening to the multifarious and conflicting counsels poured into his ear; and in the rare intervals of quietude, he had offered up prayers to Heaven for his royal consort, his children, and his sister, the objects of all his fears.

"Sire," said the queen to him, with energy, "this is the moment to show yourself." We are even assured that, snatching a pistol from the belt of the aged D'Affry, she somewhat roughly presented it to the king. The eyes of the princess were inflamed with weeping, but her brow seemed loftier than ever, and her nostrils dilated with wrath and haughty pride. As for the king, he dreaded nothing on his own account, and even evinced a perfect coolness in this extreme peril; but he was in the greatest alarm for his family, and the anguish he felt at seeing it thus exposed, had thrown a dismal sadness over his countenance. He nevertheless presented himself with much firmness. He wore a violet dress, and a sword by his side; his hair, which had not been dressed since the day before, was somewhat disordered. On appearing at the balcony, he perceived, without visible emotion, a formidable park of artillery pointed against the edifice. His presence excited a remnant of enthusiasm; the caps of the grenadiers were suddenly hoisted on the points of swords and bayonets, and the ancient cry of "Long live the king!" echoed for the last time under the arches of his paternal palace. A last spark of courage was infused, dejected countenances brightened for a moment, and again there was a fleeting interval of confidence and hope. It was at this instant that some new battalions of the national guard arrived, which had formed later than the others, and now came up, according to the orders previously given by Mandat. They entered whilst the cries of "Long live the king!" were resounding in the court. Some joined in these salutations to the monarch, whilst others, being of very opposite sentiments, believed themselves in danger, and recalling all the popular fables they had heard, imagined they were about to be delivered up to the *knights of the dagger*. They immediately shouted out that the wretch Mandat had betrayed them, and thus excited a species of tumult. The artillerymen, instigated by the example, turned their pieces against the front of the palace. A contest forthwith ensued with the loyal battalions; the artillerymen were disarmed, and transferred to a detachment, and the new comers were conducted to the gardens.

After having shown himself on the balcony, the king descended the staircase to hold a review in the courts. His approach was proclaimed, and all fell into their ranks. He passed along them with a tranquil countenance, throwing upon each an expressive look, which penetrated every heart. Addressing himself to the soldiers, he told them, in a firm voice, that he was deeply sensible of their attachment, that he would remain at their side, and that, whilst defending him they defended also their wives and children. He afterwards traversed the vestibule to proceed into the garden, but at that very moment he heard the cry of "Down with the veto!" shouted by one of the battalions which had just entered. Two officers who were attending him wished him to abstain from holding the review in the garden, whilst others entreated him to visit the post of the Turning-Bridge. He at once consented to the latter proposal, although he was obliged to pass along the terrace of the Feuillants, crowded with people. In crossing this space, he was only separated from the infuriated mob by a tri-coloured string; and as he advanced, all sorts of insulting and outrageous expressions were heaped upon him. He had even the mortification to behold the battalions move off, march down the garden, and issue out of it before his eyes, with the intention of swelling the ranks of the assailants on the square of the Carrousel.

This desertion, that of the artillerymen, and the shouts of "Down with the veto," extinguished all hope in the breast of the king. At the same time, the gendarmes stationed at the colonnade of the Louvre and elsewhere, had either dispersed or joined the people. The national guards, likewise, who occupied the apartments, and on whose fidelity it was thought implicit reliance might be placed, were discontented at being associated with gentlemen, and openly manifested distrust of them. The queen endeavoured to remove these impressions. "Grenadiers," she exclaimed, pointing to those gentlemen, "they are your comrades; they have come to die by your side." But, in spite of this apparent courage, her soul was filled with despair. The review had ruined all, and she complained bitterly that the king had shown no energy. We are bound to repeat, however, that the king had no apprehensions for himself; he had, in fact, refused to wear a coat of mail as on the 14th July, saying, that on a day of battle he must be uncovered like the meanest of his servants. Courage, therefore, was not deficient in him, as he afterwards evinced in a truly noble spirit; but boldness in the offensive failed him, and he lacked consistency also, in trembling at the idea of bloodshed, when he had consented to an invasion of France by foreigners. It is certain, meanwhile, as has been often asserted, that if he had mounted on horseback, and made a charge at the head of his soldiers, the insurrection would have been quelled.

The members of the department, perceiving the universal disorder prevailing in the palace, and despairing of a successful resistance, now presented themselves to the king, and advised him to retire into the hall of the assembly. This advice, so often and so harshly censured—the common fate, indeed, of all counsels given to kings which turn out inauspiciously—was the only feasible one at the moment. By this retreat, all effusion of blood would be prevented, and the royal family escape an almost certain death should the palace be taken by assault. And in the actual position of affairs, the success of that assault was not doubtful; but had it even been so, the doubt itself was sufficient to warrant a timely withdrawal from its hazard.

The queen vehemently opposed the project, however. "Madam," said Rœderer to her, "you would expose the lives of your consort and of your children; reflect on the responsibility you take upon yourself." An altercation of some warmth ensued. At last the king decided upon retiring into the assembly; and, turning to his family and those around him, he said, with an air of resignation, "Let us go." "You answer, sir, for the lives of the king and my children," said the queen, addressing Rœderer. "Madam," replied the procurator-syndic, "I answer for my dying at their side, but I promise nothing more."

The whole party then prepared to move off towards

the assembly, by the garden, the terrace of the Feuillants, and the court of the Manège. All the gentlemen and the servants of the palace rushed forward to follow the king, although they were likely to endanger his safety, by irritating the people, and raising the bile of the assembly by their presence. Rœderer used fruitless endeavours to stop them, repeating to them, with all his strength, that they would cause the massacre of the royal family. He succeeded at length in detaching a considerable number, and the party commenced its march. A detachment of Swiss and of national guards accompanied the king. A deputation from the assembly came to receive him, and conduct him within its precincts. At this moment the crowd was so great that all progress was stopped. A grenadier of lofty stature took up the dauphin, and raising him in his arms, penetrated through the multitude, bearing him above his head. The queen, at this sight, imagined he was carrying off her son, and uttered a shriek, but her fears were speedily calmed. The grenadier entered the hall, and deposited the royal child on the table of the assembly.

The king and his family shortly followed, accompanied by two ministers. "I come," said Louis XVI., "for the purpose of preventing a great crime, and I believe, gentlemen, that I cannot be in greater safety than in the midst of you."

Vergniaud presided. He replied to the monarch, that he might rely on the firmness of the national assembly, and that its members had sworn to die in defence of the constituted authorities.

The king seated himself by the side of the president; but on the observation of Chabot, that his presence might interfere with the freedom of debate, he was placed in the box of the reporter employed to take down the proceedings.* The iron rail in front was directed to be broken down, in order that if the box were attacked, he and his family might fly without impediment into the midst of the assembly. The king assisted with his own hands in the work of demolition; the railing was overturned, and the insults and menaces thus rolled more freely into the last asylum of the dethroned monarch.

Rœderer then gave a recital of what had passed; he depicted in strong colours the fury of the multitude, and the dangers to which the palace was exposed, the courts of which were already forcibly occupied. The assembly thereupon ordered that twenty commissioners should proceed to tranquillise the people. They being named, forthwith departed. All at once a discharge of cannon was heard. Consternation pervaded the whole assembly. "I have to apprise you," said the king, "that I have just prohibited the Swiss from firing." But the roar of cannon was again heard, mingled with the report of fire-arms. Dismay was at its height. The next moment it was announced that the commissioners deputed by the assembly had been put to flight. Then the door of the hall was assailed, and loud and repeated blows resounded on its pannels, whilst at one of the side entrances armed citizens actually appeared. "We are stormed!" exclaimed a municipal officer. The president put on his hat; a number of deputies sprang from their seats to expel the intruders; by degrees the tumult subsided, and amidst the uninterrupted rolling of cannon and musketry, the deputies raised their voices and shouted—"The nation, liberty, equality, for ever!"

A most sanguinary conflict meanwhile had been proceeding at the palace. When the king quitted it, it was naturally concluded that the people would cease from seeking vengeance on a forsaken residence; and, furthermore, the confusion in which all things and minds were involved had prevented due attention being paid to it, and no order had been given for its evacuation. Simply, the troops which occupied the courts were drawn into the interior of the palace, and confusedly scattered through the apartments, commingled with domestics, gentlemen, and officers. A prodigious crowd thronged the palace, and, notwithstanding its vast extent, it was scarcely possible to move a step.

The populace, who were perhaps ignorant of the king's retreat, after waiting for some time before the principal barrier, at length attacked the gate, broke it open with axes, and rushed into the royal court. They then formed in column, and turned against the palace the pieces of ordnance imprudently left in the court after the withdrawal of the troops. However, they refrained as yet from commencing an assault. On the contrary, they made amicable demonstrations to the soldiers at the windows: "Yield us the palace," they cried, "and we are friends!" The Swiss manifested pacific intentions, and threw their cartridges out of the windows. Some of the assailants, more audacious than their comrades, broke out of column, and advanced to the vestibule of the palace. At the foot of the grand staircase, some timber had been thrown up in the form of a barricade, behind which Swiss soldiers and national guards had stationed themselves without any attempt at order. Those who came up from the mob outside endeavoured to penetrate farther and to clear the barricade. After a contest of some duration, which did not lead, however, to actual combat, the barrier was thrown down. Then the assailants crowded up the staircase, with repeated exclamations that the palace must be delivered up to them. It is asserted that at this moment some of the pikemen, who had remained in the court, grappled certain Swiss sentinels on duty outside with hooks, and massacred them; and it is likewise stated that a musket-ball was fired against the windows, which the Swiss, in a moment of indignation, returned by a general discharge. At this very instant, in fact, the palace resounded with a terrific volley, and those of the people who had entered fled with cries that they were betrayed. It is difficult to ascertain with precision, amidst so great a confusion, from which side the first shots were fired. The assailants have asserted that they advanced amicably, and when entangled in the palace, to have been treacherously attacked and mowed down; which allegation is void of probability, for the Swiss were not in a position to provoke a combat. Having no longer any obligation to fight after the departure of the king, their great object would necessarily be to save themselves, and assuredly a useless piece of treachery was not the way to gain their purpose. Besides, even could an act of aggression, distinctly proved, in the smallest degree alter the moral character of these events, it must always be confessed that the first and real aggression, that is to say, the attack on the palace itself, came from the insurgent mob. What ensued was nothing but an inevitable accident, and attributable to chance alone. But, howsoever the case may be, those who had advanced into the vestibule and up the staircase, were startled by a sudden discharge, and whilst they were flying in precipitation, received on the very stairs a shower of bullets. After this, the Swiss came down in good order, and when they reached the foot of the staircase, debouched by the vestibule into the royal court. There they seized upon one of the cannon planted in the court, and, in spite of a galling fire, wheeled it round, and discharged it upon the Marseillese, a considerable number of whom fell in consequence. The Marseillese recoiled, and the fire continuing, they abandoned the court. A panic immediately spread amongst the people, who fled on all sides, and sought shelter in the faubourgs. If at this moment the Swiss had pursued their advantage, if the gendarmes stationed at the Louvre, instead of having deserted their posts, had charged the routed insurgents, the affair had been concluded, and victory left with the palace.

* ["This box was the one occupied by the agents of the editor of a newspaper called *The Logographe*, and was but ten feet square and six feet high."—*Bertrand*, vol. vii. p. 159.]

But the order of the king, conveying a prohibition to fire, which he had intrusted to M. d'Hervilly, was produced at this critical instant. M. d'Hervilly succeeded in reaching the vestibule precisely as the Swiss had repulsed the assailants. He stopped their further proceedings, and commanded them, on the part of the king, to accompany him to the assembly. Accordingly they followed him, in considerable numbers, to the Feuillants', exposed to a most murderous discharge. The palace was thus deprived of the major part of its defenders. There still remained, however, both upon the staircase and in the apartments, a large body of Swiss, to whom the order was not communicated, and who were soon exposed, without means of resistance, to the unbridled fury of popular vengeance.

The insurgents had speedily rallied. The Marseillese and Bretons, indignant at having yielded, encouraged each other, and returned to the charge with whetted rage. Westermann, who afterwards displayed striking qualities, directed their efforts with ability. They pressed recklessly forward, fell in great numbers, but at length gained the vestibule, carried the staircase, and became masters of the palace. The rabble, with pikes, closely followed in their train, and the rest of the scene soon became nothing but a massacre. The wretched Swiss vainly implored pity, throwing down their arms; they were mercilessly hewn down. The palace was set on fire; the servants who filled it were attacked; some escaped by flight, others were immolated. Amongst the mob were some generous victors. "Mercy to women!" exclaimed one of them; "you would dishonour the nation!"—and he rescued some ladies in waiting on the queen, who were on their knees beneath uplifted swords. Many of the victims sold their lives dearly, and others had the ingenuity to save themselves, when defence was a useless heroism. Even amongst these furious assailants, feelings of honesty prevailed; all the valuables found in the palace, either from popular bravado, or from the disinterestedness attendant on enthusiasm, were borne to the assembly.

The assembly had remained in deep anxiety, awaiting the issue of the struggle. At last, about eleven o'clock, the cries of victory, a thousand times repeated, put an end to suspense. The doors gave way to the pressure of a multitude drunk with rapture and the fury of strife. The hall was strewed with the trophies they bore, and crowded with the Swiss whom they had made prisoners, and to whom life had been spared, with the view of presenting to the assembly an acceptable offering of popular moderation. The king and his family, enclosed in the narrow box of a reporter, were present all this while, the melancholy witnesses of the ruin of the throne and the savage joy of their conquerors. Vergniaud had quitted the presidency for an interval, to draw up the decree of deposition; he now returned, and the assembly passed that celebrated decree, according to which

Louis XVI. was provisionally suspended from the royalty:

A plan of education was ordered for the prince-royal:

A national convention was convoked.

Where now are the proofs of a project long formed to overturn the monarchy, when the king was only suspended, and the education of the young prince specifically designed? With what apprehension, on the contrary, was that ancient institution touched! With what hesitation, so to speak, was that growth of ages assailed, under which so many generations of Frenchmen had been alternately happy and unhappy, but under which they had at least lived!

Public imagination, however, is swift in its flights. But little time was needed to extinguish the last remnants of former reverence, and the suspended monarchy soon became the destroyed monarchy. It was to perish, not in the person of a Louis XI., of a Charles IX., or of a Louis XIV., but in that of Louis XVI., one of the most honest kings who ever sat on a throne.

CHAPTER XII.

SITUATION OF PARTIES WITHIN AND WITHOUT THE ASSEMBLY AFTER THE 10TH AUGUST.—TAKING OF LONGWY BY THE PRUSSIANS.—MASSACRES OF SEPTEMBER, AND THEIR PRINCIPAL CIRCUMSTANCES.

The Swiss had courageously defended the Tuileries, but their resistance was fruitless; the grand staircase had been stormed, and the palace taken. The people, now victorious, penetrated from all sides into that abode of royalty, in which they had always supposed countless treasures to be amassed, a felicity more than mortal, a power mysterious and mighty, and designs ever hatching fruitful with national wo. What vengeance there was to wreak all at once on wealth, grandeur, and power!

Eighty Swiss grenadiers, who had not had time to retreat, maintained a desperate struggle for life, but were remorselessly cut down. The multitude pressed into the apartments, and fell with savage wrath on those useless friends, who had gathered to defend the king, and had long been objects of popular execration, under the title of *knights of the dagger*. Their clumsy weapons served only to exasperate the conquerors, and to give an air of greater probability to the designs charged upon the court. Every door that was closed fell beneath the blows of hatchets. Two ushers, opposing access to the great council-chamber, willing to sacrifice themselves to etiquette, were massacred in an instant. The numerous servants of the royal family fled tumultuously along the vast galleries, threw themselves from the windows, or sought, in the immensity of the edifice, some obscure nook to protect their lives. The queen's women took refuge in one of her apartments, fearing every moment to be attacked in their asylum. The Princess de Tarente caused the doors to be thrown open, hoping to propitiate the assailants by offering no impediment. They soon appeared, and seized upon one of the females. The sword was already raised above her head. "Spare the women!" exclaimed a voice; "avoid dishonouring the nation!" At these words the sword dropped; the ladies of the queen were saved and conducted out of the palace by the very men who had been on the point of assassinating them, and who, with true popular instability, now acted as their escort, and displayed ingenious devotion in screening them from the fury of their confederates. After the slaughter, the work of devastation commenced; the magnificent furniture was broken, and the wrecks cast far and wide. The mob overran the private apartments of the queen, and indulged in the most indecent mirth; it penetrated into the most secluded spots, dived into all the cabinets, shattered to pieces all the pannels, and glutted the double passion of curiosity and destructiveness. To the horrors of murder and pillage was added that of fire. The flames, having already consumed the sheds erected in the outer courts, began to reach the edifice, and threatened with complete destruction that imposing sojourn of royalty. The desolation was not limited to these ample but now dismal confines; it extended beyond. The streets were strewed with wrecks and corpses. Whoever fled, or was supposed to fly, suggested the idea of an enemy, and was pursued with musket-shots. An incessant noise of musketry had succeeded to the roar of cannon, and marked fresh murders with every volley. How many are the horrors of a victory, whosoever may be the vanquished or the victors, and whatsoever the cause for which the battle has raged!

The executive power being dissolved by the suspension of Louis XVI., there remained in Paris but two authorities, the commune and the assembly. It has

been already stated, in describing the preparations for the 10th of August, that certain deputies of the sections, having assembled at the town-hall, had seized upon the municipal power to the exclusion of the former magistrates, and directed the insurrection during that night and day. They possessed the real physical force, they wielded all the dominion of victory, and were the representatives of that new and ardent revolutionary class, which had been struggling the whole session against the inertness of that other class of men, more enlightened but less active, of which the Legislative Assembly was composed. The first care of the deputies of the sections was to depose all the superior bodies, which, being nearer the supreme power, were in consequence more attached to it. They had suspended the staff of the national guard, disorganised the defence of the Tuileries by drawing Mandat from his post, and given to Santerre the command of the national guard. They had not been less hasty in suspending the administration of the department, which, from the higher position it occupied, had always thwarted the popular passions, since it in no degree participated in them. As to the municipality, they had suppressed the council-general, and taken to themselves its authority, retaining only the mayor Pétion, the procurator-syndic Manuel, and the sixteen municipal administrators. All these operations had been effected during the siege of the palace. Danton had daringly directed their stormy sitting; and when the fire of the Swiss sent the multitude flying along the quays, even to the town-hall, he had rushed out, saying, "Our brethren are seeking aid; let us supply them with it." His presence had contributed to lead back the people to the scene of action, and to decide the victory. When the contest was over, it was proposed to deliver Pétion from his constraint, and restore him to his functions of mayor. But, either from a genuine interest in his safety, or from an apprehension of giving themselves a chief too scrupulous for the first moments of an insurrection, they decided he should be guarded for a day or two longer, under pretext of securing his life from all danger. They likewise removed from the hall of the council-general the busts of Louis XVI., Bailly, and Lafayette. The new class on the rise thus discarded the first revolutionary mementos, in order to substitute others of its own.

The insurgents of the commune naturally sought to bring themselves into relation with the assembly. It is true they reproached it with vacillation, and even with royalism; but they perceived in it the only sovereign authority actually existing, and were not at all disposed to depreciate it. Very early on the 10th, indeed, a deputation appeared at its bar, to announce the formation of the insurrectional commune, and give a detail of what had been done. Danton was one of that deputation. "The people who send us to you," said he, "have charged us to inform you, that they still believe you worthy of their confidence; but that they refuse to recognise any other judge of the extraordinary measures necessity has compelled them to adopt than the French people, our sovereign and yours, when met in the primary assemblies."

The assembly replied to this deputation, through its president, to the effect that it approved of all that had been done, and that it recommended the commune to promote peace and order. It furthermore communicated the decrees passed during the day, with a request to disseminate them. It afterwards drew up a proclamation, inculcating the respect due to life and property, and commissioned some of its members to carry it amongst the people.

The principal object of the assembly at this moment was necessarily to provide a substitute for dethroned royalty. The ministers, comprehended under the title of Executive Council, were provisionally charged by it with the labours of administration and the execution of the laws. The minister of justice, holder of the seal of state, was appointed to affix it to decrees, and promulgate them in the name of the legislative authority. It then became necessary to select the individuals who should compose the ministry. The names of Roland, Servan, and Clavière, instantly suggested themselves, for they had been dismissed on account of their attachment to the popular cause, and the tendency of the new revolution was inevitably to promote all that royalty had degraded. These three ministers were consequently unanimously appointed—Roland to the interior, Servan to the war, and Clavière to the financial department. Ministers of justice, of foreign affairs, and of the marine, were still to be named. Here the choice was free, and any prepossessions in favour of obscure merit, or of ardent patriotism which had incurred the displeasure of the court, might be gratified without impediment. Danton, so puissant over the multitude, and so important a character during the last eventful hours, was judged necessary; and, although distasteful to the Girondists as an idol of the populace, he was nominated minister of justice by a majority of 222 votes out of 284 actually present. After having given this satisfaction to the multitude, and rewarded energy with so high an office, they proceeded to place a man of knowledge at the board of admiralty. This was the mathematician Monge, a learned personage, well known to and appreciated by Condorcet, and appointed on his motion. Lastly, Le Brun was named to the portfolio of foreign affairs; and in his person was recompensed one of those laborious men who did all the work of which former ministers had monopolised the credit.

After having thus, in a form, reintegrated the executive power, the assembly adopted a resolution that all the decrees to which Louis XVI. had affixed his veto should be held to possess the force of laws. The formation of a camp below Paris, the object of one of those decrees, and the occasion of such warm discussions, was ordained at once; and the cannoneers received authority, at the same time, to plant esplanades on the heights of Montmartre. So soon as the revolution was perfected at Paris, the next indispensable step was to assure its success in the departments, and above all in the armies, where suspected generals held commands. Commissioners selected from the assembly were appointed to repair to the provinces and the armies, in order to explain to them the events of the 10th August; and powers were vested in those deputies to supersede any civil or military officers they might deem necessary.

A few hours sufficed for all these decrees; and whilst the assembly was busied in framing and passing them, other objects incessantly arose to distract its attention. The valuable effects taken from the Tuileries were transported into its hall; the Swiss, the retainers of the palace, all the individuals arrested in their flight, or rescued from the fury of the people, were conducted to its bar as to a place of sanctuary. Bands of petitioners came, one after the other, to report what they had done or seen, and to recount their discoveries on the supposed plots of the court. Accusations and invectives of all kinds were vociferated against the royal family, who heard the whole from the cramped corner into which it had been thrust. Louis XVI. listened with placidity to all the speeches, and conversed at intervals with Vergniaud and other deputies who sat in his immediate proximity. Shut up in that narrow box for fifteen hours, he had requested some refreshments, of which he partook with his wife and children, thereby provoking disgraceful observations on the zest with which he was reported to indulge in the pleasures of the table. When do victorious parties spare misfortune its bitterest humiliation? The young dauphin, stretched on the bosom of his mother, slept soundly, overcome with the suffocating heat. The young princess-royal and Madame Elizabeth, their eyes swoln with tears, were by the side of the queen. In the back of the box were certain devoted nobles, whom reverse of fortune had not scared away. Fifty men, taken

from the detachment which had escorted the royal family from the palace to the assembly, served as a guard around the party. It was from the midst of this group that the deposed monarch contemplated the spoils torn from his palace, and beheld the dismemberment of his ancient power, and the distribution of its fragments amongst the different popular authorities.

The tumult still continued with unabated violence; for, in the opinion of the populace, it was not enough to have suspended royalty, it was necessary to destroy it. Petitions quickly succeeded each other on this subject; and whilst waiting for a reply, the multitude raged outside the hall, blocked up the passages, besieged the doors, and twice or thrice attacked them so violently as to induce a belief they were forced, and to excite apprehensions for the unfortunate family which had been consigned to the guardianship of the assembly. Henry Larivière, being dispatched with other commissioners to tranquillise the people, returned at this instant, and exclaimed with a loud voice, "Yes, gentlemen, I know it, I have seen it—I assure you, the people are determined to perish a thousand times rather than dishonour liberty by any act of inhumanity; and most assuredly, there is not one person here present—and my words will be understood—that may not implicitly rely on French honour." This bold and encouraging speech was loudly applauded. Vergniaud spoke in his turn, and replied to the petitioners, who demanded that the suspension should be rendered a deposition. "I am delighted," said he, "that an occasion is afforded me to explain the views of the assembly in the presence of the citizens. It has decreed the suspension of the executive power, and convoked a convention to decide irrevocably on the great question of dethronement. In this it has kept within its powers, which do not permit it to sit in judgment on royalty; and it has provided for the safety of the state, by removing from the executive power the possibility of doing harm. It has thus satisfied all wants, without overstepping the limits of its functions." These words produced a favourable impression, and the petitioners themselves, struck by their force, undertook to instruct and appease the people.

It was at last felt indispensable to bring this prolonged sitting to a close. The assembly consequently ordered that the effects brought from the palace should be deposited with the commune; that the Swiss, and all other detained persons, should either be guarded at the Feuillants', or transferred to different places of confinement; and, lastly, that the royal family should be kept at the Luxumbourg until the meeting of the national convention, but that, whilst the necessary preparations were making for its reception, it should be lodged in the immediate locality of the assembly. At one o'clock in the morning of Saturday the 11th, the royal family was removed into the lodging destined for it, and which consisted of four cells belonging to the old Feuillants. The nobles who had kept by the king occupied the first; the king the second; the queen, his sister, and his children, the two others. The wife of the keeper attended upon the princesses, and officiated in lieu of that numerous train of ladies, who, the evening before, had emulated each other in zeal for their service.

At three in the morning the sitting was suspended. Uproar still prevailed throughout Paris. To avert riots, the environs of the palace were illuminated, and most of the citizens remained under arms.

Such was that celebrated day, and such its immediate results. The king and his family were prisoners at the Feuillants', and the three disgraced ministers replaced in office; Danton, burrowing the day before in an obscure club, was minister of justice; Pétion was consigned to his own house, but his name, proclaimed with enthusiasm, was gilded with the appellation of "Father of the people." Marat, arisen from the secret hole in which Danton had ensconced him during the attack, and armed with a sabre, paraded through Paris at the head of the Marseillese battalion. Robespierre, whom we have been unable to trace during those terrible scenes, harangued at the Jacobins', and discoursed to some members around him on the uses to be made of the victory, on the necessity of superseding the actual assembly, and of putting Lafayette under impeachment.

The following day, it was still found necessary to take measures for calming the excited populace, who continued to massacre all whom it took for fugitive aristocrats.* The assembly resumed its sitting at seven in the morning of the 11th. The royal family was replaced in the box of the *Logographe*, to witness the decrees that were about to be passed, and the scenes to be enacted in the legislative hall. Pétion, freed and escorted by a numerous mob, came to give an account of the state of Paris, which he had traversed, and where he had laboured to infuse the spirit of peace and order. Certain citizens had constituted themselves his guards, to protect a life deemed so precious. Pétion was warmly congratulated by the assembly, and took his departure to continue his pacific exhortations. The Swiss, remitted the evening before to the Feuillants', were threatened with imminent danger. The populace demanded their death with loud cries, calling them accomplices of the palace and assassins of the people. The assembly succeeded in quieting the popular wrath by an announcement that the Swiss would be tried, and that a court-martial was about to be formed for the punishment of those who were stigmatised as "the conspirators of the 10th August." "I demand," shouted the furious Chabot, "that they be conducted to the Abbey in order to be tried. In the land of equality, the law strikes at all persons, even those seated on a throne." The officers had been already transferred to the Abbey, and the soldiers were sent thither in their turn. This was accomplished with infinite difficulty, and the populace required repeated promises that they would be promptly judged.

Thus we see the idea of taking vengeance on all the defenders of royalty, and of visiting on them the dangers the insurgents had incurred, was already aroused in the public mind, and was shortly to originate rancorous divisions. In following the progress of the revolution, we have previously discerned the seeds of those differences which had begun to arise amongst the popular party. We have seen the assembly, composed of enlightened and sedate men, placed in a position of resistance to the clubs and municipalities, in which were congregrated men inferior in education and in talents, but who, from their very station, their less refined manners, and their inordinate ambition, were led to agitate and precipitate events. We have seen, that on the eve of the 10th August, Chabot differed in opinion with Pétion, who, in unison with the majority of the assembly, was desirous that a decree of deposition should be preferred to an attack by open force. Those men, therefore, who had recommended extreme measures of energy, were the following day in an attitude almost antagonistic to the assembly, elated with a victory gained in spite of it, as it were, and reminding it, in terms of equivocal respect, that it had absolved Lafayette, and must take care not again to compromise the safety of the people by any fresh weakness. They filled the commune, where they had as their colleagues ambitious citizens, subordinate agitators, and clubbists; they ruled at the Jacobins' and Cordeliers', and some amongst them sat on the extreme benches of the legislative body. The Capuchin Chabot, the most furious of all, passed alternately from the tribune of the as-

* ["In the long list of the victims of this horrid day was M. de Clermont-Tonnerre, one of the members of the first assembly, most distinguished for his talents, his errors, and his endeavours to atone for them. M. Carle, colonel of the gendarmerie, also lost his life for the proofs of attachment he had given to the king. *Bertrand*, vol. vii. p. 199.]

sembly to that of the Jacobins, and talked incessantly of pikes and the tocsin.

The assembly had pronounced the suspension, and these more relentless characters claimed the deposition; by naming a governor for the dauphin, it had contemplated royalty, and they were eager for a republic; it held in its majority that an active defence should be made against foreigners, but that mercy should be shown to the vanquished; they maintained, on the contrary, that not only must the foreigner be resisted, but also vengeance wreaked on those, who, intrenched in the palace, had designed to massacre the people, and bring the Prussians to Paris. Rising in their ardour to the most extreme ideas, they argued that the electoral bodies were not necessary to form the new assembly, but that all the citizens ought to be deemed competent to vote. One Jacobin even proposed that political rights should be given to women. They proclaimed aloud, in short, that the people must appear in arms to manifest their wishes to the legislative body. Marat strove to stimulate this raging effervescence and the cry for vengeance, because he judged, according to his hateful system, that it was expedient to purge France. Robespierre, less from any system founded on the idea of purification, or from any innate thirst for blood, than from envy towards the assembly, heaped upon it reproaches of weakness and royalism. Extolled by the Jacobins, and proposed before the 10th August as the indispensable dictator, he was now proclaimed as the most eloquent and incorruptible defender of the rights of the people. Danton, concerning himself neither about being praised nor listened to, and without having ever aspired to the dictatorship, had nevertheless decided the day on the 10th August by his indomitable daring. And now, again, despising all parade, he thought only of swaying the executive council, of which he was a member, by overawing or leading his colleagues. Incapable of hatred or envy, he entertained no bad feeling against those deputies whose fame mortified Robespierre; but he contemned them as inert, and preferred those energetic men of the inferior classes, upon whom he placed greater reliance for maintaining and consummating the revolution.

These divisions were not suspected out of Paris. All that the public of France could discern was the resistance of the assembly to demands of too extreme a character, and the absolution of Lafayette, pronounced in spite of the commune and the Jacobins. But all was attributed to the royalist and Feuillant majority; the Girondists were still admired, Brissot and Robespierre equally esteemed, and Pétion especially adored as the mayor so maltreated by the court. It was not canvassed, for it was not known, that Pétion appeared too moderate to Chabot, that he wounded the pride of Robespierre, that he was viewed as a useless and honest man by Danton, and as a conspirator, amenable to purification, by Marat. Pétion was, indeed, still encompassed by the applauses of the people; but, like Bailly after the 14th July, he was soon to be considered vexatious and odious, by condemning excesses he was impotent to prevent.

The principal coalition of the new revolutionists was formed at the Jacobin Club and at the commune. All projects were proposed and discussed at the Jacobins'; and the same men afterwards came to execute at the town-hall, by means of their municipal functions, what they could simply propound in their club. The council-general of the commune composed of itself a species of assembly, equally numerous with the legislative body, having also its tribunes, its officers, its yet more vociferous applauders, and an actual power much more considerable. The mayor was its president, and the procurator-syndic its official spokesman, charged to submit all necessary requisitions. Pétion had already withdrawn his attendance, and confined himself to the superintendence of the subsistence department. The procurator Manuel, yielding more to the revolutionary flood, took a conspicuous part in its proceedings every day. But the person who exercised the greatest sway in this assemblage was Robespierre. Standing apart during the three first days succeeding the 10th August, he had repaired thither only after the insurrection was consummated; and, presenting himself at the table to have his powers verified, he seemed as if come to take possession of a rightful dominion, rather than to submit his qualification. His reserve, far from displeasing, only augmented the respect manifested towards him. His reputation for talents, integrity, and perseverance, invested him with a grave and respectable character, such as the assembled citizens were proud of possessing amongst them. During the interval to elapse before the meeting of the convention, of which he felt sure of being elected a member, he proceeded to exercise a power in the commune more substantial than the influence of opinion he already enjoyed at the Jacobin Club.

One of the first cares of the commune was to take the police department into its own hands; for in periods of civil strife, the power of arresting and criminating enemies is the most important and valued of privileges. The justices of peace, who had hitherto in part possessed it, had incurred odium by their proceedings against popular agitators, and thus stood, whether voluntarily or not, in hostility to the patriots. He especially was called to mind who, in the affair between Bertrand de Molleville and the journalist Carra, had dared to cite two deputies. The justices of peace, therefore, were dismissed, and all their functions relative to the police transferred to the municipal authorities. In agreement on this point with the commune of Paris, the assembly passed a decree, ordaining that the police, intituled "*of general safety*," should be vested in the departments, districts, and municipalities. This police was to consist in investigating all delinquencies endangering *the internal and external safety of the state*, in drawing up a list of citizens suspected on account of their opinions or their conduct, in arresting them provisionally, and in dispersing and disarming them, if any necessity for so doing should arise. The councils of the municipalities were the parties destined to exercise this ministry, and the entire mass of the citizens was thus called upon to observe, to denounce, and to persecute the hostile party. It may be conceived that this democratic police would necessarily be singularly active, but likewise rigorous and arbitrary. The whole council was to receive the denunciations, and a committee of *surveillance* to examine them, and order the arrests. The national guards were put in permanent requisition, and the municipalities of all towns containing upwards of 20,000 inhabitants were empowered to add peculiar regulations to this law *of general safety*. The Legislative Assembly, unquestionably, had no idea of preparing the way by this measure for the massacres which subsequently took place; but, surrounded by enemies within and without, it summoned all the citizens to keep watch upon them, in like manner as it had called them all to combat and participate in the administration.

The commune of Paris hastened to exercise these new powers, and made numerous arrests. Its members appeared in the light of conquerors still exasperated at the dangers just overcome, and at those yet greater they had to encounter, who seized upon their enemies, beaten down for the moment, but probably soon to rise again by the aid of foreigners. The surveillance committee of the commune of Paris was composed of the most violent persons. Marat, who, during the course of the revolution, had so recklessly thundered his anathemas, was the chairman of that committee, and of all men he was the most formidable when invested with such functions.

Besides this principal committee, the commune of Paris instituted a particular one in each section. It decreed that passports should be granted only upon

the investigation of the sectional assemblies; that travellers should be accompanied, either to the municipality, or to the gates of Paris, by two witnesses, who should attest the identity of the person who had demanded the passport, with that of him who used it for departure. It thus endeavoured, by the most stringent means, to prevent the escape of the suspected under fictitious names. It subsequently ordered that a catalogue should be drawn up of the enemies of the revolution, and invited the citizens, by proclamation, to denounce the criminals of the 10th August. It caused the editors who had supported the royal cause to be arrested, and gave their printing-presses to the patriot editors. Marat got four presses restored to him in triumph, which he alleged had been taken from him by the orders of *the traitor Lafayette*. Commissioners visited the prisons to set at liberty those who were incarcerated for exclamations and harangues against the court. Lastly, always on the alert to extend its influence, the commune, after the example of the assembly, dispatched deputies to gain over the army of Lafayette, concerning which much uneasiness was felt.

The commune was intrusted with a further charge, not less important, namely, that of guarding the royal family. The assembly had at first ordered its transference to the Luxumbourg, and on an objection being urged that that palace was difficult to guard, it decided for the mansion of the minister of justice. But the commune, holding now the police of the capital, and deeming itself, therefore, peculiarly charged with the safe keeping of the king, proposed the Temple, declaring it could not answer for his security unless enclosed within the tower of that ancient abbey. The assembly consented, and handed over the august prisoners to the mayor and the commander-in-chief Santerre, taking the guarantee of their personal responsibility.* Twelve commissioners from the council-general were appointed to keep watch without intermission at the Temple. Certain outer works had rendered this edifice a sort of fortress. Numerous detachments of the national guard formed its garrison by rotation, and no access was permitted, except by authority from the municipality. The assembly decreed that 500,000 francs should be taken from the treasury to provide for the maintenance of the royal family until the meeting of the National Convention.

The functions of the commune were, as may be gathered from the preceding relation, very extensive. Situated in the centre of the state, where sovereign powers were exercised, and urged by its ardour and energy to execute of itself whatever seemed to it too feebly attempted by the other authorities, it was led to make incessant encroachments. The assembly, discerning the necessity of restraining it within certain limits, decreed the election of a new departmental council, in lieu of that which had been dissolved on the day of the insurrection. The commune, perceiving itself threatened with the yoke of a superior authority, which would probably obstruct its course, as the old department had done, was furious at this decree, and ordered the sections to discontinue the election which had already commenced. The procurator-syndic Manuel was dispatched from the town-hall to the Feuillants', to present the remonstrances of the municipality. "The delegates of the citizens of Paris," said he, "require powers without limits: an authority placed between them and you will only sow the seeds of discord. It will compel the people, in order to deliver themselves from a power destructive of their sovereignty, once more to arm themselves for vengeance."

Such was the menacing language which the assembly had already to brook. It granted what was demanded; and, either because it deemed resistance impossible or imprudent, or because it considered it dangerous at the moment to shackle the energy of the commune, it decided that the new council should have no authority over the municipality, but simply constitute a committee of finance, intrusted with the superintendence of the public contributions in the department of the Seine.

Another much graver question occupied attention; one which was destined to elicit still more forcibly the different feelings which actuated the commune and the assembly. Loud clamours were raised for the punishment of those who had fired on the people, and who were alleged to be prepared for a fresh attack as soon as the enemy should draw nearer. These were alternatively styled *the conspirators of the 10th August*, and *the traitors*. The military commission, appointed on the 11th to try the Swiss, was deemed insufficient, because its powers were restricted to the prosecution of those military offenders. The criminal tribunal of the Seine seemed fettered by too tedious formalities; and besides, all authorities anterior to the 10th of August were looked upon with suspicion. The commune, therefore, demanded, on the 13th, the erection of a special tribunal to try *the crimes of the 10th August*, which should have sufficient powers to grasp all who were styled *the traitors*. The assembly referred the petition to its committee of twelve, appointed since the month of July for the purpose of devising and submitting measures of safety.

On the 14th, a fresh deputation from the commune appeared before the legislative body, in order to demand the decree relative to the extraordinary tribunal, declaring that, if it were not already passed, it was instructed to wait until that form was gone through. The deputy Gaston addressed some severe observations to the deputation, and it withdrew. The assembly persisted in refusing the creation of an extraordinary tribunal, and contented itself with authorising the established tribunals to take *cognisance of the crimes of the 10th August*.

A violent uproar broke out through Paris when intelligence of this resolution was disseminated. The section of the Quinze-Vingts appeared before the council-general of the commune, and announced that the tocsin would be rung in the Faubourg Saint-Antoine, unless the decree as solicited were immediately passed. The council-general thereupon dispatched a fresh deputation, at the head of which was Robespierre. He spoke in the name of the municipality, and made the most insolent remonstrances to the deputies. "The tranquillity of the people," said he to them, "depends on the punishment of the criminals, and yet you have done nothing to smite them. Your decree is insufficient. It fails to explain the nature and extent of the crimes to be punished, for it speaks only of the *crimes of the 10th August*, whereas the crimes of the enemies of the revolution extend far beyond the 10th August and the walls of Paris. Under such a phrase, the traitor Lafayette would escape the vengeance of the law! As to the form of the tribunal, the people can no longer tolerate that which you have continued to it. The double degree of jurisdiction causes interminable delays, and besides, all the old authorities are suspected; we must have new ones; it is essential that the tribunal asked for should be formed by deputies chosen in the sections, and should have the power of judging the culpable supremely, and without appeal."

This imperious remonstrance was aggravated by the supercilious tone of Robespierre. The assembly replied to the people of Paris by an address, in which it repudiated the idea of an extraordinary commission or star-chamber (*chambre ardente*), as unworthy of liberty, and fit only for despotism.

These reasonable observations produced no effect; the irritation only became the greater. Throughout all Paris nothing was spoken of but sounding the tocsin; and the following day, a representative of the

* The king and his family were conducted to the Temple on the evening of the 13th August.

commune, presenting himself at the bar, said to the assembly, "As a citizen, as a magistrate of the people, I come to announce to you that this very night the tocsin will ring, and the drums call to arms, at midnight. The people are weary of not being avenged. Tremble lest they take justice into their own hands.—I demand," cried the audacious petitioner, in conclusion, "that, without stirring, you decree that a citizen shall be named by each section to form a criminal tribunal."

This undisguised mandate aroused the assembly, and particularly the deputies Choudieu and Thuriot, who vehemently reprimanded the envoy of the commune. However, a debate commenced on the proposition of the commune, and being powerfully supported by the more violent members of the assembly, it was finally adopted and converted into a decree. An electoral body was thereby appointed to meet, in order to elect the members of an extraordinary tribunal, to be charged with the trial of the crimes committed during the era of the 10th August, *and other crimes thereunto relative and appurtenant.* This tribunal, divided into two sections, was to judge in the last resort, and without appeal. Such was the first formation of the revolutionary tribunal, and the first great impetus given by the spirit of vengeance to the forms of justice. It was called the tribunal of the 17th August.

The effect produced on the armies by the last revolution, and the manner in which they had received the decrees of the 10th, were still subjects of doubt at Paris. These were points of the utmost importance, on which, indeed, the fate of the last revolution mainly depended. The frontier continued distributed amongst three armies, called respectively, of the north, of the centre, and of the south. Luckner commanded the first, Lafayette the second, and Montesquiou the third. Since the unfortunate affairs of Mons and Tournay, Luckner, stimulated by Dumouriez, had again essayed the offensive towards the Low Countries; but he had been obliged to retreat, and on evacuating Courtray he had burnt the faubourgs, which act was made a serious ground of accusation against the ministry immediately previous to the king's suspension. Since then, the armies had remained in the most complete inaction, lying in intrenched camps, and confining themselves to slight skirmishes. Dumouriez, on quitting the ministry, had gone as lieutenant-general to Luckner, and had met with an unfavourable reception from the army, in which the spirit of the Lafayette party predominated. Luckner, wholly subject at that period to the same influence, dismissed Dumouriez to one of the intrenched camps, that of Maulde, and left him there with a small body of troops, to look after the defences and employ himself in forays.

Lafayette wishing, on account of the dangers which threatened the king, to be nearer Paris, was anxious to have the command of the north. He was unwilling, however, to quit his troops, by whom he was greatly beloved, and he arranged with Luckner to change positions, each with his own division; that is to say, both of them were to decamp, the one marching to the north and the other to the centre. This displacement of the armies in presence of an enemy might have been attended with danger, if the war had not fortunately been completely inactive. Luckner had consequently repaired to Metz, and Lafayette to Sedan. During this cross movement, Dumouriez, being ordered to follow the army of Luckner, to which he belonged, with his small corps, suddenly stopped in front of the enemy, who had made a feint to attack him, and he was compelled to remain in his camp, under fear of opening Flanders to the Duke of Saxe-Teschen. He called together the other generals who occupied separate camps near him, communicated with Dillon, who had arrived with a portion of Lafayette's army, and demanded a council of war at Valenciennes, to justify, on the ground of necessity, his disobedience to the orders of Luckner. In the mean time, Luckner had reached Metz, and Lafayette Sedan; and if the events of the 10th August had not opportunely happened, Dumouriez, in all probability, would have undergone arrest and military judgment for his refusal to march forward.

Such was the position of the armies, when intelligence of the overthrow of the throne was brought. One of the first cares of the Legislative Assembly had been, as we have seen, to depute three commissioners to the armies, bearing its decrees, and invested with authority to administer the new oath to the troops. The three commissioners, upon their arrival at Sedan, were received by the municipality, which held an order from Lafayette for their arrest. The mayor interrogated them upon the scenes of the 10th August, exacted a minute recital of all the events, and declared, according to secret instructions from Lafayette, that the Legislative Assembly was evidently no longer free, since it had pronounced the suspension of the king; that its commissioners were merely the emissaries of a factious band; and that they must be detained in the name of the constitution. They were, in fact, imprisoned; and Lafayette, in order to shield those who had simply executed his orders, took the act on his own head. Immediately subsequent to this proceeding, he administered to his army a renewed oath of fidelity to the law and the king, and issued a command that it should be repeated by all the divisions subject to his authority. He reckoned upon seventy-five departments, which had adhered to his letter of the 16th June; and he purposed to attempt a movement in opposition to that of the 10th August. Dillon, who was at Valenciennes under the orders of Lafayette, and held a superior command to Dumouriez, obeyed his general-in-chief, administered the oath of fidelity to the law and the king, and enjoined Dumouriez to do the same in his camp at Maulde. Dumouriez, judging more sagaciously of the future, and, furthermore, irritated against the Feuillants, under whose sway he now found himself, seized the opportunity to oppose them, and at the same time gain the favour of the new government, by repudiating the oath both for himself and his troops.

On the 17th, the very day on which the extraordinary criminal tribunal was so tumultuously established, a letter arrived at Paris, communicating the intelligence that the commissioners sent to the army of Lafayette had been arrested by his orders, and that the legislative authority was set at defiance. This information excited irritation rather than alarm, and the exclamations against Lafayette arose louder than ever. His impeachment was insisted upon, and the assembly reproached in no gentle terms for not having decreed it earlier. A condemnatory resolution was instantly passed against the department of the Ardennes; fresh commissioners were dispatched, with the same powers as their predecessors, and additionally commissioned to enlarge the prisoners. Other deputies were likewise sent to the army of Dillon. Lastly, on the morning of the 19th, the assembly declared Lafayette a traitor to the country, and pronounced against him a decree of impeachment.

The crisis was momentous, for if this resistance were not overcome, the new revolution would be utterly abortive. France, distracted between the republicans in the interior and the constitutionalists in the army, would be divided in front of the enemy, and lie exposed both to invasion and a fearful reaction. Lafayette naturally looked with disgust upon the revolution of the 10th August, involving as it did the abolition of the constitution of 1791, the accomplishment of all the aristocratic prophecies, and the justification of all the reproaches which the court had been wont to fulminate against liberty. It was impossible for him to see in this victory of democracy any thing but a bloody anarchy and an endless confusion. To us, this confusion has had its term, and the soil at least been defended against the enemy; but to Lafayette the

future was unknown and portentous, the defence of the territory seemed scarcely practicable amidst political convulsions, and he must have felt an irresistible desire to oppose the threatened chaos, by taking a hostile position as well against internal as external foes. But his situation was one of great difficulty, and such as no mortal talents could probably have surmounted. His army was devoted to him—true; but armies have no individual will, and can have none but such as is communicated to them by superior authority. When a revolution explodes with the violence of 1789, then, blindly hurried away, they desert from the ancient authority, because the new impulse is irresistible: but at present circumstances were different. Proscribed and degraded by a decree, Lafayette was quite incapable of rousing his troops against the authority of the interior by his mere military popularity, and, upon an impulse derived from himself alone, of successfully combating the revolutionary stimulus of the metropolis. Placed likewise between two enemies, and uncertain as to his course of duty, he could not but hesitate. The assembly, on the contrary, hesitated not an instant, but sent forth decree upon decree, and, supporting them by energetic commissioners, was sure to gain the ascendant over the irresolution of the general, and to decide the army. In fact, the troops of Lafayette successively swerved, and manifested an intention of abandoning him. The civil authorities, also, yieided to intimidation, and surrendered to the new commissioners. The example of Dumouriez, who declared for the revolution of the 10th August, was only required to give the concluding blow; and the malecontent general remained alone with his staff, which was composed of Feuillants or constitutional officers.

Bouillé, whose energy is above all question, and Dumouriez, whose great talents none can contest, were unable to act otherwise at different periods, and found themselves compelled to take flight. Lafayette was not destined to be more happy. Writing to the various civil authorities which had seconded him in his resistance, he took upon himself the responsibility of the orders given against the commissioners of the assembly, and quitted his camp on the 20th August, with a few officers, his friends and companions in arms and sentiments. Bureau de Puzy, Latour-Maubourg, and Lameth, accompanied him. They abandoned the camp, carrying with them but one month's pay, and followed by a few domestics. Lafayette left every thing in order in his army, and took care to make the necessary dispositions for resisting the enemy, in case of an attack. He sent back some troopers who escorted him, determined not to rob France of a single arm which might be raised in her defence; and on the 21st, he took with his friends the route to the Low Countries. Having reached the Austrian advanced posts, after a ride which had exhausted their horses, these first emigrants of liberty were arrested, contrary to the laws of nations, and treated as prisoners of war. Great was the joy when the name of Lafayette echoed in the camp of the coalition, and it became known that he was a captive in the hands of the aristocratic league. The opportunity of exulting over one of the earliest friends of the revolution, and of charging upon the revolution itself the persecution of its first authors—to see verified all the excesses that malice had predicted—were gratifications indeed; and less would have sufficed to spread universal satisfaction amongst the European aristocracy.

Lafayette claimed for himself and his friends the liberty which was their undoubted right; but his appeals were in vain. It was offered him on condition of a recantation, not of all his opinions, but of one only—that relative to the abolition of nobility. He refused it on such terms, and threatened, if his words were falsely reported, to give the contradiction before a public officer. He received irons, therefore, as the reward of his constancy; and even when he was led to believe liberty stifled in Europe and in France, his mind was calm and sedate, and he never ceased to regard it as the most precious of blessings. He still asserted its sacred cause, both with the oppressors who immured him in a dungeon, and with his old associates who had remained in France. "Still love liberty," he wrote to the latter, "in spite of its storms, and serve your country." If we compare his defection with that of Bouillé, abandoning his country to re-enter it with hostile sovereigns, or with that of Dumouriez, quarrelling with the convention, under which he had served, not from any honest conviction, but from personal pique, we shall render justice to the man who forsook France only when the truth in which he put his faith was proscribed within it, and who submitted neither to execrate nor abjure it in foreign armies, but, on the contrary, professed and maintained it even amidst the horrors of a prison.

Let us not blame Dumouriez, however, too harshly for we shall soon have reason to estimate his memorable services. This able and flexible man had perfectly comprehended the rising power. After having rendered himself almost independent by his refusal to obey Luckner, and to quit the camp at Maulde, after having rejected the oath enjoined by Dillon, he was now recompensed for his discernment by the command-in-chief of the armies of the north and centre. Dillon, brave, impetuous, but shortsighted, was at first deprived of his command for having obeyed Lafayette; but he was reinstated through the credit of Dumouriez, who, keeping a steadfast eye on his ultimate object, and anxious to alienate in his progress as few men as possible, warmly defended him to the commissioners of the assembly. Dumouriez then found himself general-in-chief along the whole frontier from Metz to Dunkirk. Luckner was at Metz with his army, formerly that of the north. Influenced at first by Lafayette, he had given tokens of a resistance to the 10th August; but, speedily yielding to his army and the commissioners of the assembly, he succumbed to the decrees, and, after a fresh shower of tears, gave in to the new impulse imparted to him.

The 10th August and the advanced season were motives for deciding the coalition at length to push the war with activity. The dispositions of the European powers were not changed with regard to France. England, Holland, Denmark, and Switzerland, still promised a strict neutrality. Sweden, since the death of Gustavus, had sincerely returned to a like policy. The Italian states were inimical enough, but fortunately pretty powerless. Spain did not yet declare herself, and continued distracted by conflicting intrigues. There remained as decided enemies, Russia and the two principal courts of Germany. But Russia still adhered to mere demonstrations of her high displeasure, and contented herself with dismissing the French ambassador. Prussia and Austria alone marched armies to the frontiers of France. Amongst the other German states, only the three ecclesiastical electors and the landgraves of the two Hesses had taken an active part in the coalition; the remainder were waiting to be constrained to that course.

In this state of things, 138,000 men, perfectly organised and disciplined, menaced France, which could oppose to them at the utmost but 120,000, scattered along an immense frontier, forming at no point a sufficient mass, deprived of their officers, without confidence either in themselves or their generals, and hitherto invariably worsted in the war of posts they had kept up. The plan of the coalition was to overpower France at once, by penetrating through the Ardennes and marching by Châlons upon Paris. The two sovereigns of Prussia and Austria had repaired in person to Mayence. Sixty thousand Pussians, full of the traditions and the glory of Frederick, advanced in a single column upon the French centre, marching by Luxumbourg upon Longwy. Twenty thousand Austrians, commanded by General Clairfayt, supported

them on the right by the occupation of Stenay. Sixteen thousand Austrians, under the orders of the Prince of Hohenlohe-Kirchberg, and ten thousand Hessians, flanked the left of the Prussians. The Duke of Saxe-Teschen occupied the Low Countries, and threatened their fortresses. The Prince of Condé, with six thousand French emigrants, had proceeded towards Philipsbourg. Several other corps of emigrants were distributed in the various Prussian and Austrian armies. The foreign courts, unwilling to allow the emigrants, by a general union, to acquire too considerable an influence, had designed at first to incorporate them in the German regiments, and afterwards consented to let them exist as distinct corps, but with the precaution of dividing them amongst the armies of the coalition. These corps were chiefly composed of officers who had submitted to serve as private soldiers; they constituted a brilliant cavalry, but better suited to display a chivalric valour on a day of peril than to sustain the fatigues of a long campaign.

The French armies were disposed in the worst possible manner for resisting such a concentration of strength. Three generals, Beurnonville, Moreton, and Duval, commanded thirty thousand men in three separate camps, at Maulde, Maubeuge, and Lille. These comprised the whole resources of France on the frontier towards the north and the Low Countries. The army of Lafayette, disorganised by the departure of its general, and distracted by the greatest variety of sentiments, was encamped at Sedan, to the amount of twenty-three thousand men. Dumouriez was on the point of assuming the command of it. The army of Luckner, composed of twenty thousand men, occupied Metz, and had, like all the others, just received a new general, in the person of Kellermann. The assembly, though discontented with Luckner, had abstained nevertheless from dismissing him altogether. In transferring his command to Kellermann, it had preserved to him, under the title of generalissimo, the care of organising the new army of reserve, and the purely honorary charge of advising the generals. Lastly, there were Custine, who, with fifteen thousand men, occupied Landau; and Biron, who, stationed in Alsace with thirty thousand men, was too far removed from the principal theatre of the war to influence the fate of the campaign.

The only two collections of troops posted on the line of march of the grand army of the coalition, were the twenty-three thousand men forsaken by Lafayette, and the twenty thousand of Kellermann, ranged around Metz. If the grand army of invasion, adapting its movements to its main design, had marched rapidly on Sedan, whilst the troops of Lafayette, deprived of a general, a prey to disorder, and, not being yet joined by Dumouriez, without unity or direction, the principal defensive army had been forced, the Ardennes laid open, and the other generals obliged to retrograde with precipitation to effect a junction behind the Marne. It is possible they might not have had time to come from Lille and Metz to Chalons and Rheims; then Paris lying uncovered, there would have remained to the new government only the forlorn project of a camp under Paris or flight beyond the Loire.

But if France defended herself with all the disorder of a revolutionary convulsion, the foreign powers attacked with all the want of concert and divergent views of a coalition. The King of Prussia, intoxicated with the idea of an easy conquest, flattered and deceived by the emigrants, who depicted the invasion to him as a simple *military promenade*, was eager for the most daring enterprise. But he had too prudent a counsellor by his side in the Duke of Brunswick, for his presumption to have even the happy consequences of audacity and promptitude. The Duke of Brunswick, perceiving the season far advanced, the country very differently affected from what the emigrants had represented, and furthermore somewhat correctly appreciating the revolutionary energy by the insurrection of the 10th August, concluded that the most expedient course was to make sure of a solid base of operations on the Moselle, by laying siege to Metz and Thionville, and to defer until the following season the renewal of hostilities, with all the advantages of preceding conquests. This contest between the precipitation of the sovereign and the prudence of the general, joined to the tardiness of the Austrians, who appeared under the command of the Prince of Hohenlohe to the number of but eighteen thousand men instead of fifty thousand, prevented any decisive movement. However, the Prussian army continued to advance towards the centre, and came on the 20th before Longwy, one of the fortresses nearest the line of frontier.

Dumouriez, who had always believed that an invasion of the Low Countries would cause a revolution to break out, and that such a diversion would preserve France from the inroads of Germany, had made every preparation to push forward, the very day he received his commission of general-in-chief of the two armies. He was on the point of acting on the offensive against the Prince of Saxe-Teschen, when Westermann, who had evinced such energy on the 10th August, and was now one of the commissioners to the army of Lafayette, reached him with information of what was passing on the theatre of the grand invasion. On the 22d, Longwy had opened its gates to the Prussians, after a bombardment of a few hours. The disordered state of the garrison and the imbecility of the commandant, were the causes of its speedy surrender. Elated with this conquest, and the captivity of Lafayette, the Prussians were more than ever disposed to the plan of a prompt invasion. The army of Lafayette was lost, unless the new general came to encourage it by his presence, and to direct its movements in a beneficial manner. Such was the substance of Westermann's communication.

Dumouriez forthwith abandoned his favourite project, and on the 25th or the 26th repaired to Sedan, where his first appearance provoked amongst the troops murmurs and reproaches. He was the enemy of Lafayette, whom they still regarded with affection. On him, likewise, was laid the odium of this unfortunate war, since it was under his ministry it had been declared; and furthermore, he was considered as a man of the pen rather than of the sword. Such objections were industriously circulated in the camp, and frequently reached the ears of the general. Dumouriez was not at all disconcerted. He began by cheering the courage of his troops, affecting himself a firm and tranquil demeanour; and he was not long in making them feel the influence of a more vigorous command. But the position of twenty-three thousand men, in deplorable disorganisation, was nearly desperate thus in presence of eighty thousand, perfectly disciplined. The Prussians, after taking Longwy, had blockaded Thionville, and were advancing on Verdun, which was much less capable of resistance than the fortress of Longwy.

The generals, called together by Dumouriez, were all of opinion that the Prussians should not be waited for at Sedan, but that a rapid retreat should be made behind the Marne, and intrenchments there thrown up as well as circumstances would permit, in order to await the junction of the other armies, and thus cover the capital, which only forty leagues separated from the enemy. They all held that if a defeat were sustained in attempting to oppose the invasion, the rout would be complete; the army, utterly disorganised, would not rally between Sedan and Paris itself; and the Prussians march thither directly, and at a conqueror's pace. Such was the military situation of France, and the opinion entertained of it by her generals.

The idea formed in Paris upon the subject was not more cheerful, and the sense of danger aggravated the exasperation of the public mind. And yet that immense metropolis, which had never seen an enemy

within its precincts, and estimated its power in proportion to its extent and population, was led with difficulty to imagine the possibility of its forcible occupation: thus it dreaded the military dangers which were not perceived, and were still at a distance from it, infinitely less than the danger of a reaction on the part of the royalists, for the moment suppressed. Whilst on the frontier the generals saw only the Prussians, in the interior the people beheld only aristocrats silently conspiring for the destruction of liberty.

The people said amongst themselves that the king indeed was a prisoner, but that his party did not the less exist and conspire, as before the 10th August, to open Paris to the stranger. They pictured to themselves all the large mansions in the capital filled with armed bands, ready to issue forth on the first signal, to release Louis XVI., to seize upon all authority, and to deliver France a defenceless prey to the vengeance of emigrants and foreigners. This understanding between the internal and the external enemy was perpetually present to the minds of all. "*We must*," said they, "*be delivered from traitors;*" and the frightful idea was already generated of slaughtering the vanquished—an idea with the great majority a mere impulse of the imagination, but which, with certain men, more bloodthirsty, more enthusiastic, or more eager for action, might resolve itself into a real and deliberate plan.

We have already learnt that the question of avenging the people for the injuries received during the course of the 10th August had been canvassed, and that a warm altercation had arisen between the assembly and the commune on the subject of the revolutionary tribunal. This tribunal, which had already consigned to death Dangremont and the unfortunate Laporte, the intendant of the civil list, was not sufficiently speedy in its action to satisfy a furious and frantic populace, which beheld enemies in every quarter. It needed prompter forms to punish *the traitors*, and it especially clamoured for judgment on the prisoners transferred to the high court of Orleans. Those, for the most part, were ministers and distinguished functionaries, impeached for high crimes and misdemeanors. Delessart, the former minister of foreign affairs, was of the number. Cries were raised on all sides against the slowness of the processes; the transference of the prisoners to Paris was insisted upon, and their instant condemnation by the tribunal of the 17th August. The assembly, being petitioned on this subject, or rather summoned to yield to the general wish and pass at once a decree of transference, had made a courageous resistance. The high national court, it said, was a constitutional establishment, which it had no power to alter, inasmuch as it did not possess constituent functions, and because it was the right of every accused to be tried only according to existing laws. This question had once more stimulated crowds of petitioners; and the assembly had to resist the united clamours of a furious minority, of the commune, and of the outrageous sections. It contented itself, however, with rendering certain forms of process more expeditious, decreeing, at the same time, that the prisoners before the high court should remain at Orleans, and not be withdrawn from the jurisdiction secured to them by the constitution.

Thus two opinions were formed—the one in favour of sparing the vanquished, without, however, displaying less energy against the foreign enemy; and the other in favour of a preliminary extermination of secret foes before advancing against the armed enemies moving towards Paris. This latter was less an opinion than a blind and ferocious sentiment, compounded of terror and rage, and calculated to grow more intense with the increase of danger.

The Parisians were excited to greater fury from the consciousness of their city, the focus of all the insurrections, and the ultimate object of the foreign aggression, being exposed to the whole brunt of danger. They accused the assembly, composed as it was of deputies from the departments, of a desire to retreat into the provinces. The Girondists especially, who belonged for the most part to the southern districts of the kingdom, and formed that moderate majority so odious to the commune, were accused of a design to sacrifice Paris from hatred for the capital. They thus attributed to them sentiments sufficiently natural, and such as the Parisians might well imagine they had provoked; but the deputies in question loved their country and their cause too sincerely to dream of abandoning Paris. It is true, they had always held that if the north were lost they should fall back on the south; and it is also true, that at this very moment, some amongst them considered it prudent to transport the seat of government beyond the Loire; but an intention to sacrifice a hateful city, and trans fer the government to a locality where they would be masters, never entered their minds. They had too much elevation of sentiment, were as yet too powerful, and relied too much on the approaching meeting of the convention, to think thus early of detaching themselves from Paris.

Accusations, therefore, were made at once against their indulgence towards traitors, and their indifference towards the interests of the capital. Exposed to a constant struggle with the most violent men, they could scarcely bear up against the activity and energy of their adversaries, even though they possessed the advantages of reason and numbers. In the executive council they were five to one; for besides the three ministers, Clavière, Servan, and Roland, selected from their very bosom, two others, Monge and Lebrun, were likewise men of their choosing. But the one Danton, who, without being their personal enemy, shared neither in their moderation nor in their opinions—the single Danton, we repeat, ruled the council, and destroyed all their influence. Whilst Clavière was labouring to scrape together some financial resources, Servan bustling to procure reinforcements for the generals, and Roland distributing sagacious missives, with a view to instruct the provincial public, to direct the local authorities, to prevent their abuses of power, and check violence of every description, Danton was engaged in filling the offices of administration with his creatures. He dispatched on all missions his faithful Cordeliers, procuring by such means numerous supporters for himself, and enabling his friends to partake of the profits of the revolution. Convincing or intimidating his colleagues, he experienced no obstacle but in the rigid inflexibility of Roland, who frequently repudiated the measures or the men he proposed. Danton was irritated at this opposition, without, however, coming to any open rupture with Roland; and he strove with the greater pertinacity to carry as many nominations and decisions as possible.

Danton, whose domination was centred in Paris, naturally desired its preservation, and was resolute in opposing any scheme for transferring the government beyond the Loire. Endowed with a wonderful audacity of mind, the man to proclaim the insurrection on the eve of the 10th August, when all besides drooped and hesitated, was not likely to recoil, or uphold any doctrine but the necessity of perishing in the ruins of the capital. Master of the council, closely allied with Marat and the surveillance committee of the commune, listened to in all the clubs, and living in the midst of the multitude as in an element he agitated at pleasure, Danton was the most powerful man in Paris; and this power, based on a natural violence of disposition, which brought him in unison with the passions of the people, boded little forbearance to the vanquished. In his revolutionary ardour, Danton inclined to all the ideas of vengeance which were so hateful to the Girondists. He was the chief of that Parisian party whose motto was, "We will not retreat; we will perish in the capital and beneath its ruins; but our enemies shall perish before us!" Thus the minds of

men were trained to the contemplation of atrocious projects, and horrible scenes were destined to be the dismal consequence.

On the 26th, a rumour of the fall of Longwy spread with rapidity, and caused a general agitation in Paris. During the whole day its probability was disputed; but at length it was placed beyond all doubt, and it became known that the place had opened its gates after a bombardment of a few hours. So great a ferment ensued, that the assembly decreed the penalty of death against whomsoever should propose to surrender in a besieged fortress. On the demand of the commune, it was ordered that Paris and the contiguous departments should furnish, within a few days, thirty thousand men armed and equipped. The enthusiasm which reigned rendered such a muster easy; and the numbers who enrolled themselves lessened the apprehensions of danger. It was not to be imagined at the moment, that a hundred thousand Prussians would be able to prevail over several millions of men determined to defend themselves. Renewed activity was manifested in forming the camp under Paris; and all the women assembled in the churches to participate in preparing the materials of encampment.

Danton appeared at the commune, and on a proposition submitted by him, the adoption of certain extreme measures was voted. It was resolved to make in all the sections a list of the indigent, and to give them a pecuniary allowance and arms. By a second resolution, the disarming and arrest of all suspected persons were ordered; and under that designation were included the entire list of those who had signed the petitions against the events of the 20th June and the decree for the camp below Paris. To effect this sweeping measure of disarming and arresting, the expedient of domiciliary visits was suggested, and forthwith organised after a mode truly frightful. The barriers were appointed to be shut during forty-eight hours, commencing on the 29th August at sunset; and no permission to pass could be granted on any pretence. Guard-boats were stationed on the river, to prevent flight by that outlet. The surrounding communes were charged to apprehend whomsoever should be detected in the fields or on the roads. The roll of drums was to announce the coming visits, and at that signal every citizen was bound to repair to his own residence, under pain of being deemed suspected of assembling, if he were found at the house of another. For this reason, all the sectional assemblies, and the extraordinary tribunal itself, were to be suspended during those two days. Commissioners selected from the commune, accompanied by an armed force, were empowered to make the visits, to confiscate arms, and to apprehend the suspected; that is to say, the signers of the petitions already mentioned, the non-juring priests, the citizens who should prevaricate in their declarations, those against whom denunciations had been lodged, *et cetera*. At ten at night vehicles were to cease running, and the city was to be illuminated during all the hours of darkness.

Such were the measures resolved upon to secure the arrest of (as they were called) *the bad citizens secreted since the 10th August*. The visits were commenced on the evening of the 29th, and one party, abandoned to the mercy of another, was exposed to be cast wholesale into prison. All who had belonged to the court, either by holding offices, or by rank, or by attendance at the palace; all who had declared for it on occasion of the various royalist movements; all who had dastardly enemies capable of seeking vengeance by denunciation, were thrown into prison, to the number of twelve or fifteen thousand persons. It was the surveillance committee of the commune that presided over these arrests, and witnessed their execution. Those whom it designated for apprehension were first conducted from their residences to the committee of their section, and thence to the committee of the commune. There they were briefly questioned as to their opinions, and the acts which demonstrated their greater or less degree of energy. Frequently a single member of the committee interrogated them, whilst the other members, exhausted by a vigil of several days, were asleep on the chairs and tables. The individuals arrested were detained at the town-hall in the first instance, and subsequently distributed into the prisons where any room was yet to be found. In them were now incarcerated representatives of all the opinions that had successively reigned up till the 10th August, inheritors of distinctions levelled to the dust, and simple tradesmen, already deemed equally aristocratic with dukes and princes.

Consternation prevailed throughout Paris. The republicans felt themselves menaced by the Prussian armies; and the royalists were menaced by the republicans. The committee *of general defence*, appointed by the assembly to advise on measures for resisting the enemy, met on the 30th, and called to its aid the executive council, in order to hold a solemn deliberation on the means of public safety. The meeting was numerous; for to the actual members of the committee were added a great many deputies, who had desired to attend that sitting. Various opinions were expressed. The minister Servan stated he had no confidence in the armies, and that he held it impossible for Dumouriez, with the twenty-three thousand men Lafayette had left him, to stop the Prussians. He saw no position between them and Paris sufficiently strong to take up and check their march. Every one agreed with him on this point; and after having resolved to concentrate the whole population under the walls of Paris, there to sustain the combat of despair, the retreat to Saumur in the last extremity was spoken of, as a plan for interposing between the enemy and the authorities invested with the national sovereignty a fresh interval and fresh obstacles. Vergniaud and Guadet opposed the idea of quitting Paris. After them, Danton spoke:—

"It is proposed to you," said he, "to quit Paris. You are not ignorant that, in the opinion of our enemies, Paris represents France, and that to yield them this position is to abandon the revolution. To retreat is to ruin ourselves. We must, therefore, maintain ourselves here at all hazards, and save ourselves by audacity. Amongst the measures proposed, none has seemed to me effective. We ought not to dissemble the situation in which the 10th August has placed us. It has divided us into republicans and royalists; the first scanty, the latter abundant, in numbers. In this state of weakness, we republicans are exposed to two fires—that of the enemy situated without, and that of the royalists situated within. There is a royal directory which sits secretly at Paris, and corresponds with the Prussian army. To tell you where it meets, who are its members, is out of the power of the ministers. But in order to disconcert it, and to prevent its disastrous correspondence with the enemy, *it is necessary, it is indispensable, to strike terror into the royalists!*"

At these words, accompanied by a gesture significant of extermination, horror was depicted on every countenance. "It is indispensable, I tell you," resumed Danton, "to strike terror into the royalists. It is in Paris, above all things, it behoves you to maintain yourselves; and it is not by exhausting your strength in uncertain combats that you will succeed." A sudden stupor spread over the council. Not a word of rejoinder was given to Danton; and all moved away without any precise comprehension—without venturing, indeed, to form any surmise of what projects were devising by the minister.

He immediately proceeded to the committee of surveillance at the commune, which arbitrarily disposed of the persons of all citizens, and in which Marat reigned supreme. The colleagues of Marat, his ignorant and blind instruments, were Panis and Sergent,

already signalised on the 20th June and the 10th August, and certain persons respectively named Jourdeuil, Duplain, Lefort, and Lenfant. There, during the night between Thursday the 30th and Friday the 31st August, horrible schemes were meditated against the unfortunate persons detained in the prisons of Paris. A deplorable and terrible example of political passion! Danton, whom we have always represented as without hatred against his personal enemies, and frequently accessible to emotions of pity, lent his daring spirit to the infernal reveries of Marat. They arranged in conjunction a project, such as several earlier ages have witnessed, but which, at the end of the eighteenth century, cannot be explained by the ignorance of the times or the ferocity of manners. We have seen, three years previously, a certain Maillard figuring at the head of some infuriated women, during the famous days of the 5th and 6th October. This Maillard, formerly a tipstaff, a clever but bloodthirsty personage, had drawn together a band of brutal men, fit for any desperate deed, and such as are found in those classes amongst which education has not corrected the impulses by improving the understanding. He then was known to be the leader of such a band; and if we may credit a recent publication, he was instructed "to hold himself in readiness to act on the first signal, to plant himself in an effective and sure manner, to prepare instruments, to arrange precautions for preventing the shrieks of victims, to provide vinegar, birch-brooms, quick-lime, covered carts, *et cetera*."

In the mean time, a rumour of some terrible execution was silently disseminated. The relatives of the prisoners were in mortal agony, and the plot, like those of the 10th August, the 20th June, and other eras, transpired beforehand through sinister portents. On all sides were men repeating that it was necessary, by a terrible example, to paralyse the conspirators, who, from the depths of prisons, were in correspondence with the foreigner. They complained of the dilatoriness of the tribunal erected to punish the criminals of the 10th August, and demanded, with cries of fury, prompt justice. On the 31st, the ex-minister Montmorin was acquitted by the tribunal of the 17th August; and it was forthwith proclaimed to the outermost suburb that treason was rampant every where, and that impunity to the guilty was assured. The same day it was confidently asserted that a condemned prisoner had made revelations. These revelations imported that, during the night, the prisoners were to escape from the jails, seize upon arms, spread themselves through the city, wreak a full measure of vengeance, then release the king, and open Paris to the Prussians. Meanwhile, the captives thus accused were trembling for their lives; their relatives were in the utmost consternation, and the royal family itself expected nothing but death in the recesses of the Temple donjon.

At the Jacobin Club, in the sections, in the council of the commune, and in the majority of the assembly, were many men who implicitly believed in these plots imputed to the captives, and scrupled not to assert their extermination to be lawful and right. Surely nature does not produce so many monsters for one moment of time, and it is the spirit of party alone which can warp the intellect of so many men at once! How mournful a lesson for nations! A belief in dangers is prevalent, a strong conviction of the necessity of repelling them is felt; this cry is incessantly repeated; frenzy is engendered; and whilst certain men lightly say that some blow ought really to be struck, others strike the blow with sanguinary daring.

On Saturday the 1st September, the forty-eight hours fixed for the closing of the barriers and the execution of the domiciliary visits had elapsed, and the communications were re-established. But a sudden report was spread during the day of the capture of Verdun. That fortress was only invested, but it was currently believed that it had fallen, and that a fresh treason had delivered it, like Longwy. Danton caused it to be immediately decreed by the commune that on the following day, the 2d of September, the muster-drums should be beat, the tocsin sounded, the alarm-guns fired; and that all the disposable citizens should assemble in arms on the Champ de Mars, there bivouac during the rest of the day, and depart the next morning to plant themselves under the walls of Verdun. From such portentous stimulants it was evident that something more than a general levy was contemplated. Relatives ran in haste, and used every effort to obtain the enlargement of prisoners dear to them. Manuel, the procurator-syndic, being entreated by a generous female, set at liberty, it is said, two captives of the family of Latrémouille. Another woman, Madame Fausse-Lendry, obstinately desiring to follow her uncle, the Abbé de Rastignac, into captivity, was answered by Sergent in these words, "You are very imprudent; *the prisons are not safe*."

The following day, the 2d September, was a Sunday, and the prevailing idleness augmented the popular ferment. Numerous groups were gathered at all points, and it was loudly proclaimed that the enemy might be at Paris in three days. The commune informed the assembly of the measures it had taken to raise a general levy of the citizens. Vergniaud, giving way to a patriotic enthusiasm, instantly mounted the tribune, congratulated the Parisians on their courage, and applauded them for converting the barren zeal of speech into the more active and beneficial zeal of martial heroism. "It appears," said he, "that the plan of the enemy is to march straight upon the capital, leaving the fortifications behind him. So be it!—such a project will be our salvation and his ruin. Our armies, too weak to resist him, will be at least strong enough to harass him in the rear; and when he arrives, followed by our battalions, he will find himself in presence of the Parisian army, drawn up in battle array under the walls of the capital; and then, enveloped on all sides, he will be exterminated by the land he has profaned. But amidst these flattering hopes, there is one danger which must not be dissembled, and it is that of panics. Our enemies count upon them, lavish gold to produce them; and you are aware there are men kneaded of so slimy a mud, that they decompose at the slightest shock of danger. I wish this race without souls, but with the human form, could be distinguished, all its members gathered into one town—Longwy, for example—to be called the town of poltroons; and there, the objects of contumely, they could no longer diffuse alarm amongst their fellow-citizens, no longer lead them to take dwarfs for giants, or the dust flying before a company of Hulans for embattled battalions!

Parisians! it is now you are called upon to display a grand energy. Why are the intrenchments of the camp not more advanced? Where are the spades and mattocks which reared the altar of the federation and levelled the Champ de Mars? You have manifested an exemplary ardour for festivals; you will doubtless not evince less for battles. You have celebrated and sung the songs of liberty; now you must defend it! We have no longer mere kings of brass to cast down, but kings living, and armed with all their power. I therefore move that the national assembly gives the first example, and sends twelve commissioners, not to make exhortations, but to labour and hew with their own hands, in the face of all the citizens."

This proposition was adopted with the greatest enthusiasm. Danton followed Vergniaud; he expatiated upon the measures already adopted, and proposed additional ones. "One part of the people," said he, "is about to depart for the frontiers, another to dig intrenchments, and a third with pikes will defend the interior of our towns. But this is not enough; we must dispatch into all quarters commissioners and couriers to bring the whole of France into an imitation of Paris· we must pass a decree by which every citizen

shall be obliged, under penalty of death, to serve in person or to furnish his arms." He added, in conclusion: "The guns you will shortly hear are not the guns of alarm—they are to sound the charge upon the enemies of the country. To vanquish them, to overwhelm them, what is needed? *Boldness! still boldness, for ever boldness!*"

The words and gestures of the minister produced a profound sensation amongst all present. His suggestion was acceded to, and a decree passed in accordance; he then left and repaired to the committee of surveillance. All the authorities, all the bodies—the assembly, the commune, the sections, the clubs—were sitting. The ministers, assembled at the office of the admiralty, were waiting for Danton to hold a council. The entire city was agitated. Profound terror pervaded the prisons. At the Temple, the royal family, which every commotion was calculated to alarm more than any other prisoners, inquired with great anxiety the cause of so much agitation. In the various prisons, the jailors were themselves dismayed. The governor of the Abbey had early in the morning sent away his wife and children. Dinner had been served to the prisoners two hours before the accustomed time, and all the knives removed from their napkins. Struck with these circumstances, they urgently questioned their keepers, but could elicit no reply. At length, as the clocks tolled two, the drums began to beat, the tocsin was rung, and the alarm-guns resounded through the capital. Groups of citizens repaired to the Champ de Mars; others surrounded the commune and the assembly, and blocked up the public places.

At the town-hall were twenty-four priests, arrested for their refusal to take the oath, who were intended to be transferred from the room of provisional detention to the dungeons of the Abbey. Either intentionally or otherwise, this moment was chosen for their removal. They were placed in six hackney-coaches, escorted by Breton and Marseillese federalists, and conducted at a slow pace towards the Faubourg Saint-Germain, along the quays, the Pont Neuf, and the Rue Dauphine. A mob surrounded and overwhelmed them with execrations. "These are the conspirators," said the federalists, "who are to murder our wives and children whilst we are absent on the frontiers!" These words tended still more to increase the tumult. The doors of the vehicles were opened; the unfortunate ecclesiastics attempted to shut them, so as to shelter themselves from injurious treatment, but they were prevented, and compelled to suffer with patience the blows and curses showered upon them. At length they reached the court of the Abbey, where an immense crowd was already congregated. This court led to the cells, and communicated with the room in which the committee of the section Quatre-Nations held its sittings. The first coach stopped before the door of the committee-room, and was immediately surrounded by a horde of infuriated men. Maillard was present. The carriage-door was thrown open; the nearest of the prisoners advanced to alight and enter the committee, but he was instantly pierced with a thousand daggers. The second threw himself back in the coach, but he was pulled out by main force, and slaughtered like the first. The two others met with the same fate in their turn; and the assassins abandoned that vehicle to attack those which followed. They arrived one after the other in the fatal court; and the last of the twenty-four priests was murdered amidst the yells of the furious populace.*

At this moment hastily arrived Billaud-Varennes, a member of the communal council, and the only one amongst the organisers of these massacres who constantly defended them, and witnessed their perpetration with intrepid cruelty. He appeared wearing his official scarf, made his way through the blood and over the corpses, and addressed the mob of murderers in terms of approbation. "People," said he, "you exterminate your enemies; you do your duty." A voice was raised after Billaud had ceased; it was the voice of Maillard. "There's nothing more to be done here," he cried; "let us go to the Carmelites'." His band followed him; and all rushed tumultuously towards the church of the Carmelites, in which two hundred priests had been imprisoned. They broke into the church, and killed those unfortunate ecclesiastics as they prayed to Heaven, and embraced each other under impending death. They then raised loud shouts for the Archbishop of Arles, sought for, discovered, and dispatched him by cleaving his skull with a sabre. After wielding their swords in the slaughter, they levelled their fire-arms, and poured general volleys into the chambers and the garden, upon the walls and the trees, where many of the victims had fled to save themselves.

Whilst this massacre was proceeding at the Carmelite Church, Maillard returned to the Abbey with a part of his gang. Covered with blood and sweat, he entered the committee of the section of the Quatre-Nations, and demanded *wine for the brave labourers who were delivering the nation from its enemies.* The affrighted committee granted them twenty-four quarts.

The wine was served in the court, upon tables surrounded by the victims of the afternoon's massacre. After drinking, Maillard suddenly exclaimed, pointing to the prison, "To the Abbey!" At these words a new impulse was imparted to the assassins, and they commenced an attack upon the gate. The trembling prisoners heard the howls, and knew them to be the signals of death. The jailor and his wife fainted away. The doors were forced open; the first captives that offered were seized, dragged by the feet, and thrown all bleeding into the court. Whilst these were being slaughtered without distinction, Maillard and his associates demanded the prison register and the keys of the different wards. One of them, advancing towards the wicket, mounted on a stool, and commenced an harangue. "My friends," said he, "you are anxious to destroy the aristocrats who are the enemies of the people, and who designed to cut the throats of your wives and children whilst you were on the frontiers. You have good reason, doubtless; but you are good citizens, who love justice, and would be torn by remorse if you steeped your hands in innocent blood." "Yes! yes!" shouted the assassins. "Very well; then, I ask you, when you are thus rushing like infuriated tigers, without inquiry or discrimination, upon men who are unknown to you, do you not run the risk of confounding the innocent with the guilty?" The speaker was interrupted by one of his hearers, who, holding a sword in his hand, exclaimed in his turn, "Do you also wish to set us asleep? If the Prussians and Austrians were at Paris, would they seek to distinguish the guilty? I have a wife and children whom I will not leave in danger. If you please, you can give arms to these *rascals*, and we will fight them with equal numbers; but before we depart, Paris must be purged." "He is right—we must enter!" said the others, and they pushed forward. They were stopped, however, and compelled to consent to a species of trial. It was agreed that the prison register should be consulted, and that one of the assailants should perform the functions of a president, read aloud the names, the causes of detention, and pronounce upon the spot the fate of each prisoner. "Maillard! Maillard for president!" cried several voices, and that person immediately assumed the office. This terrible president seated himself at a table, spread before him the prison records, called around him some men selected at hazard to assist with their counsel, appointed others to bring forth the prisoners from the cells, and disposed the rest at the door to finish the murders. In order to avoid scenes of agony and despair, it was arranged that he should pronounce these words, "*The*

* Excepting one only, the Abbé Sicard, who was saved by a miracle.

gentleman to La Force," when the prisoner, being pushed through the wicket, would be delivered over, without suspecting it, to the swords awaiting him.

The first brought forward were the Swiss detained at the Abbey, their officers having been conducted to the Conciergerie. "It was you," said Maillard to them, "who assassinated the people on the 10th August." "We were attacked," replied the wretched captives, "and we obeyed our leaders." "Well," coolly observed Maillard, "we only intend to conduct you to La Force." But the unfortunate Swiss had got a glimpse of the threatening swords on the other side of the wicket, and could not be deceived. They were urged to advance, but they recoiled and fell back. One of them, with a firmer spirit, asked where it was intended they should pass. The door was opened before him, and, lowering his head, he precipitated himself into the midst of the swords and pikes. The others rushed after him, and all suffered a like fate.

The executioners returned to the cells, collected the women into one chamber, and brought out fresh prisoners. Some amongst them, accused of forging assignats, were the first to fall. After them came the celebrated Montmorin, whose acquittal had caused so great a tumult, but had not procured him his freedom. Conducted before the blood-stained president, he declared, that having pleaded before a regular tribunal, he could not recognise any other. "In that case," replied Maillard, "you must go to La Force to await a new trial." The ex-minister, effectually deceived, craved a coach. He was informed he would find one at the gate. He made a fresh request for some effects, proceeded to the door, and received immediate death.

Thierry, the king's valet-de-chambre, was afterwards led out. "Like master, like servant," said Maillard; and the wretched man was dispatched. Subsequently came the justices of peace Buob and Bocquillon, accused of having formed part of the secret committee at the Tuileries, upon which ground they were killed. The night thus advanced, and each prisoner, as he heard the yells of the assassins, deemed his last hour at hand.

And what were the constituted authorities, the assembled bodies, the citizens of Paris, doing at this moment? In so immense a capital, silence and tumult, security and terror, may prevail at the same time, so distant is one part from another. It was late before the assembly heard of the outrages at the prisons, and, struck with dismay, it had forthwith sent a deputation to appease the people and save the victims. The commune had commissioned some of its members to deliver prisoners for debt, and distinguish between those who were called the *innocent* and the *guilty*. The Jacobins, although assembled, and well aware of all that was passing, observed a silence apparently studied. The ministers, sitting at the office of the marine in order to form a council, were as yet ignorant of the scenes enacting, and awaited the arrival of Danton, who was busy at the committee of surveillance. The commander-in-chief Santerre had, as he stated to the commune, issued orders, but they were not obeyed; and, besides, almost all his grenadiers were occupied with the guard of the barriers. It is certain there were furtive and contradictory commands, and all the evidences of some secret authority in opposition to the public authority were manifested. A piquet of national guards was stationed at the court of the Abbey, holding orders to give entrance but allow no exit. At other posts the men stood waiting for instructions, but received none. Santerre had either lost his presence of mind, as on the 10th August, or was in the plot. Whilst commissioners, publicly dispatched by the commune, came to preach tranquillity and stay the populace, other members of the same commune appeared before the committee of the Quatre-Nations, which was sitting close beside the scene of massacre, and said, "*Is all going well here as at the Carmelites'? The commune sends us to offer you assistance if you require any.*

The commissioners sent by the assembly and the commune to put a stop to the murders, were quite powerless. They had found an immense crowd besieging the environs of the prison, and witnessing the frightful spectacle, with cries of "The nation for ever!" The aged Dusaulx, mounted on a chair, endeavoured to utter a few words of clemency, but was unable to obtain a hearing. Bazire, with greater tact, feigned to partake the resentment of the multitude, but was no longer listened to when he strove to awaken sentiments of compassion. Manuel, the procurator of the commune, stimulated by pity, ran the greatest risks without succeeding in saving a single victim. When these tidings were communicated, the commune, somewhat more roused in feeling, dispatched a second deputation "for the purpose of calming the excitement, and instructing the people as to their real interests." This deputation, equally impotent with the first, was merely able to release a few women and debtors.

The massacre continued during the whole night. The assassins at times changed characters, those at the wicket taking the place of those on the judgment-seat, and thus becoming alternately judges and executioners. Meanwhile they drank abundantly, setting their glasses, stained with blood, on the table. In the midst of this terrible carnage, however, they spared some victims, and experienced an inconceivable joy in granting them life. A young man, claimed by a section, and declared free from aristocracy, was acquitted to the shouts of "The nation for ever!" and borne in triumph on the bloody arms of the executioners. The venerable Sombreuil, governor of the Invalids, was brought forth in his turn, and condemned to be transferred to La Force. His daughter had perceived him from the depths of the prison; she sprang through swords and pikes, pressed her father in her arms, clung to him with such force, and supplicated the murderers with so many tears and in so heart-rending an accent, that their fury was arrested by amazement. Then, as if to test by further proof a sensibility which began to affect them, "Drink," they cried to the generous girl —"drink of the blood of aristocrats!" and they presented to her a goblet full of blood. She drank, and her father was saved. The daughter of Cazotte likewise succeeded in clasping her father in her arms; she entreated like the young and noble Sombreuil, was irresistible like her, and more happy, since she obtained the safety of her parent without any revolting test being imposed on her affection. Tears flowed from the eyes of these ferocious men, and then they returned to demand more victims! One of them, going back into the prison to bring out prisoners for slaughter, learnt that the unfortunate persons whose throats he came to cut had been without water during twenty-two hours, and he wished to put the jailor to death for his neglect. Another felt interested in a prisoner whom he was conducting to the wicket, because he heard him speak the dialect of his department. "Why art thou here?" said he to M. Journiac de Saint-Méard. "If thou art not a traitor, the president, *who is not a fool*, will render thee justice. Be firm, and answer without trembling." M. de Journiac was presented to Maillard, who inspected the register. "Ah!" said Maillard, "it is you, M. Journiac, who wrote in the Journal of the Court and the City?" "No," replied the prisoner, "it is a calumny; I never wrote in it." "Take care how you deceive us," observed Maillard, "for every falsehood is here punished with death. Have you not recently absented yourself for the purpose of joining the army of emigrants?" "That is also a calumny; I have a certificate attesting that I have not quitted Paris during twenty-three months." "From whom is the certificate? Is the signature authentic?" Luckily for M. de Journiac, there was a man in the sanguinary auditory to whom the signer of the certificate was personally known. The signature was accordingly verified, and declared genuine. "You see now," quoth M. de Journiac, "I have been

calumniated." "If the calumniator were here," replied Maillard, "a terrible retribution would be inflicted on him. But say, was there no motive for imprisoning you?" "Yes," responded M. de Journiac, "I was known for an aristocrat." "An aristocrat!" "Yes, an aristocrat; but you are not here to try opinions, you can only judge conduct. Mine is without reproach: I have never conspired: my soldiers, in the regiment I commanded, adored me, and they besought me at Nanci to go and seize upon Malseigne." Struck with so undaunted a firmness, the judges looked at each other, and Maillard gave the signal of pardon. Instantly shouts of "The nation for ever!" resounded from all sides. The prisoner was embraced. Two individuals took hold of him, and, shielding him with their arms, carried him in safety through the fearful forest of pikes and sabres. M. de Journiac wished to give them money, but they refused it, and asked only to embrace him. Another prisoner, likewise saved, was conducted to his own house with equal fervour. The executioners, all steeped in blood, requested to be witnesses of the joy of his family, and immediately afterwards they returned to the carnage. In so convulsive a state, all the emotions successively beat in the human heart. Alternately a mild and savage animal, the man weeps or slays. Plunged in blood, he is suddenly touched by some noble instance of devotion or firmness; he is sensible of the honour of appearing just, alive to the vanity of seeming honest and disinterested. If, during these deplorable days of September, some of the savages acted both as murderers and robbers, others were seen coming to deposit on the desk of the committee at the Abbey the bloody jewels found on the slain.

But during this frightful night, the gang had devided, and carried carnage into the other prisons of Paris. At the Châtelet, La Force, La Conciergerie, the Bernardins, Saint-Firmin, La Salpêtrière, and the Bicêtre, the like slaughter had been perpetrated, and torrents of blood had flowed as at the Abbey. The following day, Monday the 3d September, the sun made manifest the atrocious deeds of darkness, and Paris looked on in stupor. Billaud-Varennes appeared again at the Abbey, where the evening before he had encouraged those he called *the labourers*. He again addressed them:—"My friends," said he, "by slaying the traitors, you have saved the country. France owes you an eternal gratitude, and the municipality is sensible of the obligation it has contracted towards you. It offers twenty-four livres to each of you, and that sum will be immediately paid." These words were received with unanimous applause; and those to whom they were spoken followed Billaud-Varennes into the committee, in order to obtain the payment that was promised them. "Where do you intend us to find funds for this outlay?" said the president to Billaud. He thereupon, pronouncing a fresh eulogy upon the massacres, replied to the president that the minister of the interior ought to provide them for such a purpose. The murderers hastened to Roland, who had learnt with the daylight the crimes of the night, and who rejected the demand with indignation. Returning to the committee, the assassins claimed, under pain of death, the wages of their infamous labours, and each member was obliged to empty his pockets to pay them. Ultimately the commune discharged the debt; and in the register of its expenses may be found several items of sums paid to the executioners of September. Under date of the 4th September especially, is marked a sum of one thousand four hundred and sixty-three livres as applied in that channel.

The tale of so many horrors had traversed all Paris, and diffused the utmost consternation. The Jacobins continued in their pristine silence. At the commune, men began to be moved with grief; but they did not fail to add that the people were justified, that they had struck none but criminals, and that in their vengeance they had only erred in anticipating the sword of the laws. The council-general had sent new commissioners "*to calm the effervescence, and bring back to principles those who had been misled.*" Such were the expressions of the public authorities. Every where men were abroad, who, albeit lamenting the sufferings of the slaughtered, added: "If they had been left alive, they would have cut our throats in a few days." Others said: "If we be conquered and massacred by the Prussians, they at least will have fallen before us." Such are the dismal fruits of the fear mutually inspired by parties, and of the hatred engendered by that fear.

The assembly, in the midst of these frightful disorders, was grievously afflicted. Decree upon decree it passed, calling upon the commune to give an account of the state of Paris, to which the commune answered that it was applying all its energies to re-establish order and law. However, the assembly, composed of those Girondists who so intrepidly denounced the assassins of September, and died so nobly for having attacked them, was not inspired with the idea of proceeding in a body to the prisons, and interposing between the murderers and the victims. If that generous idea came not to tear the members from their benches, and impel them to the scene of carnage, it must be attributed to surprise, to the feeling of their utter powerlessness, perhaps also to that slender emotion evoked by the perils of enemies, and to that fatal conviction, partaken by several deputies, that the victims were only so many conspirators, from whom death would have been received if it had not been given.

One man displayed that day great magnanimity of character, and arose with noble energy against the assassins. In their reign of three days he entered his protest on the second. On the morning of Monday the instant he was apprised of the crimes of the night, he wrote to the mayor Pétion, who was as yet ignorant of them, and to Santerre, who remained inactive, addressing to them both the most urgent remonstrances. At the same moment he sent a letter to the assembly, which elicited great applause. This man of honesty and courage, so unworthily traduced by party-spirit, was the minister Roland. In his letter he denounced all kinds of disorders, the usurpations of the commune, and the outrages of the populace, saying nobly that he knew how to die at the post the law had assigned him. But we may form an idea of the disposition of the public mind, of the fury which raged against those who were called *traitors*, and of the caution it was needful to observe in speaking to the outrageous passions of the moment, by reflecting upon the following passage. Assuredly the courage of the man who, singly and publicly, threw the responsibility of the massacres upon all the authorities, cannot be questioned; and yet such is the manner in which he was obliged to express himself in that respect.

"Yesterday was a day over whose occurrences we ought perhaps to cast a veil. I know that the people, terrible in their vengeance, still observe in its exaction a species of justice; they do not render victims all who come in the way of their fury; they direct it upon those whom they believe to have been too long spared by the sword of the law, and whom the threatening aspect of affairs persuades them ought to be sacrificed without delay. But I know that it is easy for ruffians and traitors to take advantage of this ferment, and that it must be allayed; I aver that we owe to all France the declaration that the executive power could neither foresee nor prevent these excesses; I aver that it is the bounden duty of the constituted authorities to put a period to them, or to consider themselves as annihilated. I am well aware that this declaration will expose me to the rage of certain agitators. So be it! Let them take my life: I desire to preserve it only for liberty and equality. If they be violated, destroyed, either by the sway of

foreign despots or the aberrations of a deluded people, I have lived long enough; but to my last sigh I shall have done my duty. That consciousness is the only possession I covet, and no power on earth shall take it from me."

The assembly greeted this letter with infinite applause; and, on the motion of Lamourette, ordained that the commune should render an account of the state of Paris. The commune rejoined that tranquillity was re-established. On learning the bold exhortations of the minister of the interior, Marat and his committee were moved with wrath, and audaciously directed against him a warrant of arrest. Such was their blind fury, that they dared to attack a minister, and a man who at the moment was still in the enjoyment of all his popularity. Danton, when he heard of their proceedings, exclaimed with vehemence against those members of the committee whom he called *madmen*. Although thwarted daily by the inflexibility of Roland, he was far from hating him; besides, he discountenanced, in his terrible policy, all that he deemed useless; and he looked upon it as a pure extravagance to seize the first minister of the state in the midst of his functions. He repaired to the municipality, burst into the committee-room, and inveighed with warmth against Marat. However, the others succeeded in appeasing him, and inducing a reconciliation between him and Marat. The warrant of arrest was put into his hands, and he proceeded forthwith to show it to Pétion, relating at the same time what he had done. "See," said he to the mayor, "of what these *madmen* are capable! But I know how to bring them to reason." "You have done wrong," coldly observed Pétion; "that act would have simply ruined its authors."

Pétion, likewise, though cooler in temperament than Roland, had evinced equal courage. He had written to Santerre, who, from impotence or collusion, merely replied that his heart was torn, but that he could not enforce the execution of his orders. He had subsequently repaired in person to the different scenes of the carnage. At La Force, he had dragged from their blood-stained seat two municipal officers, who, in their official scarfs, were performing the functions that Maillard exercised at the Abbey. But he had scarcely departed to visit the other prisons, than those municipal officers returned and resumed their executions. Pétion, every where powerless, ultimately repaired to the house of Roland, whom grief had thrown into a fit of illness. The Temple alone, against which the popular rage was strongly excited, on account of the important inmates it shielded, was secured from outrage. At that spot the armed force had been more respected; and a tricoloured ribbon, stretched between the walls and the populace, had sufficed to keep it back, and to save the royal family.

The monstrous beings who, since Sunday, had been shedding blood, had grown enamoured of their horrible task, and contracted a habit for it which they were unable to shake off. They had even established a certain regularity in their massacres: they suspended them, to remove the dead bodies and to take refreshments. Women, carrying food, went to the prisons and furnished dinner to their husbands, who, as they said, "*were employed at the Abbey.*"

At La Force, Bicêtre, and the Abbey, the slaughter continued longer than elsewhere. It was at La Force that the unfortunate Princess de Lamballe was imprisoned—she who had been so idolised at court for her beauty and influence with the queen. She was led in a dying state to the fatal wicket. "Who are you?" asked the executioners in scarfs, addressing her. "Louisa of Savoy, Princess de Lamballe." "What part did you play at court? Are you acquainted with the plots of the palace?" "I never knew of any plot." "Take an oath to love liberty—take an oath to hate the king, the queen, and royalty." "I will take the first oath; I cannot take the second, it is not in my heart." "Swear, then" said one of the assistants, who desired to save her. But the unfortunate captive was no longer able to see or to hear. "Let the lady *be released*," said the foreman of the gang. Here, as at the Abbey, a phrase had been fixed upon to serve as the signal of death. They led away this forlorn female, whom they did not intend, some writers allege, to put to death, but actually to release. However, she was received at the door by some ruffians thirsting for carnage. A sabre-cut upon the back of her head made the blood spout forth. She still advanced, nevertheless, supported by two men, who possibly wished to save her; but she fell, a few paces farther, under a second blow. Her beautiful form was lacerated and hacked. The assassins outraged and mutilated her body, and divided its portions. Her head, her heart, and other parts of the corpse, stuck on the points of pikes, were paraded through the streets of Paris. It was but proper, said these persons, in their atrocious language, *to carry them to the foot of the throne.* They ran to the Temple, and startled with frightful howls the wretched captives, who inquired with terror what was their cause. The municipal officers strove to prevent their seeing the horrible procession pass beneath their window, and the bleeding head elevated on the end of the pike. A national guard at length said to the queen, "It is the head of Lamballe they wish to prevent you seeing." At these words the queen fainted. The Princess Elizabeth, the king, and the valet-de-chambre Cléry, removed in their arms the unfortunate queen; but the yells of the ferocious crowd continued for a length of time to echo around the walls of the Temple.

The day of the 3d, and the night between the 3d and 4th, were stained with a continuance of these murders. At Bicêtre especially the carnage was longer and greater than at the other prisons. There, several thousand prisoners were confined for every variety of offence. They were attacked, and endeavoured to defend themselves. Cannon was brought up to reduce them. A member of the communal council-general scrupled not to come and ask assistance to overpower the prisoners who were guilty of defending themselves. He was not listened to. Pétion again repaired to Bicêtre, but could effect nothing. An insatiate thirst for blood infuriated the multitude; a frenzy for combat and slaughter had succeeded with the populace to political fanaticism, and they slew for the pleasure of slaying. The massacre lasted at Bicêtre until Wednesday the 5th of September.

At last, almost all the destined victims had perished; the prisons were empty; the furious demanded more blood, but the sombre instigators of so many murders seemed to evince some return to pity. The expressions used by the commune began to breathe gentler sentiments. Deeply afflicted, it said, at the rigours exercised against the prisoners, it issued fresh orders to suppress them, and was now better obeyed. At the same time there remained but few individuals to whom its mercy could be available. The estimate of the number of victims differs in all the accounts of the time, ranging from six to twelve thousand as the amount of those who were massacred in the prisons of Paris.*

* The following extracts give some curious details respecting the days of September, and pourtray those frightful scenes in their true aspect. It was at the Jacobin Club the most important revelations were made, in consequence of the disputes which arose in the convention.

(SITTING OF MONDAY 29TH OCTOBER 1792.)

Chabot.—"This morning Louvet has asserted a fact which it is essential to review. He said it was not the men of the 10th August who acted on the day of the 2d September; and I, as an eyewitness, tell you it was the same men. He said there were not two hundred acting persons, and I tell you that I passed under an arch of steel formed by ten thousand sabres: I appeal to Bazire, Colon, and other deputies who were with me: between the Court of the Monks and the prison of the Abbey they were obliged to press close in order to allow us room to pass. I recognised, for my own

But if the executions spread consternation, the audacity requisite to avow and recommend an imitation of them is a phenomenon not less surprising than the executions themselves. The committee of surveillance did not shrink from distributing a circular through all the communes of France, which history is bound to preserve, with the seven signatures attached to it. This astounding record is as follows:—

"*Paris, 2d September* 1792.

Brothers and Friends—A detestable plot, hatched by the court, for murdering all the patriots of the French empire—a plot in which a great number of members of assembly are compromised, having reduced the commune of Paris, on the 9th of last month, to the cruel necessity of using the force of the people to save the nation, it neglected nothing to deserve well of the country. After the testimonies borne to its vigilance by the national assembly itself, could it have been imagined that fresh plots were brewing in silence at the very time, and that they should burst forth precisely as the national assembly, forgetting it had just declared the commune of Paris to have saved the country, determined upon superseding it as the reward of its intense civicism? At this intelligence, the public clamour, which arose on every side, convinced the national assembly of the urgent necessity of uniting with the people, and of restoring to the commune, by the repeal of the decree of deprivation, the power with which it had invested it.

Proud of enjoying in full plenitude the national confidence, which it will endeavour to merit more and more—placed in the centre of all conspiracies, and determined to perish for the public safety, it will plume itself on having done its duty only when it shall have obtained your approbation, which is the object of all its hopes, and of which it will be assured only when all the departments have sanctioned its measures for the public safety. Professing the principles of the most perfect equality, and desiring no other privilege than that of being the first to mount the breach, it will joyfully lower itself to the level of the smallest commune in the empire, so soon as there shall be nothing more to dread.

Aware that barbarian hordes are advancing against it, the commune of Paris hastens to inform its brethren in all the departments that a part of the ferocious conspirators detained in the prisons has been put to death by the people: an act of justice which appeared to them indispensable for restraining by force of terror the legions of traitors contained within their walls, at the moment they were about to march against the enemy; and doubtless the nation, after the long series of treasons which has conducted it to the edge of the abyss, will freely adopt a measure so useful and necessary; and all the French will say like the Parisians—'We march to meet the enemy, but we leave not behind us brigands to cut the throats of our wives and children!'

(Signed) DUPLAIN, PANIS, SERGENT, LENFANT, MARAT, LEFORT, JOURDEUIL, *Administrators of the Committee of Surveillance constituted at the Municipality.*"

A perusal of this document will serve to demonstrate to what a height of fanaticism the approach of danger had driven a vast proportion of the people. But it is time to revert to the theatre of the war, where more glorious recollections are to be found.

part, one hundred and fifty federalists. It is impossible but that Louvet and his adherents were present at those popular executions. At the same time, any one who could coolly pronounce such a discourse as that of Louvet, cannot have much humanity; I know that, since his speech, I would not like to sleep by his side for fear of being assassinated. I call upon Pétion to declare if it be true that there were not more than two hundred men at those executions: but it is natural that intriguers should fasten on that day, respecting which France has yet much to learn. They wish to cut off the patriots in detail; they are about to decree impeachment against Robespierre, Marat, Danton, Santerre. They will soon add to the number, Bazire, Merlin, Chabot, Montaut, even Grangeneuve, if he had not become reconciled with them. Then they will propose a decree against the whole Faubourg Saint-Antoine, against the forty-eight sections; and we shall be eight hundred thousand men decreed for impeachment! They ought, however, to be pretty sure of their power, since they demand an ostracism."

(SITTING OF MONDAY 5TH NOVEMBER.)

"Fabre d'Eglantine offers remarks on the day of the 2d September. He affirms that it was the men of the 10th August who broke open the prisons of the Abbey, those of Orleans, and those of Versailles. He says, that, in those critical moments, he saw the same men come to the house of Danton, and evince their gratification by rubbing their hands; that one amongst them expressed a keen desire that Morande should be immolated. He adds, that he saw, in the garden of the minister for foreign affairs, the minister Roland, pale, dejected, his head leaning against a tree, and demanding the removal of the convention to Tours or Blois. The speaker says, further, that Danton alone showed great energy of character during that day; that he never despaired of the safety of the country; that, by striking the earth with his foot, he made thousands of defenders start up; and that he had sufficient moderation not to abuse the species of dictatorship with which the national assembly had invested him, by its decree that those who should impede the ministerial operations should be punished with death. Fabre afterwards declares that he has received a letter from Madame Roland, in which she, the wife of the minister of the interior, begs him to give his aid to a particular line of tactics, in order to carry some decrees in the convention. The speaker demands that the society order the framing of an address, which shall contain all the historical details of the events which have occurred since the period of Lafayette's acquittal up till this day."

Chabot.—"Here are the facts it is important to know. On the 10th August, the people in insurrection determined to sacrifice the Swiss; at that epoch, the Brissotins did not deem themselves the men of the 10th, for they came to implore us to have pity on them; such were the expressions of Lasource. I was a god upon that day: I saved one hundred and fifty Swiss; I stopped by myself alone, at the door of the Feuillants, the people who wished to penetrate into the hall, to sacrifice to their vengeance those unfortunate Swiss: the Brissotins were afraid lest the massacre should extend to them. From what I had done on the 10th August, I expected on the 2d September that I should be deputed to the people; no! the extraordinary commission, with the supreme Brissot for its president, did not choose me! Whom did it select? Dusaulx, to whom, it is true, Bazire was joined. It was not ignorant, however, what men were alone capable of influencing the people, and stopping the effusion of blood. I encountered the deputation on the way; Bazire urged me to accompany him; he induced me to accede. Had Dusaulx any particular instructions? I know not; but this I know, that Dusaulx would not allow any one to speak. Amidst an assemblage of 10,000 men, amongst whom were 150 Marseillese, Dusaulx mounted on a chair; he was much confused; he had to speak to men armed with daggers. When he at length gained silence, I addressed him rapidly in these words, "If you have self-possession, you will stop the effusion of blood; tell the Parisians it is their interest the massacre should cease, in order that the departments may not conceive apprehensions relative to the safety of the national convention about to assemble at Paris." Dusaulx heard me; but, from insincerity or the vanity of old age, he did nothing as I told him; and yet it is M. Dusaulx who is proclaimed as the only honest man in the deputation of Paris! A second fact, not less essential, is, that the massacre of the prisoners at Orleans was not perpetrated by Parisians. That massacre ought to be esteemed the more odious, since it was longer after the 10th August, and was committed by a less number of men. But the intriguers never speak of it; they say not a word about it, because an enemy of Brissot perished on that occasion—the minister of foreign affairs, who had dismissed his protegé Narbonne. If I, of myself, at the door of the Feuillants, stopped the people who wished to slay the Swiss, how much more ought the Legislative Assembly to have prevented the effusion of blood! If, then, any crime were committed, it must be charged upon the Legislative Assembly, or rather upon Brissot, who then managed it."

CHAPTER XIII.

CAMPAIGN OF THE ARGONNE.—VICTORY OF VALMY.—RETREAT OF THE ALLIES.

We have already seen that Dumouriez had held a council of war at Sedan. Dillon had there delivered an opinion in favour of a retreat to Châlons, in order to place the Marne in front of the French army, the passage of which river he proposed to defend. The disorganised condition of the 23,000 men left to Dumouriez; the impossibility of their resisting 80,000 Prussians, exactly disciplined and inured to war; the plan attributed to the enemy of making a rapid invasion without stopping before fortresses—were the reasons which led Dillon to believe that the French could not retard the Prussians, and that they ought to retire in all haste before them in quest of stronger positions, and thereby make amends for the weakness and inefficient state of their forces. The council was so struck with these reasons, that it unanimously adhered to Dillon's opinion, and Dumouriez, with whom the decision lay as general-in-chief, replied that he would take time to consider.

It was on the evening of the 28th August that a resolution was taken which saved France. Several have laid claim to the honour of it, but it is quite clear that it belongs to Dumouriez. At all events, the execution renders it exclusively his, and ought to secure him all the glory. France, as the reader is aware, is defended to the east by the Rhine and the Vosges, and to the north by a series of fortresses, monuments of the genius of Vauban, and by the Meuse, the Moselle, and various streams of water, which, in conjunction with the fortresses, present a combination of obstacles sufficient to protect that frontier. The enemy had penetrated into France by the north, and directed his march between Sedan and Metz, leaving the siege of the strong places in the Low Countries to the Duke of Saxe-Teschen, and masking Metz and Lorraine by a body of troops. To follow up this plan, he ought to have advanced rapidly, to profit by the disorganisation of the French, strike them with terror by decisive attacks, and overwhelm, in fact, the 23,000 men of Lafayette, before a new general had imparted to them unity and confidence. But the contest between the presumption of the King of Prussia and the circumspection of Brunswick, retarded every resolution, and prevented the allies from being seriously either daring or prudent. The capture of Verdun tended to excite the vanity of Frederick William and the ardour of the emigrants, but gave no stimulus to the activity of Brunswick, who strongly disapproved of the invasion with the means intrusted to him, and with the dispositions of the invaded country. After the fall of Verdun, on the 2d September, the allied army lay extended for several days over the plains bordering on the Meuse, contenting itself with the occupation of Stenay, and not making a step in advance. Dumouriez was at Sedan, and his army encamped in the environs.

From Sedan to Passavant stretches a forest, whose name ought to be for ever famous in French annals. It is the forest of the Argonne, which covers a space of from thirteen to fifteen leagues, and which, from the inequalities of surface, and the mixture of wood and water, is completely impassable to an army, except at certain principal avenues. By this forest it was necessary for the enemy to penetrate in order to reach Châlons, and afterwards pursue the route to Paris. Holding such a scheme, it is surprising he had not yet thought of occupying its principal passes, and therein anticipating Dumouriez, who in his position at Sedan was distant from them by the whole length of the forest. In the evening after the sitting of the council of war, the French general examined the map with an officer in whose talents he placed the firmest confidence—Thouvenot. Pointing out to him with his finger the Argonne, and the openings by which it is traversed, he said to him, "There is the Thermopylæ of France: if I can get there before the Prussians, all is saved!"

These words warmed the genius of Thouvenot, and the two generals set seriously about the details of this admirable project. The advantages it held out were very considerable. Not only did it obviate the necessity of a retreat, and of making the Marne a last line of defence, but it caused the enemy to lose some very precious time; it would oblige him to remain in the Champagne-Pouilleuse, the wasted, swampy, and barren soil of which was incapable of supporting an army; it would save abandoning to him, as in the case of a retreat to Châlons, the three bishoprics, rich and fertile districts, where he might winter in excellent quarters, supposing even that he should fail in forcing the Marne. If the enemy, after having lost some time before the forest, should determine upon turning it, and proceeding towards Sedan, he would find in front of him th fortresses of the Low Countries; and it was beyond supposition that they would all fall before him. If he ascended towards the other extremity of the forest, he would encounter Metz and the army of the centre; in which case Dumouriez would put himself in pursuit, and, effecting a junction with Kellermann, might form a mass of 50,000 men, resting on Metz and various fortified places. In every case, it would cause the purpose of the enemy's march to fail, and ensure the loss of the campaign; for it was already September, and it was still usual at that season to put armies into winter quarters. The project, therefore, was excellent; but obstacles stood in the way of its execution. The Prussians, extending along the Argonne, whilst Dumouriez was at one of its extremities, could easily have occupied its passes; consequently the fate of this grand scheme, and of France, depended upon a chance and an oversight of the enemy.

Five defiles, called the Chêne-Populeux, the Croix-aux-Bois, Grand-Pré, La Chalade, and Les Islettes, intersected the Argonne. The most important were Grand-Pré and Les Islettes; and, unfortunately, they were the farthest from Sedan, and the nearest to the enemy. Dumouriez resolved to proceed thither himself with all his army. At the same time he ordered General Dubouquet to quit the department of the north, and occupy the avenue of the Chêne-Populeux, which was of great importance, but very near Sedan, and consequently its occupation was less urgent. Two routes offered themselves to Dumouriez to reach Grand-Pré and Les Islettes; the one behind the forest, the other before it and in face of the enemy. The first, passing in the rear of the forest, was the safest but also the longest; it would expose the plan to the enemy, and give him time to counteract it. The second was shorter; but it likewise betrayed the object, and exposed the march to the attacks of a formidable army. It would be necessary, in fact, to skirt the length of the forest, and pass before Stenay, where Clairfayt and his Austrians were stationed. Dumouriez, however, preferred the latter route, and adopted the boldest course. He concluded, that, with the usual Austrian prudence, the general would not fail, when he saw the French, to intrench himself in the excellent camp of Brouenne; and that, whilst he was so doing, they would slip past him, and push forward to Grand-Pré and Les Islettes.

Accordingly, on the 30th, Dillon was set in motion, and departed with 8000 men for Stenay, marching between the Meuse and the Argonne. He encountered Clairfayt, who occupied the two banks of the river with 25,000 Austrians. General Miaczinsky attacked with 1500 men the advanced posts of Clairfayt, whilst Dillon, stationed in the rear, marched to his support with his whole division. A smart firing ensued, and Clairfayt, immediately repassing the Meuse, proceeded to fix himself at Brouenne, as Dumouriez had very exactly forethought. In the mean time, Dillon boldly

continued his route between the Meuse and the Argonne. Dumouriez closely followed him with the 15,000 men who formed his main army, and they both advanced towards the positions prescribed for them. On the 2d September Dumouriez was at Beffu, and had only one march to make to reach Grand-Pré. Dillon was the same day at Pierremont, and still drawing nearer the Islettes with exemplary intrepidity. Fortunately for him, General Galbaud, who had been sent to reinforce the garrison of Verdun, had arrived too late, and fallen back on the Islettes, which he consequently held in advance. Dillon arrived there on the 4th with his 10,000 men, forthwith established himself, and furthermore sent a detachment to seize La Chalade, another secondary pass which was confided to him. At the same time, Dumouriez reached Grand-Pré, found the post vacant, and took possession of it on the 3d. Thus on the 3d and 4th, the passes were occupied by the French, and the safety of the country was materially secured.

It was by this daring march, at least as meritorious as the idea of occupying the Argonne, that Dumouriez put himself in a state to resist the invasion. But much more was required; it was necessary to render these passes impregnable, and for that end to make a variety of dispositions, the success of which depended on a multitude of chances.

Dillon intrenched himself at the Islettes: he felled trees, raised excellent intrenchments, and, skilfully disposing his artillery, which was numerous and efficient, planted batteries in such a manner as to render the pass inaccessible. He occupied, likewise, La Chalade; and was thus master of the two routes which conducted to Sainte-Menehould, and from Sainte-Menehould to Châlons. Dumouriez established himself at Grand Pré, in a camp which nature and art had combined to render formidable. The army was stationed on heights, extending in the form of an amphitheatre. At the base of these heights stretched vast pasture-lands, in front of which ran the Aire, forming the *tête-du-camp*. Two bridges were thrown over the Aire; two strong advanced guards were posted on them, with orders to retreat in case of attack, and burn the bridges. The enemy, after dislodging these advanced troops, would have to effect a passage across the Aire without the aid of bridges, and exposed to the fire of the whole French artillery. After clearing the river, he would have to traverse a basin of meadows with a thousand cross-fires, and finally carry steep and almost inaccessible intrenchments. Supposing all these obstacles should be overcome, Dumouriez, retiring by the heights he occupied, could descend on their opposite flanks, take at their base the Aisne, another water-course skirting them in the rear, cross two other bridges he would take care to destroy, and thus again place a river between him and the Prussians. This camp might indeed be deemed impregnable, and there the French general was in sufficient security to enable him to attend in tranquillity to the whole theatre of the war.

On the 7th, General Dubouquet occupied with 6000 men the pass of the Chêne-Populeux. The only avenue that remained free was the comparatively unimportant one of the Croix-aux-Bois, situated between the Chêne-Populeux and the Grand-Pré. Dumouriez, after breaking up the road and felling trees, had posted there a colonel with two battalions and two squadrons. Thus, placed in the centre of the forest, and in an impregnable camp, he defended the principal defile with 15,000 men, having on his right, at a distance of four leagues, Dillon, who guarded the Islettes and La Chalade with 8000 men, on his left Dubouquet, defending the Chêne-Populeux with 6000, and in the interval between the Chêne-Populeux and Grand-Pré, a colonel watching with a few companies over the route of the Croix-aux-Bois, which had been considered of very secondary importance.

His entire defence being thus constituted, he was in a condition to wait for reinforcements, and he hastened to give orders with reference to that object. He directed Beurnonville to quit the frontiers of the Low Countries, where the Duke of Saxe-Teschen was attempting nothing of moment, and to be at Rethel on the 13th September with 10,000 men. He assigned Châlons as the depôt for provisions and munitions, and the rendezvous for recruits and reinforcements dispatching to him. He thus concentrated behind him all the means available for an effectual resistance. At the same time, he apprised the executive power that he had occupied the Argonne. "Grand-Pré and Les Islettes," he wrote, "are our straits of Thermopylæ; but I will be more fortunate than Leonidas." He required that some regiments should be detached from the army of the Rhine, which was not menaced, and added to the army of the centre, previously intrusted to Kellermann. As the plan of the Prussians evidently was to march on Paris, from their masking Montmedy and Thionville, without stopping before them, he desired that Kellermann should be ordered to skirt their left by Ligny and Bar-le-Duc, and thus take them in flank and in rear during their offensive march. According to all these dispositions, if the Prussians, renouncing the idea of forcing the Argonne, should proceed higher up, Dumouriez might reach Revigny before them, and there meet Kellermann coming from Metz with the army of the centre. If they went down towards Sedan, Dumouriez would still follow them, join the 10,000 men under Beurnonville, and await Kellermann upon the banks of the Aisne. In both cases, the junction would concentrate a mass of 60,000 men, capable of appearing in the open field.

The executive power omitted nothing to second Dumouriez in his skilful dispositions. Servan, the minister at war, though suffering from illness, gave unremitting attention to the provisioning of the armies, to the transport of stores and ammunition, and to the assembling of the new levies. He dispatched every day from Paris from 1500 to 2000 volunteers. A general feeling towards the army had set in, and people flocked to it in multitudes. The patriotic societies, the communal councils, and the national assembly, were continually interrupted by companies spontaneously levied parading through their halls before they departed for Châlons, the general rendezvous for volunteers. Nothing was wanting to these young soldiers but discipline and the habit of war, which, although at present not possessing, they might soon acquire under an able general.

The Girondists were personal enemies of Dumouriez, and placed but a small share of confidence in him ever since he had driven them from the ministry; they had even purposed superseding him in the general command in favour of an officer named Grimoard. But they cordially united with him so soon as the destinies of the country seemed greatly to depend upon him. Roland, the purest and most magnanimous amongst them, wrote to him a touching letter, in which he assured him that all was forgotten, and that all his friends wished only to have his victories to celebrate.

Dumouriez, then, had energetically seized upon the threatened frontier, and made himself the focus of great movements, hitherto too slow and disunited. He had happily occupied the defiles of the Argonne, and taken up a position which afforded the armies time to unite and organise themselves in his rear. He brought up in succession all the various corps, in order to form one imposing mass, and placed Kellermann under the necessity of receiving his orders from him. His command was distinguished for vigour and celerity; and he imparted courage to his soldiers by appearing in the midst of them, testifying unlimited confidence in them, and inspiriting them with ardour for speedy combat with the enemy.

Such was the state of affairs on the 10th September. The Prussians attempted all the French posts, skirmished in front of all their intrenchments, and were

every where repulsed. Dumouriez had cut secret communications in the interior of the forest, and was thus enabled to bring unexpected forces upon menaced points, which, in the opinion of the enemy, doubled the actual strength of the French army. On the 11th, there was a general attack against Grand-Pré, but General Miranda, stationed at Mortaume, and General Stengel at Saint-Jouvin, repelled all the attempts. The soldiers, encouraged by their position, and the firm attitude of their leaders, leapt over the intrenchments at several points, and advanced with bayonets fixed to meet the assailants in their approach. These combats served to keep the army occupied: at the same time it often wanted provisions, on account of the inevitable disorder attendant upon a volunteer enrolment. But the gaiety of the general, who fared no better than his soldiers, induced all to bear privations with resignation; and, in spite of a dysentery which began to prevail, a gratifying contentment reigned in the camp of Grand-Pré. The superior officers alone, who doubted the possibility of a long resistance, and the ministry, whose faith was not more confirmed, spoke of a retreat behind the Marne, and pestered Dumouriez with their forebodings. He, on his part, wrote stimulating letters to the ministers, and imposed silence upon his officers, telling them that when he desired to hear their opinions he would convoke a council of war.

The most brilliant qualities of a man are unavoidably accompanied by certain drawbacks. The very promptitude of Dumouriez's genius often blinded him to reflection. His ardour in conception had already sometimes led him to overlook material obstacles to his projects, a signal instance of which occurred when he ordered Lafayette to proceed from Metz to Givet. He here again committed a capital blunder, which, if he had been endowed with less strength of character and cool determination, would have caused the loss of the campaign. Between the Chêne-Populeux and Grand-Pré was, as we have stated, a secondary avenue, the importance of which had been deemed inconsiderable, and it was consequently defended by but two battalions and two squadrons. Overpowered with urgent demands upon his attention, Dumouriez had not gone in person to estimate the value of this defile. Besides, having but few men at disposal to station there, he had too readily adopted the idea that a few hundred men would suffice to guard it. To increase the mischief, the colonel who commanded at that post persuaded him that a part even of the troops already there might be withdrawn, and that, by breaking up the roads, a few voluntcers would be able to maintain the defensive. Dumouriez allowed himself to be deceived by this colonel, who was an old soldier, and held worthy of confidence.

In the mean time, Brunswick had examined the different French positions, and for a moment entertained the project of skirting the forest as far as Sedan, with the view of turning it at that extremity. Whilst preparing for this movement, it would seem that his scouts acquainted him with the negligence of the French general. The Croix-aux-Bois was attacked by some Austrians and emigrants commanded by the Prince de Ligne. The intrenchments of felled trees had scarcely been commenced, the roads were not broken, and the pass was occupied without resistance on the morning of the 13th. The instant Dumouriez learnt this disastrous intelligence, he sent General Chasot, a man of distinguished bravery, with two brigades, six squadrons, and four eight-pounders, to dislodge the Austrians and again occupy the pass. He directed they should be attacked with the utmost promptitude at the point of the bayonet, before they should have time to intrench themselves. The 13th and 14th September both elapsed ere General Chasot could execute his orders. At length, on the 15th, he attacked with vigour, and drove back the enemy, who lost both the post and its commander, the Prince de Ligne. But, attacked two hours later by a very superior force, and before he could intrench himself, he was repulsed in his turn, and entirely dispossessed of the Croix-aux-Bois. He was furthermore cut off from Grand-Pré, and unable to retire towards the main army, which was thus weakened to the extent of his force. He accordingly fell back on Vouziers. General Dubouquet, commanding at the Chêne-Populeux, and hitherto successful in his resistance, seeing himself separated from Grand Pré, conceived that he ought not to expose himself to the risk of being enveloped by the enemy, who, having pierced the line at the Croix-aux-Bois, was about to debouch in mass. He resolved, therefore, to decamp, and retreat by Attigny and Somme-Puis upon Châlons. Thus the fruit of so many bold combinations and auspicious accidents was lost; the only obstacle in the way of the invasion, the Argonne, was overcome, and the route to Paris laid open.

Dumouriez, severed from Chasot and Dubouquet, had no more than fifteen thousand men; and if the enemy, debouching rapidly by the Croix-aux-Bois, turned the position of Grand-Pré and occupied the passages of the Aisne, which, as we have stated, served for outlet at the rear of the camp, the French general was undone. With forty thousand Prussians in front and twenty-five thousand Austrians in rear, thus hemmed in with fifteen thousand men by sixty-five thousand, by two streams of water and the forest, he could have done nothing more than lay down his arms or perish uselessly to the last man. The only army upon which France relied was in that case annihilated, and the allies were at full liberty to march upon Paris.

In this desperate situation, the general's courage was dauntless as ever, and he preserved an admirable coolness. His first care was that very day to take measures for securing a retreat, since the most pressing matter on his hands was to free himself with all dispatch from the Caudine forks. He reflected that by his right he touched Dillon, still master of the Islettes and of the route to Sainte-Menehould; that by falling back upon his rear, and resting his army back to back with him, they would both face the enemy, the one at the Islettes and the other at Sainte-Menehould, and thus present a double intrenched front. There they might await the junction of the two generals, Chasot and Dubouquet, now detached from the main body; that of Beurnonville, ordered from Flanders to be at Rethel on the 13th; and, lastly, that of Kellermann, who, having been already upwards of ten days on the march, could not be long in arriving. This plan was the best and the most consistent with the system adopted by Dumouriez, which was not to retreat into the interior towards an open country, but to keep in a difficult country, in which to temporise and put himself in a position to effect his junction with the army of the centre. If, on the contrary, he had fallen back on Châlons, he would have been pursued as a fugitive, executing, under every disadvantage, a retreat he might have made more advantageously at first, and debarring himself, above all, from the possibility of an union with Kellermann. It evinced great hardihood, after a mischance such as that of the Croix-aux-Bois, to persist in his system; and it needed at the moment equal genius and energy to avoid yielding to the counsel, so oft repeated, to retire behind the Marne. But, after all, how many fortunate chances were requisite to effect successfully a retreat so difficult, so harassed, and to be made with so small a body of troops in the face of so powerful an enemy!

Without a moment's delay, he sent orders to Beurnonville, previously directed upon Rethel, to Chasot, from whom he had just received some cheering news, and to Dubouquet, retiring upon Attigny, enjoining all of them to muster at Sainte-Menehould. At the same time, he again sent a message to Kellermann to continue his march, for he was reasonably apprehen-

sive lest Kellermann, when he learnt the loss of the defiles, should return to Metz. After having made all these dispositions, and receiving a Prussian officer who requested a parley, to whom he showed the camp in the highest order, he struck his tents at midnight, and marched in silence towards the two bridges which served for communication to the camp of Grand-Pré. Luckily for him, the enemy had not yet thought of penetrating by the Croix-aux-Bois and turning the French positions. The sky was stormy, and covered with its shadows the retreat of the French. They marched all night over deplorable roads; and the army, which had not been allowed time to take alarm, retired without knowing the reason that induced its commander to change his position. The next day, the 16th, at eight in the morning, all the troops had crossed the Aisne; Dumouriez had escaped, and he halted in battle-array upon the heights of Autry, four leagues from Grand-Pré. He was not pursued; concluding himself safe, he advanced to Dammartin-sur-Hans, in order to select an encampment for the day, but was suddenly startled by fugitives crying out that all was lost, and that the enemy, having fallen on the rear, had put the army to rout. Dumouriez hastened to his rearguard, and found the Peruvian Miranda and old General Duval stopping the fugitives, and reforming, with exemplary fortitude, the ranks of the army, which the Prussian hussars had for a time surprised and broken. The inexperience of these young troops, and the fears of treachery which then filled all minds, rendered panics easy and frequent. However, all was remedied by the exertions of the three generals, Miranda, Duval, and Stengel, who were stationed in the rearguard. The army bivouacked at Dammartin, with hopes of soon reaching the back of the Islettes, and happily terminating its perilous retreat.

Dumouriez had been on horseback twenty hours. At six in the evening he was dismounting, when he again suddenly heard cries of terror and dismay, imprecations against generals who were traitors, and especially against the commander-in-chief, who had gone over, it was said, to the enemy. The artillery was horsed, and about to be driven off to a height for safety. All the troops were thrown together and confounded. He caused large bonfires to be lighted, and gave orders that the army should remain on the spot all night. Ten hours were thus passed in mud and darkness. Upwards of fifteen hundred fugitives, escaping across the fields, spread the intelligence at Paris, and through all France, that the army of the north, the last hope of the country, was lost, and delivered into the hands of the enemy.

The next day all was repaired. Dumouriez wrote to the national assembly with his accustomed confidence. "I have been obliged to abandon the camp of Grand-Pré," said he. "The retreat was effected, when a panic seized upon the army, and 10,000 men fled before 1500 Prussian hussars. The loss does not exceed fifty men and some baggage. ALL IS REMEDIED, AND I ANSWER FOR ALL." Nothing less than such assurances would have sufficed to calm the terrors of Paris and the executive council, which was again moved to enjoin upon the general the passage behind the Marne.

Sainte-Menehould, whither Dumouriez was marching, is situated on the Aisne, one of the two rivers which enclosed the encampment at Grand-Pré. Dumouriez, therefore, had to ascend its course, and before reaching it, had to pass three tolerably deep streams which fall into it, namely, the Tourbe, the Bionne, and the Auve. Beyond these three streams was the camp he intended to occupy. In front of Sainte-Menehould rise in circular form some heights for three-quarters of a league. At their base stretches a sunken plain, in which the Auve forms marshes before discharging its waters into the Aisne. This hollow is bounded on the right by the heights of L'Hyron, in front by those of La Lune, and on the left by those of Gisaucourt. In the centre of the basin are different elevations, lower, however, than those of Sainte-Menehould. The hill of Valmy is one of them, and immediately fronts the eminence of La Lune. The high road from Châlons to Sainte-Menehould passes across this basin, almost parallel to the course of the Auve. It was at Sainte-Menehould, and above this basin, that Dumouriez planted himself. He took possession of all the most important positions around him, and rested his rear against Dillon, whom he urged to hold firm against the enemy. He thus occupied the high road to Paris upon three points—Les Islettes, Sainte-Menehould, and Châlons.

It was possible, however, for the Prussians, if they penetrated by Grand-Pré, to leave him at Sainte-Menehould, and make a rapid advance to Châlons. Consequently Dumouriez ordered Dubouquet, whose happy arrival at Châlons he had learnt, to occupy with his division the camp of L'Epine, and collect there all the volunteers recently arrived, in order to cover Châlons from a sudden attack. He was subsequently joined by Chasot, and ultimately by Beurnonville. The latter had come in sight of Sainte-Menehould on the 15th. Perceiving an army in excellent position, he had supposed it to be the enemy, for he could not imagine that Dumouriez, who was reported vanquished, had so speedily and successfully extricated himself from the embarrassments by which he was understood to have been paralysed. Under this impression, he had fallen back on Châlons, when, being informed of the real state of the case, he had returned and taken up a position on the 19th at Maffrecourt, on the right of the camp. He brought with him those 10,000 men whom Dumouriez had ably trained, during a month in the camp at Maulde, by a constant war of posts. When strengthened by Chasot and Beurnonville, Dumouriez could muster 35,000 men. Thus, owing to his firmness and presence of mind, he again found himself in a very strong position, and in a capacity to temporise nearly at pleasure. But if the enemy, acting promptly, should leave him behind, and push rapidly forward to Châlons, what became of his camp at Sainte-Menehould? The same fear was always present; and his precautions, by the camp at L'Epine, were quite inefficient to obviate such a danger.

Two movements were progressing leisurely in his vicinity—that of the Duke of Brunswick, who hesitated in his march, and that of Kellermann, who, having left Metz on the 4th, had not yet arrived at the stipulated point, after being fifteen days on the road. But if the slowness of Brunswick availed Dumouriez, that of Kellermann seriously compromised him. This general, prudent and irresolute, though of undoubted gallantry, had alternately advanced and receded, according to the marches of the Prussian army; and so lately as the 17th, on learning the loss of the defiles, he had made a retrograde movement. At length, on the evening of the 19th, he apprised Dumouriez that he was within two leagues of Sainte-Menehould. Dumouriez had reserved for him the heights of Gisaucourt, situated on his left, and commanding the road to Châlons, and the rivulet of the Auve. He had communicated to him, that in case of a battle, he might deploy on the secondary heights, and plant himself on Valmy, on the opposite side of the Auve. He could not spare time to go in person and post his colleague. Kellermann, passing the Auve during the night of the 19th, fixed himself on Valmy, in the centre of the basin, and neglected the heights of Gisaucourt, which formed the left of the camp of Sainte-Menehould, and commanded those of La Lune, upon which the Prussians were arriving.

At this moment, in fact, the Prussians, debouching by Grand-Pré, had arrived in sight of the French army, and scaling the heights of La Lune, obtained a view for the first time of the ground whose summit was occupied by Dumouriez. Renouncing the idea of

a forced march on Châlons, they were rejoiced, it is said, to find the two French generals together, and thus to have an opportunity of overwhelming them both at one blow. Their design was to render themselves masters of the route to Châlons, occupy Vitry, force Dillon at the Islettes, thus surround Sainte-Menehould on all sides, and oblige the two armies to lay down their arms.

At daylight on the 20th, Kellermann, who, instead of occupying the heights of Gisaucourt, had fixed himself in the centre of the basin on the hill of Valmy, saw himself commanded in front by the heights of La Lune, occupied by the enemy. On one side, he had L'Hyron, which the French held in possession, but might easily be dislodged, and on the other, Gisaucourt, which he had omitted to seize, and where the Prussians were proceeding to establish themselves. In case of a defeat, he would be forced into the marshes of the Auve, stretching behind the eminence of Valmy, and might be overpowered before he could join Dumouriez in the hollow of that amphitheatre. He accordingly sent to his colleague, desiring him to join him. But the King of Prussia, perceiving a great stir in the French army, and concluding that the design of the generals was to retire upon Châlons, instantly resolved to block up the way, and ordered an attack. The Prussian advanced guard encountered Kellermann's advanced guard on the Châlons road, the general himself being with his main body on the height of Valmy. A warm engagement took place, and the French, at first repulsed, were rallied, and afterwards supported by the carbineers of General Valence. From the heights of La Lune a cannonade opened on the hill of Valmy, and the French artillery briskly responded to the Prussian.

The position of Kellermann, however, was highly dangerous. His troops were all heaped confusedly on the eminence of Valmy, and too much exposed to combat with effect. From the heights of La Lune a cannonade played upon him; from those of Gisaucourt a fire established by the Prussians incommoded his left; L'Hyron, which flanked his right, was certainly occupied by the French, but Clairfayt might readily attack that post with his 25,000 Austrians, and inevitably gain possession of it; and then Kellermann, battered from all quarters, might be driven from Valmy into the Auve, without Dumouriez being able to assist him. The latter hastened to dispatch General Stengel with a strong division to support the French on L'Hyron, and secure the right of Valmy; he ordered Beurnonville to aid Stengel with sixteen battalions; and he sent Chasot, with nine battalions and eight squadrons, by the Châlons road, to occupy Gisaucourt and flank Kellermann's left. But Chasot, when he came near Valmy, sought orders from Kellermann instead of advancing upon Gisaucourt, and thus gave the Prussians time to occupy it, and establish a murderous fire from its elevation. However, supported on the right and left, Kellermann was able to maintain himself on the hill of Valmy. Unfortunately, a howitzer falling on an ammunition-waggon, blew it up, and put the infantry into disorder; the firing from La Lune increased it, and the first line already began to give way. Kellermann, perceiving this recoil, flew into the ranks, rallied them, and restored order. At this moment, Brunswick conceived the time arrived for scaling the eminence, and driving off the French at the point of the bayonet.

It was now noon. A thick mist, which, up to this moment, had covered the two armies, cleared away, and they had a distinct view of each other—the young French soldiers beholding the Prussians advancing upon them in three columns, with the firm assurance of veteran and disciplined troops. This was the first time they had been on a field of battle with a hundred thousand combatants, or on the point of crossing bayonets. As yet they knew neither themselves nor the enemy, and they looked round upon each other with anxiety and doubt. Kellermann jumped upon the intrenchments, disposed his troops in columns, with a battalion to face, and ordered them, when the Prussians were within a certain distance, not to wait for them, but meet and charge them with the bayonet. Then he raised his voice and cried: "The nation for ever!" The moment was decisive either for bravery or cowardice. The cry of "The nation for ever!" inspirits valour alone; and the young soldiers of France, with their enthusiasm quickened, marched forward, repeating the cry of "The nation for ever!" At this spectacle, Brunswick, who instituted the attack with reluctance, and with considerable doubts as to the result, hesitated, stopped his columns, and finally ordered them into the camp.

This trial was decisive. Thenceforth a higher estimate was formed of those *cobblers* and *tailors* who composed the French army, according to the scornful emigrants. These had beheld men equipped, arrayed, and valorous; they had seen officers wearing older decorations and full of experience—General Duval, whose upright form and blanched hairs commanded respect; in a word, Kellermann and Dumouriez, displaying admirable constancy and talent in presence of an enemy much superior in number. At this instant, the French revolution was appreciated, and its chaos, hitherto the subject of derision, henceforth appeared more truly as a terrible outburst of national energy.

At four o'clock, Brunswick attempted a fresh attack. The confident aspect of the French again disconcerted him, and he drew back his columns a second time. Having encountered on his march a series of disappointments, ever finding things most falsely represented to him, the Prussian general made his advances with the greatest circumspection; and although he has been censured for not having pushed the attack with more spirit, and dislodged Kellermann, very excellent judges consider that he acted rightly. Kellermann, supported on the right and left by the whole French army, was not a powerless antagonist; and if Brunswick, entangled in a gorge and a detestable ground, had been once repulsed, the chances were in favour of his utter destruction. Besides, he had occupied, as the result of the day, the route to Châlons; and the French being consequently cut off from their depôt, he anticipated compelling them to quit their position within a few days. He did not consider that, being masters of Vitry, they had only to make a longer circuit and suffer a little extra delay in obtaining their convoys.

Such was the celebrated day of the 20th September 1792, on which more than twenty thousand cannon-balls were fired, and since called THE CANNONADE OF VALMY. The loss was equal on both sides, amounting in each army to eight or nine hundred men. But cheerfulness and confidence reigned in the French camp, discontent and recrimination in the Prussian. It is stated, on good authority, that the King of Prussia directed some severe remonstrances to the emigrants that very evening, and henceforth the influence of Calonne was judged on the wane—he who of all the emigrant ministers was the most presumptuous, the most profuse in exaggerated promises, and the most ready with tidings belied by the result.

During the same night, Kellermann silently repassed the Auve, and proceeded to encamp on the heights of Gisaucourt, which he ought to have occupied at first, and from which omission the Prussians had profited materially in the battle. The latter remained on the heights of La Lune. In the opposite background was Dumouriez, and on his left Kellermann, on the heights he had just seized. In this singular position, the French, looking towards France, seemed the invading force, and the Prussians, leaning upon her, seemed drawn up to defend her from aggression. At this period, Dumouriez commenced a fresh series of firm and energetic measures, both against the enemy and against his own officers and the executive autho-

rity. With nearly 70,000 troops, intrenched in a good encampment, and with no, or a very rare, deficiency of provisions, he could temporise with eminent composure. The Prussians, on the contrary, were at a loss for subsistence; diseases began to prevail in their army, and in such a situation inactivity was disastrous to them. An inclement season, besides, acting on a swampy and humid soil, rendered it impossible for them to remain any length of time. And then, should they thus late resume the promptitude and vigour befitting an invasion, and march upon Paris, Dumouriez was in force to follow, and close upon them when engaged in front.

Such deductions were consistent with reason and prudence. But in the camp, where the officers were growing weary of privations, and where Kellermann was dissatisfied with subjection to a superior authority; at Paris, where they felt themselves separated from the principal army, and could perceive no obstacle between them and the Prussians—where, in fact, they saw the Hulans approach within fifteen leagues, since the forest of Argonne was laid open—the views of Dumouriez excited disapprobation. The assembly and the council inveighed against his obstinacy, and wrote him the most imperative letters to abandon his position and repass the Marne. The camp at Montmartre, and an army between Châlons and Paris, were the double ramparts essential in the estimation of affrighted citizens. "The hulans pester you," wrote Dumouriez: "well! kill them; the affair does not concern me. I will not change my plan for skirmishers." Entreaties and commands, however, did not the less continue to pour in upon him. In the camp, the officers were free and pertinacious in their remarks. The soldiers alone, cheered by the gaiety of the general, who was unremitting in going through their ranks, in encouraging them, and in explaining to them the critical position of the Prussians, patiently endured the rain and the privations to which they were exposed. On one occasion, Kellermann resolved to leave, and Dumouriez was compelled, like Columbus stipulating for a few days more from his crew, to promise he would decamp, if within a certain number of days the Prussians did not beat a retreat.

The fine army of the allies was truly in a very deplorable condition; it was perishing by famine, and still more by the afflicting consequences of dysentery. The dispositions of Dumouriez had powerfully contributed to produce this dismal emergency. The sharpshooting in front of the camp being deemed useless, because it conduced to no result, it was agreed between the two armies to suspend it; but Dumouriez stipulated that the intermission should be confined to the front alone. Accordingly, he detached all his cavalry, especially that of the new levy, into the surrounding country, in order to intercept the convoys of the enemy, who, having arrived by the defile of Grand-Pré, and ascended the course of the Aisne in pursuit of the French retreat, was obliged to bring his stores by the same tedious circuit. The French troopers grew enamoured of so lucrative a warfare, and prosecuted it with signal success. In this position of affairs, September drew to a close; the evil became intolerable in the Prussian army, and officers were sent to the French camp to hold a parley. At first an exchange of prisoners was the only question mooted: the Prussians demanded the benefit of the exchange for the emigrants, but it was refused them. A refined politeness marked the intercourse on both sides. From the topic of exchanging prisoners, conversation proceeded to the motives of the war; and, on the part of the Prussians, it was almost avowed that the war had been impolitic. The character of Dumouriez here appeared in full relief. Relieved from the cares of fighting, he composed memorials for the King of Prussia, and demonstrated to him how little he could gain by uniting with the house of Austria against France. At the same time he sent him twelve pounds of coffee, the last that remained in both camps. His memorials, which could not fail to be appreciated, were nevertheless ungraciously received, and could scarcely be otherwise. Brunswick replied, in the name of the King of Prussia, by a declaration as arrogant as his first manifesto, and all negotiation was broken off. The assembly, when consulted by Dumouriez, returned the answer of the Roman senate, that it would not treat with the enemy until he had removed from the soil of France.

These negotiations were attended with no other effect than affording ground of calumny against the general, who was thenceforth suspected of holding secret relations with the enemy; and drawing upon him the affected disdain of a haughty monarch, soured by the result of the war. But such was Dumouriez; possessing all the attributes of courage and mind in their highest developments, he was deficient in that reserve and dignity which awes men, whilst genius does but excite their admiration. Be that as it may, it came to pass as the French general had foreseen; for, on the 1st October, the Prussians, unable to bear up any longer against the combined evils of hunger and disease, began to decamp. It was a grand subject of amazement, conjecture, and fabulous narration for all Europe, to behold so puissant and much-vaunted an army retreating in humiliation before those patriotic artisans and shopkeepers, who were to have been driven back into their towns by beat of drum, and chastised for having left them. The feebleness with which the Prussians were pursued, and the impunity seemingly accorded them as they repassed the defiles of the Argonne, gave rise to the supposition of secret stipulations, and even of a bargain with the King of Prussia. The military considerations will account, better than all such vague allegations, for the retreat of the allies.

To remain in so disastrous a position was no longer possible. To invade had become altogether inopportune in a season so far advanced and so inclement. The only resource, therefore, was to retire into Luxumbourg and Lorraine, and there form a strong basis of operations, with a view to recommence the campaign the following year. Besides, there are grounds for believing that at this moment Frederick William was revolving in his mind the assumption of his part of Poland; for, after having stimulated the Poles against Russia and Austria, that prince now evinced a readiness to share in their spoliation. Thus the state of the season and of the localities; disgust at an abortive enterprise; regret at having allied himself against France with the house of Austria; and, lastly, new interests in the north, were with his majesty of Prussia motives amply sufficient to determine his retreat. It was effected in perfect order, for the enemy, who consented to depart, was not a whit the less formidable on that account. To attempt blocking up his retreat and compelling him to open a passage by a victory, was an imprudence Dumouriez would not commit. It was incumbent on him to be contented with harassing it; and this he did with too little activity; in which negligence both he and Kellermann were to blame.

The danger being past, and the campaign finished, each reverted to himself and his own projects. Dumouriez thought of his enterprise into the Low Countries, Kellermann of his command at Metz; and the pursuit of the Prussians failed to obtain from the two generals the attention it required. Dumouriez dispatched General d'Harville to the Chêne-Populeux to fall upon the emigrants, and ordered General Miaczinski to wait for them at Stenay, at the outlet of the pass, to complete their destruction; he sent Chasot in the same direction, to occupy the road to Longwy; stationed the generals Beurnonville, Stengel, and Valence, with upwards of twenty-five thousand men, on the rear of the grand army, with orders to pursue it with vigour; and at the same time forwarded an injunction to Dillon, who had throughout main-

tained himself at the Islettes with perfect success, to advance upon Clermont and Varennes, in order to cut off the route to Verdun. These dispositions were doubtless good, but they ought to have been executed by the general himself; he ought, according to the very just and intelligent opinion of M. Jomini, to have pushed directly upon the Rhine, and afterwards descended it with all his army. In that moment of success, overthrowing all before him, he would have conquered Belgium in a single march. But he resolved upon going to Paris, with the view of arranging an invasion by Lille. On their part, too, the three generals, Beurnonville, Stengel, and Valence, did not act in concert sufficiently, and but feebly pursued the Prussians. Valence, who served under Kellermann, suddenly received an order to join his general at Châlons, in order to resume the route to Metz. It must be allowed that this movement was strangely imagined, since it conducted Kellermann into the interior, to turn afterwards into the route to the Lorraine frontier. The rational course was in front, by Vitry or Clermont, and that coincided with the pursuit of the Prussians in the manner directed by Dumouriez. The instant the latter heard of the order given to Valence, he laid fresh injunctions upon that officer to pursue his march, stating that so long as the junction of the armies of the north and centre continued, the supreme command belonged to him alone. He remonstrated very warmly with Kellermann, who ultimately recalled his previous determination, and consented to take his course by Sainte-Menehould and Clermont. However, the pursuit was conducted with the same faintness as before. Dillon alone harassed the Prussians with impetuous ardour, and narrowly escaped severe treatment, by darting too rashly on their track.

The want of concord amongst the generals, and their personal estrangements after the danger, were evidently the sole causes of so easy a retreat being granted to the Prussians. It has been asserted that their departure was purchased, and the price defrayed by the produce of a theft, to which we shall subsequently refer; that it was arranged with Dumouriez, one of the stipulations in the bargain being the free passage of the Prussians; and, lastly, that Louis XVI. had solicited it from the recesses of his prison. We have just seen that this retreat may be sufficiently accounted for by natural causes; but several other reasons demonstrate the absurdity of such suppositions. Thus, it is not credible that a monarch, whose failing was not that of a vile cupidity, should allow himself to be bought; we cannot see why, if there were a convention, Dumouriez should not have justified himself in the eyes of military men for not having pursued the enemy, by avowing a treaty which had nothing discreditable in it, so far as he was concerned; lastly, the king's valet-de-chambre, Cléry, assures us that nothing similar to the pretended letter addressed by Louis XVI. to Frederick William, and transmitted by the attorney of the commune, Manuel, was ever written, or given to that personage. The whole relation, therefore, is but a tissue of falsehood; and the retreat of the allies was simply the natural consequence of the campaign. Dumouriez, in spite of his faults, of his oversight at Grand-Pré, and of his negligence with regard to the retreat, was nevertheless the preserver of France, and of a revolution which has probably advanced Europe by several centuries. It was he who, taking the command of an army disorganised, distrustful, and discontented; restoring to it unity and confidence; establishing along the whole of that frontier a concentrated and vigorous action; never yielding to despair amidst the most disastrous circumstances; displaying, after the loss of the defiles, an almost unexampled instance of undaunted coolness; persisting in his original system of temporising, in spite of all perils—in spite of his army and of his government—with a firmness which proves the vigour of his judgment and his character;—it was he, we assert, who saved France from the stranger and counter-revolutionary wrath, and offered the imposing spectacle of a man saving his fellow-citizens in spite of themselves. No conquest, howsoever vast it might be, could be more glorious, or produce, in its moral results, a more decisive influence.

CHAPTER XIV.

MASSACRES AT VERSAILLES.—OPENING OF THE NATIONAL CONVENTION, 20TH SEPTEMBER 1792.—ESTABLISHMENT OF THE REPUBLIC.

Whilst the French armies were engaged in repelling the march of the allies, Paris was in a continual state of disorder and confusion. We have already witnessed the encroachments of the commune, the prolonged abominations of September, the impotency of the authorities, and the inertness of the public force during those disastrous days; we have also seen with what cool audacity the committee of surveillance avowed the massacres, and recommended an imitation of them to the other communes of France. However, the commissioners accredited by the commune had been every where repudiated, for France did not partake the furious spirit which a sense of danger had aroused in the capital. But in the vicinity of Paris, even all the murders of which we have read do not close the list. There had been formed in that city a troop of assassins, whom the massacres of September had familiarised with blood, and who longed to shed more. Some hundreds of persons had previously departed from Paris, bent upon the project of dragging from the prisons of Orleans those under impeachment for high-treason. Those unfortunate captives, by a final decree of the assembly, were appointed to be conveyed to Saumur. Nevertheless, their destination was altered on the route, and they were escorted in the direction of Paris. On the 9th September, it was reported that they were to arrive at Versailles on the 10th. Consequent upon those tidings, either from fresh orders being issued to the gang of murderers, or from the mere mention of such an arrival sufficing to awaken their bloodthirsty mania, they flocked to Versailles from the 9th to the 10th. A dull rumour immediately pervaded that town that fresh massacres were about to be committed. The mayor of Versailles took every precaution to prevent additional disasters. The president of the criminal tribunal hastened to Paris, in order to apprise the minister Danton of the dangers that threatened the prisoners; but he obtained one invariable answer to all his applications: "*Those men are highly criminal!*" "Possibly," retorted the president Alquier; "but the law alone ought to inflict punishment upon them." "What! do you not see," cried Danton, in a terrible voice, "that I would have answered you in another manner if I could? What have you to do with those prisoners? Go back to your business, and take no farther heed concerning them!" Alquier obeyed, in trepidation.

The next day the prisoners arrived at Versailles. A horde of unknown ruffians rushed upon the vehicles, surrounded and separated them from the escort, knocked the commander Fournier from horseback, carried off the mayor, who announced a generous resolution to die at his post, and massacred the unfortunate prisoners, to the number of fifty-two. Amongst them perished Delessart and D'Abancourt, placed under impeachment as ministers, and Brissac, as commander of the constitutional guard, disbanded under the Legislative Assembly. Immediately after this execution, the assassins flew to the prisons of the town, and renewed the scenes of the first days of September, employing the same means, and parodying, as at Paris, the judicial forms. This event, occurring after an interval of five days from the former, carried the uni-

versal terror to its height. At Paris, the committee of surveillance, however, halted not an instant in its action; when the prisons were emptied by death, it began again to fill them by issuing fresh warrants of arrest. These warrants were so numerous, that the minister of the interior, Roland, denouncing to the assembly these new acts of arbitrary injustice, was enabled to lay between five and six hundred of them on the table, some signed by a single person, others by two or three at most, the major part void of motive, and a great proportion founded on the mere suspicion of *incivism*.

Whilst the commune was making its power felt at Paris, it sent commissioners into the departments to justify its conduct, exhort them to follow its example, recommend to the electors deputies of its nomination, and depreciate those who opposed it in the Legislative Assembly. It subsequently secured immense funds by seizing the money found with the treasurer of the civil list, Septeuil; by appropriating the plate in the churches, and the rich moveables of the emigrants; and, lastly, by obtaining from the exchequer several considerable sums, under the pretext of supporting the assistance-fund, and completing the works of the camp. All the effects of the unhappy persons massacred in the prisons of Paris and on the route to Versailles, had been sequestered, and deposited in the spacious halls of the committee of surveillance. The commune constantly refused to produce either the objects themselves or their value, and even to give any answer upon the subject to the minister of the interior or to the directory of the department, which, as has been previously mentioned, had been converted into a mere commission of finance. It went yet farther, and proceeded to sell, by its own authority, the furniture in large mansions, upon which seals had been affixed since the departure of the proprietors. It was in vain that the superior administration issued prohibitions; the entire body of subordinates, upon whom the execution of those orders was imposed, either belonged to the municipality, or had no means of vindicating their authority. The orders consequently met with no attention.

The national guard, reconstructed under the influence of the armed sections, and filled with men of all grades, was in complete disorganisation. Sometimes it was accessory to mischief, sometimes it simply allowed its perpetration from carelessness. Many of the posts were altogether abandoned, because the men on guard, not being relieved even after forty-eight hours' watch, retired exhausted with fatigue and wrath. All the peaceable citizens had quitted the corps, formerly so regular and useful; and Santerre, who now commanded it, was of too feeble and uncultivated a character to re-organise it.

The tranquillity of Paris was therefore abandoned to hazard; and on one hand the commune, on the other the populace, had the field open for any enterprise. Amongst the spoils of royalty, the most precious, and consequently the most coveted, were those contained in the Garde-Meuble, the rich deposit of all the effects which formerly lent a splendour to the throne. Since the 10th August, this collection had aroused the cupidity of the multitude, and more than one significant symptom had excited the vigilance of the inspector of the establishment. He had made requisition upon requisition to obtain a sufficient guard; but from the prevalent confusion, or from the difficulty of filling all the posts, or, in short, from studied indifference, he was not furnished with the force he demanded. During the night of the 16th September, the Garde-Meuble was robbed, and the greatest part of its contents passed into unknown hands, which the authorities subsequently made fruitless efforts to discover. This fresh outrage was attributed to the men who had secretly directed the massacres. But in this instance they could be instigated by neither fanaticism nor a sanguinary policy; and, supposing them actuated by rapacity, they had in the vaults of the commune wherewithal to satisfy such a passion to the fullest extent. It has been said, indeed, that this spoliation was effected in order to buy the retreat of the King of Prussia, which is absurd, and to supply the expenses of the party, which is more probable, but rests upon no proof. At the same time, the robbery of the Garde-Meuble ought to have but little influence on the judgment to be formed of the commune and its leaders. It is unquestionably true, however, that the commune, as the depositary of vast wealth, never rendered any account of it; that the seals upon the chests were broken, without the locks being forced, which indicates an abstraction and not a popular pillage; and that so large a collection of precious moveables disappeared for ever. A portion was audaciously stolen by certain subordinates, such as Sergent, surnamed *the Agate*, on account of a rich jewel with which he decked himself; and another portion served to defray the charges of the extraordinary government instituted by the commune. It was a war waged against the old society; and every war is sullied by murder and pillage.

Such was the situation of Paris whilst the elections were proceeding for the National Convention. It was from that new assembly honest citizens anticipated the force and energy necessary to restore order; they hoped the forty days of confusion and crime, elapsed since the 10th August, would be but an accident of the revolution—a deplorable accident assuredly, but transitory. The deputies themselves, sitting with such impotence in the Legislative Assembly, prorogued their energy to the meeting of that convention, which was the common hope of all parties.

All France was the scene of agitation directed to influence the elections. The clubs exercised great sway in that respect. The Jacobins of Paris had printed and distributed a list of all the votes recorded during the legislative session, to serve as references for the electors. The deputies who had voted against the laws proposed by the popular party, and especially those who had absolved Lafayette, had particular attention drawn to them. Nevertheless, in the provinces, where the dissensions of the capital had not yet penetrated, the Girondists, even the most odious to the agitators of Paris, were chosen on account of their acknowledged talents. Almost all the members of the late assembly were re-elected. A great many ex-constituents, whom the self-denying ordinance had excluded from the legislative body, were nominated to form part of the convention. In the number were Buzot and Pétion. Amongst the new members naturally appeared the men who had distinguished themselves in their departments by their energy and ardour; or authors, who, like Louvet, had gained renown by their talents both in the capital and the provinces.

At Paris, the violent faction which had domineered since the 10th August completely controlled the elections, and carried all the men of its party. Robespierre and Danton were the first named. The Jacobins and the council of the commune hailed this result with acclamations. After them were chosen Camille-Desmoulins, famous by his writings; David, by his pictures; Fabre-d'Eglantine, by his dramatic productions and hearty participation in the revolutionary troubles; Legendre, Panis, Sergent, and Billaud-Varennes, by their services at the commune. To them were added the procurator-syndic Manuel; Robespierre the younger, brother of the celebrated Maximilian; Collot-d'Herbois, an ex-comedian; and the Duke of Orleans, who had abdicated his titles, and called himself Philip-Egalité. After all these names, great astonishment was manifested at the election of the aged Dusaulx, one of the electors of 1789, who had so often opposed the furious outbursts of the populace, and so often shed tears over its excesses, and who was named as a last memento of '89, and as an honest inoffensive man, distasteful to no party. To this strange collection was only wanting the cynical and sanguinary Marat.

That singular man had, from the surpassing audacity of his writings, something of the astounding, even in the eyes of those who had witnessed the days of September. The capuchin Chabot, who exercised great influence at the Jacobins' by his vehemence, and there obtained the triumphs which were denied him in the Legislative Assembly, was obliged to pronounce an apologetic harangue for Marat; and, as it was amongst the Jacobins that every thing was arranged beforehand, his election, being sanctioned by them, was soon completed in the electoral assembly. Marat, Fréron, likewise a journalist, and some obscure individuals, completed that famous deputation, which, including a few traders, a butcher, a comedian, an engraver, a painter, an advocate, three or four writers, and a despoiled prince, adequately represented the confusion and the variety of existences in conflict within the immense capital of France.

The deputies arrived successively at Paris, and in proportion as their number swelled, and the events which had produced so universal a terror grew distant, they began to take courage and deprecate the disorders of the capital. The fear of the enemy was diminished by the firm position of Dumouriez in the Argonne; the hatred for *aristocrats* was changed into pity, since the horrible slaughter that had been made of them in Paris and Versailles. Those crimes, which had found so many delirious applauders or timid censors, had become more hideous by the robbery recently added to murder, and excited general reprobation. The Girondists, indignant at such atrocities, and exasperated at the personal oppression they had endured during a whole month, became more firm and energetic. Resplendent for talent and courage in the eyes of France, invoking justice and humanity, public opinion could scarcely fail to be with them; and already they openly threatened their adversaries with its visitation.

At the same time, if the Girondists were all equally decisive against the excesses of Paris, they did not all experience and excite those personal resentments which envenom party strife. Brissot, for example, by pertinaciously contesting the palm of eloquence at the Jacobin Club with Robespierre, had inspired him with profound hatred. Possessed of great information and talent, Brissot produced considerable effect; but he had neither the personal consideration nor sufficient tact to be the leader of a party; and the hatred of Robespierre unduly exalted him, by imputing that character to him. When, on the eve of the insurrection, the Girondists wrote a letter to Bose, the king's painter, rumours of a treaty with the court were spread abroad, and Brissot was charged with a design to escape to London, with a vast booty. There was no truth in such allegations; but Marat, to whom the most insignificant reports, and even those, indeed, distinctly disproved, were sufficient for grounding accusations, did not the less issue a warrant of arrest against Brissot, during the general incarceration of the pretended conspirators of the 10th August. A great sensation had followed this step, and the warrant of arrest was not executed. But the Jacobins adhered to the assertion that Brissot was sold to Brunswick; Robespierre repeated it and believed it, so readily did his distorted mind conclude those guilty whom he hated. Louvet had inspired him with equal abhorrence, by seconding Brissot at the Jacobins' and in the journal *La Sentinelle*. Louvet, replete with talent and boldness, made direct attacks on men. His virulent personalities, continued from day to day in the pages of his journal, had made him the most feared and the most detested enemy of the Robespierre faction.

The minister Roland had displeased the whole Jacobin and municipal party by his courageous letter of the 3d September, and by his steadfast resistance to the encroachments of the commune; but having no rivalry with any individual, he excited only a certain anger of opinion. He had personally offended Danton alone, by opposing him in the council, which was not attended with much danger, for of all men there was none whose resentment was less to be feared than Danton's. But in the person of Roland it was principally his wife who was detested; a woman proud, severe, courageous, and intellectual, gathering around her those enlightened and brilliant Girondists, animating them by her looks, rewarding them with her esteem, and preserving in her circle, amidst a republican simplicity, a politeness odious to obscure and uncultivated men. These already endeavoured to circulate vulgar ridicule against Roland. His wife, they said, governed for him, directed his friends, and recompensed them even by her favours. In his ignoble language, Marat called her *the Circe* of the party.

Guadet, Vergniaud, and Gensonné, though they had gained great lustre in the Legislative Assembly, and had set themselves in opposition to the Jacobins, had not yet aroused all that venom they excited at a later date. Guadet had even gratified the energetic republicans by his attacks against Lafayette and the court. Prompt to show himself in the van, Guadet could pass at pleasure from the highest excitement to the most perfect coolness; and thus master of himself in the tribune, he shone there by the pertinence and vigour of his remarks. Thus, he naturally liked an exercise in which he excelled, used it perhaps too freely, and took more pleasure than was prudent in triumphing by words over a party which was speedily to retort upon him by death.

Vergniaud had not succeeded so well as Gaudet with the violent spirits of the time, because he never showed so much ardour against the court; but he had been less exposed, likewise, to wound them, because, in his carelessness and supineness, he offended persons less than his friend Guadet. Passions had little effect in rousing this speaker; permitting him to slumber amidst the storms of party, and not driving him in the face of men, their hatred was greatly blunted against him. Still he was not indifferent. He possessed a noble heart, a fine and lucid intellect; and the dormant fire of his soul, blazing up at intervals, warmed and roused him to sublime energy. He had not the vivacity in repartee of Guadet, but he grew animated in the tribune, discoursed with a copious eloquence, and, such was his extraordinary ductibility of organ, that he poured out his thoughts with a facility and fecundity of expression such as no man hath ever surpassed. The elocution of Mirabeau was, like his character, unequal and powerful; that of Vergniaud, always elegant and dignified, became at times grand and energetic. But all the exhortations of Roland's consort did not always succeed in rousing this champion, often disgusted with mankind, often opposed to the indiscreet courses of his friends, and, above all, not very confident in the efficacy of words against force.

Gensonné, a man of sense and probity, but gifted with only a moderate fluency of speech, and mainly adapted for drawing up reports, had not yet made a figure in the tribune. However, strong passions and an obstinate temper sufficed to procure for him considerable influence with his friends, and amongst his enemies the hatred which attaches to character much more than talent.

Condorcet, formerly a marquis, and always a philosopher, lofty and unbiassed in his speculations, discerning clearly the faults of his party, and little fitted for the terrible agitations of democracy, rarely put himself in the foreground, and had as yet no immediate enemy on his own account, reserving himself principally for those various labours which required deep meditation. Buzot, endowed with intelligence, and elevation of mind and courage, uniting with the graces of person a firm and simple eloquence, bespoke attention by all the dignity of address, and exercised a high moral ascendancy around him.

Barbaroux, elected by his fellow-citizens, had just

arrived from the south with one of his friends, a deputy like himself to the National Convention. This friend was called Rebecqui. He was a man of indifferent culture, but bold, enterprising, and wholly devoted to Barbaroux. It will be remembered that the latter idolised Roland and Pétion; that he regarded Marat as an atrocious madman, and Robespierre as actuated by ambition, especially since Panis had designated him as the indispensable dictator. Loathing the crimes committed during his absence, he readily imputed them to men whom he already detested; and he expressed himself on his arrival with an energy that precluded the possibility of reconciliation. Inferior to his friends in mental accomplishments, but possessing a fair proportion of intelligence and readiness, handsome and chivalric withal, he freely scattered menaces, and in a few days earned for himself a hatred equal to that which attended many, who, during the whole legislative session, had never ceased their assaults on opinions and persons.

The individual around whom the entire party rallied, and who enjoyed universal consideration, was Pétion. Mayor during the Legislative Assembly, he had, by his contest with the court, acquired a boundless popularity. True, he had on the 9th August recommended a debate in preference to a combat; since then he had declared against the September deeds, and withdrawn from the commune, as Bailly in 1790; but his opposition had been quiet and silent, and, without yet actually embroiling him with the faction, had rendered him formidable to it. With a well-stored mind, calm in temper, rarely speaking, never attempting a rivalry of display with any one, he exercised over all, and over Robespierre himself, the ascendancy of a cool, dispassionate, and universally revered sense. Although reputed a Girondist, all parties sought his suffrage, all stood in awe of him, and, in the new assembly, he had with him not only the right side, but the whole intermediate body, and several even of the left side.

Here then was the situation of the Girondists in front of the Parisian faction: they had for them the general opinion, which reprobated the excesses; they had won to themselves a great number of the deputies who were daily entering Paris; they had all the ministers, except Danton, who often ruled the council, but never made use of his power against them; finally, they exhibited at their head the Mayor of Paris, the most respected man of the moment. But at Paris they were not amongst friends, but found themselves in the very centre of their foes; and they had to dread the violence of the inferior classes which surged beneath them, and, moreover, the violence portended by the future, fanned by revolutionary passions.

The first accusation levelled against them was a design to sacrifice Paris. They had formerly been charged with intending to take refuge in the departments, and beyond the Loire. The wrongs of Paris, as regarded them, being aggravated since the 2d and 3d September, the imputation of a wish to abandon that city was fixed with the greater pertinacity, and it was confidently asserted that they had attempted to assemble the convention elsewhere. By degrees, these suspicions settling down, took a more regular form. They were reproached with desiring to break the national unity, and compose of the eighty-three departments so many separate states, all equal amongst themselves, and connected by a simple federative bond. By this scheme, it was added, they contemplated the destruction of the Parisian predominance, and the possession of a personal sway in their respective departments. It was thus the calumny of federalism originated. It is true, that when France was threatened by the invasion of the Prussians, they had thought of intrenching themselves, at the last extremity, in the southern departments; it is also true, that, beholding the excesses and the tyranny of Paris, they had sometimes rested their hopes on the departments; but between such speculations and a scheme for a federal system there was a considerable interval. And yet, all the difference between a federal government and a single central government consisting in the greater or less degree of influence in the local institutions, the criminality of such an idea, if it existed at all, was singularly vague. The Girondists, in fact, perceiving nothing very culpable in it, took no pains to repudiate it; and many amongst them, irritated at the absurdity manifested in decrying such a system, asked if North America, Holland, and Switzerland, were not, after all, free and happy under a federal government; and if it would be any signal error or high crime to confer a similar boon on France. Buzot, especially, often upheld such opinions, and Brissot, who was an ardent admirer of the Americans, likewise defended them, rather as the result of a philosophic deduction, than as embracing a project applicable to France. Such conversations being divulged, gave greater weight to the calumny of federalism. At the Jacobin Club, the question of federalism was gravely discussed, and a thousand outrageous invectives were launched against the Girondists. The clamour arose that they designed to crush the nucleus of the revolutionary power; to wrest from it that unity which constituted its strength; and that this fell scheme was hatched to render themselves kings in their provinces.

The Girondists retorted on their side by invectives somewhat more substantial, but which unfortunately were likewise exaggerated, and consequently lost in force what they lacked in truth. They reproached the commune with having rendered itself supreme; with having by its usurpations encroached on the national sovereignty, and arrogated to itself an authority which belonged only to France in the aggregate. They charged upon it a design to domineer over the convention as it had before oppressed the Legislative Assembly; they said that in sitting beside it, the national delegates were not in security, since they would sit amongst the assassins of September. They accused it of having dishonoured the revolution during the forty days which followed the 10th August, and of having stocked the deputation of Paris with men notorious for their participation in those infernal scenes. Thus far they were within the bounds of truth. But they added reproaches as vague as those of federalism directed against themselves. They loudly accused Marat, Danton, and Robespierre of aspiring to supreme power—Marat, because he daily published that a dictator was needed to purge society of the impure members who corrupted it; Robespierre, because he had dogmatised at the commune and spoken with insolence to the assembly, and because, on the eve of the 10th August, Panis had proposed him to Barbaroux for dictator; lastly, Danton, because he wielded over the ministry, over the people, wheresoever he appeared, indeed, the influence of a mighty being. They called them triumvirs; and yet there was no union amongst them. Marat was but a systematic maniac; Robespierre as yet merely a jealous struggler, who had not sufficient elevation of mind to be ambitious; Danton a man of active mind, ardent, and zealous for the goal of the Revolution, and extending his interference to all things, more from restless energy than from ambition. But amongst these three men there was as yet no usurper, nor did any two of them conspire in concert; and it was imprudent in the Girondists to give their adversaries, already more powerful than they, the advantage of being unjustly accused. At the same time, they were less acrimonious against Danton, because there was no personal animosity between him and them, and they held Marat in too great contempt to accuse him directly; but they railed unmercifully against Robespierre, because the renown of what was called his virtue and his eloquence irritated them to a greater extent; they bore towards him the resentment felt by genuine superiority against a vain and inflated mediocrity.

Attempts, nevertheless, were made to arrive at an understanding before the opening of the National Convention, and divers meetings held, in which frank explanations on both sides were proposed and recommended as a means for terminating baneful disputes. Danton was cordially disposed to such a course,* because he was not restrained by a morbid pride, and had the success of the revolution, above all things, at heart. Pétion evinced infinite coolness and sound sense; but Robespierre was sulky, like one personally wronged; the Girondists were haughty and stern, as men innocent and indignant, who deemed certain vengeance in their power. Barbaroux said there was no alliance possible between *crime* and *virtue;* and on both sides they retired more distant from a reconciliation than before they met. All the Jacobins rallied around Robespierre; the Girondists, and the prudent and moderate mass, around Pétion. The opinion of the latter, and of all sensible men, was in favour of dropping accusations, since it was impossible to apprehend the authors of the September massacres and the robbery of the Garde-Meuble; of ceasing to speak of triumvirs, since their ambition was neither sufficiently proved nor sufficiently manifest to support a prosecution; of despising a score of worthless characters introduced into the assembly by the elections of Paris; and, in short, of proceeding with all dispatch to fulfil the objects of the convention, by forming a constitution and deciding the fate of Louis XVI. Such was the counsel of dispassionate men; but others, less calm, indulged as usual in projects which, being as yet incapable of execution, had the demerit of warning and exasperating their adversaries. They proposed to cashier the municipality, remove the convention in emergency, transfer its sittings from Paris, constitute it as a court of justice for the trial without appeal of all conspirators, and finally raise for its protection a peculiar guard, selected from the eighty-three departments. These projects had no result, and served only to irritate the passions. The Girondists relied upon the public feeling, which, as they imagined, would kindle into indignation at the accents of their eloquence and the recital of the crimes they were prepared to denounce. They would meet, therefore, at the tribune of the convention, said they, and crush their foes.

At length, on the 20th September, the deputies to the convention met together at the Tuileries, to constitute the new assembly. Their number being sufficient, they resolved themselves into legal constitution, verified their powers, and immediately proceeded to the nomination of officers. Pétion was almost unanimously proclaimed president. Brissot, Condorcet, Rabaud Saint-Etienne, Lasource, Vergniaud, and Camus, were elected secretaries. These selections prove the influence then possessed by the Girondist party in the assembly.

The Legislative Assembly, which since the 10th August had been sitting permanently, was informed on the 20th, by a deputation, that the National Convention was formed, and the legislature terminated. The two assemblies had merely to resolve the one into the other, and the convention proceeded to occupy the hall of the legislative.

Manuel, procurator-syndic of the commune, who had been suspended after the 20th June with Pétion, and become extremely popular on account of that suspension; who had subsequently taken office with the furious usurpers of the commune, but retreated from them, and drawn towards the Girondists at sight of the massacres in the Abbey—Manuel, so early as the 21st, made a proposition which excited murmurs amongst the enemies of the Gironde. "Citizen-representatives," said he, "it is fitting that every thing here bear a character of dignity and grandeur calculated to awe the universe. I move that *the president of France* be lodged in the national palace of the Tuileries; that he be preceded by the public force and the symbols of the law; and that the citizens rise at his approach." At these words, the Jacobin Chabot, and Tallien, the secretary of the commune, protested with vehemence against a ceremonial imitated from royalty. Chabot said that the representatives of the people ought to assimilate themselves to the citizens from whose ranks they came—*to the sans-culottes*, who formed the majority of the nation. Tallien added, that the president of the convention should be sought for in a garret, since it was in such abodes that genius and virtue dwelt. The proposition of Manuel was rejected, and the enemies of the Gironde asserted that it had intended to decree sovereign honours to its chief, Pétion.

After this motion had been disposed of, a multitude of others succeeded, without pause or order. On all sides the wish was expressed to record by authentic declarations the sentiments which animated the assembly and France. Various demands were made, to the effect that the new constitution should be based on absolute equality, the sovereignty of the people decreed, hatred sworn to royalty, to a dictatorship, to a triumvirate, to every individual authority; and the penalty of death pronounced against whomsoever should propose any project with that tendency. Danton put an end to all these motions, by procuring a decree that the new constitution should be valid only after being sanctioned by the people. It was subjoined that the existing laws should provisionally continue to have effect; the authorities, not displaced, be provisionally maintained; and the taxes levied as before, until the new systems of contribution were organised. After these motions and decrees, Manuel, Collot-d'Herbois, and Gregoire, entered upon the question of royalty, and demanded that its abolition should be forthwith pronounced. The people, said they, had just been declared sovereign, but they could not really be so until they were delivered from a rival authority —that of kings. The assembly, all the galleries, rose with one accord to express an unanimous reprobation of royalty. But Bazire wished a solemn discussion upon so momentous a question. "What occasion is there to discuss," exclaimed Gregoire, "when every one is of the same opinion? Courts are the workshops of crime, the furnace of corruption. The history of kings is the martyrology of nations. Since we are all equally impressed with these truths, what need of discussion?"

The debate was in fact closed. A profound silence prevailed, and, according to the unanimous declaration of the assembly, the president pronounced royalty abolished in France. This decree was hailed with universal acclamation; its publication was instantly voted, as likewise its transmission to the armies and all the municipalities.

When the institution of a republic was thus proclaimed, the Prussians still menaced the country. Dumouriez, as we have related, had fixed himself at Sainte-Menehould, and the cannonade of the 21st, so auspicious for the French arms, was not yet known at Paris. The next day, the 22d, Billaud-Varennes proposed to date, no longer from the year 4 of liberty, but from the year 1 of the republic. This proposition was adopted. The year 1789 was no longer considered as the commencement of liberty, and the new republican era opened that very day, the 22d September.

In the evening the cannonade of Valmy was reported, and joy beamed on every countenance. On the petition of the citizens of Orleans, who complained of their magistrates, it was decreed that all the members of administrative bodies and tribunals should be re-elected, and that the conditions of eligibility, as fixed by the constitution of 1791, should be deemed null. It was declared no longer necessary to select the judges from lawyers, nor the administrators from

* See Durand Maillanne, Dumouriez, Meilhan, and all the contemporaries.

a certain class of proprietors. The Legislative Assembly had already abolished the mark of silver, and conferred upon all citizens at the age of majority the electoral franchise. The convention effaced the last traces of distinction, by calling all the citizens to all, the most diverse, functions. Thus was commenced the system of absolute equality.

On the 23d, all the ministers were heard. The deputy Cambon made a report upon the state of the finances. The preceding assemblies had decreed the fabrication of two thousand seven hundred millions of assignats; two thousand five hundred millions had been expended; there remained two hundred millions, of which one hundred and seventy-six were still to manufacture, and the remaining twenty-four were in the exchequer. The taxes were detained by the departments for purchases of grain ordered by the last assembly; and the public exigencies required some new extraordinary resources. The mass of national property augmenting every day by emigration, no fears were entertained from the issue of paper representing it, nor hesitation felt at making the experiment: a fresh creation of assignats was accordingly ordered.

Roland was heard upon the state of France and the capital. Equally severe, but bolder than on the 3d September, he set forth in energetic terms the disorders of Paris, their causes, and the means of preventing them. He recommended the prompt institution of a strong and vigorous government, as the only guarantee of order in free states. His report was favourably heard, and crowned with applause, failing to excite any explosion on the part of those who considered themselves as accused when the troubles of Paris were alluded to.

But scarcely had this first glance been cast over the situation of France, than news arrived of the spread of disorder in certain departments. Roland wrote a letter to the convention, denouncing these new excesses, and demanding their repression. The instant the letter was read, the deputies Kersaint and Buzot sprang to the tribune, to inveigh against the violences of all descriptions in progress of commission. "The assassinations," said they, "are imitated in the departments. It is not anarchy we can charge with them, but tyrants of a new order, who are arising in scarcely emancipated France. It is from Paris that these fatal instigations to crime are daily sent. On all the walls of the capital we read placards stimulating to murder, burning, pillage; and lists of proscription, in which fresh victims are daily pointed out. How are the people to be preserved from wretchedness, if so many citizens are condemned to shroud their existence? How can France hope for a constitution, if the convention which is appointed to frame it deliberates beneath the points of daggers? It is necessary, for the honour of the revolution, to suppress all these excesses, and draw the distinction between the civic gallantry which braved despotism on the 10th August, and the savage cruelty which ministered to a still and hidden tyranny on the 2d and 3d September."

In consequence, the orators demanded the appointment of a committee, charged—

1st, To render an account of the state of the republic, and of Paris in particular.

2d, To present a project of law against instigators to murder and assassination.

3d, To draw up a statement of the means adapted for raising a public force, to be placed at the disposition of the National Convention, and taken from the eighty-three departments.

At this proposition, all the members of the left side, on which were ranged the most violent spirits of the new assembly, uttered tumultuous cries. The evils of France were exaggerated, they said. The hypocritical wailings they had just heard, came from the depths of the dungeons, into which those had been cast who, for the last three years, had been invoking the horrors of civil war upon their country. The disorders complained against were inevitable; the people were in a state of revolution, and they must of necessity adopt energetic measures for their security. At present those critical moments were past, and the declarations already made by the convention would suffice to allay all commotions. Besides, why an extraordinary jurisdiction? The ancient laws existed, and met the case of instigations to murder. Was a new martial law sought to be established?

By a very usual contradiction amongst parties, those who had demanded the extraordinary jurisdiction of the 17th August, those who were soon to demand the revolutionary tribunal, rose indignantly against a law which they denounced as a law of blood! "A law of blood!" exclaimed Kersaint in reply: "why, I desire, on the contrary, to prevent its being shed!" An adjournment was strenuously insisted upon. "To adjourn the suppression of murders," cried Vergniaud, "is to legalise them! The enemies of France are in arms on our frontiers, and you desire that the citizens of France, instead of meeting them in combat, should slay each other like the soldiers of Cadmus!"

At length, the motion of Kersaint and Buzot was adopted without modification. It was resolved that laws should be framed for the punishment of instigators to murder, and for the organisation of a departmental guard.

This debate of the 24th had caused great excitement amongst the members; still, no name had been mentioned, and the accusations remained general. The next day they met with all the resentments evoked by the previous sitting still rankling; on one side they murmured against the decrees that had been passed, and on the other felt regret at not having been sufficiently severe upon the faction they stigmatised as *disorganising*. Whilst one party was attacking the decrees, and the other defending them, Merlin, formerly a tipstaff and municipal officer at Thionville, and lately a deputy to the legislative body, where he signalised himself amongst the most uncompromising patriots—Merlin, renowned for his ardour and temerity, demanded to be heard.

"The order of the day," said he, "is to elucidate, whether, as Lasource assured me yesterday, there exists in the heart of the National Convention a faction labouring to establish a dictatorship or a triumvirate: either these suspicions should cease, or Lasource be called upon to mark the guilty; and I swear to poniard them in face of the assembly." Lasource, thus emphatically summoned to explain himself, related his conversation with Merlin, and again described, without naming them, those ambitious characters who were striving to raise themselves upon the ruins of prostrated royalty. "They are those who have stimulated murder and robbery; who have issued warrants of arrest against members of the legislature; who point out for daggers the courageous members of the convention; and who impute to the people the excesses which they themselves order. When the time comes, I will tear the veil which I now merely raise, should I perish beneath their blows."

Still the triumvirs were not expressly named. Osselin scaled the tribune, and spoke with reference to the Parisian deputation, of which he was one. He said it was against the metropolitan deputies distrust was intended to be excited, but that they were neither so profoundly ignorant, nor so atrociously wicked, as to have formed projects for a triumvirate or a dictatorship; that he was ready to take an oath to the fact, and demanded anathema and death against the first who should be found meditating such schemes. "Let each," he added, "follow me to the tribune, and there make the same declaration." "Yes!" exclaimed Rebecqui, the courageous friend of Barbaroux; "yes! that party accused of tyrannical projects exists, and I proclaim it: it is the Robespierre party! Marseilles knows it, and has sent us here to combat it."

This bold apostrophe caused a great sensation in the assembly. All eyes were turned on Robespierre. Danton hastened to the tribune in order to appease these divisions, and dispel accusations which he knew to be partly directed against himself. "That will be," said he, "a glorious day for the republic, on which a frank and amicable explanation shall allay all these suspicions. You speak of dictators, of triumvirs; but such an accusation is vague, and ought to be signed." "I will sign it!" exclaimed Rebecqui, darting to the table. "Good," replied Danton; "if there be traitors, let them be immolated, were they the dearest of my friends. For myself, my life is known. In the patriotic societies, on the 10th August, and in the executive council, I have served the cause of liberty without any personal views, and with *the energy of my temperament.* I do not fear accusations for myself, therefore; but I wish to avert them from all. There is, I grant, a man in the deputation of Paris, who may be called the *Royou* of republicans: I mean Marat. I have been often charged as the instigator of his placards; but I appeal to the testimony of the president, and I call upon him to declare, whether, in the commune and in the committees, he has not often seen me in altercation with Marat. At the same time, this writer, so denounced, has passed a portion of his life in cellars and dungeons; sufferings have soured his temper, and his resentment may be excused. But let us leave these discussions, purely individual, and endeavour to promote the public good. Decree the pain of death against any who shall propose a dictatorship or triumvirate." This recommendation was warmly applauded. "That is not all," resumed Danton; "there is another apprehension rife in the public mind, and it is expedient to dissipate it. It is alleged that a number of the deputies contemplate the federal system, and the division of France into a multitude of sections. It behoves us to form but one aggregate. Declare, therefore, by another decree, the unity of France and its government. These points determined, let us cast aside our suspicions; let us be united, and advance to our common aim."

Buzot replied to Danton that a dictatorship is seized, but not solicited, and that to pass laws against such a request was mere delusion; that, as to the federal system, no person had ever dreamt of it; that the proposition of a departmental guard was a means of unity, since all the departments would be called to guard the national representation in common; but that, at the same time, it might be advisable to pass a law upon the subject, which, however, ought to be maturely weighed; and that, in consequence, the propositions of Danton should be referred to the committee of six, appointed the previous day.

Robespierre, being personally accused, demanded to be heard in his turn. In commencing, he asserted it was not himself he was about to defend, but the public weal, attacked in his person. Turning to Rebecqui, "Citizen," said he to that deputy—"you who have not feared to accuse me—I thank you. I recognise in your courage the renowned city that has deputed you. The country, you, and I, will all gain by this accusation.

A party is mentioned," he continued, "which is alleged to be meditating a new tyranny, and I am named as its head. The accusation is vague; but thanks to all I have done for liberty, it will be easy for me to refute it. It was I who, in the Constituent Assembly, combated for three years all the factions, whatsoever names they assumed; it was I who fought against the court, and disdained its presents; it was I"—— "That is not the question," exclaimed several deputies. "He must be allowed to justify himself," cried Tallien, in reply. "Since I am accused," resumed Robespierre, "of betraying the country, have I not a right to set my whole life in opposition to the charge?" He thereupon recommenced the enumeration of his double services against aristocracy and against the false patriots who took the mask of liberty. In saying these words, he pointed to the right side of the convention. Osselin himself, fatigued with this egotistical review, interrupted Robespierre, and enjoined him to give a frank explanation. "The question is not what thou hast done," added Lecointe-Puyravaux, "but what thou art accused of doing at this present time." Robespierre then tauntingly expatiated on the freedom of opinion, on the sacred right of defence, on the public safety, equally compromised with himself in this accusation. He was again requested to be more precise; but he continued in the same discursive strain. Recalling the famous decrees he was instrumental in passing against the re-election of constituent members, and against the nomination of deputies to offices in the gift of the government, he asked if those were proofs of ambition. Then, recriminating upon his adversaries, he reiterated the imputation of federalism; and concluded by demanding the adoption of the decrees proposed by Danton, and a rigorous examination into the charges brought against him.

Barbaroux, out of all patience, rushed to the bar. "Barbaroux of Marseilles," he exclaimed, "presents himself to sign the denunciation made by Rebecqui against Robespierre." He then recounted a very insignificant and often-repeated tale, to wit, that previous to the 10th August, Panis conducted him to the house of Robespierre, and that, on the termination of their interview, Panis represented Robespierre to him as the only man, the only dictator, capable of saving the commonwealth; to which communication he, Barbaroux, had replied, that the Marseillese would never bow the knee before either king or dictator.

We have already recorded this circumstance, and our readers may judge whether those vague and trivial expressions of Robespierre's friends were sufficient to support such an accusation.

Barbaroux proceeded, and took up, one by one, the charges brought against the Girondists. He moved that federalism should be proscribed by a decree, and that all the members of the National Convention should swear to endure a blockade in the capital, and to die within its walls rather than forsake it. After the cheering provoked by this proposition had subsided, Barbaroux resumed his discourse, and said that it was impossible to deny the existence of projects for a dictatorship; that the usurpations of the commune, the warrants directed against members of the national representation, the commissioners sent into the departments, all proved a scheme for domination; but that the city of Marseilles kept a watchful eye upon the safety of its deputies, and, always prompt to anticipate patriotic decrees, it had dispatched a battalion of federalists, in spite of the royal veto, and was now sending forth eight hundred of its citizens, to whom their parents had given a brace of pistols, a sabre, a musket, and an assignat for five hundred livres; that to them were added two hundred cavalry, perfectly equipped; and that this force would give a commencement to the departmental guard proposed for the security of the convention. "As to Robespierre," concluded Barbaroux, "I feel much regret at having accused him, for I formerly loved and esteemed him. Yes! we all loved and esteemed him, and yet we have accused him! But let him acknowledge his errors and we will desist. Let him cease to complain; for if he has saved liberty by his writings, we have vindicated it by our persons. Citizens, when the day of peril shall arrive, you will duly estimate us; and we shall then see whether the fabricators of placards will have the courage to die with us!" Loud acclamations accompanied Barbaroux even to his seat.

At the mention of placards, Marat claimed the right of speaking. Cambon likewise sought it, and obtained the preference. He denounced certain placards in which the dictatorship was recommended as indispensable, and which were signed with the name of Marat. At this specific charge, every one moved away from

that personage, who retorted the scorn evinced towards him by a derisive scowl. Other accusers of Marat and the commune succeeded Cambon. Marat made strenuous efforts to obtain a hearing; but Panis once more procured a preference, to enable him to repel the allegations of Barbaroux. Panis, with great lack of discretion, denied actual but irrelevant facts, which it would have been more advantageous to avow, relying upon their want of purpose. He was interrupted by Brissot, who asked him the occasion of the warrant of arrest issued against his person. Panis recurred in vindication to circumstances which, he said, had been too readily overlooked; to the disorder and terror which prevailed at that time in all minds; to the multitude of denunciations against the conspirators of the 10th August; to the strength of the rumours current against Brissot, and to the necessity of investigating them.

After these tedious explanations, every moment interrupted and resumed, Marat, still insisting upon being heard, at length obtained the right when it was no longer possible to refuse it to him. It was the first time he had appeared at the tribune. His appearance provoked a burst of indignation, and a terrible shout arose against him. "Down! down!" was the general cry. Indifferently clad, wearing a cap, which he laid upon the tribune, and passing over his auditory a convulsive and defying grin, he said: "I have a great number of personal enemies in this assembly" —— "All! all!" exclaimed the majority of the deputies. "I have in this assembly," resumed Marat, with imperturbable assurance, "a great number of personal enemies, whom I invite to the observation of decency. Let them spare their infuriated clamours against a man who has served liberty and themselves more than they imagine.

You speak of a triumvirate, of a dictatorship, and attribute the design to the Parisian deputation; but I owe it to my colleagues, and especially Robespierre and Danton, to declare that they have always opposed it, and that I have always had to combat them on that point. I first and singly, amongst all the political writers in France, advocated such a measure, as the only means of crushing traitors and conspirators. It is I alone who am amenable to punishment; but before striking, deign to hear me." Here some applause was faintly manifested. He resumed. "Amidst the eternal machinations of a perfidious king, of a detestable court, and of false patriots, who, in both assemblies, sold the public liberty, can you impute it to me as a crime that I conceived the only means of safety, and invoked vengeance upon the heads of the guilty? No! for if you did so, the nation would disavow you. It felt that this means was the only one reserved to it; and it was by constituting itself dictator that it has delivered itself from traitors.

I have shuddered more than any other at the idea of those terrible movements, and it was because I desired they might not be perpetually fruitless that I maintained they should be directed by a firm and equitable hand. If the necessity of this step had been perceived at the taking of the Bastille, five hundred reprobate heads would have fallen at my voice, and peace have been established at that epoch. But in consequence of not having displayed an energy equally sagacious and necessary, one hundred thousand patriots have been murdered, and one hundred thousand are menaced with the like fate. At the same time, as a proof that I did not wish to render this species of dictator, tribune, triumvir (the name is of little moment), a tyrant such as stupidity has imagined, but a victim offered up to the country, whose lot no ambitious man would have envied, I intended that his authority should continue only a few days; that it should be restricted to the power of condemning traitors; and even that a cannon-ball should be fastened to his ankle, so that he might be always under the control of the people. My ideas, however revolting they may have appeared to you, were directed to the public good alone. If you were not sufficiently elevated to comprehend me, so much the worse for yourselves!"

The profound silence which had hitherto reigned was here broken by laughter, which in no way disconcerted the speaker, infinitely more terrible than ridiculous. He continued: "Such was my opinion, written, signed, publicly asserted. If it were wrong, you ought to have combated it, shown me that I erred, and not have denounced me to despotism. I am accused of ambition!—but hear and judge me. If I had been willing to put a price on my silence, I might have been gorged with gold, and I am poor! Persecuted without intermission, I have wandered from cellar to cellar, and preached truth with my head upon the block! Open, then, your eyes; instead of consuming your time in scandalous discussions, consummate the declaration of rights, establish the constitution, and settle the basis of a just and free government, which is the true object of your labours."

Universal attention had been conceded to this singular person, and the assembly, astounded at a system so frightful and so studied, had observed a deep silence. Some partisans of Marat, emboldened by this silence, had applauded; but they were not imitated, and Marat resumed his seat without receiving either cheers or marks of anger.

Vergniaud, the purest and most discreet of the Girondists, deemed himself called upon to kindle the indignation of the assembly. Mounting the tribune, he deplored the misfortune of having to answer a man convicted of crimes. Chabot and Tallien remonstrated against the use of such words, and asked whether they referred to the sentence passed by the Châtelet for having unmasked Lafayette. Vergniaud persisted, and re-asserted his deep regret at having to answer a man who had not cleared himself from the judgments recorded against him—a man all steeped in calumny, malice, and blood. The murmurs were renewed, but he continued with firmness; and after excepting from the general Parisian deputation David, Dusaulx, and some other members, he took in his hands the famous circular of the commune, which we have already quoted, and read it word for word. As it was already known, however, it did not produce so material an effect as another paper, which the deputy Boileau read in the course of his speech. It was an article published by Marat that very day, in which he said: "A single reflection oppresses me, namely, that all my efforts to save the people will result in nothing without a fresh insurrection. From the sort of men who compose the majority of the National Convention, I despair of the public safety. If, in the first eight sittings, the foundations of the constitution are not laid, expect no good from that assembly. Fifty years of anarchy await you, and you will avert them only by a dictator —a genuine patriot and statesman. *Oh ye generation of prattlers! did ye but know how to act!*"

The reading of this article was repeatedly interrupted by cries of indignation. Scarcely was it concluded, than a large body of the members rose in fury against Marat. Some openly threatened him, and shouted, "To the Abbey! To the guillotine!"—others overwhelmed him with epithets of scorn. He replied to all the attacks levelled against him simply by his old grimace. Boileau moved a decree of impeachment, and the majority of the assembly called eagerly for the votes. Marat insisted, with great self-possession, upon being heard. It was proposed that he be heard only at the bar, but he ultimately secured the tribune. According to his usual expression, *he recalled his enemies to decency.* As to the judgments they had not blushed to upbraid him with, he gloried in them, as the rewards of his courage. Besides, the people, by sending him into the national assembly, had wiped away those decrees, and decided between his accusers and him. As to the article that had just been read, he was far from disavowing it, inasmuch

as falsehood never polluted his lips, and fear was a stranger to his heart. "To ask from me a retractation," he added, "is to require me not to see what I have before my eyes—not to feel what I am deeply sensible of; and there is no power under the sun capable of thus subverting my ideas. I can answer for the purity of my heart, but I cannot change my thoughts; they are such as the nature of things suggests to me."

Marat proceeded to inform the assembly that the article in question, published ten days ago as a placard, had been republished against his wish by his bookseller, but that he had just given a new exposition of his principles in the first number of the *Journal of the Republic*, with which the assembly would be assuredly well satisfied, if it would vouchsafe to hear it read.

The assembly agreed to allow its perusal, and, appeased by the moderate expressions of Marat in the article entitled "*Its new progress*," treated him with less bitterness; he even obtained some marks of satisfaction. But he remounted the tribune with his usual effrontery, and ventured to administer a severe rebuke to his colleagues upon the dangers of passion and prejudice. He told them that if his journal had not appeared that very day, opportunely to exculpate him, they would have blindly consigned him to irons. "But," said he, drawing forth a pistol, which he always carried in his pocket, and now pointed to his forehead, "I had the means of securing freedom; and if you had decreed me under impeachment, I would have blown my brains to atoms in this very tribune. Behold the reward of my labours, of my perils, of my sufferings! But now I will remain amongst you to brave your fury!" At this last expression of Marat, his colleagues, moved with all their former indignation, shouted out that he was a fool and a villain, and gave way to a prolonged tumult.

The debate had lasted several hours, and what, after all, had been elicited? Nothing upon the alleged project of a dictatorship for the dominion of a triumvirate, but much upon the character of parties, and on their respective strength. Danton had shown himself moderate, and full of kindness for his colleagues, provided his conduct were not too severely handled; Robespierre vindictive and sullen; Marat astounding by his cynicism and cool audacity, repudiated even by his own party, but striving to inculcate his atrocious system, and habituate the mind to its contemplation; —all three prospering in the revolution by different faculties and vices; not acting in concert, on the contrary disavowing each other, and evidently impelled simply by that desire for influence which is natural to all men, but which has not yet ripened into a project of tyranny. Public opinion went with the Girondists in execrating September and its horrors; it granted them the estimation due to their talents and probity; but it deemed their accusations exaggerated and imprudent, and held it as but too palpable that certain personal feelings mingled in their indignation.

From this day, the assembly was divided into a right side and left side, as at the opening of the first Constituent Assembly. On the right side were ranged all the Girondists, and those who, without being personally linked to their destinies, partook, nevertheless, their generous indignation. In the centre were gathered in considerable number all those honest but peaceable deputies, who, moved neither by character nor talents to take part in the contest of factions otherwise than by silent votes, sought obscurity and safety by merging in the multitude. Their numerical force in the assembly, the great respect still entertained for that body itself, and the pains taken by the Jacobin and municipal party to justify itself in their eyes, all tended to give them confidence. They loved to believe that the authority of the convention would suffice in time to subdue the agitators; nor were they sorry to have a plea for deferring the display of energy, and charging the Girondists with hazarding rash accusations. As yet they were principally distinguished for a laudable spirit of justice and impartiality, at times betraying a certain jealousy of the too frequent and too brilliant eloquence of the right side; but they were speedily to become feeble and cowardly in presence of tyranny. They were called *the Plain*, and in opposition, the left side was denominated *the Mountain*, on which all the Jacobins were heaped one above the other. Upon the tiers of this Mountain were perceived the deputies of Paris, and such provincial representatives as owed their election to the correspondence of the clubs, or had been gained since their arrival by the opinion that no quarter ought to be granted to the enemies of the revolution. On them might be likewise discerned certain distinguished characters, men of the exact, rigorous, and positive order of minds, by whom the theories and philanthropy of the Girondists were contemned as idle abstractions. However, the Mountaineers were few in number at this time. The Plain, united with the right side, composed an immense majority, which had given the presidency to Pétion, and approved of the attacks made by the Girondists against September, save the personal denunciations, which seemed too premature, and too insufficiently grounded.*

* The following is the picture which the minister Garat, who studied the characters of the revolution with the most observant eye, has drawn of the two sides of the convention :—

"In the right side of the convention were included almost all the men of whom I have just spoken: I could not discern any other spirit amongst them than such as I had always recognised in them. There, then, I perceived both that republicanism of sentiment which only consents to obey a man when that man speaks *in the name* of the nation and *as* the law, and that still more rare republicanism of the mind which has taken to pieces and put together again all the springs of organisation in a society of men alike in rights as in nature; which has discovered by what happy and profound artifice there may be associated in a great republic those things that appear incapable of association—equality, and submission to the magistrates; a beneficial agitation in opinion and discussion, and a constant, immoveable order; a government whose power may always be absolute over individuals and the multitude, and still amenable to the nation; an executive power whose outward forms and pomp, of an useful splendour, may always support the idea of the majesty of the republic, but never that of the greatness of an individual.

On the same side I saw seated the men most fully versant in those doctrines of political economy which teach the policy of opening and enlarging the channels of private and of national wealth; of composing the public treasury of such contributions as the fortune of each individual owes to it; of creating new sources and new channels of productiveness to private capital by a skilful use of what it has poured into the coffers of the state; of protecting and leaving without restrictions all kinds of industry, without favouring any in particular; of viewing large possessions not as unfruitful lakes, which absorb and hold all the tributary streams that pour from the mountains, but as reservoirs necessary for the purposes of multiplying and improving the germs of universal fecundity, and of distributing them by degrees over localities which would have otherwise remained in unproductiveness and sterility—admirable doctrines, which introduced liberty into arts and commerce before it had penetrated into governments, but peculiarly fitted by their essence to the spirit of republics, they being alone capable of giving a solid foundation to *equality*, not in a general *frugality* always violated, and which fetters the desires infinitely less than industry, but in an universal competence, in those labours, the ingenious variety and continual revival of which can alone occupy, auspiciously for liberty, that turbulent activity of democracies which, after having long tormented, finally caused the downfall of the ancient republics, amidst the storms and tempests in which their atmosphere was always enveloped.

On the right side were five or six men whose genius was competent to originate these great theories of the social and economical orders, and a considerable number of men capable of understanding and diffusing them. It was there, likewise, that certain spirits were ranged, formerly distinguished for impetuosity and violence, but who, after describing and exhausting the entire circle of demagogical passions, now aspired simply to discredit and combat the follies they themselves had propagated. There, finally, were seated, like devotees kneeling at the foot of the altar, those men, whom subdued passions, a moderate tor-

The assembly had passed to the order of the day upon the respective accusations of the two parties, but had maintained the decree of the previous day. Thus three points remained fixed: 1st, To require from the minister of the interior a faithful and exact account of the state of Paris; 2d, To frame a project of law against instigators to murder and pillage; and, 3d, To devise the means of assembling a departmental guard around the National Convention. The energy and spirit with which the report upon the state of Paris would be characterised was well known, since it was intrusted to Roland; and the committee charged with the two projects against written instigations, and for the establishment of a guard, inspired equal confidence, inasmuch as it was entirely composed of Girondists. Buzot, Lasource, and Kersaint, were members of it.

It was against the two latter objects that the Mountaineers were especially inveterate. They asked whether it were intended to repeat the proclamation of martial law and the massacre of the Champ-de-Mars, and whether the convention designed to give itself satellites and body-guards like the last king. They thus revived, as the Girondists upbraided them, all the reasons alleged by the court against the camp below Paris.

Many members of the left side, even the most ardent, were, in their capacity of deputies of the convention, decisively inimical to the usurpations of the commune; and, with the exception of the deputies of Paris, no one defended it when attacked, which occurred almost daily. Thus decrees were passed in rapid succession. As the commune delayed to adopt steps for its own renewal, in execution of the decree prescribing the re-election of all the administrative bodies, the executive council was ordered to superintend its reconstruction, and render an account of the same to the assembly within three days. A commission of six members was named to receive declarations from all those who had deposited effects at the town-hall, and to ascertain the existence of those effects, or the purposes to which the municipality had applied them. The directory of the department, which the insurrectional commune had reduced to the title and the functions of a simple administrative commission, was restored to all its prerogatives, and resumed its title of directory. The communal elections for appointing a mayor, and the members of the municipality and the council-general, which the Jacobins had recently determined to make *viva voce*, as a means of intimidating the faint-hearted, were rendered secret by a fresh confirmation of the existing law. The elections already made according to that illegal mode were annulled, and the sections submitted to re-commence them in the prescribed form. It was finally decreed that all the prisoners confined without a warrant of arrest should be forthwith discharged. This was a heavy blow levelled at the committee of surveillance, whose rage was principally directed against persons.

All these decrees were passed during the first days of October, and the commune, thus vigorously assailed, found itself compelled to bend beneath the ascendancy of the convention. However, the committee of sur-

tune, and an education which had not been neglected, prepared to illustrate, by all the private virtues, a republic which permitted them to enjoy their tranquillity, their easy and kindly life, and their possessions.

Turning my eyes from this right side to the left, fixing them upon the Mountain, what a contrast struck me! There I beheld a man working with the utmost turbulence, to whom a visage tinged with a copper dye gave the appearance of one sprung from the bloody caverns of the anthropophagi or the burning threshold of hell; in whom, by his convulsive, abrupt, and broken step, you recognised one of those assassins who have escaped the executioner but not the Furies, and who seem willing to annihilate the human race for the sake of escaping the terror with which the sight of every man inspires them. Under the despotism, which he had not covered with blood as he had done liberty, this man had been possessed with the ambition of making a revolution in the sciences; and he had attacked, in audacious and contemptible systems, the greatest discoveries of modern times and of human intelligence. His eyes, wandering over the history of the world, had paused upon the lives of four or five grand exterminators, who converted cities into deserts, in order afterwards to repeople the deserts with a race formed after their own likeness, or after that of tigers—such was all he had retained of the annals of nations, all that he knew or wished to imitate of them. By an instinct similar to that of wild beasts, rather than from a perception of human perversity, he had discerned to how many follies and crimes it was possible to hurry an immense nation whose religious and political chains had just been snapped asunder; it was that idea which dictated all his writings, all his words, all his actions. And his fall was reserved to the poniard of a woman! and more than fifty thousand statues of him were erected in the republic!

By his side were drawn men who would not of themselves have conceived such atrocities, but who, cast with him, by an act of extreme temerity, into events the critical import of which unnerved them, and whose dangers made them tremble, even whilst disavowing the maxims of the monster, had probably already followed them, and were not indisposed to allow the fear to prevail that they might follow them again. They held Marat in horror, but they felt no repugnance in making use of him. They placed him in the midst of them, they put him in the foreground, they carried him, as it were, upon their breasts, like a head of Medusa. As the terror such a man inspired was every where, so he himself was thought every where visible; he was in some sort believed to be the whole Mountain, or the whole Mountain to be like him. Amongst the leaders, in fact, there were several who reproved the crimes of Marat only as they were somewhat too glaring and avowed.

But amongst those very leaders (and here truth compels me to dissent from the opinions of many honest men), amongst the leaders themselves were many men who, connected with the others greatly more by events than by sentiment, cast many a look and a regret towards justice and humanity; who would have displayed numerous virtues, and rendered numerous services, if at any instant they had been deemed capable of such manifestations or actions. To the Mountain repaired, as to military posts, those who abundantly possessed the passion, but scantily the theory, of liberty; those who believed equality menaced, or even broken, by dignity of sentiment and elegance of language; those who, reared in hovels or workshops, refused to recognise a republican except in the costume they themselves wore; those who, entering for the first time into the career of the revolution, found it incumbent on them to signalise that impetuosity and violence which had originated the glory of almost all the great revolutionists; those who, still young, and formed rather to serve the republic in the armies than in the sanctuary of the laws, having seen the republic take birth amidst the roar of thunder, believed that it was always amidst the roar of thunder it behoved them to preserve it and promulgate its decrees. To this left side also resorted, seeking an asylum rather than a position, several of those deputies who, having been reared in the proscribed castes of nobility and priesthood, although always unsullied, were perpetually exposed to suspicions, and fled to the top of the Mountain to avert the accusation of not having attained the requisite elevation of principles. Thither proceeded, too, to feed upon their suspicions and live in the midst of chimeras, those solemn and melancholy characters who, having observed falsehood too often united with politeness, believed in virtue only when gloomy, and in liberty only when savage. There sat, also, certain spirits who had contracted in the exact sciences surliness as well as preciseness, and who, proud of possessing knowledge immediately applicable to the mechanical arts, were well pleased to be separated by position, as by disdain, from those men of letters and philosophers whose accomplishments are not so promptly serviceable to weavers and forgers, and reach individuals only after having enlightened the entire society. There, finally, were inevitably moved to vote, whatsoever might be in other respects their avocations and talents, all those who, by the overstrained workings of their character, were disposed to go beyond, rather than remain within, the limit which might have been assigned to the revolutionary energy and mania.

Such was the idea I formed to myself of the *elements* composing the two sides of the convention.

Judging each side by the majority of its elements, both, in different kinds and degrees, infallibly appeared to me capable of rendering great services to the republic: the right side in organising the interior with wisdom and dignity; the left side in imparting from their own souls into those of all the French, those republican and popular passions so necessary to a nation assailed on all sides by the herd of kings and the soldiery of Europe."

veillance had resolved not to be discomfited without a show of resistance. Its members had accordingly presented themselves at the bar of the assembly, saying that they came to confound their adversaries. Possessing the papers found at the house of Laporte, intendant of the civil list, and condemned, as the reader will recollect, by the tribunal of the 17th August, they had discovered, they alleged, a letter in which was mentioned how much certain decrees had cost, passed in the preceding assemblies. They were prepared to unmask the deputies sold to the court, and demonstrate the hollowness of their patriotism. "Name them!" the assembly exclaimed, indignantly. "We cannot yet do so," replied the members of the committee. A commission of twenty-four deputies was immediately nominated, all unconnected with the Constituent and Legislative Assemblies, charged, as a means of rebutting the calumny, to investigate those papers and give in a report of their contents. Marat, the inventor of this expedient, published in his journal that he had "*paid the Rolandists*," the accusers of the commune, "*in their own coin*;" and he announced the pretended discovery of a Girondist treason. In the mean time the papers were examined, none of the present deputies were found compromised, and the committee of surveillance was accordingly declared guilty of calumny. The papers being too voluminous for the twenty-four deputies to continue their examination at the town-hall, they were removed to one of the committee-rooms of the assembly. Marat, seeing himself thus deprived of rich materials for his daily accusations, was violently exasperated, and pretended in his journal that it was a scheme to destroy the record of numberless treasons.

After having thus repressed the encroachments of the commune, the assembly turned its attention to the executive power, and decided that the ministry could not be held by any of its members. Danton, obliged to choose between the functions of minister of justice and of member of the convention, preferred, like Mirabeau, those which opened to him the tribune; and he quitted the ministry without rendering an account of his secret disbursements, which he asserted he had already laid before the council. This allegation was not quite accurate; but too close a scrutiny was not judged expedient, and the matter was passed over. On the refusal of François de Neufchâteau, Garat, a distinguished author, and highly intellectual ideologist, who had become famous by his admirable conduct of the *Journal de Paris*, occupied the post of minister of justice. Servan, wearied by a laborious office, above, not his capacity, but his strength, preferred the command of the army of observation stationed at the foot of the Pyrenees. The minister Lebrun was provisionally intrusted with the portfolio of war, in addition to that of foreign affairs. Roland likewise tendered his resignation, disgusted with an anarchy so repulsive to his integrity and inflexible love of order. The Girondists moved the assembly to invite him to retain the portfolio. The Mountaineers, and particularly Danton, whom he had greatly thwarted, opposed this proposition as derogatory to the assembly. Danton complained that he was feeble, and under the control of his wife; which reproach was answered by an appeal to his letter of the 3d September, and might have been more signally repelled by adducing the opposition that he, Danton himself, had experienced from him in the council. However, the order of the day was carried, and the motion passed aside. But, urged by the Girondists and all the men of character, Roland continued in the ministry. "I remain," he nobly wrote to the assembly, "because I am assailed by calumny, because dangers press upon me, and because the convention has appeared desirous that I should still exercise the ministry.—It is too glorious," he added, in finishing his letter, "that my union with courage and virtue is the solitary reproach made against me."

The assembly subsequently divided itself into different committees. It instituted a committee of surveillance composed of thirty members; a second, of war, of twenty-four; a third, of accounts, of fifteen; a fourth, of civil and criminal legislation, of forty-eight; a fifth, of assignats, currency, and finance, of forty-two. A sixth committee, more important than all the others, was intrusted with the principal object for which the convention itself was convoked, that is to say, the preparation of a constitution. It was composed of nine members, enjoying celebrity on various grounds, and almost all chosen in the interest of the right side. Philosophy had its representatives in the persons of Siêyes, Condorcet, and the American, Thomas Paine, recently elected a French citizen and a member of the National Convention; the Gironde was peculiarly represented by Gensonné, Vergniaud, Pétion, and Brissot; the centre by Barrère, and the Mountain by Danton. It was certainly matter of astonishment that this latter tribune, so fitted for action but so essentially unspeculative, should be placed in this purely philosophical committee, especially when the character of Robespierre, if not his talents, distinctly pointed him out for such a part. It is certain that Robespierre was much more desirous of the distinction, and that he was deeply incensed at not obtaining it. It was conferred in preference on Danton, whom his natural capacity rendered suitable for all tasks, and whom no bitter animosity yet separated from his colleagues. This composition of the committee, however, was the occasion of the constitution being so long delayed.

After having thus provided for the re-establishment of order in the capital, for the organisation of the executive power, for the distribution of business amongst committees, and for the preparation of the constitution, there remained a final subject to regulate, one of the gravest that could occupy the assembly—the fate of Louis XVI. and of his family. A profound silence had been observed upon this topic in the assembly; and whilst it was every where discussed—at the Jacobin Club, at the commune, and in all public or private meetings, in the convention alone it was never mentioned. Some emigrants having been seized with arms in their hands, they had been conducted towards Paris to receive the application of the criminal laws. On this point, a voice (it was the first) asked whether, instead of heeding these subordinate culprits, it was not expedient to adopt measures regarding those lofty criminals confined in the Temple. At these words, the assembly was hushed into the deepest silence. Barbaroux was the first to break it, and he moved that, before resolving whether the convention should try Louis XVI., it should be settled whether the convention were a judicial body, for it had other criminals to judge besides those in the Temple. In starting this question, Barbaroux had reference to the project for constituting the convention an extraordinary tribunal for trying *the agitators*, *the triumvirs*, &c. After some discussion, the motion was remitted to the committee of legislation, with instructions to examine the questions involved in it.

CHAPTER XV.

MILITARY OPERATIONS AT THE END OF OCTOBER 1792.—SECOND CONTEST BETWEEN THE GIRONDISTS AND THE MOUNTAIN.—PRELIMINARY PROPOSITIONS FOR THE TRIAL OF LOUIS XVI.

At this period the military situation of France was greatly changed. It was nearly the middle of October, and the enemy was already driven from Champagne and Flanders, and alien territory invaded on three points, the Palatinate, Savoy, and the county of Nice.

We have seen the Prussians retreating from the camp of La Lune, retracing the route of the Argonne, strewing its defiles with dead and sick, and only

escaping total destruction by the negligence of the French generals, who each pursued a different object. The Duke of Saxe-Teschen had not been more successful in the Low Countries. Whilst the Prussians were marching on the Argonne, that prince, unwilling to remain inactive, had thought himself called upon to undertake a brilliant enterprise. However, although the frontier to the north was undefended, his means were not much more considerable than those of his opponents, and he had some difficulty in collecting fifteen thousand men, with an indifferent train of artillery. Directing a series of false attacks along the whole line of fortresses, he succeeded in breaking up one of the small camps, and suddenly advanced upon Lille, to attempt a siege in which the greatest generals had been foiled, with powerful armies and a formidable artillery. Destructive enterprises are only justified in war by the possibility of success. The duke could only approach one point of the place, and he there established batteries of howitzers, with which he bombarded it during six consecutive days, and burnt upwards of two hundred houses. It is said that the Archduchess Christina resolved to be present at this horrible spectacle. If it were so, she would merely witness the heroism of the besieged and the inutility of Austrian barbarity. The people of Lille, resisting with noble fortitude, determined never to surrender; and on the 8th October, whilst the Prussians were making the best of their way through the Argonne, the Duke Albert found it necessary to abandon Lille. General Labourdonnaye, arriving from Soissons, and Beurnonville, returning from Champagne, forced him to retire precipitately from the French frontiers; and the resistance of the Lillois, published throughout all France, tended to augment the general enthusiasm.

Almost simultaneously with these events, Custine attempted some bold operations in the Palatinate, but with a result more brilliant than solid. Attached to the army of Biron, who was encamped along the banks of the Rhine, he was stationed with 17,000 men, at some distance from Spires. The grand invading army had but weakly protected its rear when advancing into the interior of France. Feeble detachments, therefore, covered Spires, Worms, and Mayence. Custine perceived the neglect, marched on Spires, and entered it without resistance on the 30th September. Emboldened by this first success, he penetrated on the 5th October into Worms, without encountering greater difficulties, and obliged a garrison of 2700 men to lay down their arms. He afterwards took Frankenthal, and immediately formed a design on the important fortress of Mayence, which was the main point of retreat to the Prussians, and in which they had been imprudent enough to leave but a moderate garrison. Custine, with only 17,000 men, and without artillery, could not institute a siege, but he determined upon a sudden assault. The opinions which had roused France agitated all Germany, and especially the university towns. Mayence was one of these, and Custine opened a correspondence within its walls. He then drew near it, withdrew upon false intelligence of the arrival of an Austrian corps, again returned, and, making certain considerable demonstrations, deceived the enemy as to the strength of his army. An anxious deliberation meanwhile was proceeding in the fortress. A capitulation was strenuously recommended by the partisans of the French, and on the 21st October the gates were opened to Custine. The garrison laid down their arms, excepting 800 Austrians, who rejoined the grand army. The news of these successes spread with rapidity, and caused an extraordinary sensation. They had, doubtless, cost little in the acquisition; they were infinitely less meritorious than the resolution of the Lillois, and the magnanimous determination displayed at Sainte-Menehould; but there was a mighty charm in passing from mere resistance to conquest. So far Custine had conducted himself with ability; and if he had properly appreciated his position, he would have concluded the campaign by a movement at once feasible and decisive.

At this instant, the three armies of Dumouriez, Kellermann, and Custine were, by the happiest conjunction, so situated as to be able to destroy the Prussians, and conquer by a single march the whole line of the Rhine as far as the ocean. If Dumouriez, less prepossessed by another idea, had retained Kellermann under his orders, and pursued the Prussians with his 80,000 men; if, at the same time, Custine, descending the Rhine from Mayence to Coblentz, had thrown himself on their rear, they must infallibly have been overwhelmed. Then following the course of the Rhine to Holland, the French would have taken Duke Albert in the rear, obliged him to lay down his arms, or cut his way through their army, and all the Low Countries must have submitted. Treves and Luxumbourg, comprised within the line described, would have necessarily fallen; France had been extended to the banks of the Rhine, and the campaign terminated in a month. Genius was abundant in Dumouriez, but his ideas had taken another course. Impatient to return into Belgium, he was intent only upon marching there in a direct line, in order to succour Lille and drive Duke Albert before him. He consequently left Kellermann to carry on the pursuit of the Prussians alone. The latter might still have advanced on Coblentz, passing between Luxumbourg and Treves, whilst Custine descended from Mayence. But Kellermann, backward in enterprise, presumed too little on his troops, which appeared harassed, and he cantoned around Metz. Custine, on his part, desiring to act independently, and to make brilliant incursions, had no wish to join Kellermann, and confine himself to the limits of the Rhine. He never once thought, therefore, of proceeding to Coblentz. Thus was this admirable plan neglected, so ably seized and developed by the greatest of the French military historians.*

Custine, possessing considerable talents, was nevertheless presumptuous, hasty, and inconsiderate. He was mainly bent on rendering himself independent of Biron and every other general, and filled with the idea of conquering all around him. An attack on Manheim would be a violation of the neutrality of the elector-palatine, which was expressly prohibited by the executive council, and he therefore resolved to quit the Rhine and advance into Germany. Frankfort, situated on the Maine, seemed to him a prey worthy of acquisition, and he determined to proceed thither. That free and commercial town, however, always neutral in the various wars, and well inclined towards France, was far from meriting so disastrous a preference. Being unfortified, it was easy to capture, but difficult to defend, and consequently useless to occupy. Such an enterprise could have but one object, that of levying contributions; and it was the height of injustice to impose them upon a population invariably neutral, reposing, furthermore, upon its friendly dispositions, and by those very dispositions deserving the favour of France, of which it approved the principles and wished the success. Custine committed the fault of entering it, nevertheless. His occupation was effected on the 27th October. He exacted contributions, and irritated the inhabitants, whom he rendered hostile to France. He likewise exposed himself, by thus advancing on the Maine, to be cut off from the Rhine, either by the Prussians, should they ascend as far as Bingen, or by the elector-palatine, should he break his neutrality, and march from Manheim.

The intelligence of these incursions on the enemy's territory continued to excite great joy in France, which was sufficiently amazed at hearing of conquests a few days after trembling at the idea of being itself subdued. The Prussians, in alarm, threw a flying bridge over the Rhine, in order to ascend the right

* Jomini.

bank, and drive back the French. Luckily for Custine, they took twelve days to pass the river. Desertions, disease, and the separation of the Austrians, had reduced their army to fifty thousand men. Clairfayt, with his eighteen thousand Austrians, had followed the general movement of the French troops towards Flanders, and was marching to the relief of Duke Albert. The corps of emigrants had been disbanded, and that glittering soldiery had been incorporated in the troops under Condé, or had passed into foreign service.

Whilst these events were passing on the frontiers of the north and the Rhine, the French gained advantages also on the Alpine frontier. Montesquiou, commanding the army of the south, overran Savoy, and occupied the county of Nice by one of his lieutenants. This general, who had evinced in the Constituent Assembly all the talents of an enlightened statesman, and only wanted time to display the qualities of an able soldier, with which we are assured he was plentifully endowed, had been ordered to the bar of the legislative body to give an account of his conduct, denounced as too dilatory. He had succeeded in convincing his accusers that his tardiness was owing to the deficiency of means, and not to a lack of zeal, and he had returned to the Alps. He belonged, however, to the first revolutionary generation, and consequently harmonised but indifferently with the second. Summoned once more to Paris, he was on the point of being superseded, when tidings of his entrance into Savoy were received. His dismissal was then suspended, and he was allowed to continue his conquest.

According to the plan conceived by Dumouriez, when, as minister of foreign affairs, he regulated at once diplomacy and war, France was to push her armies to her natural frontiers, the Rhine and the high chain of the Alps. With this view, it became necessary to conquer Belgium, Savoy, and Nice. Whilst thus returning to the invariable principles of her policy, France had the advantage of despoiling none but the two enemies who made war upon her, namely, the house of Austria and the court of Turin. Of this plan, foiled in April as to Belgium, and hitherto deferred as to Savoy, Montesquiou was now proceeding to execute the part assigned to him. He gave a division to General Anselme, with orders to pass the Var, and march on Nice at a given signal; he himself advanced, with the greater part of his army, from Grenoble towards Chambery, threatened the Sardinian troops by a detachment in the direction of Saint-Geniès, and proceeding in person from Fort Barraux upon Montmelian, he succeeded in dividing them and driving them into the valleys. Whilst his lieutenants pursued them, he marched to Chambery, and on the 28th September made his triumphal entry into that town, to the great delight of the inhabitants, who loved liberty as true sons of the mountains, and France, as men speaking the same language, having the same manners, and belonging to the same territorial enclosure. He immediately convened an assembly of Savoyards, for the purpose of deliberating on a question attended with little difficulty in solution, to wit, union with France.

In the same period, Anselme, reinforced by six thousand Marseillese, whom he had demanded as auxiliaries, had reached the Var, an unequal torrent, like all lofty mountain streams, alternately flooded and dry, and incapable of having a fixed bridge thrown over it. Anselme boldly passed the Var, and occupied Nice, which the Count Saint-André had just abandoned, and which the magistrates urged him to enter, for the purpose of checking the disorders of the populace, who were pursuing a frightful course of pillage. The Sardinian troops fell back towards the high valleys; Anselme followed after them; but he stopped before a strong fort, that of Saorgio, from which he could never dislodge the Piedmontese garrison. In the mean time, the squadron of Admiral Truguet, regulating its motions by those of General Anselme, had obtained the surrender of Villafranca, and subsequently anchored before the petty principality of Oneglia. This port was a usual asylum for corsairs, and on that account its reduction was advisable. But, whilst a French boat was pulling to shore for the purpose of holding a parley, several of its crew were, in violation of the rights of nations, killed by a general discharge. Thereupon the admiral, mooring his vessels in front of the town, opened on it a destructive fire, and disembarked some troops, who sacked the place, and made a great carnage of monks, who were found there in considerable number, and had been, it was alleged, the instigators of so gross a breach of faith. Such is the inexorable rigour of military law; and upon the wretched town of Oneglia it was wreaked without mercy. After this expedition, the French squadron returned before Nice, where Anselme, separated by the floods of the Var from the rest of his army, was in a position of extreme hazard. However, by taking due precautions against the post of Saorgio, and conciliating the inhabitants more than he had thought fit to do at first, he was enabled to make good his station and preserve his conquest.

During these occurrences, Montesquiou had advanced from Chambery in the direction of Geneva, and now nearly approached the frontier of Switzerland, a country variously inclined towards the French, and pretending to view the invasion of Savoy as dangerous to its neutrality.

The feelings of the cantons were greatly divided touching the French nation. All the aristocratic republics condemned the French revolution. Berne especially, and its avoyer Stinger, heartily detested it, and the more so, perhaps, because the Pays de Vaud, so cruelly oppressed, regarded it with rapture. The Helvetian aristocracy, stimulated by the avoyer Stinger and the English ambassador, called for war against the French; and assigned as its motives the massacre of the Swiss guards on the 10th August; the disarming of a regiment at Aix; and, lastly, the occupation of the gorges of Porentruy, which depended on the bishopric of Basle, and which Biron had seized, in order to close the passage of the Jura. The moderate party, however, gained the ascendancy, and an armed neutrality was resolved upon. The canton of Berne, more exasperated and distrustful than the rest, marched a detachment to Nyon, and, under pretext of a request by the magistrates of Geneva, placed a garrison in that town. According to ancient treaties, Geneva, in the event of a war between France and Savoy, was bound to receive a garrison from neither power. The French envoy immediately departed, and the executive council, urged by Clavière, who had been formerly exiled from Geneva, and was anxious to introduce the revolution amongst its inhabitants, ordered Montesquiou to insist upon the execution of the treaties. Furthermore, he was enjoined to place a garrison in the town himself; that is to say, to imitate the infraction exclaimed against on the part of the Bernese. Montesquiou was sensible, in the first place, that he wanted means to take Geneva, and in the next, that by breaking the neutrality, and commencing war with Switzerland, France would be laid open on the east, and the right flank of her defensive uncovered. He resolved, therefore, to intimidate Geneva on the one hand, whilst on the other he attempted to impress these prudential views on the executive council. He accordingly imperatively demanded the dismissal of the Bernese garrison, and endeavoured to persuade the French ministry that it was inexpedient to exact more.

His purpose was, in case of extremity, to bombard Geneva, and advance by a bold march into the canton of Vaud, with the view of revolutionising it. Geneva consented to dismiss the Bernese troops on condition that Montesquiou withdrew to a distance of ten leagues, to which he instantly acceded. This con-

cession, however, was blamed at Paris; and Montesquiou, in position at Carouge, where the Genevese exiles, eager to return into their native country, pressed around him, was placed between the fear of embroiling France with Switzerland, and that of disobeying the executive council, which disdained the most sagacious military and political considerations. This negotiation, delayed by the distance between the places, was not finished by the end of October.

Therefore, in October 1792, the state of the French forces, from Dunkirk to Basle, and from Basle to Nice, may be thus described. The frontier of Champagne was delivered from the grand invasion; the troops were proceeding from that province towards Flanders, to relieve Lille and invade Belgium. Kellermann had his quarters in Lorraine. Custine, emancipated from the command of Biron, master of Mayence, and pushing imprudently into the Palatinate and even to the Maine, gladdened France by his conquests, alarmed Germany, and exposed himself inconsiderately to the risk of being cut off by the Prussians, who were ascending the right bank of the Rhine, with sickly and vanquished troops, but still numerous, and quite capable of overwhelming the small French army. Biron was still encamped along the Rhine. Montesquiou, master of Savoy by the retreat of the Piedmontese beyond the Alps, and guarded from fresh attacks by the snow, had to decide the question of Swiss neutrality either by arms or by negotiations. Lastly, Anselme, master of Nice, and supported by a squadron, was enabled to retain his position, in spite of the floods of the Var, and of the Piedmontese clustered above him in the post of Saorgio.

Whilst the war was being transferred from Champagne to Belgium, Dumouriez had asked permission to visit Paris for two or three days, in order to concert with the ministers the invasion of the Low Countries, and a general plan for all the military operations. His enemies reported that his real object was to reap applause, and that he disregarded the duties of his command for the gratification of a silly vanity. This reproach was unduly exaggerated, for Dumouriez's command was not injured by his absence, and the mere marches of troops could be executed without his superintendence. His presence at Paris, on the other hand, must necessarily be advantageous to the council in determining upon a general plan of operations; and furthermore, he might be pardoned for a certain impatience to enjoy his triumph, so general amongst mankind, and so excusable when it may be gratified without detriment to duty.

He arrived on the 11th October at Paris. His position was somewhat embarrassing, for he was in complete harmony with neither of the two parties. The violence of the Jacobins was repugnant to him, and he had quarrelled with the Girondists, by expelling them a few months before from the ministry. However, well received throughout Champagne, he was still more so in Paris, especially by the ministers and by Roland himself, who extinguished his personal resentment when the public good was interested. He presented himself on the 12th to the convention. Scarcely was his name announced than acclamations, mingled with the clapping of hands, burst from all quarters. He pronounced a simple energetic discourse, in which he briefly retraced the whole campaign of the Argonne, and eulogised, in emphatic terms, his troops, and Kellermann himself. His staff then presented a flag captured from the emigrants, which they offered to the assembly as a memento of the futility of their projects. Immediately afterwards the deputies crowded around him, and the sitting was suspended, that free scope might be afforded to congratulations. The numerous deputies of the Plain, *the impartials*, as they were called, having to upbraid him neither with abandonment nor with revolutionary lukewarmness, were those who testified towards him the most lively and heartfelt joy. The Girondists, indeed, were not backward in their manifestations; but, either through the fault of Dumouriez, or through their own, the reconciliation was not perfect, and a remnant of estrangement might still be perceived between them. The Mountaineers, who had once reproached him with attachment for Louis XVI., and now found him, in manners, merit, and elevation, too similar to the Girondists, looked with an evil eye on the testimonies of regard he obtained from them, and imagined such testimonies to be more significant than they in truth were.

After leaving the convention, the Jacobin Club remained to be visited; and so overweening was the influence possessed by that association, that the victorious general could not dispense with paying it his homage. It was there that the clamour of the moment grew into projects and imposed laws. Whether it had reference to an important decree, a high political question, or a great revolutionary measure, the Jacobins, always the promptest, immediately opened the discussion and gave their opinion. Then they spread themselves into the commune and the sections, and wrote to all the affiliated clubs; and the opinion they had pronounced, the intentions they had formed, returned in the shape of addresses from all the corners of France, and in that of armed petitions from all the quarters of Paris. When, in the municipal councils, the sections, and all assemblies invested with any authority whatsoever, the members still hesitated upon a question from a lingering respect for legality, the Jacobins, who deemed themselves as unfettered as thought, boldly solved it; and every insurrection was debated amongst them long before it broke out. They had deliberated on that of the 10th August during an entire month. Besides this initiatory course on each question, they usurped an inexorable inquisition over all the details of government. Were a minister, the head of a department, or a contractor, accused, commissioners proceeded from the Jacobin Club, ordered the desks to be opened, and exacted rigorous accounts, which were rendered to them without any marks of disdain or impatience. Every citizen who considered he had reason to complain of any act whatever, had only to appear before the society, and he there found officious defenders ready to procure him justice. One day were soldiers complaining of their officers, artisans of their employers; another, an actress exclaiming against her manager; and once a Jacobin appeared to demand reparation for adultery committed with his wife by one of his comrades.

Every one hastened to have his name inscribed on the registers of the society, as a proof of patriotic zeal. Almost all the deputies newly arrived at Paris had taken care to present themselves; one hundred and thirteen were reckoned in one week; and even those who had no intention of frequenting their meetings did not the less solicit admission. The affiliated societies wrote from the obscurest corners of the provinces to know if the deputies of their departments had sought to be enrolled and were assiduous in their attendance. The wealthy of the capital strove to have their opulence pardoned by going to the Jacobins' and covering their heads with the red cap; and their equipages blocked the doors of that chosen abode of equality. Whilst the hall was filled with the multitude of its members, whilst the galleries were overflowing with people, an immense crowd, mingling with the equipages, waited at the door, and demanded admission with loud cries. Sometimes this crowd grew irritated, especially when rain, so frequent in the climate of Paris, increased the annoyance of waiting; and then some member moved the admission of *the good people* suffering at the doors of the hall. Marat was frequently accustomed to make such propositions; and when admission was granted, sometimes before, a prodigious concourse of men and women inundated the hall and mixed promiscuously with the members. It was towards the close of day that the club met. The

angry feelings, aroused and kept down in the convention, were brought there to find free vent. The late hour, the multitude of persons present, all contributed to excite the mind; often the sitting, being prolonged, degenerated into a frightful tumult; and at such times the agitators derived for the morrow the courage necessary for the most audacious enterprises. Yet this society, so far advanced in the demagogical career, was not what it afterwards became. The equipages of those who came to abjure the inequality of conditions were still allowed at the door. Some members had made fruitless efforts to speak with their hats on, but they had been obliged to uncover. Brissot, it is true, had been recently excluded by a solemn decision, but Pétion continued to preside there amidst acclamations. Chabot, Collot-d'Herbois, Fabre-d'Eglantine, were the favourite orators. Marat was still viewed as something strange; and Chabot said, in the language of the place, that Marat was *a porcupine that could not be grasped at any point.*

Dumouriez was received by Danton, who presided at the sitting: vehement applause greeted him, and his presence amongst them procured his pardon for the supposed friendship of the Girondists. He uttered a few words suitable to the occasion, and promised, "*before the end of the month, to march at the head of sixty thousand men, for the purpose of attacking kings and rescuing nations from tyranny.*"

Danton, answering in analogous style, said to him that, rallying the French in the camp of Sainte-Menehould, he had deserved well of the country; but that a new career was opening for him; that he was destined to make crowns fall before the red cap with which the society had honoured him, and that his name would in that case shine amongst the most renowned in the history of France. Collot-d'Herbois afterwards addressed him, and treated him to a discourse which exhibits at once the prevalent language of the era, and the sentiments entertained towards the general at that particular moment.*

* I deem it incumbent on me to subjoin such notes as appear to me valuable, both as elucidating facts little known and wrongly appreciated, and as records of a style and language at present utterly forgotten, but nevertheless extremely characteristic. They are, for the most part, taken from sources wholly overlooked, and chiefly from the debates of the Jacobin Club, a political monument equally rare and curious.

SPEECH OF COLLOT-D'HERBOIS TO DUMOURIEZ, AFTER THE CAMPAIGN OF THE ARGONNE.

(*Extracted from the Journal of the Jacobins.*)

(SITTING OF SUNDAY 14TH OCTOBER, YEAR FIRST OF THE REPUBLIC.)

"I wished to speak of our armies, and I congratulate myself on speaking of them in presence of the soldier you have just heard. I might blame the answer of the president: I have already repeatedly affirmed that the president ought never to answer members of the society; but he has replied to all the soldiers of the army. That reply conveys to all an emphatic testimony of your satisfaction; Dumouriez will share it with all his brethren in arms, for he knows that without them his glory would be as a thing that was not. We must accustom ourselves to this language. Dumouriez has done his duty: in that is his best recompense. It is not because he is a general that I praise him, but because he is a French soldier.

Is it not true, general, that it is glorious to command a republican army?—that thou hast found a material difference between such an army and those of despotism? They have not only bravery, our French—they are not contented with spurning death merely—for who is there that fears death? But those inhabitants of Lille and Thionville, who await heated balls with calm indifference, who remain unmoved amidst the bursting of shells and the conflagration of their homes—is there not in this the development of all the virtues? Ah, yes! those virtues are superior to all triumphs! A new mode of waging war is now invented, and our enemies will not discover it: tyrants will be powerless for evil so long as there are free men determined upon defence.

A great number of brothers are dead combating for liberty; they are dead, but their memory is dear to us; they have left examples which live in our hearts: but do those live who attacked

"It is not a king who has nominated thee, oh Dumouriez, but thy fellow-citizens. Remember that a general of the republic ought never to serve any but it alone. Thou hast heard of Themistocles: he had just saved Greece at Salamis; but, calumniated by his enemies, he was driven to seek an asylum with tyrants. They made him offers to serve against his country; for answer, he plunged his sword into his heart. Dumouriez, thou hast enemies—thou wilt be calumniated: remember Themistocles!

Enslaved nations await thee to aid them: thou wilt speedily deliver them. How glorious a mission! I must warn thee, however, against any excess of generosity towards thy enemies. *Thou hast escorted back the King of Prussia a little too much after the French fashion.* But we will hope that Austria will have a double measure dealt out to her.

Thou wilt go to Brussels, Dumouriez——I have nothing to say to thee. But, if thou shouldst find there an execrable woman, who, under the walls of Lille, came to feast her ferocity with the spectacle of red-hot balls!——But that woman will not stay for thee.

At Brussels, liberty is about to revive under thy steps. Citizens, maidens, matrons, children, will press us? No: they have bit the dust, and their cohorts are but heaps of lifeless bodies, putrefying where they battled; they are but a putrid stench the air of liberty will scarcely purify. That host of strolling skeletons resembles the skeleton of tyranny; and, like it, they will speedily succumb. Where are those veteran generals of high renown? Their shadows vanish before the all-puissant genius of liberty: they fly, and find only dungeons as a retreat; for dungeons will soon be the only palaces of despots: they fly, because nations are arisen.

It is not a king who has named thee, Dumouriez, but thy fellow-citizens. Remember, that a general of the republic must never treat with tyrants; remember, that generals like thee must never serve aught but liberty. Thou hast heard of Themistocles: he had just saved the Greeks by the battle of Salamis; he was calumniated (thou hast enemies, Dumouriez; thou wilt be calumniated; it is therefore I speak to thee): Themistocles was calumniated; he was unjustly condemned by his countrymen; he found an asylum in the abode of tyrants; but he was still Themistocles. He was asked to bear arms against his native land. 'My sword shall never serve tyrants,' he replied, and plunged it in his heart. I remind thee, also, of Scipio. Antiochus strove to seduce that great man by offering to restore him a precious hostage, his own son. Scipio answered, 'Thou hast not wealth enough to buy my conscience, and nature has nothing superior to the love of country.'

Nations are groaning in slavery: thou wilt speedily set them free. How glorious a mission! Success is not doubtful: the citizens who await thee are eager to hail thee; and those who are here urge thee onward. Thou art open to reproach, however, for certain excesses of generosity towards thy foes; thou hast escorted back the King of Prussia a little too much after the French fashion—I mean the old French fashion (applause). But, we will hope, Austria will pay a double penalty: she is opulent; do not spare her; thou canst not make her pay too highly for the outrages her race has inflicted on the human species.

Thou goest to Brussels, Dumouriez (applause); thou wilt pass Courtray. There the French name has been profaned; a general abused the confidence of a nation; the traitor Jarry burned houses. Hitherto I have spoken only to thy courage, now I speak to thy heart. Bear in mind those unfortunate inhabitants of Courtray; belie not their hopes this time; promise them the justice of the nation; the nation will not disavow thee.

When thou art at Brussels—I have nothing to say to thee upon the conduct thou hast to pursue; if thou shouldst find there an execrable woman, who, under the walls of Lille, came to gloat her ferocity with the spectacle of heated balls——but that woman will not wait for thee. If thou *shouldst* find her, she will be thy prisoner; we have others, also, who are of her stock; thou wilt send her here; let her be so shaved, at least, that a peruke will not again fit her.

At Brussels, liberty is about to revive under thy auspices. An entire people will give way to rapture; thou wilt restore children to their parents, wives to their husbands; the spectacle of their bliss will repay all thy labours. Children, citizens, maidens, matrons, all will press around thee—all will embrace thee as their father! What felicity is in store for thee, Dumouriez! My wife—she is from Brussels; she also will embrace thee."

This discourse was repeatedly interrupted by loud cheers.

around thee. What felicity there is in store for thee, Dumouriez! My wife—she is from Brussels; she also will embrace thee!"

Danton then left with Dumouriez, whom he had appropriated as it were, and to whom he rendered the honours of the republic. Danton having manifested at Paris a firmness analogous to that of Dumouriez at Sainte-Menehould, they were looked upon as the two saviours of the revolution, and were jointly applauded at all the public places they visited. A certain instinct drew these men together, notwithstanding the discrepancy of their pursuits. They were libertines of the two systems of things, associating from an identical bent and taste for pleasure, but distinct in the order of their corruption. Danton's was that of the people, Dumouriez's that of courts; but more happy than his colleague, the latter had always served in a noble sphere and with arms in his hands, whilst Danton had the misfortune to have sullied a great character by the atrocities of September.

Those brilliant saloons, where celebrated men formerly enjoyed their glory—where, during the last century, Voltaire, Diderot, D'Alembert, Rousseau, were listened to and applauded—such saloons were no longer in existence. There remained the simple and select society of Madame Roland, where all the Girondists assembled—the handsome Barbaroux, the witty Louvet, the grave Buzot, the brilliant Guadet, the captivating Vergniaud; and where still reigned polite language, instructive conversation, and elegant and polished manners. The ministers met there twice in the week, and partook of a repast composed of a single course. Such was the new republican society, which united with the graces of the olden France the seriousness of the modern, and which, alas! was speedily in its turn to disappear before demagogical grossness. Dumouriez was present at one of these simple banquets: at first he felt some constraint at sight of those old friends whom he had chased from the ministry, and of that woman who, in his eyes, was too severe, whilst to her he appeared too licentious; but he sustained the ordeal with his accustomed spirit, and was greatly moved at the unaffected cordiality of Roland. After the society of the Girondists, that of the artists was the only one which had survived the dispersion of the ancient aristocracy. Almost all the artists had warmly embraced a revolution which avenged them for high-born disdain, and which promised distinction to merit and genius alone. They in turn entertained Dumouriez, and gave a feast in his honour, at which were assembled all the talents the metropolis could boast. But in the midst of that same festival, a strange occurrence happened to interrupt its harmony, and excite equal astonishment and disgust.

Marat, always ready to take the initiative in revolutionary doubts, was not satisfied with the general. The furious denouncer of all men enjoying public favour, he had invariably provoked, by his outrageous invectives, the odium incurred by the popular leaders. Mirabeau, Bailly, Lafayette, Pétion, the Girondists, had all been exposed to his abuse even when standing highest in popularity. Since the 10th August more especially, he had given full scope to the monstrous conceptions of his brain; and, although a loathsome object in the eyes of rational and worthy men, and strange at the least in those of heated revolutionists themselves, he had been encouraged by certain evidences of success. Consequently, he soon began to look upon himself as a public man, essential to the new order of things. He passed a great portion of his time in collecting rumours, in diffusing them in his newspaper, and in scouring the offices on his self-imposed mission of redressing the wrongs of administrators towards the people. Making the public the confidant of his mode of life, he said one day, in one of his sheets,* that his occupations were overwhelming; that out of the twenty-four hours in the day, he gave but two to sleep, and only one to the table and domestic concerns; that besides the hours consecrated to his duties as a deputy, he regularly employed six in gathering and enforcing the complaints of a multitude of the wretched and oppressed; that he devoted the remaining hours to perusing and answering numerous letters, writing his observations upon events, receiving denunciations, satisfying himself of the veracity of his informants; finally, in composing his journal and superintending the publication of a great work. For three years, he said, he had not taken a quarter of an hour's recreation; and we tremble as we think of what so disturbed an intellect, acting with so inordinate an activity, might produce in a revolution.

Marat pretended to see in Dumouriez only an aristocrat of depraved manners, against whom it was prudent to be on guard. To increase his venom, he learnt that Dumouriez had recently proceeded with the utmost rigour against two battalions of volunteers who had massacred some emigrant deserters. He instantly repaired to the Jacobins', denounced the general from their tribune, and moved that two commissioners be sent to interrogate him on his conduct. To himself were added two persons, named Montaut and Bentabolle; and upon the instant he proceeded on his mission, accompanied by them. Dumouriez was not at his own residence. Marat hastened to various places of amusement, and ultimately learnt that Dumouriez was present at an entertainment given to him by the artists, at the house of Madame Candeille, a celebrated woman of those days. Marat scrupled not to proceed thither, in spite of his filthy dress. The equipages, the detachments of the national guard which he met at the door of the house where the feast was celebrated, the presence of the commander Santerre, and of a great many deputies, and all the manifestations of a festive meeting, aggravated his wrath. He boldly advanced, and requested to see Dumouriez. A sort of rumour arose at his approach. His name being announced, caused a multitude of visages suddenly to disappear, flying, as he said, his accusing glance. Walking directly up to Dumouriez, he loudly called him by name, and demanded an account of the punishment inflicted on the two battalions. The general surveyed him, and said to him with a contemptuous sneer, "Ah! you are he whom they call Marat!" He again examined him from head to foot, and turned his back upon him, without saying another word. However, the Jacobins who accompanied Marat appearing more modest and discreet, Dumouriez vouchsafed certain explanations to them, and dismissed them satisfied. Marat, who was not so, uttered loud cries in the antechambers; upbraided Santerre, who performed, he said, the functions of a lackey to the general; declaimed furiously against the national guards, who contributed to the pomp of the feast; and finally withdrew, threatening with his wrath all the aristocrats present at the entertainment. He ran with all speed to describe in his journal this ridiculous scene, which so admirably depicts the position of Dumouriez, the frenzy of Marat, and the manners of that epoch.*

* Journal of the French Republic, No. 93. Wednesday, 9th January 1793.

* ACCOUNT OF THE VISIT WHICH MARAT PAID TO DUMOURIEZ AT THE HOUSE OF MADAME CANDEILLE.

(Extracted from the Journal of the French Republic, and written by Marat himself in his number of Wednesday, 17th October 1792.)

"DECLARATION OF THE FRIEND OF THE PEOPLE.

Less astonished than indignant at seeing old valets of the court—placed, by the result of circumstances, at the head of our armies, and maintained in office since the 10th August by the combined effect of influence, intrigue, and stupidity—carry audacity to the height of degrading and treating as culprits two patriotic battalions, under the ridiculous, and most probably mendacious, pretext that certain individuals had massacred four Prussian deserters, I presented myself at the tribune of the Jacobins to unmask this odious plot, and to request that two commissioners, distinguished for their civism, might be named to accompany me to Dumouriez's, and be witnesses of his answers

Dumouriez had passed four days at Paris, and during that period had failed to come to an understanding with the Girondists, though he had an intimate friend amongst them in the person of Gensonné. He had simply recommended the latter to reconcile himself with Danton, as the most redoubtable man of the times, and as one who, despite his vices, was fitted to become the most useful to men of probity. Dumouriez had not been more successful with the Jacobins, to whom he had conceived an unalterable repugnance, and by whom he was himself suspected, on account of his supposed friendship with the Girondists. His visit to Paris, therefore, had been of little service to him with regard to the two parties, but of considerable utility in a military point of view.

According to his wonted custom, he had formed a general plan, which was adopted by the executive council. In accordance with this plan, Montesquiou was to maintain himself along the Alps, and make sure of the great chain as a barrier, by completing the conquest of Nice and striving to preserve the Swiss neutrality. Biron was to be reinforced, so that he might guard the Rhine from Basle to Landau. A corps of 12,000 men, under the orders of General Meusnier, was to take up a position in the rear of Custine, in order to cover his communications. Kellermann was

to my interrogatories. I repaired to his house with the citizens Bentabole and Montaut, two of my colleagues in the convention, where we were informed he was at the theatre, and intended to sup from home.

We learnt he had left the Variétés; we went to seek him at the club of Cypher D, where we were told he was wont to resort; lost labour. At last we learnt that he was to sup in the Rue Chantereine, in the small house of Talma. A string of carriages and brilliant illuminations pointed out to us the temple where the son of Thalia was regaling the child of Mars. We were surprised to find Parisian national guards within and without. After traversing an antechamber full of domestics, mingled with heiducs, we reached a saloon thronged with a numerous company.

At the door was Santerre, general of the Parisian army, performing the functions of a lackey or usher. He announced me in a loud tone as soon as he perceived me—an indiscretion which greatly displeased me, inasmuch as it might cause certain masks to vanish interesting to recognise. However, I saw enough to thread the labyrinth of intrigue. I will not speak of a dozen fairies destined to grace the festival. Probably, politics were not the objects of their congregating. Nor will I say any thing of the national officers who were paying court to the great general, nor of the old valets of the court who formed his retinue, under the appearance of aides-de-camp. Lastly, I will say nothing of the master of the house, who was in the midst of them habited as a player. But I cannot dispense with declaring, as an elucidation of the operations of the Convention, and as rightly pourtraying the fabricators of decrees, that in the august company were Kersaint, the great operator Lebrun, and Roland, Lasource, Chenier, all organs of the faction of a federal republic; Dulaure and Gorsas, their libellous scouts. As there was a crowd, I only distinguished these conspirators; perhaps they were in greater force; and, as it was still early, it is probable they were not all assembled; for the Vergniauds, the Buzots, the Camuses, the Rabauts, the Lacroixes, the Guadets, the Barbarouxes, and other schemers, were doubtless invited, since they are of the conclave.

Before giving an account of our interview with Dumouriez, I pause for an instant to make, with the judicious reader, some observations which are not out of place. How are we to understand that this generalissimo of the republic, who allowed the King of Prussia to escape at Verdun, and capitulated with the enemy whom he was able to force in his camp and compel to lay down his arms, instead of favouring his retreat, should choose so critical a moment to abandon the armies under his command, to visit theatres, get himself applauded at them, and indulge in orgies at an actor's house with nymphs of the opera?

Dumouriez has concealed the secret motives which called him to Paris, under the pretext of concerting with the ministers a plan for the operations of the campaign. What! with a Roland, a mere scullion and petty intriguer, who is competent only for the crawling subterfuges of falsehood and trickery! with a Lepage, the worthy attendant of Roland, his protector! with a Clavière, who knows nothing but the rubrics of stock-jobbing! with a Garat, who is only versant in choice phrases and the tricks of an academic sneak! I will say nothing of Monge; he is believed a patriot; but he is as ignorant of military operations as his colleagues, who understand nothing of them. Dumouriez is come to consult with the schemers of the clique which cabals for the establishment of a federal republic. Such is the object of his notable prank!

On entering the saloon where the feast was held, I very clearly perceived that my presence disturbed its gaiety; which will not be wondered at when it is considered that I am the terror of the enemies of the country. Dumouriez, in particular, appeared disconcerted; I begged him to retire into another room with us, for the purpose of conversing a few moments in private. I acted as spokesman; and I subjoin our conversation, word for word. 'We are members of the National Convention, and are come, sir, to beg you to give us an explanation as to the nature of the

affair of the two battalions, Mauconseil and Republican, accused by you of having assassinated in cold blood four Prussian deserters. We have searched the records of the military committee, and those of the department of war; in them we have not found the slightest proof of the crime; and no person can better inform us concerning all these circumstances than you.' 'Gentlemen, I have sent all the documents to the minister.' 'We assure you, sir, that we have in our hands a memorial drawn up in his office and in his name, purporting that he was entirely without facts to enable him to decide upon this pretended crime, and that we must apply to you to obtain them.' 'But, gentlemen, I have informed the convention, and I refer to it.' 'Permit us, sir, to observe, that the informations given are not sufficient, since the committees of the convention, to which this affair has been remitted, have declared in their report that they were incapable of pronouncing an opinion, from the want of information and proof of the alleged crime. We beg you to tell us whether you are acquainted with the groundwork of the affair.' 'Certainly, of myself.' 'And was it not, then, from a confidential denunciation made to you on the word of M. Duchasseau?' 'But, gentlemen, when I affirm any thing, I think I ought to be believed.' 'Sir, if we thought on that point like you, we should not prosecute the matter that brings us here. We have good reasons for doubting; several members of the military committee inform us that those pretended Prussians were four French emigrants.' 'Well, gentlemen, were it so' —— 'Sir, that would effectually change the features of the case; and, without approving prematurely the conduct of the battalions, they are perhaps completely innocent. The circumstances which provoked the massacre are what it is essential to know: now, letters arrived from the army assert that those emigrants were recognised as spies sent by the enemy, and that they had mutinied against the national guards.' 'How, sir! do you approve then of the insubordination of soldiers?' 'No, sir, I do not approve of the insubordination of soldiers, but I detest the tyranny of officers: I have too good grounds for believing that this was a machination of Duchasseau against the patriot battalions; and the manner in which you have treated them is revolting.' 'Monsieur Marat, you are too vehement; I cannot enter into an explanation with you.' Here Dumouriez, finding himself too closely pressed, got rid of his embarrassment by leaving us; my two colleagues followed him, and in the conversation they had with him, he contented himself with saying that he had sent the documents to the minister. During their interview, I saw myself encompassed by all the aides-du-camp of Dumouriez and the officers of the Parisian guard. Santerre endeavoured to appease me; he spoke to me of the necessity of subordination amongst troops. 'I know that as well as you,' I answered; 'but I feel abhorrence at the manner in which the soldiers of the country are treated. I still bear in my heart the massacres of Nanci and of the Champ de Mars.' Here some aides-du-camp of Dumouriez began to declaim against agitators. 'Cease those ridiculous tirades,' I exclaimed: 'there are no agitators in our armies but the infamous officers, their spies and perfidious parasites, whom we have had the folly to leave at the head of our troops.' I addressed myself to Moreton Chabrillant and Bourdoin, the one an old valet of the court, and the other a spy of Lafayette.

I was indignant at all I had heard, at the conviction on my mind of the atrocities in the odious conduct of our generals. Unable any longer to contain myself, I quitted the party, and I beheld with astonishment in the adjoining room, the doors of which were open, several of Dumouriez's heiduks with naked swords at their shoulders. I know not what might be the object of this ridiculous parade: if it were intended to intimidate me, it must be allowed the valets of Dumouriez have sublime ideas of liberty. Have patience, gentlemen, we will teach you to understand it. In the mean time, be sure that your master has a more wholesome dread of the tip of my pen than I have fear for the sabres of his ruffians."

ordered to quit his quarters, pass rapidly between Luxumbourg and Treves to Coblentz, and thus execute what had been already urged upon him, and what he and Custine ought to have performed long before. Lastly, assuming the offensive himself with 80,000 men, Dumouriez was to round the French territory by the long-projected acquisition of Belgium. Thus, observing the defensive on all the frontiers protected by the nature of the ground, attack was to be risked only on the open frontier, that of the Low Countries, where, as Dumouriez said, *France could only defend herself by gaining battles.*

Through the credit of Santerre he succeeded in obtaining an abandonment of the absurd scheme of a camp below Paris; furthermore, that all the collections made in men, artillery, munitions, and camp equipments, should be transported into Flanders for the advantage of his army, which was in the greatest want: and that there should be added shoes, cloaks, and six millions in specie, to furnish the soldiers with money until their arrival in the Low Countries, after which he hoped to provide for himself. He departed on the 16th October, somewhat undeceived as to what is called public gratitude, rather less in harmony than before with the two parties, and simply indemnified for his journey by certain military arrangements concluded with the executive council.

During this interval, the convention had continued to act against the commune, by insisting upon its re-election, and by keeping a strict watch over all its proceedings. Pétion had been chosen mayor by a majority of 13,899 votes; whilst Robespierre had only obtained 23, Billaud-Varennes 14, Panis 80, and Danton 11. We must not, however, estimate the comparative popularity of Robespierre and Pétion by this difference in the number of votes; because the people were accustomed to see in the one a mayor, in the other a deputy, and had no idea of altering their respective positions: at the same time, this immense majority demonstrates the popularity still enjoyed by the principal leader of the Girondist party. We ought not to omit the fact that Bailly obtained two votes, a singular memento accorded to that virtuous magistrate of 1789. Pétion refused the mayoralty, wearied with the commotions in the commune, and preferring the functions of a deputy in the National Convention.

The three principal measures projected in the famous sitting of the 24th September were—a law against provocations to murder; a decree upon the formation of a departmental guard; and, lastly, an exact account of the state of Paris. The two first, intrusted for preparation to the committee of nine, excited a continual outcry at the Jacobins', at the commune, and in the sections. The committee of nine, however, proceeded in their labours, regardless of these clamours; and from various departments, especially from Marseilles and Calvados, battalions arrived spontaneously, thus anticipating the decree on the departmental guard, as had occurred on another occasion previous to the 10th August. Roland, charged with the third measure, that is to say, the report upon the state of the capital, executed his task without shrinking, and with rigorous accuracy. He described and excused the inevitable confusion of the first insurrection; but he pourtrayed with energy and held up to execration the crimes added by the 2d September to the revolution of the 10th August; he exhibited all the excesses of the commune, its abuses of power, its arbitrary imprisonments, and its vast spoliations. He concluded with these words:—

"A department sagacious but almost powerless; a commune active and despotic; a people excellent, but of whom the sound part is intimidated or constrained, whilst the other is stimulated by flatterers, and exasperated by calumnious charges; a confusion of powers; an abuse and contempt of authority; a public force weak or null from an inefficient command—such is Paris!"*

* Sitting of the 29th October.

His report was applauded by the usual majority, although, during its perusal, certain murmurs broke from the quarter of the Mountain. However, a letter written by a private individual to a magistrate, communicated by that magistrate to the executive council, and unfolding the project of a new 2d of September against a part of the convention, excited an extraordinary agitation. An expression in this letter, relative to the conspirators, was thus couched: "*They will hear only of Robespierre.*" At this phrase, all eyes were turned upon that deputy; some glowed with indignation, others encouraged him to speak. He addressed the convention, in fact, on the question of printing Roland's report, which he stigmatised as a defamatory romance; and he maintained that it ought not to be made public until those who were therein accused, and himself particularly, had been heard in refutation. Then diverging to what was personal to himself, he began a justification, which was almost wholly inaudible, on account of the noise prevailing in the hall. "Go on," said Danton to him—"speak; there are good citizens here listening to thee." Robespierre, succeeding at length in obtaining silence, recommenced his exculpation, and defied his adversaries to accuse him openly, or to produce a single positive proof against him. At this defiance, Louvet sprang forward: "I," said he to him—"I accuse thee!" And as he uttered these words he was already at the foot of the tribune, and Barbaroux and Rebecqui were with him to support the accusation. When he saw them, Robespierre was moved, and his countenance underwent a visible alteration; he requested that his accuser might be heard, and then himself in reply. But Danton, taking his place in the tribune, protested against the system of calumny organised against the commune and the Parisian deputation; and reiterated concerning Marat, who was the chief cause of all accusations, what he had already declared, to the effect that he had no esteem for him; that he had made sufficient trial of his *volcanic and unsociable temperament;* and that all idea of a triumviral coalition was absurd. He concluded by moving that a day be fixed for the discussion of the report. The assembly, meanwhile, decreed its publication, but deferred its transmission to the departments until Louvet and Robespierre had been heard.

Louvet was impetuous and full of courage; his patriotism was sincere; but into his hatred against Robespierre entered the resentful feelings engendered by a long course of personal hostility, commencing at the Jacobins', continued in the *Sentinel*, prolonged in the electoral assembly, and increased in virulence, since he found himself face to face with his jealous rival in the National Convention. To an extreme petulance of character, Louvet joined a romantic and credulous fancy, which perpetually misled him, and induced him to believe in designs and plots when the causes were but the involuntary effects of passion. He gave unlimited faith to his own suppositions, and was urgent with his friends to accord them the same implicit credit. But he encountered, in the dispassionate and excellent sense of Pétion and Roland, in the indolent impartiality of Vergniaud, an opposition which afflicted him to despair. Buzot, Barbaroux, Guadet, without equal credulity, without equal belief in such complicated schemes, deemed the wickedness of their adversaries undoubted, and seconded the attacks of Louvet from the impulses of indignation and courage. Salles, deputy of La Meurthe, a determined foe to anarchists in the Constituent Assembly and in the convention, a man possessed of a sombre and violent cast of mind, was alone open to all the suggestions of Louvet, and put faith, like him, in vast plots, originating in the commune, and extending to other countries. For, impassioned lovers of liberty, Louvet and Salles could not consent to charge such multifarious evils on its sacred name, but fondly believed that the Mountaineers, Marat above all, were

bribed by the emigrants and England to drive the revolution to crime, dishonour, and general confusion. Not so certain of Robespierre's venalty, they saw in him, at all events, a tyrant engrossed by pride and ambition, and proceeding with rapid strides to supreme power.

Louvet, having previously formed the resolution to make a vigorous assault on Robespierre, and to afford him no interval of rest, held his speech ready written, and was armed with it the very day on which Roland was to make his report; consequently, he was all prepared to support his accusation when leave was given him to speak. He immediately availed himself of the permission, when Roland had concluded.

The Girondists had been long ago sufficiently prone to misconceive the nature of circumstances, and to presume criminal projects in the outbreaks of wayward passion; but to the sanguine Louvet the conspiracy was palpable, its parts most closely knitted. In the increasing exaggeration of the Jacobins, in the success with which the morose reserve of Robespierre had been crowned during the course of 1792, he perceived a plot distinctly developed, emanating from that ambitious tribune. He exhibited him as surrounded by satellites, to whose violence he abandoned his antagonists; as rendering himself the object of an idolatrous regard—spreading, through his emissaries, before the 10th August, the persuasion that he alone was competent to save liberty and France; and when the 10th August came, hiding himself from the light; re-appearing two days after the danger was past; proceeding straightway to the commune, notwithstanding his pledge never to accept office, and, of his plenary authority, seating himself at the table of the council-general; there, usurping sway over an inconsiderate assemblage of petty tradesmen, impelling them at his will to excesses of the most hateful character; appearing in their name before the Legislative Assembly, with insolent effrontery, and exacting decrees from that national body under threats of the tocsin; ordaining, without being seen, the massacres and thefts of September, with the view of supporting the municipal authority by terror; and, finally, sending emissaries throughout all France to instigate the like crimes, and induce the provinces to acknowledge the superior authority of Paris. Robespierre, added Louvet, was solicitous to destroy the national representation for the purpose of putting in its place the commune, which hung upon his nod, and imposing upon France the government of Rome, where, under the appellation of *municipia*, the provinces were subject to the sovereignty of the metropolis. Thus master of Paris, and it the mistress of France, he would have stepped upon the vacant throne. Seeing, however, the moment drawing nigh for the meeting of a new assembly, he had passed from the council-general to the electoral assembly, and controlled its nominations by the force of terror, in order to become master of the convention through the deputation of Paris.

It was he, Robespierre, who had pointed out to the electors that man of blood whose incendiary placards filled France with amazement and consternation. That libellist, with whose name Louvet said he would not sully his lips, was but the scapegoat of assassination, possessing, for the avocations of preaching crime and traducing the purest characters, a courage which was wanting to the wily Robespierre. As to Danton, Louvet separated him from the accusation, and even expressed his astonishment that he should have hastened to the tribune to repel an attack not directed against him. He did not, however, exculpate him from September, because, during those mournful days, when all the authorities—the assembly, the ministers, the mayor—spoke in vain to stop the slaughter, the minister of justice alone *spoke not*; because, in short, he only was excepted from the calumnies spread against the most virtuous citizens in the famous placards. "And may thou be able, oh Danton!" exclaimed Louvet, "to clear thyself from that disgraceful exception in the judgment of posterity!" Much applause greeted these words, equally spirited and imprudent.

Louvet's charge, constantly applauded at particular passages, had not been heard, however, without many counter murmurs; but an expression frequently repeated during the sitting had checked them. "Secure me silence," said Louvet to the president, "*for I am about to probe the wound*, and may draw shrieks!" "Proceed," said Danton; "probe the wound." And every time murmurs arose, "Silence!" was shouted—"silence to the wounded!"

Louvet at length resumed his charge. "Robespierre!" he exclaimed, "I accuse thee of having traduced the purest citizens, and of having done so at the moment when calumnies were proscriptions; I accuse thee of having paraded thyself as an object of idolatry, and disseminated the impression that thou wert the only man capable of saving France; I accuse thee of having degraded, insulted, and persecuted the national representation, of having tyrannised over the electoral assembly of Paris, and of having advanced to supreme power by the ways of calumny, violence, and terror; and I demand a committee to examine thy conduct." Louvet then proposed a law condemning to exile whomsoever should have made his name a subject of discord amongst the citizens. He urged that, to the measures in preparation by the commission of nine, an additional reference should be made, namely, to devise a plan for placing the armed force at the disposition of the minister of the interior. "In conclusion," said he, "I crave upon the instant a decree of impeachment against Marat! Ye gods! ye gods! I have named him!"

Robespierre, dismayed at the acclamations lavished on his adversary, essayed to speak. Amidst the uproar and murmurs excited by his appearance, he faltered, his features and his voice became agitated; however, he obtained a hearing, and asked for time to prepare his defence. The delay was granted him, and the question adjourned to the 5th November. This resolution was favourable to the accused, for, excited by the eloquence of Louvet, the assembly felt at that moment an indignation it would have been difficult to allay.

In the evening, great was the commotion at the Jacobin Club, where the sittings of the convention were freely criticised. A crowd of members rushed incontinently to descant upon the *horrible conduct* of Louvet, and to demand his expulsion. He had calumniated the society, and inculpated Danton, Santerre, Robespierre, and Marat; he had demanded an impeachment against the two last; proposed sanguinary laws—shackles on the liberty of the press; and, in short, *the ostracism of Athens*. Legendre said it was a studied plot, since Louvet had his discourse all ready, and Roland's report had very obviously been framed with no other object than to furnish an occasion for that diatribe.

Fabre-d'Eglantine complained that the system of scandal was daily augmenting, and that every effort was made to calumniate Paris and the patriots. "Petty conjectures," said he, "are linked to trivial suppositions; thence is conjured up a vast conspiracy, and we are told neither where it is, who are its agents, nor what its means. If there were a man who had seen all, appreciated all in both the one and the other party, you cannot doubt that such a man, the friend of truth, would be the fittest to make it known. Such a man, then, is Pétion. Force his virtue to reveal all that he has seen, and to pronounce upon the crimes imputed to the patriots. Whatever consideration he may have for his friends, I venture to say that the intriguers have not corrupted him. Pétion is always disinterested and sincere; he would have spoken to-day; force him, then, to declare himself."*

* Pétion must be classed amongst the coolest and most dispassionate characters of the revolution. None judged with a

Merlin opposed the suggestion that Pétion should be constituted judge between Robespierre and Louvet, on the ground that it was a violation of equality thus

more sagacious eye the two parties who divided the convention. His equity was so well known, that both sides consented to appeal to his decision. The accusations which were made from the opening of the assembly provoked warm discussions at the Jacobins'. Fabre-d'Eglantine proposed to refer all disputes to Pétion, and abide his judgment. The following is the manner in which he expressed himself:—

SITTING OF THE 29TH OCTOBER 1792.

"There is another mode which I deem advisable, and which will produce a great effect. Almost invariably, when a vast intrigue is in agitation, it stands in need of influence, and is driven to the greatest exertions to procure a personal credit. If there existed a man who had seen all, appreciated all in both parties, you cannot doubt that such a man, the friend of truth, would be the fittest to make it known. Now, I propose that you invite this man, a member of your society, to pronounce respecting the crimes imputed to the patriots—force his virtue to reveal all that he has seen: this man is Pétion. Whatever consideration he may have for his friends, I venture to say that the intriguers have not corrupted Pétion; he is still pure, always sincere. I here state that I often speak to him, in the convention, during moments of excitement; and if he does not always tell one that he groans, I see that he groans inwardly; this morning even he would have mounted the tribune. He cannot decline your request to write what he thinks, and we shall see whether, although it is I who urge recourse to him, the intriguers can sway him. Observe, citizens, this single step will prove that you only desire truth; it is a tribute that you render to the virtue of a good patriot, and with the greater cause, since the liars have wrapped themselves in his virtue to attain eminence. I demand that the motion be put to the vote." (Applause.)

Legendre.—"The stroke was meditated, that is clear. The distribution of Brissot's speech, the report of the minister of the interior, the oration of Louvet in his pocket—all prove that the attack was studied. The speech of Brissot upon the expulsion contains all that Louvet said; the report of Roland was to furnish Louvet with an opportunity of speaking. I approve of Fabre's motion, but the convention will shortly decide: Robespierre has the tribune for Monday. I move that the society suspend its decision: it is impossible that in a free country virtue should succumb to vice."

After these quotations, I deem it proper to transcribe the document written by Pétion relative to the dispute at issue between Louvet and Robespierre. After the extracts taken from Garat, it contains the most invaluable information upon the conduct and character of the men of that day, and such as history ought to preserve as the fittest to convey just ideas upon the epoch under review:—

"Citizens—I promised myself to observe the strictest silence upon the events which have occurred since the 10th August: motives of delicacy and of public good determined me to use that reserve.

But it impossible to be longer silent. On both sides my testimony is invoked; each presses me to deliver my opinion: I will therefore speak with frankness what I know concerning men, what I think concerning things.

I have beheld the scenes of the revolution near at hand; I have witnessed the cabals, the intrigues, the stormy contentions between tyranny and liberty, between vice and virtue.

When the play of human passions is laid bare; when a man perceives the secret springs which have regulated the most important operations; when he traces events to their causes; when he knows all the perils that liberty has incurred; when he has penetrated into the depths of that corruption which threatened every moment to engulf us, he asks himself with amazement by what series of prodigies we have reached the point at which we now find ourselves.

Revolutions should be seen from a distance; that illusion is necessary to them: ages efface the blemishes that darken them; posterity considers only the results. Our grandsons will deem us great; let us render them better than ourselves.

I pass over the facts anterior to that day for ever memorable, which elevated liberty upon the ruins of tyranny, and changed a monarchy into a republic.

The men who have assumed to themselves the glory of that day are the men to whom it least belongs: it is due to those who concerted it; it is due to the inevitable nature of things; it is due to the brave federalists and their secret directory, who long before arranged the plan of the insurrection; it is due to the people; it to render a citizen the supreme arbiter of others. He alleged, furthermore, that although Pétion was undoubtedly worthy of respect, he might possibly de-

is due, in fine, to the tutelary genius which has constantly presided over the destinies of France since the first assembly of its representatives!

It must be granted, success was for a moment doubtful; and those who are truly informed of the details of that day, know who were the intrepid defenders of the country that prevented the Swiss and the other satellites of despotism from remaining masters of the field of battle---who those were that rallied our citizen phalanxes when for an instant broken.

That day likewise occurred without the aid of the commissioners of several sections assembled at the common hall: the members of the old municipality, who had not moved during the night, were still sitting at half-past nine in the morning.

Those commissioners nevertheless conceived a grand idea, and adopted a bold measure, when they seized upon all the municipal powers, and took the place of a council-general whose weakness and corruption they feared; they courageously exposed their lives in case success had not sanctified the enterprise.

If those commissioners had had the wisdom to lay down their authority at the proper time, and return to the grade of simple citizens after the admirable action they had performed, they would have covered themselves with glory; but they could not resist the attractions of power, and the thirst of dominion seized upon them.

During the first moments of rapture after the conquest of liberty, and after a commotion so violent, it was impossible that all things should resolve again at once into the accustomed calmness and order; it would have been unjust to insist upon it. At that time the reproaches addressed to the new council of the commune were not well founded: in them neither its position nor the circumstances of the time were appreciated; but those commissioners began to merit them when they themselves prolonged the revolutionary movement beyond its term.

The national assembly had shown itself equal to the crisis: it had taken a decisive part; had passed decrees which saved the empire, had suspended the king, had blotted out the line of demarcation which severed the citizens into two classes, and had convoked the convention. The royalist party was annihilated. Thenceforth the assembly ought to have been supported, strengthened in public opinion, regarded with generous confidence: this duty and sound policy alike counselled.

The commune deemed it more becoming to enter into rivalry with the assembly. It provoked a contest which was only calculated to throw discredit upon all that had passed, and to inculcate the belief that the assembly was under the irresistible pressure of circumstances: it obeyed or resisted the decrees, precisely as they promoted or thwarted its own views; it employed in its representations to the legislative body imperious and irritating expressions; it affected supremacy, and knew not either how to enjoy its triumphs or how to make others pardon them.

The majority had succeeded in persuading some of its members that so long as the revolutionary state of things continued, power had reverted to its source; that the national assembly was in abeyance, that its existence was precarious, and that the assemblies of the commune were the sole legitimate and efficient authorities.

It had poisoned others with the belief that the leaders of opinion in the national assembly had perfidious projects, and were plotting to overthrow liberty and deliver the republic to foreigners.

Insomuch that many members of the council conceived they were acting upon a legitimate right when they usurped authority; that they were resisting oppression when they opposed the law; that they were performing an act of civism when they failed in their duties as citizens. Nevertheless, in the midst of this anarchy, the commune adopted from time to time salutary resolutions.

I had been retained in my office; but it had become an empty title: I essayed its functions in vain; they were scattered amongst all, and every one exercised them.

I repaired to the council during the first few days: I was amazed at the disorder which prevailed in that assembly, and especially at the spirit predominant in it. It was no longer an administrative body, deliberating upon municipal affairs; it was a political assembly, deeming itself invested with plenary powers, discussing the great interests of the state, examining existing laws, and promulgating new ones: its members descanted upon plots against public liberty; they denounced citizens, summoned them to the bar, interrogated them publicly, passed judgment upon them, discharging them as absolved or ordering them into custody. The ordinary rules had disappeared; the ferment of

viate: that he was a man, the friend of Brissot and Roland, and received at his house Lasource, Vergniaud, Barbaroux, and all the intriguers who compromised liberty.

minds was such that it was impossible to stem the torrent: all the deliberations were carried on with the impetuosity of enthusiasm, and succeeded each other with startling rapidity: day and night, without intermission, the council held its sittings.

I was unwilling that my name should be attached to a multitude of measures so irregular—so contrary to all principles.

I was likewise sensible that prudence and duty equally counselled me not to sanction or strengthen by my presence what was passing. Those of the council who feared to see me there, those whom my presence troubled, strongly desired that the people, whose confidence I preserved, should believe that I presided over its operations, and that nothing was done but in concert with me: my reserve in that respect increased their enmity, but they dared not manifest it too openly, from a dread of displeasing the people, whose favour they courted.

I rarely appeared; and the conduct I observed in this highly delicate position, between the old municipality, which exclaimed against its deprivation, and the new, which proclaimed itself legally constituted, was not without utility to the public tranquillity; for, if I had then decidedly pronounced for or against, I should have occasioned an exasperation that might have been attended with disastrous consequences. In all things there is a point of maturity which it devolves on men to seize with judgment.

The administration was neglected; the mayor was no longer a centre of union; all the threads were snapped in my hands; power was scattered; the function of superintendence was extinct, and so also was that of repression.

Robespierre then took the ascendant in the council; and it could scarcely be otherwise under the circumstances then existing, and from the character of his mind. I heard him pronounce a discourse which afflicted my heart; it was on the subject of the decree opening the barriers, and on this topic he gave way to declamations extremely animated—to the delusions of a gloomy imagination; he perceived precipices beneath his feet, plots against liberty; he pourtrayed the pretended conspirators; he addressed himself to the people, inflamed their minds, and caused, amongst all who heard him, the greatest excitement.

I replied to that discourse with the view of restoring calmness, dissipating those sombre illusions, and bringing back the discussion to the only point competent for the assembly to entertain.

Robespierre and his partisans thus drew the commune into inconsiderate measures—into extreme positions.

I did not suspect on that account the intentions of Robespierre; I accused his head more than his heart; but the consequences of those gloomy visions did not cause me the less alarm.

Every day the tribunes of the council rung with violent diatribes; the members were unable to understand they were magistrates charged to watch over the execution of the laws and the maintenance of order; they always viewed themselves as forming a revolutionary association.

The assembled sections imbibed that doctrine, and communicated it in turn; so that all Paris was simultaneously in fermentation.

The surveillance committee of the commune stocked the prisons: it cannot be denied that, if several of those arrests were just and necessary, others infringed legality But the leaders were less to blame than the agents: the police was badly organised: one man amongst others, whose very name is become a reproach, the bare mention of which strikes terror to the hearts of all peaceable citizens, seemed to have seized upon its direction and its movements: constant at all conferences, he intermeddled in all affairs; he spoke, he commanded in the tone of a master: I loudly complained of him to the commune, and I summed up my opinion in these words, '*Marat is either the most insensate or the most wicked of mortals.*' I have never spoken of him since.

Justice was deliberate in pronouncing upon the fate of the prisoners, and they accumulated more and more in the jails. A section came as a deputation to the council of the commune on the 23d of August, and formally declared that the citizens, weary and indignant at the delays in rendering judgment, would force the gates of those asylums, and sacrifice to their vengeance the culprits they contained. This petition, couched in the most furious terms, met with no censure—it even received applause!

On the 25th, from 1600 to 1700 armed citizens departed from Paris to carry off the state-prisoners detained at Orleans, and transfer them elsewhere.

Unfortunate tidings arrived to add still more to the agitation: The motion of Fabre-d'Eglantine was not pressed; and Robespierre the younger, assuming a lamentable tone, as the relatives of those on trial were wont to do at Rome, gave vent to his grief, and sorely complained

the treason of Longwy was announced, and a few days afterwards the siege of Verdun.

On the 27th, the National Assembly invited the department of Paris and those in the vicinity to furnish 30,000 armed men to fly to the frontiers: this decree imparted an additional impulse, which combined with those already existing.

On the 31st, the acquittal of Montmorin exasperated the people; a rumour spread that he had been saved by the perfidy of an emissary of the king, who had led the jury astray.

At the same moment, publicity was given to the statement of a condemned captive, revealing a plot for the escape of all the prisoners, who were afterwards to spread themselves through the city, commit every variety of excess, and carry off the king.

The ferment was at its height. The commune, in order to stimulate the enthusiasm of the citizens, and urge them to the civic enrolments, had decreed they should assemble with ceremony on the Champ de Mars to the firing of cannon.

The 2d of September arrives; the alarm gun is fired; the tocsin is rung. Oh! day of sorrow!—At that mournful and alarming sound, they assemble, rush to the prisons—murder, massacre! Manuel, and several deputies of the national assembly, repair to those scenes of carnage; but their efforts are in vain—the victims are slain even in their arms! Alas! I was in a false security; I knew not of these cruelties, since for some time previously nothing was ever mentioned to me. I am apprised of them at length, and how?—in a vague, indirect, distorted manner; and at the same time it is told to me that all was finished. The most heart-rending details subsequently reach me, and I had the most positive conviction that the sun which had lighted these dismal scenes would never rise again. In the mean time they continue: I write to the commander-in-chief—I require him to march forces to the prisons: he at first gives me no answer; I write again. He tells me he has given orders; nothing shows that those orders are in course of execution. They still continue: I go to the council of the commune; thence I proceed to the prison of La Force, with several of my colleagues. Citizens comparatively peaceable crowd the street leading to that prison; a very small guard was at the gate. I enter. Never will the spectacle that met my eyes be effaced from my mind! I perceive two municipal officers wearing their scarfs; I see three men tranquilly sitting before a table, the prison registers lying open before them, calling over the roll of captives; other men interrogating them, and others again performing the functions of judges and jurymen; a dozen of executioners, with naked arms, covered with blood, some with clubs, others with swords and cutlasses, all dripping with gore, executing the judgments on the instant; citizens outside awaiting those judgments with anxious impatience, observing a mournful silence at the decrees of death, uttering cries of joy at those of pardon.

And the men who were sitting in judgment, and those executing their fiats, had the same feeling of security as if the law had called upon them to perform such functions. They boasted to me of their justice, of their care in discriminating between the innocent and the guilty, and of the services they had rendered. They asked—can it be believed?—they asked to be remunerated for the time they had thus passed! I was absolutely confounded when I heard them!

I spoke to them in the austere language of the law—I spoke to them with the feeling of deep indignation which stirred within me: I made them go out before me. I had scarcely left ere they returned: I was again upon the spot to drive them forth; but in the night they accomplished their horrible butchery!

Were these assassinations commanded—were they directed by certain persons? I have had lists before me, I have received reports, I have collected several facts; but if I had to pronounce as a judge, I could not say, Behold the guilty!

I am of opinion that those crimes would not have run so free a course if endeavours had been made to check them—if all those exercising authority and force had viewed them with horror; but I am bound to state what is true: several of those public men, of those defenders of the country, deemed those disastrous and disgraceful days necessary; holding that they purged the empire of dangerous men, struck terror into the souls of conspirators, and, in short, were crimes, odious in morality, but useful in policy.

Yes, such were the ideas that slackened the zeal of those to whom the law had confided the maintenance of order, and to whom it had intrusted the defence of persons and property.

that he was not calumniated like his brother. "This moment," said he, "is one pregnant with danger; all the people are not for us. The citizens of Paris alone are sufficiently enlightened; the others are so but imperfectly. It is possible, therefore, that innocence may succumb on Monday!—for the convention has heard at full length the amplified lies of Louvet. Citizens, I have had a terrible vision: it seemed to me that assassins were on the point of stabbing my brother. I have heard men say that he should perish by their hands only; another told me he hoped to be his executioner." At these words, several members rose and declared that they also had been menaced, particularly by Barbaroux, Rebecqui, and several citizens in the galleries; that those who threatened them said, "Robespierre and Marat must be got rid of." They then crowded round the younger Robespierre, promised him to watch over the safety of his brother, and unanimously agreed that those who had friends or relatives in the departments should write to them, in order to give opinion its fitting bias. The younger Robespierre, before quitting the tribune, took the opportunity of uttering a calumny. Anarcharsis Clootz, he said, had assured him he daily broke lances against federalism at the house of Roland.

The fiery Chabot came in his turn. What chiefly irritated him in Louvet's speech was, that he attributed the 10th August to himself and his friends, and the 2d September to two hundred assassins. "I remember," said Chabot, "that I addressed the gentlemen of the right side on the evening of the 9th August, proposing to them the insurrection, and that they replied to me by a smile from the corner of their mouths. I do not see, therefore, with what right they take to themselves the 10th August. As to the 2d September, its authors were the same people who accomplished the 10th August in spite of them, and who, after the victory, determined on avenging themselves. Louvet said there were not two hundred assassins; and I assert that I passed with the commissioners of the legislative body under an arch of ten thousand sabres. I recognised upwards of one hundred and fifty federalists. There are no crimes in revolutions. Marat, so incessantly accused, is attacked for revolutionary deeds alone. To-day Marat, Danton, Robespierre, are accused; to-morrow it will be Santerre, Chabot, Merlin," &c.

Excited by these audacious words, a federalist present at the sitting did what no man had yet dared publicly do—he declared that he *acted* with a great number of his comrades at the prisons, and under the persuasion that he was only slaying conspirators, fabricators of false assignats, and rescuing Paris from fire and slaughter. He added, that he was grateful to the society for the kindness it had manifested to all the federalists; that they departed the next day for the army, and carried with them but one regret, namely, that of leaving the patriots in such imminent perils.

This abominable declaration closed the sitting. Robespierre had not appeared, nor did he appear during the whole week, being engaged in preparing his defence, and leaving to his partisans the task of disposing the public mind. In the mean time, the commune of Paris persisted in its conduct and system. It was stated that it had seized ten millions in the chest of Septeuil, the treasurer of the civil list; and at this very period it was urging a petition upon the forty-eight sections or municipalities against the plan for giving a guard to the convention. Barbaroux imme-

How these days of the 2d, 3d, 4th, and 5th of September may be connected with the immortal 10th of August—how they may be held a continuation of the revolutionary movement imparted upon that day, the first in the annals of the republic—is sufficiently palpable. For my part, however, I cannot consent to confound glory with infamy, and to defile the 10th August with the excesses of the 2d September.

The committee of surveillance issued a warrant of arrest against the minister Roland: it was the 4th, and the massacre still went on. Danton heard of the warrant; he came to the town-hall; he saw Robespierre, remonstrated with warmth against so arbitrary and insane an act, which would have injured, not Roland, but those who had decreed it. Danton procured its revocation, and it was buried in oblivion.

I had an explanation with Robespierre; it was very serious: I have always made reproaches to his face, which friendship has tempered in his absence. I said to him, 'Robespierre, you do much mischief! Your denunciations, your alarms, your hatreds, your suspicions, keep the people for ever in agitation. But at length explain yourself: have you any facts, have you any proofs? I am fighting along with you; I desire truth alone; I want only liberty.'

'You allow yourself to be ensnared—to be prepossessed,' he answered me: 'they prejudice you against me; you see my enemies every day—you see Brissot and his party.'

'You are deceived, Robespierre; no person is more on his guard against prepossessions, or judges men and things more dispassionately. It is true I see Brissot; rarely, however: but you do not know him, and I have known him from boyhood; I have seen him in those moments when the mind fully displays itself—when it abandons itself without reserve to friendship and confidence: I know his disinterestedness; I know his principles—I protest to you they are pure. Those who represent him as the leader of a party have not the slightest knowledge of his character. He has talents and accomplishments; but he has neither the reserve, nor the dissimulation, nor those winning manners, nor that spirit of pertinacity, which are essential to the leader of a party; and what will more surprise you is, that so far from leading others he is very easily misled himself.'

Robespierre persisted, but intrenching himself in generalities. 'For pity's sake,' said I to him, 'explain yourself; tell me frankly what you have on your mind—what you know.'

'Well, then,' he answered me, 'I believe that Brissot is sold to Brunswick.'

'How great is your mistake!' I exclaimed; 'it is absolute folly; how your imagination blinds you! Would not Brunswick be the first to cut off his head? Brissot is not such a fool as to doubt it. Which of us can seriously think of capitulating?—which of us risk his life? Let us banish unjust suspicions!'

I return to the events of which I have given you a feeble outline. Those events, and some that preceded the celebrated day of the 10th August, the connexion of facts and of numberless portents, induced the belief that certain intriguers had designed to possess the people, in order, with the people, to possess themselves of authority. Robespierre was distinctly alluded to; his connexions were reviewed, his conduct was analysed; the words which it is said escaped one of his friends were adduced; and from the whole it was concluded that Robespierre had the insane ambition to become the dictator of his country.

The character of Robespierre explains what he has done. Robespierre is extremely reserved and distrustful; he every where descries plots, treasons, precipices; his jaundiced temperament, his morbid imagination, present all objects to him under the gloomiest colours: overbearing in his opinion, listening only to himself, impatient of contradiction, incapable of pardoning him who wounds his self-love, or of ever acknowledging his errors; denouncing with recklessness, wrathful upon the slightest suspicion, always imagining that others are occupied with him, and for the purpose of persecuting him; boasting of his services, and speaking of himself with little delicacy; disregarding the rules of decorum, and thereby injuring the very causes he advocates; striving above all things to gain the favour of the people; paying court to them unceasingly, and seeking their applause with affected preference—this last weakness it is, more especially, which, ingrafted on all the acts of his public life, has strengthened the supposition that Robespierre aspires to high destinies, and aims at usurping the dictatorial power.

For myself, I cannot persuade myself that this chimera has seriously occupied his thoughts, or has been the object of his desires—the goal of his ambition.

There is a man, however, who has grown delirious with this phantasy—who has incessantly invoked a dictatorship over France as a mercy—as the only dispensation which can save us from the anarchy he preaches, and conduct us to liberty and happiness! He solicits this tyrannical power—and for whom? You will never divine; you know not sufficiently all the frenzy of his vanity: he solicits it for himself! yes, for himself—Marat! If his madness were not ferocious, there would be nothing so ridiculous as this being, upon whom nature seems to have wittingly set the mark of her reprobation."

diately proposed four energetic and ably devised decrees.

By the first, the capital was to lose the right of having the national representation held within its walls, when it should be unable to protect it from insults or violence.

By the second, the federalists and the national gendarmes were, concurrently with the armed sections of Paris, to guard the national representation and the public establishments.

By the third, the convention was to resolve itself into a court of justice to try conspirators.

By the fourth, the convention dissolved the municipality of Paris.

These four decrees were perfectly adapted to the circumstances, and appropriately fitted to meet the actual dangers of the moment; but all the power was needed to pass them which would have resulted from the decrees themselves. To create the means of energy, energy itself is requisite; and every moderate party attempting to keep a violent party in check, is in a baneful entanglement from which it never can get free. Doubtless, the majority, leaning towards the Girondists, might have passed the decrees; but it was its moderation which induced its bias in their favour, and that moderation counselled it to wait, to temporise, to rest upon the future, and to shun every measure too prematurely decisive. The assembly even rejected a decree infinitely less offensive, namely, the first of those which had been remitted for preparation to the committee of nine. It referred to instigators of murder and pillage; and Buzot introduced it. By the enactment as proposed, all direct instigation was punished with death, and indirect provocation with ten years in irons. The assembly found the punishment too severe on direct instigation, and indirect too vaguely defined and too difficult to reach. Buzot vainly argued that revolutionary, and consequently arbitrary, measures were indispensable against the adversaries the republic had to combat; he was not heeded, and could scarcely be so when addressing a majority which condemned in the violent party those very revolutionary measures, and which was consequently, to a certain extent, debarred from employing them against it. The decree was accordingly deferred; and the committee of nine, appointed to advise on the means of maintaining wholesome order, became to all efficient purposes null and void.

The assembly, however, exhibited a somewhat greater degree of energy in reference to the question of repressing the encroachments of the commune. It then seemed to defend its authority with a species of jealousy and vigour. The council-general of the commune, ordered to the bar on account of the petition against the project of a departmental guard, appeared to justify itself. It was no longer, it said, the commune of the 10th August. Certain prevaricators had crept in amongst its members, whom good reasons had existed for denouncing; but such men were no longer to be found at its board. "Do not confound the innocent with the guilty," it added. "Vouchsafe us the confidence which we so much need. We are anxious to restore the tranquillity necessary to the convention for the enactment of good laws. With regard to the presentation of this petition, it was the sections which insisted upon it, and we are merely their mandatories; but we will urge them to forego it."

This submission disarmed the Girondists themselves; and, on the motion of Gensonné, the honours of the sitting were granted to the council-general. The dignity of the convention might be vindicated by such docility on the part of the municipal administrators, but it gave no assurance as to the real dispositions of the capital. The excitement increased into tumult as the 5th November drew nigh, the day fixed for hearing Robespierre. The day before there were commotions in different interests. Bands traversed the streets of Paris, some shouting, "To the guillotine with Robespierre, Danton, Marat!" others crying, "Death to Roland, Lasource, Guadet!" Complaints of these cries were made at the Jacobins', but only of those directed against Robespierre, Danton, and Marat. The soldiers and federalists, who were as yet devoted to the convention, were charged with these vociferations. The younger Robespierre again presented himself in the tribune, breaking forth into lamentations on the perils of innocence, and repudiating a suggestion of conciliation hazarded by a member of the society, saying that the opposite party was decidedly counter-revolutionary, and that neither peace nor truce ought to be observed with it. He allowed that innocence was sure to perish in the contest, but that the sacrifice was fitting; that Maximilian Robespierre should be permitted to succumb, because the loss of a single man would not involve that of liberty. All the Jacobins applauded these fine sentiments, but at the same time consoled the younger Robespierre with the assurance that such things could not be, and that his brother would not perish.

Very different were the grievances alleged in the assembly, where the shouts against Roland, Lasource, Guadet, &c., were denounced. Roland complained of the inutility of his requisitions to the department and the commune for an armed force. Long and desultory discussions, bitter and acrimonious recriminations, ensued; and the day elapsed without any measure being adopted. On the morrow, the 5th November, Robespierre at length appeared, and took his station in the tribune.

Intense anxiety was manifested as to the issue of this solemn discussion, and the assembly's hall was early filled. The speech of Robespierre was voluminous and carefully digested. His rejoinders to the accusations of Louvet were such as have never failed to be made on similar occasions. "You accuse me," said he, "of aspiring to the tyranny; but, to gain that height, means are essential, and where are my treasures and my armies? You allege that I have reared the edifice of my power in the Jacobin Club. But what does that circumstance prove? Merely that I have been there more heeded, have addressed myself possibly better than you to the reason of that society, and that you seek to avenge here the pangs of wounded self-love. You pretend that this celebrated society has degenerated; but demand a decree of impeachment against it, and I will assume the task of justifying it, and we shall see whether you will be more fortunate or more persuasive than Leopold and Lafayette. You assert that I did not appear at the commune until two days after the 10th August, and that I then installed myself of my own authority on its bench. But I was not summoned thither earlier; and when I presented myself at the table, it was not to install myself, but to have my powers verified. You add that I insulted the Legislative Assembly, that I menaced it with the tocsin; the charge is false. Some one sitting near me accused me of sounding the tocsin: I replied to the intermeddler, that the ringers of the tocsin were those who embittered the public mind by injustice; and thereupon one of my colleagues, less reserved, observed that it would be sounded. Such is the solitary fact upon which my accuser has erected this fable. In the electoral assembly I certainly spoke, but it was agreed that citizens might be heard; I offered a few observations, and several exercised the same privilege. I neither accused nor recommended any individual. The man whom you charge me with using as my instrument, Marat, was never either my friend or my candidate. If I judged him by those who assail him, he would stand acquitted; but I give no opinion. I will merely state that he was always unknown to me; that he once came to my house, when I addressed to him some remarks on his writings—on their exaggerated tone, and on the pain with which patriots saw him compromise our cause by the violence of his opinions; but he deemed me a politician of confined views, and pub-

lished that estimate the following day. It is therefore a calumny to allege me the instigator and the ally of that man."

Passing from these personal charges to the general accusations levelled against the commune, Robespierre repeated, with all its advocates, that the 2d September was the continuation of the 10th August; that the precise limit to which the waves of a popular insurrection may surge can never be assigned; that the executions were doubtless illegal, but that without illegal measures despotism could not have been shaken off; that the same reproach might be made against the whole revolution, for all its acts were illegal—the prostration of the throne, the capture of the Bastille. He subsequently depicted the dangers of Paris, the indignation of its citizens, their flocking round the prisons, and their inordinate fury at the reflection that they were leaving conspirators behind them to exterminate their families. "We are assured that one innocent person perished," exclaimed the speaker with emphasis—"one only; it was doubtless a great deal too many. Citizens! deplore that cruel error! We have long deplored the man; he was a good citizen—one of our friends! Weep even for the victims who ought to have been reserved for the vengeance of the laws, but who fell under the sword of popular justice! But let your grief have a term, like all human concerns. Let us spare a few tears for calamities more affecting—weep for a hundred thousand patriots immolated by tyranny—weep for our citizens expiring under their burning roofs, and the infants of citizens massacred in the cradle or in the arms of their mothers—weep, in short, for humanity crushed beneath the yoke of tyrants! But be consoled, when, silencing all the brutal passions, you aspire to assert the happiness of your country, and to prepare the way for that of the world.

The sensibility which grieves almost exclusively for the enemies of liberty, is to me suspicious. Cease to flutter before my eyes the bloody robe of the tyrant, or I shall believe you intend to replunge Rome into slavery!"

It was by this mixture of cunning logic and revolutionary declamation, that Robespierre succeeded in captivating his audience, and obtaining universal plaudits. All that he had said respecting himself was correct; for there was great imprudence on the part of the Girondists in stigmatising as a project of usurpation a mere desire of influence, rendered odious, certainly, by an envious character; and there was the like imprudence in pretending to discover, in the acts of the commune, proofs of a vast conspiracy, when they were but the natural consequences of popular passions in high excitement. The Girondists thus afforded the assembly an occasion for charging them with wrong as against their adversaries. Flattered, so to speak, at seeing the alleged leader of the conspirators reduced to justify himself; delighted at finding all the crimes explained away by being charged on an insurrection which could not again recur; and charmed with the vision of a better future, the convention deemed it consistent with dignity and prudence to consign all these personal denunciations to oblivion; and accordingly the order of the day was forthwith moved. Louvet instantly sprang forward to oppose the motion, and to claim his right of reply. A number of members simultaneously rose, all eager to speak for, upon, or against, the order of the day. Barbaroux, despairing to make himself heard, rushed to the bar, that he might be listened to in the character of a petitioner at least. Lanjuinais proposed that the debate should proceed upon the important questions involved in Roland's report. At length Barrère succeeded in obtaining silence and leave to speak. "Citizens," said he, "if there existed in the republic a man endowed with the genius of Cæsar, or the audacity of Cromwell—a man who, with the talents of Sylla, possessed also his formidable means—if there were, indeed, here some legislator of commanding genius, of inordinate ambition, of profound sagacity; a general, for example, his brow bound with laurels, and returning amongst you to impose laws upon you or trample on the rights of the people, I should be ready to move a decree of impeachment against such a personage. But that you should confer that honour on creatures of the hour, on petty schemers of riots, on persons whose civic crowns are strewed with cypress leaves, is what I am unable to conceive!"

This singular mediator proposed thus to preamble the order of the day: *Considering that the National Convention ought to attend only to the interests of the republic.* "I abjure your order of the day!" exclaimed Robespierre, "if it contain a recital injurious to me!" The assembly ultimately adopted the order of the day simply and unconditionally.

The hall of the Jacobins was thronged that night to celebrate this victory, and Robespierre was received as a triumphant hero. The instant he made his appearance, the building shook with acclamations. A member moved that the tribune be given up to him, that he might gladden the club by the recital of so glorious a day. Another affirmed, as upon authority, that his modesty restrained him, and that he declined to speak. Robespierre, enjoying this enthusiasm in silence, left to a partisan the task of pronouncing a sycophantic relation. He was called Aristides. His *simple and manly* eloquence was lauded with an affected rapture, which proved how well his thirst of literary homage was understood. The convention was reinstated in public opinion; it had regained the esteem of the society; and all proclaimed that the reign of truth was dawning, and that the clouds which had hovered over the safety of the republic were dispelled.

Barrère was called upon to explain the terms in which he had expressed himself with reference to *petty schemers of riots;* and he completely belied himself by affirming that he intended by those words to describe, not the true patriots accused with Robespierre, but their opponents.

Thus finished this celebrated accusation. It was an act of unquestionable imprudence. The entire conduct of the Girondists is summed up in this proceeding. They were actuated by a generous indignation, and expressed it with talent; but therewith was mingled enough of personal resentment, of false conjecture, of chimerical supposition, to supply those who loved to delude themselves with a pretext for not heeding them; those who recoiled from an act of energy, with a motive for deferring it; those, in fine, who affected impartiality, with a plausible reason for not adopting their conclusions; and these three classes composed the Plain. One amongst the Girondist deputies, however, the discerning Pétion, kept aloof from their exaggerations; he published a speech he had prepared on the occasion, in which the whole subject was most discreetly handled. Vergniaud, whom his fine intellect and scornful indifference removed from the sphere of passion, was likewise exempt from their indiscretions, and he observed a profound silence. At the moment, the accusation of the Girondists had no other consequence than definitively rendering all reconciliation impossible, exhausting in a useless contest the most potent of their means, oratory and indignant invective, and aggravating the hatred and fury of their enemies without obtaining for themselves a single additional resource.

Wo to the vanquished when the victors disagree! These afford a diversion to their own disputes, and they strive to outstrip each other in zeal for crushing their fallen foes. In the Temple were prisoners upon whom was destined to fall the tempest of revolutionary passions. The monarchy, the aristocracy, the whole past, in short, against which the revolution battled with ferocity, were personified, as it were, in the unfortunate Louis XVI.; and the manner in which they should treat the dethroned prince, became for each

the standard whereby hatred of counter-revolutionary tendencies was to be estimated. The Legislative Assembly, too dependent on the constitution which declared the king inviolable, had not ventured to decide his fate; it had suspended his functions, and incarcerated him in the Temple; it had not even abolished royalty, but had bequeathed to a convention the task of dealing with the substance and the personality of the antiquated monarchy. Royalty abolished, a republic decreed, and the framing of a constitution intrusted to the meditations of the most distinguished minds in the assembly, the fate of Louis XVI. remained for discussion. Six weeks had elapsed, and multitudinous cares—the forwarding of supplies, the consideration of military affairs, the subject of provisions, which were deficient at that time as in all periods of commotion; the police, and all the details of government, which had been transferred, after the fall of royalty, to the executive council, with excessive chariness; and, lastly, the violent quarrels—had still prevented the convention from attending to the prisoners in the Temple. Once the question had been started, and, as we have seen, the proposition was referred to the committee of legislation. In the mean time, the subject itself was the theme of all discourse. At the Jacobins' voices were daily raised, invoking judgment on the head of Louis XVI., and charging the Girondists with delaying it by quarrels, in which, however, each of that especial auditory took quite as great a share and interest. On the 1st of November, during the interval between the accusation of Robespierre and his defence, a section having appeared before the convention to complain of fresh placards stimulating to murder and insurrection, the trial of Marat was demanded, as on that topic invariably happened. The Girondists insisted that he and some of his colleagues were the causes of all the disorders, and availed themselves of every new fact corroborating that opinion to propose their prosecution. Their enemies, on the contrary, alleged that the cause of all the troubles was at the Temple; that the new republic would be consolidated, and tranquillity and security reign, only when the late king should be sacrificed, and by that decisive blow all hope taken away from the conspirators. Jean de Bry, the same deputy who had maintained in the Legislative Assembly that *the law of public safety* should be followed as the only rule of conduct, rose to speak upon this question, and recommended that Marat and Louis XVI. should be both put upon their trial. "Marat," said he, "has earned the title of man-eater, and would have made an excellent king. He is the true cause of all the troubles of which Louis XVI. is made the pretext: let us try them both, and ensure the public repose by this double example." In consequence, the convention ordained that the report upon the denunciations against Marat should be presented before the sitting broke up, and that, within eight days at latest, the committee of legislation should render its opinion upon the forms to be observed in the trial of Louis XVI.; declaring, furthermore, that if, after the eight days, the committee had not brought up its report, every member should be at liberty to occupy the tribune, and deliver his sentiments upon that important topic. New quarrels and new distractions delayed the report upon Marat, which indeed was not presented till long afterwards; but the committee of legislation got ready its project touching the august and unfortunate family immured in the Temple.

Europe had its eyes fixed at this moment on France. It contemplated with amazement those subjects, deemed at first so weak, now become victorious and triumphant, and sufficiently hardy to hurl defiance at all thrones. It awaited with anxiety their coming deeds, and hoped their audacity would soon have an end. However, military events were progressing, which conduced to exalt their delirium, and greatly to augment the surprise and terror of the world.

CHAPTER XVI.

MILITARY OPERATIONS.—VICTORY OF JEMAPPES.—CONQUEST OF BELGIUM.

Dumouriez had departed for Belgium at the end of October, and reached Valenciennes on the 25th. His general plan was framed upon the idea which engrossed his mind, and consisted in pushing the enemy in front, and taking advantage of the great numerical superiority possessed over him. Dumouriez had it in his power, by following the course of the Meuse with the greater part of his forces, to prevent the junction of Clairfayt, who was proceeding from Champagne, take Duke Albert in the rear, and thus execute what he had grossly erred in not doing at first. when he ought to have pushed forward to the Rhine, and followed that river to Cleves; but his plan was differently organised, and he preferred to a sagacious march a brilliant action, which would raise the courage of his soldiers, already greatly animated by the cannonade of Valmy, and correct the opinion entertained in Europe for the last fifty years, that the French, however excellent in impetuous attack, were incapable of achieving a pitched battle. His superiority of number sanctioned such an enterprise, and the idea had its profoundness, too, as well as the manœuvres he has been censured for not employing. However, he did not overlook the important points of turning the enemy, and separating him from Clairfayt. Valence, posted for that purpose along the Meuse, was appointed to march from Givet upon Namur and Liege, with the army of the Ardennes, 18,000 men strong. D'Harville, with 12,000, had orders to manœuvre between the grand army and Valence, in order to turn the enemy at a nearer point. Such were the dispositions of Dumouriez on his right. On his left, Labourdonnaye was intended, taking his departure from Lille, to scour the coast of Flanders, and occupy all the maritime strongholds. On his arrival at Antwerp, he had directions to skirt the Dutch frontier, and meet the Meuse at Ruremonde. Belgium being thus encompassed, Dumouriez occupied the centre of the circle with a mass of 40,000 men, and in a position to overwhelm the enemy on the first point he should attempt to cope with the French.

Impatient to enter the field and open the glorious career for which his ardent imagination panted, Dumouriez urged the arrival of the supplies promised him at Paris, and which ought to have reached Valenciennes on the 25th. Servan had quitted the war ministry, preferring the less troubled functions of a military command to the chaos in which all administration was involved. He re-established the vigour of his mind and his health in the camp of the Pyrenees. Roland had proposed and carried as his successor, Pache, an unassuming, talented, and laborious man, who, having formerly quitted France to reside in Switzerland, had returned at the epoch of the revolution, surrendered the warrant of a pension he drew from the Marshal de Castries, and distinguished himself in the office of the home department by a rare ability and application. Carrying in his pocket a piece of bread, and quitting his labours not even for the purposes of refreshment, he attended during entire days, and won the friendship of Roland alike by his manners and his zeal. Servan had solicited his translation during the arduous administration of August and September, and Roland had yielded to his wishes with regret, and only in consideration of the great importance of the labours of the war department at that period. Pache rendered in his new post services equally efficient as in the former; and when the place of minister-at-war became vacant, he was immediately proposed to fill it. as one of those obscure but invaluable workmen, whom justice and the public interest should, if consulted, have raised rapidly to distinction.

Pache, affable and modest, was an universal favourite, and could not fail to be acceptable: the Girondists naturally relied upon the political moderation of a man so calm, so prudent, and moreover so indebted to them for fortune. The Jacobins, who found him bland and deferential towards them, extolled his modesty, and contrasted it with what they called the pride and harshness of Roland. Dumouriez, on his part, was charmed with a minister who promised to be more manageable than the Girondists, and more disposed to aid his views. He had at this time fresh grievances against Roland. The latter had written a letter to him in the name of the council, in which he took him to task for assuming too imperative a tone in urging his plans upon the ministry, and exhibited towards him a distrust, enhanced by the conviction of his superior talents. Roland, full of loyalty to the public service, combated in public what he had advanced in the secrecy of correspondence. Dumouriez, disregarding the honesty of Roland's intentions, made his complaints to Pache, who received them, and indemnified him by his flatteries for the jealousies of his colleagues. Such, then, was the new minister of war: standing between the Jacobins, the Girondists, and Dumouriez, listening to their respective grievances, he gained them all by his assurances and deference, and led them all to esteem him an ally and a friend.

Dumouriez attributed the delay in forwarding supplies to his army to the change in the offices consequent upon a new ministry. Only the moiety of the promised stores had arrived; and he commenced his march without waiting for the remainder, writing to Pache, at the same time, that he must infallibly have sent to him 30,000 pairs of shoes, 25,000 greatcoats, camp-materials for 40,000 men, and, above all, two millions in specie, to furnish the soldiers with cash, because, entering a country where assignats were not current, they must necessarily pay in hard coin for all they should purchase. Every thing was promised; and Dumouriez, stirring the ardour of his troops, encouraging them with the prospect of a speedy and certain conquest, led them onward, although deficient in necessaries for a winter campaign in a severe climate.

Valence, retarded in his march by a diversion on Longwy, and by the total want of all military stores, which did not reach him till November, permitted Clairfayt to pass without obstacle from Luxumbourg into Belgium, and join Duke Albert with 12,000 men. Dumouriez, foregoing his intention of availing himself of Valence's aid, drew towards him the division of General d'Harville, and marching his troops between Quarouble and Quiévrain, hastened to come up with the hostile army. Duke Albert, true to the Austrian system, had formed a cordon from Tournay to Mons; and although he had 30,000 men, he assembled scarcely 20,000 before the town of Mons. Dumouriez, pressing on him closely, arrived on the 3d November before the eminence of Boussu, and ordered his advanced guard, commanded by the gallant Beurnonville, to dislodge the enemy posted on the heights. The attack was at first successful, but the Austrians rallying, the French were obliged to retire. Dumouriez, aware how important success was at the commencement, sent Beurnonville back to the attack, carried all the enemy's posts, and, on the evening of the 3d, found himself in presence of the Austrians, intrenched on the heights which skirt the town of Mons.

On these heights, stretching semicircularly in front of the place, were planted three villages, Jemappes, Cuesmes, and Berthaimont. The Austrians, in expectation of being attacked, had formed the imprudent resolution of maintaining that position, and had for some time devoted the greatest pains to render it impregnable. Clairfayt occupied Jemappes and Cuesmes; a little beyond, Beaulieu encamped above Berthaimont. Rapid declivities, woods, felled trees, fourteen redoubts, a formidable artillery ranging in tiers, and 20,000 men, defended these positions, and rendered approach almost impracticable. Tyrolian riflemen lined the woods which stretched below the heights. The cavalry, stationed in the intervals between the hills, and principally in the hollow separating Jemappes from Cuesmes, was in readiness to debouch and fall on the French columns, when thrown into confusion by the fire of the batteries.

It was in front of this camp, so strongly barricaded, that Dumouriez planted himself. He drew up his army in a semicircle, parallel to the positions of the enemy. General D'Harville, who had effected his junction with the main army on the evening of the 5th, was appointed to manœuvre on the extreme right of the French line. By dawn on the 6th he was to skirt the positions of Beaulieu, essay to turn them, and then occupy the heights behind Mons, the sole retreat of the Austrians. Beurnonville, forming the right itself of the French line, had orders to march on the village of Cuesmes. The Duke de Chartres,* who served in the army with the rank of general, and commanded in the centre that day, was to advance on Jemappes in front, and endeavour at the same time to penetrate by the hollow which divided Jemappes from Cuesmes. Lastly, General Ferrand, intrusted with the command of the left, was directed to go through a little village called Quaregnon, and bear upon the flank of Jemappes. All these attacks were intended to be executed in columns by battalions; the cavalry stood ready to support them from behind and on the flanks. The artillery was posted so as to play on each redoubt in flank, and silence its fire if possible. A reserve of infantry and cavalry awaited the event behind the rivulet of Wasme.

During the night between the 5th and 6th, General Beaulieu recommended a sortie from the intrenchments and a sudden attack upon the French, in order to disconcert them by an unexpected and nocturnal onslaught. This energetic counsel was not heeded; and on the 6th, at eight in the morning, the French were in order of battle, full of courage and ardour, although exposed to a murderous fire and in sight of almost invulnerable intrenchments. Sixty thousand men covered the field of battle, and one hundred pieces of ordnance thundered in front of the two armies.

The cannonade had commenced with the dawn. Dumouriez ordered Generals Ferrand and Beurnonville to begin the attack, the one on the left, the other on the right, whilst he himself awaited in the centre the moment for acting, and D'Harville, skirting the positions of Beaulieu, deployed to cut off the retreat. Ferrand attacked faintly, and Beurnonville failed to silence the Austrian fire. It was now eleven o'clock; and the enemy was not sufficiently distressed on the flanks to risk an assault in front. Dumouriez thereupon dispatched his faithful Thouvenot to the left wing to decide the success. Thouvenot, causing the useless cannonade to cease, traversed Quaregnon, turned Jemappes, and at a brisk pace, with bayonets fixed, scaled the height and arrived on the flank of the Austrians. Dumouriez, apprised of this movement, resolved to commence the attack in front, and moved the centre directly against Jemappes. He made his infantry advance in columns, and disposed his hussars and dragoons so as to cover the hollow between Jemappes and Cuesmes, whence the enemy's cavalry was preparing to charge. The French troops moved forward, and cleared with alacrity the intervening space. A brigade, however, perceiving the Austrian cavalry debouching by the hollow, wavered, recoiled, and exposed the flank of the columns. At this instant, the young Baptiste Renard, a mere domestic of Dumouriez, yielding to the inspiration of courage and intelligence, flew to the general of that brigade, upbraided him with his weakness, demonstrated the critical nature of the danger, and led him back to the

* [The present King of the French.]

hollow. A certain hesitation was manifested in the whole centre, and the battalions began to grow uneasy under the galling fire from the batteries. The Duke de Chartres threw himself into the midst of the ranks, rallied them, formed around him a battalion which he called *the battalion of Jemappes*, and led it boldly against the enemy. The battle was thus restored; and Clairfayt, although taken in flank and menaced in front, resisted nevertheless with heroic firmness.

Dumouriez, witnessing all these movements, but doubtful of success, hastened to the right, where the contest was still undecided, in spite of Beurnonville's most strenuous efforts. His intention was to bring the attack to a speedy termination, or, failing, to fall back with the right wing, and use it to protect the retreat of the centre, should a retrograde movement become necessary.

Beurnonville had been making fruitless attempts against the village of Cuesmes, and was about to give up in despair, when Dampierre, who commanded a point of the assault, took with him some companies and charged audaciously into the midst of a redoubt. Dumouriez came up at the very moment Dampierre was executing this gallant action; he found the rest of the battalions without a leader, exposed to a destructive fire, and wavering in presence of the imperial hussars, on the point of charging them. These were the same battalions which, in the camp of Maulde, had formed so strong an attachment towards Dumouriez. He restored their confidence, and prepared them to hold firm against the hostile cavalry. A discharge within range checked that cavalry, and the hussars of Berchini, falling opportunely on it, completed its discomfiture. Then Dumouriez, putting himself at the head of his battalions, and chanting with them the Marseillese hymn, led them onwards, hurried them to the intrenchments, overthrew all before him, and carried the village of Cuesmes.

This exploit was scarcely achieved before Dumouriez, still anxious for the centre, galloped back in that direction, followed by a few squadrons. But whilst on the way, the young Duke de Montpensier met him with tidings of the victory of the centre, owing principally to his brother the Duke de Chartres. Thus, Jemappes assailed in flank and front, and Cuesmes carried, Clairfayt could no longer offer resistance, and was necessitated to retire. He consequently yielded the ground after a brave defence, and abandoned a dearly bought victory to Dumouriez. His retreat took place at two o'clock; the French troops, drooping with fatigue, craved a moment's repose; Dumouriez granted their request, and halted on the heights of Jemappes and Cuesmes. He relied upon D'Harville for the pursuit of the enemy; that general being charged to turn Berthaimont, and cut off the retreat of the Austrians. But his orders not being sufficiently explicit, and being, furthermore, misunderstood, D'Harville had remained in front of Berthaimont, and uselessly cannonaded its heights. Clairfayt accordingly fell back under the wing of Beaulieu, who had not been engaged; and both took the road to Brussels, which D'Harville had left open for them.

The battle cost the Austrians 1500 prisoners, and 4500 dead or wounded. The loss of the French was nearly as great. Dumouriez disguised its extent, and confessed to only a few hundred men. He has been censured for not having turned the enemy by marching on his right, and thus taking him in the rear, instead of obstinately persisting in the attacks on the left and centre. The idea had occurred to him when he ordered D'Harville to skirt Berthaimont, but he had not acted upon it with sufficient vigour. His promptitude, frequently superseding reflection, and the ambition of brilliant enterprises, made him prefer at Jemappes, as throughout the campaign, an attack in front. At the same time, full of ardour and presence of mind in the midst of action, he had admirably sustained his troops, and communicated to them an heroic courage. A vast renown attended this signal victory. The battle of Jemappes filled France with indescribable joy, and Europe with fresh amazement. Every where, so formidable an artillery braved with such exemplary coolness, redoubts breasted with such distinguished gallantry, formed the theme of wonder; the peril and the victory were even exaggerated; and through all Europe the faculty of gaining pitched battles was again conceded to the French.

At Paris, all the sincere republicans experienced unalloyed gratification at the auspicious tidings, and celebrated them by rejoicings. Dumouriez's servant, the youthful Baptiste Rénard, was presented to the convention, and rewarded by it with a civic crown and an officer's epaulette. The Girondists, from patriotism, from a sense of justice, applauded the talents of the general. The Jacobins, although distrusting him, likewise applauded him, from the pure necessity of exulting at the triumphs of the revolution. Marat alone, reproaching the French for their infatuation, exclaimed that Dumouriez must have falsified the number of his dead; that a mountain could not be assailed at so little cost; that he had taken neither baggage nor artillery; that the Austrians had moved tranquilly away; that it was a retreat rather than a defeat; and that Dumouriez might have attacked the enemy more discreetly: and mingling with this actual sagacity a demoniac frenzy for calumny, he added that this attack in front was designed for no other purpose than that of sacrificing the brave battalions of Paris; that his colleagues in the convention and Jacobin Club, all the French, in short, so prompt to admire, were but dolts; and that for himself, he would allow Dumouriez to be a good general when all Belgium was subdued, without a single Austrian escaping, and a good patriot when Belgium was thoroughly revolutionised and rendered illimitably free. "You French," said he, "with this disposition to admire without reflection, are exposed to equally swift revulsion. One day you proscribe Montesquiou; you are told that he has conquered Savoy, and you applaud him; you again proscribe him, and become a general laughing-stock by these silly vacillations. For myself, I distrust, I accuse always; and so far as the inconveniences of this disposition are concerned, they are incomparably less than those resulting from a contrary tendency, inasmuch as they never compromise the public safety. They may doubtless expose me to mistakes as to certain individuals; but, seeing the corruption of the age, and the multitude of enemies to liberty from education, principle, and interest, it is a thousand to one that I am right, when I take them at once as intriguers and public knaves, all ready for plots. I am, therefore, a thousand times less likely to be deceived regarding public functionaries; and whilst the fatal confidence reposed in them enables them to scheme against the country with equal effrontery and security, the eternal distrust with which the public should regard them, according to my principles, would not allow them to move a step without trembling at the dread of being unmasked and punished."*

The battle of Jemappes opened Belgium to the French: but now strange difficulties beset Dumouriez, and two striking spectacles presented themselves —on the conquered territory, the French revolution acting upon adjacent revolutions, both by way of precipitation and assimilation; and with regard to the French army, the demagogical spirit infusing itself into the administrations, and disorganising them under pretence of purification.

There were several parties in Belgium: the first, that attached to Austrian domination, existed only in the imperial armies put to flight by Dumouriez; the second, composing the whole nation, nobles, priests,

* "Journal of the French Republic, by Marat, the Friend of the People," No. 43. Monday, 12th November 1792.

magistrates, people, unanimously repudiated the foreign yoke, and desired the independence of the Belgian nation. But this latter was subdivided into two others: the priests and the privileged orders were in favour of preserving the ancient states, the ancient institutions, the distinctions of classes and provinces—every thing, in short, except only the Austrian sway, and they had on their side a portion of the population, still very superstitious, and greatly attached to the clergy; on the other hand, the Belgian demagogues or Jacobins were anxious for a complete revolution and the sovereignty of the people, demanding the French level and absolute equality. Thus, each adopted of the revolution what suited its own views; the party of the privileged orders sought only the ancient system; the party of plebeians sought democracy and the reign of the multitude. Amongst the different parties, it will be easily divined that Dumouriez's predilections would lead him to steer a middle course. Repelling Austria with his troops, condemning the exclusive pretensions of the privileged orders, he had no desire at the same time to transport the Jacobins of Paris to Brussels, and there give being to new Chabots and Marats. His design in truth was, whilst respecting the ancient organisation of the country, to reform what it held too purely feudal. The enlightened part of the population was also actuated by such views; but it was difficult to form it into an aggregate, on account of the lack of union amongst the towns and provinces; and, furthermore, by convoking it in an assembly, it would be exposed to the domination of the violent party. In case he could realise his wishes, Dumouriez thought, either by means of an alliance or of a union, to connect Belgium with the French empire, and thus complete its territory. He was, above all things, desirous of preventing spoliations, of ensuring the immense resources of the country for war, and of indisposing no class of the population, so that his army might not perish by an insurrection. He looked forward, likewise, to conciliating the clergy, who exercised a prodigious influence over the minds of the people. He desired, in fine, such things as the experience of revolutions shows to be impossible, and which all administrative and political genius, however vast, may at once renounce with perfect resignation. We shall see his plans and projects take development in their proper place.

On entering Belgium, he promised, in a proclamation, to respect property, persons, and the national independence. He ordered that all things should be maintained as they were; that the authorities should continue their functions, the imposts be collected, and primary assemblies be immediately convoked to form a national convention to decide on the fate of Belgium.

Difficulties of a different and graver cast were, however, in store for him. Motives of policy, of public good, of humanity, might make him desire a prudent and moderate revolution in Belgium; but his army meanwhile must live, and therein lay his entanglement. He was the general, and, above all things besides, was obliged to be victorious. For that end, discipline and resources were essential to him. Upon his first entry into Mons on the morning of the 7th November, amidst the acclamations of the Brabanters, who decreed him a crown, as well as the brave Dampierre, he found himself in the greatest embarrassment His commissariat was at Valenciennes, and no part of what had been promised him was forthcoming. He wanted clothing for his soldiers, more than half-naked, provisions, horses for his artillery, and light carriages to assist the progress of the invasion, especially in a country where transport was extremely difficult; lastly, specie to pay the troops, because the Belgians were not willing to accept assignats. The emigrants had circulated a large quantity of forged assignats, and thus thrown discredit on them; besides, no nation is over prone to share the burdens of another, by receiving paper which represents its debts.

The impetuosity of Dumouriez's character, amounting almost to imprudence, would scarcely permit us to believe that he remained from the 7th to the 11th at Mons, and left the Duke of Saxe-Teschen to pursue his retreat in tranquillity, if administrative details had not imperiously detained him, and absorbed that attention which should have been exclusively fixed on military affairs. The plan he formed was wisely conceived; it consisted in forming contracts for provisions, forage, and stores, with the Belgians themselves. Hence numerous advantages would result; in the first place, the articles of consumption were on the spot, and no delay was to be feared; the contracts would give the Belgians an interest in the presence of the French army; and by paying the venders in assignats, they would be compelled to promote their circulation of themselves, thus avoiding a forced currency, an object of great importance, since every one upon whom a forced currency is imposed considers himself defrauded by the authority coercing, and nothing tends more universally to exasperate a population. Dumouriez had furthermore reflected upon the feasibility of making loans from the clergy under the guarantee of France. Such loans would supply him with specie, and replenish his exhausted chest; whilst the clergy, although smote for the instant, would feel more at ease as to their stability and possessions, when thus directly connected with him. And on the other hand, France having a right to claim indemnities from the Belgians for the expenses of a liberating war, those indemnities would be set apart for the payment of the loans; and thus, by means of a slight additional contribution, the whole war would be defrayed, and Dumouriez would fulfil his boast of living at the cost of Belgium without harassing or disorganising it. But these were plans inspired by genius simply; and in the stormy eras of revolution, it behoves genius to adopt one of two decided courses—either, foreseeing the disorders and the outrages about to follow, to retire betimes; or, still foreseeing them, to yield thereto, and submit to pursue a career of violence for the purpose of continuing useful, whether at the head of an army or the state. No man has been sufficiently superior to worldly influences to essay the first; one has been great, and shown that he could preserve his purity of character whilst following the second. I refer to him who, holding a seat in the committee of public safety, took no part in its political acts, but devoted himself to the department of war, and *organised victory*, a thing fair, permitted, and always patriotic under all governments.*

In effecting his contracts and financial operations, Dumouriez employed Malus, his war commissary, whom he highly esteemed on account of his talents and activity, without inquiring too narrowly whether or not he were moderate in his gains. He likewise made use of one D'Espagnac, an ex-abbé of libertine morals, and one of those intellectual and sprightly *roués* of the lapsed era, who pursued all trades with infinite skill and grace, and left an equivocal reputation in all. Him Dumouriez dispatched to the ministry in order to unfold his plans, and procure a ratification of all the engagements he had contracted. He had already incurred sufficient odium by the species of administrative dictatorship he had arrogated to himself, and by the revolutionary moderation he evinced with respect to the Belgians, without further compromising himself by an association with men, either the present objects of suspicion, or, if not now so, soon to become such. In fact, at this very period, a general murmur arose against the old administrations, which were alleged to be full of knaves and aristocrats.

After bestowing so much care on the comfort of his soldiers, Dumouriez turned his attention to the march of Labourdonnaye, which he was desirous of accelerat-

* [Carnot is alluded to in this description.]

ing. That general, who had displayed remarkable obstinacy in lingering behind, reached Tournay very tardily; and, when arrived there, illustrated his coming by scenes worthy of the Jacobins, and levied heavy contributions. Dumouriez directed him to march rapidly on Ghent and the Scheldt, in order to occupy Antwerp, and then accomplish the circuit of the country as far as the Meuse. Valence, who had at length arrived in line, after unavoidable delays, was ordered to be at Nivelles on the 13th or 14th. Dumouriez, concluding that the Duke of Saxe-Teschen would retire behind the canal of Vilvorden, intended that Valence, turning the forest of Soignies, should proceed beyond that canal, and there be ready to receive the duke at the passage of the Dyle.

He left Mons on the 11th, and came slowly up with the enemy, who was retreating in good order, but with singular sluggishness. Impeded by crazy conveyances, he was unable to proceed with sufficient promptitude to make amends for the delays he had been compelled to undergo. On the 13th, preceding his army with a mere advanced guard, he fell into the midst of the enemy at Anderlecht, and narrowly escaped being surrounded; but, with his usual address and firmness, he manœuvred his little band, brought forward with much show some pieces of artillery he had with him, and induced the Austrians to conclude that he was on the field of battle with his entire army. He thus succeeded in keeping them in check until he was succoured by his own soldiers, who, learning his critical position, flew with all speed to disengage him.

He entered Brussels on the 14th, and was again stopped there by administrative embarrassments, having neither money nor resources necessary for the support of his troops. He was likewise apprised that the ministry refused to sanction his last contracts, with one exception; and that all the old military administrations were cashiered, and replaced by a committee called *the Committee of Purchases*. This committee alone was for the future to be authorised to purchase for the use of the armies; and no general was allowed to intermeddle with that department in any respect. This was the beginning of a revolution in the offices of administration, which was not long in throwing them all into complete disorganisation for a time.

The administrative departments, which require for their service a long practice or special study, are generally those into which a revolution is the last to penetrate, inasmuch as they less excite ambition, and the necessity of retaining capable officers saves them from the rage for innovation. Consequently, scarcely any change had been made in the staffs, in the scientific corps of the army, in the offices of the various ministries, in the old commissariat departments, and above all, in the marine, which, of all the divisions of military art, most especially demands peculiar knowledge. Outcries were therefore speedily raised against the aristocrats wherewith these departments were filled, and reproaches levelled at the executive council for not remodelling them. The branch of administration which provoked the greatest exasperation was the commissariat. Just indignation was expressed against the contractors, who, from something inherent in government transactions, and, moreover, under favour of the prevalent disorders of the moment, asked exorbitant prices in all their bargains, supplied the worst articles to the troops, and robbed the state with glaring effrontery. Their exactions formed the subject of complaint from all quarters; and an inexorable adversary arose against them in the person of Cambon of Montpellier, a deputy of the convention. Devoting himself with untiring zeal to matters of finance and public economy, this deputy had gained a great ascendancy in discussions upon those points, and enjoyed the full confidence of the assembly. Although a decided democrat, he had never ceased to exclaim against the spoliations of the commune, and in so doing surprised those who were unable to comprehend that he condemned as a financier disorders he would have possibly excused as a Jacobin. He inveighed with still greater vehemence against the contractors, and attacked them with all the violence of his character. Every day he denounced new frauds, and insisted upon their punishment; which exhortations were heard with universal satisfaction. Honest men desired the chastisement of knaves, the Jacobins the persecution of aristocrats, and intriguers the multiplication of vacant situations.

Thus an idea gradually arose in favour of forming a committee composed of certain individuals empowered to make all purchases for behoof of the republic. It was thought that this committee, sole and responsible, would rescue the state from those frauds perpetrated by a multitude of isolated contractors; and that, becoming the only purchaser for all the administrations, it would avoid enhancing prices by competition, as always happened when each ministry and each army treated separately for their respective wants. This body was established with the sanction of all the ministers; and Cambon was its most strenuous advocate, since so new and simple a form suited his dogmatic spirit. Dumouriez was thereupon advertised that he should conclude no more contracts, and ordered, furthermore, to annul those he had already signed. The regimental chests were at the same time abolished; and the rigour of the new principle was pushed to such extremity in execution, that serious difficulties were started against retiring at the national treasury a draft of Dumouriez, granted for an advance made to the army by a Belgian merchant.

This revolution in the commissariat department, laudable as it was in motive, resulted, concurrently with other circumstances, in producing disastrous consequences. During the administration of Servan, that minister had been called upon to satisfy the first wants of troops hastily assembled in Champagne, and it required great exertions to meet those early embarrassments. But after the campaign of the Argonne was over, the stores collected with such difficulty were utterly exhausted; the volunteers, having left their homes with a single suit, were almost naked; insomuch, that to each of the armies a complete equipment was indispensable, to be provided too in the depth of winter, and amidst the rapid invasion of Belgium. Pache, Servan's successor, had consequently a prodigious task to perform, and unfortunately he joined to great talents and application a weak and supple character, which, leading him to study pleasing every body, especially the Jacobins, incapacitated him for command, and disabled him from imparting the necessary energy to an administration so vast as that intrusted to him. When, therefore, we reflect that, in addition to the pressing urgency and enormity of the wants to be supplied, the difficulties of the season, and the necessity of decisive promptitude, we have to place the weakness of a new minister, the general disorder of the state, and, above all, a complete revolution in the administrative system, we may readily conceive the confusion inevitably to arise during the first moments—the destitution of the armies, their angry complaints, and the violent remonstrances passed between the generals and the ministers.

Upon learning these administrative changes, Dumouriez was much incensed. Until the organisation of the new system was effected, he perceived that his army must be exposed to the greatest misery, unless his contracts were maintained and executed. He, therefore, took it upon himself to uphold them, and ordered his agents, Malus, D'Espagnac, and a third named Petit-Jean, to continue their operations upon his personal responsibility. At the same time, he wrote to the minister in an imperious style, calculated to render him additionally suspected by distrustful, sour, and gloomy demagogues, already discontented at his revolutionary lukewarmness and administrative

dictatorship. He told him that, in order to ensure a continuation of his services, he must be left at liberty to provide for the wants of his army; that the committee of purchases was an absurdity, since it would have to transport stores laboriously and from afar, when they were easily obtainable upon the spot; that the mere conveyance would lead to vast expense and delays, during which the armies might perish from hunger, cold, and wretchedness; that the Belgians would lose all interest in the presence of the French, and cease to aid the circulation of the assignats; that the extortions of contractors would proceed as usual, since the facility of plundering the state in supplies had always made, and would always continue to make, robbers; and that the members of the committee of purchases would themselves become contractors and dealers, notwithstanding the provision of the law forbidding them; and that the whole was but an idle effort at economy, which, even were it not chimerical, was sure to produce a fatal paralysis in the service for at least a time. The committee of purchases irritated Dumouriez the more, because its members were known to him as the creatures of the minister Clavière; and he deemed the innovation itself to spring from the jealousy with which he was regarded by the Girondists. But, on the contrary, its institution originated in the sincerest motives, and met the warm approval of all parties, without any factious view or purpose.

Pache, if he had been a firm and patriotic minister, would have endeavoured to satisfy the general, in order to secure his aid to the republic. With this view, it was his duty to have examined his demands, considered how many of them were just, conceded all such, repudiated the rest, and conducted the business in an authoritative and vigorous spirit—after a manner, in short, to obviate reproaches, disputes, and confusion. Instead, however, of so doing, Pache, already accused by the Girondists of weakness, and doubtless ill-disposed towards them, left to their mutual upbraidings the general, the Girondists, and the convention. He laid before the council some hasty letters of Dumouriez, in which he pointedly complained of the bad feeling entertained towards him by the Girondist ministers; and he made known to the convention the demands Dumouriez imperiously insisted upon having yielded to him, under threat of tendering his resignation. Avoiding either to censure or to explain, and affecting in his reports a scrupulous fidelity, he allowed every sinister circumstance to work out its worst consequences. The Girondists, the convention, the Jacobins, were all, upon distinct grounds, irritated at the haughty bearing of Dumouriez. Cambon inveighed against Malus, D'Espagnac, and Petit-Jean, quoting the terms of their contracts, which were exorbitant, and depicting the unbridled luxury of D'Espagnac and the former malversations of Petit-Jean; and ultimately induced the assembly to impeach all three. He alleged that Dumouriez was encompassed by intriguers, from whom it was necessary to free him, and strenuously maintained the excellence of the committee of purchases, arguing that buying articles of consumption on the theatre of war was discouraging the industry of native artisans, and disposing them to seditions from idleness; that, as to assignats, there was no occasion for any address to induce their circulation, as the general was wrong in not enforcing their acceptance, and introducing into Belgium the whole revolution, with its spirit, its systems, and its currency, since the Belgians, reaping the inestimable gift of liberty, must take its inconveniences as well as blessings. In the tribune of the convention, Dumouriez was considered merely as the dupe of his agents; but at the Jacobin Club, and in the journal of Marat, he was invariably denounced as in concert with them and partaking their spoils, although no proof existed for the allegation, save the too frequent example of commanders yielding to similar temptations.

Dumouriez was thus compelled to abandon the three commissaries; nor did he escape the affront of seeing them arrested, in despite of the guarantee he had himself given them. Pache wrote to him, with his accustomed blandness, that his demands were under examination; that his wants would be speedily supplied; and that for such purpose the committee of purchases had made considerable contracts. In the mean time, he announced to him certain large arrivals, which never appeared. Dumouriez, out of patience at this disappointment, renewed his complaints; and from the correspondence between them, if the letters of the minister were heeded, all seemed in profusion and abundance—if those of the general were believed, all was in positive destitution. Dumouriez had recourse to temporary expedients, and to loans from the cathedral chapters; one contract of Malus, which, from the emergency of the case, he had been allowed to maintain, kept him in food; and he was in this state detained at Brussels from the 14th to the 19th.

In this interval, Stengel, having been detached with the advanced guard, had taken Malines, an important capture, on account of the stores of powder and arms of all kinds accumulated in a fortress which was deemed the arsenal of Belgium. Labourdonnaye had entered Antwerp on the 18th, in which city he organised clubs, and greatly disgusted the Belgians by the special favour he extended to popular agitators, instead of pushing with the requisite vigour the siege of the citadel. Dumouriez, finding it impossible to agree with a lieutenant so much interested in clubs and so little with war, displaced him for Miranda, a Peruvian of distinguished gallantry, who had settled in France at the period of the revolution, and attained an eminent position through the friendship of Pétion. Labourdonnaye, deprived of his army, and sent back to the department of the north, used every endeavour to kindle the zeal of the Jacobins against *Cæsar-Dumouriez*, the name by which the general was already stigmatised amongst that fraternity.

The enemy had at first intended to take position behind the canal of Vilvorden, and to maintain a communication with Antwerp. He thus committed the same fault as Dumouriez, attempting to keep near the Scheldt instead of hastening upon the Meuse, as they both ought to have done, the one to secure, the other to cut off, a retreat. At length Clairfayt, who had assumed the command, perceived the necessity of repassing the Meuse with all dispatch, and abandoning Antwerp to its fate. Dumouriez then called Valence from Nivelles to undertake the siege of Namur, committing the grievous fault of not throwing him along the Meuse so as to block the Austrian retreat. The defeat of the defensive army would have unquestionably ensured the surrender of the fastness. But the example of grand strategic manœuvres had not then been given; and, furthermore, Dumouriez lacked on this occasion, as on many others, the necessary reflection. He left Brussels on the 19th; passed Louvain on the 20th, and came up with the enemy at Tirlemont on the 22d, killing two or three hundred of his men. Again detained by absolute destitution, he did not start from that place till the 26th. On the 27th he arrived before Liege, and had to sustain a sharp engagement at Varoux against the Austrian rearguard. General Starai, who commanded it, made a glorious defence, and received his death-wound. Finally, on the morning of the 28th, Dumouriez entered Liege amidst the acclamations of the people, whose minds were peculiarly ripe for revolutionary excitement. Miranda took the citadel of Antwerp on the 29th, and was in a position to complete the circuit of Belgium by marching to Ruremond. On the 2d of December Valence occupied Namur. Clairfayt proceeded towards the Roër, and Beaulieu towards Luxumbourg.

At this moment all Belgium was occupied as far as the Meuse; but the country intervening to the Rhine remained for conquest, and serious difficulties stood in

the way of Dumouriez. Either from the obstacles impeding transport, or the negligence of functionaries, nothing reached his army; and although ample magazines were formed at Valenciennes, total want prevailed on the Meuse. Pache, to curry favour with the Jacobins, had thrown his offices open to them, and the greatest disorder ensued as a necessary consequence. Duties were interrupted or neglected; and from inattention the most contradictory orders were issued. Thus every branch of the service was thrown into inextricable confusion; and whilst the minister concluded the convoys safely arrived, they had not even started. The institution of the committee of purchases tended materially to augment the disorder. Ronsin, the new commissary, who had succeeded Malus and D'Espagnac after denouncing them, was in the greatest embarrassment. His reception by the army had been far from cordial; and growing alarmed at his critical position, he obeyed the orders of Dumouriez, and pursued the plan of purchases on the spot, regardless of the recent decisions. By these means the army got supplies of bread and flesh; but clothes, carriages, specie, and forage, were entirely wanting, and all the horses were starved to death. Another calamity afflicted this unfortunate army, namely, desertion. The volunteers, who, during the first enthusiasm, had poured into Champagne, were greatly cooled after the moment of danger was past; and, furthermore, contracting disgust at the numerous privations to which they were subjected, they deserted in crowds. The single corps of Dumouriez had lost at least ten thousand, and was daily losing more. The Belgian levies were not completed, since it was almost impossible to organise a country in which the different classes of the population, and the different provinces of the state, were so indisposed to concert. Liege was rife with the revolutionary spirit; but Brabant and Flanders saw with ill-disguised repugnance the Jacobin faction raise its head in clubs, attempted to be established in Ghent, Antwerp, Brussels, &c. Nor were the Belgian people on too good an understanding with the French soldiers, who desired to pay in assignats; every where that paper currency was rejected, and Dumouriez refused to give it a forced circulation. Thus, although victorious and master of the country, the French army found itself in a deplorable condition from the combined effects of destitution, desertion, and the uncertain, if not hostile, dispositions of the inhabitants. The convention, harassed by the contradictory reports of the general, who uttered his complaints with indignant warmth, and of the minister, who certified with modesty, but with assurance, that the most abundant supplies had been forwarded, dispatched four commissioners selected from its own members, to satisfy themselves of the true state of the case. These four commissioners were Danton, Camus, Lacroix, and Cossuin.

Whilst the month of November had been consumed by Dumouriez in the occupation of Belgium to the Meuse, Custine, still hovering in the neighbourhood of Frankfort and the river Maine, was menaced by the Prussians, who advanced up the Lahn. This general would have willingly seen the whole current of the war directed to his quarter, in order that his rear might be covered, and his silly incursions into Germany supported. He was therefore incessantly exclaiming against Dumouriez for not appearing at Cologne, and against Kellermann for not bearing on Coblentz. We have seen the difficulties Dumouriez had to encounter effectually impeding his more speedy advance; and such a movement on the part of Kellermann could only have been rendered possible by Custine abandoning incursions which merely served to fill the hall of the Jacobins and the newspapers with exulting acclamations, restricting himself to the limit of the Rhine, and, first fortifying Mayence, himself descending to Coblentz. But he was desirous that all should operate in his rear, so that he might have the honour of continuing the offensive in Germany. Overborne by his solicitations and complaints, the executive council recalled Kellermann, and nominated Beurnonville in his place, giving him the tardy commission to take Treves, in so advanced a season, and amidst a country poor and difficult to occupy Only one advisable mode of executing this enterprise had ever existed, and that was to have marched at the commencement between Luxumbourg and Treves, and thus reached Coblentz, whilst Custine came to the same point down the Rhine. The French would then have overpowered the Prussians, still disheartened by their repulse in Champagne, and been enabled to extend a helping hand to Dumouriez in his progress to Cologne, in case he had not already reached it. In this manner, Luxumbourg and Treves, which it was impossible to take by main force, would have fallen by famine and from want of succour; but Custine having persisted in his Weteravian expedition, and the army of the Moselle having remained quiescent in its cantonments, the time had lapsed at the end of November for marching on those fortresses, to effect a diversion in favour of Custine against the Prussians, now invigorated with fresh courage, and ascending the Rhine. Beurnonville alleged such reasons, but they were overruled, for a strong inclination to conquer and to chastise the Elector of Treves for his conduct towards France pervaded the public mind; and he was ordered to make the attack, which he conducted with as much spirit as if it had met his warmest approbation. After certain brilliant and hotly contested actions, he was obliged to renounce the expedition and fall back towards Lorraine. In this position of affairs, Custine was of course seriously compromised on the banks of the Maine; but he was loth, by retreating, to confess his temerity and the evanescent nature of his conquest, and he persisted in clinging to it without any reasonable prospect of success. He had placed in Frankfort a garrison of 2400 men; and although such a force was absurdly inadequate to defend an open town, with a population exasperated by iniquitous contributions, he enjoined the commander to hold steadfast, whilst he himself, taking post at Oberyssel and Hombourg, a little below Frankfort, affected a determination and defiance bordering on the burlesque. Such was the situation of the army on that particular point, at the end of November and beginning of December, whereby it is manifest that along the course of the Rhine the campaign had been barren of results.

On the Alpine frontier, Montesquiou, whom we left negotiating with the Swiss, and endeavouring to impress the dictates of reason on both Geneva and the French ministry, had been compelled to emigrate. An impeachment had been launched against him for having, as alleged, compromised the dignity of France by allowing the insertion of an article in the convention, by which its troops were bound to withdraw a certain distance; and especially for having the good faith to execute the stipulation in question. A decree was fulminated against him, and he took refuge within the walls of Geneva. But his moderation had ensured the success of his labours; and even whilst he was put under the ban of accusation, the ministry negotiated with the Genevese on the very bases he had fixed. The troops of Berne retired, the French troops cantoned within the prescribed limits, the invaluable neutrality of Switzerland was secured to France, and one at least of its frontiers guaranteed from invasion for several years. This important advantage had been despised, owing to the counsels of Clavière, and to a too finical susceptibility, fostered doubtless by the recent unanticipated triumphs.

In the county of Nice, the French had gloriously retaken the post of Sospella, which the Piedmontese had wrested from them for a moment, only to lose again after a considerable repulse. This success was owing to the ability of General Brunet. Their fleets, also, which rode predominant in the waters of the

Mediterranean, appeared before Genoa and before Naples, where branches of the Bourbons reigned, in order to obtain from them, as indeed from all the Italian principalities, a formal recognition of the new French republic. After Naples had been exposed to a cannonade, the reluctant acknowledgment was given, and the French squadron returned to harbour exulting in this signal avowal of its might.

In the Pyrences, a dead inertness marked the season. Servan, from deficiency of means, experienced almost insurmountable difficulty in recomposing the army of observation. Notwithstanding the enormous expenditure of from one hundred and eighty to two hundred millions [seven and a half to eight millions sterling] per month, all the armies, in the Pyrenees, in the Alps, and on the Moselle, were in the like forlorn condition, from the disorganisation prevailing throughout all the details of the service, and from the deplorable confusion paramount in the ministry of war. Yet in the midst even of such untoward circumstances, the intoxication and pride of victory were diffused throughout France. At this instant, in truth, the most exalted ideas, stimulated by the victory of Jemappes, the taking of Frankfort, the occupation of Savoy and Nice, and the favourable reaction of opinion in Europe, filled all minds, and led to the confident anticipation that the doom of monarchies was at hand, that the nations were on the eve of annihilating thrones and resolving themselves into republics. "Ah! if it were true," exclaimed a member of the Jacobin Club, when discussing the junction of Savoy with France—"if it were true that the awakening of nations has come, that the overthrow of all thrones must ensue as a speedy consequence of the success of our armies, and of the revolutionary volcano; if it were true that republican virtue was at last about to avenge the world for crowned villany—that each country, restored to liberty, should form a government conformable to the extent, more or less considerable, assigned to it by nature—and that from all these national conventions a certain number of extraordinary deputies should compose an universal convention in the centre of the universe, vigilantly guarding over the integrity of the rights of man, the general freedom of commerce, and the peace of the human race!"*

The convention, at this same period, learning the severities inflicted by the Duke of Deux-Ponts upon certain subjects in his dependence, voted, in a burst of enthusiasm, the following decree:—

"The National Convention declares that it will grant succour and fraternity to all populations disposed to recover liberty; and it charges the executive power to give orders to the generals of the French armies, enjoining them to aid all citizens who have been or may be oppressed in the cause of freedom.

The National Convention commands the generals of the French armies to print and affix the present decree in all places to which they shall carry the arms of the republic.

Paris, the 19th of November 1792."

CHAPTER XVII.

PROCEEDINGS RELATIVE TO THE TRIAL OF LOUIS XVI. —HIS FIRST EXAMINATION BEFORE THE CONVENTION.

THE trial of Louis XVI. was at length to be commenced, and the different parties awaited it to measure their strength, to ascertain their intentions, and to form of each other a definitive judgment. The Girondists especially were observed with curious scrutiny, to surprise in them the slightest bias towards commiseration, and to accuse them of royalism, should fallen greatness move their sympathies.

* Speech of Milhaud, deputy of the Cantal, delivered at the Jacobin Club in November 1792.

The Jacobin party, which assailed the entire cause of monarchy in the person of the unfortunate Louis XVI., had undoubtedly waxed in power of late, but it still encountered a vigorous opposition in Paris, and still more in the rest of France. It domineered in the capital by means of its club,* the commune, and the sections; but the middle class was resuming courage, and offering a resistance far from despicable. Pétion having declined the mayoralty, the physician Chambon had obtained a large majority of votes, and accepted with reluctance functions which were little suited to his moderate and unambitious character. This election proves the power still possessed by the burgher class even in Paris itself; and it was unquestionably much greater in the rest of France. The landowners, the traders, all the middle community in short, retained their places in the municipal councils, the departmental councils, and the popular societies, and sent addresses to the majority of the convention in favour of the laws and moderation. Several of the societies affiliated to the Jacobins disavowed the parent society, and strenuously demanded the expulsion of Marat—some even that of Robespierre. Finally, from the departments of the Mouths of the Rhone, Calvados, Finisterre, and the Gironde, new bands of federalists issued, who, anticipating the decrees for their enrolment as upon the occurrence of the 10th August, came to protect the convention and ensure its independence.

The Jacobins had not yet gained the armies; the staffs and the military organisation opposed continual obstacles. They had, however, completely carried one ministry—that of war. Pache had opened it to them from want of firmness, and displaced all its old functionaries for members of the club. In its offices the clerks spoke in the second person singular, wore shabby and squalid garments, and expatiated on motions; many

* The Jacobin Club has, perhaps, though often pourtrayed, never been more graphically depicted than by the pen of the author already quoted, in the *History of the National Convention and its Principal Members.*

"The club of the Jacobins," says he, "was veritably a co-ordinate part of the sovereign power, and the most energetic part too; it could not be sufficiently dreaded, so extreme was its jealous susceptibility, and so terrible its vengeance. It was for ever restless, apprehensive, suspicious, implacable, and ferocious; its conception of liberty was formed with the indispensable adjuncts of dungeons, irons, and streams of blood. All the evils, all the crimes, all the execrable resolutions, which rendered France a theatre of desolation during three years, originated in this infernal cavern. The Jacobins ruled with a crushing, gigantic, hideous tyranny, which sat upon us all like an enduring nightmare. An inquisition, terrible, furious, and yet wily, it upheld itself by a concerted system of terror, violence, and denunciation, and by the universal consternation it diffused. The most influential amongst the revolutionists derived from it all their strength, and at the same time ceased not to adulate and cajole the club, with equal baseness and perseverance; for the mass of the club, in fact, held the power, and so much as individuals gained must revert to it, as to its sole legitimate origin.

No man of honour, no virtue arrayed in its inestimable attributes, could ever be endured in this society; it was in antithesis to all that was not in some respects impure and tainted. A robber, an assassin, found in it more affinity than the despoiled or the victim. The celebrated phrase, '*What hast thou done to be hanged, if the old system be restored?*' was equally applicable in a moral as in a political sense. Whoever presented himself with a reputation free from reproach was of necessity suspected; but the branded inspired interest, and felt himself in harmony, in fraternal association with the habitual inmates of the sewer. The club met in the old convent of the Jacobins, in the Rue St Honoré; the hall had formerly been the library, and was of vast dimensions, in the Gothic style of architecture. It was ornamented with tricoloured banners, anarchical devices, and portraits and busts of the most famous revolutionists. I myself saw, some time before the murder of Louis XVI., two portraits, those of Jacques Clement and Ravaillac, hung with garlands of oak, in the form of civic crowns; underneath were their names, with the dates of their regicides, and above appeared these words: '*They were happy---they slew a king.*'"—Vol. i. p. 110, 112.

of them were married priests, introduced by Audouin, Pache's son-in-law, and himself a married priest. One of the heads of this ministry was Hassenfratz, formerly an inhabitant of Metz, driven from home on account of bankruptcy, and, like many others, elevated to high functions from manifesting great demagogical zeal. Thus the military administration was in the course of modification, and the armies were, as much as possible, filled with a new class, and impressed with new opinions. Thus also, whilst Roland was exposed to the implacable hatred of the Jacobins, Pache was cherished and extolled by them. His mildness, his modesty, his great capacity, were all highly praised, and bitterly contrasted with the severity of Roland, which was stigmatised as pride. Roland had scrupulously avoided allowing the Jacobins admission to his ministry of the interior. Examining the reports of the constituted authorities, curbing those who transgressed the prescribed limits, maintaining the public tranquillity, keeping a watchful eye on the popular societies, providing plentiful supplies of provisions, protecting trade and property; in a word, vigilantly attending to all the internal administration of the state, formed his multitudinous duties, and he performed them with distinguished energy and diligence. Scarcely a day passed but he denounced the commune, and exclaimed against its abuses of power, its peculations, and its missions of envoys; he intercepted its correspondence, as likewise that of the Jacobins, and substituted for their violent communications others replete with moderation, which every where produced a most auspicious effect. All the estates of emigrants which had lapsed to the state, likewise fell under his superintending care; the supplies of food, and the suppression of disorders springing from that source, engrossed a considerable portion of his attention; and he had in some sort to multiply himself, in order effectually to oppose the revolutionary passions, and to vindicate the authority of the law, whensoever efficient means were at his disposal. Hence the different aspects under which Pache and Roland appeared to the eyes of Jacobins, may be readily conceived. The families of the two ministers also contributed to render the discrepancy more striking. The wife and daughters of Pache attended the clubs and sections, even visited the barracks of the federalists, whom zealous efforts were made to gain over to the cause; and, by a grovelling Jacobinism, stood in strong relief from the polished and haughty consort of Roland, encompassed by brilliant but odious orators, the choicest ornaments of the national representation.

Pache and Roland, therefore, were the two men around whom their colleagues rallied in the council. Clavière, minister of finance, although often embroiled with the rest, from the extreme irascibility of his temper, always sided with Roland when he was appeased. Le Brun, weak in character, but attached to the Girondists from the sympathy of an accomplished mind, transacted much of his official business in concert with Brissot; and the Jacobins, decrying the latter as an intriguer, asserted that he was master of the whole government, because he assisted Le Brun in the toils of diplomacy. Garat, contemplating the parties from a metaphysical elevation, contented himself with judging them, feeling himself relieved from any necessity to combat the one or the other. He seemed to consider that he was justified in withholding active support from the Girondists, because he discerned them not free from faults, and deemed his inertness the wisdom of a superior mind. The Jacobins, meanwhile, were well contented with the neutrality of so distinguished a man, viewing it as an inestimable gain, and rewarded Garat with lavish eulogies. Lastly, Monge, of mathematical precision and zealous patriotism, was but little disposed to adopt the somewhat vague theories of the Girondists; and, following the example of Pache, he allowed his offices to be overrun by the Jacobins. Thus, without altogether repudiating the Girondists, to whom he owed his advancement, he received the praises of their adversaries, and partook the popularity of the minister-at-war.

The Jacobin party, consequently, with two complaisant instruments in Pache and Monge, and an ideologist in Garat keeping himself aloof, but an inexorable opponent in Roland, who drew to his standard Le Brun and Clavière, and often carried even the others with him, was yet far from wielding the government of the state, and perpetually exclaimed that the only novelty in the new order of things was a king the less, but with that exception, there still existed the same despotism, the same intrigues, the same treasons. It contended, in the like strain, that the revolution would never be complete and irrevocable until destruction had fallen on the secret author of all machinations and all resistances, immured in the Temple.

Thus we have endeavoured to pourtray the respective strength of the parties, and the state of the revolution, at the moment the trial of Louis XVI. was entered upon. That prince with his family occupied the great tower of the Temple. The commune, having the disposition of the armed force, and the charge of the police in the capital, was intrusted with the guard of the Temple, and to its distrustful, gloomy, and ungenerous superintendence, the royal family was wholly subject. Guarded by a class of men greatly inferior to that of which the convention was principally composed, that unfortunate family found it need not expect either the moderation or the attentions which a liberal education and polite manners always command for misfortune. It had been placed at first in the little tower, but was subsequently transferred to the larger tower, because it was deemed of more easy and secure wardenship. The king occupied one floor, and the princesses with the children the other. During the day they were brought together, and suffered to pass the dismal hours of captivity in each other's society. A single domestic had obtained permission to follow them to prison: this was the faithful Cléry, who, having escaped the massacre of the 10th of August, had ventured into the midst of Paris in order to serve in their downfall those whom he had tended in the zenith of their power. He was accustomed to rise at dawn, and multiply himself, so to speak, to compensate the loss of those numerous servitors who were wont to attend his august patrons. At nine o'clock, breakfast was served in the king's chamber, and at ten the whole family repaired to the queen's apartment. Louis XVI. then devoted himself to the instruction of his son. He made him learn a few verses of Racine or Corneille, and afterwards imparted to him the elements of geography, a science he had himself cultivated with considerable ardour and success. The queen, on her part, took charge of her daughter's education, and subsequently joined her sister-in-law in weaving tapestry. At one o'clock, when the weather was fine, the whole family was conducted into the garden, to inhale the fresh air, and indulge in a short promenade. Several officers of the municipality and guard accompanied the royal captives, and, varying with the persons, they sometimes encountered humane and sympathetic countenances, at others, harsh and insulting. Uncultivated men are rarely generous, and in their eyes grandeur is not atoned for even when stricken to the dust. If we imagine uncouth artisans, almost wholly uneducated, masters of that family, for having so long endured whose power and ministered to whose luxury they continually upbraided themselves, we may form an idea of the brutal outrages sometimes perpetrated on it. The king and queen were often compelled to listen to ferocious epithets, and perceived on the walls of the courts and corridors inscriptions expressing a hatred which the old government had frequently merited, but which neither Louis XVI. nor his consort had done

any thing to provoke. They occasionally experienced some consolation, however, in detecting stealthy expressions of interest; and they continued those cheerless promenades on account of their children, to whom air and exercise were so essential. Whilst they thus mournfully paced the court of the Temple, they recognised at the windows of the adjoining houses many old retainers still attached to their fortunes, who came to contemplate the narrow space in which the dethroned monarch was confined. At two o'clock the promenade terminated, and dinner was served. After that repast, the king took some repose; whilst he slumbered, his wife, sister, and daughter, wrought in silence, and Cléry exercised in another room the young dauphin in the games of boyhood. They afterwards heard a work read aloud, supped, and finally retired to their respective apartments after a painful farewell, for they never parted without sorrow. The king continued to read for several hours alone: Montesquieu, Buffon, the historian Hume, the Imitation of Jesus Christ, and certain Latin and Italian classics, formed his habitual study. He had finished about two hundred and fifty volumes when he left the Temple.

Such was the life of this monarch during his sad captivity. Reduced to private life, all his virtues shone to advantage, and he evinced himself worthy the esteem of every dispassionate and honourable mind. His bitterest enemies, beholding him so meek, tranquil, and pure, could scarcely have avoided an involuntary emotion of respect, and would have surely pardoned the errors of the prince in deference to the virtues of the man.

The commune, to the last degree suspicious, used the most vexatious precautions. Municipal officers had their eyes incessantly on the persons of the royal family, and only when in bed did they consent to be separated from them by a closed door. During those hours they placed a bed before the doorway of each apartment, so as to block all egress, and there passed the night. Santerre, accompanied by his staff, made a daily visit of inspection throughout the tower, of which he rendered a regular account. The municipal officers on duty formed a sort of permanent council, which, sitting in a room of the tower, was appointed to issue orders and adjudicate upon all the requests of the prisoners. At first they had allowed pens, ink, and paper, in the jail, but those articles were shortly withdrawn, as also all sharp instruments, table and pen knives, razors, and scissors, and the most minute and offensive searches were instituted to discover whether any of such objects might not have been concealed. This procedure involved a serious affliction to the princesses, since they were thenceforth deprived of the resources of the needle, and were disabled from repairing their garments, already in a sufficiently dilapidated condition, not having been changed since their incarceration in the Temple. Almost every thing appertaining to the personal use of the royal family had been destroyed in the sack of the palace. The consort of the British ambassador* sent linen to the queen, and the commune, upon the king's application, caused the whole family to be supplied. The king and queen never thought it worth while to ask for new clothes or habiliments, although there is no doubt they would have been amply furnished had they expressed the requisite wish. In the concerns of the purse, a sum of 2000 francs [£80] was given them in the month of September for their personal expenses; but it had been determined to grant them no more money, as fears were entertained of the purposes to which they might apply it. A sum was deposited in the hands of the governor of the Temple, and on the petition of the captives, the different articles they needed were purchased for their use.

* [The British ambassador at that period was the Earl of Gower, the late Duke of Sutherland, and the lady referred to was the Countess of Sutherland.]

There is no need to exaggerate the sins of human frailty, and thus conclude that the keepers of the royal family, uniting an execrable vileness with the rage of fanaticism, subjected it at caprice to shameful privations, exulting at the idea of rendering the pangs of reminiscence more acute. Caution was the only motive for certain denials. Consequently, whilst the dread of plots and communications prevented more than one servant being allowed in the interior of the prison, a numerous establishment was employed in preparing the food of the prisoners. Thirteen caterers to the palate were planted in a range of kitchens not far from the tower. In the accounts of expenditure in the Temple, in which an exemplary propriety is observed, the prisoners are mentioned in terms of respect, their frugality is lauded, and Louis XVI. absolved from the vulgar opprobrium of indulging too freely in wine; these unimpeachable accounts carry the charges of the table to 28,745 francs [£1197] in two months. Whilst thirteen domestics crowded the kitchen, one only was permitted to enter the prison and assist Cléry in waiting at table. Yet, such is the ingenuity of captivity, it was by this solitary attendant, whose sensibility Cléry had succeeded in arousing, that intelligence from without sometimes reached the recesses of the Temple. Its wretched inmates had been constantly left in ignorance of the course of events. The representatives of the commune had contented themselves with communicating the journals which recorded the victories of the republic, accounts which extinguished any hopes that might still linger in their breasts.

Cléry had imagined an adroit expedient to gain tidings of the current events, which succeeded tolerably well. By means of an intercourse he contrived to maintain outside, he procured a public crier to be selected, bribed, and instructed to stand beneath the windows of the Temple, and under pretext of vending newspapers, to recapitulate the principal details with all the strength of his lungs. Cléry, who was apprised of the hour, placed himself near the adjacent embrasure, stored up all he heard, and in the evening, leaning over the king's bed, when engaged in drawing the curtains, related to him what he had learned. Such is a sketch of the situation in which the royal family of France, fallen from the pinnacle of greatness into the gloom of a dungeon, was placed, and of the manner in which the inventive zeal of a faithful servant contended with the harsh suspicions of its keepers.

The committees had at length adjusted their conclusions respecting the trial of Louis XVI. Dufriche-Valazé had presented a preliminary report upon the delinquencies imputed to the monarch, and on the documents relied upon as proofs. This report, too voluminous for perusal in the convention, had been printed by its orders, and distributed to each of its members. On the 7th November, the deputy Maille brought up, in the name of the committee of legislation, the report upon the important questions which the intended process started:—

Can Louis XVI. be tried?

What tribunal is competent to pronounce judgment?

Such were the two essential questions opened to discussion—questions well calculated to deeply agitate the minds of all men. The printing of the report was ordered forthwith. Translated into all languages and profusely disseminated, it soon penetrated into every corner of France and Europe. The debate thereon was adjourned to the 13th, contrary to the wish of Billaud-Varennes, who maintained that the affirmative of the first question should be voted by acclamation.

Now was to be waged the final contest between the ideas of the Constituent Assembly and of the convention, and this struggle was necessarily the more violent, since the life or death of a king hung upon its issue. The Constituent Assembly had been democratic in its tendencies, but monarchical in its feelings. Thus, whilst it constituted the whole state upon a republican

model, from a remnant of attachment and respect for Louis XVI. it retained royalty with the attributes deemed befitting it in a system of limited feudal monarchy. Hereditary succession, the executive power, participation in the enactment of laws, and above all, inviolability—such are the prerogatives recognised in the throne under modern monarchies, and such the first national assembly had left to the reigning house. The participation in legislative authority and the executive power are functions liable to variations in their extent, and do not constitute modern royalty so essentially as hereditary descent and inviolability. Of these two last attributes, the one secures the perpetual and natural transmission of royalty, the other fences it from all attack in the person of each heir; and both together render it something eternal, never in abeyance, and something invulnerable, amenable to no penalty. Obliged to act only by ministers, who are responsible for its deeds, royalty is accessible only through its agents, and thus a point is open by which it may be humbled without endangering its stability. Such I hold to be the feudal monarchy, as successively modified by time, and harmonised with the degree of liberty enjoyed by modern nations.

The Constituent Assembly, however, had been induced to place a restriction upon the royal inviolability. The flight to Varennes and the enterprises of the emigrants had convinced it that ministerial responsibility was not an adequate guarantee to the nation against all the possible faults of royalty. It had in consequence provided for an emergency, in which the monarch should put himself at the head of a hostile army to assail the constitution of the state, or should even not oppose, by *a formal act*, an enterprise of that nature undertaken in his name. Upon such a contingency it had declared the monarch, not indictable under the ordinary laws against felony, but dethroned; in fact, *judged to have abdicated royalty*. Such was the precise language of the law it had passed. The prayer to accept the constitution, addressed by it to the king, and the acceptance on his part, had rendered the contract irrevocable; and the assembly had accordingly incurred the solemn obligation to keep sacred the person of the monarch.

It was with this express engagement entangling them that the members of the convention found themselves, when called upon to decide the fate of Louis XVI. But these new representatives, assembled under the name of conventionalists, alleged themselves not more bound by the institutions of their predecessors than the latter had considered themselves shackled by the antiquated institutions of feudalism. So rapid an impulse had been given to opinion, that the laws of 1791 appeared as absurd to the generation of 1792, as those of the 13th century had seemed to that of 1789. The conventionalists, therefore, repudiated the sanction of a law they decried as absurd, in the same spirit as the states-general had declared against the existence of the three orders.

Consequently, upon the opening of the debate, on the 13th November, two opposite opinions were of course expressed; some maintained the inviolability, others absolutely rejected it. Ideas had undergone so remarkable a change, that no member of the convention ventured to vindicate the inviolability on its own merits; its advocates, on the contrary, defended it simply as a prior enactment, the benefit of which accrued to the monarch, and which could not be denied him without violating a national engagement. But even very few deputies supported it on the ground of an obligation incurred, and the Girondists condemned it in that light. They remained aloof from the debate, however, and sat as calm observers of the discussion between the scanty partisans of the inviolability and its numerous opponents.

"In the first place," contended the adversaries of the inviolability, "to render an engagement valid, it is necessary that he who incurs it should have the right so to do. Now, the national sovereignty is inalienable, and cannot be fettered by anticipation. The nation may, certainly, when covenanting the inviolability, have rendered the executive power inaccessible to the assaults of the legislative power, for such was a political precaution expedient in the system of the Constituent Assembly; but if it rendered the king inviolable with regard to all the constituted bodies, it could not render him inviolable with regard to itself, for it can never renounce the faculty of doing and willing all things at all times; this faculty constitutes its omnipotence, which is inalienable; therefore the nation was not competent to bind itself to Louis XVI., and it cannot be estopped by an engagement it had no power to contract.

Secondly, even supposing the engagement possible, it must be taken to be reciprocal. Now, it never was so on the part of Louis XVI. That constitution, upon which he is so anxious at present to lay stress, he never desired, but always protested against it, and never ceased to attempt its destruction, not only by internal conspiracies but by the swords of enemies. What right, then, has he to plead its guarantee?

But admitting for the instant that the engagement was possible and reciprocal, it must furthermore be consistent with reason in order to be valid. Thus, there is nothing repugnant to comprehension in an inviolability bearing on all the ostensible acts for which a minister answers in lieu of the king. For all acts of this nature a guarantee subsists in the ministerial responsibility, and the inviolability, not being impunity, ceases to be inconsistent with reason, in other words, ceases to be absurd. But for all the secret acts, such as hidden plots, communications with the enemy, treasons in short, what minister can there be to countersign or incur the responsibility? And yet such acts are to remain unpunished, although the gravest and most criminal of all! That corollary is inadmissible; it must be acknowledged that the king, inviolable for the acts of his administration, ceases to be so for secret and criminal acts endangering the public safety. So a deputy, inviolable in his legislative character, an ambassador in his diplomatic character, are not so as regards all the actions of their private lives. Inviolability, therefore, has limits; and there are points upon which the king ceases to be shielded from attack. Will it be alleged that dethronement is the penalty prescribed against perfidies for which a minister is not answerable? That is to say, the mere privation of his power is to be the sole chastisement inflicted on a monarch for having so outrageously abused it! The people whom he has betrayed and delivered over to the sword of the foreigner and to every conceivable calamity, are to content themselves with saying, Withdraw! Such justice is purely illusory; and no nation can be so wanting to itself as to leave unpunished crimes committed against its existence and its liberty.

A known penalty, it is true, one assigned in a prior law, is requisite to enable its application to a delinquency. But are there not the ordinary penalties against treason? Are not those penalties the same in all codes? Was not the monarch cognisant, from the morality of all times and all regions, that treason is a crime, and that by the laws of all nations such a crime is punished with the last severity? But besides a penal law, a tribunal is needed. Behold, then, the sovereign nation, uniting in itself all powers—the right to judge as well as the right to make laws, to declare peace or war; it is before you with its omnipotence, its universality, and there is no function above its capacity to perform. This nation is the convention which represents it, with a mandate to do all for its behoof—to avenge, to constitute, to save. The convention, then, is competent to try Louis XVI.; it has sufficient powers; it is the most independent, the most elevated tribunal an accused could select; and unless he desiderates partisans or paid emissaries of the enemy to obtain justice, the monarch

cannot desire other judges. True, he will have the same men for accusers and judges. But if, in the ordinary tribunals, exposed in an inferior sphere to individual and particular provocatives to error, the functions are separated and care is taken that an accusation should not be adjudicated by those who have instituted it, in the general council of the nation, which is placed paramount to all interests, all individual motives, the same precautions are no longer necessary. *The nation cannot err*, and the deputies who represent it partake its infallibility as well as its powers.

Thus, to sum up, the engagement contracted in 1791 being impotent to bind the national sovereignty, being without reciprocity, and, furthermore, involving an absurd conclusion, that treason may be committed with impunity, is altogether null, and Louis XVI. may be brought to trial. With regard to the punishment, it has been known from all time, has been prescribed in all laws. As to the tribunal, it rests in the convention, invested with all legislative, executive, and judicial powers."

These orators, therefore, demanded, in conformity with the report of the committee, "that Louis XVI. should be tried; that the trial should take place before the National Convention; that the articles of impeachment should be framed by a select committee; that he should appear in person to plead thereto; that counsel should be allowed him in his defence; and that immediately after being heard, the convention should pronounce its judgment, each member *vivâ voce*."

The advocates of the inviolability left none of these reasons unanswered, and refuted the whole system of their opponents.

"It is argued," said they, "that the nation cannot alienate its sovereignty, or abrogate its right to punish a delinquency perpetrated against itself; that the inviolability proclaimed in 1791 bound merely the legislative body, but not the nation in its collective capacity. In the first place, if it be correct that the national sovereignty cannot be alienated or restricted in the right to make new laws, it is equally correct that the past at least is beyond its control; for instance, it is incapable of obliterating what has been—it cannot take from the laws it had previously promulgated the operation they have already had, or annul indemnities they have pronounced. It is perfectly competent to declare that, for the future, monarchs shall cease to be inviolable; but it cannot prevent them being so retrospectively, inasmuch as it has so declared them; it is, in short, disabled from violating engagements contracted with third parties, in respect to whom it became a simple party when covenanting with them. Thus, therefore, a case is established in which the national sovereignty could bind itself for a period; it intended to do so in the amplest manner, not only for the legislative body, which it interdicted from all judicial action against the king, but for itself, because the political object of the inviolability would have been frustrated, had royalty not been placed paramount to all attack whatsoever, as well on the part of the nation as of the constituted authorities.

With regard to the want of reciprocity in the operation of the engagement, the difficulty has been forestalled. The possibility of a failure in fidelity to the engagement, was foreseen by the engagement itself. All the modes in which such failure could occur are comprehended in one, the most grave conceivable, war against the nation, and are with it punished by dethronement, that is to say, by the dissolution of the contract existing between the nation and the king. The want of reciprocity, therefore, is not a reason sufficient to relieve the nation from its pledge of inviolability.

The engagement, then, was substantial and absolute, equally obligatory on the nation as on the legislative body; the lack of reciprocity was foreknown, and cannot be adduced in allegation of a *nudum pactum;* and we finally proceed to show that, under the monarchical system, such a contract was not inconsistent with reason, and cannot be assailed on the ground of absurdity. This inviolability, in fact, left no crime unpunished, whatever may be alleged to the contrary. The ministerial responsibility extended to every act, because a king can no more conspire than govern without agents; and thus public justice had always its resource. And those secret crimes, distinct from the ostensible delinquencies of administration, were foreseen and punished with forfeiture; for every fault on the part of the king was atoned for, according to that legislation, by the cessation of his functions. To this it is opposed, that forfeiture is not a penalty, as it amounts simply to the privation of a means abused by the monarch. But, under a system in which the royal person was intended to be unassailable, the severity of the punishment was not the important consideration; the essential point was its political result; and this result was effectually obtained by the deprivation of power. Besides, is the loss of the first throne in the universe really no punishment? Can a man, without deep affliction, forfeit a diadem which from infancy has encircled his brow, with which the years of his life have been passed, and a homage of twenty years commanded? To minds nurtured in supreme rank, is not such a punishment equivalent to death? But, even were the penalty too mild, it is based upon an express stipulation; and an insufficiency of punishment cannot be a cause of nullity in a law. It is a maxim in criminal legislation, that all mistakes in the law should redound to the advantage of the accused, upon the equitable principle that the errors of the strong should not be visited upon the weak and powerless. Thus, therefore, the engagement, already demonstrated to be valid and absolute, involves no absurdity; it stipulates no impunity, nor is treason left unpunished. Consequently, there is no need to recur either to natural right or to the nation, inasmuch as deposition is already prescribed by an existing law. This penalty the king has undergone, without any tribunal pronouncing it, and after the only possible procedure, that of a national insurrection. Dethroned at this moment, in an utter impossibility of acting, France may do nothing more against him than pursue precautionary measures for his safe keeping. Let her banish him from her territory for her own security; let her detain him, if she please, until the peace; or let her leave him to become a private citizen in the heart of the land: this is all she is justified in doing, all she can do. It is therefore quite unnecessary to constitute a tribunal, or to discuss the competency of the convention: on the 10th August all was finished for Louis XVI.; on the 10th August he ceased to be a king; on the 10th August he was put upon his trial, judged, deposed, and all was consummated between him and the nation."

Such was the answer of the partisans of the inviolability to their adversaries. The national sovereignty being taken as it was then interpreted, their rejoinders must be deemed victorious, and all the reasonings of the committee of legislation mere laboured sophisms, false and vapid.

Our immediate task has been to condense the arguments used on the two sides of the question in regular debate. But another system, a distinct opinion, sprung from the exaltation of minds and passions. At the Jacobin Club, and in the ranks of the Mountain, it had been already asked whether any discussion, any trial, any forms in short, were necessary to get rid of the man known as a tyrant, taken with arms in his hands, and shedding the blood of the nation. This opinion had a formidable organ in the young Saint-Just, an austere and passionless fanatic, who, at the age of twenty, meditated a perfectly ideal society, in which should reign absolute equality, simplicity, austerity, and indomitable energy. Long before the 10th August he dwelt, in the depths of his gloomy mind, upon

this hypernatural society, and had arrived through fanaticism at that extreme point of human ideas which Robespierre had reached through intensity of hate alone. New amidst the revolution, into which he had scarcely entered, as yet a stranger to all the discords, wrongs, and crimes of parties, siding with the faction of the Mountain from the violence of his opinions, delighting the Jacobins by his boldness of spirit, surprising the convention by his talents, he had not yet, however, gained any popular fame. His ideas, though always favourably heard, but not always distinctly comprehended, did not produce all their effect until they had become, by the plagiarisms of Robespierre, more common, clear, and declamatory.

He spoke after Morisson, the most zealous amongst the defenders of the inviolability, and, indulging in no personalities against his opponents, for he was not old enough on the scene to have contracted personal enmities, the whole force of his indignation was at first directed against the petty ideas of the assembly, and the casuistry of the debate. "What!" said he, "you, the committee and its adversaries, laboriously seek for forms whereby to try the late king—tormenting yourselves to make of him a citizen, to raise him to that quality, so that you may find laws applicable to him! And I, on the contrary, say that the king is not a citizen; that he ought to be judged as an enemy; that we have not so much to try as to combat him; and that, standing for nothing in the contract which unites the French, the forms of the procedure are not to be sought in the civil law, but *in the law of nations*."

Thus, therefore, Saint-Just repudiated the process as involving a question of justice, but saw in it simply a question of martial law.

"To try a king as a citizen!" he proceeded. "Such a phrase will astonish posterity! To try, is to apply the law; law is an emanation of justice: what relation of justice, I ask, can exist between humanity and kings?

Simply to reign is an offence—an usurpation which nothing can justify, which a nation is culpable to endure, and against which every man has an individual right. It is impossible to reign innocently; the absurdity of the thing is too great. The usurpation ought to be treated as kings themselves treat that of their pretended authority. Is not the memory of Cromwell arraigned for having usurped the authority of Charles I.? And yet, the one was no more an usurper than the other; for, when a nation is base enough to let tyrants domineer over it, the domination is the right of him who can seize it, and is not one whit more sacred or legitimate in the hands of one than in those of another."

Passing to the topic of forms, Saint-Just perceived in the consideration only fresh errors and inconsistencies. Forms of process were, he alleged, but so much hypocrisy; it was not the manner of arraignment which had justified all the recorded acts of vengeance wreaked by nations on kings, it was the right of force against force.

"It will be one day a matter of astonishment," he exclaimed, "that in the eighteenth century ideas were more backward than in the time of Cæsar: then, the tyrant was immolated in full senate, without other formality than the points of twenty-three daggers, and without other law than the liberty of Rome. And now, you enter with respect on the indictment of a man, the assassin of a people, caught in flagrant crime!"

Viewing the question under another aspect, without reference to Louis XVI., Saint-Just animadverted upon the tendency to refinement and subtlety, so detrimental, as he contended, in affairs of great moment. The life of Louis XVI. was of no consequence; the spirit to be evinced by his judges was what disquieted him; the estimate they should present of themselves was what mainly concerned him. "The men who are about to judge Louis XVI. have a republic to found, and those who attach any importance to the just chastisement of a king, will never found a republic. Since the report, a certain doubt has manifested itself. Each considers the trial of the king under his own peculiar views: some seem to fear the future consequences of their courage; others have not renounced hopes of monarchy; these dread an example of virtue which would tighten the bonds of union.

We all judge each other with severity, I will even say with fury; we think only of modifying the energy of the people and of liberty, whilst the common enemy is scarcely noticed, and whilst all, either paralysed by weakness or immersed in crime, stand in mutual survey before striking the first blow!

Citizens, if the Roman people, after six hundred years of virtue and of hatred to kings, if Great Britain, after the death of Cromwell, saw kings restored in spite of their energy, what fears may not oppress good citizens amongst us, the true friends of liberty, when they behold the axe tremble in our hands, and a nation, even in the first moment of its freedom, respect the memory of its fetters? What republic will you establish amidst our individual contests and our common failings? I will always uphold the doctrine, that the spirit in which you judge the king will be the same as that in which you will establish the republic. The measure of your philosophy in that judgment will be likewise the measure of freedom in the constitution!"

There were men, however, who, less fanaticised than Saint-Just, endeavoured to place the question upon juster grounds, and lead the assembly to consider it under a more favourable and equitable point of view. "Reflect," said Rouzet,* "upon the veritable situation of the king in the constitution of 1791. He was placed before the national representation in a position of constrained rivalry. Was it not natural he should seek to recover as much as possible of the power he had lost? Was it not yourselves who had opened the lists, and called him to the combat with the legislative power? Well, in these lists he has been conquered; he is now a captive, disarmed, prostrate at the feet of twenty-five millions of men, and these twenty-five millions would have the useless baseness to immolate the vanquished! But, furthermore," added Rouzet, "that perpetual craving for dominion, a lust which actuates all hearts, Louis XVI. has stifled in his bosom more than any sovereign in the world. Did he not make in 1789 a voluntary sacrifice of part of his authority? Did he not renounce many of the prerogatives his predecessors scrupled not to exercise? Did he not abolish servitude in his domains? Did he not call to his council philosophic ministers, and even empirics whom the public voice pointed out? Did he not convoke the states-general, and restore to the third-estate a portion of its rights?"

Faure, a deputy from the Lower-Seine, evinced even greater boldness. Reverting to the conduct of Louis XVI., he ventured to vindicate the reminiscence. "The wrath of the people," said he, "might have been stimulated against Titus as well as against Nero, for crimes might have been found against him, were they those only committed before Jerusalem. But where are those you impute to Louis XVI.? I have listened with the greatest attention to the documents read against him; I have detected in them simply the weakness of a man who yields to all the hopes suggested to him of recovering his former authority; and I maintain that all the monarchs who have died peaceably in their beds were more culpable than he. The good Louis XII., even, by sacrificing 50,000 Frenchmen in Italy, in his private quarrel, was infinitely more criminal! A civil list, a veto, the choice of his ministers, women, kinsmen, courtiers, such the seductions of Capet!—and what seductions! I invoke Aristides and Epictetus; let them say whether their firmness could have withstood such assaults. It is upon the heart of frail mortals I rest my estimate of principles

* Sitting of the 15th November.

or errors. Arise, then, to the full grandeur of the national sovereignty; reflect with what magnanimity such a power should bear itself. Call Louis XVI. not as a criminal, but as a Frenchman, before you, and say to him, Those who once raised thee on their bucklers and saluted thee as king, now depose thee; thou promised to be their father, and thou wert not. Expiate, by thy virtues as a citizen, the conduct thou hast pursued as a king!"

In the extraordinary excitement of the epoch, each was led to view the question under different phases. Fauchet, the constitutional priest who had gained celebrity in 1789 by using in the pulpit the language of the revolution, demanded whether society had a right to inflict the penalty of death. "Has society the right," said he, "to take from a man the life it has not given? Doubtless it ought to screen itself from danger, but is it true it can only do so by the death of the offender? And if it can by other means, is it not bound to employ them? In this case, more than in any other, the maxim is applicable. You allege it is for the public interest, for the consolidation of the new-born republic, that you are to immolate Louis XVI.! But will all his family perish by the same blow that annihilates him? According to the system of hereditary succession, does not one king immediately succeed another? Are you freed, by the death of Louis XVI., from the rights an entire family deems itself to hold from a possession of several centuries? The destruction of one alone is manifestly fruitless. On the contrary, let the actual head who closes all access to the others remain; suffer him to exist with the hatred wherewith he is regarded by all aristocrats for his vacillations and his concessions; suffer him to languish with his reputation for imbecility, with the ignominy of his defeat, and you will have less to apprehend from him than from any other. Allow this deposed monarch to wander within the vast circuit of your republic, shorn of that splendour wont to encompass him; show how small a thing is a king when reduced to himself; testify a profound disdain for the remembrance of what he was, and that remembrance will cease to have any vigour; you will thereby give a great example to mankind, and secure stability and integrity to the republic much more effectually than by shedding blood which does not belong to you. As to the son of Louis XVI., if he can wax into a man, we will make a citizen of him, like young Egalité. He will fight for the republic, and we need never fear that a single soldier of liberty will at any time aid him in becoming a traitor to the country. Let us thus demonstrate to all nations that we dread nothing; let us induce them to imitate us, so that all in concert may form an European congress, depose their sovereigns, send those emasculated beings to drag out their obscure lives amidst the flourishing republics; and even grant them small pensions, for such creatures are so devoid of faculties, that want itself would not teach them to earn their bread. Present, then, this bright example of the abolition of a barbarous punishment. Suppress the iniquitous usage of shedding blood; and above all, cure the people of that unwholesome longing they have to spill it. Strive to assuage in them that thirst which perverse men would whet, to use it hereafter in overthrowing the republic. Recollect that certain barbarians still ask from you one hundred and fifty thousand heads, and that after conceding the king's, you will be unable to refuse them any. Prevent crimes which will long agitate the heart of the republic, dishonour liberty, slacken its progress, and delay the era of the world's happiness."

This debate continued from the 13th till the 30th November, and excited an universal agitation. Those whom the new order of things had not swept into its vortex, and who preserved some recollection of 1789, of the goodness of the monarch, and of the love that was borne him, could not comprehend that this same king, suddenly transformed into a tyrant, should be consigned to a scaffold. Whilst they admitted his correspondence with foreigners, they imputed that fault to his weakness, to those around him, or to the invincible love of hereditary power; and the supposition of an ignominious punishment shocked their feelings. They dared not, however, openly undertake the defence of Louis XVI. The recent peril to which the country had been exposed by the Prussian invasion, and the opinion generally entertained that the court was the secret instigator of that inroad on the French territory, had aroused an exasperation which fell heavily on the unfortunate monarch, and the force of which the boldest shrunk from encountering. They contented themselves with resisting in a general manner those who clamoured for acts of vengeance; they represented them as the fomentors of disturbances, as *Septembrisers*, who wished to cover France with blood and devastation. Without defending Louis XVI. by name, they advocated moderation towards fallen enemies. They exhorted all to beware of a hypocritical energy, which, pretending to defend the republic by judicial murders, sought only to enslave it by terror, or compromise it with all Europe.

The Girondists had not yet taken part in the discussion. It was surmised, ere their opinion was known, and the Mountain, in order to have grounds for accusing them, confidently asserted, that they desired to save Louis XVI. They were not decided, however, on the subject. On the one hand, rejecting the inviolability, and regarding Louis XVI. as an accomplice of the foreign invasion, and on the other, moved at the contemplation of a dismal reverse, and inclined on all occasions to oppose the violence of their adversaries, they knew not what course to follow, and preserved a doubtful and threatening silence.

Another subject agitated the public mind at this moment, and occasioned as much ferment as the other. We refer to the supplies of food, which had been a plentiful source of discord at all periods of the revolution.

We have already seen how many anxious and arduous moments this cause had occasioned Bailly and Necker during the troubled era of 1789. The same difficulties presented themselves in a still more aggravated shape at the end of 1792, accompanied by movements of the most formidable character. The suspension of trade in all commodities not of the first necessity, may seriously affect industry and ultimately press upon the labouring classes; but when grain, the indispensable aliment, fails, commotions and disorders immediately ensue. Thus, the old police had ranked the care of supplies in the number of its duties, as one of the matters most affecting the public tranquillity.

The crops were not deficient in 1792, but the harvest had been retarded by ungenial weather, and the thrashing of the corn impeded by a lack of hands. But the chief cause of the scarcity existed elsewhere. In 1792, as in 1789, the want of security, the dread of pillage on the highways, and vexations in the markets, prevented the farmers from bringing forward their stocks. A clamour was forthwith raised against forestalling. Indignation was chiefly expressed against the rich farmers, who were styled aristocrats, and whose extensive farms, it was contended, ought to be divided. The greater the exasperation aroused against them, the less they were disposed to appear in the markets, and the more the scarcity increased. The assignats had likewise contributed to produce this result. Many farmers, who sold merely to accumulate, were careless about hoarding a variable paper currency, and preferred keeping their corn. Furthermore, as wheat became daily more scarce and assignats more plentiful, the disproportion between the symbol and the reality kept a corresponding pace, and the enhancement of price grew more and more sensible. By an accident usual in all famines, foresight being awakened by alarm, every one was eager to get into

stock; private families, the municipalities, the government, made extensive purchases, and consequently rendered produce more scarce and dear. At Paris especially, the municipality committed a very grave and antiquated blunder; it bought corn in the neighbouring departments and sold it under value, with the twofold view of relieving the people and augmenting its popularity. It thence resulted that the merchants, overborne by this rivalry, withdrew from the market, and the rural population, attracted by the low price, came to Paris and absorbed a part of the supplies collected at heavy cost by the police. These imprudent measures, suggested by erroneous ideas of economy and an excessive lust of popularity, destroyed commerce, so essentially necessary to Paris, where a greater quantity of grain ought always to be amassed than at any other point. The causes of the scarcity were, therefore, multifarious; the alarm of the farmers keeping them aloof from the markets, the enhancement of price occasioned by the assignats, the eagerness to lay in stores, and, finally, the intervention of the Parisian municipality disarranging trade by its overpowering competition.

Under circumstances of such difficulty, the part which the two orders of men who then divided the sovereignty of France would take is easy of divination. The violent spirits who had hitherto known but one means of repelling opposition, the destruction of their opponents—who, to stifle conspiracies, had massacred all those they suspected to be against them—to such minds only one expedient, force, still force, presented itself to terminate the scarcity. They maintained that the farmers must be goaded from their sluggishness, and compelled to appear in the markets; that when there they should be constrained to sell their produce at a price fixed by the communes; that the corn should not be permitted to be removed from the place of sale or be accumulated in the granaries of those they stigmatised as engrossers. They therefore demanded the forced presence of the dealers in the markets, the limitation of price or the *maximum*, the prohibition of all transit—in a word, the obedience of trade to their desires, not from the ordinary attraction of profit, but from the fear of penalties and death.

The men of moderate principles, on the contrary, were desirous that trade should be left to resume its accustomed channels, by dissipating the alarm of the farmers, leaving them free to fix their prices, holding out to them the inducement of a voluntary, safe, and advantageous exchange, and permitting transit from one department into another, so that the non-producing districts might be likewise furnished with supplies. They consequently repudiated a maximum price, as well as prohibitions of every description, and joined the economists in advocating an entirely free trade in corn throughout the whole extent of France. Adopting the opinion of Barbaroux, who was well acquainted with the subject, they demanded that foreign exportation should be subjected to a duty, not fixed, but rising in proportion to the enhancement of the article, which expedient would counteract absorption by other countries when the home demand was urgent. They were prepared to admit administrative interference only to the extent of establishing certain markets in extraordinary cases. Severity they upheld simply against the riotous who assaulted the farmers on the roads or in the market-places; and they utterly rejected the use of punishments as a stimulant to trade, alleging with truth that terror may be a means of repression, but can never be a means of action: it paralyses and not animates men.

When a party gains supremacy in a state, forthwith assuming the government, it quickly imbibes the ideas and contracts the prejudices common to all governments; the machine must at every sacrifice be kept in motion, and force employed as the universal medium. It was in conformity with this invariable rule that the ardent friends of liberty had the predilection of all governments for prohibitive systems, whilst they encountered as adversaries those who, with greater moderation, desired liberty not only in the end but also in the means, and contended for clemency to enemies, deliberation in the forms of justice, and absolute freedom of trade.

The Girondists, therefore, upheld all the theories started by speculative minds, in reprobation of administrative tyranny; but these new economists, instead of having to battle as formerly with a government ashamed to enter the lists and always condemned by public opinion, clashed with exuberant minds fanaticised by the idea of the public safety, and who conscientiously believed that force employed in so sacred an end was but the energy of superior virtue.

This discussion brought in its train an additional topic of recrimination. Roland continually exclaimed against the commune for perverting funds in purchases of grain, and making it scarce in Paris, by lowering prices through a vain ambition of popularity. The Mountaineers retorted upon Roland by accusing him of misappropriating considerable sums, apportioned to his ministry, in the acquisition of corn, so as to render himself, in truth, the chief of engrossers, and the dictator of France, by buying up its food.

Whilst the assembly was engaged in acrimonious disputes upon this subject, insurrections broke out in certain departments, and particularly in that of Eure-and-Loir. The rural population, maddened by the want of bread and the instigations of the priests, charged the convention with being the sole cause of all their calamities; and whilst they complained that it hesitated to fix a maximum price on corn, they likewise accused it of contemplating the destruction of religion. Cambon was the cause of this last reproach. Zealous for retrenchments not affecting the operations of war, he had announced that the expenses of public worship ought to be suppressed, and that those who *wanted mass should defray its cost.* Consequently the insurgents failed not to allege that religion was ruined, and, by a singular contradiction, they upbraided the convention on the one hand for moderation in matters of internal commerce, and on the other for violence with regard to religious worship. Two members, commissioned by the assembly, found in the environs of Courville an assemblage of several thousand peasants, armed with pitchforks and fowling-pieces; and they were compelled, under the threat of assassination, to sign the maximum upon corn. The convention disavowed them, declaring they ought rather to have died, and abolished the limitation they had signed. An armed force was immediately dispatched to disperse the insurrectionists. Thus commenced the troubles of the west, originating in distress and attachment to rites.

In order to allay discontent amongst the western population, the assembly, on the motion of Danton, passed a declaration that it had no intention of abrogating religion; but it persisted in refusing the *maximum.* Thus, still firm amidst the tempest, and adhering to liberality of sentiment, the conventional majority declared for freedom of trade, in opposition to the prohibitive system. If we now cast a retrospective glance upon the various matters occurring in the armies, in the administrations, in the trial of Louis XVI., we shall assuredly behold a singular and terrible spectacle. Men of ardent temperaments have worked themselves into frenzy, and insist upon an entire recomposition of the armies and the administrations, in order to expel therefrom the lukewarm and the suspected; they demand the employment of force against trade, in order to prevent it stagnating; and they advocate a system of sanguinary vengeance in order to scare every foe. Men of moderate dispositions, on the contrary, are apprehensive of disorganising the armies by remodelling them, of annihilating commerce by using constraint, and of infuriating to revolt by diffusing alarm; but their opponents wax

yet more wroth at this very timidity, and more vehement in their determination to remodel, to coerce, to avenge. Such was the spectacle presented at this moment by the left against the right side of the convention.

The sitting of the 30th had been rendered extremely violent by the complaints of Roland against the municipality for its conduct respecting corn, and by the report of the commissioners sent into the department of Eure-and-Loir. All is recalled at once when we begin to count up our woes. So, on the one hand, the massacres and the incendiary placards were held up to execration; on the other, the vacillations, the remains of royalism, and the delays opposed to the national vengeance, were vehemently retorted. Marat had spoken, and excited a general murmur. Robespierre ascended the tribune amidst the noise, and came forward to propose, as he said, a more effectual means than any that had been propounded to re-establish the public tranquillity, a means which would restore a spirit of impartiality and concord to the assembly, confound the enemies of the National Convention, impose silence on all libellists, on all the authors of placards, and belie their calumnies. "What is it?" was asked; "what is this means?" Robespierre resumed: "It consists in condemning to-morrow the tyrant of the French to the expiation of his crimes, and thus destroying the rallying point for all conspirators. The following day you will take measures respecting provisions, and the day after you will fix the bases of a free constitution."

This emphatic and astute mode of assigning the means of safety, and making them consist in a measure combated by the right side, aroused the Girondists, and obliged them to enter on the important question of the trial. "You speak of the king," said Buzot: "the evil of the disorders is chargeable upon those who are labouring to fill his place. When the proper time arrives for deciding on his fate, I shall be prepared to do so with the severity he has merited; but we have not that question before us at the present moment; the subject of inquiry is concerning the troubles, and I declare they spring from anarchy, and anarchy in its turn results from the non-execution of the laws. This non-execution will continue so long as the convention shall delay adopting steps to ensure order." Legendre immediately followed Buzot, and besought his colleagues to eschew personal feuds, and give attention solely to the public weal and to the seditions, which, having no object but that of saving the king, would cease with his life. He therefore moved that the assembly order the opinions digested on the trial to be laid on the table, printed, and distributed to all the members; and that the decision whether Louis XVI. ought to be tried be subsequently pronounced, without wasting time in listening to long harangues. Jean Bon-Saint-André contended that no necessity existed for entering upon these preliminary points, and that the only questions for instant solution were the condemnation and the form of the execution. The convention eventually passed the motion of Legendre, and decreed that all the speeches should be printed. The debate was then adjourned to the 3d December.

On the 3d, opinions were almost universally expressed in favour of the arraignment, the immediate framing of the articles of impeachment, and the settlement of the forms according to which the trial should proceed. Robespierre claimed to be heard; and although it had been decided that all discourses should be printed and not read, he obtained permission to address the assembly, because he desired to speak, not upon the trial, but against the trial, and for a condemnation without forms of process.

He argued that to institute a trial was to commence a deliberation; that to permit deliberation was to sanction doubts, and even a solution favourable to the accused. But to view the criminality of Louis XVI. as problematical, was to condemn the Parisians, the federalists, all the patriots, in short, who achieved the revolution of the 10th August; to absolve Louis XVI., the aristocrats, the foreign powers and their manifestos —in a word, to declare royalty innocent and the republic guilty.

"See," continued Robespierre, "what audacity the enemies of liberty have in consequence acquired since you have started these doubts! In the month of August last, the partisans of the king concealed themselves. Whoever had dared undertake his vindication would have been punished as a traitor. Now, at the present moment, they raise an audacious front with impunity; insolent publications inundate Paris and the departments; armed men, introduced within these walls, unknown to you and against the laws, have made this city resound with seditious cries and demands for the impunity of Louis XVI.! It only remains for you to throw open this building to those who are already emulous of the honour of defending him. But what?—why, even now, Louis divides the mandatories of the people! They speak for and against him! Who could have suspected, two months ago, that the question would have here arisen, whether he be inviolable? But, since citizen Pétion has presented, as a matter of serious debate, and as a subject entitled to mature and separate consideration, the question whether the king can be tried, the doctrines of the Constituent Assembly have re-appeared here. How criminal! how shameful! The tribune of the French people has rung with panegyrics on Louis XVI.! We have heard the virtues and the benefits of the tyrant vaunted! Whilst we have had the greatest difficulty in saving the purest citizens from the injustice of a precipitate decision, the cause of the tyrant alone is so sacred that it cannot be too tediously and too deliberately discussed! If we believe his apologists, the trial will last several months—will stretch into the succeeding spring, when the despots are to make upon us a general attack. What a career opened to conspirators! What encouragement given to intrigue and aristocracy!

Just Heaven! the ferocious hordes of despotism are making ready once more to tear the heart of our country in the name of Louis XVI.! Louis still fights against us from the recesses of his prison, and you doubt whether he be guilty—whether it be allowable to treat him as an enemy! You ask what laws condemn him! You adduce the constitution in his behalf! Why, the constitution prohibited you from doing what you have done: if he could be punished only by dethronement, you were incompetent to pronounce it without putting him on his trial; you had no right to detain him in prison; he, on the contrary, has a right to claim damages and costs, and his enlargement: the constitution condemns you; hasten to the feet of Louis and invoke his clemency!"

These declamatory and taunting apostrophes, although involving no material point not already urged by Saint-Just, produced, nevertheless, a considerable sensation in the assembly, and it determined to pass a definitive resolution before adjourning. Robespierre had insisted that Louis XVI. should be forthwith judged; but several members, with Pétion in the number, persisted in recommending that, before deciding on the forms to be observed, the convention should, at all events, pronounce the arraignment; for that, said they, was an indispensable preliminary, with whatever dispatch it might be wished to carry on the process. Robespierre rose to speak again, and seemed as it were to insist upon being heard; but his presumptuous demeanour irritated the majority, and the tribune was interdicted him.

The assembly at length passed the following resolution:—"The National Convention declares that Louis XVI. shall be tried by it."*

The next day the forms of the trial were brought

* 3d December.

under discussion. Buzot, in consequence of the repeated taunts thrown out concerning royalism, claimed to be heard upon a question of order; and, as he alleged, with the view of removing all suspicions, he proposed the penalty of death against any who should advocate the re-establishment of royalty in France. This was one of the modes which parties often adopted to prove that they were incapable of the designs imputed to them. Considerable applause greeted the useless motion; but the Mountaineers, who, according to their system, ought to have opposed no obstacle to its adoption, assailed it from spleen, and Bazire rose to urge its rejection. He was met with shouts of "Divide! divide!" Philipeaux, supporting Bazire, moved that the convention attend only to the matters touching Louis XVI., and hold a permanent sitting until his trial should be concluded. The opposers of Buzot's proposition were then asked what motives induced them to repudiate it, since none could possibly regret royalty. Lejeune replied that it was recalling to debate what had been decided by the abolition of royalty. "But," said Rewbel, "the question mooted is the addition of a penal enactment to that abolition; it is therefore far from bringing under debate any thing already decreed." Merlin, with less tact than his associates, introduced an amendment, to except the case of a proposition to re-establish royalty, emanating in the primary assemblies, from the application of the penalty of death. Murmurs arose from all sides against this reservation. "Now the secret's out!" exclaimed several members. "They wish a king, but one taken from the primary assemblies—from those bodies whence Marat, Robespierre, and Danton have sprung." Merlin sought to justify himself by asserting that he intended to pay due homage to the sovereignty of the people. His voice was drowned in indignant reproaches of royalism, and a motion was made that he should be called to order. Thereupon Guadet, with a want of candour sometimes exhibited by highly honourable men in the wrath and passion of discussion, maintained that freedom of opinion ought to be respected, to which, in the present case, the discovery of an important secret was owing, that furnished the clue to a desperate machination. "The assembly," said he, "can have no reason to regret having heard this amendment, which demonstrates to it that a new despotism is intended to succeed the one destroyed; and it ought to thank Merlin rather than call him to order." A burst of vociferations interrupted Guadet's progress. Bazire, Merlin, and Robespierre, denounced the calumnious implication; and there is no doubt the charge of purposing to substitute a plebeian king for the dethroned monarch was equally absurd with that of federalism urged against the Girondists. The assembly eventually decreed the penalty of death against whomsoever should attempt the re-establishment of royalty in France, under any denomination whatever.

The debate reverted to the forms of the trial and the proposition of a permanent sitting. Robespierre again insisted that the judgment should be instantly pronounced. Pétion, still supported by the majority, procured a resolution that the sitting should not be permanent, nor the judgment immediate, but that the assembly would devote its attention to the subject, excluding all others, daily, from eleven in the forenoon till s x in the evening.

The following days were consumed in reading the documents found in the house of Laporte, and others more recently discovered at the palace, in a secret recess, constructed by the king's directions in the thickness of a wall. The door of this closet was of iron, whence it became known under the name of the *iron chest*. The workman employed in its formation denounced it to Roland, who, in his eagerness to ascertain the fact, had the imprudence to proceed thither upon the spur of the moment, without summoning witnesses from the ranks of the assembly to accompany him, which gave occasion to his enemies to allege that he had withheld a portion of the papers. Roland found in it all the documents relative to the communications of the court with the emigrants and divers members of the assemblies. The negotiations of Mirabeau thereby came to light, and the memory of the great orator was on the point of being proscribed, when Manuel, his ardent admirer, prevailed on the convention to remit the documents to the committee of public instruction, that they might undergo a more ample examination.* It afterwards nominated a committee to frame the articles of impeachment against Louis XVI. with reference to this documentary evidence. When those articles were digested, they were to be submitted to the assembly for approval. Louis XVI. was thereafter to appear in person at the bar of the convention, and be interrogated by the president upon each article of the arraignment. After his examination, two days were to be granted him for the preparation of his defence, and the day succeeding its adducement, judgment was to be pronounced by each member individually. The executive power was directed to take all necessary measures for ensuring public tranquillity during the removal of the king to the assembly. These arrangements were decreed on the 9th December.

The articles of impeachment were laid before the assembly on the 10th, and the appearance of Louis XVI. was ordered for the day subsequent.

The unhappy monarch was therefore shortly to appear in presence of the National Convention, and undergo an interrogatory upon all the acts of his reign. Information of the intended trial, and of the order for appearance, had reached Cléry by the secret means of correspondence he had arranged outside the Temple, and he communicated it to the afflicted family with palpitating anguish. Not daring to impart it to the king himself, he conveyed his dismal tidings to the ear of the Princess Elizabeth, and apprised her, furthermore, that the commune had determined to separate Louis XVI. from his family during the trial. He settled with the princess a method of corresponding during this separation, which consisted in the transmission of a kerchief by Cléry, who was to remain with the king, whereby the princesses would be informed that their august relative was ill. Such was all the intelligence these unfortunate prisoners pretended to communicate to each other! The king was advertised by his sister of his approaching interrogatory, and of the separation they were doomed to suffer during his trial. He received the tidings with perfect resignation, and prepared to endure the trying scene with firmness.

The commune had ordered that, on the 11th at dawn, all the administrative bodies should be assembled, all the sections under arms, the guard at all the public places, finance-offices, storehouses, &c., augmented by two hundred men at each post, numerous reserves stationed on various points, with a strong artillery, and a chosen escort prepared to accompany the king's carriage.

On the morning of the 11th, the beating of drums through Paris announced the sad and novel event. Companies of troops surrounded the Temple, and the clang of arms and horses penetrated even to the prisoners, who feigned ignorance of the cause of such agitation. At nine o'clock, the family, according to usage, repaired to the king's apartment for the purpose of breakfasting. The municipal officers, more watchful than ever, prevented, by their presence, any interchange of feeling. They shortly separated the captives. The king in vain solicited that his son might be left with him for a few seconds longer. Regardless of his entreaties, the boy was torn from him,

* These papers were revealed in the sitting of the 5th December The convention was moved to immediately break the bust of Mirabeau, and order the removal of his ashes from the Pantheon, but it contented itself that day with veiling his bust.

and he remained alone about two hours. The Mayor of Paris and the procurator of the commune then arrived, and communicated to him the decree of the convention, which summoned him to its bar under the name of Louis Capet. "Capet," observed the prince, "was the name of one of my ancestors, but is not mine." He thereupon arose, and proceeded to the mayor's carriage which awaited him. Six hundred chosen men surrounded the coach. It was preceded by three pieces of cannon, and followed by as many more. A numerous body of cavalry formed the advanced and the rear guard. An immense crowd contemplated the mournful procession in silence, and with the same apathy it had so often displayed when viewing the rigorous examples of the old government. A few cries were raised, but very partially. The king heard them without emotion, and conversed placidly upon the objects that met his eye on the way. When the carriage reached the Feuillants', he was conducted to a room, until the pleasure of the assembly was declared.

In the mean time, various motions were made relative to the manner of receiving Louis XVI. It was proposed that no petition should be presented, no deputy allowed to speak, and no sign of sympathy or antipathy manifested towards the king. "We ought to scare him with the silence of the tomb," said Legendre. A general murmur condemned the unfeeling phrase. Défermont moved that a seat be placed for the accused. The proposition was deemed too essential to be put to the vote, and a seat was placed at the bar. Through a ridiculous vanity, Manuel suggested that the question standing on the order of the day should be discussed, so as to avoid appearing simply occupied with the king; "even," he added, "should we make him wait at the door." The assembly accordingly proceeded to discuss a law upon the emigrants.

Santerre at length announced the arrival of Louis XVI. Barrère was president. "Citizens," said he, "Europe has its eyes upon you. Posterity will judge you with inflexible severity; preserve, therefore, the dignity and calmness which befit judges. Remember the awful silence which met Louis on his return from Varennes."

Louis appeared at the bar about half-past two. The mayor and the Generals Santerre and Wittengoff were at his side. A profound stillness pervaded the hall. The dignity of Louis, and his tranquil countenance, in so extraordinary a reverse, affected every spectator. The deputies of the centre were visibly moved. The Girondists evinced deep commiseration. Even Saint-Just, Robespierre, and Marat, felt their fanaticism giving way, and were surprised to find a man in the king they pursued so remorselessly.

"Be seated," said Barrère to Louis, "and answer the questions that may be addressed to you." Louis seated himself, and listened whilst the articles of impeachment were read over, section by section. In them, all the faults of the court were recapitulated, and charged personally on Louis XVI. He was upbraided with the interruption of the sittings on the 20th June 1789; with the bed of justice held on the 23d of the same month; with the aristocratic conspiracy foiled by the insurrection of the 14th July; with the banquet to the body-guards; with the insults heaped on the national cockade; with the refusal to sanction the declaration of rights, as also various constitutional articles; with all the facts which made manifest a new conspiracy in October, and which were followed by the scenes of the 5th and 6th; with the conciliatory speeches which had succeeded those scenes, promising a change never intended; with the false oath taken at the federation of the 14th July; with the secret intrigues of Talon and Mirabeau to effect a counter-revolution; with the money appropriated to corrupt a number of deputies; with the gathering of "the knights of the dagger" on the 28th February 1791; with the flight to Varennes; with the slaughter on the Champ de Mars; with the silence observed respecting the convention of Pilnitz; with the delay in the promulgation of the decree reuniting Avignon to France; with the commotions at Nimes, Montauban, Mende, and Jallès; with the continuance of their pay to emigrant body-guards and to the disbanded constitutional guard; with the secret correspondence with the emigrant princes; with the insufficiency of the armies assembled on the frontiers; with the refusal to sanction the decree for the camp of 20,000 men; with the dismantling of all the fortresses; with the tardy announcement of the march of the Prussians; with the organisation of secret companies in the interior of Paris; with the review of the Swiss and other troops which formed the garrison of the palace on the morning of the 10th August; with the doubling of that guard; with the summons of the mayor to the Tuileries; lastly, with the effusion of blood, which had been the consequence of those military dispositions.

If regret for his former power were not allowed as excusable and natural, every thing in the conduct of the king might be tortured into crime; for his conduct was but one long regret, interspersed with occasional timid efforts to recover what he had lost. After each article, the president paused, saying, "What have you to answer?" The king, always speaking in a firm voice, denied part of the facts, threw the remainder on his ministers, and constantly appealed to the constitution, which he asseverated he had never infringed. His answers were throughout calm and deliberate. But at the accusation—"*You caused the blood of the people to flow on the 10th August!*" he exclaimed, in a loud tone, "No, sir, no—it was not I."

All the documents were afterwards exhibited to him, and, using an unquestionable privilege, he refused to acknowledge some of them, and contested the existence of the iron chest. This denial produced an unfavourable impression; and it was certainly ill-judged, for the fact was placed beyond all doubt. He finally demanded copies of the articles of impeachment and of the documents adduced, and counsel to aid him in his defence.

The president notified to him that he might retire. Refreshments were presented to him in the adjoining apartment; and being conducted back to the carriage, he was once more removed to the Temple. He arrived there at half-past six, and his first anxiety was to see his family: the request was refused, on the allegation that the commune had ordered the separation during the continuance of the trial. At half-past eight, when supper was announced to him, he again solicited leave to embrace his children. The gloomy suspicions of the commune rendered all the keepers inexorable; and that consolation was once more harshly denied him.

During this interval, the assembly was a scene of tumult, owing to the request made by Louis XVI. to be allowed counsel. Treilhard and Pétion argued with vehemence that the demand should be conceded; Tallien, Billaud-Varennes, Chabot, and Merlin, opposed it with equal force, asserting that it was a mere pretence to retard the proceedings by chicanery. The assembly, in conclusion, granted counsel. A deputation was appointed to wait on Louis XVI., communicate to him this resolution, and ascertain from him upon whom his choice fell. The king named Target, or, failing him, Tronchet, and both if it were possible. He also requested that he might be supplied with pens, ink, and paper, to prepare materials for his defence, and be permitted to see his family. The convention immediately ordained that every thing necessary for writing should be furnished to him; that the two advocates whom he had selected should be apprised of the preference shown them; that he should be allowed the freest intercourse with them; and that he might see his family.

Target declined the commission which Louis XVI. intrusted to him, alleging as a reason that he had been unable, ever since 1785, to pursue the labours of the bar. Tronchet instantly wrote that he was ready to accept the functions confided to him; and whilst the appointment of a second counsel was under deliberation, a letter was received from a citizen, a septuagenarian, the venerable Malesherbes, the friend and associate of Turgot, and the most respected magistrate in France. The noble veteran wrote to the president: "I have been twice called to the council of him who was my master, at a time when that service was an object of universal ambition; I owe him the same obedience when it is a service deemed dangerous by many." He besought the president to inform Louis XVI. that he was prepared to devote all his energies in his defence.

Several other citizens made the same offer, with which the king was duly acquainted. He thanked them all, but accepted Tronchet and Malesherbes only. The commune directed that the two advocates should be subjected to the most minute search before they were ushered into the presence of their client. The convention, which had ordered *unrestricted communication*, re-asserted its resolution, and they were allowed to enter the Temple without obstruction. On seeing Malesherbes, the king advanced to meet him; the venerable old man fell at his feet, and burst into tears. The king raised him, and they remained in a long embrace. The business of the defence, however, demanded and obtained their speedy attention. Commissioners from the assembly brought the documents to the Temple daily, with orders to communicate their contents, but not to part from their possession. The king examined them with great attention, and with a tranquillity likewise which infinitely astonished the commissioners.

The only consolation he had solicited, permission to see his family, had not yet been granted to him, notwithstanding the decree of the convention. The commune, already disposed to throw every obstacle in the way of the indulgence, had petitioned for the repeal of the decree. "You will vainly enjoin it," said Tallien to the convention; "if the commune be unwilling, it will not be carried into effect." These insolent words excited considerable tumult. However, the assembly, modifying its decree, ordained that the king might have his two children with him, but on condition that the children should not return to their mother during the entire process. The king, sensible that they were most necessary to their mother, refused to deprive her of them, and submitted to this new affliction with a resignation no indignity could shake.

In proportion as the trial advanced, the vast importance of the question at issue became more perfectly understood. On the one hand were those who felt assured that proceeding by regicide against the old royalty was embarking in an inexorable system of vengeance and atrocity, and declaring war to the death against the former order of things: they were willing, indeed, to abrogate that order of things, but not to destroy it in so violent a manner. On the other hand were those who desired that very war to the death, as admitting no more vacillation or return, and as planting an impassable barrier between the monarchy and the revolution. The person of the king was scarcely considered in the greatness of the question; all attention was engrossed on the one point, whether it were expedient or not to break entirely with the past by one decisive and irrevocable act. The result alone was weighed, and the victim destined for the sacrifice was in the interim overlooked.

The Girondists, steadfast in their detestation of the Jacobins, unceasingly upbraided them with the massacres of September, and represented them as anarchists, scheming to overawe the assembly by terror, and to immolate the king for the purpose of replacing him by the triumvirs. Guadet almost succeeded in expelling them from the convention, by procuring a decree that the electoral assemblies of the whole country should be convoked in order to confirm or recall their deputies. This proposition, adopted and rescinded in the course of one sitting, had struck considerable alarm into the Jacobins. Other circumstances likewise tended to augment their uneasiness. The federalists continued to arrive from all quarters. The municipalities forwarded a multitude of addresses, in which, whilst approving of the republic, and applauding the convention for having instituted it, they reprobated the crimes and excesses of anarchy. The affiliated societies also continually reproached the parent society with having in its bosom men of blood, who contaminated public morality and advocated attempts on the security of the convention. Some even repudiated their parent, declaring they cast away all further affiliation, and announcing that at the first signal they would fly to Paris to support the assembly. All especially called for the expulsion of Marat, some for that of Robespierre himself.

The dispirited Jacobins allowed that opinion was growing corrupt in France; but they exhorted each other to hold together, and to use all diligence in writing to the different provinces, and enlightening their deceived brethren. They accused "the traitor" Roland of intercepting their correspondence, and substituting for their wholesome lessons hypocritical writings calculated to pervert the understanding. They proposed a voluntary subscription for the purpose of disseminating sound publications, particularly the "admirable" discourses of Robespierre; and sought means for securing their safe delivery in spite of Roland, who violated, as they alleged, the freedom of the post-office. At the same time, they agreed that Marat compromised them by the violence of his writings, and that it was essential the parent society should make known to France how marked a distinction it held to exist between Marat, whose heated temperament carried him beyond bounds, and the prudent, virtuous Robespierre, who, always within proper limits, upheld without weakness, as also without exaggeration, the just and possible course. Previously, however, a vehement dispute had occurred in the club respecting those two men. It had been generally acknowledged that Marat was a man of bold and powerful intellect, but too excitable. He had been useful to the cause of the people, it was allowed, but he knew not where to stop. The partisans of Marat had replied that he did not deem it necessary to execute all that he had recommended, and that none was so good a judge as he of the limit at which things ought to be stayed. They adduced several of his passages. Marat had said:— "*There needs but one Marat in the republic. I demand the greater to obtain the less. My hand should wither rather than write, if I thought the people would execute to the letter all that I advise. I overtask the people because I know they will bargain with me.*" The galleries had applauded and supported this justification of Marat. But the society had finally resolved to frame an address, in which, pourtraying the characters of Marat and Robespierre, it should show how striking a difference it placed between the discretion of the one and the vehemence of the other.* After deciding upon this mea-

* Amongst the many curious judgments passed upon Marat and Robespierre, that pronounced in the Jacobin Club in the sitting of Sunday, 23d December 1792, ought not to be omitted. I know nothing more accurately descriptive of the spirit and temper of the moment than the discussion upon the characters of those two men. The following is an extract:—

"Desfieux read over the correspondence. A letter from a society, whose name has escaped us, gave rise to considerable discussion, calculated to evoke important reflections. This society announced to the parent society that it was invariably attached to the principles of the Jacobins, that it had not allowed itself to be blinded by the calumnies so profusely scattered against Marat and Robespierre, and that it continued all its esteem and veneration for those two incorruptible friends of the people.

This letter was warmly applauded, but was followed by a dis-

sure, several others were adopted, and especially a determination not to relax for an instant in urging the departure of the federalists for the frontiers. Accordingly, whenever intelligence reached Paris that the army under Dumouriez was weakened by desertion, the Jacobins exclaimed that the reinforcement of the federalists was indispensable. Marat published that the volunteers who had first gone off had been kept for upwards of a year, and that it was time to replace them by those loitering in Paris. It was known, too, about this time, that Custine had been obliged to abandon Frankfort, that Beurnonville's attack on the electorate of Treves had been fruitless; and the Jacobins failed not to maintain that if those two generals had been strengthened by the federalists who uselessly crowded the capital, they would have been spared the disgrace of those checks.

The various tidings of the fruitless attempt of Beurnonville and the repulse of Custine had powerfully agitated the public mind. It had needed little foresight to predict both; for Beurnonville, attacking unassailable positions, in a bad season, and with insufficient means, could not succeed; and Custine, pertinaciously refusing to recoil upon the Rhine of his own accord, shunning so signal an avowal of his temerity, must infallibly be reduced to a retreat upon Mayence. Public misfortunes always furnish parties with aliment for invective. The Jacobins, who were sufficiently inimical to generals suspected of an aristocratic bias, seized upon the occasion, declaimed with fury against them, and denounced them as Feuillants and Girondists. Marat failed not to inveigh more emphatically than ever against the rage for conquest, which he had always blamed, he said, and which, moreover, was but a disguised ambition of the generals to attain a position of formidable greatness. Robespierre, pointing the odium according to the instigations of his malice, contended that it was not the generals who were to blame, but the infamous faction which ruled the assembly and the executive power. The perfidious Roland, the intriguing Brissot, the wretches Louvet, Guadet, Vergniaud, were the authors of all the disasters that afflicted France. He craved to be the first assassinated by them, but he hoped ere that occurred to have the pleasure of denouncing them. Dumouriez and Custine, he added, knew them, and took good care to hold aloof from them; but all feared them, because they disposed of gold, places, and all the resources of the republic. Their intention was to enslave it, and for that purpose they fettered all the true patriots, prevented the development of their energy, and thus exposed France to be vanquished by its enemies. Their more immediate design was to annihilate the society of Jacobins, and to massacre all who should have courage to resist. "For myself," he exclaimed, "I ask to be assassinated by Roland!"*

cussion which Brissot and Gorsas, who are assuredly prophets, foretold the evening before.

Robert.—'It is very surprising that people will perpetually confound the names of Marat and Robespierre. How the public mind must be corrupted in the departments, when no difference is observed between those two defenders of the people! They have both virtues, it is true; Marat is a patriot, and has truly estimable qualities, I admit; but how different is he from Robespierre! *He* is prudent, moderate in his means, whilst Marat is prone to exaggeration, and has not that wisdom which characterises Robespierre. It is not sufficient to be a patriot; in order to serve the people usefully, a man must be reserved in his means of execution; and Robespierre incomparably excels Marat in the means of execution.

It is time, citizens, to tear away the veil which conceals the truth from the eyes of the departments; it is time they should know that we draw a marked distinction between Marat and Robespierre. Let us write to the affiliated societies what we think of those two citizens; for, I confess to you, I am no great admirer of Marat.' (Murmurs in the galleries, and partially from the hall.)

Bourdon.—'We ought to have made known our sentiments touching Marat long ago to the affiliated societies. How is it possible they could ever confound Marat and Robespierre? Robespierre is a man essentially virtuous, against whom, during the whole revolution, we have no reproach to make; Robespierre is moderate in his means, whilst Marat, on the contrary, is an unbridled writer, who greatly injures the Jacobins (murmurs); and, besides, it is proper to observe, that Marat does us infinite mischief in the National Convention.

The deputies conceive that we are partisans of Marat; they call us *Maratists;* if we show that we rightly estimate Marat, you will soon see the deputies draw near the Mountain on which we sit; you will see them come into the bosom of this society; you will see the affiliated societies recover from their aberration, and rally anew around the cradle of liberty. If Marat be a patriot, he must accede to the motion I am about to submit. Marat will be ready to sacrifice himself to the cause of liberty. I move that his name be erased from the list of members of this society.'

This motion excited a few plaudits, violent murmurs in a part of the hall, and tumultuous agitation in the galleries.

It was remembered that eight days before this novel scene, Marat had been loaded with applause in the society; the people in the galleries, who have good memories, recollected the circumstance very distinctly; they could not imagine how so prompt a change had come over the spirits of men; and, as the moral instinct of the people is always just, they were highly indignant at the proposition of Bourdon: they defended their *virtuous friend;* they refused to believe that, in the short space of a week, he could have forfeited the esteem of the society, for although it had been said that ingratitude was a virtue of republics, it would require some difficulty to familiarise the French people with such virtues.

The union of the names of Marat and Robespierre was not at all revolting to the people; their ears had been long accustomed to hear them named in conjunction in the correspondence; and, after having repeatedly seen the society moved with indignation when the clubs of other departments demanded the expulsion of Marat, they were far from deeming themselves bound to support the present motion of Bourdon.

A citizen from an affiliated society pressed upon the attention of the society how really dangerous it was to join together the names of Marat and Robespierre. 'In the departments,' said he, 'we draw a great distinction between Marat and Robespierre; but we are surprised to see the society silent upon the differences between these two patriots. I propose to the society, after it has decided upon the fate of Marat, to speak no more of affiliation, as that word ought not to be pronounced in a republic, but to use the term *fraternisation* instead.',

Dufourny.—'I oppose the motion for striking Marat off the list of the society. (Great applause.) I will not deny the difference that exists between Marat and Robespierre. Those two writers, who may be likened to each other in patriotism, have very remarkable points of difference; they have both served the cause of the people, but by different modes. Robespierre has defended the true principles with method, firmness, and all befitting discretion; Marat, on the contrary, has often overstepped the bounds of sound reason and prudence. Still, although granting the distinction existing between Marat and Robespierre, I am not in favour of the expulsion; we may be just without being ungrateful to Marat. Marat has been serviceable to us, he has aided the revolution with courage. (Repeated cheers from the society and the galleries.) It would be ungrateful to erase him. (Yes! yes! from all sides.) Marat is an indispensable person; in revolutions there is a call for those strong minds capable of uniting states, and Marat is one of the rare characters necessary to overthrow despotism. (Applause.)

I conclude with moving that the motion of Bourdon be rejected, and that the society contents itself with writing to the affiliated clubs, signifying to them the distinction we mark between Marat and Robespierre.' (Applause.)

The society resolved that it would no longer use the term affiliation, regarding it as repulsive to republican equality; it substituted for it the word fraternisation. The society afterwards resolved that Marat should not be erased from the list of members, but that it would address a circular to all the societies holding the right of fraternisation, in which should be detailed the relations, resemblances, dissemblances, affinities, and estrangements which were traceable between Marat and Robespierre, in order that all those who fraternised with the Jacobins might be enabled to judge in full cognisance of those two defenders of the people, and finally learn to separate two names which they erroneously deemed were linked in an eternal union."

* Sitting of the Jacobins, 12th December.

This frantic hatred, communicating itself to the whole society, stirred it like a tempestuous sea. The members pledged themselves to an implacable war with the faction; they repelled in advance all idea of reconciliation; and as a new proposal of negotiation had been recently canvassed, they bound themselves to reject for ever the *Lamourette kiss.*

Similar scenes occurred in the assembly during the delay which had been granted to Louis XVI. for the preparation of his defence. Complaints were incessantly repeated that the royalists every where menaced the patriots and distributed pamphlets in favour of the king. Thuriot proposed a measure to meet the crisis; it consisted in punishing with death whomsoever should meditate disrupturing the unity of the republic or dismembering any portion. This was a decree against the fable of federalism, that is to say, against the Girondists. Buzot hastened to retort by another project, and moved a decree of exile against the family of Orleans. Parties are thus prone to the exchange of falsehoods, and take vengeance for calumnies by hurling back others. Whilst the Jacobins, therefore, accused the Girondists of federalism, these reproached the former with intending the Duke of Orleans for the throne, and thirsting for the blood of Louis XVI. merely to render the place vacant.

The Duke of Orleans lingered in existence at Paris, vainly striving to be forgotten in the midst of the convention. He could scarcely find that position, encompassed by furious demagogues, agreeable to his feelings; but whither could he fly? In Europe, the emigration sat in waiting for him, and outrages, possibly even extreme punishments, threatened the kinsman of royalty, who had repudiated his birth and his rank. In France, he sought to bury his origin in oblivion by assuming the most humble designations, and he styled himself *Egalité* (Equality). But the remembrance of his former dignity was ineffaceable, and the evidence of his vast wealth always present. Unless he clothed himself in rags, and rendered himself despicable by affected cynicism, how was he to escape suspicions? In the Girondist ranks he had been ruined at once; and all the reproaches of royalism directed against them would have been held justified. In those of the Jacobins, he had the mob of Paris as a support; but he was pretty certain to provoke the accusations of the Girondists, as in truth was demonstrated. They, abhorring him for ranking with their enemies, concluded that, in order to render himself supportable, he lavished his treasures upon the anarchists, and supplied their party with the powerful aid of his fortune.

The suspicious Louvet was more credulous, and sincerely believed he still harboured hopes of royalty. It was without participating in that opinion, but to meet the assault of Thuriot by another, that Buzot ascended the tribune. "If the decree proposed by Thuriot be calculated to restore confidence," said he, "I am about to submit one equally well calculated to produce that desirable end. The monarchy is laid prostrate, but it still lives in the habits and in the remembrances of its former creatures. Let us imitate the Romans; they chased away Tarquin and his family; in like manner let us expel the family of the Bourbons. A part of that family is in irons, but there is another yet more dangerous, because it was more popular—I mean that of Orleans. The bust of Orleans was paraded through Paris; his sons, warmed by courage, have distinguished themselves in our armies; but the very merits of the family render it hazardous to liberty. Let it make a final sacrifice to the country by voluntarily withdrawing from its soil; let it betake elsewhere the calamity of having stood near the throne, and the still greater calamity of bearing a name which is odious to us, and which cannot fail to sound harshly in the ear of every freeman."

Louvet, succeeding Buzot, and addressing Orleans himself, urged upon him the spontaneous exile of Collatinus, and besought him to imitate it. Lanjuinais reverted to the elections of Paris, whereby Egalité was deputed, and which were conducted under the poniards of the anarchist faction; he recalled the efforts that were made to obtain the nomination of a chancellor of the house of Orleans to the ministry of war, and the influence its sons had acquired in the armies; for all which reasons, he moved the banishment of the Bourbons. Bazire, Saint-Just, and Chabot, rose to oppose the motion, rather from enmity to the Girondists than interest for Orleans. They contended that this was not the moment to crush the only member of the Bourbon race who had evinced loyalty towards the nation; that the duty of the convention was first to punish the captive Bourbon, and then to frame the constitution, after which it might direct its attention to citizens who had become dangerous; that, furthermore, sending Orleans out of France was consigning him to death, and that so cruel a measure ought at least to be delayed. Nevertheless, the banishment was decreed by acclamation. The only additional point to settle, in drawing up the decree, was the period at which the banishment should commence. "Since you use the ostracism against Egalité," said Merlin, "employ it against all dangerous men; and, first of all, I ask it against the executive power." "Against Roland!" exclaimed Albitte. "Against Roland and Pache!" added Barrère, "since they have become the cause of disunion amongst us. Let them both be banished from the ministry, as a propitiation to peace and union." Kersaint, however, expressed an apprehension lest England might take advantage of the ministerial disorganisation to declare war, as she had done in 1757, when D'Argenson and Machau were disgraced; and Rewbel inquired whether a representative of the people could be banished, and whether Philip Egalité, under that character, did not belong to the nation which had nominated him.

These various observations arrested the current of passion. The subject was dropped, then resumed, and, without revoking the decree of banishment against the Bourbons, the convention adjourned the debate for three days, to afford an interval for resentments to subside, and for more maturely considering the questions, whether it was competent to banish Egalité, and whether it could without hazard displace the two ministers of the interior and of war.

This debate was eminently qualified to arouse the fiercest tumult in the sections, at the commune, and at the Jacobin Club. Ostracism became the absorbing clamour of the moment, and petitions were prepared in all quarters to be presented at the resumption of the debate. The three days elapsed, and the discussion recommenced. The mayor came at the head of the sections to solicit the repeal of the decree. The assembly passed to the order of the day after hearing the address; but Pétion, seeing how great a ferment the question excited, moved its adjournment until after the trial of Louis XVI. This species of compromise was adopted, and the full fury of the storm returned on the defenceless victim, against whom all passions found vent. The celebrated trial was therefore immediately resumed.

CHAPTER XVIII.

CONTINUATION OF THE TRIAL OF LOUIS XVI. — HIS DEFENCE.—HIS CONDEMNATION.—HIS LAST MINUTES IN THE PRISON AND ON THE SCAFFOLD.

The interval granted to Louis XVI. for preparing his defence, was scarcely sufficient to thoroughly investigate the multifarious records upon which it was to be founded. His two advocates solicited the assistance of a third, younger and more active than themselves, who might frame and deliver the defence, whilst they sought out and arranged its materials.

This young adjunct was the advocate Desèze, who had defended Besenval after the 14th July. The convention, having already conceded the defence, made no objection to an additional counsel, and M. Desèze obtained, like Malesherbes and Tronchet, the privilege of entering the Temple. A committee carried the documents thither daily, and exhibited them to Louis XVI., who inspected them with the greatest coolness, and as if the process *had concerned another*, as a report of the commune expressed it. He evinced the most marked politeness towards the commissioners, and ordered them refreshments when the consultations stretched to an unusual length. Whilst he was occupied with his trial, he had discovered a mode of communicating with his family. He wrote by means of the pens and paper allowed him for composing his defence, and the princesses pricked their reply upon the paper with needles. They sometimes folded the notes in balls of thread, which an attendant from the kitchen, whilst serving dinner, threw under the table; and at other times they let them down by a string of packthread from one floor to the other. The unhappy captives were thus enabled to give each other tidings of their health, and experienced much consolation from the assurance that sickness was not also one of their afflictions.

At length M. Desèze had finished the defence by devoting day and night to its compilation. The king made him suppress all that was too oratorical, desiring to restrict himself to the simple discussion of the points upon which he rested his case. On the 26th, at half-past nine in the morning, all the armed force was in motion to conduct him from the Temple to the Feuillants, with the same precautions and in the same order as upon the former occasion. Seated in the carriage of the mayor, he conversed with him on the way with his invariable tranquillity; they talked of Seneca, of Titus-Livius, of the hospitals; he even addressed a sprightly witticism to one of the municipal officers who kept his hat on in the carriage. Arrived at the Feuillants, he asked with solicitude for his advocates, sat by their side in the assembly, surveyed with infinite calmness the benches on which his accusers and his judges were seated, appeared to scan their countenances as if seeking to observe the effect of M. Desèze's address, and more than once interchanged a few words with Tronchet and Malesherbes, with a smile upon his countenance. The assembly heard his defence in gloomy silence, and without testifying any disapprobation.

The advocate divided his address into two parts—the principles of right, and the facts charged upon Louis XVI.

Although the assembly, by deciding that the king should be tried by it, had explicitly declared that the inviolability could not be invoked, Desèze argued successfully that nothing could limit the defence, and that its scope remained unfettered even after the decree; consequently, if Louis XVI. deemed the inviolability efficacious, he had a right to urge it. He was obliged preliminarily to acknowledge the sovereignty of the people; and, with all the defenders of the constitution of 1791, he contended that the sovereignty, albeit absolute and uncontrolled, could be bound; that it had so intended with reference to Louis XVI., when covenanting the inviolability; that it had not designed an absurdity in the system of the monarchy; that in consequence the obligation was valid, and ought to be executed; and that all conceivable crimes, had the king committed such, could be punished only by deposition. He said that, unless it were so, the constitution of 1791 was a barbarous snare laid for Louis XVI., since a pledge had been given him with the secret intention of not observing it; but that if Louis were to be denied his rights as a king, he should surely be allowed those of a citizen, and he asked where were the preservative forms which every citizen had a right to claim, such as the distinction between the accusing and the judging jury, the privilege of challenge, the majority of two-thirds, the secret vote, and the silence of the judges whilst forming their opinion. He added, with a boldness which failed to disturb the absolute stillness, that he looked every where for judges, but that his eye lighted only upon accusers.

He then passed to the division of facts, which he ranged under two heads—those which had preceded, and those which had followed the acceptance of the constitutional act. The first were covered by the acceptance of that act, the others by the inviolability. He did not abstain from discussing them notwithstanding, and entered upon an effective refutation, because the managers of the impeachment had adduced a multitude of insignificant facts in default of precise proof of intercourse with foreigners—a crime which they deemed quite undoubted, but whereof positive evidence was still wanting. He triumphantly repelled the accusation of having shed French blood on the 10th August. Louis XVI., in fact, was not the aggressor on that day, but the people. It was but just that Louis XVI., attacked and besieged, should endeavour to defend himself, and adopt the necessary precautions. The magistrates themselves had sanctioned his doing so, and had given the troops a formal order to repel force by force. Notwithstanding that, said M. Desèze, the king was unwilling to make use of that authority, which he held both from nature and the law, and he retired into the sanctuary of the legislative body to prevent the effusion of blood. The contest which ensued did not implicate him, but ought to be regarded favourably rather than revengefully, so far as he was concerned, inasmuch as it was upon an order under his hand that the Swiss abandoned the defence of the palace and of their own lives. It was, then, a flagrant injustice to upbraid Louis XVI. with having shed French blood, for on that point he was irreproachable; he had shown himself, on the contrary, full of forbearance and magnanimity.

The advocate concluded in these brief and impressive terms, the only occasion in which he dwelt upon the virtues of Louis XVI.:—

"Louis ascended the throne in the twentieth year of his age, and at that period of life gave an example of morality from the throne; he carried to it no criminal failing or depraved passion; he was economical, just, temperate, and he showed himself in every instance the friend of the people. The people desired the destruction of a baneful impost which pressed upon them, and he abrogated it; the people demanded the abolition of servitude, and he began by abolishing it in his own domains; the people solicited reforms in the criminal legislation, for the purpose of alleviating the treatment of persons under accusation, and he instituted those reforms; the people wished that many thousands of Frenchmen, whom the rigour of our laws had hitherto deprived of rights which belong to citizens, should acquire or recover those rights, and he called them to their enjoyment by his laws; the people craved liberty, and he gave it them! He even anticipated them in his sacrifices; and yet it is in the name of these same people that you are asked this day —— Citizens, I will not finish — I pause before history. Reflect that it will judge your judgment, and that its decision will be the decision of ages!"

Louis XVI., speaking immediately after his advocate, uttered a few words he had previously transcribed. "You have just heard my grounds of defence," said he, "and I will not reiterate them. Addressing you perhaps for the last time, I declare to you that my conscience reproaches me with nothing, and that my advocates have told you the truth.

I never feared a public examination of my conduct, but my heart is torn to find in the articles of impeachment the charge of having wilfully shed the blood of the people, and especially that the calamities of the 10th August are attributable to me.

I confess I deemed the multiplied proofs I had at all times given of my love for the people, and the conduct which I had always pursued, ought to have sufficiently demonstrated that I never shrunk from exposing myself to spare their blood, and to have for ever averted from me such an imputation."

The president then inquired of Louis XVI. whether he had any thing further to allege in his defence. Louis having declared that he had urged all he intended, the president informed him he might withdraw. Being conducted into an adjacent room with his advocates, his solicitude was aroused for the young Desèze, who gave tokens of exhaustion from his lengthened pleading. Again seated in the carriage, he discoursed with his accustomed serenity to those who escorted him, and reached the Temple at five o'clock.

He had scarcely quitted the convention ere a violent storm burst forth within it. One party maintained that a discussion should be opened, whilst the other, exclaiming against the eternal delays interposed to the conclusion of the trial, demanded an immediate vote, alleging that every tribunal, after having heard the accused, proceeded to gather the opinions. Lanjuinais had been moved, since the commencement of the proceedings, with an indignation which the impetuosity of his character no longer permitted him to restrain. He sprang to the tribune, and amidst the shouts his presence excited, moved, not an adjournment for discussion, but the abrogation of the whole process. Raising his voice, he asserted that the sway of the ferocious was over, and that the assembly must not be dishonoured by constituting itself the judge of Louis XVI.; that none in France possessed such a right, and that the assembly in particular had not the vestige of a title; that if it pretended to act as a political body, it could only take measures of security against the deposed king, but that if it acted as a tribunal, it outraged all principles, for it thereby submitted the vanquished to the judgment of the conqueror himself, inasmuch as the majority of the members present had proclaimed themselves the conspirators of the 10th August. At the word "conspirators" a frightful tumult ensued in every part of the hall. Deafening shouts arose:—"Order!" "To the Abbey!" "Down from the tribune!" It was in vain that Lanjuinais would have justified the obnoxious word by suggesting that it ought to be understood in its favourable sense, for the 10th August was a glorious conspiracy. The clamour still continued, and he finished by declaring that he would rather perish a thousand times than condemn, contrary to all law, even the most execrable tyrant.

A crowd of speakers pressed to succeed him, and the ferment grew more boisterous. The deputies would hear no more; they rose from their seats, intermingled, gathered into groups, upbraided and menaced each other: the president was obliged to put on his hat.* After an hour of agitation, tranquillity was at length restored; and the assembly, adopting the opinion of those who advocated a general discussion on the trial of Louis XVI., resolved that the discussion was opened, and that it should be continued, to the exclusion of all other business, until the decision should be pronounced.

The debate was therefore resumed on the 27th. The speakers already heard re-appeared at the tribune. Saint-Just was of the number. The presence of Louis XVI., humbled, prostrated, and serene in his disaster, had originated certain qualms in his mind. But he silenced them by representing Louis XVI. as a modest and wily tyrant, who oppressed with modesty, who defended himself with modesty, and against whose insinuating blandness it was necessary to be most strongly guarded. He had convoked the states-general, certainly, but it was to humble the nobility and reign by dividing; consequently, when he saw the power of the states swell so rapidly, he attempted to annihilate it. On the 14th July, on the 5th and 6th October, he was known to have secretly accumulated means for overwhelming the people; but each time his conspiracies were foiled by the national energy, he feigned a voluntary return from his evil courses, and exhibited a hypocritical and unnatural joy at his own discomfiture and the people's triumph. Subsequently, being unable to make use of force, he corrupted the defenders of liberty, plotted with the foreign foe, and drove his ministers to despair, one of whom felt compelled to address him by letter in these words—"Your secret relations prevent me from executing the laws, and I resign." In fine, he had put in vogue all the expedients of the deepest perfidy up to the 10th August; and now he still affected a delusive mildness to stagger his judges and snatch an escape.

It was thus that the vacillations of Louis XVI., so natural under his circumstances, were judged in a violent mind, which saw a marked and studied perfidy where merely weakness and regret for the past prevailed. Other speakers succeeded Saint-Just, and great impatience began to be manifested for the appearance of the Girondists in the debate. They had not yet committed themselves, but the time for explanation had now come. We have already alluded to the doubts that weighed with them, to the emotions wherewith they were affected, and to their tendency to extenuate in Louis XVI. a resistance they were so much more capable of comprehending than their opponents. Vergniaud avowed before some friends the deep commiseration he felt. Without being equally moved, perhaps, the others were all disposed to sympathise with the victim; and, in this position, they devised an expedient which strikingly betrays all their feelings and all their embarrassment; this was an appeal to the people. To get rid of a dangerous responsibility, and throw upon the nation the odium of barbarity if the king were condemned, or that of royalism if he were absolved, were the objects of the Girondists; and therein they displayed a deplorable weakness. Forasmuch as they were touched at the contemplation of the profound calamity of Louis XVI., they should unquestionably have had the courage to vindicate him themselves, and not have risked a civil war by remitting to the forty-four thousand sections into which France was subdivided, a question infallibly destined to stimulate the most violent passions and force all parties into hostile array. They ought to have energetically seized upon authority, and themselves courageously employed it, without shifting to the multitude a duty for which it was manifestly unfitted, and exposing the country to fatal confusion. By the advocacy of such a course, the Girondists gave their adversaries a signal advantage, since they justified the aspersion that they designed to foment civil war, and likewise brought into grievous suspicion their courage and sincerity. The Jacobins, consequently, were not backward in seizing the occasion, and asserted that those who contended for the acquittal of Louis XVI. were more candid and estimable than those who supported an appeal to the people. But such is the ordinary conduct of moderate parties. Pursuing the like conduct now as on the 2d and 3d September, the Girondists hesitated to compromise themselves for a king whom they regarded as an enemy—as one who, according to their sincere persuasion, had laboured to destroy them by foreign bayonets; nevertheless, moved at sight of this enemy vanquished and in captivity, they endeavoured to protect him, talked indignantly of the violence committed in his case, and, in short, did enough to ruin themselves without doing enough to save him.

Salles, who more than any other yielded to the phantasies of Louvet, and even excelled him in the art of detecting imaginary plots, was the first who broached

* [This is the last expedient adopted by the president in the French national assemblies to recall the members to order, after he has vainly exhausted the more usual appeal, the ringing of his bell.]

and vindicated the expedient of an appeal to the people, in the sitting of the 27th. Giving up the conduct of Louis XVI. to all the bitterest animadversions of the republicans, and allowing that he richly merited the utmost severity with which it was possible to treat him, he insisted nevertheless that the assembly was called upon to perform a great political act, and not a mere act of vengeance; wherefore the question ought to be strictly judged with reference to the public interest. Now, in either case of acquittal or condemnation, he perceived striking inconveniences. An acquittal would be a perpetual source of discord, and the king would become the rallying cry for all parties. The remembrance of his delinquencies would be constantly recalled to the assembly as a standard reproach upon its weakness; such impunity would be a public scandal, likely to provoke popular revolts, and certain to be seized as a pretext by all agitators. The infamous men who had already paralysed the state by their crimes, would not fail to found upon this act of clemency reasons of justification for fresh excesses, precisely as they proclaimed themselves authorised by the slowness of the tribunals to perpetrate the massacres of September. From all quarters, in short, the assembly would be accused of having lacked the courage to terminate the universal excitement, and to consolidate the republic by an energetic and terrible example.

Condemned, the king would bequeath to his family all the pretensions of his race, and leave them to brothers more dangerous than himself, because they were less despised for weakness. The people, having no longer the crimes but the atonement before their eyes, would probably be induced to commiserate the fate of the king, and the factious would again find in that disposition a means of exasperating them against the National Convention. The sovereigns of Europe at present preserved an ominous silence, in expectation of an event which they looked forward to as the crowning iniquity, as the signal for an outburst of general detestation; but so soon as the head of the king had fallen, all, taking advantage of that pretext, would simultaneously pour on France to devastate and rend her. Then, perhaps, France herself, goaded by sufferings, would execrate the convention for an act thus provocative of a cruel and disastrous war.

Such were, argued Salles, the painful alternatives offered to the National Convention. In such a position, it was for the nation itself to decide, and to determine its own fate by determining that of Louis XVI. The danger of civil war was chimerical, for no such evil had resulted from the convocation of the primary assemblies to elect a convention to be intrusted with the destinies of France, nor did any apprehensions of such a consequence appear to be entertained upon an occasion equally momentous and exciting, since the sanction of the constitution was intended for submission to these same primary assemblies. The delays and the difficulties of a fresh deliberation in forty-four thousand assemblies were but vain objections, for the reference would be, not to deliberate, but to decide without discussion between the two propositions presented by the convention. The question would be thus stated to the primary assemblies—"Shall Louis XVI. be punished with death or detained till the peace?" and they would reply by the words, "detained," or "put to death," as the case might be. With the aid of extraordinary couriers, the answers might be brought in fifteen days from the farthest extremities of France.

These sentiments had been heard with various feelings. Serres, deputy from the Upper Alps, retracted his first opinion, which was for the judgment, and supported an appeal to the people. Barbaroux repelled the justification of Louis XVI., without concluding with any specific motion, for he did not venture to absolve against the wishes of his constituents, or condemn against those of his friends. Buzot declared himself in favour of the appeal to the people; but he modified the measure of Salles, and recommended that the convention should itself take the initiative by voting the death, and merely demanding from the primary assemblies a simple sanction of that judgment. Rabaut Saint-Etienne, that protestant minister who had already distinguished himself by his talents in the Constituent Assembly, exclaimed with indignation against the accumulated powers exercised by the assembly. "As to myself," said he, "I am weary of my portion of despotism; I am disgusted, tormented, remorseful, at the tyranny that falls to my share, and I sigh for the moment when you shall create a tribunal which may take from me the form and aspect of a tyrant. You seek political reasons; you will find them in history. The people of London, who had pressed so urgently for the execution of the king, were the first to curse his judges, and prostrate themselves before his successors. When Charles II. returned to the throne, the city gave him a superb feast, the people gave way to the most extravagant joy, and flocked to witness the deaths of those very judges whom Charles afterwards sacrificed to the manes of his father. People of Paris, parliament of France, have you understood me?"

Faure boldly and energetically urged the revocation of all the decrees bearing upon the arraignment. The sombre Robespierre at length appeared, surcharged with gall and malice. He said that he also had been affected, and had felt the republican virtue shaken in his heart, at sight of the criminal humbled before the sovereign power. But the last proof of devotion due to the country was to stifle every emotion of sensibility. He then reiterated what had been already advanced upon the competence of the convention, upon the endless delays frustrating the national vengeance, and upon the consideration observed for the tyrant, whilst the warmest friends of liberty were attacked without the slightest regard. He asserted that this appeal to the people was a mere scheme similar to that devised by Guadet, when advocating the purging scrutiny, and that its perfidious object was to bring every thing into question again—the existing representation, the 10th August, and the republic itself. Identifying the question, as usual, with himself and his enemies, he drew a comparison between the present situation and that of July 1791, when it was debated whether Louis XVI. should be tried for the flight to Varennes. Robespierre had played an important part upon that occasion. He recalled his own dangers, the successful efforts of his adversaries to replace Louis XVI. upon the throne, the slaughter of the Champ de Mars which had ensued, and the perils to which Louis XVI., when replaced on the throne, had exposed the commonwealth. With malicious perfidy, he depicted his opponents of the present day as the same as his opponents of former times, and represented himself as exposed, and France with him, to the same dangers as then, and still by the intrigues of those miscreants who called themselves exclusively the honest. "At this moment," added Robespierre, "they are silent upon the great interests of the country; they abstain from declaring their opinion upon the last king; but their secret and pernicious activity produces all the troubles which agitate the country; and to mislead the sound but often deceived majority, they assail the purest patriots, under the title of a factious minority. Minorities often resolve into majorities when the eyes of hoodwinked assemblies are opened. Virtue was always in a minority upon earth! Unless it were so, would the earth be peopled by tyrants and slaves? Hampden* and Sydney were in the minority, for they expired on a scaffold. Critias, Anitus, Cæsar, Clodius, were in the majority; but Socrates was in a minority, for he swallowed hemlock—Cato was in the minority, for he tore open his bowels." Robespierre subsequently

* [Probably Russell is meant. Hampden died of a wound received in battle.]

recommended quietness to the galleries, in order to deprive his adversaries of all pretext for accusation, since they represented the simple applauses bestowed on the faithful deputies as proofs of rebellion. "People," he exclaimed, "reserve your applauses, shun the spectacle of our debates! We shall not combat the less resolutely apart from your presence." He at length brought his speech to a conclusion, by demanding that Louis XVI. should be forthwith pronounced guilty, and condemned to death.

The debate continued, and speakers succeeded each other in the tribune during the 28th, the 29th, and till the 31st. Vergniaud ultimately rose for the first time, and extraordinary eagerness was manifested to hear the Girondists expressing their opinions by the tongue of their greatest orator, and breaking a silence with which Robespierre was not the only one to upbraid them.

Vergniaud began by developing the principle of the sovereignty of the people, and distinguishing the cases in which the representatives ought to make a reference to it. It would be attended with too much delay and too many difficulties to appeal on all legislative acts to a great nation; but on certain acts of high importance it was quite otherwise. The constitution, for example, had been destined in advance to the national sanction. But that was not the only object which claimed an extraordinary sanction. The trial of Louis XVI. was invested with such grave considerations, from the accumulation of powers arrogated by the assembly, from the inviolability which had been constitutionally secured to the monarch, and from the political effects which were certain to result from a condemnation, that its high importance could scarcely be contested, nor that the final adjudication ought to be submitted to the people themselves. After having substantiated these positions, Vergniaud, who directed himself peculiarly to the refutation of Robespierre, proceeded to investigate the political dangers of an appeal to the people, and to handle all the great questions which divided the two parties.

He adverted, in the first place, to the contentions which were apprehended from remitting to the people the judgment on the king for sanction. He reproduced the arguments adduced by the other Girondists, and maintained that if no civil war were feared from convoking the primary assemblies to sanction the constitution, no good ground for alarm could exist in their meeting to ratify the sentence on the king. This oft-repeated argument was, after all, of little value, for the constitution was not the grand question of the revolution; it could never be more than a collection of details, under an institution already decreed and accepted—a republic. But the death of the king was a more formidable question, since it involved the momentous point whether the revolution, proceeding by way of death against royalty, should irrevocably break with the past, and march to its proposed goal with inexorable vengeance and energy for its watchwords. Now, if so fearful a question already divided the convention and Paris with such bitterness of discord, there was the greatest danger in introducing it amongst the forty-four thousand sections of the French territory. In all the theatres, in all the popular societies, tumultuous dissensions occurred; and the convention was imperatively called upon boldly to grapple with the difficulty, and decide the question at once and for ever, precisely to prevent it resting with the whole French people, who would have in all probability solved it in multitudinous battle-fields.

Vergniaud, however, partaking upon this point the opinion of his friends, contended that civil war was not to be apprehended. He said that in the departments the agitators had not gained the preponderance which a dastardly weakness had allowed them to usurp in Paris; that they had certainly traversed the surface of the republic, but had nowhere met with aught but scorn; and that the people had given the strongest proof of obedience to the law by respecting the impure blood that flowed in their veins. He subsequently ridiculed the fears that had been expressed respecting the actual majority, which was alleged to be composed of intriguers, royalists, and aristocrats, and held up to merited reproof the presumptuous assertion that virtue was in a minority on earth. "Citizens!" he exclaimed, "Catiline was of the minority in the Roman senate; and if that minority had prevailed, there was an end of Rome, the senate, and liberty. In the Constituent Assembly, Maury and Cazalès were in the minority; and if they had prevailed, there was an end of you. The kings also are in a minority upon earth, and to enchain the people, they assert likewise that virtue is in a minority! They also say that the majority of populations is composed of intriguers, who must be awed to silence by terror, if empires are to be preserved from a general convulsion."

He then tauntingly asked whether, in order to constitute a majority conformable to the desires of certain men, it was deemed expedient to employ banishment and death, to convert France into a desert, and thus abandon it to the conceptions of frantic miscreants.

After having avenged the majority of France, he vindicated himself and his friends, whom he exhibited constantly resisting, and with equal courage, all despotisms—that of the court and that of the brigands of September. He pourtrayed them, during the day of the 10th August, sitting calmly amidst the roar of cannon from the palace, and pronouncing the deposition before the victory of the people, whilst those Brutuses, so eager now to throttle prostrate tyrants, hid their terrors in the bowels of the earth, and there ignominiously awaited the issue of the uncertain combat waging by liberty against despotism.

He then retorted upon his adversaries the reproach of stirring up civil war. "Yes," said he, "those are the genuine instigators of civil war, who, preaching assassination against the partisans of tyranny, apply that epithet to all the victims their hatred prompts them to destroy; those who invoke poniards against the representatives of the people, and clamour for the dissolution of the government and of the convention; those who conspire that the minority may become the arbiter of the majority, that it may enforce its decrees by insurrections, and that the Catilines may be called to dominion in the senate. They desire civil war who inculcate these maxims in all public places, and mystify the people by stigmatising reason as *Feuillantism*, justice as pusillanimity, and sacred humanity as conspiracy."

"Civil war!" exclaimed the orator, rebuking Robespierre, "by invoking the sovereignty of the people! But in July 1791 you were more modest—you were not then so solicitous to depreciate it and usurp its functions. You busied yourself in circulating a petition praying the assembly to consult the people on the judgment to be passed on Louis XVI. after the return from Varennes! At that time you upheld the sovereignty of the people, and were far from surmising that its invocation was equivalent to civil war! Was it because it then favoured your secret views, and it now thwarts them?"

Vergniaud subsequently turned to other considerations. It had been said that the assembly ought to evince sufficient greatness and courage to execute its judgment without seeking to support itself by the opinion of the people. "Courage was needed," said he, "to attack Louis XVI. in the plenitude of his power—is much required to send Louis, vanquished and disarmed, to the scaffold? A Cimbrian soldier entered the cell of Marius to kill him; terrified at the aspect of his victim, he fled without daring to strike. Do you doubt if that soldier had been a member of the senate, he would have hesitated to vote the death of the tyrant? What courage do you discover in an act of which any poltroon is capable?"

Adverting to another order of courage, that which must be displayed against foreign powers, he said, "Since you talk continually of a great political act, it is not inexpedient to consider the question in that light. We are well aware that the powers merely wait for this concluding pretext to pour all together upon France. She will vanquish them, doubtless; the heroism of the French soldiers is a sure guarantee; but war will compel an increased expenditure, additional efforts of all kinds. If, then, hostilities induce fresh emissions of assignats, thereby enhancing in a fearful proportion the price of the first necessaries of life—if they give new and mortal stabs to commerce—if they cause torrents of blood to flow on land and sea—what great benefits will you have conferred on humanity? What gratitude will your country owe you for having perpetrated in its name, and in despite of its contemned sovereignty, an act of vengeance, become the cause, or even the pretext, of events so calamitous? I discard," emphatically exclaimed the speaker, "every idea of discomfiture; but will you dare vaunt your services? There will not be a family without a father or a son to mourn; agriculture will soon languish for want of hands to till; the workshops will be forsaken; your exhausted exchequer will demand fresh taxes; the social body, worn out by the assaults made upon it from without by armed enemies, from within by contending factions, will fall into a mortal languor. Tremble lest amidst those triumphs France may not resemble those famous monuments which in Egypt have vanquished time: the stranger as he passes wonders at their greatness: should he penetrate, what meets his eye?—inanimate ashes and the silence of the tomb."

Besides these fears, there were others which presented themselves to the mind of Vergniaud; they were suggested to him by the history of England, and by the conduct of Cromwell, the principal but hidden author of the death of Charles I. That man, always stimulating the people, first against the king, then against the parliament itself, eventually broke his feeble instrument and seated himself in supreme power. "Have you not heard," added Vergniaud, on this topic, "within these walls and elsewhere, men crying, '*If bread be dear, the cause is at the Temple; if specie be scarce, if our armies be badly provided, the cause is at the Temple; if we have to suffer the daily spectacle of indigence, the cause is at the Temple!*'"

Those who hold this language, nevertheless, are not ignorant that the high price of bread, the deficient supplies of food, the defective administration in the war departments, and the indigence which so acutely afflicts our sensibility, are owing to other causes than any at the Temple. What, then, are their designs? Who will assure me that those same men who strive so pertinaciously to degrade the convention, and would have perhaps succeeded in that object if the majesty of the people, which resides in it, could by any possibility have been affected by their falsehoods—those same men who every where proclaim that a new revolution is necessary, who induce such and such sections to declare themselves in a state of permanent insurrection, who say at the commune that when the convention succeeded Louis they did but change their tyrant, and that another 10th August is indispensable; those men who speak only of plots, death, traitors, proscriptions, who inculcate in the sectional assemblies, and in their publications, that a *defender* must be named for the republic, that its hope of safety rests in a single chief—who will assure me, I ask, that those same men will not exclaim, after the death of Louis, with exaggerated violence, '*If bread be dear, the cause is in the convention; if specie be scarce, if our armies be badly provided, the cause is in the convention; if the machine of government be moved with difficulty, the cause is in the convention intrusted with its direction; if the calamities of war have been aggravated by the declarations of England and Spain, the cause is the convention, which provoked those declarations by the precipitate condemnation of Louis?*'

Who will assure me that around those seditious cries of turbulent anarchy there will not rally an aristocracy thirsting for vengeance, misery eager for change, and even the pity inveterate prejudices will have excited for the fate of Louis? Who will assure me that in this tempest, during whose fury the assassins of September will be seen starting from their dens, there will not be presented to you, steeped in gore and saluted as a liberator, that *defender*, that chief who is said to be so indispensable? A chief! ah! if such were their audacity, his appearance would be the signal for a thousand daggers to be planted in his body! But to what horrors would not Paris in the interim be abandoned—Paris, whose heroic courage against kings posterity will admire, and never conceive its ignominious subjection to a handful of brigands, the refuse of the human species, agitating in its very heart, and tearing it in every direction in the convulsive throes of their madness and ambition! Who would be able to inhabit a city where terror and death held sway? And you, industrious citizens, whose industry produces all wealth, and for whom the means of industry would be destroyed—you who have made such great sacrifices for the revolution, and from whom the last remnant would be wrested—you whose virtues, ardent patriotism, and pure sincerity, have too easily rendered you open to seduction—what would become of you? what resources would you have? what hands would stanch your wounds and administer succour to your wailing families?

Would you seek those false friends, those perfidious flatterers, who had precipitated you into the abyss? Alas! rather fly them! Dread their reply! I will foretell it to you. You would ask of them bread, and they would say to you, '*Go into the quarries, and dispute with the earth for some bleeding fragments of the victims you have slaughtered!*' or, '*Will you have blood? Here take, this is blood and human flesh, we have no other sustenance to offer you!*' You shudder, citizens! Oh, my country! I invoke thee to attest the efforts which I make to save thee from this terrible crisis."

Vergniaud's extemporary oratory produced a profound impression upon his auditors, and excited general admiration. Robespierre had slunk abashed beneath the fire of his frank and vigorous eloquence. But although it had shaken, it failed to persuade the assembly, which still hesitated between the two parties. Several speakers were successively heard for and against the appeal to the people. Brissot, Gensonné, and Pétion, all supported it in their turns. Eventually a deputy rose, who operated a decisive influence upon the question: this was Barrère. From his pliability, his cold and evasive reasoning, he was at once the type and the oracle of the centre or Plain. He discoursed largely upon the trial, viewed it in all its phases as regarded facts, laws, and policy, and supplied motives for condemning to all those feeble minds who only required specious grounds for yielding. His mediocre arguments served as efficient pretexts to all who hung in trembling suspense; and from that moment the unhappy monarch's doom was sealed. The debate was prolonged till the 7th January 1793, by which time every one was thoroughly weary of the monotonous repetition of the same facts and arguments. It was declared closed without opposition; but a motion for a fresh adjournment excited a tumult of the most violent description, but was finally disposed of by a decree definitively fixing the 14th January for framing the questions and calling the roll of members.

When that fatal day arrived, an extraordinary concourse of spectators surrounded the assembly and filled the galleries. Several members pressed to the tribune, propounding various forms of submitting the questions. At length, after a long debate, the convention resolved all the questions into the three following:—

Is Louis Capet guilty of conspiracy against the liberty of the nation, and of crimes against the general safety of the state?

Shall the judgment, whatever it may be, be referred to the sanction of the people?

What penalty shall be inflicted on him?

The whole day was consumed in settling the questions. The 15th was devoted to the call of members. The assembly passed a preliminary resolution that each member should pronounce his vote in the tribune; that the vote might be accompanied with reasons, and should be written and signed; that the absent without cause should be censured, but that those who subsequently appeared might record their votes, even after the call was finished. At last this dreaded call commenced upon the first question. Eight members were absent on account of illness, and twenty on commissions of the assembly. Thirty-seven, alleging different reasons for their conclusion, acknowledged Louis XVI. guilty, but declared themselves incompetent to pronounce a sentence, and demanded mere general measures of precaution against him. Six hundred and eighty-three members declared Louis XVI. guilty, without explanation. The assembly was composed of 749 members.

The president, in the name of the National Convention, declared Louis Capet "guilty of conspiracy against the liberty of the nation, and of crimes against the general safety of the state."

The call recommenced on the second question, that of the appeal to the people. Twenty-nine members were absent. Four, namely, Lafon, Waudelaincourt, Morisson, and Lacroix, declined to vote. The deputy Noël protested. Eleven gave their opinions coupled with different conditions. Two hundred and eighty-one voted for the appeal to the people; four hundred and twenty-three rejected it. The president declared, in the name of the National Convention, that "the sentence on Louis XVI. shall not be referred to the ratification of the people."

The whole of the 15th was taken up in the individual vote upon the two first questions; the third was adjourned to the sitting of the following day.

The excitement in Paris grew more intense as the decisive moment approached. At the theatres, cries in favour of Louis XVI. had been uttered during the representation of a piece called "The Friend of the Laws." The commune had ordered the suspension of all theatrical exhibitions; but the executive council had revoked the measure as an attack on the liberty of the press, under which category the liberty of the stage was comprehended. In the prisons the inmates were in the deepest consternation. Rumours had gone abroad that the frightful days of September were to be renewed, and the prisoners and their relatives besieged the deputies with supplications to save them from death. The Jacobins, on their side, asserted that conspiracies were hatching in all quarters to screen Louis XVI. from punishment and to re-establish royalty. Their rage, stimulated by the delays and obstacles opposed to its gratification, broke out into more furious menaces; and the two parties were thus additionally incensed against each other by their mutual suspicions of sinister designs.

The multitude congregated around the hall of the assembly on the morning of the 16th, far exceeded the numbers of the previous days. The proceedings of that day were to be decisive, for the verdict of guilty became in reality of no value if Louis XVI. were simply condemned to banishment, and the object of those desirous to save him would be fully gained, since all they could possibly hope for at the moment was to snatch him from the scaffold. The galleries had been early usurped by the Jacobins, and their eyes were intently fixed on the tribune, where each deputy was to appear when recording his vote. Several hours were consumed by the convention in attending to measures of public order, in summoning and hearing the ministers, and in eliciting explanations from the mayor respecting the closing of the barriers, which were alleged to have been kept shut during the day. It was ordered that they should remain open, and that the federalists then in Paris should share with the Parisians in doing duty through the city and at all the public establishments. As the day was already far advanced, it was resolved that the sitting should be permanent until the conclusion of the voting. At the instant the call was about to commence, a doubt was started upon the proportion of voices necessary to pass a particular sentence. Lehardy proposed two-thirds, as in the criminal courts. Danton, who had just arrived from Belgium, strongly opposed that suggestion, and advocated the simple majority, that is to say, the moiety plus one. Lanjuinais braved a fresh storm by strenuously insisting that, after so flagrantly violating all the other forms of justice, the convention should at least observe that which rendered two-thirds of the suffrages indispensable. "We are to vote," he exclaimed, "under the daggers and the cannons of the factious." At these words, multitudinous vociferations assailed the speaker, and the assembly stopped the debate by resolving that the formalities observed in its decrees were peculiar, and that, according to those formalities, they were all passed by a simple majority.

It was now half-past seven in the evening, and the calling to vote began with the prospect of continuing through the night. Some pronounced death unconditionally; others declared for detention and banishment after peace; a certain number voted death with a restriction, in the form of an invitation to examine whether it might not be advisable to respite the execution. Mailhe was the deviser of this restriction, which was capable of saving Louis XVI., for time was every thing in the case, and delay equivalent to acquittal. The expedient was adopted by several members.

The voting proceeded in the midst of tumult. At this moment, the interest inspired by Louis XVI. had reached its height, and many members had entered with the intention of declaring in his favour; but on the opposite side, the malevolence of his enemies had likewise waxed in fierceness, and the people had been finally led to identify the cause of the republic with the death of the last king, and to deem the republic condemned and royalty re-established if Louis XVI. were saved. Alarmed at the ferment this popular conviction excited, several members began to dread civil war; and, although greatly moved at the fate of Louis, they shuddered at the consequences of an acquittal. This apprehension became greater at sight of the convention and the scene passing within its walls. As each deputy ascended the steps of the tribune, all noise was hushed to hear him; but the instant he had voted, marks of approbation or displeasure were boisterously manifested, and followed him as he returned to his seat. The galleries received with murmurs every vote not for death; their occupants often directed threatening gestures to the assembly itself. The deputies retorted from the interior of the hall, and thence resulted a tumultuous interchange of hot defiance and opprobrious phrases. This mournful and terrible scene caused many a heart to quake, and changed various resolutions. Lecointre of Versailles, whose courage was undoubted, and who had been one of the most vehement gesticulators against the galleries, came into the tribune, paused in evident tremor, and dropped from his lips the unexpected and irrevocable word—"Death." Vergniaud, who had felt so deep a sympathy for Louis XVI., and had even declared to his friends that he never could bring himself to condemn that unfortunate prince—Vergniaud, when he beheld so lamentable a scene of uproar, believed it indicative of civil war in France, and gave his vote for death, coupling it, nevertheless, with the amendment of Mailhe. Being interrogated

upon his change of opinion, he replied that he felt assured civil war was ready to explode, and that he dared not put the life of a single individual in the balance against the safety of all France.

A great many of the Girondists adopted the amendment of Mailhe. One deputy whose vote excited an extraordinary sensation was the Duke of Orleans. Obliged to render himself acceptable to the Jacobins or perish, he pronounced the death of his kinsman, and returned to his seat amidst the universal and indescribable agitation caused by his vote.* This melancholy scene continued throughout the night of the 16th and the day of the 17th, till seven in the evening. The examination of the votes was awaited with breathless anxiety. The avenues were thronged with an immense crowd, and eager inquiries ran from mouth to mouth as to the result of the scrutiny. In the assembly itself great uncertainty prevailed, for the words "detention" and "banishment" were thought to have been heard as often as the more emphatic one of "death." According to some, the condemnation had failed by one vote, whilst others alleged that the casting voice rested on the other side. It was universally allowed, however, that a single suffrage might decide the question, and great solicitude was felt whether a new voter might not arrive. At that identical moment a man was descried at the foot of the tribune, moving painfully forwards, and whose bandaged head proclaimed him an invalid. It was Duchastel, deputy of the Deux-Sevres, who had risen from his bed of sickness to record his vote. His appearance was the signal for astounding vociferations. Their purport was that the conspirators had forced him out to save Louis XVI., and that he ought to be subjected to an interrogation. This the assembly refused, and sustained his privilege of voting in virtue of the resolution which admitted suffrages after the general call. Duchastel ascended the tribune with an air of firmness, and amidst the profoundest attention gave his voice for banishment.

Other incidents succeeded. The minister for foreign affairs solicited liberty to speak, in order to communicate a note of the Chevalier d'Ocariz, the Spanish ambassador. He offered the neutrality of Spain and its good offices with the other powers, if the life of Louis XVI. were spared. The impatient Mountaineers exclaimed that this was a preconcerted diversion to originate fresh obstacles, and demanded the order of the day. Danton urged that war should be instantly declared against Spain. The assembly adopted in preference the order of the day. Another request was then submitted; it was from the advocates of Louis XVI., who desired to appear before the assembly for the purpose of making a communication. Redoubled cries issued from the Mountain. Robespierre insisted that all defence was terminated, that counsel could have nothing more to impart to the convention, that the judgment was already passed, and that it ought to be forthwith pronounced. It was resolved that the advocates should not be introduced until after the promulgation of the sentence.

Vergniaud occupied the presidential chair. "Citizens," said he, "I am about to announce the result of the scrutiny. You will preserve, I hope, a profound silence. When justice has spoken, humanity resumes its sway."

The assembly was composed of 749 members; fifteen were absent on commissions, eight from illness, and five had declined voting, which reduced the number of deputies present to 721, and the absolute majority to 361. The scrutiny showed that 286 had voted for detention or banishment under different conditions. Two had voted for irons; forty-six for death with a respite, either till the peace or till the ratification of the constitution. Twenty-six had declared for death, but like Mailhe, they had recommended the question for consideration whether it might not be advantageous to respite the execution. Their vote, however, was independent of this restrictive clause. Three hundred and sixty-one had voted for death without condition.

The president, in an accent of grief, declared, in the name of the convention, that "*the penalty pronounced against Louis Capet is death.*"*

The advocates of Louis XVI. were immediately after this announcement ushered to the bar. Desèze was the first to speak. He said he had been sent by his client to interpose an appeal to the people from the judgment passed by the convention. He rested his procedure upon the small majority which had decided the condemnation, and argued that, since such conscientious doubts had been entertained by so many enlightened minds, it was but reasonable to refer it to the nation itself. Tronchet subjoined that the penal code having been followed with regard to the severity of the punishment, it should surely have been respected in the humanity of its forms; consequently, the provision requiring two-thirds of the voices ought not to have been disregarded. The venerable Malesherbes rose also in his turn, and, in a voice broken with sobs, essayed to speak. "Citizens," said he, "I am unused to oratory—I observe with pain that you refuse me time to collect my ideas upon the mode of reckoning the votes—I have many observations to impress upon you—but—citizens—pardon my confusion—grant me until to-morrow to lay my ideas before you."

The assembly was moved at sight of the tears and the grey hairs of the estimable old man. "Citizens," said Vergniaud to the three advocates, "the convention has heard your reclamations; they were made by you in execution of a sacred duty." Then addressing the assembly, he added: "Is it your pleasure to decern the honours of the sitting to the defenders of Louis?" "Yes, yes," was the unanimous rejoinder.

Robespierre immediately took possession of the tribune, and quoting the decree already passed against the appeal to the people, repudiated the demand of the advocates. Guadet recommended that, without admitting the appeal to the people, twenty-four hours should be allowed to Malesherbes. Merlin of Douai maintained that the manner of accounting the votes was as a topic absolutely foreclosed, inasmuch as, if the penal code, so constantly invoked, required two-

* [The reader will probably pardon another quotation from the author of *The Graphic History of the National Convention*. It conveys one of his best pictures.

"Egalité, walking with a faltering step and a countenance paler than the corpse already stretched in the tomb, advanced to the place where he was to put the seal to his eternal infamy; and there, unable to utter a word in public unless it were written down, he read, in these terms, his fearful vote:—

'Exclusively governed by my duty, and convinced that all those who have resisted the sovereignty of the people deserve death, my vote is for DEATH!'

'Oh, the monster!' broke forth from all sides; 'how infamous!' and general hisses and imprecations attended Egalité as he returned to his seat. His conduct appeared so atrocious, that of all the assassins of September, of all the wretches of every description who were there assembled, and truly the number was not small, *not one* ventured to applaud him; all, on the contrary, viewed him with distrust or detestation; and after the declaration of his vote, the agitation of the assembly was extreme. From the effect it produced, it seemed as if Egalité, by that single vote, had irrevocably condemned Louis to death, and that all that followed was but a vain formality."—Vol. ii. p. 48.]

* ["When the fatal words were pronounced, an explosion of satanic joy was expected from the tribunes; nothing of the kind occurred. An universal stupor took possession of the whole assembly, damping alike the atrocious hurras and the infernal applause. The victory which had been obtained filled the victors with as much awe as it inspired the vanquished with consternation; hardly was a hollow murmur heard; the members gazed at each other in deathlike silence; every one seemed to dread even the sound of his own voice. There is something so overpowering in great events, that those even whose passions they most completely satisfy are restrained from giving vent to their feelings."—*Graphic History of the Convention*, vol. ii. p. 61.]

thirds of the voices for a decision on the fact, it required but a simple majority for the adjudication of the punishment. As, in the case under discussion, the criminality had been declared almost unanimously, it was of very little moment that a bare majority had been obtained for the sentence.

In consequence of these observations, the convention passed to the order of the day upon the reclamations of the advocates, declared the appeal of Louis null, and deferred till the morrow the question of respite. When that morrow came (the 18th), a complaint was lodged that the enumeration of the votes had not been taken with exactness, and a fresh examination was accordingly demanded. The whole day was engrossed by contentions: the calculation was eventually found to be accurate, but the assembly was compelled to adjourn till the following morning the question of respite.

On the 19th, therefore, this final question was agitated. It brought the whole process into dilemma again, for delay was to Louis XVI. life itself. But, after having exhausted their whole artillery of reason in the previous discussions upon the punishment and the appeal, the Girondists and those who wished to save Louis XVI. were completely at a loss for further arguments. They indeed once more brought forward the allegation of political reasons; but they were quickly answered that if Louis XVI. were dead, the powers would doubtless arm to avenge him, and that if he were alive and incarcerated, they would just as doubtless arm to deliver him, and that the consequences would be precisely similar. Barrère represented that it was disgraceful thus to parade a head in the European courts, and stipulate for the life or death of a condemned person as an article of treaty. He added, that it would be an act of cruelty to Louis himself, who would be exposed to death at every movement of the armies. The assembly, hastily closing the discussion, resolved that each member should vote *yea* or *nay* without quitting his place. At three o'clock in the morning of the 20th January the call was finished, and the president declared, upon a majority of 380 to 310 voices, that there should be no respite to the execution of Louis Capet.

At this instant a letter was brought from Kersaint. That deputy resigned his seat, stating to the assembly that he could no longer endure the ignominy of sitting in its ranks amongst men of blood, when their counsels, aided by the force of terror, gained the ascendancy over those of virtuous men—when Marat prevailed over Pétion. This letter caused prodigious excitement. Gensonné took the initiative, and availed himself of the occasion to avenge upon the Septembrisers the sentence of death that had been so recently passed. "It was of little consequence," he said, "to have merely punished the outrages of tyranny, if others much more formidable were suffered to enjoy impunity. The convention had but performed the moiety of its task, unless it subjected to dire expiation the crimes of September, and enjoined a prosecution against their instigators." The greater part of the assembly rose and responded to this sentiment with acclamation. Marat and Tallien attempted to stem the movement. "If you punish," they exclaimed, "the instigators of September, punish likewise the conspirators who were intrenched in the palace on the day of the 10th August." The assembly, acting upon all these suggestions, forthwith ordered the minister of justice to institute proceedings against the promoters of the offences committed during the early days of September, the individuals found bearing arms in the palace on the night of the 9th and 10th August, and the functionaries who quitted their posts to repair to Paris for the purpose of conspiring with the court.

Louis XVI. was definitively condemned. No reprieve could defer the execution of the sentence, and all conceivable means for postponing the fatal hour had been tried in vain. The members of the right side, secret royalists as well as republicans, were equally dismayed, both at the cruelty of the sentence and the ascendancy manifestly acquired by the Mountaineers. In Paris a dead stupor reigned; the audacity of the new governing power had produced the ordinary effect of force on the masses; it had paralysed and reduced to silence the great majority, and excited indignation simply in a few more unbending minds. There were still some old retainers of Louis XVI., some young nobles, and some guardsmen, who purposed, as it was rumoured, to rush to the rescue of their king and snatch him from the scaffold. But to meet, to exchange ideas, to concert, in short, amidst the profound terror on the one hand and the active vigilance on the other, was impracticable, and all that could possibly occur must amount only to certain isolated acts of despair. The Jacobins, in raptures at their triumph, were nevertheless themselves amazed at it; and they exhorted each other to keep in close array during the last and critical twenty-four hours, to send trusty messengers to all the authorities—the commune, the staff of the national guard, the department, and the executive council—to keep alive their zeal and ensure the execution of the sentence. They boasted that this execution would take place, that it must infallibly take place; but from the very eagerness wherewith they repeated that opinion, it was clear that they were not so sure of the catastrophe as they pretended. The death of a king on a public scaffold, in the heart of a country which in its manners, usages, and laws, was but three years previously an absolute monarchy, seemed still environed with doubt, and to be rendered credible only by the event itself.

Upon the executive council was thrown the painful duty of putting the sentence in execution. All the ministers had assembled in the council-chamber, depressed and horror-struck; of their body, Garat, as minister of justice, was charged with the most melancholy of all commissions—that of waiting upon Louis XVI., and imparting to him the decrees of the convention. He accordingly repaired to the Temple, accompanied by Santerre, by a deputation from the commune and the criminal tribunal, and by the secretary of the executive council. Louis XVI. had anxiously expected a visit from his defenders for the last four days, and had often vainly requested to see them. Two hours after mid-day of the 20th January he was still looking every instant for their arrival, when he suddenly heard the welcome sounds of steps approaching; he hastened forward and perceived the messengers of the executive council. He paused with dignity upon the threshold of the door, and allowed no outward symptom of emotion to escape him. Garat addressed him with an air of sadness, and communicated to him the object of his mission. Grouvelle, the secretary of the executive council, upon the intimation of his superior, read aloud the decrees of the convention. The first declared Louis XVI. guilty of crimes affecting the general security of the state; the second condemned him to death; the third rejected all appeal to the people; and the fourth enjoined the execution within twenty-four hours. Louis, surveying those who surrounded him with a tranquil gaze, took the paper containing the decrees from the hands of Grouvelle, placed it in his pocket, and read to Garat a letter in which he requested three days to prepare for death, a confessor to assist him in his last moments, the privilege of seeing his family, and permission for it to leave France. Garat received the letter, with a promise to lay it without loss of time before the convention. The king at the same time gave him the address of the ecclesiastic whose last offices he desired to secure.

Louis XVI. re-entered his apartment with undisturbed serenity, directed dinner to be served, and partook of the meats as usual. Knives had been purposely withheld, and were refused him when he desired they might be brought. "Do they think me

such a coward," said he, with dignity, "as to attempt my own life? I am innocent, and will die without fear." He was obliged, however to dispense with a knife. After finishing his repast, he returned to his chamber, and awaited the rejoinder to his letter with perfect calmness.

The convention refused the respite, but granted all the other demands. Garat dispatched a messenger to M. Edgeworth de Firmont, the ecclesiastic selected by Louis XVI.; he offered him a seat in his own carriage, and conducted him in person to the Temple. He reached that prison at six o'clock, and immediately proceeded to the great tower, accompanied by Santerre. He apprised the king that the convention permitted him the solace of a minister of religion, and to see his family without witnesses, but that it repelled the application for a respite.

Garat added that M. Edgeworth had arrived, that he was in an adjacent room, and would be immediately introduced. He then retired, with increased amazement and admiration at the placid magnanimity of the prince.

When ushered into the presence of the king, M. Edgeworth would have thrown himself at his feet, but the king prevented him, and both together melted into tears of tenderness. He then inquired with lively curiosity after the state of the clergy of France, after several bishops, and especially after the Archbishop of Paris, whom he begged M. Edgeworth to assure that he died sincerely attached to his communion. Eight o'clock having struck, he arose, requested M. Edgeworth to wait, and left him in great emotion, saying he was going to see his family. The municipal officers, unwilling to lose sight of the king's person even whilst he was with his family, had determined that the interview should take place in the eating-room, which was provided with a glass door, and in which all his motions could be observed without his words being overheard. The king, consequently, proceeded to that apartment, and caused water to be placed on the table, lest the princesses might have need of such relief. He walked uneasily to and fro. anxiously awaiting the painful moment in which beings so dear to him should appear. At half-past eight the door opened; the queen, holding the dauphin by the hand, the Princess Elizabeth, and the princess-royal, flew into the arms of Louis XVI., sobbing bitterly. The door was closed, and the municipal officers, Cléry, and M. Edgeworth, planted themselves before the glazed frames, to witness the heart-rending interview. During the first moments, the scene was one of distraction and despairing wo. Shrieks, lamentations, convulsive sobs, dimly expressed its intense desolation. At length the tears were dried, conversation became more tranquil, and the princesses, still holding the king in their arms, spoke to him for some time in subdued tones. After a conference of considerable duration, broken by intervals of speechless dejection, he moved to depart, fearful of being altogether overpowered by so afflicting a situation, and promised to see them again the following morning at eight o'clock. "You promise us?" urged the princesses, with solicitude. "Yes, yes!" replied the king, sighing deeply. At this moment, the queen had grasped him by one arm, the Princess Elizabeth by the other; the princess-royal held her arms tightly clasped round her father's waist, and the young prince, in front of him, stretched his hands to his mother and his aunt. At the instant of separation, the young princess-royal fell in a swoon; she was quickly revived, and the king returned to M. Edgeworth, grievously depressed at the agonising scene. In a few minutes, however, he succeeded in retrieving himself, and resumed all his serenity.

M. Edgeworth then proposed to celebrate mass, which the king had not heard for a long period. After some demur, the commune consented to allow the ceremony, and a requisition was made to the neighbouring church for the necessary ornaments to be furnished on the following morning. The king retired to rest about midnight, desiring Cléry to awaken him before five o'clock. M. Edgeworth threw himself on a bed; Cléry remained standing by the pillow of his master, contemplating the peaceful slumber he enjoyed on the eve of an ignominious execution.

Whilst these things were passing at the Temple, a deplorable event had occurred in the city. A few indignant spirits, scattered here and there, it is certain were hotly brooding over the coming catastrophe, although the mass, either terror-struck or supine, remained quiescent. A body-guardsman, named Pâris, had resolved to avenge the death of Louis XVI. upon one of his judges. Lepelletier Saint-Fargeau had, like many others of his rank, voted for death, with the view of screening from odium his birth and fortune. He had thereby excited greater indignation amongst the royalists, on account of the class to which he belonged. On the evening of the 20th, he was pointed out to the guardsman Pâris, as he seated himself at table in a coffee-room of the Palais-Royal. The young man, enveloped in a large cloak, approached him, saying, "Thou art the miscreant Lepelletier, who voted the death of the king?" "Yes," replied the other; "but I am not a miscreant; I voted according to my conscience." "So!" retorted Paris; "here is thy reward!" and he dug his sword into his side. Lepelletier fell, and Pâris disappeared before any one had time to seize his person.

Tidings of this event spread rapidly into all quarters. It was proclaimed in the convention, the Jacobin Club, and the commune; and the occurrence gave additional credit to the rumours of a royalist conspiracy, intended to massacre the left side and deliver the king at the foot of the scaffold. The Jacobins declared their sitting permanent, and dispatched fresh commissioners to all the authorities and all the sections, to stimulate zeal and place the whole population under arms.

The following morning, the 21st January, five o'clock had tolled at the Temple. The king awoke, called Cléry, inquired the hour, and, rising, dressed with great deliberation. He congratulated himself on having recruited his strength by sleep. Cléry lighted a fire, and brought a chest of drawers, which he converted into an altar. M. Edgeworth assumed the pontifical garments, and commenced the celebration of mass. Cléry officiated as assistant; and the king heard it, kneeling with deep devotion. He afterwards received the sacrament from the hands of M. Edgeworth, and, the ceremony concluded, he rose with fresh resolution, and waited in tranquillity for the moment of proceeding to the scaffold. He asked for scissors, with the view of cutting his hair himself, and avoiding that humiliating operation at the hands of the executioners; but the commune refused him a pair, distrusting his purpose.

At this period the drums were beating through the capital. All who formed part of the armed sections repaired to their companies in perfect submission; and those whom no obligation called to co-operate in the service of that portentous day, remained shut up in their houses. The doors and windows were closed, and each awaited in his own abode the final accomplishment of the catastrophe. It was reported that four or five hundred devoted men were to rush upon the carriage and rescue the king. The convention, the commune, the executive council, the Jacobin Club, were all sitting.

At eight o'clock, Santerre, with a deputation from the commune, the department, and the criminal tribunal, arrived at the Temple. Louis XVI., hearing the noise, arose and prepared to depart. He had declined seeing his family again, to avoid a renewal of the unnerving scene of the previous evening. He charged Cléry to carry his farewell to his wife, sister, and children; and he gave him a signet, some hair, and trinkets, with a commission to deliver them into

their possession. He then pressed his hand, thanking him for his services. Subsequently, turning to one of the municipal officers, he begged him to transmit his testament to the commune. This official was an expriest, called Jacques-Roux, who brutally replied that his duty was to conduct him to execution, and not to perform commissions. One of his colleagues took the charge on himself; and Louis, advancing towards the attendant group, gave the signal for departure with unshaken firmness.

Two officers of gendarmerie were seated in the front part of the coach; the king and M. Edgeworth occupied the back seat. During the route, which was long and tedious, the king read the prayers of the dying from his confessor's breviary, and the two gendarmes were struck with his exemplary piety and resignation. They were instructed, it is said, to kill him if the coach were attacked. However, no hostile demonstration was manifested from the Temple to the Place de la Revolution. An armed multitude lined the way; the vehicle advanced slowly, and amidst an universal silence. On the square of the Revolution, a large space had been left vacant around the scaffold. Cannon encompassed this space; the most zealous federalists were planted nearest the scaffold, and a vile mob, ever ready to insult genius, virtue, or misfortune, when instigated by worthless leaders, pressed behind the ranks of the federalists, and alone gave any external signs of gratification, whilst all others sought to bury in the innermost recesses of the heart the painful feelings they experienced.

At ten minutes past ten the carriage stopped. Louis XVI., rising unperturbed, alighted on the square. Three executioners came forward; he repulsed them, and disarranged his own dress. But, seeing that they wished to bind his hands, he gave way to a feeling of indignation, and seemed prepared to defend himself. M. Edgeworth, all whose words on the occasion were sublime, turned upon him a last look, and said, "Suffer this outrage as a final resemblance to the God about to become your recompense." At these words, the victim, resigned and docile, allowed himself to be bound and led to the scaffold. Suddenly, Louis stepped apart, shook off the executioners, and advanced to address the people. "Frenchmen," said he, in a firm voice, "I die innocent of the crimes laid to my charge: I pardon the authors of my death; and pray that my blood may not be visited on France." He would have continued, but an order to beat the drums was instantly given; their rolling drowned the voice of the monarch: the executioners rudely seized upon him, and M. Edgeworth solemnly pronounced the words: "*Son of Saint Louis, ascend to heaven!*"*

Scarcely had his blood spouted forth, than monsters dipped their pikes and handkerchiefs in it, and spread through Paris, vociferating "Long live the republic! The nation for ever!" and even thronged to the gates of the Temple, exhibiting the insensate and spurious joy the multitude always manifests at the birth, the accession, or the fall of princes.

CHAPTER XIX.

POSITION OF PARTIES AFTER THE DEATH OF LOUIS XVI.—ASPECT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS.—SECOND COALITION AGAINST FRANCE.—STRUGGLES BETWEEN THE GIRONDISTS AND MOUNTAINEERS.—ESTABLISHMENT OF THE EXTRAORDINARY CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL.

The death of the unfortunate Louis XVI. had produced profound consternation in France, and mingled astonishment and indignation in Europe. As the more discerning revolutionists had foreseen, the nation was irretrievably committed to the most rancorous hostilities, and every avenue to conciliation was irrevocably closed. The necessity was thenceforth imposed on the revolution of waging battle against the coalesced thrones and vanquishing them, or itself sinking beneath their assaults. Nor was any attempt made to conceal the danger; in the assembly, in the Jacobin Club, every where, in fact, it was proclaimed that external defence ought to be the material object of attention; and from this moment the topics of war and finance were constantly inscribed on the order of the day.

We have seen with what apprehensions the two domestic parties regarded each other. The Jacobins thought they beheld a dangerous lurking of royalism in the resistance offered to the condemnation of Louis XVI., and in the horror manifested by several of the departments at the excesses committed since the 10th August. To the last moment, therefore, they had doubted their victory; but the easy execution of the 21st January finally dispelled all their forebodings. Thenceforward they deemed it possible that the cause of the revolution should flourish; and they drew up addresses with the view of enlightening the departments and effecting their conversion. The Girondists, on the contrary, already struck with commiseration for the fate of Louis XVI., and now alarmed besides at the triumph of their adversaries, began to discover in the catastrophe of the 21st January the prelude to long and sanguinary outrages, and the first step towards that inexorable system they so strenuously resisted. Their opponents, indeed, had conceded them the prosecution of the authors of September; but it was a nominal and sterile advantage. In abandoning Louis XVI., their main desire had been to demonstrate that they were not royalists; in abandoning the Septembrisers, the others had been anxious to escape the charge that they protected crime; but neither instance tended, save in a very remote degree, to convince or to mitigate distrust on the one side or the other. The Jacobins still looked upon them as lukewarm republicans, if not as royalists, and they in

* ["Thus perished, at the age of thirty-nine, after a reign of 16½ years, passed in seeking good, the best but the weakest of monarchs. His ancestors bequeathed him a revolution. He was more fitted than any of them to prevent or terminate it, for he was capable of being a reforming king before it broke out, or of being, after its explosion, a constitutional king. He is the only prince, perhaps, who, without passions, had not even that of power; and who combined the two qualities which make good kings, the fear of God and love for the people. He perished the victim of passions he did not partake—those of the persons surrounding him, which were alien to him, and those of the multitude, which he had not excited. There are few kingly memories equally worthy of praise. History will say of him that, with a little more strength of mind, he had stood alone in the list of kings."—*Mignet*, vol. i. p. 233.

"The sight of the royal corpse produced divers sensations in the minds of the spectators. Some cut off parts of his dress; others sought to gather a few fragments of his hair; a few dipped their sabres in his blood; and many hurried from the scene, evincing in their countenances the most poignant grief. An Englishman, bolder than the rest, threw himself at the foot of the scaffold, dipped his handkerchief in the blood which covered the ground, and disappeared.

In the capital, the great body of the citizens appeared to be overwhelmed by a general stupor; they hardly ventured to look each other in the face on the streets; sadness was depicted on every countenance; a heavy disquietude seemed to have taken possession of every mind. The day following the execution they had not got the better of their consternation, which appeared then to have reached the members of the convention, who were astonished and terrified at so bold a stroke, and the possible consequences with which it might be followed.

Immediately after the execution, the body of Louis XVI. was transported into the ancient cemetery of the Madeleine; it was placed in a ditch six feet square, with its back against the wall of the Rue d'Anjou, and covered with quicklime, which was the cause of its being so difficult afterwards, in 1815, to discover the smallest traces of his remains."—*Hist. of Con.* vol. ii. p. 13.]



The Right Hon.ble William Pitt

Engraved by T. Freeman

from an Original Painting by Gainsborough

return continued to view their enemies as men defiled with blood and carnage.

Roland, completely discouraged, not at the danger he incurred, but at the evident impossibility of being serviceable, sent in his resignation on the 23d January. The Jacobins congratulated themselves on the event, but speedily raised the cry that the ministry still contained the traitors Clavière and Lebrun, whom Brissot directed as his tools; that the evil was far from being eradicated; and that they must not relax in their exertions, but, on the contrary, redouble their activity, until they had finally purged the government of *intriguers*, *Girondists*, *Rolandists*, *Brissotins*, &c. On the other hand, the Girondists demanded the re-organisation of the war ministry, which Pache, by his imbecile submission to the Jacobins, had brought into a most deplorable condition. After violent debates, Pache was dismissed as incompetent. Thus the two leaders who divided the ministry, and whose names had become the rallying cries of party, were excluded from the government. The majority of the convention believed that this expedient was an advance towards peace, as if by suppressing the names used by opposing passions, the passions themselves were not sure to survive, seek out fresh mottoes, and continue their contest. Beurnonville, the friend of Dumouriez, and surnamed *the French Ajax*, was called to the administration of the war department. He was as yet known to the parties only by his gallantry; but his attachment to discipline was speedily to place him in opposition to the disorganising genius of the Jacobins.

After these proceedings, the assembly ordered financial questions to take precedence as orders of the day, since, at this critical moment, when the revolution had to withstand the shock of all Europe, they were confessedly the most important. At the same time, it directed that the constitution committee should present its report in fifteen days at the latest; and resolved that it would immediately afterwards devote itself to the public consolidation. Numerous individuals, not correctly appreciating the causes of revolutionary troubles, imagined that it was the want of laws which provoked all the disasters of the country, and that the constitution would allay all dissensions. Under this persuasion, many of the Girondists, and all the members of the Plain, continually demanded the constitution, and complained bitterly of the delay observed in completing it, alleging with energy that their mission was to constitute. And this they maintained in perfect sincerity; all of them were impressed with the idea that they had been convoked for this purpose alone, and that their assigned task could be accomplished in a few months. They had not yet been made aware that they were assembled, not to institute but to combat; that their fearful mission was to defend the revolution against Europe and La Vendée; that they would soon be converted from the deliberative body they then formed into a sanguinary dictatorship, at once proscribing domestic foes, fighting battles against Europe and revolted provinces, and defending themselves on all sides with the resources of violence; that their laws, transitory as the crisis, would be viewed merely as the emanations of angry excitement; and that of their varied labours, all that would endure was the glory of their defence, the unexampled and terrible mission imposed upon them by destiny, but which they themselves were as yet far from deeming the only one in store for them.

Meanwhile, either from the exhaustion of a prolonged struggle, or from the unanimity of sentiment on the subject of war, all being in harmony on the necessity of making a vigorous defence, and even of provoking the enemy, an interval of quietude succeeded the fierce agitation which had marked the course of the king's trial, and even Brissot was universally applauded for his diplomatic reports upon the relations with foreign powers.

Such, then, was the domestic situation of France, and the state of the parties which divided it. Her position with respect to Europe was most alarming. It was, in truth, a general rupture with all the powers. Hitherto France had only had three declared enemies, Piedmont, Austria, and Prussia. The revolution, every where approved by the people according to the degree of their enlightenment, every where abhorred by the governments in the ratio of their fears, had recently excited very different sensations throughout the world, by the terrible events of the 10th August, the 2d and 3d September, and the 21st January. Less contemned since it had so energetically defended itself, but also less esteemed since it had sullied itself with crimes, it had ceased to interest nations so warmly as before, but taught governments to regard it with a considerable abatement of disdain.

The war, then, was henceforth to become general. Our previous pages have shown Austria giving way to family considerations, and embarking in hostilities little conducive to her interests; Prussia, whose natural policy pointed to an alliance with France against the head of the empire, throwing her armies across the Rhine, upon most frivolous pretences, and retreating from the inglorious campaign of the Argonne; Catherine of Russia, once so addicted to philosophy, deserting, like all the other flutterers in courts, the cause she had formerly espoused from vanity, assailing the revolution in accordance with the dictates as well of policy as of feeling, craftily stimulating Gustavus, the Emperor of Austria, and the King of Prussia, in order to distract their attention from Poland, and drive them towards the west; Piedmont, attacking France against its interests, but from motives of kinsmanship and of hatred for the revolution; the petty courts of Italy, detesting the new republic, but not daring to attack it—nay, even acknowledging it at sight of the tricoloured flag; Switzerland observing a strict neutrality; Holland and the Germanic diet avoiding any decisive manifestation, but allowing their profound abhorrence to be perceptible; Spain preserving a prudent neutrality, under the counsels of the sagacious Count d'Aranda; and, lastly, England, leaving France to tear herself to pieces, the continent to exhaust itself, and the French colonies to convert themselves into wastes—in short, abandoning the pursuit of her vengeance to the inevitable disorders of a revolution.

The new revolutionary impetuosity was destined to disturb all these studied neutralities. Hitherto, Pitt had regulated his conduct upon fair and indisputable principles. In England, a partial revolution, which had but half regenerated the social state, had left in subsistence a multitude of feudal institutions, which of course were objects of warm attachment to the aristocracy and the court, and of severe invective to the opposition. Pitt had two objects in view: the first, domestic, consisted in moderating aristocratic repugnance on the one hand, and checking the spirit of reform on the other, and thus preserving his ministry by controlling the two parties; the second, foreign, contemplated the prostration of France under the weight of her own disasters, and the hatred of all the European governments; in a word, he wished to render his country mistress of the world, and to be master of that country; such was the twofold design he pursued, with the selfishness and strength of purpose characteristic of a great statesman. Neutrality suited his designs most admirably. By abstaining from war, he curbed the blind hatred of his court for liberty; by allowing all the excesses of the French revolution to take free and unrestricted development, he was daily supplied with sanguinary answers in refutation of the apologists of that revolution—answers which in truth proved nothing, but produced, nevertheless, a material effect. He invariably retorted upon the celebrated Fox, the most eloquent man in the ranks of opposition, and indeed in all England, by citing the crimes

of reformed France. Upon Burke, an impassioned declaimer, devolved the duty of recapitulating these crimes, a task of which he acquitted himself with absurd violence; he proceeded on one occasion to such a pitch of extravagance as to throw a dagger on the floor of the House of Commons, proclaiming it the manufacture of proselytising Jacobins. Whilst at Paris Pitt was accused of fomenting troubles by largesses, at London he accused the French revolutionists of distributing money to excite rebellion, and the French emigrants gave additional weight to such rumours by diligently repeating and accrediting them. Thus, whilst by this astute policy, worthy a disciple of Machiavel, he rendered French liberty distasteful to the English, he stirred up all Europe against France herself, and, by his envoys, disposed its numerous governments to take up arms. In Switzerland he had not succeeded, but at the Hague, the docile stadtholder, to whom one revolution had been matter of personal experience, who was still distrustful of his people, and had no other support than the English squadrons, had given him unlimited satisfaction, and demonstrated his animosity to France by various unequivocal and hostile proceedings. It was, however, more especially in Spain that Pitt employed a persevering course of intrigue to induce that power to adopt the most inconsiderate step it ever took, that of uniting with England against France, its only maritime ally. The Spanish people had been but slightly moved at the French revolution, and the reasons tending to indispose the cabinet of Madrid against it were less those of security and policy than those resulting from family sympathy, and from the antipathy felt in common by all governments. The prudent Count d'Aranda, resisting the intrigues of the emigrants, the impatient spirit of the Spanish aristocracy, and the instigations of Pitt, had carefully conciliated the jealous susceptibility of the French government. Eventually overthrown, however, and displaced for Don Manuel Godoy, afterwards Prince of Peace, he left his unfortunate country a prey to the most fatal counsels. The cabinet of Madrid had throughout avoided any explicit avowals with respect to France; at the period of the definitive sentence on Louis XVI., it had offered its political recognition, and its mediation with the other powers, if the dethroned monarch were permitted to enjoy life in safety. In reply to this proposition, Danton had moved a declaration of war, but the assembly simply adopted the order of the day. Since that moment, the inclination for war was no longer a subject of doubt. Catalonia was filled with troops; in all the ports, armaments were fitted out, and an immediate attack was resolved upon. Pitt's success, therefore, was secured, whilst he himself, without yet openly declaring his intentions, without compromising England too precipitately, took all needful time to place her navy on a formidable footing, kept her aristocracy in good humour by his vast preparations, and fostered public indignation against France and her revolution by declamatory publications, for which he largely disbursed the national funds. Thus silently augmenting his resources, he at the same time inspirited a preponderating league against France, which, completely engrossing all her strength, effectually prevented her either from succouring her colonies or arresting the progress of the English arms in the Indian peninsula.

At no period is Europe recorded to have been stricken with so perfect a blindness, and to have committed against herself so many astounding follies, as at the one now under review. Thus, turning our eyes to the west, we behold Spain, Holland, and all the maritime powers, under the misguiding influence of aristocratic passions, arming in conjunction with their enemy England against France, their natural ally. Prussia likewise we see, yielding to an inconceivable vanity, uniting itself with the head of the empire against that very France whose firm alliance the great Frederick had always recommended. The insignificant King of Sardinia fell into the same error, from motives which it must be allowed were more intelligible —the sympathies of kinsmanship. In the east and in the north, we perceive Catherine left at liberty to perpetrate a crime against Poland, and to compromise the security of Germany, for the petty advantage of acquiring a few provinces, and of being enabled to desolate France without interference. Hence all the ancient and mutually advantageous connexions were cast aside, and the perfidious suggestions of the two most formidable powers weakly listened to by the various European cabinets, thus stimulated to arms against one unfortunate country, and that country the old protectress or ally of those now attacking her. All conspired to hasten that consummation, all yielded implicitly to the views of Pitt and Catherine; inconsiderate Frenchmen overspread Europe to promote this baneful departure from all true policy and prudence, and to draw upon their native land the most deplorable of scourges. And what were the motives of such infatuated conduct? Poland was abandoned to Catherine, because it had presumed to regulate its old and pristine liberty; France was abandoned to Pitt, because it had presumed to give itself the liberty it never enjoyed before. Doubtless France had committed excesses; but those very excesses were sure to be aggravated by the violence of the approaching struggle; and, without succeeding in blotting out that so much abhorred liberty, Europe was now preparing to enter upon a course which led to a thirty years' war, the most destructive in the annals of the human race, provoking interminable invasions, arousing an universal conqueror, producing endless vicissitudes and desolations, and finishing by the consolidation of the two colossal empires, which at the present day domineer over Europe upon the two elements—England and Russia.

Amidst this general confederacy, Denmark, ruled by a discreet minister, and Sweden, freed from the presumptuous projects of Gustavus, alone observed a prudent caution, which Holland and Spain would have done well to imitate, by joining the system of the armed neutrality. The French government had formed a perfectly correct judgment upon these general dispositions, and the impatience which characterised it at this moment did not admit of its tarrying for formal declarations of war, but urged it, on the contrary, to precipitate them. Since the 10th August, it had continually demanded its recognition; but with regard to England, whose neutrality was precious on account of the enemies already drawn up in array against it, it had still preserved a certain moderation in its tone. But after the 21st January, it had thrown all such considerations aside, and at once determined upon an universal war. Convinced that secret attacks were not less dangerous than open and avowed hostilities, it hastened to make its enemies declare themselves; and so early as the 22d January, the National Convention passed all the cabinets in review, directed reports upon the conduct of each with respect to France, and stood prepared to proclaim war against them, should they procrastinate in furnishing explicit and categorical explanations.

Since the 10th August, England had withdrawn her ambassador from Paris, and only permitted as French ambassador in London, M. Chauvelin, in the capacity of envoy from the extinct royalty. These diplomatic refinements were simply intended to keep up appearances as regarded the imprisoned king, and at the same time to defer hostilities, for which the time was not yet ripe. Accordingly, Pitt pretended to require a secret agent to unfold his complaints against the French government. The citizen Maret was charged with this mission in the month of December. He had a confidential interview with Pitt After mutual protests, to the purport that the interview possessed no official character, that it was strictly amicable, and had no other object save the beneficent

hope of tending to satisfy the two nations as to their reciprocal grievances, Pitt complained that France threatened the allies of England, even assailed their interests, and, in corroboration of his assertion, pointed to Holland. The injury here alleged was the opening of the Scheldt, a measure imprudent, perhaps, but just and beneficial, which the French had adopted on their entrance into the Low Countries. In truth, there was something inexpressibly absurd in the old observance, that to secure the Dutch a monopoly of its navigation, the Low Countries, through which the Scheldt passes, should be debarred from making any use of that river. Austria had not ventured to abolish this servitude, but Dumouriez did so by orders from his government; and the inhabitants of Antwerp beheld with joyful emotions vessels again ascending the Scheldt as far as their city. The reply was not difficult; for France, when respecting the rights of neutral neighbours, had not undertaken to uphold political iniquities, because neutrals were interested in their preservation. Besides, the Dutch government had evinced sufficient malevolence to abrogate the necessity of consulting its wishes at any great sacrifice. The second grievance adduced was the decree of the 15th November, by which the National Convention promised aid to all nations who should throw off the yoke of tyranny. This decree, an imprudent bravado, doubtless, and adopted in a moment of enthusiasm, did not mean, as Pitt feigned to believe, that the convention invited all nations to revolt, but that it would afford succour to the people against their governments in all countries at war with the revolution. Pitt lastly complained of the constant menaces and declamations which issued from the Jacobins against all governments; but in this particular the governments were assuredly not one whit more blameless than the Jacobins; and if a balance had been struck, little would have been found due to either side on the score of foul language.

This interview produced no result, and served merely to show that England's object at the moment was to gain time; that she had every wish for war, but judged a certain delay in its declaration expedient. However, the great trial of the month of January accelerated events. The English parliament was suddenly convoked before the usual period. An inquisitorial law was passed against all Frenchmen travelling in England; the Tower of London was put in a state of defence, and militia-levies were ordered: preparations and proclamations alike announced war to be determined upon. The populace of London was purposely excited; and throughout the island that insensate passion was studiously aroused, which renders a war with France acceptable as if it were a signal national benefit. At length, vessels loaded with grain bound for French ports were stopped; and on tidings of the 21st January, the French ambassador, whom the English government had hitherto refused in some sort to recognise, received orders to quit the kingdom within eight days. The National Convention forthwith directed a report to be framed upon the conduct of England with respect to France, and upon its close relations with the stadtholder of the United Provinces; and on the first of February, after hearing Brissot, who, for that fleeting moment, obtained the applauses of both parties, solemnly declared war against Holland and England. Hostilities with the Spanish government, also, were imminent; and although war was not formally declared, that ceremony seemed tacitly waived on both sides. Thus France had almost the whole of Europe arrayed in open enmity against her; and the act whereby she had broken with all crowned heads, and committed herself past recall to the torrent of the revolution, was unquestionably that which so fatally illustrated the 21st of January.

The dread assault of so many confederated powers had accordingly to be withstood, and however powerful in population and resources, France could hardly expect to resist with success so universal and inveterate an attack. But her leaders were not dismayed, nor were their confidence and audacity in the least abated. The unexpected triumphs of the republic in the Argonne and in Belgium had convinced them that every man, above all, a Frenchman, could become a soldier in six months. The excitement pervading France induced them to believe, also, that the entire population might be transported to fields of battle; and that it was thus quite possible to assemble even three or four millions of men, who would soon be soldiers; and in this manner far outstrip all that the united sovereigns of Europe could bring together in the shape of armies. "Observe well," said they, "the result as regards all kingdoms: we see a small quantity of men, recruited with difficulty, filling out the forms of armies; the bulk of the people stands aloof and regardless, and a handful of disciplined creatures decides the fate of the most extensive empires. But, on the other hand, imagine an entire nation starting from private life and taking arms for its defence, must it not set all ordinary calculations at nought? What is there impossible to twenty-five millions of men, not inert, but roused and acting?" Upon the point of expenditure they were equally sanguine. The amount of national property was daily increasing by emigration, and already greatly exceeded that of the national debt. At the moment, this capital lay dormant from the want of purchasers; but assignats would take its place, and their conventional value realise the prospective value of the estates they represented. In circulation they were certainly depreciated a third of their nominal value, but they had merely to add a third to the amount on this ground, as the pledge was so enormous that it could safely bear any requisite excess of issue. Besides, as the men to be moved to the field of battle lived well at present, many indeed in luxury, why should they not live in a camp as easily as by their firesides? Could the elements and food be ever wanting to men, wheresoever they might congregate? Again, society, as it then existed, possessed more wealth than was needed to supply the wants of all; it only required a better distribution; with which view they proposed to tax the rich, and make them bear the charges of the war. Lastly, the countries into which the French armies would penetrate, having likewise old social systems to overthrow and abuses to root out, in them immense sums might be realised from the spoils of priests, nobles, and kings, for such states must in pure justice repay France for the aid she should afford them.

It was thus the ardent imagination of Cambon reasoned, and his ideas speedily took possession of the public mind. In the antiquated system of cabinets, from one to two hundred thousand soldiers, supported by certain imposts or crown-revenues, were all that politicians calculated upon; in the present instance, it was one mass of human beings who arose of themselves and said, "We will compose the armies;" who glanced at the total aggregate of wealth, and again communed with themselves—"This sum is sufficient, and, divided amongst all, will supply the wants of all." Doubtless it was not the entire nation which held such language; but these opinions were embraced by the most enthusiastic portion of that nation, and it was prepared to enforce them by all expedients upon the general body.

Before proceeding to the distribution of the resources thus acutely discerned by the zealous revolutionists, it will be necessary to revisit the frontiers, and consider how the last campaign had terminated. Its commencement had been sufficiently brilliant; but a first success, ill improved, had merely served to extend the line of operations, and provoke on the part of the enemy a more formidable and decisive effort. Thus, defence had become more difficult in proportion as it spread over more ground, and the defeated foe was incited to act with redoubled energy; at the same time his invigorated assault came in conjunction with the

almost general disorganisation of the French armies. In addition to these untoward circumstances, the number of the hostile confederates was more than doubled; for the English upon the coasts, the Spaniards on the Pyrenees, and the Dutch to the north of the Low Countries, threatened new attacks.

Dumouriez had stopped short on the banks of the Meuse, being prevented from pushing on to the Rhine by reasons which have been imperfectly appreciated, because the delays which succeeded the rapidity of his early operations seemed inexplicable. When he reached Liege, the disorganisation of his army was complete. The soldiers were almost naked; for want of shoes they had wrapped their feet in hay; all that they had in any thing like sufficiency was meat and bread, owing to a contract which Dumouriez had maintained by his own authority. But no money was obtainable to pay them even partially in specie, and they either plundered the peasants, or used violence to compel them to receive assignats. The horses were daily perishing for want of provender; those of the artillery were almost all dead. Privations, and the slackened progress of the war, conspired to disgust the troops; and the volunteers deserted in whole companies, adducing a decree which declared that the country had ceased to be in danger. The convention was obliged to pass another decree in order to prevent this extensive evasion, and, however severe its provisions, the gendarmerie stationed on the highways scarcely sufficed to stop the fugitives. The army was diminished a third. These united causes effectually debarred Dumouriez from pursuing the Austrians with the necessary vivacity. Clairfayt had found time to intrench himself on the banks of the Erft, and Beaulieu in the direction of Luxumbourg; and it was impossible for Dumouriez, with an army reduced to 30,000 or 40,000 men, to drive before him an enemy defended by strong hilly and woody positions, and resting upon Luxumbourg, one of the most impregnable fortresses in the world. If, as was incessantly repeated, Custine, instead of making excursions in Germany, had turned back on Coblentz, effected a junction with Beurnonville for the capture of Treves, and both had afterwards descended the Rhine, Dumouriez on his part would have advanced to that barrier by Cologne. By this means, all three might have united together; Luxumbourg would have been invested, and in all probability fallen, from its communications being completely intercepted. But all this had remained simply hypothetical: Custine, stubborn in his desire to draw the war towards his own quarter, was successful only in provoking a declaration from the Germanic diet, in irritating the vanity of the King of Prussia, and fixing him more firmly in the coalition; Beurnonville, reduced to his own troops, had failed in effecting the fall of Treves; and the enemy had maintained his positions both in the electorate of Treves and the duchy of Luxumbourg. In this state of things, if Dumouriez had advanced towards the Rhine, he would have uncovered his right flank and his rear, and even then have been unable, considering the doleful situation of his army, to overrun that extensive region which stretches between the Meuse and the Rhine, and as far as the frontiers of Holland—a difficult country, with no facilities for transport, intersected with woods and high hills, and occupied by an enemy still far from contemptible. We may be quite sure that Dumouriez would have preferred gaining laurels on the Rhine, if he had possessed the means of conquest, to visiting Paris as a mediator for Louis XVI. The zeal for royalty, which he so largely attributed to himself in London to increase his consequence, and with which the Jacobins upbraided him in Paris to destroy his influence, was by no means so ardent as to lead him from a brilliant course of victory to place himself in jeopardy amidst the factions of the capital. He quitted the scene of warfare only because he could effect nothing more, and because he hoped, by personal intercourse with the government, to remove the difficulties that had been thrown in his path during the invasion of Belgium.

We have in an earlier part of this work described the embarrassments his conquest was preparing for him. Belgium desired a revolution, but not so sweeping and radical a revolution as that of France. Dumouriez, from principle, policy, and considerations of military prudence, was naturally disposed to declare in favour of the moderate tendencies of the country he occupied. We have already seen him struggling to save the Belgians from the disasters of war, to give them a share in the profit of commissariat contracts, and to insinuate rather than force the assignats into circulation. For all such cares his exclusive recompense was the fiercest of Jacobin invectives. Cambon had materially aggravated his difficulties by procuring the decree of the 15th December.

When urging its adoption, that deputy had, amidst the most vehement cheering, thus spoken:—"In the countries we enter, we must at once proclaim *a revolutionary government.* It is useless to practise concealment: the despots know well what we aim at; and since they interpret our meaning so sagaciously, we ought to declare it boldly and openly, the more especially when its justice can be so triumphantly avowed. Wheresoever our generals shall come, there must they be enjoined to proclaim the sovereignty of the people, the abolition of feudalism, of tithes, of all abuses; there must all former authorities be dissolved, and new local administrations be provisionally formed, under the direction of our generals. Those administrations will govern the country, and advise on the means of composing a national convention to decide upon its destiny. The property of our enemies, that is to say, of nobles, priests, lay or ecclesiastical corporations, churches, &c., must be instantly sequestrated, and placed under the safeguard of the French nation, so that strict accounts may be rendered through the local administrations, and the possessions themselves serve as security for the costs of the war, whereof the delivered countries will of course defray a portion, since the war is undertaken for their enfranchisement. After the campaign, a balance will be struck; should the republic be found to have received in stores more than the expenses due to her justly warrant, she will discharge the surplus; if there be a deficiency, it will be made good to her. It is also indispensable that our assignats, based on the new distribution of property, should be received in the conquered countries, and that their field should expand with the principles which have produced them; and, lastly, that the executive power should dispatch envoys to concert with those provisional administrations, fraternise with them, keep the accounts of the republic, and execute the ordained confiscation." He added, "No half revolutions! Every nation which refuses what we now propose shall be our enemy, and will richly deserve to be treated as such. Peace and fraternity to all the friends of liberty; war to the abject partisans of despotism! *War to palaces, peace to cottages!*"

These ideas had been forthwith embodied in a decree, and carried into practical operation throughout the conquered provinces. A multitude of agents, selected by the executive power from the Jacobin ranks, had been immediately disseminated through Belgium, the provisional administrations formed under their guidance, and those bodies urged to an exceeding pitch of demagogical fury. The lowest classes, instigated by the Jacobin emissaries against the middle ranks, committed the most revolting disorders. They introduced, in truth, all at once, and without any state of transition between the old and the new order of things, the anarchy of 1793, which had been progressively brought on in France by four years of trouble and excitement. These proconsuls, invested with almost absolute powers, imprisoned persons and confiscated property at pleasure; and despoiling the churches of all their plate, highly exasperated the unhappy

Belgians, who were ardently attached to the rites of their faith, and gave occasion, moreover, for extensive malversations. They assembled what were called conventions, to decide on the destiny of each province; and, under their despotic influence, a union with France was voted at Liege, Brussels, Mons, &c. These were evils inevitable from the policy adopted, and were infinitely aggravated by the military brutality wherewith revolutionary violence was aided in producing them. Nor were these the only calamities which befel this unfortunate country: divisions of a different nature broke out to complete its misery. The agents of the executive power pretended to hold subject to their orders the generals commanding within the limits of their commissariat jurisdiction; and if those generals were not Jacobins, as often happened to be the case, this assumption became a fresh and prolific source of quarrels and struggles, which succeeded in perfecting the universal confusion. Dumouriez, indignant at seeing his conquests compromised, both by the disorganisation of his army and the hatred infused into the Belgians, had already treated with harshness some of these proconsuls, and repaired to Paris to make known his complaints, with the warmth characteristic of his temper, and the haughtiness of a victorious general who deemed himself necessary to the republic.

Such was the situation of affairs on the principal theatre of the war. On the other points, Custine, driven back into Mayence, passed his time in declamations against the manner in which Beurnonville had executed his attempt on Treves. Kellermann supported himself in the Alps, at Chambéry, and at Nice. Servan was fruitlessly expending his efforts to form an army at the foot of the Pyrenees; and Monge, equally docile towards the Jacobins as Pache, had allowed the administration of the navy department to be thrown into a state of utter decomposition. Hence it became absolutely necessary for the convention to devote immediate and undivided attention to the defence of the frontiers. Dumouriez had passed the latter part of December and the month of January at Paris, where he completely wrecked his favour with the mob and its leaders, by letting fall certain expressions in behalf of Louis XVI., by absenting himself from the Jacobin Club, where he was repeatedly announced as about to appear, but never gratified its members by an actual entrance, and by his close intimacy with his friend Gensonné. He had drawn up four memorials, one on the decree of the 15th December, another on the organisation of the army, a third on the subject of supplies, and the last on the plan of the campaign for the opening year. At the foot of each of his memorials was appended his resignation, if his propositions were rejected.

In addition to the diplomatic and military committees, the assembly had appointed a third extraordinary committee, called that of *general defence*, with instructions to devote exclusive attention to all that concerned the defence of France. It was very numerous, and all the members of the assembly were allowed, if they pleased, to be present at its sittings. One of the main objects of its formation was to reconcile the members of the two parties, and satisfy them as to their several intentions, by bringing them to labour in common for the general safety. Robespierre, annoyed at seeing the Girondists, who were assiduous in their attendance on the committee, seldom appeared at its meetings. Dumouriez came before it with his plans, was unfortunate enough not to be always comprehended, on several occasions gave offence by his haughty bearing, and ultimately abandoned his memorials to their fate. He then retired to some distance from Paris, not much in the mood to divest himself of his commandership, notwithstanding his warnings on that head to the convention, and awaiting in gloomy reserve the season for opening a new campaign.

His popularity at the Jacobin Club was for ever gone, and Marat assailed him daily in his journal for having abetted a demi-revolution in Belgium, and having shown a spirit of enmity against the demagogues. He was accused, also, of having voluntarily allowed the Austrians to escape from Belgium; and, going still farther back, it was publicly asserted that he had opened the passes of the Argonne for Frederick William, whom he might have readily exterminated. The members of the council and committees, however, gave way less blindly to popular passions, and, deeply sensible of his importance, endeavoured to soothe his ruffled feelings. Robespierre even spoke in his vindication, attributing all his backslidings to his pretended friends the Girondists. Thus a general disposition prevailed, in the convention at least, to give him all possible satisfaction, without departing, however, from the decrees already passed, or the inexorable principles of the revolution. His two commissariat agents, Malus and Petit-Jean, were restored to him, numerous reinforcements granted, promises of abundant supplies held out, and his ideas on the general plan of the ensuing campaign adopted; but no relaxation was made in the decree of the 15th December, or in the new system of administration for the army. The nomination of Beurnonville, his friend, to the ministry of war, was an additional advantage to him; and he might reasonably anticipate the greatest zeal on the part of government in providing all that he should subsequently need.

He entertained the idea for a moment that England would accept him as a mediator between her and France, and he departed for Antwerp full of that flattering hallucination. But the convention, having had its patience exhausted by the perfidies of Pitt, declared war against England and Holland, as we have previously observed. That declaration found him at Antwerp, accompanied by an intimation of the measures that had been resolved upon, partly framed in accordance with his own plans for the defence of the territory. It was determined to raise the armies to 502,000 men, which will appear but a moderate force when the ideas prevalent respecting the capabilities of France are considered, and when compared with the standard to which they were afterwards elevated. The defensive was to be maintained on the east and south, observation simply kept up along the Pyrenees and the coasts, and all the vigour of the offensive displayed in the north, where, as Dumouriez had said on a former occasion, "a general could defend himself by battles alone." To secure the execution of this plan, 150,000 men were to occupy Belgium, and cover the frontier from Dunkirk to the Meuse; 50,000 were to guard the interval between the Meuse and the Sarre; and 150,000 to extend along the Rhine and the Vosges, from Mayence to Besançon and Gex; lastly, a reserve was to be stationed at Châlons, provided with every essential to proceed upon any point where its aid might be required. It was agreed to defend Savoy and Nice with two armies of 70,000 men each, the Pyrenees with one of 40,000, and the coasts of the ocean and Brittany with 46,000 men, part of whom might be transferred on board of ship if it were judged necessary. Of these 502,000 men, 50,000 were intended for cavalry, and 20,000 as artillery.* Such were the demonstrations detailed on a sheet of paper; but the actual force fell far short of what was projected, sinking to 270,000 men, of whom 100,000 were in various quarters of Belgium, 25,000 on the Moselle, 45,000 at Mayence, under the orders of Custine, 30,000 on the Upper-Rhine, 40,000 in Savoy and Nice, and 30,000, at the utmost, in the interior. But to fill up the destined complement, the assembly decreed that the armies should be recruited from the national guard; that every member thereof, unmarried, or married and childless, or a widower without offspring, was at the disposition of the executive power, from the age

* [A numerical error occurs in the text here, as the amount of all the forces enumerated, exclusive of the reserve at Châlons, is exactly 576,000 men, so that the artillery and cavalry must have been intended as in addition to the 502,000.]

of eighteen to that of forty-five. This enactment was based on the allegation that 300,000 men were necessary to resist the coalition; and it directed that the enrolments should be proceeded with until that number was obtained.* At the same time, the convention ordered the emission of eight hundred millions of assignats, and the demolition of the woods of Corsica for the construction of ships of war.

In the interim, until the accomplishment of these projects, the campaign was opened with 270,000 men. Of these, Dumouriez had 30,000 on the Scheldt and about 70,000 on the Meuse. The rapid invasion of Holland was a bold thought, which stirred all minds at the moment; and Dumouriez was compulsorily driven to its adoption by the general feeling. Several plans for effecting the object were propounded. One, invented by the Batavian refugees exiled from their country after the revolution of 1787, consisted in invading Zealand with a few thousand men, and seizing upon the government, which would retreat to that province. Dumouriez had feigned acquiescence in that project, but in truth he found it barren and pitiful, inasmuch as it confined him to the occupation of an inconsiderable, and, furthermore, an unimportant part of Holland. A second plan took its parentage from himself; it proposed to descend the Meuse by Venloo to Graves, turn from the latter place to Nimeguen, and subsequently fall on Amsterdam. This would have been the surest scheme, if the future could have been foreseen. But, stationed as he was at Antwerp, Dumouriez formed a third project, surpassing the others in boldness and promptitude, in admirable harmony with revolutionary impatience, and more prolific in decisive results, if success should attend it. Whilst his lieutenants, Miranda, Valence, Dampierre, and others, were to descend the Meuse and occupy Maestricht, upon which the French had refrained from seizing the year before, and Venloo, which could not offer a long resistance, Dumouriez conceived the idea of proceeding secretly with 25,000 men between Bergen-op-Zoom and Breda, thus attaining Moerdyk, then passing the small sea of Bielbos, and advancing rapidly by the mouths of the rivers to Leyden and Amsterdam. This daring plan was as defensible in reason as many others which have been sanctified by success; and if it were hazardous, it made amends by offering much greater advantages than that of attacking directly by Venloo and Nimeguen. By pursuing the latter course, Dumouriez assailed the Dutch in front, they having already made all their preparations between Graves and Gorkum, and he even allowed them time to draw reinforcements from England or Prussia. On the contrary, by passing over the mouths of the rivers, he penetrated into the interior of Holland, which was not defended; and if he surmounted the impediment of the waters, Holland fell at once into his possession. Returning from Amsterdam, he would take the fortresses in the rear, and reduce all between him and his lieutenants, who would be prepared to join him by Nimeguen and Utrecht.

It was natural that he should assume the command of the army destined for the expedition, since in its conduct more essentially than elsewhere were needed promptitude, bold determination, and ability. The project itself involved the danger common to all offensive operations, to wit, exposing his own territory to invasion by uncovering it. Thus the Meuse remained open to the Austrians. At the same time, in all cases of reciprocal inroads, the advantage accrues to the party which most strenuously resists the peril, and is least wrought upon by the terrors of invasion.

Dumouriez dispatched Thouvenot, in whom he had full confidence, to the Meuse; he imparted to his lieutenants, Valence and Miranda, the plans he had hitherto concealed from them, and enjoined them to hasten the siege of Maestricht and Venloo, and in case of unexpected delays, to relieve each other before those places, so that the progress towards Nimeguen might always proceed. He also directed them to appoint Liege and Aix-la-Chapelle as the localities for all dispersed detachments to rally around, in order to be in a position to resist the enemy, should he appear in force to incommode the sieges about to be undertaken on the Meuse.

Dumouriez lost no time in starting from Antwerp with 18,000 troops hastily collected. He divided his little army into several detachments, which had orders to summon the various strong places to surrender, without tarrying, however, to besiege them. His advanced guard was to push on with all dispatch to seize boats and means of transport, whilst he himself, with the main body, would keep in readiness to carry succour to such of his lieutenants as might require it. On the 17th February 1793, he entered the Dutch territory, and published a proclamation, in which he held out the promise of amity to the Batavians, and the threat of hostility merely to the stadtholder and the English influence. His divisions, meanwhile, advanced, leaving General Leclerc before Bergen-op-Zoom, planting General Berneron before Klundert and Willemstadt, and consigning to the excellent engineer, D'Arçon, the feint of an attack on the important fortress of Breda. Dumouriez halted with the rearguard at Sevenberghen. On the 25th, General Berneron carried the fort of Klundert, and directed all his efforts against Willemstadt. General d'Arçon threw a few shells on Breda. That fastness enjoyed a high reputation for strength, and the garrison was sufficient for its defence, but was badly officered; it surrendered after a few hours' cannonade to a body of assailants scarcely exceeding its defenders in number. The French entered Breda on the 27th, and gained considerable spoil in munitions of war, consisting of 250 pieces of ordnance, 300,000 pounds of powder, and 5000 muskets. After leaving a garrison in Breda, General d'Arçon appeared on the 1st March before Gertruydenberg, likewise a very strong fortification, and carried the same day all the advanced works. Dumouriez had proceeded to Moerdyk, and was engaged in repairing the evils that had arisen from the delays of his advanced guard. So auspicious a series of surprises, upon fortresses capable of maintaining a stout and obstinate resistance, threw infinite lustre upon the commencement of this expedition; but unforeseen obstacles impeded the passage of the arm of the sea, the most difficult operation in the whole enterprise. Dumouriez had anticipated that his advanced guard, acting with greater energy and promptitude than it displayed, would have appropriated a quantity of boats, boldly crossed the Bielbos, occupied the island of Dort, which was guarded by a few hundred men at the utmost, and seizing upon a numerous flotilla, conveyed it to the opposite shore, for the purpose of transporting the army over the frith. Unavoidable delays prevented the execution of this part of the plan. Dumouriez strove to compensate for the failure by possessing himself of all the boats or skiffs he could discover, and gathering carpenters to construct floating rafts. Meanwhile time was becoming hourly more precious, as the Dutch army was assembling at Gorkum, at Stry, and in the Isle of Dort, whilst some gunboats and an English frigate threatened his embarkation, and even cannonaded his camp, designated by his ever sprightly soldiery "the camp of beavers." The troops had in fact erected huts of straw, whence the idea was taken; and animated by the presence of their general, braved with admirable fortitude the intense cold, the privations and dangers affecting them, looked forward intrepidly to the coming hazards of so daring an undertaking, and impatiently awaited the moment for passing to the opposite strand. On the 3d of March, General Deflers arrived with a fresh division; on the 4th, Gertruydenberg opened its gates; and all was in readiness for attempting the passage of the Bielbos.

* Decree of the 24th February.

Whilst these events were illustrating the military annals of France, the contest between the two parties of the interior continued in all its virulence. The murder of Lepelletier had afforded the Mountaineers an opportunity for proclaiming their lives in danger, and the assembly had found it impossible to deny them the renewal of the committee of surveillance. This committee was composed of Mountaineers, whose first act was to order the arrest of Gorsas, a deputy and journalist, attached to the party of the Gironde. The Jacobins had likewise gained another advantage, in procuring the suspension of the prosecutions decreed on the 20th January against the authors of the September massacres. Those proceedings had scarcely commenced before it was discovered that overwhelming evidence implicating the principal revolutionists, and Danton himself, could be adduced. Thereupon the Jacobins stirred up the elements of fury, and vociferated that all were equally criminal on those days, because all had either deemed their occurrences necessary or quietly suffered them. They even ventured to maintain that the only evil to be deplored on those days was the incompleteness of the sacrifice; and they vehemently demanded the suspension of proceedings which were tortured into attacks on the purest revolutionists. In pursuance of these clamorous instances, the prosecutions were suspended, that is to say, abrogated; and a deputation from the Jacobin Club immediately appeared before the minister of justice, to ensure the transmission of a dispatch by extraordinary couriers, staying the indictments already opened against their *brothers of Meaux*.

We have already seen that Pache had been obliged to quit the ministry, and that Roland had voluntarily submitted his resignation. This mutual concession failed to mitigate the inveteracies of hatred. The Jacobins were so far from being appeased, that they called for a prosecution against Roland, alleging, as crimes against him, that he had defrauded the state of immense sums, and remitted to London upwards of twelve millions; that he had employed this ill-gotten wealth in perverting the public mind by means of hireling writers, and in promoting sedition by forestalling supplies of grain. They asserted that proceedings ought to be instituted in like manner against Clavière, Lebrun, and Beurnonville, who, according to their views, were all traitors and accomplices in the intrigues of the Girondists. At the same time, they prepared for their complaisant ex-placeman a flattering and beneficial compensation. Chambon, the successor of Pétion in the mayoralty of Paris, had abdicated functions too arduous for his weakness of character. The Jacobins immediately turned their eyes on Pache, in whom they found concentred all the requisite wisdom and inflexibility of a magistrate. The idea was warmly responded to amongst themselves, and quickly imparted to the commune, the sections, and the clubs; and the Parisians, impelled by these overweening influences, avenged Pache for his disgrace by nominating him their mayor. Assuming that Pache showed himself as docile in the mayoralty as in the ministry of war, the Jacobins thus assured their domination in Paris; and the choice became equally conducive to their interests and to the gratification of their passions.

The scarcity of provisions, and the depression of trade were still continual sources of disturbance and complaint; and so far from abating, the evil had been considerably aggravated from December to February. The fear of violence and pillage, the repugnance of the agriculturists to accept paper, and the enhancement of value arising from the surplusage of fictitious money, were, as we have previously stated, the causes which prevented the free course of trade in corn, and produced the scarcity. Nevertheless, the administrative efforts of the several communes compensated, to a certain extent, the inertness of trade; and supplies never absolutely failed in the markets, but they were held at exorbitant prices. The value of assignats falling every day in the ratio of their increase, a greater amount of them was always becoming necessary to purchase the same quantity of produce, and it was thus that prices were driven to such an excessive pitch. The labouring classes, receiving the same nominal value for their industry, were unable to obtain articles of necessity, and naturally broke into impatient murmurs and threats. Bread was not the only substance which increased progressively in cost; sugar, coffee, candles, and soap, likewise had doubled in value. The laundresses appeared at the bar of the convention to remonstrate against the charge of thirty sous for soap, which had formerly been purchasable at fourteen. It was in vain that the people were told to raise the price of their labour so as to restore the proportion between their wages and their consumption; they were incapable of effecting the requisite combination for that object, and only the more vehemently exclaimed against the rich, against monopolisers, and against the trading aristocracy, concluding with a demand for the simple expedient of a fixed price or *maximum*. The Jacobins and the members of the commune, who belonged to a lower grade in the social order than the National Convention, but were nevertheless almost enlightened assemblies when compared with the bulk of the populace, were sensible of the inconveniences attending forced contracts. Although more inclined to support the popular clamour than the convention, they offered a steady resistance; and at the Jacobin Club, Dubois de Crancé, the two Robespierres, Thuriot, and other Mountaineers, were daily heard inveighing against the proposal of a maximum. Chaumette and Hébert pursued the same course at the commune; but the galleries murmured impatiently, and often retorted upon them with groans and howls. Deputations from the sections frequently presented themselves before the commune, to upbraid it with moderation and connivance in the practices of forestallers. It was in these assemblies of sections that were gathered together the lowest classes of agitators, and within them reigned a revolutionary fanaticism far surpassing in blind ignorance and fury that predominant at the commune and the Jacobin Club. In strict coalition with the Cordeliers, where all the men of physical action congregated, the sections provoked all the troubles of the capital. Their inferiority and obscurity, exposing them more readily to agitation, likewise left them open to instigations of opposite tendencies; and accordingly we find that it was in them the remnants of aristocracy ventured to emerge and attempt movements of resistance. The old dependants of the nobility, the servants of the emigrants, and all those turbulent idlers who, between the two antagonist causes, had preferred the aristocratic, frequented the sections, in which an honest trading class persevered in favour of the Girondists, and cloaked themselves behind that rational and prudent opposition, to combat the Mountaineers and labour in behalf of the foreigner and the ancient system. In these contests, the honest middle-men for the most part retired, and the two extreme orders of agitators remained face to face, and contended on this inferior stage with desperate violence. Almost every day terrific scenes occurred on petitions to the commune, the Jacobin Club, or the assembly. According to the issue of the combat, from these tempestuous regions issued forth addresses against September and the maximum, or against appellants,* aristocrats, and forestallers.

The commune rejected the inflammatory petitions of the sections, and exhorted them to beware of the furtive agitators who were striving to introduce discord and confusion amongst them. In this instance it performed the part, with reference to the sections, which the convention assumed in dealing with itself.

* [Alluding to those who advocated the appeal to the people on the king's sentence.]

The Jacobin Club, not having determinate functions to exercise like the commune, but in lieu thereof discussing and arguing all definable subjects, boasted great philosophical acquirements, and pretended to a much more profound insight into social economy than the sections and the Cordelier Club. They accordingly affected upon various points to contemn the vulgar passions of these subaltern assemblies, and in particular condemned the fixed price as dangerous to freedom of commerce. But, as a substitute for the measure they thus repudiated, they proposed to make assignats be taken at par, and to punish with death whomsoever should refuse to accept them according to the value they expressed to bear, as if this were not merely a different mode of infringing the freedom of trade. They also recommended a general pledge to abstain from using sugar or coffee, in order to drive down the price of those articles; and, finally, they upheld the expediency of stopping the issue of assignats, and supplying their place by loans from the rich, in the nature of forced loans, assessed upon the basis of establishments in servants, horses, &c. All these propositions, however, tended not to alleviate the evil or to avert an inevitable crisis. Meanwhile, until it should actually explode, the public misfortunes afforded grounds for mutual recriminations to the two parties. The Girondists were accused of conspiring with the rich and the monopolisers to starve the people, to drive them into disturbances, and to avail themselves of that pretence to enact fresh martial laws; they were even charged with designing to favour the approach of foreign armies, by multiplying disorder—an absurd reproach, but one which proved mortal. The Girondists retorted by similar accusations. They upbraided their adversaries with causing the scarcity and the troubles by the alarms they excited amongst the trading community, and of scheming to promote anarchy by the national disasters, to grasp power by the spread of anarchy, and perhaps eventually to bring about foreign subjection.

Towards the end of February, the difficulty of procuring subsistence had carried the exasperation of the people to the highest pitch. The women, apparently more moved than men by this species of suffering, were roused to an extraordinary ferment. They presented themselves at the Jacobin Club on the 22d, to request that it would lend them the hall, as they wished to deliberate on the dearness of provisions, and to prepare a petition to the National Convention. It was known that the purport of this petition would be the imposition of the maximum, and the demand was refused. The galleries thereupon assailed the Jacobins with the disapprobation they were occasionally wont to manifest towards the assembly: "Down with the forestallers!" "Down with the rich!" were the general cries. The president was obliged to put on his hat to calm the tumult; and it was subsequently explained that so flagrant a want of respect was owing to disguised aristocrats in the hall. Robespierre and Dubois de Crancé took the opportunity of again denouncing the proposal of a fixed price, and exhorted the people to remain quiet, in order to deprive their adversaries of all pretext for calumniating them, and avoid furnishing them with an occasion to pass sanguinary laws.

Marat, who arrogated the faculty of always devising the most simple, prompt, and efficacious remedies, published in his journal, on the morning of the 25th, that forestalling would never cease unless much surer means were employed than any that had been as yet proposed. Inveighing against *monopolisers, dealers in luxury, fatteners on chicanery, pettifoggers, ex-nobles*, whom the faithless mandatories of the people encouraged to crime by impunity, he added, "In every country where the rights of the people are not vain titles, pompously set forth in an idle declaration, the pillage of a few magazines, with the engrossers hanged at their doors, would soon put an end to these malversations, which reduce five millions of men to despair, and cause thousands to perish from want. Will the deputies of the people, then, never learn more than merely to prate about their grievances instead of redressing them?"*

It was on the morning of the 25th that this inflated madman wrote these words. Whether they had really operated on the populace, or the irritation, having reached its height, could be no longer kept within bounds, it is certain a crowd of women assembled tumultuously around the shops of the grocers. At first they confined themselves to complaints concerning the dearness of all articles, and to a somewhat vociferous demand for a reduction of price. The commune had had no previous warning; the commander Santerre had gone to Versailles with the view of organising a body of cavalry; and no order was given to put the public force in motion. Thus the rioters met with no obstacle, and speedily passed from complaints and menaces to violence and pillage. The principal gatherings took place in the streets called Vieille-Monnaie, Cinq-Diamants, and Lombard. The terms insisted upon were, that all articles should be lowered to half price: soap to sixteen sous, sugar to twenty-five, molasses to fifteen, and candles to thirteen per pound. A considerable quantity of goods were forcibly carried away at these rates, and the value was faithfully paid by the abductors to the shopkeepers. But in a short time the multitude conceived it useless to pay any more, and the stores were appropriated without a particle of consideration being tendered in return. An armed detachment hastening to the thickest of the fray was repulsed, and tremendous shouts of "Down with the bayonets!" arose from all quarters. The assembly, the commune, and the Jacobin Club, were sitting in their respective halls. The assembly gave ear to a report upon the subject, in which the minister of the interior demonstrated that articles of consumption were plentiful in Paris, but that the distress arose from the disproportion between the value of the current money and that of all produce. Thereupon the assembly, anxious to parry the difficulties for the moment, assigned additional funds to the commune, in order that it might procure a distribution of provisions at a lower rate. At the same moment, the commune, actuated by similar sentiments and zeal, dispatched persons to collect reports of the circumstances, and issued orders for measures of police. At every new outrage denounced before it, the galleries cried, "Bravo! so much the better!" At every proposition of preventive means, they cried, "Bah! away with it!" Chaumette and Hébert were hooted for having suggested the expediency of beating the alarum and ordering out the armed force. However, it was resolved that two strong patrols, preceded by two municipal officers, should be sent to restore order; and that twenty-seven other municipal officers should proceed to read proclamations in the sections.

The riot gradually extended its locality: the mob plundered in different streets, and even manifested an intention of transferring its ravages from the grocers to other dealers. Meanwhile, men of all parties seized the occasion to charge the disturbance, and the evils which occasioned it, upon each other. "When you had a king," said the partisans of downcast royalty in the public thoroughfares, "you were not compelled to pay so dearly for things, nor were exposed to pillage." "Behold," said the partisans of the Girondists, "whither the system of violence and impunity to revolutionary excesses is conducting us!"

The Mountaineers were thrown into the greatest distress by this outbreak, and were reduced to maintain that it was disguised aristocrats, Lafayettists, Rolandists, Brissotins, who, mingled in the groups, instigated the people to plunder. They asserted having descried in the crowd women of high rank,

* Journal of the Republic, 25th February 1793.

powdered gentry, and great mens' lacqueys, distributing assignats, in order to induce the people to enter the shops. At length, after the tumult had continued for several hours, the armed force was collected in sufficient number; Santerre returned from Versailles, and the necessary orders were given; the battalion from Brest, then at Paris, displayed infinite zeal and perseverance, and the plunderers were finally dispersed.

In the evening, the Jacobin Club was the scene of an animated debate. The disorders just suppressed were descanted upon and generally deplored, in spite of the howls and denials of the galleries. Collot-d'Herbois, Thuriot, and Robespierre, all agreed in recommending tranquillity, and attributing the excesses to the aristocrats and Girondists. Robespierre delivered a long oration upon the matter, in which he maintained that the people were *impeccable;* that they could never do wrong; and that, unless when artfully misled, they never committed any error. He insisted that amidst those groups of pillagers voices were raised bewailing the deceased king, and lauding the right side of the assembly; that he himself had heard them, and consequently there could not remain any doubt as to the real instigators who had prompted all the mischief. Even Marat came forward to advocate peace and order, to condemn the pillage he had invoked that very morning in his journal, and to throw the odium upon the Girondists and royalists.

On the morrow, the usual bootless complaints rang in the assembly. Barrère inveighed with energy against the crimes of the preceding day. He animadverted especially upon the tardiness wherewith the authorities had acted in repressing the riot. The mob had begun to pillage about ten in the forenoon, and at five in the afternoon the armed force was not collected. He accordingly moved that the mayor and the commander-in-chief should be called to the bar, to explain the causes of such delay. A deputation from the section of Bon-Conseil appeared in support of this motion. Salles then ascended the tribune: he proposed a decree of impeachment against the instigator of robberies—against Marat, and read the article inserted in his journal of yesterday. Often had impeachment been urged against the provokers to crime, and in particular against Marat; no occasion could be more favourable for this design than the present, for never had outrage followed so quickly upon the accents of incitement. Marat, without being in the least disconcerted, upheld in the tribune that it was quite natural for the people to do themselves justice on the forestallers, since the laws were insufficient, and that "*those who proposed to impeach him ought to be sent to bedlam.*" Buzot moved the order of the day on the proposition to impeach *Monsieur* Marat. "The law is emphatic," said he; "but *Monsieur* Marat will quibble on his expressions, the jury will be confused, and it will be better not to prepare a triumph for *Monsieur* Marat, in the very presence of justice herself." A member suggested that the convention should proclaim to the republic that in the morning Marat had counselled pillage, and in the afternoon Paris was a prey to pillage. Several motions were successively submitted; the convention finally paused on that which proposed to remit all the authors of disturbances, without distinction, to the ordinary tribunals. Marat thereupon exclaimed, "Nay, rather pass a decree of impeachment against me alone, that you may show how utterly you are lost to all sense of shame." At these words a tumult arose, and the convention forthwith committed to the tribunals Marat and all the authors of the crimes perpetrated in the course of the 25th February. The motion of Barrère was likewise adopted, and Santerre and Pache were ordered to the bar. Additional precautions were taken against the supposed agents of foreign powers and the emigrants. At the moment, the belief in a foreign influence was universally entertained. The day before, fresh domiciliary visits had been ordered throughout the whole of France, with the view of apprehending emigrants and suspicious travellers; this day the convention revived the necessity for passports, and strictly enjoined all hotel and lodging-house keepers to specify the strangers sojourning in their establishments, ordering, moreover, a new registration of all the citizens by sections.

Marat, then, was to be prosecuted at last; and the next morning he published the following passages in his paper:—

"Indignant at beholding the enemies of the public welfare eternally manœuvring against the people; shocked at viewing the monopolisers of all kinds coalescing to reduce them to despair by misery and famine; distressed at perceiving that the measures taken by the convention to prevent these conspiracies failed to effect their object; stung by the groans of the unfortunate coming every morning to ask bread from me, whilst accusing the convention of leaving them to perish from want, I took up my pen to canvass the best means of finally terminating the conspiracies of the public enemies and the sufferings of the people. The simplest ideas are those which first present themselves to a well-constituted mind, which desires only the general happiness without any selfish considerations; accordingly, I asked myself why we should not turn against public brigands the expedients they pursue to ruin the people and destroy liberty. In accordance with this idea, I observed that in a country where the rights of the people were not vain titles, pompously set forth in an idle declaration, the pillage of a few magazines, with the engrossers hanged at their doors, would soon put an end to their malversations. What do the drivers of the faction of statesmen do? They seize with avidity upon this phrase, hasten to send emissaries amongst the women assembled before the bakers' shops, inciting them to bear away, at reasonable prices, soap, candles, and sugar, from the shops of retail grocers, whilst those emissaries themselves plunder the stores of poor patriot grocers. Then those miscreants keep silence all the day, concert together at night in a secret conclave, held in the Rue de Rohan, at the house of the caitiff counter-revolutionist Valazé, and come the next day to denounce me from the tribune as the instigator of excesses which are exclusively owing to themselves!"

The breach became every day wider and more incurable. Already threats were openly exchanged; several deputies never appeared without arms, and again the cry was raised, with the same energy as had marked it in the months of July and August of the preceding year, that it behoved the patriots to save themselves by insurrection, and to cut off the *gangrened* part of the national representation. The Girondists met in the evenings at the house of a member of their party, Valazé, where great uncertainty prevailed amongst them as to the course expedient to be pursued. Some believed, others denied, the danger to be imminent. Certain of their number, such as Salles and Louvet, conceived imaginary conspiracies, and by directing attention to chimeras, turned it from veritable perils. Tossed thus uneasily from project to project, fixed in the midst of Paris without any force at their disposition, and resting for support merely on opinion in the departments—a vast resource, doubtless, but perfectly inert—some sudden onslaught might, upon any given day, deliver them into the power of their adversaries and accomplish their annihilation. They had been unsuccessful in their attempts to form a departmental guard; the bands of federalists, congregated in the metropolis since the meeting of the convention, were partly gained over and partly draughted into the armies, so that their only reliance was somewhat doubtingly placed on 400 men of Brest, the same whose resolute conduct had stopped the recent pillage. Failing the departmental guard, they had vainly essayed to transfer the direction of the public force from the commune to the minister of the

interior. The Mountain, by furious clamours, intimidated the majority, and prevented the adoption of such a measure. The number of members upon whom the Girondists could count as uninfluenced by fear, and firm in critical discussions, scarcely amounted to eighty. In this precarious state of matters, there remained to the Girondists but one expedient, as impracticable in execution as all the others—that of dissolving the convention. Upon this point, also, the outrageous vehemence of the Mountaineers extinguished all hope of obtaining a majority. Amidst these tormenting uncertainties, proceeding not from weakness but from sheer want of power, they were fain to turn their desponding hopes towards the constitution, flattering themselves that the yoke of laws would prove a restraint on passions and put an end to all convulsions. The more speculative minds, in particular, fondly clung to this idea. Condorcet had presented a report in the name of the committee on the constitution, which had excited a general clamour. Condorcet, Pétion, and Sièyes, were held up to the public execration at the Jacobin Club. Their republic was deemed to be but an aristocracy ingeniously framed for certain overbearing and despotic men of talent. Consequently, the Mountaineers deprecated its further consideration; and several members of convention, by this time sensible that their business was not to constitute, but to defend the revolution, spoke out boldly, and said, that it was necessary to postpone the constitution until the following year, and in the interim devote exclusive attention to the cares of governing and fighting. Thus the long sway of that stormy assembly began to be distinctly intimated; it had ceased to believe in the brevity of its legislative mission; and the Girondists saw their last hope vanish—the expectation of speedily curbing the violence of faction by laws.

At the same time, their adversaries were not less embarrassed. Doubtless, they had in their favour exalted passions; they had the Jacobin Club, the commune, and the majority of the sections; but they did not command the ministers, and they dreaded the departments, where the two opinions were struggling in most rancorous contest, in which theirs had evidently the disadvantage; furthermore, they looked with alarm to the efforts of foreign powers; and although the ordinary rules of revolutions assure victory to the most violent, those laws, being to them unknown, could afford no encouragement. Their projects were as vague as those of their adversaries. To attack the national representation was an act of desperate audacity, from which they as yet recoiled in idea. There were assuredly agitators in the sections, who were ready to brave and to propose any measures; but their schemes were discountenanced by the Jacobin Club, the commune, and the Mountain, for they, who were daily accused of conspiring and daily justifying themselves, felt that proposals of this nature would compromise them in the eyes of their adversaries and of the departments. Danton, who had taken but a moderate share in the party quarrels, was regardful only of two things—to guarantee himself from all prosecution on account of his revolutionary acts, and to prevent the revolution from retrograding and succumbing beneath the assaults of the public enemy. Marat himself, so reckless and atrocious when it concerned means, even Marat hesitated; and Robespierre, notwithstanding his inveteracy against the Girondists, against Brissot, Roland, Guadet, and Vergniaud, dared not think of an attack upon the national representation; he knew not upon what expedient to determine, but sunk into dejection, doubted of the stability of the revolution, and told Garat he feared plots of destruction were laid for all the defenders of the republic.*

* I subjoin an extract from the Memoirs of Garat, not less curious than the one already quoted, and which contains by far the most adequate representation that has been given of Robespierre, and of the suspicions which haunted his mind. It is in the form of a conversation: —

During the heated controversies between the two parties at Marseilles, Lyons, and Bordeaux, a proposition for getting rid of the *appellants*, and excluding

"Scarcely had Robespierre understood that I intended speaking to him concerning the quarrels in the convention, than he said, 'All those deputies of the Gironde, that Brissot, Louvet, Barbaroux, are counter-revolutionists, conspirators.' I could not avoid laughing, and my merriment very speedily soured his visage. 'You were always *that way*. In the Constituent Assembly, you were disposed to believe that the aristocrats were attached to the revolution.' 'I was very far from being always *that way*. I might have believed at the most that certain nobles were not aristocrats. I judged so indeed of several, and you yourself think so still of some. I may have likewise been of opinion that we would have made some conversions even amongst the aristocrats, if of the two means which were at our disposition, reason and force, we had more frequently employed reason, which was altogether on our side, and less frequently force, which might have been on the side of the tyrants. Trust me, we should forget the dangers we have passed through, which have nothing in common with those that now threaten us. War then raged between the friends and the enemies of liberty; it rages at present between the friends and the enemies of the republic. If an opportunity should offer, I will tell Louvet he errs too egregiously when he deems you a royalist; but to you, I consider myself bound to declare that Louvet is no more a royalist than yourself. In your quarrels you resemble the Molinists and the Jansenists, the entire dispute between whom turned on the manner in which divine grace operates within our souls, and who furiously charged each other with disbelieving in God.' 'If they be not royalists, why, pray, did they labour so strenuously to save the life of a king? I'll wager, now, that you also were for pardon, for clemency —— Why, what signifies the principle which rendered the death of the tyrant just and necessary? Your Brissot and your appellants to the people were against it. Would they then have left to tyranny the means of rearing its head again?' 'I am not aware whether the intention of the *appellants to the people* was to spare the life of Capet; the appeal to the people always appeared to me imprudent and dangerous; but I can easily conceive how those who voted for it may have believed the life of Capet in captivity might be more useful, in the course of events, than his death; I can imagine how they may have thought the appeal to the people a signal mode of honouring a republican nation in the eyes of the whole world, by giving it the opportunity of exercising a great act of sovereignty generously and magnanimously.' 'You certainly attribute fine motives for measures of which you disapprove, and to men who are conspiring in all quarters.' 'And where, then, are they conspiring?' 'Every where—in Paris, in all France, in all Europe. At Paris, Gensonné conspires in the Faubourg Saint-Antoine, by going from shop to shop persuading the dealers that we patriots wish to pillage their stores; the Gironde has long since formed the design of separating from France to unite with England; and the leaders of its deputation are themselves the authors of that plan, which they are determined upon executing at all hazards. Gensonné makes no secret of it; he tells all who are disposed to listen to him, that they are not here as representatives of the nation, but as plenipotentiaries of the Gironde. Brissot conspires in his journal, which is a tocsin of civil war; it is well known that he has gone to England, and also the motives of his going there; we are not ignorant of his intimate connexion with the minister of foreign affairs, with that Lebrun, who is a native of Liege, and a creature of the house of Austria. The best friend of Brissot is Clavière, and Clavière has conspired wherever he has breathed. Rabaut, a traitor, philosopher and Protestant as he is, has not been deep enough to conceal from us his correspondence with the courtier and traitor Montesquiou; for the last six months they have been working in concert to open Savoy and France to the Piedmontese. Servan has been named general of the army of the Pyrenees only to deliver the keys of France to the Spaniards. In fine, look at Dumouriez, who no longer threatens Holland but Paris; and when that charlatan of a hero came here, *where I wished to have him arrested*, it was not with the Mountain he dined every day, but with the ministers and the Girondists.' 'Three or four times with me, for example.' 'I am *sick of the revolution*—I am ill; never was the country in greater danger, and I doubt whether it can extricate itself. And now, are you still disposed to laugh, and to believe that they are honest men—good republicans?' 'No, I am not tempted to laugh, but I can scarcely retain the tears I ought to shed for my country, when I see its legislators a prey to suspicions so dreadful upon grounds so insignificant. I am convinced that nothing of what you suspect is real; but I am still more convinced that your suspicions involve a very real and

them from the convention, originated with the Jacobins of Marseilles, in the rage of contention with the partisans of the Girondists. This proposition, being laid before the Jacobins of Paris, was discussed in their club. Desfieux argued, that the demand in question was advanced by a sufficient number of affiliated

flagrant danger. Almost all those men are your enemies, but not one, except Dumouriez, is the enemy of the republic; and if you could stifle your hatreds on all sides, the republic would be beyond all peril.' 'Are you not going to ask me to revive the motion of Bishop Lamourette?' 'No; I have at least so far profited by the lessons you have given me, and the three national assemblies have taken the pains to teach me, that the best patriots hate their enemies much more cordially than they love their country. But I have one question to ask you, and I beg you to reflect before answering it. Have you no doubts concerning what you have just told me?' 'None.'

I quitted him, and fell into a long reverie of astonishment and terror at what I had heard.

A few days afterwards, as I was leaving the executive council, I met Salles, who was coming out of the National Convention. Affairs were hourly wearing a more menacing aspect. All who entertained mutual sentiments of esteem could not see each other without feeling impelled by a necessity to converse upon the state of the commonwealth.

'Well,' said I to Salles, as I accosted him, 'are there no means of terminating these horrible quarrels?' 'Oh! yes, I hope so; I expect I shall shortly tear away the veil that still covers those detestable miscreants and their frightful conspiracies. But as to you, I know that you always indulge in blind confidence; I know that your mania is to believe nothing.' 'You are quite mistaken; I believe as well as others, but upon deductions, not upon bare suspicions—on accredited facts, not on imaginary creations. Why do you suppose me so incredulous? Is it because, in 1789, I would not believe you, when you assured me that Necker was plundering the treasury, and that people had seen mules loaded with gold and silver bearing his millions to Geneva. This incredulity, I confess, remains quite incorrigible; for even at this day I am persuaded Necker left here more millions of his own than he took millions of ours to Geneva.' 'Necker was a knave, but nothing compared to the wretches by whom we are now encompassed; and it is of those I wish to speak with you if you will listen to me. I will tell you all, for I know all; I have fathomed all their plots. The schemes and crimes of the Mountain commenced with the revolution; Orleans is the chief of this band of brigands, and it was the author of the infernal romance of "*Dangerous Connexions*" who drew out the plan of all the abominations they have committed for the last five years. The traitor Lafayette was their accomplice; and it was he who, pretending to crush the conspiracy in the bud, sent Orleans into England to arrange matters with Pitt, the Prince of Wales, and the cabinet of St James's. Mirabeau was likewise implicated; he received money from the king to conceal his connexion with Orleans, but he received still more from Orleans in expectation of his services. The great point for the Orleans party was to draw the Jacobins into its designs. They dared not attempt it directly; therefore to the Cordeliers they first addressed themselves. In the Cordeliers, all was immediately sold to them and placed at their disposal. Observe, now, that the Cordeliers have always been less numerous than the Jacobins, have always made less noise; and this because they are willing enough that every body should be their instrument, but not so that every body should be in their secrets. The Cordeliers have always been the nursery of conspirators; there the most formidable of all, Danton, moulds and incites them to audacity and falsehood, whilst Marat fashions them for murder and massacre; it is there they rehearse the part they are afterwards to enact in the Jacobins; and the Jacobins, who appear to lead France, are themselves led, without suspecting it, by the Cordeliers. The Cordeliers, who seem to be ensconced in a hole in Paris, negotiate with the whole of Europe, and have envoys in all the courts who have sworn the ruin of our liberty: the fact is certain; I have proofs of it. Finally, who but the Cordeliers have engulfed a throne in a sea of blood to draw forth a new throne instead? They are well aware that the right side, which contains all the virtue, likewise counts in its ranks all the true republicans in the convention; and if they accuse us of royalism, it is because that charge is necessary to pour upon us the fury of the multitude—because, in short, daggers are more easily found against us than arguments. In a single conspiracy, three or four others are involved. When the right side shall be entirely extirpated, the Duke of York will arrive to occupy the throne, and Orleans, who has promised it to him, will assassinate him; Orleans, in his turn, will be assassinated by Marat, Danton, and Robespierre, who have made him the like promise, and the triumvirs will divide France, covered with ashes and blood, until the ablest of them, and that will be

Danton, assassinates the two others and reigns alone, at first under the title of dictator, afterwards, without disguise, under that of king. Such is their plan, you may be assured. By dint of constant reflection I have discovered it; every thing proves and renders it evident. See how circumstances hang and hold together; there is not a fact in the revolution which is not a part and a proof of these horrible plots. You are astonished, I see; will you still be incredulous?' 'I am indeed astonished; but tell me, are there many amongst you, that is, on your side, who think like you on all these things?' 'All, or almost all. Condorcet made a few objections once; Sièyes holds little intercourse with us; Rabaut has another plan, which sometimes tallies, sometimes clashes with mine; but all the others entertain no more doubts than I myself upon what I have just related to you: all feel the necessity of acting promptly, *of putting the irons to the fire without delay*, to prevent the occurrence of so many crimes and misfortunes, and to avoid losing the fruit of a revolution which has cost us so dearly. In the right side are numbers who have not sufficient confidence in you; but I, who have been your colleague, who know you to be an honest man, and a staunch friend to liberty—I assure them that you will be for us, that you will aid us with all the means your office puts in your power. Can the slightest doubt still linger in your mind as to the truth of what I have told you respecting those wretches?' 'I should be too unworthy of the esteem you express for me, were I to leave you under the persuasion that I believe in the fact of the plan you judge that of your enemies. The more you adduce men and things, the more probable it seems to you and the less so to me. The greater part of the facts wherewith you weave the web of your plot have had a definite object, which it needed no ingenuity to carve for them, since it spoke for itself; but you assign them an object which is very far from naturally presenting itself, and which must therefore be laboriously attributed to them. Now, in the first place, you will allow it requires proofs to justify the casting aside a simple and natural explanation; and, in the next, additional proofs to induce the adoption of an explanation which does not occur to the mind thus simply and naturally. For example, all the world believes that Lafayette and Orleans were enemies, and that it was to deliver the National Assembly, Paris, and France, from a multitude of anxieties, that Orleans was persuaded or compelled by Lafayette to withdraw for a time from France; therefore, it must be established, not by assertion but by proof—1st, that they were not enemies; 2d, that they were accomplices; 3d, that the object of Orleans's journey to England was the execution of their schemes. I am aware that by so rigorous a mode of reasoning, a risk is incurred of affording play to crimes and disasters by relaxing foresight to meet and suppress them; but I am also aware that by yielding blindly to the imagination, systems are conjured up on events past and on events to come; the faculty of justly discerning and appreciating contemporary events is lost; and whilst dreaming of thousands of delinquencies which never entered the head of mortal, an utter incapacity ensues to perceive those which actually impend and menace; whilst, moreover, enemies, who are not over-scrupulous, are driven to the temptation of committing crimes they never would have otherwise thought of. I do not doubt that there are around us a multitude of miscreants; the unbridled state of passions arouses them abundantly, and the gold of the stranger supports them. But, be assured, if their projects be desperate, they are neither so vast nor so complicated, nor formed and directed so remotely. In all you state there is much more to bespeak robbers and assassins than profound conspirators. The veritable conspirators against the republic are the sovereigns of Europe and the passions of the republicans. To repel the kings of Europe and their regiments, our armies are sufficient and to boot; to prevent our being devoured by our own passions, there is a mode, but it is unique—hasten to organise a government which shall have strength, and will merit confidence. In the state to which our quarrels reduce the government, a democracy of even twenty-five millions of angels would speedily become a prey to all the dissensions of ambitious pride; as Jean-Jacques says, twenty-five millions of gods would be needed, and into no imagination has so huge a conception entered. My dear Salles, men and large assemblies are not so constituted as that on one side shall be found only gods, and on the other only devils. Every where are men in a conflict of interests and opinions, wherein even the best have evil passions, and even the worst, if we studiously and dispassionately seek to learn their inward thoughts, are susceptible of upright and virtuous impressions. I find in the recesses of my own mind a clear and unanswerable voucher for the half at least of this

societies to be converted into a petition and presented to the National Convention. Robespierre, who was apprehensive that such a project might lead to the total reconstruction of the assembly, and that in the electional struggle the Mountain might be discomfited, strongly opposed the suggestion, and succeeded in getting rid of it by the arguments usually adduced in deprecation of premature dissolutions.

Military reverses added their influence to precipitate events. We left Dumouriez encamped on the shores of the Bielbos, and preparing a hazardous but feasible embarkment in Holland. Whilst he was engaged in making the dispositions for his enterprise, 260,000 soldiers were marching against France, ranging from the Upper Rhine to Holland. Fifty-six thousand Prussians, 24,000 Austrians, and 25,000 Hessians, Saxons and Bavarians, threatened the Rhine from Basle as far as Mayence and Coblentz. From that point to the Meuse, 30,000 men occupied Luxumbourg. Sixty thousand Austrians and 10,000 Prussians marched upon the French quarters on the Meuse, to interrupt the sieges of Maestricht and Venloo. Lastly, 40,000 English, Hanoverians, and Dutch, as yet remaining in the background, were emerging from the extremity of Holland upon the French line of operations. The project of the enemy was to drive the French out of Holland upon the Scheldt, to make them repass the Meuse, and then halt upon that river until the fortress of Mayence should be recaptured. Thus his plan was to march gradually forward, and upon all points at once, not penetrating too eagerly upon any, lest he should expose his flanks. This timid and methodical plan would have permitted the French to push much farther and more actively the offensive expedition against Holland, if blunders or unlucky accidents, or too much hurry in taking alarm, had not obliged them to renounce it. The Prince of Cobourg, who had distinguished himself against the Turks in the last campaign, commanded the Austrians, who were proceeding towards the Meuse. The French quarters, dispersed between Maestricht, Aix-la-Chapelle, Liege, and Tongres, were thrown into the greatest disorder. During the first days of March, the Prince of Cobourg passed the Roer, and advanced by Duren and Aldenhoven upon Aix-la-Chapelle. The French troops being suddenly attacked, retired in confusion into Aix-la-Chapelle, and even abandoned its gates to the enemy. Miaczinski stood his ground for some time; but after a sanguinary conflict in the streets of the city, he was obliged to yield and retreat towards Liege. At the same time, Stengel and Neuilly, separated by this movement, were driven back into Limbourg. Miranda, who was besieging Maestricht, and might be isolated from the main body in retreat upon Liege, also abandoned the left bank and retired upon Tongres. The imperialists immediately entered Maestricht, and the Archduke Charles, boldly pushing his advantage beyond the Meuse, proceeded even to Tongres, and gained a brilliant action. Thereupon Valence, Dampierre, and Miaczinski, united at Liege, judged that all speed should be used in rejoining Miranda, and with that view marched upon Saint-Trond, whither Miranda proceeded on his part. The retreat was so precipitate, that a part of the munitions was lost. However, after great dangers, they succeeded in effecting a junction at Saint-Trond. Lamarlière and Champmorin, stationed at Ruremonde, had time to reach the same point by Diest. Stengel and Neuilly, completely separated from the army and thrown back into Limbourg, were sheltered at Namur by the division of General d'Harville. Ultimately, the French, rallying at Tirlemont, resumed a degree of calmness and assurance, and awaited the arrival of Dumouriez, whose presence the whole army invoked in general and impatient cries.

When that commander had been apprised of the first repulse, he had ordered Miranda to rally all the divisions at Maestricht, and tranquilly to continue the siege with 70,000 men. He was convinced that the Austrians would not venture to force a battle, and that the invasion of Holland would speedily induce them to retrograde. This was a sound conclusion, and founded upon the unfailing principle, that, in case of a reciprocal offensive warfare, the advantage will remain with the party which can hold out the longest. The timorous plan of the imperialists, restraining them from penetrating upon any point, fully justified this deduction; but the negligence of the generals, who failed to concentrate their respective divisions with sufficient promptitude, their confusion after the attack, the impossibility in which they found themselves of rallying in presence of the enemy, and, above all, the absence of a man of superior influence and authority, rendered the execution of the order transmitted by Dumouriez impracticable. Consequently, letter upon letter was dispatched to him, urging his return from Holland. A general panic was rapidly spreading; upwards of ten thousand deserters had already abandoned the army, and scattered themselves towards the interior. The commissioners of the convention hastened to Paris, and procured an order for Dumouriez to leave in the hands of another the expedition undertaken against Holland, and to return with all speed to put himself at the head of the grand army of the Meuse. He received this order on the 8th March, and departed on the 9th, with the vexatious reflection that all his projects were counteracted. He came back more disposed than ever to condemn the proceedings in the revolutionary system introduced into Belgium, and to charge upon the Jacobins the bad success of his plans for the campaign. He found, in fact, ample matter for complaint and censure. The agents of the executive power exercised a despotic authority in Belgium, after a most outrageous fashion. They had every where stirred up the populace, and invariably used violence in the assemblies where a union with France was decided upon. They had seized upon the plate in the churches, sequestrated the revenues of the clergy, confiscated the possessions of the nobles, and provoked the liveliest indignation amongst all classes of the Belgic nation. An insurrection against the French was already beginning to explode on the side of Grammont.

Delinquencies of so grave a character were scarcely needed to incline the mind of Dumouriez to view the commissioners of the government with horror and repugnance. He began by arresting two of them, and dismissing them under escort to Paris. He addressed the others in a tone of high command, and restricted them thenceforth to their functions, prohibiting them from interposing in the military dispositions of the generals, or giving orders to the troops stationed within the limits of their commissariat divisions. He deprived General Moreton of his command, on account of his having made common cause with these disorganisers. He shut up the clubs, restored to the Bel-

axiom: I am fair and open, assuredly quite as much so as any of you; but when, instead of refuting my opinions logically and temperately, they are repudiated with distrust and contumely, I am ready to throw aside argument, and to look if my pistols be well loaded. You have twice made me a minister, and twice have rendered me a signal disservice; the dangers which encompass us, and which encompass me, are the considerations that alone induce me to remain at the post I occupy. A brave man does not ask leave of absence on the eve of battle. The battle, I see, is not far distant; and, foreseeing that from both sides you will assail me, I am determined to remain. I will be ever ready to declare what I believe true according to my reason and conscience; but I now warn you that I will take for my guides my own conscience and reason, and not those of any man on the face of the earth. I have not laboured thirty years of my life to make a lantern for myself, in order afterwards to light my path by the lantern of others.

Salles and I separated, cordially pressing each other's hand and embracing, as if we had still been colleagues in the Constituent Assembly."

gians a part of the property taken from the churches, and joined with these measures a proclamation disavowing, in the name of France, the enormities that had been recently committed. He stigmatised with the name of *brigands* those who were their authors; and in his whole conduct assumed a dictatorial supremacy, which, although grateful in its exercise to the Belgians, and securing to the French troops a safer sojourn in the country, excited the rage of the Jacobins to a frantic pitch. He had on the subject a very angry discussion with Camus, the deputy, in which he expressed great contempt for the government of the day; and, forgetting the fate of Lafayette, relying too readily on military power, he comported himself as a general certain of his ability, if he chose, to make the revolution retrograde, and quite prepared to choose it if he were provoked. The same spirit had crept into his staff; the officers composing it spoke with scorn of that populace which governed Paris, and of the imbecile conventionalists who allowed themselves to be oppressed by it; they insulted and drove away all who were suspected of Jacobinism; and the soldiers, also, overjoyed at beholding their general again in the midst of them, affected, in the presence of the commissioners of the convention, to stop his horse and kiss his boots, saluting him as their father.

These tidings threw Paris into tumultuous agitation, and stimulated renewed vociferations against traitors and counter-revolutionists. The deputy Choudieu promptly seized the occasion to demand, as had been often done before, the dismissal of the federalists loitering in Paris. It was usual to raise this clamour at every disastrous intelligence from the armies. Barbaroux essayed to speak upon the question, but his presence occasioned an uproar of surpassing violence. Buzot laboured in vain to extol the firmness of the men of Brest during the last riot; Boyer-Fonfrède merely obtained, by a species of compromise, that the federalists of the maritime departments should be draughted into the army, still deficient in force, destined for the coasts of the ocean. The others retained the privilege of remaining at Paris.

The next day, being the 8th March, the convention ordered all officers to rejoin their regiments without delay. Danton proposed to afford the Parisians a fresh opportunity of saving France. "Ask them for thirty thousand men," said he; "send them to Dumouriez, and Belgium is assured to us, Holland conquered." There was, doubtless, little difficulty in finding thirty thousand men in Paris, whilst such a reinforcement would be of infinite service to the army of the north, and the capital would, by so seasonable an aid, acquire even additional importance. Moreover, Danton proposed to depute commissioners from the convention to the departments and the sections, with the view of accelerating the levies by all possible means. All his suggestions were adopted. The sections had injunctions to assemble in the evening; commissioners were named to attend their meetings; the theatres were closed to remove all distraction; and the black flag was displayed at the town-hall as a signal of distress.

In accordance with the will of the convention, the sections met in the evening, and extended the warmest reception to the commissioners. The imaginations of men were vividly elated, and the proposition to resort in a mass and on the moment to the armies was every where enthusiastically hailed. But there happened in this instance what had previously occurred on the 2d and 3d of September: before departing, it was insisted that the traitors should be punished. Since that dismal epoch, in fact, the ready-made phrase had passed into constant use—"We will not leave behind us conspirators prepared to massacre the families of the absent." Hence it became necessary, if it were wished to avoid fresh popular executions, to organise legal and inexorable executions, which swiftly and without appeal should embrace the counter-revolutionists—the concealed conspirators, who menaced the revolution within, already so grievously jeopardised from without. It was held indispensable to suspend the sword over the heads of generals, ministers, and faithless deputies, who compromised the public safety. Furthermore, it was deemed inconsistent with justice that the selfish wealthy, who abhorred the system of equality, stood indifferent to the national struggles, and consequently refrained from coming forward to fill the ranks of the army, should remain unaffected by the public exigencies, and do nothing for their alleviation. Accordingly, all those who had above 1500 livres (£65) a-year, ought to pay a tax proportioned to their means, and sufficient to compensate those who took upon themselves all the costs and risks of service. Such were the sentiments almost universally upheld in the sections, resolving into the twofold desire of a new tribunal erected against the hostile party, and of a contribution wrung from the rich in favour of the poor departing to combat. Several amongst them appeared to impress their wishes upon the commune; the Jacobins promulgated the like doctrines on their part; and the following day the convention found itself breasted by a general and irresistible opinion.

On that morning (the 9th March), all the Mountaineer deputies were early in their places. The galleries were filled with Jacobins. They had turned out all the females, *because*, as they said, *an expedition was to be undertaken.* Several of them exhibited pistols. The deputy Gamon rose to remonstrate against the outrage, but he was unheeded. The Mountain and the galleries, firmly bent on their purpose, intimidated the majority, and gave palpable token of a determination to suffer no resistance. The mayor appeared with the council of the commune, confirmed the report of the commissioners of the convention upon the zeal of the sections, and submitted their prayer for an extraordinary tribunal, and a tax upon the rich. Divers sections followed the commune, and repeated the demand for the tribunal and the tax. Some insisted, moreover, upon a law against forestallers, upon a maximum in the price of commodities, and upon the abrogation of a decree which declared metallic moneys merchandise, and permitted their circulation at a different standard than paper. After the presentation of all these petitions, it was proposed to put the measures recommended to the vote. In the first place, the immediate adoption of the principle of an extraordinary tribunal was insisted upon. Certain deputies, however, opposed this precipitancy. Lanjuinais rose, and begged that, if it were absolutely determined to sanction the iniquity of a tribunal without appeal, the calamity might be at least restricted to the single department of Paris. Guadet and Valazé made fruitless attempts to support Lanjuinais; they were assailed with brutal interruptions by the Mountain. Some deputies even demanded that the tribunal should bear the title of *Revolutionary.* But the convention, putting an end to all further discus on, decreed "the establishment of an *Extraordinary Criminal* Tribunal, to judge without appeal, and without recourse to the tribunal of Cassation, conspirators and counter-revolutionists," and charged its committee of legislation to present to-morrow a project of organisation.

Immediately following this decree, it passed a second, which imposed upon the rich an extraordinary war tax; and a third, instituting forty-one commissions, of two deputies each, to be sent into the departments to accelerate the levies by all possible means, to disarm those who lingered behind, to arrest the suspected, to seize upon horses kept for pleasure and convenience, in short, to exercise an uncontrolled despotism. To these measures were added others. The bursaries in colleges were for the future to be restricted to the sons of those who joined the armies; all bachelors employed in the public offices were to be replaced by fathers of

families; imprisonment for debt was abolished. The right of testamentary disposition had met that fate a few days previously. All these resolutions were adopted on the motion of Danton, who perfectly understood the art of attaching interests to the cause of the revolution.

The Jacobins, well contented with this day, rushed eagerly to their club to indulge in self-congratulations upon the zeal they had manifested, the foresight wherewith they had usurped the galleries, and the imposing front presented by the serried ranks of the Mountain. They exhorted each other to persevere, and to be all present at the next day's sitting, when the extraordinary tribunal was to be organised. "Robespierre," said they, "has strongly recommended it." Still they were not fully satisfied with what they had obtained: one of the club proposed the framing of a petition, in which they should demand the reconstruction of the committees and of the ministry, the arrest of all functionaries at the moment of their dismissal, as also that of all postmasters and counter-revolutionary journalists. A general desire was evinced in favour of the instant adoption of such a petition, but the president objected that the society could not perform any act in its collective capacity, and the members consequently agreed to go in quest of another locality wherein they might assemble simply as petitioners. They subsequently dispersed into the different quarters of Paris. The din of tumult pervaded its atmosphere. Some hundred or more of rioters, the ordinary promoters of all disturbances, led on by Lasouski, had stormed the premises of the journalist Gorsas, armed with pistols and swords, and broken his presses. Gorsas had taken to flight, and only succeeded in saving his life by an admirable display of courage and presence of mind. They had afterwards visited the editor of the *Chronicle*, and likewise destroyed his printing machinery.

The succeeding day (the 10th) threatened to be still more stormy. It was Sunday, and an entertainment was prepared in the section of the Halle-aux-Blés, in honour of the recruits about to depart for the army; so that the idleness of the people, united with the excitement of a public feast, might be readily adapted to criminal projects. The hall of the convention was as crowded as on the preceding day. In the galleries and on the Mountain the muster was equally strong and menacing. The debate opened upon several matters of detail. A letter of Dumouriez was taken into consideration. Robespierre supported the propositions of the general, and moved a decree of impeachment against Lanoue and Stengel, both commanding the advanced guard during the last repulse. The impeachment was immediately voted. Then the departure of the commissioners for hastening the levies was broached; but their votes being necessary to ensure the establishment of the extraordinary tribunal, it was decided that the institution should be organised before the sitting ended, and the deputies dispatched the next day. Cambacérès thereupon urged not only the organisation of the extraordinary tribunal, but also that of the ministry. Buzot sprang up the tribune, and encountered a storm of murmurs. "These murmurs," he exclaimed, "teach me what I already knew, that there is courage in opposing the despotism preparing for us." The uproar augmented. He continued: "I give you up my life; but I will save my memory from dishonour by opposing the despotism of the National Convention. You are incited to arrogate all powers into your own hands." "We must act and not prate," cried a voice. "You are right," retorted Buzot; "the publicists of monarchy likewise say that action is necessary, and that, consequently, the despotic government of one will is the best"—— A fresh clamour interrupted the speaker, and general confusion prevailed in the assembly. It was eventually agreed to adjourn the re-organisation of the ministry, and attend at present simply to the extraordinary tribunal. The report of the committee was called for. The report was not digested, but in lieu thereof the project on which the committee had agreed was demanded. Robert Lindet rose to lay it before the convention, deeply deploring its severity. The following was the proposition he submitted, in an accent of profound emotion: The tribunal to be composed of nine judges, nominated by the convention, superior to all forms, acquiring information by any modes; divided into two sections, always permanent; arraigning at the instance of the convention, or directly, those who, by their conduct or the manifestation of their opinions, should have endeavoured to mislead the people, and those who, by the stations they filled under the old system, recalled to memory prerogatives usurped by despots.

On hearing this frightful scheme propounded, loud cheers broke from the left, and violent agitation was evinced on the right. "Rather die!" exclaimed Vergniaud, "than consent to the establishment of this Venitian inquisition!" "The people must have either this measure or an insurrection," replied Amar. "My feeling for revolutionary power is well known," said Cambon; "but if the people have been deceived in the elections, we also may be misled in the choice of these nine judges; and they may be insupportable tyrants, whom we are thus voluntarily imposing upon ourselves." "This tribunal," cried Duhem, "is far too good for villains and counter-revolutionists!" The tumult grew every moment greater; the time was consumed in menaces, abusive epithets, shouts and yells of all descriptions. "We will have it!" exclaimed the one side; "We will not have it!" retorted the other. Barrère moved the addition of juries, and forcibly urged their necessity. Turreau insisted that they should be struck in Paris, Boyer Fonfrède in the whole republic, because the new tribunal would have to judge crimes committed in the departments, the armies, and every where. Thus the day waned, and the shades of evening began to fall. The president Gensonné summed up the various propositions, and prepared to put them to the vote. The assembly, overpowered with exhaustion, seemed ready to yield to the determined violence. The members of the Plain began to retire, and the Mountain, in order to complete their terror, demanded that the votes should be given aloud. "Yes!" exclaimed Faraud, with indignation—"yes, let us vote aloud, so that the world may know the men who wish to assassinate innocence under shelter of the law!" This vehement apostrophe reanimated the right side and the centre, and, contrary to all expectation, the majority declared: 1st, that there should be juries; 2d, that those juries should be taken in equal numbers from the departments; 3d, that they should be nominated by the convention.

After the adoption of these three propositions, Gensonné deemed it expedient to give an hour's respite to the assembly, which was fatigued and worn to lassitude. The deputies rose to retire. "I call upon good citizens to remain in their places!" shouted Danton. Every one resumed his seat at the vibrations of that terrific voice. "What!" he resumed, "is it at the moment that Miranda may be vanquished, and Dumouriez, taken in the rear, obliged to lay down his arms,* that you think of forsaking your posts? It behoves you to conclude the enactment of these extraordinary laws, destined to strike terror into your domestic foes! They require to be arbitrary, because it is impossible to render them precise; because, terrible though they be, they are surely preferable to popular executions, which, now as in September, would be the consequence of delays in justice. After settling this tribunal, it will be incumbent on you to organise an energetic executive power, to be in immediate relation with yourselves, and capable of putting

* At this moment it was not known in Paris that Dumouriez had left Holland to return upon the Meuse.

in motion all your resources of men and money. To-day, then, the extraordinary tribunal; to-morrow, the executive power; and after to-morrow, the departure if your commissioners for the departments. Let calumnies be heaped upon my head, let my very memory perish, but let the republic be saved!"

Notwithstanding this impetuous exhortation, the suspension of an hour was carried, and the deputies proceeded to snatch a few moments of indispensable repose. It was about seven in the evening. The idleness of the Sunday, the entertainments given in the course of the day, and the questions agitated in the assembly, all contributed to stimulate popular excitation. Without any plot being formed beforehand, as the Girondists believed, but simply by concurrent causes of incitement acting upon previous dispositions, the people were led to a deplorable scene of commotion. The Jacobin Club was sitting; Bentabole had hastened thither to report what had passed in the convention, and to complain that the patriots had not been so energetic as on the day preceding. The council-general of the commune was likewise assembled. The sections, forsaken by the peaceable citizens, were abandoned to a few furious men, who passed the most inflammatory resolutions. In that of the Quatre-Nations, eighteen frantic bawlers had decided that the department of the Seine ought at the moment to be invested with the sovereignty, and that the electoral body of Paris ought immediately to assemble for the purpose of lopping off the unfaithful members of the National Convention, who were in confederacy with the enemies of the revolution. The same resolution had been adopted by the Cordelier Club; and a joint deputation from the section and the club was at this particular instant haranguing the commune in communication of these resolves. According to the usual custom in all disturbances, certain of the more froward ran to make fast the barriers.

At this very time, the shouts of an infuriated mob resounded in the streets; the recruits who had dined at the Halle-aux-Blés, foaming with rage and debauchery, brandishing swords and pistols, advanced towards the hall of the Jacobin Club, filling the air with excruciating yells. They arrived there precisely as Bentabole finished his report upon the day's proceedings in the convention. Congregated at the doorway, they demanded leave to defile through the hall. They crossed it amidst deafening cheers. One of them essayed to speak, and articulated: "Citizens, in the danger of the country, the conquerors of the 10th August are arisen to exterminate the enemies at home and abroad." "Yes!" responded the president Collot-D'Herbois, "in spite of intriguers, we will save liberty with you." Desfieux then spoke, saying that Miranda was the creature of Pétion, and a traitor; that Brissot had provoked the declaration of war against England in order to ruin France. "There is only one mode," added he, "of saving ourselves, and that is by getting rid of all these traitors, by placing all the *appellants* under arrest at their own houses, and having other deputies nominated by the people." A man attired in military garb, issuing from the crowd which had just defiled through the hall, vociferated that arrest was far from being sufficient, that vengeance was needed. "What is inviolability?" said he: "I trample it under my feet!" At this moment, Dubois de Crancé arrived, and attempted to repudiate these instigations. His resistance provoked a tempestuous scene. It was finally proposed to divide into two columns, one to go in quest of their brethren the Cordeliers, and the other to visit the convention, with the view of defiling through its hall, and making known to it all that was demanded at its hands. The leaders hesitated to sanction the departure; but the galleries pressed into the hall, the lights were extinguished, the agitators gained their point, and the multitude divided into two bodies to proceed to the convention and the Cordeliers.

It so happened that the wife of Louvet, who resided with him in the Rue Saint-Honoré, near the Jacobin Club, had heard the tumultuous din proceeding from that locality, and had repaired thither to learn what might be its cause. She was present at the scene we have just related; she hastened to apprize Louvet, who, with several other members of the right side, had quitted the sitting of the convention, where it was rumoured they were marked out for assassination. Louvet, armed as was then universally the custom, profited by the obscurity of the night, ran from door to door advertising his friends of their danger, and appointing for them a rendezvous in a secluded spot, where they might shelter themselves from the blows of the assassins. He found several of them at the house of Pétion, calmly deliberating upon decrees to be passed. He endeavoured to inspire them with his own alarms, but failed to disturb the impassible Pétion, who, looking up at the sky, and seeing the rain pouring down, said coolly, "There will be nothing to-night." However, a rendezvous was fixed, and one of them, Kervélégan by name, repaired in all haste to the barrack of the Brest battalion, in order to put it under arms. In the mean time, the ministers assembled at the house of Lebrun, and, being utterly powerless from the want of an armed force, knew not what means to take in defence of the convention and of themselves, for they also were threatened. The assembly itself, struck with consternation, sat in anticipation of some terrible catastrophe, deeming at every noise, at every reverberating shout, that the next moment would bring the assassins into its precincts. Only forty members remained on the benches of the right side, in full expectation of an attack upon their lives; they all had arms, and held their pistols ready for service. They had agreed amongst themselves to rush upon the Mountain at the first commotion, and cut down as many of its members as they could. The galleries and the Mountain maintained a similar attitude of preparation, and on both sides a sanguinary and desperate encounter was thus defyingly awaited.

But audacity had not reached the pitch necessary for the perpetration of a 10th of August against the convention; this was but a preliminary scene—a 20th of June. The commune shrunk from encouraging a movement for which opinion was not yet prepared—nay, reprobated it with all sincerity. The mayor, when the deputations from the Cordeliers and the Quatre-Nations presented themselves, rebuked them without allowing them to conclude. A fawner upon the Jacobins, Pache was doubtless inimical to the Girondists; it is probable he even desired their fall; but he might judge a demonstration premature and dangerous; moreover, like Pétion on the 20th June and the 10th August, he was restrained by a sense of illegality, and waited for a show of coercion to yield. Consequently, he repelled the joint deputation. Hebert and Chaumette, procurators of the commune, supported him. Orders were sent to throw open the barriers, and addresses were framed to the sections and the Jacobins, recalling them to the observance of order. Santerre delivered a highly energetic discourse before the commune, in denunciation of those who clamoured for a fresh insurrection. He said that the tyrant being cast down, a second insurrection could only be directed against the people, who actually reigned alone; that if there were evil deputies, they must be endured, as Maury and Cazalès had been endured; that Paris was not all France, and was bound to accept the deputies of the departments; and that as to the complaints against the minister of war, if he had displaced several persons in his department, he was perfectly justified, since he was responsible for his agents. He added, that certain misguided and empty-headed persons in Paris had an idea they were fit to govern, whilst they did but disorganise; but that in a twinkling he would call out the armed force and reduce the malignants to order.

In the interim, Beurnonville, minister at war, whose mansion was beset, cleared the walls of his garden, collected all the adherents he could muster, put himself at the head of the battalion of Brest, and kept the agitators in awe. The section Quatre-Nations, the Cordeliers, and the Jacobins, retreated to their respective localities. Thus the resistance of the commune, the conduct of Santerre, the courage of Beurnonville and the Brest battalion, perhaps also the rain, which fell abundantly, arrested the progress of the insurrection. Furthermore, passion was not yet sufficiently inordinate against all that was most noble and generous in the new-born republic. Pétion, Condorcet, and Vergniaud, were still destined to manifest for some time longer their fortitude, their talents, and their commanding eloquence, in the convention. All gradually subsided into calmness. The mayor, summoned to the bar of the convention, gave the most satisfactory assurances; and that very night it tranquilly concluded the decree organising the revolutionary tribunal. This tribunal, as thus finally constituted, was composed of a jury, five judges, a public accuser, and two associates, all named by the convention. The jurymen were to be chosen before the month of May, and provisionally they might be taken from the department of Paris and the four adjoining departments. Each juryman was to pronounce his opinion in open court.

The immediate consequence of the 10th March was to rekindle the indignation of the members of the right side, and somewhat to perplex those of the left side, who were compromised by these precipitate demonstrations. On all sides, however, the movement was deprecated as illegal, and as an outrage on the national representation. Those even who were not hostile to the idea of a fresh insurrection, condemned the recent attempt as ill conducted, and warned the people to beware of disorganisers, subsidised by the emigrants and England to provoke disturbances. The two sides of the assembly seemed to emulate each other in strengthening this latter opinion; both in fact presumed a secret influence at work, and upbraided each other with being in confederacy therewith. An extraordinary scene that occurred in the assembly still further confirmed this general conviction. The section Poissonnière, in presenting some volunteers, demanded an act of impeachment against Dumouriez, the general upon whom the entire hopes of the French army at that time reposed. This petition, read at the bar by the president of the section, excited a general burst of indignation. "He is an aristocrat," exclaimed several voices, "in the pay of England!" At this instant, curious eyes were directed towards the banner borne by the section, and the astounding fact was discerned that its streamer was white, and that *fleurs-de-lis* decorated its summit. Shouts of wrath broke forth at this discovery; the fleurs-de-lis and the streamer were torn to shreds, and replaced by a tricoloured ribbon thrown down by a female in the galleries. Isnard immediately rose to move a decree of impeachment against the president of the section. More than a hundred voices seconded the motion, and in the number, that which attracted most attention was the voice of Marat.

"This petition," said he, "is a foul plot, and ought to be read to the end; it will be seen that it contains a demand for the heads of Vergniaud, Guadet, Gensonné, and others. You feel what a triumph such a massacre would be for our enemies! it would prove the desolation of the convention"—— Here universal cheers interrupted Marat. He resumed; himself denounced one of the chief agitators, named Fournier, and moved his arrest. It was instantly ordered; the whole affair was remitted to the committee of general safety; and a copy of the minutes was directed to be transmitted to Dumouriez, in order that he might perceive how the assembly spurned the insinuations of his calumniators.

Varlet, the young friend and companion of Fournier, flew to the Jacobin Club, claiming vengeance for his arrest, and aid for his rescue. "Fournier," said he, "is not the only one menaced: Lasouski, Desfieux, myself, in fine, are so likewise. The revolutionary tribunal, just established, is to be turned against the patriots like that of the 10th August, and the brethren who hear me are not true Jacobins unless they follow me." He then proceeded to inveigh against Dumouriez, and urge his impeachment; upon which a terrible tumult ensued in the society; the president put on his hat, and declared that a design clearly existed for ruining the Jacobins. Billaud-Varennes himself appeared in the tribune to denounce these inflammatory diatribes and justify Dumouriez, to whom he was not partial, he said, but who was then discharging his duty, and had proved that he was prepared to combat vigorously. He complained, also, of a project formed to disorganise the convention by violent attacks on its members; he pronounced Varlet, Fournier, and Desfieux, open to grave suspicions; and recommended the plan of a purifying scrutiny, to relieve the society from all secret enemies plotting to compromise it. The opinions of Billaud-Varennes were listened to with attention; and satisfactory tidings arriving at the moment, to wit, the rallying of the army by Dumouriez, and the recognition of the republic by the Ottoman Porte, tranquillity was in the end fully restored.

Thus Marat, Billaud-Varennes, and Robespierre (the latter having also spoken in the same spirit), all declared against the agitators, and affected to believe that they were subsidised by the enemy. Hence, an incontestible proof is afforded that no secretly concerted plot existed, as the Girondists were prone to surmise. If any such confederacy had been planned, Billaud-Varennes, Marat, and Robespierre, would unquestionably have been more or less implicated; they would have felt it incumbent on them to observe silence, as did the left side of the Legislative Assembly after the analogous outrage of the 20th June; and assuredly could not have ventured to demand the arrest of one of their own accomplices. But in this instance the movement was simply the effect of sudden popular ferment, and could be safely disavowed if it proved too premature, or were ill-arranged. Moreover, Marat, Robespierre, and Billaud-Varennes, albeit desiderating the fall of the Girondists, were sincere in their dread of foreign intrigues, and of disorganisation in presence of a victorious enemy; especially apprehensive of opinion in the departments, seriously embarrassed by the accusations to which such movements exposed them, and probably as yet looking forward merely to monopolise all the ministries and all the committees, and so effecting the exclusion of the Girondists from any influential participation in the government, but not violently expelling them from the legislature.

One man only, Danton, might be justly viewed with suspicion, although he was the least inveterate amongst the enemies of the Girondists. He possessed unlimited influence over the Cordeliers, the authors of the movement; he was not hostile to the members of the right side, but to their system of moderation, which in his judgment relaxed the action of government; he insisted at all hazards upon an extraordinary tribunal and a supreme committee, invested with an irresistible dictatorship, because his paramount object, superior to all other considerations, was the success of the revolution; and it is possible that he had secretly instigated the agitators of the 10th March, with the view of intimidating the Girondists and subduing their resistance. It is at all events certain that he evinced no eagerness to disavow the authors of the commotion, but on the contrary reiterated his exhortations for the organisation of the government upon more energetic and inexorable principles.

Be the conjecture correct or erroneous, it was decided that the aristocrats were the hidden movers of

these disturbances; every one believed or affected to believe so. Vergniaud, in a speech of captivating eloquence, devoted to an exposure of the whole conspiracy, upheld this supposition; he was blamed, it is true, by Louvet, who was desirous that the Jacobins should be more directly attacked; but he gained the point, that the first task of the extraordinary tribunal should be to pursue the authors of the 10th March. The minister of justice, who had been instructed to present a report upon the events of that day, declared that in his researches he had not found the least trace of the revolutionary committee, to whom they were sometimes attributed, but had simply discovered hasty ebullitions in clubs, and impetuous suggestions offered under the influence of excitement. All that he had ascertained of a more precise nature was the fact of meetings being held at the Café Corrazza by certain members of the Cordelier Club. These persons were Lasouski, Fournier, Gusman, Desfieux, and Varlet, the usual agitators of the sections. They were accustomed to meet after the sittings to discuss political subjects. No importance was attached to this revelation: and, as much deeper schemes had been presumed, the conclave of a few individuals, so subordinate in station, at the Café Corrazza, was treated with derision.

CHAPTER XX.

MILITARY REVERSES, AND THEIR CONSEQUENCES.—BEGINNING OF THE TROUBLES IN LA VENDEE.—REVOLUTIONARY DECREES.—ARREST OF THE DUKE OF ORLEANS AND HIS FAMILY.—TREASON AND FLIGHT OF DUMOURIEZ.

In the preceding chapter we have seen to what a pitch of exasperation the feuds of parties had mounted in France, and the extraordinary measures taken by the revolutionary government to withstand the foreign coalition and domestic factions. It was in this state of things, with all its lowering portents, that Dumouriez returned from Holland and joined the army at Louvain. We have already described him employing his authority against the commissioners of the executive power, and repelling with all his might the Jacobinism attempted to be ingrafted on Belgium. To these steps he added one still more daring, calculated to involve him in a fate similar to that of Lafayette. On the 12th March he addressed a letter to the convention, in which, reverting to the disorganisation of the armies effectuated by Pache and the Jacobins, to the decree of the 15th December, and to the vexations inflicted upon the Belgians, he imputed all the existing evils to the disorganising spirit communicated from Paris to France, and from France to the countries enfranchised by her armies. This letter, full of rash expressions, and even of remonstrances, such as it became no general to make, reached the committee of general safety at the very moment so many accusing voices were raised against Dumouriez, and when constant efforts were making to prop him in popular estimation, as well as to attach him personally to the republic. This letter was kept secret, and Danton was forthwith dispatched to induce him to recall it.

Dumouriez rallied his army in advance of Louvain, collected his scattered columns, and pushed a corps towards the right, both to defend the Compine and connect his operations with the rear of the army entangled in Holland. Immediately afterwards he determined upon resuming the offensive, in order to restore confidence to his soldiers. The Prince of Cobourg, after seizing upon the course of the Meuse from Liege to Maestricht, and advancing beyond it as far as Saint-Trond, had caused Tirlemont to be occupied by an advanced corps. Dumouriez retook that town; and perceiving that his enemy had neglected to guard the important post of Goidsenhoven, which commands the whole country between the two Gettes, he ordered a few battalions to the spot, which established themselves without difficulty. The next day, the 16th March, the enemy attempted to recover this lost position, and assaulted it with great vigour. Dumouriez, who was prepared for this attack, took care to have it well sustained, trusting to encourage his troops by the result of this contest. The imperialists were repulsed, with the loss of from 700 to 800 men; and repassing the little Gette, proceeded to station themselves in and amongst the villages of Neerwinden, Landen, Neerlanden, Overwinden, and Racour. The French, exhilarated by their recent advantage, planted themselves in front of Tirlemont, and in several villages situated on the left of the little Gette, which had become the line of separation between the two armies.

In this position, Dumouriez resolved to risk a general engagement; and this determination was equally bold and prudent. A methodical war of tactics was unsuited to his troops, still but partially disciplined. He felt the necessity of restoring the lustre of French prowess, calming the apprehensions of the convention, securing the fidelity of the Belgians, driving the enemy beyond the Meuse, there fixing him for a time, then darting off once more to Holland, marching with flying colours into a capital of the coalesced powers, and establishing the revolution in that central point. To these projects Dumouriez further added, according to his own statement, the re-establishment of the constitution of 1791 and the overthrow of demagogues, to be accomplished by the aid of the Dutch and of his own army. But this addition was as absurd at this moment as when he was upon the Moerdyk; wherein all that was sagacious, practicable, and essential in his plan, consisted in the purpose of regaining his influence, recovering the reputation of the French arms, and being enabled to resume his military projects by a decisive victory. The reviving ardour of his troops, and the position he occupied, gave him well-grounded hopes of success; moreover, he was in a situation that imperiously called upon him to incur great hazards, and banish hesitation from his mind.

The French army extended along a front of two leagues, skirting the little Gette from Neer-Heylissem to Leaw. Dumouriez resolved upon a converting movement, intended to drive the enemy between Leaw and Saint-Trond. His left being planted at Leaw as on a pivot, his right would turn by Neer-Heylissem, Racour, and Landen, and oblige the Austrians to recede before it as far as Saint-Trond. For that purpose, it was necessary to pass the little Gette, scale its precipitate banks, carry Leaw, Orsmaël, Neerwinden, Overwinden, and Racour. These three last-named villages, fronting the right flank, which would have to traverse them in its converting movement, formed the principal objects of attack. Dumouriez, dividing his right into three columns, under the orders of Valence, commanded them to pass the Gette at the bridge of Neer-Heylissem; the first was directed to distract the attention of the enemy; the second, to seize briskly upon the elevated cemetery of Middelwinden, thunder upon the village of Overwinden from that height, and capture it; the third, to attack the village of Neerwinden from the right. The centre, intrusted to the Duke of Chartres, and composed of two columns, had orders to pass by the bridge of Esemaël, move through Laer, and attack Neerwinden in front, already menaced on its first flank by the third column. Lastly, the left, under the command of Miranda, was to be divided into two and three columns, occupy Leaw and Orsmaël, and there maintain itself; whilst the centre and the right, marching forward after the victory, would accomplish the converting movement which was the aim of the battle.

These dispositions were fixed on the 17th March, at night. The next day, the 18th, by nine in the morning, the whole army was in motion, all alacrity and

order. The Gette was passed at all points. Miranda occupied Leaw by his lieutenant Champmorin, carried Orsmäel in person, and opened a cannonade upon the enemy, who had retired to the heights of Halle, and there strongly intrenched himself. The object was attained in this quarter.

In the centre and on the right, the movements took place at the same hour; those two divisions of the army traversed Elissem, Esemaël, and Neer-Heylissem, and, in spite of a murderous fire, cleared in gallant style the steep heights bordering on the Gette. The column on the extreme right passed through Racour, poured into the plain, and instead of expanding itself, as it was ordered, committed the error of contracting upon Overwinden in quest of the enemy. The second column of the right, after being retarded in its march, charged with heroic impetuosity the elevated cemetery of Middelwinden, and drove out the imperialists; but instead of establishing itself firmly in that position, it merely traversed it, and took possession of Overwinden. The third column entered Neerwinden, and also committed a blunder in consequence of a misconception, by spreading too early out of the village, and thereby exposing itself to be dislodged by a return of the imperialists. The French army, however, had almost attained its object; but the Prince of Cobourg, having originally erred in not attacking the French forces when engaged in passing the Gette, and climbing its steep banks, now repaired his fault by giving a general order to retake the abandoned positions. A superior force was brought against the right flank under Miranda. Clairfayt, profiting by the first column not having persisted in turning him, by the second not having established itself on the cemetery of Middelwinden, and by the third and the two composing the centre, having gathered confusedly in Neerwinden, crossed the plain of Landen, retook Racour, the cemetery of Middelwinden, Overwinden, and Neerwinden. At this instant, the French were in a precarious predicament. Driven from all the points they had occupied, forced back on the declivities of the heights, turned on their right, cannonaded on their front by a superior artillery, menaced by two corps of cavalry, and having a river at their back, they might be utterly cut off, and would assuredly have been so, if the enemy, instead of directing his main force against their left, had pushed with more vigour their centre and right. Dumouriez, flying to the threatened point, rallied his columns, recaptured by a detachment the cemetery of Middelwinden, and marched in person upon Neerwinden, already twice taken by the French, and as many times retaken by the imperialists. Dumouriez re-entered it for the third time, after a frightful carnage. This unlucky village was choked with the bodies of men and horses; and, in the confusion of the attack, the French troops were both unduly heaped and scattered. Dumouriez, perceiving the danger, abandoned a position so encumbered with human fragments, and reformed his columns at some distance from the village. There he surrounded himself with artillery, and prepared to maintain himself on the field of battle. At this moment, two squadrons of cavalry plunged upon him, the one from Neerwinden, the other from Overwinden. Valence anticipated the first, at the head of the French cavalry, made an impetuous charge upon it, repulsed it, and, covered with wounds, reluctantly yielded his command to the Duke of Chartres. General Thouvenot received the second with calm intrepidity, permitted it to get entangled in the midst of his infantry, whose ranks he had ordered to open, then suddenly gave the word for a double discharge of grape and musketry, which being made at close aim, overwhelmed the imperial cavalry, and almost entirely destroyed it. Dumouriez thus remained master of the field of battle, and established himself thereon with the view of completing the next day his converting movement.

The day had been sanguinary, but the most difficult task seemed accomplished. The left, planted since the morning at Leaw and Orsmaël, was deemed to have been unmolested, since the fire had ceased at two o'clock in the afternoon. Dumouriez, therefore, concluded that it had retained its acquisition. He looked upon himself as victor, inasmuch as he occupied the field of battle. In the mean time, night approached, the right and the centre had lighted their fires, but no officer had arrived to apprise Dumouriez, on the part of Miranda, of what had occurred on his left flank. He began to entertain doubts, which soon increased to anxiety. He set off on horseback with two officers and two servants, and found the village of Laer abandoned by Dampierre, who commanded one of the two centre columns under the Duke of Chartres. Dumouriez there learnt that the left, entirely broken, had repassed the Gette and fled to Tirlemont; and that Dampierre, finding himself, from that cause, uncovered, had moved backward to the post he occupied in the morning before the battle. He instantly departed at full gallop, followed by his two officers and two servants, narrowly escaped capture by the Austrian hulans, reached Tirlemont at midnight, and came up with Miranda, who had retrograded two leagues from the field of battle, and whom Valence, transported to the rear on account of his wounds, was vainly urging to retrace his ground. Miranda, fixed at Orsmaël from the morning, had been attacked at the moment the imperialists retook all their positions. The greater part of the opposing forces had borne on his wing, which, being partly composed of national volunteers, had forthwith broken rank, and fled to Tirlemont. Miranda, hurried along with the fugitives, had not had either time or vigour sufficient to rally his soldiers, although Miaczinski had come to his succour with a corps of fresh troops; he even forgot to let the general-in-chief be informed of his disaster. On the other hand, Champmorin, who had occupied Leaw with the last column, had maintained himself there until evening, without thinking of retreating to Bingen, his point of departure in the morning, until the close of day,

The French army was thus divided, part being behind and part in front of the Gette; and if the enemy had been less intimidated by so obstinate an action, and pushed his advantages to their practicable extent, he might have sliced the French line, annihilated the right, encamped at Neerwinden, and put to flight the left, which had already so precipitately recoiled. Dumouriez, cool and collected, forthwith decided upon a retreat, and the following morning prepared to execute it. He took the command of Miranda's division, endeavoured to impart fresh courage to the soldiers, and ordered a movement in advance, so as to stop the enemy on the left of the line, whilst the centre and right, prosecuting their retreat, should be engaged in repassing the Gette. But this portion of the army, disheartened by its defeat of the preceding day, advanced reluctantly. Fortunately Dampierre, who had recrossed the Gette the same day with a column of the centre, supported the movement of Dumouriez, and displayed equal intelligence and courage. Dumouriez, constantly in the midst of his battalions, cheered their drooping spirits, and prepared to lead them up the heights of Wommersem, which they had occupied the day before the battle. The Austrians had already planted batteries on this eminence, from which they kept up a murderous fire. Dumouriez came in front of his dejected troops, and pointed out to them that it was better to risk the assault than receive an unintermitting fire, and that they would escape it for a single charge, infinitely less destructive to them than a dead inertness before a sweeping artillery. Twice he stirred them into motion, and twice, as if paralysed by the remembrance of yesterday, they came to a stand-still; and whilst they supported, with heroic constancy, the cannonade from the heights of Wommersem, they could not muster the easier courage to charge with

fixed bayonets. During this critical pause, a ball struck the horse rode by Dumouriez; he was thrown to the earth, and covered with mud. His panic-struck soldiers were on the point of flight at this spectacle; but the general sprang on his feet with youthful agility, remounted on horseback, and continued to uphold them on the field of battle.

During this interval, the Duke of Chartres conducted the retreat of the right and half of the centre. Directing his four columns with infinite judgment and intrepidity, he tranquilly retired in presence of a formidable array, and crossed the three bridges of the Gette without being incommoded. Dumouriez thereupon withdrew his left wing, as well as the column under Dampierre, and re-assumed his positions held previous to the battle, in presence of an enemy struck with admiration at his dexterous retreat. On the 19th, the army found itself, as on the 17th, between Hackendoven and Goidsenhoven, but weakened by a loss of 4000 dead, by a desertion of more than 10,000 fugitives, who were scampering in all directions towards the interior, and by the depression of a lost battle.

Dumouriez, deeply chagrined, and agitated by contending emotions, was sometimes moved to rush desperately upon the Austrians and fight them to the last extremity, and at other times to exterminate the faction of Jacobins, to whom he attributed the disorganisation and the discomfiture of his troops. In his fits of wrath, he loudly execrated the tyranny of Paris, and his words, repeated by his staff, were circulated throughout the army. Nevertheless, although a prey to singular exasperation of mind, he lost not the coolness necessary in a retreat, but made the best dispositions for securing a long occupancy of Belgium by means of the fortresses, if he should be obliged to evacuate it with his armies. Thus he ordered General d'Harville to throw a strong garrison into the castle of Namur, and make a stand there with a division. He dispatched General Ruault to Antwerp, in order to collect the 20,000 men engaged in the expedition to Holland, and guard the Scheldt, whilst sufficient garrisons occupied Breda and Gertruydenberg. His object was to form a semicircle of fortresses, described by Namur, Mons, Tournay, Courtray, Antwerp, Breda, and Gertruydenberg, and to fix himself in the centre of this semicircle, and await the reinforcements necessary to act with renewed energy. On the 22d, he sustained an action of position with the imperialists before Louvain, an engagement almost equal in importance with that of Goidsenhoven, and costing as many men. The same evening he had an interview with Colonel Mack, an officer who exercised great influence over the operations of the allies, on account of the reputation he enjoyed in Germany. They agreed to abstain from provoking pitched battles, to proceed consecutively, with leisure and in good order, so as to spare the blood of the soldiers and the countries which formed the theatre of war. This species of armistice, signally favourable to the French, who would have disbanded if they had been warmly attacked, likewise perfectly suited the timid system of the coalition, which, after having recovered the Meuse, was unwilling to attempt any further decisive operations until the capture of Mayence.

This was the first negotiation of Dumouriez with the enemy. The politeness of Colonel Mack, and his engaging manners, were calculated to suggest to the agitated mind of the general the idea of appealing to foreign aid. He began to lose sight of any brilliant future in the career to which he was now bound: if a few months previously he contemplated gaining success, glory, influence, by commanding the French armies, and if this anticipation had rendered him more indulgent towards revolutionary violence, at present vanquished, odious in popular estimation, and attributing the disorganisation of his army to that very violence, he looked with unmitigated disgust upon disorders he had hitherto viewed with apathy and indifference. Reared in courts, and from personal observation well convinced how strongly framed a machine was needed to secure durability to a state, it was to him inconceivable that insurgent burghers should be equal to an operation so complicated as that of government. Under such circumstances, if a general, at once a warrior and administrator, holds force in his hands, he is easily tempted to indulge the idea of employing it to terminate disorders which afflict his mind and even menace his life. Dumouriez was sufficiently daring to form such an idea; and no longer perceiving any signal inducement to serve the revolution by victories, he determined to carve out a fresh prospect for himself, by making that revolution retrograde to the constitution of 1791, and reconciling it at that cost to all Europe. In this plan he required a king, and men mattered so little to Dumouriez, that the choice was not likely to incommode him greatly. He was charged at the time with a design to place the house of Orleans on the throne. What induced this belief was his affection for the Duke of Chartres, for whom he had reserved the most brilliant services in the army. But this was a very insignificant proof, for the young duke had merited all the distinction he had obtained, and moreover, there was nothing in his conduct to show any concert with Dumouriez. But another consideration effectually persuaded all minds, namely, that at the moment there was no other selection possible, if a new dynasty were intended to be created. The son of the deceased king was too young, and, besides, regicide does not admit so prompt a reconciliation with the dynasty smitten. The uncles were in a state of hostility; and there only remained the Orleans branch, as much compromised in the revolution as the Jacobins themselves, and alone capable of obviating the fears of revolutionists. If the excited mind of Dumouriez ever seriously pondered upon a preference, he could not then assign it elsewhere; and it was upon this necessity the accusation was grounded, that he designed to place the house of Orleans upon the throne. He denied the imputation when an emigrant; but that interested repudiation proves nothing; and he is entitled to no greater credence upon that point than upon the anterior date to which he pretended to carry back his counter-revolutionary projects. He has laboured to enforce the impression that his plan of resistance against the Jacobins was of older digestion; but the fact was not so. It was only when the career of success was closed for him, that he dreamt of opening for himself another. His project largely partook of personal resentment, chagrin at defeat, and a sincere though tardy abhorrence for endless disorders, to which he became acutely sensible when the film of illusion had been finally dispelled.

On the 22d, he found at Louvain Danton and Lacroix, who had arrived to remonstrate with him touching the letter written on the 12th to the convention, and kept secret by the committee of public safety. Danton, with whom he had many sympathies in common, hoped to win him back to calmer sentiments and to the general cause. But Dumouriez treated the commissioners, and Danton himself, with infinite moroseness, and took little pains to conceal from them the most untoward inclinations. He broke out into fresh complaints against the convention and the Jacobins, and refused to retract his letter. He merely consented to write a couple of lines, saying that he would explain his meaning at a future date. Danton and Lacroix departed without obtaining any satisfaction, and leaving him in a state of most irritable agitation.

On the 23d, after maintaining a stout resistance during the day, several corps abandoned their posts, and he was obliged to quit Louvain in confusion. Fortunately, the enemy was blind to this movement, and took no advantage of it to throw the whole army into irremediable confusion by a close pursuit. Dumouriez, after this last event, separated the troops of the line

from the volunteers, united them with the artillery, and composed by the junction a chosen body of 15,000 men, with which he placed himself in the rearguard. There, ever visible amongst his soldiers, and daily skirmishing at their head, he succeeded in imparting to his retreat a firmer aspect. He caused Brussels to be evacuated with great order, passed through that city on the 25th, and pitched his tents at Ath on the 27th. Here he had renewed conferences with Colonel Mack, who treated him with distinguished regard and delicacy; and an interview, intended simply to regulate the details of the armistice, speedily changed into an important negotiation. Dumouriez confided all his wrongs to the foreign colonel, and avowed to him his projects for overthrowing the National Convention. And here, blinded by resentment, incensed to fury at the idea of a general disorganisation, the saviour of France in the Argonne obscured his glory by treating with an enemy whose ambition ought to have rendered all his intentions suspected, and whose power was then directly endangering the integrity of the country. As we have upon a former occasion been called upon to remark, there is only one alternative for a man of genius in such situations—either to retire and abdicate all influence, so as to avoid being the accomplice of a system which he disapproves, or to keep aloof from the evil he cannot obviate, and pursue one course, perform one part, always virtuous, always glorious—to labour zealously in defence of his country.

Dumouriez agreed with Colonel Mack that there should be a suspension of hostilities between the two armies; that the imperialists should not advance upon Paris, whilst he should march thither himself; and that the evacuation of Belgium should be the reward of this concession. It was likewise stipulated that the fastness of Condé should be provisionally surrendered as a guarantee, and that in case Dumouriez should stand in need of the Austrians, they were to be at his disposal. The fortresses were to receive mixed garrisons of imperialists and French in equal proportions, but to be under the command of French governors; and at the peace all places were to be restored. Such was the criminal convention concluded by Dumouriez with the Prince of Cobourg, through the medium of Colonel Mack.

The defeat of Neerwinden, and the progressive evacuation of Belgium, formed the extent of the disaster as yet known in Paris. But the loss of a great battle and a precipitate retreat, occurring simultaneously with gloomy tidings from the west, sufficed to occasion an alarming agitation. A plot had been discovered at Rennes, hatched according to all appearances by England, the Breton gentry, and the nonjuring priests. Commotions had previously broken out in the west, on account of the dearness of provisions and the threat to withhold pecuniary support from the state religion; but now the flag of insurrection was unfurled, with the avowed design of defending the cause of absolute monarchy. Gatherings of peasants, demanding the re-establishment of the clergy and the Bourbons, had appeared in the vicinity of Rennes and Nantes. Orleans was in open insurgency, and the representative Bourdon had narrowly escaped assassination. The rebels already amounted to several thousands—in sufficient force to require armies and generals to reduce them. The large towns were dispatching their national guards, General Labourdonnaye was advancing with his corps, and all things announced a civil war of the most implacable character. Thus, on the one hand, were the armies retreating before the coalition, and, on the other, La Vendée was up in arms: never had the ferment usually produced by impending danger had fiercer stimulants at any period of the revolution.

A short while previously, immediately after the 10th March, an attempt had been made to bring the leaders of the two parties together in the committee of general safety, with the view of enabling them to come to an understanding upon the causes of their differences. Danton was mainly instrumental in promoting this congress. The daily conflicts satisfied no hatreds of his, exposed him to discussions which he dreaded, and stayed the action of the revolution, an object so dear to his heart. He was therefore extremely solicitous to have them terminated. In the different interviews that were held, he evinced great candour and tolerance; and if he took the initiative, if he accused the Girondists, it was chiefly to ward off the reproaches that might have been so easily preferred against himself. The Girondists, Buzot, Guadet, Vergniaud, and Gensonné, with their accustomed sensitiveness, justified themselves as if the accusation had been serious, and their arguments found Danton by no means steeled against conviction. It was far otherwise with Robespierre; they irritated him whilst striving to convince him, and then endeavoured to show him how wrong he was to lose his temper, as if such a demonstration were likely to sweeten it. As for Marat, who had deemed himself essential to these conferences, none deigned to offer him the least explanation; and even his friends, fearful lest the alliance should be hereafter urged upbraidingly against them, refrained from exchanging a single word with him. Such meetings were calculated rather to aggravate than mitigate existing enmities: even had the leaders succeeded in demonstrating to each other their mutual wrongs, it is more than doubtful whether the persuasion would have cemented a reconciliation.

Affairs were in this state when the events in Belgium were made known at Paris. The tidings became the signal for immediate recriminations: on one side it was maintained that the public disasters were solely owing to the disorganisation introduced into the government, and on the other to the slackened action impeding it. Explanations were demanded touching the conduct of Dumouriez. His letter of the 12th March was read, which had been hitherto suppressed, and on its perusal exclamations arose that Dumouriez was tending to traitorous practices, that he was clearly pursuing the same course as Lafayette, and, following his example, commencing his treachery by insolent letters to the assembly. A second letter, dated the 27th March, which was even more bold in its expressions than that of the 12th, excited such suspicions still more strongly. On all sides Danton was pressed to disclose what he knew of Dumouriez. Every one was well aware that these two personages were united by a certain sympathy, that Danton had insisted upon the letter of the 12th March being suppressed, and that he had visited him to procure its recall. It was even bruited that they had jobbed in copartnery in affluent Belgium. Alike in the Jacobin Club, the committee of general defence, and the assembly, Danton was importuned for explanations. He, embarrassed by the suspicions of the Girondists, and the doubts of the Mountaineers themselves, for the first time in his life felt some difficulty in replying. He said that the great talents of Dumouriez had seemed worthy of the highest consideration; that it had been accordingly judged essential to see him before denouncing him, in order to impress upon him the errors he had been led into, and win him back, if it were possible, to better sentiments; that hitherto the commissioners had discerned in his conduct merely the effect of evil suggestions, and especially chagrin at his late reverses; but that they had deemed, and still adhered to the opinion, that his talents might be advantageously preserved to the republic.

Robespierre said that if such were the state of the case, it was quite unnecessary to humour his caprices, and in fact preposterous to observe such excessive delicacy towards him. He then proceeded to renew the motion formerly made by Louvet against the Bourbons remaining in France, that is to say, against the members of the Orleans family; thus greatly surprising all men that he, Robespierre, who in January had so energetically defended them when assailed by the

Girondists, should now attack them with such fury. But his distrustful mind had been suddenly charged with sinister forebodings. Thus had he reasoned with himself: "A former prince of the blood cannot resign himself to his new condition, and although he may call himself Egalité, it is impossible that his sacrifice can be sincere; therefore he is conspiring, and in fact all our generals belong to him. Biron, who commands in the Alps, is his intimate friend; Valence, general of the army of the Ardennes, is son-in-law to his confidant Sillery; his two sons occupy distinguished stations in the army of Belgium, Dumouriez is openly devoted to them, and watches over their advancement with marked solicitude. The Girondists certainly attacked the family of Orleans in January last, but it was a feint on their part, simply designed to stifle suspicions of confederacy. Brissot, the friend of Sillery, is the intermediate agent of the conspiracy; the plot is palpable; the throne is reared again in France, and the country consigned to perdition, unless unwonted diligence be used in proscribing the implicated."

Such were the conclusions of Robespierre; and what rendered his peculiar logic the more formidable, was the fact that he, absorbed in hatred, implicitly believed in his own aspersions. The Mountain, in the greatest amazement, repudiated his proposition. "Adduce some proofs at least," said those who were seated near him. "Proofs!" retorted he; "of proofs I have none, but I have a *moral conviction!*"

The first impulse of opinion was, as usual in all moments of danger, to accelerate the action of the executive power and of the tribunals, at once to guard against what were called the external and internal enemies.

The commissioners named for the several departments were immediately dispatched, and the question was seriously canvassed whether the convention *ought not to take a greater share in the execution of the laws.* The manner in which the executive power was organised appeared inefficient. Ministerial officers, planted beyond the walls of the assembly, acting apart from their superior, and under his too slender and distant supervision, and committees enjoined to make reports upon all matters affecting the general safety—these various authorities clashing with each other, perpetually deliberating without acting, seemed decisively incompetent to the prodigious task intrusted to them. Besides, this ministry and these committees were composed of members suspected because they were moderate; and at that period, when promptitude and vigour were indispensable conditions of success, all tardiness, all moderation, was viewed as conspiracy. It was resolved, therefore, to establish a committee which should unite the functions of the diplomatic committee, the military committee, and the committee of general safety, with powers to order and act on emergency independently of its institutor, and arrest or supply ministerial action. Various projects of organisation were submitted to effect this purpose, and were eventually referred to a commission charged with their examination. Immediately subsequent to the disposal of this subject, the attention of the convention was claimed to the means available for reaching the internal enemy, that is to say, *aristocrats and traitors*, by whom it was said to be encompassed. France, exclaimed many voices, was full of refractory priests, of nobles, of their former dependants and of their former domestics; and this collection, still considerable, surrounded them, betrayed them, and menaced them as formidably as the foreign bayonets. These persons, therefore, it was necessary to ferret out, mark, and expose to the light, so that they might be prevented from pursuing their machinations. The Jacobins had consequently proposed, and the convention decreed, that, adopting a custom borrowed from China, the names of all the persons inhabiting a house should be inscribed on the doors.* It thereafter enjoined the disarming of all *suspected* citizens, and designated such to be nonjuring priests, nobles, seigneurs under the old feudal system, superseded functionaries, &c. &c. The disarming was to be effected by the mode of domiciliary visits, and the only alleviation introduced into the measure consisted in forbidding the visits to be made at night. After having thus ensured the means of pursuing and grasping all those who gave the least umbrage, it finally added a mode of smiting them with the utmost dispatch, by installing the revolutionary tribunal. It was on the proposition of Danton that this terrible instrument of revolutionary distrust and jealousy was brought into play. That redoubtable person had fully comprehended its possible abuse, but he sacrificed all considerations to the one great object. He was quite aware that to smite swiftly meant to investigate imperfectly; that to investigate imperfectly involved the chance of error, especially in times of party rage; and that to commit error was to commit atrocious injustice. But, in his eyes, the revolution was society accelerating its movement in all things, in matters of justice, administration, and war. "In periods of tranquillity," said he, "society prefers allowing the escape of the guilty to punishing the innocent, because the guilty is scarcely dangerous; but in proportion as he becomes so, it increases its vigilance to seize him; and when he becomes so dangerous as to place its very existence in jeopardy, or at least when it thus imagines, it smites all that excite its suspicions, and then prefers injuring an innocent person to allowing the escape of one guilty. Such is a dictatorship—that is to say, violent action in threatened societies—it is swift, arbitrary, faulty, but irresistible."

Thus the concentration of powers in the convention, the installation of the revolutionary tribunal, the commencement of the inquisition against the *suspected*, and a duplication of hatred against the deputies who resisted these extraordinary measures, were the consequences of the battle of Neerwinden, the retreat from Belgium, the threats of Dumouriez, and the commotions in La Vendée.

The splenetic humour of Dumouriez was further ruffled by additional disappointments. He speedily learnt that the army of Holland was retiring in disorder, abandoning Antwerp and the Scheldt, and leaving merely the two French garrisons in Breda and Gertruydenberg; that D'Harville had been unable to hold the castle of Namur, and was falling back on Givet and Maubeuge; and, lastly, that Neuilly, far from being in a capacity to maintain himself at Mons, had felt himself obliged to retire upon Condé and Valenciennes, because his division, instead of taking position on the heights of Nimy, had pillaged the magazines and taken to flight. Thus, in consequence of the vicious condition of this army, he saw his project vanish for forming a semicircle of fortresses in Belgium, which would have passed from Namur into Flanders and Holland, and in the centre whereof he would himself have taken post, as the most advantageous for action. He had soon nothing to offer in exchange to the imperialists; and in proportion as he became weaker, he fell more and more in dependence upon them. His irritation augmented as he drew nigh to France, having then an opportunity of seeing more nearly the prevailing disorders, and hearing the cries raised against himself. He began to throw off all disguise in conversation, and his words, gathered by his staff and repeated in the army, proclaimed the projects fermenting in his brain. The sister of the Duke of Orleans and Madame de Sillery, flying from the proscriptions with which they were menaced, had repaired to Belgium in quest of protection from their kinsmen. They were at Ath, and the fact gave a fresh stimulus to suspicion.

Three Jacobin envoys, named respectively Dubuisson, a refugee from Brussels, Proly, a natural son of Kaunitz, and Pereyra, a Portuguese Jew, made their

* Decree of the 29th March.

appearance at Ath, under the real or false pretence of having a mission from Lebrun. They visited the quarters of the general as emissaries of the government, and experienced no difficulty in ascertaining projects which Dumouriez no longer concealed. They found him accompanied by Valence and the two sons of Orleans, encountered a very unfavourable reception, and heard expressions by no means flattering to the Jacobins and the convention. However, they returned the next day, and obtained a secret interview. Upon this occasion Dumouriez was perfectly explicit and frank. He began by informing them that he was sufficiently strong to combat both in front and in rear; that the convention was composed of two hundred brigands and six hundred imbeciles, and that he despised its decrees, which would speedily lose all efficacy except in the precincts of Paris itself. "As to the revolutionary tribunal," he added, with increasing indignation, "I shall know how to suppress it; and so long as I have three inches of steel in my belt, that abomination shall never subsist." He subsequently inveighed against the volunteers, whom he stigmatised as cowards, saying, that for the future he would only have troops of the line, and that with them he would put an end to all the disorders in Paris.

"You do not wish a constitution, then?" observed the three dialogists. "The new constitution imagined by Condorcet is too preposterous." "And what will you substitute?" "The old one of 1791, bad as it is." "But you will need a king; and the name of Louis excites horror." "It matters little whether his name be Louis or Jacques." "Or Philip?" suggested one of the envoys: "but how will you replace the existing assembly?"

Dumouriez reflected for a moment, and then replied: —"There are local administrations, all nominated by the confidence of the nation; and the five hundred presidents of districts will be the five hundred representatives." "But before they can be assembled, who will take the initiative in this revolution?" "The Mamelukes, or, in other words, my army. It will express the wish, the presidents of districts will confirm that expression, and I will make peace with the coalition, which, if I offer no opposition, is at Paris in a fortnight."

The three dialogists, either because they had come to sound him in the interest of the Jacobins, as Dumouriez himself thought, or because they were anxious to lead him into still more precise revelations, hereupon threw in a suggestion. "Why," they asked, "would he not put the Jacobin Club, a ready-formed deliberative body, into the place of the convention?" A flush of indignation, mingled with scorn, spread over the countenance of the general at these words, and they withdrew their proposition. They then reminded him of the danger to which his scheme would expose the Bourbons detained in the Temple, and in whose fate he had betokened great interest. He replied quickly, that should they perish to the last scion, at Paris and at Coblentz, France would still find a chief and be saved; that for the rest, if Paris committed fresh barbarities on the unfortunate prisoners in the Temple, he would be speedily on the spot, and with 12,000 men obtain the mastery. He would not imitate the imbecility of Broglie, he said, who, with 30,000 men, had permitted the capture of the Bastille; but with two posts, Nogent and Pont-Saint-Maxence, he would starve the Parisians to death. "At the same time," he subjoined, "your Jacobins may expiate all their crimes; let them save the unfortunate prisoners, and expel the seven hundred and fifty-five tyrants of the convention, and their sins are forgiven."

His interlocutors finally spoke to him of his own dangers. "There will be always time for a gallop to the Austrians," said he. "Do you desire, then, to partake the fate of Lafayette?" they asked. "I will go to the enemy somewhat differently from him," he replied; "besides, the powers have another opinion of my talents, and do not reproach me with the 5th and 6th October."

Dumouriez had good reason for not fearing the fate of Lafayette. The coalition esteemed his talents too highly, the firmness of his principles too lightly, to incarcerate him at Olmütz. The three envoys quitted his presence, saying they would sound Paris and the Jacobins on the hints he had thrown out.

Although firmly assured that his visiters were pure Jacobins, Dumouriez had expressed himself with unreserved boldness. At this instant, in fact, his projects were notorious; the troops of the line and the volunteers observed each other with distrust, and all announced that the flag of revolt was about to be unfurled.

The executive power had received alarming reports, and the committee of general safety had proposed and procured a decree by which Dumouriez was ordered to the bar. Four commissioners, accompanied by the minister of war, were directed to proceed to the army, signify the decree, and bring the general to Paris. These four commissioners were Bancal, Quinette, Camus, and Lamarque. Beurnonville's nomination to this mission imposed upon him a difficult part, on account of the friendship which existed between him and Dumouriez.

This commission departed on the 30th March. On the same day, Dumouriez moved to the camp of Bruille, whence he threatened equally the three important strongholds of Lille, Condé, and Valenciennes. He was very uncertain as to the part he ought to take, for his army was divided in sentiment. The artillery, the troops of the line, the cavalry, all the organised corps, seemed devoted to him; but the national volunteers began to murmur and to separate from the others. In this situation, only one expedient was left him, namely, to disarm the volunteers. But he thereby ran the risk of provoking a combat, and the experiment was full of danger, inasmuch as the troops of the line might probably feel repugnance at slaughtering their comrades. Moreover, amongst those volunteers themselves were some who had fought admirably, and who manifested an attachment to his person. Hesitating, therefore, on so rigorous a measure, he turned his attention to the seizure of the three fortified towns into whose vicinity he had moved. By occupying them, he ensured supplies of provisions, and a supporting basis against the enemy, of whom he was still distrustful. But opinions were divided in those towns. The popular societies, aided by the volunteers, had openly declared against him, and indulged in threats against the troops of the line. At Valenciennes and Lille, the commissioners of the convention inflamed the zeal of the republicans, and in Condé his partisans had the advantage solely through the influence of the Neuilly division. Amongst the generals of division, Dampierre pursued a line of conduct towards him such as he himself had observed with respect to Lafayette after the 10th August; and several others, without distinctly announcing their intentions, were prepared to abandon him.

On the 31st, six volunteers, bearing on their caps the words written with chalk, "The republic or death," advanced up to him in his camp, and seemed disposed to seize upon his person. Assisted by his faithful Baptiste, he drove them off, and consigned them to his hussars. This occurrence gave rise to a considerable excitement in the army, and the various corps presented addresses to him during the day, which greatly cheered his hopes. He forthwith raised his standard, and detached Miaczinski with a few thousand men to occupy Lille. Miaczinski, advancing to execute his orders, intrusted Saint-Georges, the mulatto, who commanded one of the regiments in garrison, with the secret of his enterprise. The latter deceitfully urged Miaczinski to enter the place with a slight escort. The unsuspecting general allowed him-

self to be persuaded, and once within the walls, he was surrounded and delivered up to the authorities. The gates were closed, and the division wandered without a commander on the glacis of the fortification. Dumouriez instantly dispatched an aid-de-camp to rally it; but the aid-de-camp was likewise taken, and the division, being finally dispersed, was lost to him. After this unlucky attempt, he tried a similar one on Valenciennes, where General Ferrand commanded, whom he deemed perfectly disposed in his favour. But the officer charged to surprise the place betrayed his projects, joined Ferrand and the commissioners of the convention, and thus counteracted his designs on Valenciennes likewise. Condé, therefore, alone remained to him. Placed as he was between France and the enemy, he had but this solitary possession as a basis. If that were lost to him, he had no alternative but to submit to the imperialists, surrender himself entirely into their hands, and in all probability arouse the wrath of his army by forcing it to march in concert with them.

He transferred his head-quarters, on the 1st of April, to the flats of Saint-Amand, in order to be nearer Condé. He caused the son of Lecointre, member for Versailles, to be arrested, and sent him as a hostage to Tournay, requesting the Austrian Clairfayt to keep him shut up in the citadel. On the evening of the 2d, the four deputies of the convention, preceded by Beurnonville, arrived at Dumouriez's quarters. The hussars of Berchiny were drawn up before his door, and the whole of his staff was around him. Dumouriez in the first place cordially greeted his friend Beurnonville, and then asked the deputies the object of their mission. They refused to enter into explanations before the crowd of officers, whose dispositions appeared to them unfriendly, and desired to retire into an adjoining apartment. Dumouriez acceded to their wish, but the officers insisted that the door should remain open. Camus thereupon read him the decree, and called upon him to submit to its terms. The general replied that the state of his army required his presence; but that when it should be re-organised, he would see how it behoved him to act. Camus pressed him still more emphatically; but Dumouriez observed in answer, that he was not quite fool enough to trust himself in Paris, or within the fangs of the revolutionary tribunal; that tigers were howling for his head, but it was not his intention to gratify their craving. The four commissioners vainly assured him that no sinister purpose was formed against his personal safety, that they themselves were ready to answer for him, that his acquiescence would satisfy the convention, and that he would be speedily restored to his army. He refused to listen to their assurances, entreated them not to drive him to extremity, and told them their more advisable course was to adopt the moderate expedient of declaring by a resolution, that Dumouriez had appeared to them too indispensable to the army to warrant their separating him at so critical a moment. As he concluded this intimation he left them, enjoining them at the same time to hasten their decision. He returned with Beurnonville into the room where his staff was assembled, and awaited the determination of the commissioners amidst his officers. The deputies followed him in a few seconds, and with undaunted firmness reiterated their summons. "Will you obey the convention?" said Camus to him. "No," replied the general. "In that case," resumed Camus, "you are suspended from your functions; your papers will be seized, and your person arrested." "This is too much," exclaimed Dumouriez; "here, hussars!" The hussars flew to the call. "Arrest these persons," said he to them in German; "but do them no injury." Beurnonville entreated him to let him share their fate. "Very well," replied he; "I dare say I shall render you a real service, for I doubtless save you from the revolutionary tribunal."

Dumouriez ordered them refreshments, and then dismissed them to Tournay, in order to be kept as hostages by the Austrians. Early the following morning he mounted his horse, published a proclamation to the army and to France, and found in his soldiers, especially those of the line, dispositions to all appearance such as he could desire.

Intelligence of these various circumstances had been successively conveyed to Paris. The interview of Dumouriez with Proly, Dubuisson, and Pereyra, his attempts on Lille and Valenciennes, and lastly, the arrest of the four commissioners, were made known in that city in the order of their occurrence. The convention, the municipal assemblies, and the popular societies, had forthwith declared themselves permanent, a price had been set on the head of Dumouriez, and all the relatives of the officers in his army put under arrest in the character of hostages. A levy of 40,000 men was ordered in Paris and the neighbouring towns to cover the capital, and Dampierre received the command-in-chief of the army of Belgium. These measures of emergency were, as usual, accompanied by calumnious invectives. On all sides, Dumouriez, Orleans, and the Girondists, were ranked together and denounced as accomplices. Dumouriez, as the clamour rung, was one of those military aristocrats, a member of those old staffs, whose evil principles had been perpetually unmasking; Orleans was the first of those magnates who had assumed a false attachment to liberty, and whose deceit was unfolded after an hypocrisy of many years; finally, the Girondists were deputies become unfaithful like the members of all the right sides, and who abused their powers to destroy liberty. Dumouriez was only doing a little later what Bouillé and Lafayette had done somewhat earlier; Orleans was pursuing the same conduct as the other members of the house of Bourbon, and had merely adhered to the revolution a little longer than the Count de Provence; and the Girondists, like Maury and Cazalès in the Constituent, like Vaublanc and Pastoret in the Legislative Assembly, were betraying their country quite as palpably, but simply at a different period. Consequently, Dumouriez, Orleans, Brissot, Vergniaud, Guadet, Gensonné, &c., all accomplices, were the traitors of this year.

The Girondists retorted by asserting that they had always been opposed to Orleans, whilst the Mountaineers were the very parties who had defended him; that they had quarrelled with Dumouriez, and held no relation with him; but that, on the other hand, those who had been sent to him in Belgium, those who had followed him in all his expeditions, those who had always shown themselves his friends, and even palliated his conduct, were Mountaineers. Lasource, carrying the recrimination still farther, had the imprudence to single out Lacroix and Danton, and accuse them of having neutralised the zeal of the convention by disguising the misdeeds of Dumouriez. This reproach of Lasource revived suspicions previously entertained as to the behaviour of Lacroix and Danton in Belgium. It was alleged, in fact, that they had reciprocated favours with Dumouriez; or, in other words, he had aided their rapine, they had winked at his defection. Danton, who only asked silence from the Girondists, was filled with rage, and darting to the tribune, proclaimed war to the death against them. "No more peace or truce," he exclaimed, "between you and us!" Contorting his terrific countenance, menacing the right side as he pointed his finger upon it, he cried—"I have intrenched myself in the citadel of reason, whence I will come forth with the cannon of truth, and pulverise the miscreants who have dared to accuse me."

The result of these mutual charges was—

1st, The nomination of a committee empowered to investigate the conduct of the commissioners sent into Belgium.

2d, The adoption of a decree destined to have fatal consequences, purporting that, without regard to the

inviolability of the representatives, they should be put under impeachment the instant they were strongly presumed to be in confederacy with the enemies of the state.

3d, The arrest and translation to the prisons of Marseilles of Philip of Orleans and all his family.*

Thus, the fate of this prince, the sport of all parties, alternately suspected by the Jacobins and the Girondists, and accused of conspiring with all, because, in truth, he conspired with none, afforded a proof that no past grandeur could be endured in the present state of the revolution, and that the deepest self-abasement could neither allay distrust nor slip the scaffold.

Dumouriez, in the interim, judged that he had no time to lose. Seeing Dampierre and several generals of division abandon him, others merely awaiting the favourable moment, and a multitude of emissaries besieging his troops, he concluded it was essential to put them in motion, so as to impart the wished-for impetus to both officers and soldiers, and withdraw them from any other influence than his own. Consequently, he fixed a meeting with the Prince of Cobourg for the 4th April, in order to arrange definitively with him and Colonel Mack the operations he had in view. The meeting was appointed to take place near Condé. His design was to enter the place afterwards, purge the garrison of its doubtful members, and moving with all his army on Orchies, menace Lille, and attempt to awe it into surrender by deploying his entire strength.

On the morning of the 4th, he prepared to keep his appointment, and thence to proceed to Condé. He had merely ordered an escort of fifty troopers, and as their arrival was delayed, he rode on, directing they should be sent after him. Thouvenot, the sons of Orleans, a few officers, and some attendants, accompanied him. As soon as he reached the highway to Condé, he encountered two battalions of volunteers, whose appearance at that point greatly surprised him. Not having issued any commands for their removal, he was intending to dismount near a house to write out an order for their return, when he heard shouts and the firing of muskets. The battalions had in fact divided; and whilst one portion pursued him with cries to stop, the other endeavoured to cut off his escape towards a moat. He thereupon sprang forward with those that accompanied him, and anticipated the volunteers running to intercept his retreat. Reaching the edge of the moat, and his horse refusing the leap, he threw himself into it, climbed up the opposite bank amidst a shower of bullets, and, taking the horse of a servant, fled at full gallop towards Bury. After riding the whole day, he arrived there in the evening, and was joined by Colonel Mack, who had been apprised of what had passed. He sat up all night, writing and settling with Colonel Mack and the Prince of Cobourg all the conditions of their alliance, and somewhat amazed them by intimating his purpose to return amidst his army after the occurrences of the morning.

He mounted his horse, in fact, at dawn, and, followed by some imperial horse, returned by Maulde into the midst of his army. A few troops of the line surrounded him, and testified a continued attachment towards him, but the majority of countenances wore a gloomy frown. The news of his flight to Bury, in the centre of the hostile army, and the sight of the imperial dragoons, produced an impression at once fatal to Dumouriez, honourable to the French soldiers, and auspicious to the fortune of France. He soon learnt that the artillery, on the rumour of his having passed over to the Austrians, had quitted the camp, and that the retreat of so influential a portion of the army had discouraged the rest. Whole divisions were in the act of withdrawing to Valenciennes, to place themselves under Dampierre. He then saw that an absolute necessity had arisen for his definitively quitting the army and repassing to the imperialists. He was accompanied by a numerous staff, in which were included the two sons of Orleans and Thouvenot, and by the hussars of Berchiny, the whole of which regiment was eager to follow his fortunes.

The Prince of Cobourg and Colonel Mack, whose friend he had become, treated him with distinguished regard, and desired to renew with him the projects of the previous night, by constituting him the leader of a new emigration, distinct in its features from that of Coblentz. But after a lapse of two days, he told the German prince that he had always intended to execute his designs against Paris with French soldiers, accepting imperialists simply as auxiliaries; and that his character of a Frenchman debarred him from marching at the head of foreigners. He accordingly demanded passports for Switzerland, which were instantly granted him. The high value put upon his talents, and the slight estimation in which his political principles were held, procured him a consideration denied to Lafayette, who, at that very moment, was expiating his heroic constancy in the dungeons of Olmütz.

Thus finished the career of this superior man, who had displayed talents of every order—those of the diplomatist, the administrator, and the captain; and all grades of courage—that of the civilian, who withstands the storms of the tribune; that of the soldier, imperturbable amidst flying balls; and that of the general, who grapples with desperate positions, and faces the hazards of the most daring enterprises; but who, without principles, without the moral ascendancy they confer, without other influence than that of genius, speedily attenuated in a rapid succession of events and persons, vigorously essayed to struggle with the revolution, and demonstrated by a signal example that an individual can prevail against a national passion only when it is emasculated. In deserting to the enemy, Dumouriez had not the excuse of the aristocratic prejudices of Bouillé or the delicacy of principle of Lafayette, for he had tolerated all disorders until they happened to thwart his views. By his defection he might charge himself with having accelerated the fall of the Girondists and the great revolutionary crisis. Still it must not be forgotten that this man, unattached to any cause, had a preference for liberty grounded on reason; nor must it be forgotten that he loved his country; that when none believed in the possibility of resisting foreign aggression, he attempted it, and relied upon French men more than they upon themselves; that at Sainte-Ménéhould he taught them to view the enemy with composure; that at Jemappes he infused into them the heroic spirit, and restored France to the rank of a first-rate power: it must never be forgotten, in short, that if he abandoned France, he had likewise saved her. Moreover, old age crept upon him far from his native soil; and it is impossible to avoid a sigh of deep regret at the contemplation of a man, fifty years of whose life were consumed in the intrigues of a court, thirty in exile, and only three employed on a theatre worthy of his genius.

Dampierre received the command-in-chief of the army of the north, and intrenched his troops in the camp of Famars, in a situation to succour such of the fortresses as might be attacked. The strength of this position, and the plan of campaign laid down by the allies, according to which they were not to penetrate farther until Mayence was retaken, necessarily retarded the events of the war in that quarter. Custine, who, in order to excuse his own faults, had never ceased censuring his colleagues and the ministers, was favourably heard when inveighing against Beurnonville, who was regarded as an accomplice of Dumouriez, although delivered by him to the Austrians; and he accordingly obtained the entire command of the Rhine, from the Vosges and the Moselle to Huninguen. As the defection of Dumouriez had commenced with

* Decree of the 6th April.

negotiations, the penalty of death was decreed against any general who should entertain propositions from the enemy, unless the sovereignty of the people and the republic were preliminarily recognised. Bouchotte was subsequently named minister of war, and Monge, though agreeable to the Jacobins from his complaisance, was superseded as unequal to all the details of his immense department. It was furthermore determined that three commissioners of the convention should constantly remain with the armies, one of whom should be renewed every month.

CHAPTER XXI.

ESTABLISHMENT OF THE COMMITTEE OF PUBLIC WELFARE.—RENEWAL OF THE STRUGGLE BETWEEN THE TWO PARTIES IN THE CONVENTION.—IMPEACHMENT OF MARAT—HIS ACQUITTAL AND TRIUMPH.—STATE OF OPINION IN THE CHIEF TOWNS. — SKETCH OF BRITTANY AND LA VENDEE, AND THE CAUSES OF THE CIVIL WAR.

The defection of Dumouriez, the disastrous condition of the armies, and the imminent dangers to which both the revolution and the territory were exposed, had provoked all the violent measures of which we have immediately spoken, and finally drove the convention to devote serious attention to the often-suggested project of imparting greater energy to the government by concentrating its action within itself After various propositions, it adopted the plan of a committee designated that of *public welfare*, and composed of nine members. This committee was to carry on its deliberations in secret. Its functions consisted in superintending and accelerating the action of the executive power, with authority even to suspend its resolutions when it deemed them injurious to the general welfare, on condition merely of notifying such interference to the convention. It was empowered to take, in urgent circumstances, measures of internal and external defence; and orders signed by the majority of its members were to be immediately executed by the executive power. It was instituted only for a month, and could not issue its warrants against any but the agents of administration.*

The members nominated to compose this committee were Barrère, Delmas, Bréard, Cambon, Jean Debry, Danton, Guithon-Morveaux, Treilhard, and Lacroix d'Eure-et-Loir.† Although not yet invested with an unlimited range of authority, it nevertheless acquired a prodigious influence; it corresponded with the commissioners of the convention, gave them their instructions, and exercised the license of substituting for the measures of the ministers such as seemed fitting to its own pleasure. Through Cambon it controlled the finances, and with Danton for a component part, it could scarcely fail to gain all the sway and daring of that redoubtable party leader. Thus, by the accumulation of perils, the country was progressing towards a dictatorship.

Recovering from the consternation occasioned by Dumouriez's desertion, party-spirit sought to turn it to account by imputations of confederacy, in which emulous recrimination the stronger faction was sure to overwhelm the weaker. The sections and the popular societies, through whom all agitation had its usual commencement, took the initiative, and denounced the Girondists in petitions and addresses.

A new congregation, still more violent than any of the others, had been recently formed, in accordance with a doctrine of Marat. That person had stated that the sovereignty of the people had been hitherto a mere subject of "babble;" that according to the true interpretation of the principle, each section was supreme in its own limits, and was entitled at any moment to revoke the powers it had delegated. The most desperate agitators, availing themselves of this hypothesis, had actually pretended to be deputed by the sections to ascertain the use made of their authority, and to consult on the safety of the commonwealth. They had assembled at the Evêché, and asserted their right to correspond with all the municipalities of the republic Consequently, they styled themselves the *Central Committee of Public Safety*. From this hotbed of passion the most inflammatory propositions henceforth sprung. A resolution was there passed to proceed in a body to the convention, and demand from it whether or not it possessed the means of saving the state. This congregation, which had already attracted the notice of the assembly, speedily drew the attention of the commune and the Jacobin Club likewise. Robespierre, who unquestionably desired the result of an insurrection, but dreaded the employment of such a means, and always shook with fear on the eve of every movement, raised his voice against the violent motions discussed in those inferior meetings, adhering to his favourite policy of reviling the deputies stigmatised as unfaithful, and ruining them in public estimation before adopting any ulterior steps against them. Relishing the mode of invective and accusation, he shrunk from the exhibition of pure force, and preferred to insurrections the contests of the tribune, which were unattended with danger, and whereof he exclusively reaped all the honour. Marat, who had at intervals the vanity of moderation, like his fellows, denounced the congregation of the Evêché, although he had supplied the dogmas on which it was founded. Envoys were sent to ascertain whether the persons composing it were in reality patriots of an extreme character, or, as was suspected, hireling agitators. After duly verifying the fact that they were simply men of too burning a zeal, the society of Jacobins, loath to expel them from its fold, as had been proposed, directed a list of their names to be made out, in order that a watch might be set upon them; and it passed a public censure on their conduct, because, as it alleged, there could be no other centre of public safety than itself. After the like fashion had been prepared and preliminarily condemned the insurrection of the 10th August. All who lack the fortitude to act, all who are mortified at seeing themselves outstripped, disapprove of first attempts, though passionately longing for the result they promise. Danton alone kept profound silence as to these movements, neither disavowing nor blaming the subordinate agitators. Tedious accusations in the tribune were not such triumphs as satisfied him; the ways of action were his, and mighty did they become in his hands, for he had at his beck all that Paris contained of the idle, immoral, and turbulent. Nevertheless, it cannot be truly averred that he was secretly manœuvring; only he preserved a menacing silence.

Several of the sections repudiated the congregation of the Evêché, and that of Mail even presented an energetic petition on the subject to the convention. That of Bonne-Nouvelle, on the contrary, read an address at the bar, in which it denounced Brissot, Vergniaud, Guadet, Gensonné, &c., as friends and accomplices of Dumouriez, and prayed they might be struck with the sword of justice. After an uproarious contest, these petitioners received the honours of the sitting; but it was at the same time declared that for the future the assembly would not entertain accusations against its members, and that all such denunciations must be lodged with the committee of public safety.

The section of the Halle-aux-Blés, one of the most outrageous in Paris, drew up a fresh petition under the presidency of Marat, and sent it to the Jacobins, the sections, and the commune, for their approbation, in order that, being thus sanctioned by all the authori-

* The committee of public safety was decreed in the sitting of the 6th April.

† To these members were added three substitutes, Robert Lindet, Isnard, and Cambacérès.

ties of the capital, it might be solemnly presented by the mayor Pache to the National Convention. In this petition, hawked about from place to place, and notorious as the day, it was proclaimed that a portion of the convention was corrupted, in confederacy with forestallers and with Dumouriez, and ought to be replaced by substitutes. On the 10th April, whilst this petition was circulating from section to section, Pétion rose indignantly, and demanded attention on a point of order. He inveighed, with an energy most unusual with him, against the calumnies directed towards a part of the convention, and urged immediate measures of repression. Danton, on the other hand, claimed honourable mention for the petition in the course of signature. Pétion, thoroughly incensed, maintained that its authors should be sent before the revolutionary tribunal. Danton retorted, with a sneer, that honest representatives, strong in their purity of conscience, could have nothing to fear from calumny, which was inseparable from republican freedom; and that, as the convention had neither repulsed the Austrians nor framed a constitution, its title to eulogy was rather dubious. He concluded by insisting that the national assembly should not be made the arena for private contentions, but that those who deemed themselves traduced should apply for redress to the tribunals. The question was thus evaded; but Fonfrède revived it, and again it met the same fate. Robespierre, luxuriating in such a scene of personal discord, once more renewed the topic, and asked leave to tear aside the veil of iniquity. The tribune was accorded him, and he forthwith commenced the most venomous, the most atrocious of all the defamatory harangues that had been hitherto permitted. It behoves us to pause on this speech, pourtraying as it does how the conduct of his enemies was interpreted in that gloomy imagination.*

The articles of his belief were, concisely, that beneath the high aristocracy dislodged in 1789, there existed a burgher aristocracy, as presumptuous and overbearing as the preceding, whose treasons had succeeded those of the nobility. A genuine revolution was distasteful to this class; and it wanted a king, with the constitution of 1791, in order to ensure its supremacy. The Girondists were its leaders. Under the Legislative Assembly, they had usurped the ministries in the persons of Roland, Clavière, and Servan; after dismissal from office, they had sought revenge by the 20th June; and on the eve of the 10th August, they treated with the court, and offered peace on condition of their restoration to power. On the 10th August itself, they contented themselves with suspending the king, instead of abolishing royalty, and nominated a governor for the prince-royal. After the 10th August, they again appropriated the ministries, and calumniated the commune, with the view of undermining its influence and securing an exclusive domination. The convention being constituted, they engrossed the committees, continued to slander Paris, to represent that city as the nursery of all crimes; and perverted public opinion by the agency of their journals, and of the enormous sums devoted by Roland to aid the distribution of perfidious writings. Finally, in January, they opposed the death of the tyrant, not from sympathy for his person, but from sympathy for royalty.

"This faction," proceeded Robespierre, "is the sole cause of the disastrous war we are now waging. It resolved upon it in order to expose us to the invasion of Austria, who promised a congress, with the burgher constitution of 1791. It has directed this war with treachery; and after using the traitor Lafayette, it afterwards employed the traitor Dumouriez, to attain the object it had so long pursued. At first, it pretended to quarrel with Dumouriez, but the rupture was never serious, for, a short while before, it had elevated him to the ministry through his friend Gensonné, and granted him an allowance of six millions for secret expenses. Dumouriez, in confederacy with the faction, saved the Prussians in the Argonne, when he might have annihilated them. In Belgium, it is true, he gained a great victory; but some signal exploit was necessary to gain the public confidence, and so soon as he had secured that confidence, he abused it in all possible forms. He did not invade Holland, which he had it in his power to occupy during the first campaign; he prevented the union of the conquered countries with France; and the diplomatic committee, in concert with him, neglected no expedient to delude the Belgian deputies who sought the junction. Those envoys of the executive power, whom Dumouriez maltreated because they vexed the Belgians, were all selected by the Girondists, who had agreed to send disorganisers, against whom public vengeance might be roused, so as to bring discredit on the republican cause. Dumouriez, after tardily invading Holland, returned to Belgium, lost the battle of Neerwinden; and it was Miranda, the friend and creature of Pétion, who, by his retreat, decided the fate of the battle. Dumouriez then fell back, and raised the standard of revolt, at the very moment the faction was exciting royalist outbreaks in the west. All, therefore, was prepared for this critical moment. A perfidious minister had been placed in the war department for so important a juncture; the committee of general safety, composed of Girondists, except seven or eight faithful deputies who never attended, that committee did nothing to avert the public dangers. Thus nothing had been omitted to ensure the success of the conspiracy. A king was required, and the generals all adhered to Egalité. The family of Egalité was clustered around Dumouriez; his sons, his daughter, even to the intriguer Sillery, were with him. Dumouriez began by manifestos; and what does he say? Every thing that the orators and writers of the faction say from the tribune and in the newspapers—that the convention is composed of miscreants, setting aside a trifling sound portion; that Paris is the hotbed of crimes; that the Jacobins are disorganisers, who instigate troubles and civil war, &c."

Such was the manner in which Robespierre explained both the defection of Dumouriez and the opposition of the Girondists. After minutely developing his fantastic series of calumnies, he proposed to send before the revolutionary tribunal the accomplices of Dumouriez, all upholders of Orleans and their friends. "As to the deputies Guadet, Gensonné, Vergniaud, &c.," said he, with vicious irony, "it would be pure sacrilege to accuse such honest personages; and feeling my incapacity in that respect, I leave them to the wisdom of the assembly."

The galleries and the Mountain loudly applauded their *virtuous* orator. The Girondists were filled with indignation at so atrocious a category, in which subtle malice played a part quite as perceptible as a natural distrustfulness of character; for in the discourse was exhibited singular cunning in combining circumstances and forestalling objections; in truth, Robespierre had shown in this villainous accusation much more talent than usually marked his declamations. Vergniaud mounted the tribune, his breast struggling with emotions, and claimed to speak with so much earnestness, vivacity, and determination, that he obtained the leave he sought, and the Mountain and galleries eventually refrained from interrupting him. He opposed to the studied harangue of Robespierre an extempore speech, delivered with all the noble warmth of genuine eloquence and integrity.

"He would venture," he said, "to answer Monsieur Robespierre, and at no great cost of either time or art, for he merely needed to lay bare his soul. He would not speak for himself, for he knew that in times of revolution the dregs of nations fermented and rose for a moment above the sound and honest, but for the

* The reader is referred to the note, page 246, to which we have already adverted, and which admirably depicts the character of Robespierre.

purpose of enlightening France. His voice, which more than once had carried terror into that palace, whence it had concurred in expelling tyranny, would likewise carry it into the hearts of wretches who were labouring to substitute their own tyranny for that of royalty."

He proceeded to refute each inculpation of Robespierre by arguments such as any might have used who had but a simple knowledge of the facts. He had provoked the dethronement by his speech in July. A little before the 10th August, when doubtful of the success of the insurrection, ignorant even whether it would take place, he had pointed out to an agent of the court what it ought to do, in order to reconcile itself with the nation and to save the country. On the 10th August, he had occupied his seat amidst the roar of cannon, whilst "Monsieur" Robespierre was skulking in a cellar. He had not supported an immediate declaration of forfeiture, because the issue was doubtful; and he had proposed to nominate a governor for the dauphin, because, in case royalty were retained, a good education secured to the young prince was a guarantee for the future welfare of France. He and his friends had supported the proclamation of war, because it already existed in fact; and it was more advisable to declare it openly, and repel force by force, than suffer its evils without striking in return. He and his friends had been borne to the ministries and the committees by the public voice. In the committee of twenty-one, in the Legislative Assembly, they had opposed all projects for quitting Paris, and had prepared the resources which France deployed in the Argonne. In the committee of general safety, in the convention, they had assiduously exerted themselves, and in presence of their colleagues, who were always entitled to witness their labours. He (Robespierre) had deserted the committee, and never gave his attendance at its sittings. They had not calumniated Paris, but opposed assassins who usurped the title of Parisians, and disgraced both Paris and the republic. They had not perverted public opinion, for, so far as he was concerned, he had not written a single word, and what Roland had circulated was known to the whole of France. He and his friends had demanded an appeal to the people on the judgment of Louis XVI., because they held that upon so important a question the national sanction could not be dispensed with. For himself personally, he was scarcely acquainted with Dumouriez, having only met him twice, the first time on his return from the Argonne, the second and last time on his return from Belgium; but Danton and Santerre saw him, congratulated him, loaded him with blandishments, and made him feast with them every day. As to Egalité, he knew equally little of him. The Mountaineers alone were intimate with him, and frequenters of his house; and when the Girondists attacked him, the Mountaineers had been his most resolute advocates. With what, therefore, could he and his friends be reproached? With being manœuvrers, intriguers? But they did not scour the sections to agitate; they did not fill the galleries in order to wrest decrees by terror; they had never desired that the ministers should be taken from assemblies in which they held seats as deputies. With being moderates? But they were not so on the 10th August, when Marat and Robespierre hid themselves; they were so in September, when prisoners were assassinated and the Garde-Meuble was plundered.

Vergniaud wound up his masterly vindication in the following words:—"You can testify whether I have allowed the wrongs so plentifully visited on me during the last six months to corrode in secret; whether I have sacrificed to the good of my country the justest resentments; you can testify whether, under taunts of cowardice, under imputations of avowing guilt, under the risk of foregoing the little good still permitted to my exertions, I have abstained from exposing in all their hideousness the impostures and wickedness of Robespierre. May this day be the last we shall waste in scandalous debates!"

He concluded by moving that the section of the Halle-aux-Blés be called to the bar, and ordered to produce its registers.

The talent displayed by Vergniaud had captivated even his enemies. His evident sincerity and touching eloquence had moved and won over the great majority of the assembly, and unequivocal testimonies of the warmest regard were showered upon him from all sides. Guadet next ascended the tribune; but upon his appearance, the dumb-struck Mountain began to heave, and speedily emitted appalling sounds. The sitting was suspended; and it was not until the 12th that Guadet obtained in his turn the right to answer Robespierre, and he did so in a manner calculated to arouse passions much more fiercely than Vergniaud. None had conspired, according to his views; but appearances, such as did exist, were rather against the Mountaineers and Jacobins, who had maintained relations with Dumouriez and Egalité, than against the Girondists, who had quarrelled with both. "Who," exclaimed he, "was with Dumouriez at the Jacobin Club, at the theatres? Your own Danton!" "Ah! thou accusest me," roared Danton; "thou knowest not my strength!"

The conclusion of Guadet's speech was deferred to the morrow. Resuming, he continued to throw all conspiracy, if any there were, upon the Mountaineers. As he finished, he read an address, which, like that of the Halle-aux-Blés, was signed by Marat. It proceeded from the Jacobins, and Marat had affixed his name as president of the society. It contained these words, which Guadet read to the assembly:—"Citizens, let us arm! The counter-revolution is in the government, in the heart of the convention. Citizens, let us march thither—ay, let us march!"

"Ay!" exclaimed Marat from his seat—"ay, let us march!" At these words, the assembly rose with one impulse, and demanded a decree of impeachment against Marat. Danton started up to oppose, alleging that on both sides of the assembly the same wish prevailed for impeaching the family of Orleans, which ought consequently to be sent before the tribunals; but that it was preposterous to impeach Marat for a shout uttered in the excitement of a stormy debate. Danton was answered that the family of Orleans was not to be tried at Paris but at Marseilles. He attempted to rejoin; but, without hearing him, precedence was given to the decree of impeachment against Marat; and Lacroix moved in addition that he should be immediately put under arrest. "Since my enemies," cried Marat, "have lost all shame, I only ask one thing: the decree is calculated to excite a commotion; therefore let me go to the Jacobin Club, accompanied by two gendarmes, in order that I may recommend tranquillity." Without heeding such ridiculous inanities, he was placed under arrest; and the articles of impeachment were directed to be framed by noon the following day.

Robespierre flew to the club of Jacobins to vent his ire, to celebrate the energy of Danton, to extol the moderation of Marat, and to exhort them to be calm, so that no reproach might go forth that Paris had risen in insurrection to deliver a Jacobin.

On the morrow, the articles of arraignment were read and approved by the assembly; and the impeachment, so repeatedly proposed against Marat, was at length seriously prosecuted before the revolutionary tribunal.

The project of a petition against the Girondists had been the original provocative to these violent discussions between the two sides of the convention; but nothing had been decided upon that subject, and, in fact, nothing could be decided, since the assembly had no physical means of arresting the movements which stimulated the petitions. Accordingly, the plan of combining a general address from all the sections was

pursued with activity, and an uniform document was agreed upon; out of forty-three sections, thirty-five adopted it; the council-general of the commune sanctioned it; and on the 15th April the deputies from the thirty-five sections, with the mayor Pache at their head, presented themselves at the bar. To a certain extent the address might be deemed the manifesto by which the commune of Paris announced its intentions, and threatened insurrection in case of refusal. It was thus it had acted before the 10th August, and thus it was acting on the eve of the 31st May. The orator of the deputation, Rousselin, performed the part of reading the petition aloud. After adverting to the criminal conduct of certain members, the document demanded their expulsion from the convention, and enumerated them one after the other. They were twenty-two in number: Brissot, Guadet, Vergniaud, Gensonné, Grangeneuve, Buzot, Barbaroux, Salles, Biroteau, Pontécoulant, Pétion, Lanjuinais, Valazé, Hardy, Louvet, Lehardy, Gorsas, Fauchet, Lanthenais, Lasource, Valady, and Chambon.

The galleries loudly applauded as the names were read. The president informed the petitioners that the law obliged them to sign their petition. They all pressed forward to do so, except Pache, who, desirous of preserving his neutrality yet awhile, kept in the background. His signature, however, was claimed; he objected that he was not of the number of the petitioners, and had been merely instructed by the council-general to accompany them. But finding that all evasion was useless, he advanced and signed the petition. The galleries rewarded him with vociferous cheers.

Boyer-Fonfrède presently appeared in the tribune, and said, that if modesty were not a duty, he would ask to be added to the glorious list of twenty-two. The majority of the assembly, impelled by a generous emotion, responded in applauding exclamations. "Let all our names be inscribed—all!" they cried. Then they crowded round the twenty-two deputies, and lavished on them the most expressive marks of attachment and interest: the debate, interrupted by this scene, was adjourned to the succeeding day.

The sittings were resumed at the appointed period. Charges and counter-charges recommenced between the two sides of the assembly. Certain deputies of the centre, taking advantage of letters received on the state of the armies, besought attention to the general interests of the republic, and oblivion to individual quarrels. They were heeded for the moment, but on the 18th, a fresh petition against the right side revived the exasperation caused by that of the thirty-five sections. The occasion seemed favourable to denounce various acts of the commune, by one of which it had declared itself in a continued state of revolution, and by another had established out of its own members a committee of correspondence with all the municipalities in the kingdom. Long ago, it had sought to give its purely local authority a character of generality, which would permit it to speak in the name of France, and support a rivalry for power with the convention. The committee of the Evêché, dissolved by the advice of the Jacobins, had likewise been designed to place Paris in communication with the other towns; and at present the commune had resolved to supply its deficiency by organising such a correspondence within its own body. Vergniaud was selected to speak upon the occasion; and assailing at once the petition of the thirty-five sections, the acts imputed to the commune, and the schemes its proceedings betrayed, moved that the petition be declared calumnious, and the municipality enjoined to bring its registers to the assembly, in order that the resolutions it had taken might be ascertained. These motions were carried, in spite of the galleries and the left side. At this moment, the right side, supported by the Plain, began to sway all the decisions. It had procured the nomination of Lasource, one of its most zealous members, as president; and it had again the majority, or in other words, right and law—but a feeble guarantee against force, and only serving to infuriate it the more.

The municipal officers, thus ordered to the bar, came with the coolest effrontery to submit the records of their deliberations, and stood in apparent confidence that their resolutions would meet the warmest approval. The registers were found to commemorate the following facts: 1st, That the council-general declared itself in a state of revolution, so long as the scarcity of provisions was not obviated; 2d, That the committee of correspondence with the 44,000 municipalities should be composed of nine members, and kept in constant activity; 3d, That 12,000 copies of the petition against the twenty-two should be printed and distributed by the committee of correspondence; and, 4th, That the council-general would consider itself attacked when one of its members, or even a president or secretary of a section or club, should be molested on account of their opinions. This latter resolution had been taken to meet the case of Marat, accused of having signed, in the character of president of a section, a seditious address.

Thus the commune, as we see, resisted the assembly at every step, and took a decision of hostile tendency upon every important point of discussion. Upon the question of food, it constituted itself revolutionally, if violent measures were refused. With regard to Marat, it threw over him the shield of its protection. Touching the twenty-two deputies, it made an appeal to the 44,000 municipalities, and put itself in correspondence with them for the purpose of deriving, to a certain extent, general or national powers against the convention. Opposition was completely organised on all points, and, moreover, attended by the still more formidable preparatives of insurrection.

When the perusal of the registers was concluded, Robespierre the younger claimed the honours of the sitting for the municipal officers. The right side opposed the demand; the Plain hesitated, alleging that it might perhaps be dangerous to discredit the magistrates in the eyes of the people, by refusing them a barren honour not withheld even from mere petitioners. Amidst tumultuous contention, the sitting was prolonged till eleven at night; the right side and the Plain at length retired, and a hundred and forty-three members alone remained on the Mountain to admit the Parisian municipality to the honours of the assembly. On that day, pronounced slanderous, repudiated by the majority, and ushered to the honours of the sitting by the Mountain and the galleries alone, it could not fail to be deeply mortified, and henceforth more decisively to become the rallying point for all who wished to break the authority of the convention.

Marat had been at last consigned to the revolutionary tribunal. His impeachment had been exclusively owing to the energy of the right side, acting opportunely on the wavering tendencies of the Plain. Every act of energy honours a party struggling against a superior movement, but hastens its fall. The Girondists, in their courageous prosecution of Marat, had merely paved the way for his egregious triumph. The articles bore in substance, that Marat, having in his journal instigated murder, carnage, the degradation and dissolution of the convention, and the establishment of a power destructive to liberty, he had been decreed amenable to impeachment, and consigned to the revolutionary tribunal. The Jacobins, the Cordeliers, all the agitators of Paris, in short, were in active motion for behoof of "that austere philosopher, formed and chastened," as they said, "by adversity and meditation; combining, with a soul of fire, high sagacity and profound knowledge of the human heart; detecting traitors on their triumphant chariots at the moment the stupid vulgar still offer incense! The traitors," they exclaimed with fury—"the traitors will pass away, but the reputation of Marat only now blossoms!"

Although the revolutionary tribunal was not then composed as at a subsequent period, Marat nevertheless was in no danger of condemnation. The deliberation scarcely lasted beyond a few seconds. The accused was absolved unanimously, amidst the plaudits of a numerous crowd assembled to witness his trial. The event occurred on the 24th April. He was immediately surrounded by a prodigious concourse of women, sans-culottes with pikes, and armed detachments from the sections. These seized upon him, and proceeded to the convention, in order to replace him on his seat as a deputy. Two municipal officers opened the march, heading the procession. Marat, elevated on the arms of some sappers, his brow encircled with a garland of oak, was borne in triumph to the door of the hall. A sapper, stepping out of the crowd, presented himself at the bar, and said: "Citizen president, we bring you the brave Marat. Marat has always been the friend of the people, and the people will always be the friends of Marat! If the head of Marat must fall, the head of the sapper will fall before his!" Whilst uttering these words, this uncouth petitioner kept brandishing his axe, and the galleries applauded with fearful tumult. He then asked leave for the procession to defile through the hall. "I will consult the assembly," replied the president Lasource, in consternation at the horrible scene. But the crowd would not wait until he had consulted the assembly, and the people rushed into the hall on all sides. Men and women thronged its circuit, penetrating into every part, and occupying the seats vacated by the retirement of the members, thoroughly disgusted at such a spectacle. Marat at last appeared, passed from arm to arm, and hailed with a frenzy of applause. From the arms of the petitioners he was transferred into those of his colleagues on the Mountain, who embraced him with the most ardent demonstrations of joy. He tore himself, after an interval, from the caresses of his colleagues, ran to the tribune, and declared to the assembled legislators that he came to offer them a pure heart and a vindicated name, and that he was ready to die in defending liberty and the rights of the people.

Additional honours awaited him at the Jacobin Club. The women had prepared a great quantity of garlands. The president offered him one. A child of four years of age, lifted on the table, placed another on his head. Marat threw aside the wreaths with insulting disdain. "Citizens," he exclaimed, "indignant at seeing a delinquent faction betray the republic, I determined to unmask it, and *put the rope round its neck.* It resisted me by launching a decree of impeachment against me. I have come forth victorious. The faction is humbled, but not crushed. Waste not your time in decerning triumphs; keep yourselves free from enthusiasm. I lay upon the table the two crowns just offered to me, and I beg my fellow-citizens to wait the conclusion of my career before they decide upon it."

Vociferous cheers greeted this arrogant modesty.

Robespierre was present at this triumph, and doubtless contemned it, as of too despicable and vulgar a character. Nevertheless, he was himself destined in his turn to undergo all the vanity of such empty ovations. The rejoicings concluded, the club relapsed into its ordinary topics, to wit, the means of purging the government, and eradicating traitors, Rolandists, Brissotins, &c. For these purposes it was proposed to frame a list of persons employed in all the administrations, and to mark such as had merited dismissal. "Assign me that list," said Marat; "I will make choice of those who ought to be superseded or retained, and I will notify the results to the ministers." Robespierre proffered a suggestion: he said that the ministers were almost all accomplices of the guilty, and would give no heed to the society; consequently, it would be more advisable to address the committee of public welfare, which was placed by its functions above the executive council; and that, moreover, the society could not, without compromising itself, hold communication with collusive ministers. "These arguments are frivolous," replied Marat, disdainfully; "so pure a patriot as I *may hold communication with the devil.* I will address the ministers, and summon them to satisfy us in the name of the society."

A respectful consideration always accompanied "the virtuous, the eloquent" Robespierre; but the matchless effrontery, the cynical flippancy of Marat, amazed and captivated all the more extravagant and hot-headed of the revolutionists. His disgusting familiarity attached to him certain attendants of the markets, who were flattered by such intimacy with "the friend of the people," and were ever ready to lend his insignificant person the aid of their brawny arms and of their influence in public places.

The extreme irritation of the Mountain at this period proceeded from the obstacles it encountered; but those obstacles were infinitely greater in the provinces than at Paris, and the rebuffs and disappointments experienced on their route by the commissioners dispatched to accelerate the recruitment of the armies, shortly afterwards drove them to the last pitch of exasperation. All the provinces had been perfectly inclined towards the revolution, but all had not embraced it with the same ardour, nor signalised themselves by such excesses, as the city of Paris. The first to embark in revolutions are the ambitious idle, the enthusiastic, and the highly talented; of such, a metropolis always contains a more plentiful store than provinces, because it is the resort of all, who, from the spirit of independence or ambition, abandon the locality, the calling, and the traditions of their forefathers. Paris, therefore, was sure to produce the greatest revolutionists. Moreover, situated at a trifling distance from the frontiers, and the aim of all the enemy's attacks, that city had incurred more danger than any other in France; whilst, as the seat of the national authorities, it had witnessed all the grand topics of discussion agitated and settled within its bosom. Thus physical danger and mental conflict had conspired to evoke within it high excitement and turbulence. The provinces, which were not influenced by the like causes of agitation, had beheld the excesses of Paris with consternation, and largely participated in the sentiments of the right side and the Plain. Discontented more especially with the treatment to which their deputies were exposed, they thought they discerned in the capital, besides its revolutionary exaggeration, a design to govern France, as Rome governed its conquered provinces. Such were the dispositions of the tranquil, industrious, and moderate mass with regard to the revolutionists of Paris. These dispositions, however, were more or less emphatic according to local circumstances. Each province, each town, had likewise its impassioned revolutionists, as adventurous minds and ardent characters are found in every locality under the sun. Almost all the men of this cast had possessed themselves of the municipalities, having profited for that purpose by the general renewal of the authorities, ordered by the Legislative Assembly after the 10th August. The easy and quiescent mass always yields to the more enterprising and eager; and it was only natural that the most violent should appropriate the municipal functions, being of all others the most difficult, and requiring an untiring zeal and activity. The peaceable, moderate citizens, forming the great majority, had withdrawn into the sections, which they occasionally visited to record their votes and exercise other civic rights. The departmental functions had been conferred on the most wealthy and considerable personages in each district, and as a necessary consequence, on the least active and energetic of mankind. Thus all the extreme revolutionists were intrenched in the municipalities, whilst the middle and affluent classes filled the sections and the departmental functions. The commune, sensible of this position of affairs, had long entertained the project of establishing

a correspondence with all the municipalities, but had been prevented, as we have seen, by the convention. The parent society of the Jacobins had supplied the want by its peculiar intercourse with its branches; and the ramifications which could not yet be organised between municipality and municipality existed between club and club, which pretty nearly amounted to the same thing, for the men who carried on the deliberations in the Jacobin Clubs were the identical parties who afterwards sat in the councils of the communes. Thus the whole Jacobin party of France, gathered together in the municipalities and clubs, and corresponding from one extremity of the land to the other, found itself in array against the middle mass, an immense body, but divided into a multitude of sections, performing no active functions, maintaining no correspondence between town and town, forming here and there a few moderate clubs, and occasionally assembling in the sections or the departmental councils to exercise a timorous and hesitating suffrage.

This striking difference of position afforded the revolutionists their strongest hope of successfully rivetting their domination upon the bulk of the population. That bulk, be it remembered, admitted the republic, but desired it free from excesses; and at the period in question it had again asserted its importance in all the provinces. From the passing of the decree empowering the municipalities, armed with a terrible police, to make domiciliary visits, search out strangers, and disarm the suspected, whereby the comfort and privacy of peaceable citizens were subjected to irresponsible outrage, the sections had begun a system of reaction, and resolved into aggregate associations to keep the municipalities in awe. In almost all the towns of France, they had thus resumed courage, and were in arms, resisting the communes, inveighing against their inquisitorial police, encouraging the right side, and advocating with it order, peace, and respect for persons and property. The municipalities and Jacobin Clubs, on the contrary, clamoured for additional measures of police, and the extension of revolutionary tribunals into the departments. In particular towns the inhabitants were on the point of coming to actual warfare upon these questions. In the mean time, the sections were so influential in number, that they effectually curbed the violence of the communes. The Mountaineer deputies, commissioned to hasten the levies and stimulate revolutionary zeal, were thunderstruck at so unexpected a resistance, and filled Paris with their lamentations and alarms.

Such was the situation of nearly all France, and the manner in which it was divided. Contention was more or less strenuous, and parties more or less virulent, according to the position and dangers of each town. Wherever the revolution seemed greatly endangered, there the Jacobins were impelled to the use of violent measures, and consequently the moderate mass was most disposed to resist them. But, after all, what chiefly exasperated the revolutionary passions was not so much the perils of foreign war as those of domestic treason. Thus, on the northern frontier, which was peculiarly menaced by the hostile armies and but slightly molested by intrigue, an exemplary concord reigned; all joined in the one engrossing object of general defence, and the commissioners apportioned to the districts stretching from Lille to Lyons, had made satisfactory reports to the convention. But at Lyons, where secret manœuvres conspired with the geographical and military position of the town to augment distrust and aggravate the sense of danger, civil broils as terrible as those of Paris had prevailed. From its situation to the east, and its vicinity to Piedmont, Lyons had always attracted the attention of the counter-revolutionists. The first emigration of Turin had laboured to effect a movement there in 1790, and even determined to send a French prince to the locality. Mirabeau, also, had designed that town as the scene of his intended operations. After the main emigration was transferred to Coblentz, an agent had been left in Switzerland to correspond with Lyons, and through it with the camp of Jalles and the fanatics of the south. These intrigues provoked a reaction of Jacobinism, and the royalists at Lyons called up Mountaineers. These latter possessed a club called the *Central Club* composed of delegates from all the clubs in the district. At their head was a Piedmontese, whom an unsettled disposition had driven through various lands, and finally fixed at Lyons, where his revolutionary ardour had procured him the successive nominations of municipal officer and president of the civil tribunal. His name was Chalier, and in this same Central Club he held a language, which, if used amongst the Jacobins of Paris, would have induced even Marat to accuse him of aiming at a general chaos, and of being subsidised by foreigners. In addition to this club, the Lyonnese Mountaineers had the whole municipality, except the mayor Niviere, the friend and disciple of Roland, and head of the Girondist party at Lyons. Weary of the incessant commotion, Niviere had, like Pétion, resigned his office, and again, like that Parisian mayor, had been re-elected by the sections, which were more influential and energetic at Lyons than in all the rest of France. Out of eleven thousand voters, nine thousand had imposed on Niviere the obligation of resuming the mayoralty; but he had abdicated his functions once more, and then the Mountaineer municipality had succeeded in perfecting itself by carrying the election of a mayor favourable to its views. On that occasion an actual conflict had taken place: the youth of the sections had chased Chalier from the Central Club, and laid waste the hall in which he emitted his fanatical diatribes. The department, in great alarm, had called for commissioners from the convention, who, first pronouncing against the sections, and then against the excesses of the commune, displeased all parties, provoked a denunciation from the Jacobin Club, and were recalled by the convention. Their exertions had been limited to the reconstruction of the Central Club, its affiliation with the Jacobins, and its deliverance, with a due regard to its continued vigour, from certain impure members. By the month of May, irritation had reached its utmost bounds. On one side, the commune, entirely composed of Jacobins, and the Central Club, presided over by Chalier, demanded for Lyons a revolutionary tribunal, and paraded through the principal streets a guillotine sent from Paris, exposed to public observation, as they stated, in order to scare *traitors*, *aristocrats*, &c.; on the other side, the sections in arms were prepared to suppress the municipality, and prevent the establishment of that sanguinary tribunal the Girondists had been unable to avert from the capital. In this critical state of affairs, the secret agents of royalism, lurking in Lyons, awaited the favourable moment for turning to account the anticipated outburst of indignation amongst the inhabitants.

Throughout the rest of the south as far as Marseilles, the moderate republican spirit prevailed in a more uniform manner, and the Girondists possessed the general attachment of the country. Marseilles looked with jealousy on the supremacy of Paris, breathed vengeance for the outrages inflicted on its beloved deputy Barbaroux, and stood ready to rise against the convention, if the national representation were attacked. Although a wealthy town, it was not situated very favourably for the counter-revolutionists beyond the frontiers, inasmuch as it lay near Italy alone, where no plots were hatched, and its port was not so much an object of interest to the English as that of Toulon. Secret intrigues, therefore, had not stirred up rancour to such a pitch at Marseilles as at Lyons and Paris; and the municipality, feeble and overawed, was on the point of being superseded by the all-powerful sections. The deputy, Moses Bayle, to whom but an indifferent reception had been ex-

tended, found there an invincible ardour for recruiting the armies, but an absolute devotion to the Gironde.

Ranging from east to west, from the Rhone to the ocean, fifty or sixty departments manifested the same dispositions. At Bordeaux, indeed, the unanimity was perfect. The sections, the municipality, the principal club, all were in harmony to resist the Mountaineer violence, and support that glorious deputation of the Gironde, which was felt to reflect so much honour on its originators. The opposite party had found shelter in one section only, but every where else it was utterly powerless and reduced to silence. Bordeaux demanded neither maximum, nor supplies, nor revolutionary tribunal; and prepared at once petitions against the commune of Paris, and battalions for the service of the republic.

But along the shores of the ocean, stretching from the Gironde to the Loire, and from the Loire to the mouth of the Seine, very different opinions and much greater dangers presented themselves. In that district, the implacable Mountain encountered as formidable impediments not only the mild and generous republicanism of the Girondists, but also the constitutional royalism of 1789, which repudiated the republic as illegal, and the fanatical spirit of the feudal times, equally hostile to the revolution of '89 as to that of '93, and exclusively recognising in temporal matters the authority of their petty lords, and in spiritual affairs that of their priests.

In Normandy, and particularly at Rouen, its chief town, the inhabitants had formed a strong attachment to Louis XVI., and the constitution of 1790 had satisfied all the feelings entertained both in behalf of liberty and the throne. Since the abolition of royalty and the constitution of 1790, that is to say, since the 10th August, a sullen and threatening silence had pervaded Normandy. Brittany offered tendencies still more hostile, the people in that province being greatly under the influence of the priests and gentry. Nearer the banks of the Loire, that bias was ripening into insurrection; and, finally, on the left bank of that river, in the Bocage, the Loroux, and La Vendée, the insurrection was complete, and large armies of ten and twenty thousand men were in the field.

This is the proper time to describe that singular district, occupied by a population so obstinate, so heroic, so unfortunate, and so disastrous to France, which it nearly ruined by a lamentable diversion, and whose misfortunes it aggravated by infuriating to more desperate extremes the revolutionary dictatorship.

On both banks of the Loire, the people had retained a great attachment for their old form of existence, and especially for their priests and religious rites. When, by the effect of the civil constitution, the members of the clergy were divided, an actual schism ensued. The incumbents who refused to submit to the new distribution of benefices, and to take the oath, were preferred by the people; and when, dispossessed of their parishes, they were obliged to withdraw, the peasants followed them into the woods, and considered both themselves and their faith as grievously persecuted. They formed into small bands, attacked the constitutional incumbents as intruders, and committed deplorable excesses on their persons. In Brittany, around the town of Rennes, there were more general and imposing revolts, occasioned by the dearness of provisions, and the threat to destroy public worship, contained in those oft-repeated words of Cambon: "Those who may want mass can pay for it." However, the government had succeeded in repressing these commotions on the right bank of the Loire, and had merely to apprehend their revival from communication with the left bank, where the great insurrection was organised.

It was, in fact, on this left bank, in Anjou and the Lower and Upper Poitou, that the famous war of La Vendée had broken out. This was the part of France in which time had exerted the least influence, and the least altered ancient manners. The feudal system had there assumed a truly patriarchal character, and the revolution, far from promoting useful reforms in the country, had only disturbed its mild and primitive habits, and was universally regarded as a curse. The Bocage and the Marais formed a singular district, which will require description to render intelligible the state of manners and society within its compass. Departing from Nantes and Saumur, and advancing from the Loire to Sables d'Olonne, Luçon, Fontenay, and Niort, you find a country unequal, undulating, broken with ravines, and crossed by a multitude of hedges, serving as enclosures to the countless fields, and which have given the name of *Bocage* (thicket) to the whole region. As you approach the sea, the land sinks, terminates in salt marshes, and is every where intersected by a multitude of small canals, which render it almost inaccessible. This is the portion called the *Marais* (marsh). The only abundant production of the country is pasturage, and consequently cattle are plentiful. The peasants were accustomed merely to cultivate the quantity of corn necessary for their own consumption, and to use the produce of their flocks as the medium of exchange. It is well known that populations subsisting by this species of industry are remarkable for simplicity. No large cities had been formed in such a district; market-towns, with from wo to three thousand inhabitants, only were met wi h. Between the two high roads, conducting, the one from Tours to Poitiers, and the other from Nantes to Rochelle, stretches a space of thirty leagues in breadth, throughout which, at that time, none but cross-roads existed, leading to villages and hamlets. The lands were divided into a multitude of small farms, of from five to six hundred francs' rental (£20 to £25), each apportioned to a single family, who divided with the owner of the soil the produce of the flocks. By this process of allotment, the landlords had to treat with each family, and thus maintained with all around them constant and familiar relations. The most simple course of life prevailed also in the mansions of the gentry; the chase was eagerly pursued, because game abounded; lords and vassals joined together in the sport, and gained celebrity by their address and energy in its prosecution. The priests, distinguished for singular purity of manners, exercised a genuine pastoral ministry. Wealth had neither corrupted their characters nor provoked remarks to their disparagement. The population submitted to the authority of the lord, and believed in the words of the priest, because in neither was there oppression or scandal. Before humanity adventures upon the course of civilisation, there exists an era of simplicity, ignorance, and repose, at which it would willingly pause, if its fate were not to struggle through difficulties to attain perfection in all things—"to be made perfect through suffering."

When the revolution, so beneficial in other quarters, reached this country with its levelling pressure, it caused great regret. To render it palatable it must have been modified, but that was impossible. Those who have accused it of not adapting itself to localities, and not varying with them, have not considered the impracticability of such exceptions, and the necessity of an uniform and inexorable rule in great social reformations. Scarcely any thing was known of the revolution in this secluded and rural region—only so much, indeed, as transpired through the half-suppressed murmurs and revilings of the landlords and parsons. Although the feudal rights were abolished, the peasants ceased not to pay them. It was incumbent upon them to assemble and nominate mayors; they entreated their lords to undertake the office. But when the dismissal of the nonjuring priests deprived them of the pastors who possessed their confidence, they were highly exasperated, and, like their brethren in Brittany, retreated to the woods, and traversed great dis-

tances, to witness, in their estimation, the ceremonies of the only true religion. From that moment a violent hatred settled in their hearts, which the priests neglected no expedient to foster and inflame.

The 10th August drove some Poitevin nobles to their estates; the 21st January transported them with rage, and they communicated their feelings to all around them. Still they did not actually conspire, as has been related; but the known dispositions of the country suggested projects of conspiracy to men who were not connected with it. A conspiracy had been formed in Brittany, but none in the Bocage; no plan had been there decided upon; they waited, apparently, until driven to the last extremity. At length the levy of 300,000 men, ordered in the month of March, excited a general insurrection. Generally speaking, the peasants of Poitou were perfectly indifferent to what was passing in France; but the dispersion of their clergy, and, above all, the obligation to serve in the armies, drove them to complete desperation. Under the former system, the contingent of the province was supplied by those whom a natural restlessness impelled to quit their native soil; but at present the law coerced all indiscriminately, whatever might be their personal predilections. Compelled to take up arms, they preferred fighting against rather than for the republic. The drawing for recruits was the occasion of revolts in the upper Bocage and the Marais almost simultaneously, that is to say, about the beginning of March. On the 10th of that month, a drawing was appointed to take place at Saint-Florent, near Ancenis in Anjou, at which the young men refused to assist. The guard endeavoured to compel them, and the military commander caused a piece of ordnance to be pointed on the mutineers; on which they forthwith made a spontaneous assault with their clubs, seized upon the gun, disarmed the guard, and then surveyed each other with amazement at their temerity. A carrier named Cathelineau, a man much esteemed through the country, brave, and persuasive in speech, quitted his farm upon learning these tidings, hastened to join the malecontents, animated their courage, and gave some consistency to the insurrection by understanding the art of keeping it alive. That very day he formed the design of attacking a republican post defended by eighty men. The peasants followed him with their clubs and rifles. After a general discharge, every shot of which told, as they were excellent marksmen, they rushed upon the position, disarmed its defenders, and established themselves as its possessors. The following day, Cathelineau proceeded to Chemillé, and carried it likewise, in spite of 200 republicans and three pieces of cannon. A gamekeeper on the domain of Maulevrier, named Stofflet, and a young peasant belonging to the village of Chanzeau, had also gathered a troop of insurgents. They shortly coalesced with Cathelineau, who conceived the daring project of attacking Chollet, the most considerable town in the country, the district-capital, and guarded by 500 republicans. Their mode of fighting was the same as before. Taking advantage of hedges and inequalities of ground, they surrounded the hostile battalion, and commenced firing under shelter and at dead aim. After staggering the republicans by this terrible discharge, they seized the first moment of hesitation that appeared amongst them, darted forward with loud shouts, overthrew their ranks, wrested away their arms, and broke their heads with bludgeons. Such was, in few words, their whole military strategy, then and thereafter, and it was the best adapted to the scene of warfare. The troops they assailed, drawn up in line and uncovered, received a fire they were unable to answer, because they could neither make use of their artillery nor advance with bayonets against enemies hovering in dispersed bodies. In this predicament, unless they were veterans in discipline, they could scarcely fail to be thrown into confusion by a fire so incessant, and so accurate too, that the regular discharges of troops of the line never could equal its precision. And especially when they beheld these furious men, uttering appalling howls, come rushing upon them, it was very difficult to avoid intimidation and to keep their ranks firm and unbroken. If they swerved, they were utterly lost, for flight, so easy to the people of the country, was impracticable for troops of the line. It would consequently have required the most intrepid soldiers to contend against so many difficulties, and those who were at first opposed to the rebels were national guards of the new levy, taken from the towns, almost all of them ardent republicans it is true, but qualified for combat exclusively by their zeal.

The victorious troop of Cathelineau therefore entered Chollet, appropriated all the arms found within it, and converted the ordnance primings into cartridges. It was in this manner the Vendéans invariably procured their munitions of war. Their defeats gave nothing to the enemy, because they had nothing but a musket or a club, which they easily carried across the fields, whilst each victory assured them a considerable booty in military stores. The triumphant insurgents celebrated their success with the money they obtained, and afterwards burnt all the papers of the administrations, which in their eyes were mere instruments of tyranny. They then returned to their villages and farms, which they always refused to quit again until after a long interval.

A much more general revolt had burst forth at the same time in the Marais and the department of La Vendée. At Machecoul and Challans, the conscription was the cause of an universal rising. A certain Gaston, a hairdresser, killed an officer, borrowed his uniform, put himself at the head of the malecontents, and seized upon Challans and afterwards upon Machecoul, where his troop consigned to the flames all the papers of the administrations, and indulged in massacres from which their brethren in the Bocage had abstained. Three hundred republicans were shot in bands of twenty and thirty. The insurgents made them first of all confess, and then conducted them to the edge of a trench, where they picked them off in succession, so as to avoid the trouble of burying them. Nantes immediately dispatched several hundred men to Saint-Philibert; but ascertaining there was a movement at Savenay, it recalled its troops, and the rebels of Machecoul remained in possession of their conquests.

In the department of La Vendée, that is to say, to the south of this theatre of war, the insurrection took still greater consistence.

The national guards of Fontenay having left that place for Chantonnay, were opposed and defeated. Chantonnay was pillaged. General Verteuil, who commanded the eleventh military division, being apprised of this repulse, sent forward General Marcé with 1200 men, partly troops of the line, and partly national guards. This officer encountered the rebels at Saint-Vincent, and routed them. Augmenting his little army with an additional force of 1200 men and nine pieces of cannon, he marched upon Saint-Fulgent, and on the way again fell in with the Vendéans in a hollow, and halted to repair a bridge they had almost destroyed. About four in the afternoon of the 18th March, the Vendéans, taking the initiative, advanced to attack him. Profiting by the advantages of the ground, they began to shoot with their accustomed effect, and gradually closed in upon the republicans, who were startled at so well-directed and destructive a fire, and utterly unable to retort upon an enemy concealed and dispersed in all the surrounding recesses. At length they charged the republican army, spread disorder in its ranks, and gained possession of the artillery, the ammunition, and the arms, which the soldiers threw away in retreating, to be less incommoded in their flight.

These successes, which were more decided in the department of La Vendée, properly so called, obtained for the insurgents the title of *Vendéans*, which they

subsequently retained, although the war was much more active out of La Vendée. The robberies committed in the Marais procured for them also the appellation of *Brigands*, but that stigma justly belonged to the minority only. The insurrection extended in the Marais from the environs of Nantes to Sables, and in Anjou and Poitou to the neighbourhood of Vihiers and Parthenay. The secret of the Vendéans' victories was in the country, in its configuration, in the courage and address with which they availed themselves of those natural advantages, and lastly, in the inexperience and imprudent ardour of the republican soldiers, who, levied in haste, came to the scene of action rashly and unprepared, thus assuring to their opponents easy triumphs, and all the benefits that follow in their train —ample stores, confidence, and increased courage.

The Easter festival drew all the insurgents to their homes, whence they never consented to move until after a long leisure. War to them was a sort of hunting expedition for a few days; they carried with them sufficient bread for the time, and afterwards returned to inflame the minds of their neighbours with a recital of the deeds they had achieved. Appointments were fixed for the month of April, at which time the insurrection became general, and extended over the whole surface of the country. The theatre of war might be comprehended in a line drawn from Nantes, passing through Pornic, the Isle of Noirmoutiers, Sables, Luçon, Fontenay, Niort, Parthenay, and returning by Airvault, Thouars, Doué, and Saint-Florent, to the Loire. The revolt, commenced by men superior to the peasants they commanded only by their natural qualities, was soon continued by men of higher rank. The peasants beset the mansions of the nobles, and forced them to put themselves at their head. The whole Marais insisted upon being commanded by Charette. This individual belonged to a family at Nantes, engaged in privateering; he had served in the navy, and reached the rank of lieutenant, but at the peace had retired to a country-house, the property of his uncle, where he passed his time in the chase. Of a weak and delicate frame, he seemed but little adapted to the fatigues of war; but, living in the woods, where he consumed whole months, and sleeping on the ground with his comrades, he had invigorated his constitution, acquired a perfect knowledge of the country, and made himself known to all the peasants by his fortitude and address. At first, he hesitated to accept the command thus urged upon him, and forcibly represented to the insurgents the dangers of their enterprise. Ultimately, however, he acceded to their entreaties; and, allowing them to commit all sorts of excesses, he effectually compromised them, and thus bound them irrevocably to his service. Talented, subtle, harsh in character, and of unconquerable perseverance, he became the most formidable of the Vendéan chiefs. The whole Marais obeyed him; and with fifteen and sometimes twenty thousand men, he menaced the Sables and Nantes. Immediately after collecting all his forces, he seized upon the isle of Noirmoutiers, an important acquisition, which he might render his stronghold and point of communication with England.

In the Bocage, the peasants applied to Messieurs de Bonchamps, d'Elbée, and de Larochejacquelein, whom they tore from their homes to place at their head. M. de Bonchamps had formerly served under M. de Suffren, enjoyed the reputation of a skilful officer, and united a noble and elevated character to great intrepidity. He commanded all the rebels of Anjou and the banks of the Loire. M. d'Elbée had likewise served in the army, and was distinguished for excessive devotion, great obstinacy, and an excellent capacity for this kind of warfare. At the present time he was the most influential leader in that part of the Bocage. He commanded the parishes around Chollet and Beaupréau. Cathelineau and Stofflet retained their command also, owing to the confidence they had inspired, and formed a junction with Bonchamps and D'Elbée, for the purpose of marching on Bressuire, where General Quétineau was stationed. That officer had carried off from the mansion of Clisson the family of Lescure, which he suspected of conspiring, and detained it at Bressuire. Henri de Larochejacquelein, a young noble, formerly enrolled in the king's guard, and now residing in the Bocage, was on a visit at the time to his cousin Lescure at Clisson. He effected his escape, and stirred up the Aubiers, where he was born, and all the parishes around Châtillon. He then joined the other leaders, and with them forced General Quétineau to withdraw from Bressuire. Consequently, M. de Lescure was delivered, together with his family. He was a young man, about the age of Henri de Larochejacquelein. In character he was calm, prudent, of cold but unshaken courage, and endowed with a scrupulous regard for justice. Henri, his cousin, possessed an heroic and sometimes reckless gallantry; in disposition he was hasty and generous. M. de Lescure immediately put himself at the head of his peasants, who flocked around him; and the whole body congregated at Bressuire, with the design of advancing on Thouars. The wives of the chiefs distributed cockades and flags among the warriors, who sustained their enthusiasm with songs, and marched as if to a crusade. The army dragged no baggage-waggons with it; the peasants, who never would remain long absent, carried with them a supply of bread sufficient for the duration of each expedition; and in extraordinary cases, the parishes were called upon to provide food for those who wanted it. This army was composed of nearly 30,000 men, and was designated the grand royal and catholic army. It faced towards Angers, Saumur, Doué, Thouars, and Parthenay. Between it and the army in the Marais, commanded by Charette, were various intermediate assemblages, of which the principal, under the orders of M. de Royrand, might amount to ten or twelve thousand men.

The grand army, commanded by Messieurs de Bonchamps, d'Elbée, de Lescure, de Larochejacquelein, Cathelineau, and Stofflet, arrived before Thouars on the 3d May, and prepared to attack it the following morning. It was necessary to cross the Thoué, which nearly surrounds the town of Thouars on all sides. General Quétineau took the precaution of defending its passage. The Vendéans cannonaded for some time with the artillery they had taken from the republicans, and discharged their rifles from the banks with their accustomed precision. M. de Lescure, impatient to effect the passage, advanced amidst a shower of bullets, with which his clothes were riddled, but failed to draw above a single peasant after him. Larochejacquelein, however, hastened to the spot, followed by his men; they passed the bridge, and the republicans were beaten back into the town. But the walls exhibited no breach, and the assailants had no means of making one. Henri de Larochejacquelein raised himself on the shoulders of his followers and scaled the ramparts. M. d'Elbée pushed the attack vigorously on his side; and Quétineau, unable to offer an effectual resistance, consented to surrender in order to avert calamities from the town. Through the efforts of their leaders, the Vendéans conducted themselves with moderation; no outrage was committed on the inhabitants, and they contented themselves with burning the tree of liberty and the papers of the administrations. The generous Lescure repaid Quétineau the attentions he had received from him during his detention at Bressuire, and pressingly besought him to remain with the Vendéan army, so as to escape the severities of his own government, which, refusing him credit for the impracticability of resistance, might possibly punish him for having surrendered. Quétineau nobly repudiated the suggestion, and intimated his determination to return amongst the republicans, and demand inquiry into his conduct.

CHAPTER XXII.

LEVY OF A PARISIAN ARMY OF 12,000 MEN.—INCREASING FERMENT AMONGST THE REVOLUTIONISTS.—CONTEST BETWEEN THE COMMUNE AND THE CONVENTION.—PRINCIPAL EVENTS OF THE 28TH, 29TH, AND 30TH MAY 1793.—LAST STRUGGLE BETWEEN THE GIRONDISTS AND MOUNTAINEERS.—TWENTY-NINE GIRONDISTS ARRESTED.—GLANCE AT THE PROGRESS OF THE REVOLUTION.

INTELLIGENCE of the disasters in La Vendée, arriving concurrently with evil tidings from the north, announcing discomfitures on the part of Dampierre—from the south, importing that the Spaniards were assuming a threatening aspect on the Pyrenees—and from several provinces where the least favourable dispositions prevailed, diffused an extraordinary agitation. Some of the departments adjoining La Vendée, on being acquainted with the successes of the insurgents, deemed themselves authorised to send troops to oppose them. The department of L'Herault, in particular, raised six millions of francs and 6000 men, and forwarded an address to the people of Paris urging them to do the like. The convention, too happy to foster this enthusiasm, approved the conduct of the department of L'Herault, and thereby indirectly empowered all the communes in France to perform acts of sovereignty by levying men and money.

The commune of Paris allowed not the oversight to escape it. The Parisians, it pretended, held the mission to save France, and it eagerly seized the occasion to prove its zeal and display its authority by organising an army. It resolved that, *in accordance with the solemn approbation expressed by the convention on the conduct of the department of L'Herault*, there should be levied within the circuit of Paris an army of 12,000 men to march against La Vendée. After the example of the convention, the commune selected from the council-general commissioners to accompany this army. The 12,000 men in question were to be taken from the companies of the armed sections, and out of each company of 126, 14 were to depart for the scene of warfare. Following the revolutionary usage, a species of dictatorial power was left to the revolutionary committee of each section to mark out the men whose absence would occasion least inconvenience.

"In consequence," proceeded the ordinance of the commune, "all the unmarried clerks in all the public offices established in Paris, except the principals and sub-principals, the clerks of attorneys and barristers, the clerks of merchants and bankers, the apprentices to trades, to shopkeepers, &c., shall be exigible after the following proportions:—out of two, one shall march; out of three, two; out of four, two; out of five, three; out of six, three; out of seven, four; out of eight, four; and so on. Such of the clerks in the public offices as depart shall retain their places and the third of their salaries. No refusal will be held valid or entertained. The citizens under requisition will make known to the committee of their section what they need for equipment, and their wants will be immediately supplied. They will then assemble to nominate their officers, and forthwith place themselves under their orders."

But to ordain an army and levy it thus violently were insufficient, unless funds for its maintenance also could be exacted; and on that material point it was resolved to assail the rich. The rich, said the commune, would do positively nothing for the defence of the country and the revolution; they lived in a careless, happy idleness, and left to the people the burden of fighting for their native land; hence it became necessary to make them, at all events, contribute a part of their wealth to the common cause. For that purpose, the idea of a forced loan suggested itself, to be furnished by the citizens of Paris according to the amount of their incomes. From the revenue of a thousand francs to that of fifty thousand, their recipients were to pay a proportional sum, ranging from thirty francs to twenty thousand. All those whose income exceeded fifty thousand were to retain thirty thousand and give up the rest. The real and personal property of any recusants to this patriotic contribution was to be seized, and sold on the demand of the revolutionary committees, and their persons regarded as suspected.

Such measures, which affected so nearly all classes, either in their persons, by compelling them to take arms, or in their fortunes, by making them furnish contributions, were pretty sure to experience a stout resistance in the sections. We have already observed that divisions existed amongst those assemblies, and that they were more or less violent according to the proportion they respectively contained of the lower orders. In some, and especially those of the Quinze-Vingts, the Gravilliers, and the Halle-aux-Blés, resolutions were passed not to depart so long as federalists and paid troops remained at Paris, they serving, in the language of the malecontents, as *body-guards* to the convention. These sections resisted from a spirit of Jacobinism; but several others did so on different grounds. The whole community of clerks, apprentices, assistants in shops, &c., mustered in the sections, and offered a strenuous opposition to the two ordinances of the commune. The old servants of the scattered aristocracy, who performed no mean part in agitating Paris, hastened to unite with these parties; they gathered together in the streets and public places, and uttered cries of "Down with the Jacobins! down with the Mountain!" Thus the revolutionary system upon this occasion encountered obstacles in Paris itself, similar in nature to those which were impeding it in the provinces.

Then arose a general clamour against the aristocracy of the sections. Marat said that the "gentlemen" grocers, agents, and clerks, were conspiring with "gentlemen" on the right side, and with "gentlemen" who were rich, in order to overcome the revolution; that they ought all to be arrested as suspected, and reduced to the class of sans-culottes. "*without leaving them a rag to cover their nakedness.*"

Chaumette, the procurator of the commune, delivered a long oration, in which he deplored the calamities of the country, accruing, as he alleged, from the perfidy of the government, the selfishness of the rich, the ignorance of the people, and the weariness and disgust of numerous citizens in their unavailing struggles for the common good. He therefore proposed and carried resolutions, that the convention should be addressed for measures of public enlightenment, of energy against the lazy egotism of the affluent, and of relief to the necessities of the poor; that an assembly should be formed, comprising the presidents of the sectional revolutionary committees and the members of all the administrative bodies, to meet every Sunday and Thursday at the commune to deliberate on the dangers of the commonwealth; and, lastly, that all good citizens should be solicited to attend the meetings of the sections, in order to ensure the preponderance to patriotism.

Danton, always prompt to devise expedients in moments of difficulty, propounded a scheme for composing two armies of sans-culottes, the one to march on La Vendée, and the other to remain in Paris as a check upon the aristocrats, and for furnishing pay to both from the resources of the rich. Moreover, he proposed, in order to secure a majority in the sections, to pay the citizens who should lose their time in attending the sittings. Robespierre, borrowing the ideas of Danton, developed them at the Jacobin Club, and improved them by additions of his own. He insisted upon the assignment of new classes of suspected, not limited as heretofore to nobles, priests, and financiers, but extended to all citizens who had in any respect given tokens of incivism—upon their incarceration

until the peace—upon imparting increased stimulus to the action of the revolutionary tribunal, and counteracting by fresh modes of communication the effect of wicked journals. By the aid of all such guarantees, he said, the patriots would be able, without any illegal proceeding, without any infraction of the laws, to resist the right side and its machinations.

All ideas thus centred in one great design, which involved an armed levy of the people, one part to be detained at home, and the other to be sent abroad; its equipment at the expense of the rich, and additional contributions from the latter to enable the populace to attend and outvote them at the deliberative assemblies; the incarceration of all the enemies of the revolution under the name of *suspected*, a term much more widely defined than it had previously been; and the establishment of a closer intercourse between the commune and the sections, by the creation of a new revolutionary assembly calculated for extraordinary measures—that is to say, insurrection. The congregation of the Evêché, which had been formerly dissolved, was now revived on the motion of Chaumette, under much more imposing auspices, evidently for the purpose of effecting this latter object.

Tidings of an alarming nature came thickly pouring on each other between the 8th and 10th of May. Dampierre had been killed in command of the army of the north. In the interior, the provinces continued and extended their career of revolt. Normandy gave evidence of being about to declare common cause with Brittany. The insurgents of La Vendée had advanced from Thouars upon Loudun and Montreuil, captured those two towns, and thus nearly reached the banks of the Loire. The English were stated to be on the point of disembarking in Brittany, effecting a junction with the successful rebels, and attacking the republic in its centre. The citizens of Bordeaux, indignant at the accusations levelled against their deputies, were assuming a most threatening attitude, and had disarmed a section into which the Jacobins had retreated. At Marseilles the sections were in complete insurrection. Incensed at the excesses committed under pretext of disarming the suspected, they had gathered together, superseded the commune, transferred its powers to a committee, called the central committee of the sections, and instituted a popular court for discovering the authors of the various murders and robberies. After these precautions in their own city, they had sent deputies to the sections of the town of Aix, and otherwise taken steps to propagate their example in the whole department. Disregarding, also, the sacred character of the conventional commissioners, they had seized their papers and ordered them to retire. At Lyons the aspect of affairs was equally serious. The administrative bodies in unison with the Jacobins having ordained, in imitation of Paris, a levy of six millions and six thousand men, and furthermore attempted to execute the plan of disarming all they deemed suspected, and to institute a revolutionary tribunal, the sections had flown to arms, and stood ready to measure strength with the commune. Thus, whilst the enemy was advancing on the north, the insurrection, starting from Brittany and La Vendée, fostered and supported by the English, threatened to make the tour of France, through Bordeaux, Rouen, Nantes, Marseilles, and Lyons.

These various circumstances being in quick succession communicated to Paris within the space of two or three days, gave rise to the most gloomy forebodings on the part of the Mountaineers and Jacobins. The propositions already made were renewed with an additional degree of fury; and others were suggested, as, for instance, that all the waiters at hotels and cafés, and all domestic servants, ought to be sent off without a moment's delay; that the popular societies should march in a compact body; that commissioners of the assembly should forthwith visit the sections, and induce them to hasten their contingents; that 30,000 men should be posted to the scenes of action in the vehicles of luxury; that the rich should furnish an immediate contribution, and give up the tenth of their possessions; that the suspected should be imprisoned and guarded as hostages; that the conduct of the ministers should be investigated; that the committee of public welfare should be directed to frame an exposition for the benefit of the citizens whose judgments had been misled; and that all civil affairs should be intermitted, the proceedings of the civil tribunals suspended, the theatres closed, the tocsin sounded, and the alarm-guns fired.

Danton, with the view of restoring some confidence amidst this general consternation, offered two observations; firstly, that the apprehension of stripping Paris of honest citizens necessary to its security, need not prevent the levies, forasmuch as there would always remain 150,000 men ready to rise and exterminate any aristocrats who should dare show themselves; secondly, that the agitation of civil war, instead of being a subject of joyful anticipation, ought, on the contrary, to be a subject of alarm to the foreign enemy. "Montesquieu," said he, "has already remarked that fact in speaking of the Romans: a nation which has all its citizens armed and exercised, their minds inured to war, their souls fired with ardour, all their passions centred in a rage for battle—such a nation has nothing to fear from the cold and mercenary courage of foreign soldiers. The weakest of the two parties which civil war embroils, will always be sufficiently strong to destroy automata to whom discipline cannot impart the genuine glow of life and enthusiasm."

Resolutions were immediately passed that ninety-six commissioners should repair to the sections and accelerate their contingents, and that the committee of public welfare should continue its functions during a month longer. Custine was nominated general of the army of the north, and Houchard of that of the Rhine. A fresh distribution of the armies was made around the frontiers. Cambon presented a project for a forced loan of a thousand millions to be filled up by the rich, and hypothecated on the estates of the emigrants. "It is a mode of obliging the rich," said he, "to take part in the revolution, by reducing them to the necessity of assuming a portion of the national domains, if they wish to recover their advances by foreclosing their security."

The commune, likewise, ordained that a second army of sans-culottes should be formed in Paris to repress the aristocrats, whilst the first was marching against the rebels; that a general incarceration should be made of all the suspected; and that the central assembly, composed of the administrative authorities, the presidents of sections, and the members of revolutionary committees, should meet with all dispatch to assess the forced loan, to draw up the list of suspected, and perform other similar urgent functions.

Dissension and tumult had reached their climax. On the one side it was asserted, that the aristocrats without and those within the realm were in confederacy; that the conspirators of Marseilles, La Vendée, and Normandy, were all in one common league; that the deputies of the right side directed this vast conspiracy, and that the ferment amongst the sections was merely a sequel of their intrigues in Paris. On the other side, all the excesses committed in the various quarters were attributed to the Mountain, which was openly charged with a deliberate intention to throw France into the horrors of chaos, and to assassinate its opponents in the national representation. On both sides, anxious discussions were held upon the means of averting the threatened perils, and the measures necessary for saving the republic. The members of the right side exhorted each other to take courage, and were unanimous in recommending some act of decisive energy. Certain sec-

tions, such as those of Mail, La Butte-des-Moulins, and several others, strenuously supported them, and refused to send delegates to the central assembly convoked at the town-hall. They also refused to subscribe to the forced loan, saying they would provide for the maintenance of their own volunteers; and utterly repudiated fresh lists of the suspected, forcibly alleging that their revolutionary committees were sufficient to perform the duties of police within their jurisdictions. The Mountaineers, on the contrary, proclaimed treason, and insisted at all points that the time was arrived for bringing things to a termination; that it was now indispensable for patriots to combine, labour in common, and rescue the republic from the atrocious snares of the twenty-two denounced Girondists. At the Cordelier Club, it was openly maintained that those deputies ought to be seized and massacred. At a meeting where several outrageous females were assembled, a serious proposal was entertained for taking advantage of the first commotion in the convention to dispatch them with daggers. These harpies, in fact, provided themselves with poniards, daily filled the galleries with uproar, and boasted that they were the predestined saviours of the republic. This sudden appearance of daggers excited remarks upon their number, and it was ascertained that a single gunsmith in the Faubourg Saint-Antoine had manufactured several hundreds. On neither side did any one appear henceforth without arms, or without all the means of attack and defence. No plan had been as yet definitively arranged, but the passions had reached that point of combustion when the slightest spark suffices to kindle an explosion.

At the Jacobin Club, every variety of wild suggestion was made. On the ground that the articles of impeachment exhibited against the twenty-two Girondists did not prevent them from sitting in the convention, an act of popular energy was asserted to have become essential; the citizens destined for La Vendée must not be allowed to depart until the country was saved; the people were quite competent to save it, but they needed instruction as to the means, on which account it was expedient to name a committee of five members, with the privilege of observing secrecy even towards the society itself. To this last proposal it was objected that every thing might be openly stated in the club, that the idea of concealment was preposterous, and that the moment for acting without disguise was the present, if ever there were one. Robespierre, who deemed such declarations imprudent, appeared to condemn all illegal measures, asking whether those advantageous and more certain expedients he himself had recommended were in reality exhausted. "Have you organised," said he to his fellow Jacobins, "your revolutionary army? Have you accomplished all that is necessary to remunerate the sans-culottes called to arms or sitting in the sections? Have you covered your public places with forges and workshops? Have you arrested the suspected? No; you have employed none of those sagacious and natural appliances by which patriots would avoid being compromised, and you allow men who understand nothing about the public welfare to suggest to you measures which occasion all the calumnies disseminated against you. It is only after exhausting all legal means that recourse should be had to violent expedients, and then they ought not to be proposed in a society claiming to be enlightened and prudent. I am aware," added Robespierre, "that I shall be accused of *moderatism*, but I am sufficiently known to disregard such imputations."

Thus, as before the 10th August, the revolutionists felt the want of a fixed plan, and roamed from project to project, calling ever and anon for some place of general association, where they might enter into common arrangements. The assembly at the town-hall had been formed to satisfy this latter craving; but the department was not present in it; one only of its members, the Jacobin Dufourny, appeared; several sections absented themselves; the mayor also had declined to give the sanction of his presence, and it was adjourned over to Sunday the 19th May, to be then held for the discussion of the objects for which the meeting itself was convoked. Although the ordinance of the commune fixing this assembly had prescribed duties of an apparently circumscribed character, the same indefinite language had been held during its sitting as was prevalent every where else, and the necessity for another 10th of August was the predominant topic of declamation. But nothing beyond rabid denunciations and the usual club exaggerations had resulted; several females were intermingled with the men, and the heterogeneous assemblage presented the ordinary tumult and confusion, both in purpose and language, of all popular gatherings.

The 15th, 16th, and 17th passed in continued agitation, and every thing became an occasion for broils and disturbance in the convention. The people of Bordeaux sent an address, in which they announced their intention to rise in vindication of their deputies; declaring that part of them would march on La Vendée to fight the rebels, whilst the remainder advanced on Paris to exterminate the anarchists who dared assail the national representation. A letter from Marseilles confirmed the intelligence that the sections of that city were resolute in their resistance. A petition from Lyons solicited relief for fifteen hundred prisoners, confined under the designation of "suspected," and menaced with the revolutionary tribunal by Chalier and the Jacobins. These communications excited a deplorable commotion. In the hall of the assembly, and in the galleries, decided symptoms of a resolution to end the sitting in a general battle were manifested. The right side, however, animated by the danger, infused its own courage into the Plain; and the convention resolved, by a considerable majority, that the petition from Bordeaux was a model of patriotism, quashed all revolutionary tribunals erected by local authorities, and empowered citizens about to be dragged before them to repel force by force. These decisions at once inflamed the indignation of the Mountain and the courage of the Girondists. On the 18th, exasperation seemed to have attained its utmost bounds. The Mountain, weakened by the absence of several of its members as commissioners in the departments and the armies, exclaimed against oppression. Guadet thereupon claimed a hearing for an historical application to actual circumstances, and proceeded to prophesy the future destiny of parties in an astounding manner.

"When in England," said he, "a generous majority resisted the clamours of a factious minority, that minority exclaimed against oppression, and succeeded with that cry in bringing the majority itself under oppression. It called to its aid the patriots *par excellence*. It was thus a deluded multitude was designated, to which pillage and a partition of lands were promised. That incessant appeal by the minority to the patriots *par excellence*, against the oppression of the majority, provoked the outrage known under the name of *the purging of parliament*, an outrage of which *Pride*, who from a butcher had become a colonel, was the author and chief perpetrator. One hundred and fifty members were driven from parliament, and the minority, composed of fifty or sixty persons, remained master of the state. What was the result? These patriots *par excellence*, the mere instruments of Cromwell, who made them commit folly after folly, were expelled in their turn. Their own crimes served as the pretext for usurpation."

Then Guadet, pointing to the butcher Legendre, Danton, Lacroix, and the other deputies accused of profligacy and peculation, added—"Cromwell entered the parliament one day, and addressing those same members, who alone, according to their own statements, were competent to save the country, he drove them forth, saying to one, thou art a thief; to another

thou art a drunkard; to a third, thou art gorged with the public moneys; to a fourth, thou art a frequenter of harlots and evil places. Begone, therefore, said he to them all, and give place to honest men. They gave place, and Cromwell assumed it!"

This striking and terrible allusion produced a profound sensation in the assembly, which remained buried in silence. Guadet continued; and, in order to avert this "Pride's purge," proposed various measures of police, which the convention adopted amidst murmurs. But, whilst he was returning to his seat, a scandalous scene occurred in the galleries. A woman attempted to remove a man with the view of turning him out of the hall; she was seconded in her efforts by those around her, and the unfortunate person who resisted the violence seemed about to be overwhelmed by the whole population of the galleries. The soldiers on guard endeavoured in vain to restore order. Marat cried out at the pitch of his voice that the obnoxious individual was an aristocrat. The deputies could not restrain their indignation against Marat for this wanton attempt to increase the danger that already threatened the man. He coolly responded that the people never would be tranquil until they were delivered of aristocrats, of Dumouriez's accomplices, of *statesmen*, by which latter title he usually designated the Girondists, on account of their reputation for talent.

At this moment, the president Isnard uncovered, and claimed attention to an important declaration. He was heard with the greatest silence, and, in a tone of deep emotion, he said, "I have had revealed to me a project of England, which I deem it my duty to make known. The design of Pitt is to arm one part of the people against the other, by instigating insurrection. This insurrection is to commence with the women; the insurgents will mark out several deputies, will massacre them, then dissolve the National Convention, and that moment will be chosen to make a descent upon our coasts.

Such is the declaration I owe to my country."

The majority applauded Isnard, ordered his declaration to be printed, and moreover passed a resolution that the members should not separate, but share all their dangers in common. Explanations were then demanded as to the tumult in the galleries. A statement was made that the women who caused the disturbances belonged to a society called "The Fraternity," that they were accustomed to occupy the hall, exclude strangers and federalists from the departments, and interrupt the debates by howls and hootings. This account provoked allusions to popular societies in general, which excited instant murmurs. Marat, who had been continually moving up and down the corridors and from one bench in the hall to another, with the word "statesmen" incessantly on his tongue, here drew towards one of the members of the right side, and exclaimed, "Thou art one of them, but the people will do justice on thee and the others." Guadet again sprang to the tribune, to animate his colleagues to fortitude and determination amidst this storm. He adverted to all the troubles of which Paris was the scene, the expressions used in the popular assemblies, the frightful language held in the Jacobin Club, and the designs indicated in the association convoked at the town-hall; and he stated that the recent tumult was merely intended to produce a scene of confusion, to afford an opportunity for the premeditated assassinations to be perpetrated. In spite of the interruptions assailing him every instant, he succeeded in pitching his voice above the din, and proposed two measures of heroic energy, but quite impracticable.

"The evil," said he, "is in the anarchical authorities of Paris; I therefore move you to cashier them, and replace them by the presidents of sections.

The convention being no longer free, it is expedient to convoke another assembly elsewhere, and ordain that the substitutes shall congregate at Bourges, and there hold themselves in readiness to constitute a convention, on the first signal they shall receive from you, or on the first intelligence of the dissolution of the existing convention."

A prodigious uproar followed the submission of these two propositions. All the members of the right side arose, exclaiming that they embraced the only means of safety, and seemed to reverence the vigorous genius of Guadet evinced in their discovery. The left side likewise started on its feet, hurling menaces at its adversaries, and exclaiming in its turn that the conspiracy was at length unmasked, that the intriguers had thrown off all disguise, and that their schemes against the unity of the republic were avowed. Danton attempted to rush up the steps of the tribune, but he was stopped, and its possession given to Barrère, who appeared in the name of the committee of public wel fare.

Barrère, with his insinuating address and conciliatory tone, said that if he had been allowed to speak, he would some days earlier have revealed divers facts concerning the state of France. He then reported that a project was universally spoken of for dissolving the convention; that the president of his section had gathered from the lips of the procurator Chaumette words announcing the intention; that at the Evêché, and in an assembly at the town-hall, the same subject had been repeatedly discussed; and that to facilitate the attainment of the object, it was proposed to excite a tumult, chiefly through the instrumentality of the women, and to carry off twenty-two heads under favour of the confusion. He added, that the minister for foreign affairs and the minister of the interior must have obtained information upon this topic, which they ought to be called upon to disclose. Then passing to the proposed measures, Barrère stated he agreed in opinion with Guadet as to the authorities of Paris; there, in fact, he found a feeble department, sections acting as sovereign bodies, and a commune instigated to monstrous abuses by its procurator Chaumette, a renegade monk, and suspected like all the former nobles and priests; but at the same time he believed the abrogation of these authorities would cause a state of perfect anarchy. With regard to the meeting of substitutes at Bourges, it would not save the convention, and could not supply its place. But there was, according to his ideas, a mode of parrying all the dangers wherewith they were encompassed, without involving themselves in extreme inconveniences; and this consisted in nominating a commission of twelve members, empowered to examine and report the acts of the commune for the preceding month; to investigate the plots concocted in the interior of the republic, and the designs formed against the national representation; to take informations, whensoever needful, from all the committees, ministers, and authorities; and, lastly, to adopt all necessary steps to secure the persons of the conspirators.

The first glow of enthusiasm and courage having cooled, the majority were too happy to adopt the temporising project of Barrère. Nothing was more usual than to name commissions; at every occurrence, at every peril, at every want, a committee was created to meet the contingency, and so soon as individuals were nominated to perform a certain duty, the assembly seemed to consider that the duty was executed, and that committees would abundantly possess, what it ofttimes lacked, fortitude, knowledge, capacity, and vigour. The one appointed on the present occasion was not likely to be deficient in energy, since almost all its members belonged to the right side. Amongst others, it included Boyer-Fonfrède, Rabaut Saint-Etienne, Kervélégan, and Henri Larivière, all deputies of the Gironde. But the very energy of this committee was fated to be disastrous. Instituted with the view of shielding the convention from the designs of the Jacobins, it only stimulated them the more, and augmented the very danger it was intended to avert. The Jacobins had menaced the Girondists with their

clamours; the Girondists retorted the threats by establishing a committee, and to this the Jacobins prepared a rejoinder in the fatal catastrophe of the 31st May and 2d June.

Scarcely was the commission voted before the popular societies and the sections cried out, as usual, against inquisitions and martial law. The association of the town-hall, which stood adjourned to the 19th, met pursuant to that adjournment, and mustered more numerously than before. The mayor, however, did not appear, and a commissioner of police presided. Several sections also refrained from participating, the number which sent delegates not exceeding thirty-five. The meeting assumed the title of the *Central Revolutionary Committee.* The primary resolutions passed were, to commit nothing to paper, to keep no registers, and to prevent all egress until the conclusion of the sitting. It was then proposed to settle the form of proceeding, in other words, to fix the objects upon which attention should be directed. The real and ostensible objects were the forced loan and the lists of the suspected; but from the commencement, declamation turned upon the inability of the patriots in the convention to save the commonwealth, and upon the necessity of invigorating their power; to effect which desirable end it became an imperative duty to prosecute a diligent search for suspected characters, whether in the administrations, in the sections, or in the convention itself, and make a forcible seizure of their persons, in order to put them beyond the possibility of devising mischief. One member, with a singularly cold and precise delivery, said that he knew of no suspected persons save in the convention, and that it was in that quarter the blow must be struck. With this preamble, he proposed a very simple expedient, to wit, the abduction of the twenty-two deputies, their conveyance to a house in the suburbs, their prompt and quiet massacre, and the fabrication of letters to support the belief that they had emigrated. "We will not do the thing ourselves," subjoined this personage, "but by paying, we shall easily find performers." Another member immediately objected that this suggestion was impracticable, and that they ought to wait until Marat and Robespierre had developed their measures of insurrection at the Jacobin Club, as those, doubtless, would be infinitely preferable. "Silence!" exclaimed several voices; "mention no names!" A third member, a delegate of the Section 92, ventured a remonstrance against assassination, and reminded the meeting that there were tribunals for judging the enemies of the revolution. The greatest indignation was expressed against these doctrines; the meeting was thrown into the utmost disorder, and vociferations arose that no man should be endured who was not on a level with the crisis, and that it was the bounden duty of every patriot to denounce his neighbour if he distrusted his energy. Without further ceremony, he who had thus indiscreetly alluded to laws and courts of justice was expelled the association. A moment afterwards, it was discovered that a member of the section Fraternité, a section but ill disposed towards the Jacobins, was taking notes, whereupon he was also thrust to the door. The meeting then resumed its debate on the proscription of the deputies, on the place suitable for this "*Septembrisation*," and on the seizure and incarceration of other suspected parties, both in the commune and in the sections. A member strongly urged that the execution should take place that night, and to the objection that it was not possible, he replied, that men were all ready; adding, significantly, that at twelve o'clock Coligny was at court, but at one was a corpse.

Time, however, was elapsing, and the further discussion on these various topics was deferred till the following day, when it was agreed to consider the following matters: 1st, The abduction of the deputies; 2d, The lists of suspected; and, 3d, The purification of the public offices and committees. At six in the evening, an adjournment to the morrow was moved and carried.

On Monday the 20th the association accordingly met again. Pache was present on this occasion, and several lists, containing names of all sorts, were presented to him. He observed that they ought not to be otherwise designated than as "lists of suspected," which was legal, inasmuch as such lists were ordered. Some delegates remarked that the handwriting of the members ought not to be traceable, wherefore they suggested the lists should be re-copied. Others declared that republicans ought to fear nothing. Pache intimated that it was of little importance whether he were known to be intrusted with the lists in question, since they concerned the police of Paris, with which he was charged. The subtle and cautious character of Pache was not belied in this instance; he wished to include all that was exacted from him within the limits of the law and his own functions.

A member, observing this precaution, remarked that he seemed to be ignorant of what had passed at the previous sitting, and of the questions set down for discussion, which it behoved him to learn forthwith; and he therefore had to inform him that the first on the list was the abduction of twenty-two deputies. Pache thereupon suggested that the persons of all the deputies were confided to the city of Paris, and that any attempt affecting their security might compromise the capital with the departments and provoke a civil war. He was then pertinently interrogated how it came to pass that he, the identical Pache, had signed the petition presented on the 15th April, in the name of the forty-eight sections of Paris, against the twenty-two. Whereto he replied that he but performed his duty in signing a petition intrusted to him for presentation; but at present the question was beyond the powers of the association, convened for the specific matters of the loan and the suspected, and that he would be obliged to break up the meeting if the proposed discussion were persisted in. These observations gave rise to noisy symptoms of displeasure; but as nothing could be done in the presence of Pache, and no one had any great taste for the comparatively insipid occupation of writing out lists of suspected, the members dispersed without any fixed adjournment.

On Tuesday the 21st the delegates who appeared at the association scarcely exceeded a dozen. Some were unwilling to attend so stormy and outrageous a meeting any longer, and others found that it did not possess the expected facilities for energetic deliberation.

The Cordelier Club was selected on the following day as a fitter theatre for unbridled fury. Men and women mingled indiscriminately and uttered horrible howls. An instant insurrection was demanded; and whereas the sacrifice of twenty-two deputies now seemed but a tame conclusion to these monsters, a hecatomb of three hundred was wildly insisted upon. A woman, screaming with the impetuosity of her sex, proposed to assemble all the citizens on the Place de la Réunion, to proceed in a body with a petition to the convention, and not quit the hall until they had wrung from it all the decrees indispensable to the public welfare. Young Varlet, who for so long an after period took a prominent part in every disturbance, next submitted a scheme of insurrection digested into several articles. It propounded a plan for marching to the convention, bearing the Rights of Man shrouded with a crape veil, seizing and carrying off all the deputies who had belonged to the Constituent and Legislative Assemblies, suppressing all the ministries, destroying all that yet remained of the house of Bourbon, &c. &c. Legendre eagerly superseded him at the tribune to combat these propositions. All the strength of his powerful voice could scarcely rise above the yells and shrieks which assailed him, and he suc-

ceeded with the greatest difficulty in repelling the inflammatory motions of Varlet. A fixed term for the insurrection, however, was impatiently desired, or the appointment of a day for repairing to the convention and exacting from it all that was required; but the night being already far advanced, the crowd gradually retired without any decision being taken.

All Paris was acquainted with the language held, both in the two meetings at the town-hall of the 19th and 20th, and in the sitting of the Cordeliers of the 22d. Several members of the central revolutionary committee had themselves denounced the expressions used and the propositions submitted, and the rumour of a plot against a numerous body of citizens and deputies was universally diffused. The commission of twelve was apprised of all the details, and prepared to take measures against the authors of the most violent propositions.

The section of La Fraternité formally denounced them on the 24th, in an address to the convention, wherein it related all that had been said and done in the meeting at the town-hall, and distinctly accused the mayor of being present thereat. The right side hailed with applause this courageous denunciation, and demanded that Pache should be ordered to the bar. Marat retorted that the members of the right side were themselves the only conspirators; that Valazé, under whose roof they assembled every day, had advised them to take arms; and that they had actually attended the convention with pistols. "Yes," said Valazé, "I gave that advice, because it had become necessary to defend our lives, and we would assuredly have defended them." All the members of the right side energetically testified their acquiescence in the sentiment. Lasource added a fact of the gravest import, namely, that the conspirators, apparently under the idea that the execution of the plot had been fixed for the previous night, had visited his house to carry him off.

At this moment it was intimated that the commission of twelve had obtained all the information necessary to unmask the plot and prosecute its contrivers, and that a report would be presented from it on the following day. In the mean time the convention resolved that the section of La Fraternité had deserved well of the country.

On the evening of the same day, great abhorrence was expressed in the municipality against the section of La Fraternité, for having, as was alleged, foully calumniated the mayor and the patriots, by the surmise that they designed to massacre the national representation. Forasmuch as the project had never mounted beyond a proposition, repudiated too by the mayor, Chaumette and the commune deduced that it was a mere calumny to charge a real conspiracy. Doubtless there was none in the strict sense of the word; it was not one of those plots deeply and secretly hatched, as in the recesses of a palace, but nevertheless it was such a conspiracy as the multitude of a large city can form; it was the first manifestation of those popular movements, tumultuously projected and tumultuously executed by an infatuated mob, such as the famous eras of the 14th July and 10th August had witnessed. In this sense, it was unquestionably an actual and veritable conspiracy. But all attempts to counteract such plots are unavailing, for they do not surprise authority slumbering in careless ignorance, but openly and in the face of day assail it when apprised and wakeful.

The following day, two other sections, those of the Tuileries and the Butte-des-Moulins, joined that of La Fraternité in its denunciations. "If reason cannot prevail," said the section Butte-des-Moulins, "make an appeal to the good citizens of Paris, and we take upon ourselves to affirm in advance that our section will powerfully co-operate in trampling to dust those disguised royalists who insolently assume the title of sans-culottes" At the same time, the mayor wrote to the assembly, with an explanation of what had passed at the town-hall. "There was no plot discussed," he said, "but simply a deliberation held on the composition of the lists of suspected. Some *wrong-heads* had indeed interrupted the deliberation by certain unreasonable propositions, but he, Pache, had recalled the disturbers to order, and these vagaries of the imagination had been attended with no result." This letter from Pache was treated with contempt, and undivided attention given to the commission of twelve, which came forward to submit a decree for general security. This decree proposed to place the national representation and the establishments connected with the public finances under the safeguard of the honest citizens, and make it incumbent on all to repair, at the signal of the drum, to the place of meeting in use by the company of each quarter, and thence march on the first orders that should be given them. None might fail at this rendezvous, and until the nomination of a commander-in-chief in lieu of Santerre, destined for La Vendée, the oldest legionary chief was to hold the supreme command. The sectional assemblies were to be closed at ten in the evening; for the execution of which regulation the presidents were made responsible. This project of law was adopted without curtailment, in spite of a strenuous opposition, and in particular of Danton, who said that by thus putting the assembly and the public establishments under the safeguard of the citizens of Paris, terror was proclaimed under legislative sanction.

Immediately after procuring this decree, the commission of twelve ordered the arrest of two administrators of police, Marino and Michel by name, accused of having made the propositions in the meeting at the town-hall which had caused so much alarm. Moreover, it directed the apprehension of the substitute of the procurator of the commune, Hebert, who edited, under the name of *Pere Duchéne*, a paper even more atrocious than that of Marat, and brought to the level of the lowest rabble by the use of coarse and revolting language. In this journal Hebert openly published what Marino and Michel were accused of having verbally propounded at the town-hall. The commission thus deemed it necessary to proceed both against those who proposed, and those who more directly instigated, a fresh insurrection. Scarcely was the order of arrest issued against Hebert, than he hastened to the commune to proclaim his disaster, and to exhibit before the assembled council the warrant by which his liberty was invaded. "It tore him," he said, "from his functions, but he would yield obedience. The commune ought not to forget the oath it had taken to consider itself assailed in the person of any of its members He invoked not that oath for himself, as he was ready to lay his head upon the block, but for his fellow-citizens, menaced by a new slavery." Loud applauses greeted the speech of Hebert. Chaumette, the procurator-general, embraced him with transport, and the president gave him the hug of fraternity on behalf of the whole council. The sitting was declared permanent until tidings were received from Hebert. The members were exhorted to carry consolation and succour to the wives and children of those who were or might be detained under arrest.

The sitting being thus permanent, messengers were dispatched every hour to the committee of twelve, to gain intelligence of him, who was affectedly described as "the magistrate torn from his functions." At half-past two in the morning, it transpired that he was undergoing an examination, and that Varlet had been likewise apprehended. At four, information arrived that Hebert had been committed to the Abbey. An hour afterwards, Chaumette appeared at the gates of the prison, but failed to gain access to the captive. The council-general forthwith drew up a petition to the convention, and dispersed it by horsemen through the different sections, in order to obtain their co-operation. Contention raged in almost all of those bodies

motions and counter-motions were made every instant, having for object to retain or change the committees and presidents, to make or prevent arrests, to second or oppose the system of the commune, to sign or reject the petition it proposed. At length, adopted by a great number of the sections, this petition was presented to the convention in the course of the 25th. The deputation from the commune complained of the calumnies propagated against the magistrates of the people, and demanded that the petition of the section La Fraternité should be referred to the public accuser, in order that the guilty, if any such there were, or the slanderers, should receive condign punishment. It furthermore prayed for justice upon the committee of twelve, which had perpetrated a deplorable outrage upon the person of a magistrate of the people, by dragging him from the exercise of his functions and shutting him up in the Abbey. Isnard presided upon this occasion, and upon him devolved the duty of replying to the deputation.

"Magistrates of the people," said he, in a solemn and stern accent, "it is essential that you learn certain important truths. France has confided her representatives to the city of Paris, and it expects that they are there in safety. If the national representation be violated by one of those conspiracies wherewith we have been encompassed since the 10th March, and whereof the magistrates have been the last to warn us, I declare, in the name of the republic, that Paris would experience the vengeance of all France, and be erased from the list of cities."

This solemn and emphatic rebuke created a profound sensation in the assembly. Numerous voices demanded its publication. Danton objected that it was calculated to aggravate the dissensions already existing between Paris and the departments, and that care should be taken how such a misfortune was promoted. The convention, deeming that sufficient was accomplished by the commanding energy of the reply and of the commission of twelve, passed to the order of the day without ordaining the publication.

The deputies of the commune were accordingly dismissed from the bar without obtaining the smallest satisfaction. The remainder of the 25th, and the whole of the following day, were passed in scenes of tumult throughout all the sections. In every quarter desperate encounters prevailed, and the two opinions alternatively gained predominance, according to the hour of the day and the varying number of the advocates belonging to each faction. The commune continued to send delegates to inquire into the condition of Hebert. At one time he was found gently reposing, and at another he had begged the commune to dismiss all inquietude on his account. A clamour, nevertheless, was raised that he slept on a miserable pallet. Some of the sections took him under their especial protection; others prepared to renew the demand for his release, with a greater display of vigour than had been manifested by the municipality; and, lastly, the women, scouring the lanes and alleys with a banner, endeavoured to stir up the people to assail the Abbey and deliver their beloved magistrate.

On the 27th, the tumult was materially aggravated. Men proceeded from one section to the other to overcome opposition by actual violence. But in spite of all exertions, towards evening only twenty-eight sections had agreed to insist upon the enlargement of Hebert, and to draw up an imperative address to the convention. The committee of twelve, perceiving the disturbances in preparation, had notified to the commander on duty a requisition for the armed force of three sections, taking the precaution to designate the sections Butte-des-Moulins, Lepelletier, and Mail, which were the most devoted to the right side, and even ready to fight for it. These three sections promptly responded to the summons, and about six o'clock in the evening planted themselves in the courts of the national palace, on the side of the Carrousel, with arms and cannon, and holding matches ready lighted. In this position they presented an imposing aspect, sufficient to protect from outrage the national representation. But the crowd pressing on their ranks and about the different avenues of the palace, the uproar and confusion every where prevailing, the struggles of the deputies and others to reach the hall, gave to the scene something of the appearance of a siege. Several deputies encountered not only great obstacles, but even insults, amidst the populace in their progress to the doors, and filled the assembly with dismay by assurances that it was completely besieged. This was not exactly the case, however; for if the doors were obstructed by a mob, they were not closed against access or egress. But appearances were sufficient to alarm excited imaginations, and the assembly was thrown into the greatest confusion. Isnard occupied the chair. The section of La Cité appeared at the bar, and demanded the liberty of its president, Dobsen, arrested by order of the commission of twelve for having refused to produce the registers of his section. It furthermore solicited the liberation of the other prisoners, the suppression of the committee of twelve, and the impeachment of the members composing it. "The convention," replied Isnard, "pardons your inexperience; but it will never permit itself to be overawed by any portion of the people." The convention applauded the president's answer. Robespierre, on the other hand, moved a vote of censure. The right side strenuously opposed it, and a violent contest ensued between the two parties; the noise within the hall, combined with that outside, caused an astounding tumult.

At this moment, the mayor and the minister of the interior presented themselves at the bar, under the belief that the convention was besieged, according to the rumour prevalent in Paris. At sight of the minister of the interior, a general cry broke from the assembly, demanding from him an account of the state of Paris and of the environs of the hall. The situation of Garat was embarrassing, in being thus suddenly called upon to decide between the two parties, a task for which he was not more unsuited by the mildness of his character than by his political scepticism. But this scepticism proceeding from genuine dispassionateness, it had been fortunate for all at the moment if they could have calmly heard and appreciated his words. In his speech he reverted to the first causes of the existing disturbances. In his opinion, the original mischief sprung from the report disseminated concerning an association formed at the town-hall for the purpose of conspiring against the national representation. He stated, in accordance with the account of Pache, that the association in question was not a meeting of conspirators, but a legal assembly, convoked for a known and definite object; that if, in the absence of the mayor, certain ardent characters had made culpable propositions, those propositions, indignantly repudiated when the mayor was present, had been attended with no evil consequences, and could by no possibility be tortured into evidences of a regular veritable plot; and that the constitution of the commission of twelve for the prosecution of this pretended plot, and the arrests it had ordered, had become the causes of the present commotion. He said, moreover, that he was unacquainted with Hebert; that he had never received any unfavourable communications respecting him; that he merely knew him to be the author of a certain publication, despicable in every sense, but most erroneously considered as dangerous; that the Constituent and Legislative Assemblies had always contemned the detestable writings circulated against them, and consequently the rigour exercised against Hebert doubtless appeared unusual and probably vindictive; and, in fine, that the commission of twelve, although composed of honest men and excellent patriots, laboured under singular prejudices, and seemed too eager to gain a reputation for energy.

These sentiments were loudly cheered by the left side and the Mountain. Garat, subsequently adverting to the existing state of things, maintained that the convention was in no danger, and that the citizens surrounding it were actuated by feelings of respect. At these words, a deputy interrupted him, saying that he had been insulted. "That is possible," replied Garat; "I do not answer for what may happen to a single individual amidst a crowd containing men of all grades; but let the whole convention appear at the door, and I venture to pledge my responsibility that the people will give way respectfully before it, acknowledge its presence by marks of reverence, and listen obediently to its voice."

Garat concluded by enforcing certain conciliatory views, intimating at the same time, with all possible delicacy, that by endeavouring to repress the violence of the Jacobins, the risk or certainty of still further exasperating them was incurred. Unquestionably he was right; by putting ourselves on the defensive against a faction we irritate it the more, and precipitate the catastrophe; but when a struggle is inevitable, must we submit without resistance? The Girondists were precisely in that predicament; their instituting the commission of twelve was an act of imprudence, but an unavoidable and generous imprudence.

After finishing his speech, Garat courageously seated himself on the right side, where the danger was reputed to lie, and the convention directed his report to be printed and distributed. Pache was heard after Garat. He represented circumstances under pretty nearly the same aspect, reporting that the assembly was guarded by three devoted sections, summoned by the committee of twelve itself, wherein he intimated that committee had transgressed its powers, inasmuch as it had no authority to issue a requisition for the armed force; that a strong detachment had secured the prison of the Abbey from any infraction of the laws; that all danger was dissipated, and that the assembly might feel assured it was in perfect security. In concluding, he begged that the convention would graciously listen to the citizens who solicited the liberation of the prisoners.

At these words sounds of dissent escaped from the ranks of the assembly. "It is ten o'clock," cried voices on the right; "president, break up the sitting." "No, no." retorted voices on the left; "hear the petitioners." Henri Larivière meanwhile scaled the tribune, and insisted upon occupying it. "If you desire to hear any one," said he, "you ought to hear your commission of twelve, whom you accuse of tyranny, and to whom an opportunity for explaining its acts should be allowed, so that you may justly appreciate them." Loud murmurs drowned his voice. Isnard, unable longer to contend with disorder, vacated the chair, and was replaced by Herault-Séchelles, whose assumption drew vociferous cheers from the galleries. He proceeded to consult the assembly, which, stupified by noise and menaces, voted, amidst indescribable confusion, that the sitting should be continued.

The demagogues were then introduced to the bar, followed by a concourse of petitioners. They arrogantly demanded the suppression of an odious and tyrannical commission, the release of the arrested persons, and *the triumph of virtue.* "Citizens," replied Herault-Séchelles, "*the force of reason and the force of the people are identical.*" Extravagant joy was expressed at the promulgation of this preposterous dogma. "You claim justice," he added; "justice is our first duty, and it will be granted to you."

Other petitioners succeeded, and divers orators addressed the convention. Eventually a decree was submitted, whereby the citizens incarcerated by the commission of twelve were declared free, the commission itself was dissolved, and its conduct referred to the examination of the committee of general safety. By this time the night was far advanced; the petitioners had crowded forward and blocked up the hall. The gloom, the shouts, the tumult, all combined to render the scene one of inextricable confusion. The decree was put to the vote, and declared to be passed, without any possibility of knowing whether it were really adopted or not. Some alleged that the president had not been heard, others that the voters were not in sufficient number, and others, again, that the petitioners had taken the places of absent deputies; in short, that the decree was null and void. It was, nevertheless, proclaimed, and the galleries and the petitioners forthwith dispersed, to carry to the commune, the sections, the Jacobins, and the Cordeliers, the joyful tidings that the prisoners were released, and that the commission was superseded.

This intelligence diffused great joy amongst the populace, and procured a momentary tranquillity in Paris. Even the countenance of the mayor seemed to beam with sincere delight at this cessation of the troubles. The Girondists, however, determined to contest the victory with their adversaries to the last extremity, mustered on the following day with irrepressible indignation. Lanjuinais especially, who had not shared the more egotistical rancour dividing the two sides of the convention, and whose firm adherence to his party gave the less umbrage, as no personal animosity seemed to animate him, even he, Lanjuinais, arrived burning with ardour and resolution to put the assembly to shame for its pusillanimity on the preceding evening. The deputy Osselin had no sooner moved that the decree be read over and definitively settled, in order that the prisoners might be immediately liberated, than Lanjuinais mounted the tribune, and asked to be heard on an argument that the decree was null and had not been passed. Violent exclamations interrupted him from the left. "Grant me silence," said he, "for I am determined to remain here until you have listened to me." An objection was made to his being heard upon any point save the wording of the decree; but after a doubtful appeal, it was decided he should have the benefit of the doubt, and be allowed to speak as he listed. He then entered into an explanation of the question he purposed to discuss, admonishing his hearers that it was one of the deepest importance to the general welfare.

"More than fifty thousand citizens," said he, "have been imprisoned in the whole of France by your delegates; they have made more arbitrary arrests in one month than the old government in a century; and you complain of the apprehension of two or three men who preach murder and anarchy at two sous the sheet! Your delegates and proconsuls, who act far from your sight, you leave to act in this manner, whilst your committee, stationed by your side and under your immediate superintendence, are distrusted and suppressed! Last Sunday, a proposition was made at the Jacobin Club to execute a massacre in Paris, the same topic is revived this evening at the Evêché; proofs are supplied to you, thrust before you, and you repel them!—you protect the men of blood!"

Great commotion followed these words, and stifled the voice of the speaker. "It is impossible to deliberate," exclaimed Chambon; "we have no course left but to retire into our departments." "Your doors are beset," remarked Lanjuinais. "It is false," shouted the left. "Yesterday," added Lanjuinais, with all his force, "you were not free; you were mastered by the apostles of murder." Legendre, raising his voice from his seat, here said—"The object is to make us lose the sitting. I declare that if Lanjuinais continue to tell lies, I will throw him from the tribune."

At this scandalous menace the assembly rose tumultuously, whilst the galleries pealed with boisterous applause. Guadet instantly moved that the words of Legendre should be taken down and inserted in the votes, so that all France might be made acquainted with them, and thus learn the treatment to which its

deputies were exposed. Lanjuinais continuing, maintained that the decree of last night had not been passed, as the petitioners had voted with the deputies, or, if it had been passed, that it ought to be repealed, because the assembly was not free. "When you are free," said Lanjuinais, emphatically, "you do not vote impunity to crime." On the left it was affirmed that Lanjuinais distorted the facts, that the petitioners had not voted, but withdrawn into the corridors. On the right this statement was met by a distinct negative; and, without coming to any agreement on the subject, the repeal of the decree was put to the vote. By a majority of fifty-one voices the decree was rescinded. Whereupon Danton spoke:—"You have performed a great act of justice, and I hope it will be repeated before the close of the sitting; but if the commission you have just re-installed preserve its tyrannical powers, if the magistrates of the people be not restored to liberty and their functions, then I declare to you, that having proved how far we surpass our enemies in prudence and moderation, *we will prove that we surpass them also in boldness and revolutionary vigour.*" The provisional enlargement of the prisoners was subsequently propounded from the chair and carried unanimously. Rabaut Saint-Etienne desired to be heard in the name of the commission of twelve, and even invoked attention in behalf of the public welfare; but all his endeavours were fruitless, and he concluded by pronouncing his resignation.

The decree had been thus revoked; and the majority, by returning to the right side, seemed to prove that the left side prevailed in snatching decrees only under pressure and during moments of weakness. Although the magistrates had been liberated, although Hebert was restored to the commune, where he was crowned with civic wreaths, the repeal of the decree nevertheless had aroused the fiercest passions, and the storm, which for an instant appeared to be dispelled, speedily gathered and burst more terribly than before.

That same day, the association which had been held at the town-hall, but had refrained from assembling there since the mayor had interdicted the so-styled propositions of *public welfare*, was renewed at the Evêché, in the electoral club, where certain electors were in the occasional habit of resorting. It was composed of delegates from the sections, chosen from the committees of surveillance, and delegates from the commune, the department, and the different clubs. The women even were represented in it—out of five hundred persons, one hundred being of the fair sex, at the head of whom was a female famous for her political zeal and her popular eloquence. On the first day, envoys from only thirty-six sections appeared at this union; twelve consequently had not deputed commissioners, and to these a new summons of convocation was addressed. A committee of six members was subsequently named, with instructions to consider and report the next day upon measures of public welfare. The delegates separated after that preliminary proceeding, and adjourned the association till the morrow, the 29th May.

In the evening the sections were all in commotion. Notwithstanding the decree of the convention ordaining them to be closed at ten o'clock, they evaded the regulation by constituting themselves at that hour into *patriotic societies*, under which title they continued their sittings until the early hours of the morning. In some, new addresses were debated against the commission of twelve; in others, petitions were voted to the convention, requiring from it an explanation of those words of Isnard—"Paris will be erased from the list of cities."

At the commune, the principal events were a long discourse by Chaumette on the obvious conspiracy hatching against liberty, on the ministers, on the right side, and various similar topics; and the arrival of Hebert, who related the particulars of his detention, received a crown, which he placed on the bust of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, and then proceeded to his section, accompanied by envoys from the commune, who carried back in triumph the magistrate "wrested from persecution."

The following day, the 29th, the convention received afflicting intelligence from the two most important military points, the North and La Vendée. The army of the North had been repulsed between Bouchain and Cambray; Valenciennes and Cambray were cut off from all communication. At Fontenay the republican troops had been completely beaten by M. de Lescure, who had gained possession of Fontenay itself. These untoward tidings spread the greatest consternation, and rendered the situation of the moderate party still more dangerous. The sections appeared successively at the bar, bearing flags inscribed with these words—"*Resistance to oppression.*" Some demanded, as they had resolved the night before, an explanation of Isnard's words, whilst others declared that all other inviolability save that of the people had ceased, wherefore the deputies who had laboured to arm the departments against Paris ought to be forthwith put under impeachment, the commission of twelve abrogated, a revolutionary army organised, &c. &c.

The sitting held that day at the Jacobin Club was not less ominous. That the moment had at length arrived when the people must be saved, was the universal cry re-echoed through the hall; and when a member came forward to detail the measures to be pursued, he was at once dismissed to the commission of six, appointed at the central association. That, it was remarked, was the body charged to provide for all contingencies, and to consider of the means of public safety. Legendre, essaying to speak on the dangers of the crisis, and on the necessity of exhausting legal means before recurring to extreme expedients, was hooted as a *sleep-walker*. Robespierre, avoiding any explicit declarations, said that it was for the commune to form *an intimate union with the people;* that, with regard to himself, he was incapable of prescribing measures of safety; that such capacity indeed was not given to a single individual, and much less to him than to any other, exhausted as he was by four years of revolutionary struggles, and consumed by a slow and mortal fever.

These words of the tribune produced all the effect he desired, and were responded to with loud acclamations. They sufficiently indicated that he resigned himself, like all besides, to what might be proposed by the municipal authorities associated at the Evêché. That assembly had again met, and, as on the previous occasion, numerous females were present. The first subject attended to was to calm the fears of proprietors, by swearing to respect property. It was respected on the 14th July and the 10th August, said the advocates of the oath; and forthwith the pledge to respect it on the 31st May was taken. After this proceeding had been gone through, Dufourny, a member of the committee of six, observed, that without a commander-in-chief of the Parisian guard it was impossible to answer for any result, wherefore the commune must be requested to nominate one immediately. A woman, the celebrated Lacombe, catching up his words, strenuously enforced the proposition, and declared that unless prompt and vigorous measures were adopted, the salvation of the people was in the greatest jeopardy. A deputation was at once dispatched to the commune, which replied, after the manner of Pache, that the mode of nominating a commander-in-chief being fixed by the decrees of the convention, and this mode prohibiting it from taking the nomination upon itself, it could, under the circumstances, merely indulge hopes upon the subject. This rejoinder was an indirect instigation to rank the appointment in question amongst the number of those extraordinary measures in behalf of public safety which it behoved the association to take. The meeting subsequently resolved to invite all the cantons of the department to unite

with it, and to send deputies to Versailles. A blind confidence was demanded in the name of the six, and a promise exacted to perform without examination all they should propose. Strict silence was enjoined as to every thing concerning the grand question *of measures;* and eventually an adjournment was carried to nine the following morning, then to open a permanent sitting intended to be decisive.

The commission of twelve had been apprised of all that passed during the evening. The committee of public welfare was equally well informed, and it moreover suspected, according to a placard published that day, that secret meetings were held at Charenton, and attended by Danton, Marat, and Robespierre. The committee of public welfare, profiting by an interval of absence on the part of Danton, ordered the minister of the interior to prosecute the most diligent inquiries into the existence of any such conclaves. Nothing was discovered, and it soon became obvious that the report was false. It would appear that all arrangements were left to the central association at the townhall. Robespierre ardently desired a revolution so manifestly directed against his enemies the Girondists, but he had no need to compromise himself in provoking it; it was sufficient for him to withdraw the opposition which he had offered upon several occasions during the month of May. And in this respect, his speech at the Jacobins', in which he had said that the commune ought to coalesce intimately with the people, and devise expedients which *he* could never hope to discover, was a veritable acquiescence in the insurrection.* This indirect approval was quite enough, there being sufficient zeal in the central club to dispense with his active personal interference. As for Marat, he favoured the movement by his journal, and by his daily exhibitions in the convention; but he was not a member of the committee of six, upon which the real burden of the insurrection lay. The only one of the three who may be deemed a concealed mover of the sedition is Danton, and even he is uncertain. There is no doubt he wished for the abolition of the commission of twelve, but at the same time he was not disposed to assail—as yet, at all events—the national representation. Meilhan, meeting him, during the day, at the committee of public welfare, accosted him, and entered upon a friendly conversation with him for some time, in the course of which he impressed upon him the great distinction drawn by the Girondists between him and Robespierre, and the high estimation in which they held his powers, concluding with an assurance that he might perform a distinguished part, by directing his influence to the promotion of the public good and the support of honest men. Danton, whom these words affected, hastily raised his head and said to Meilhan, "Your Girondists have no confidence in me." Meilhan strove to remove the impression: "They have no confidence," repeated Danton; and he moved away without permitting the conversation to be resumed. This short expression distinctly reveals the true propensities of the man. He despised that municipal mob; he had no inclination for Robespierre or Marat; and he would have preferred putting himself at the head of the Girondists, but "they had no confidence in him." In truth, their principles and policy

* The real dispositions of Robespierre, with regard to the 31st May, are manifest in the speeches he delivered at the Jacobin Club, where much greater freedom was allowed to the tongue than in the convention, and where it was deemed quite unnecessary to throw a veil over any plot in agitation. A few extracts from what he said at different important periods, will exhibit the march of his ideas touching the grand catastrophe of the 31st May and 2d June. His speech on the pillage committed in the month of February conveys the first indication.

SITTING OF THE 25TH FEBRUARY 1793.

Robespierre.—"As I have always loved humanity, but have never stooped to flatter an individual, so shall I now speak the truth. This is a cunning device imagined against the patriots themselves. Intriguers are bent upon ruining the patriots; in the heart of the people burns a just feeling of indignation. I have asserted, unsupported and amidst persecutions, that the people are never wrong; I ventured to proclaim that axiom at a time when it was not acknowledged; the course of the revolution has developed it.

The people have so repeatedly heard the law invoked by those who wished to crush them beneath its yoke, that they naturally distrust such language.

The people are distressed; they have not yet gathered the fruit of their labours; they are still persecuted by the rich, and the rich are now what they always were, harsh and pitiless. (Applause.) The people behold the insolence of those who have betrayed them; they see wealth accumulated in their hands; they become insensible to the necessity of taking deliberate measures to obtain their objects; and when any speak to them the language of reason, they listen only to their indignation against the rich, and are thus easily led into false proceedings by those who win their confidence in order to betray them.

There are two causes: the first, a natural disposition in the people to seek the means of alleviating their misery—a legitimate disposition in itself; the people believe that, in default of protective laws, they have a right to guard their own interests.

The second cause: this originates in the designs of the enemies of liberty, the enemies of the people, who are well convinced that the only sure mode of subjecting us to foreign powers is to alarm the people upon the subject of food, and render them the victims of the excesses resulting from the panic. I have been myself an eyewitness of these manœuvres. By the side of honest citizens we have seen strangers and men of opulence dressed in the respectable attire of *sans-culottes*. We have heard them say, 'We were promised plenty after the death of the king, and we are more wretched since that unfortunate prince was taken from us.' We have heard them declaim, not against the intriguing and counter-revolutionary portion of the convention, which sits where sat the aristocrats of the Constituent Assembly, but against the deputation of Paris, against the Mountain, and against the Jacobins, whom they represent as forestallers.

I do not tell you that the people are culpable; I do not say that their movements involve an outrage; but when the people rise, ought they not to have an object worthy of them? And ought paltry wares to occupy their attention? They have not even profited by them, for the loaves of sugar were grasped by the menials of aristocracy; but, supposing they had reaped all the profit, what inconveniences may not ensue in return for so miserable an advantage? Our adversaries, be assured, are anxious to terrify all who have any property; they are eager to persuade that our system of equality and liberty is subversive of all order and security.

The people ought to rise, not for the purpose of obtaining sugar, but in order to exterminate brigands. (Applause.) Is it necessary to retrace your past perils? You feared to become the prey of Prussians and Austrians; there was a negotiation, and those who then made a traffic of your liberty are the same who have excited the present troubles. I assert, in the presence of the friends of liberty and equality, and in the face of the nation, that during the month of September, after the affair of the 10th August, it was decided at Paris that the Prussians should penetrate to Paris without obstacle."

SITTING OF WEDNESDAY 8TH MAY 1793.

Robespierre.—"We have to struggle against foreign and domestic war. The civil war is abetted by the enemies at home. The army of La Vendée, the army of Brittany, and the army of Coblentz, are directed against Paris, that citadel of freedom. People of Paris, tyrants take arms against you, because you are the most estimable portion of humanity; the great potentates of Europe are moved against you, and all that France contains of corruptionists second their efforts.

After having discerned this vast plan of your enemies, it is but an easy task to devise the means of defending yourselves. I have not told you my secret; I have intimated it in the convention.

I will reveal this secret to you, and if it be possible that this duty of a representative of a free people can be considered as a crime, I am prepared to brave all dangers in order to confound tyrants and save liberty.

I said this morning at the convention, that the partisans of Paris should march to encounter the miscreants of La Vendée; that they should take up on their route their brethren in the departments; and should exterminate all—ay, all the rebels at once.

I said that all the patriots ought to rise, and reduce to impotency for mischief both the aristocrats of La Vendée and the aristocrats disguised under the visor of patriotism

were distinct, and a coalition was scarcely possible. Furthermore, Danton found, neither in their opinions nor in their characters, the energy necessary to save the revolution, the grand object he looked to in all his actions. Indifferent as to persons, he sought to promote that party, of the two dividing the convention,

I said that the rebels of La Vendée had an army in Paris; I said that the generous and sublime people, who for five years have supported the burden of the revolution, ought to take the necessary precautions that our wives and children are not abandoned to the counter-revolutionary knives of the enemies Paris contains within its walls. No one has ventured to contest this principle. Such measures are of pressing, imperative necessity. Patriots! hasten to the rencounter with the brigands of La Vendée! They are formidable only because the plan of disarming the people had been adopted. Paris must send forth republican legions; but whilst we are making our internal enemies tremble, we must take care that our wives and children are not exposed to the fury of the aristocracy.

I proposed two measures; the first, that Paris should dispatch two legions sufficient to exterminate all the miscreants who have presumed to raise the standard of revolt. I demanded that all the aristocrats, all the Feuillants, all the moderates, should be expelled from the sections they have infected with their foul breath. I demanded that all suspected citizens should be placed under arrest; and that the description of suspected citizen should not be determined simply by that of noble, lawyer, financier, or merchant. I demanded that all citizens who have given proofs of incivism should be incarcerated until the war be terminated, and until we assume an imposing attitude before our enemies. I said that it was necessary to grant the people the means of frequenting the sections without curtailing their means of existence, and that, for this purpose, the convention should decree that every artisan, living on his own labour, shall be paid during the whole time he may be called upon to hold himself under arms to protect the tranquillity of Paris. I demanded an appropriation of the millions necessary for the manufacture of arms and pikes, so that all the sans-culottes of Paris may be provided with weapons.

I demanded that foundries and forges should be erected in the public thoroughfares, so that all the citizens might be witnesses to the fidelity and activity of the workmen. I demanded that all the public functionaries should be dismissed by the people.

I demanded that the municipality and the department of Paris, which possess the confidence of the people, should cease to be shackled. I demanded that the factious who are in the convention should cease to calumniate the people of Paris, and that the journalists who pervert public opinion should be reduced to silence. All these measures are necessary; and, taking the whole together, such is my acquittance of the debt I have contracted towards the people.

I demanded that the people should make an effort to crush the aristocrats, who are multiplied in every quarter. (Applause.)

I demanded that there should subsist in the heart of Paris an army, not such an army as that of Dumouriez, but a popular army, continually under arms, to overawe Feuillants and moderates. This army ought to be composed of sans-culottes receiving pay. I insisted upon millions being assigned to arm the artisans —all the good patriots; I insisted upon their occupying all the posts, so that before their imposing majesty all aristocrats may sicken and turn pale.

I move that from to-morrow forges shall be erected on the public places, where arms may be fabricated for the people. I move that the executive council shall be charged to execute these measures upon its own responsibility. If there be any who resist, if there be any who favour the enemies of liberty, to-morrow must they be scattered before the wind.

I move that the constituted authorities be charged to superintend the execution of these measures; and let them not forget they are the mandatories of a city which is the bulwark of liberty, and whose existence renders a counter-revolution impossible.

In this moment of crisis, duty calls upon all patriots to save the country by the most inexorable measures; if you suffer the patriots to be slaughtered in detail, all that the earth holds virtuous will be destroyed: it is for you to say whether you will save the human race.

(All the members rose by a simultaneous movement, and shouted, waving their hats in the air, 'Yes, yes! we will, we will!')

All the miscreants in the world have formed their plans, and all the defenders of liberty are marked out for victims.

Your glory and your happiness are brought into jeopardy, but it is not on that account alone I conjure you to watch over the welfare of the country. You imagine, perhaps, that you ought to revolt, ought to assume the appearance of insurrection; not at all: it is with the law in your hands that all our enemies must be crushed.

It is with arrant impudence that the faithless mandatories have laboured to separate the people of Paris from the departments, and the people of the galleries from the people of Paris, as if it were our especial fault, who have made all possible sacrifices to extend our galleries for the whole people of Paris. I say that I speak to all the people of Paris; and if they were actually assembled under this roof, if they heard me plead their cause against Buzot and Barbaroux, there is no question they would range themselves on my side.

Citizens, the dangers are exaggerated; we are scared with foreign armies joined to the rebels of the interior: but what can their efforts avail against millions of intrepid sans-culottes? And, if you pursue the inquiry, as one free man is equal to a hundred slaves, you ought to estimate your strength as superior to all the allied powers.

You possess in the laws all that is necessary to enable you legally to put down your enemies. You have aristocrats in the sections: expel them. You have liberty to save: proclaim the rights of liberty, and put forth all your energy. You have an immense population of sans-culottes, most pure and vigorous, but they cannot quit their labours: let them be supported by the rich. You have a National Convention; it is very possible that all the members of that convention are not equally friends of liberty and equality, but the greater number are determined to uphold the rights of the people and save the republic. The gangrened portion of the convention will not prevent the people from combating the aristocrats. Do you imagine, in fact, that the Mountain of the convention will lack sufficient force to curb all the partisans of Dumouriez, Orleans, and Cobourg? In sooth, you cannot believe it.

If liberty succumb, it will be less the fault of the delegates than of the sovereign. People, forget not that your destiny is in your own hands; your duty is to save Paris and humanity; if you fail in doing so, you are culpable.

The Mountain has need of the people; the people are upheld by the Mountain. All possible expedients are resorted to for alarming you; constant endeavours are made to impress you with the belief that the southern departments are the enemies of the Jacobins. I declare to you that Marseilles is the eternal friend of the Mountain, and at Lyons the patriots have gained a complete victory.

I now sum up and move—1st, That the sections raise an army sufficient to form the nucleus of a revolutionary army to gather in its course all the sans-culottes of the departments, in order to exterminate the rebels; 2d, That an army of sans-culottes be raised at Paris to keep the aristocrats in check; 3d, That dangerous intriguers, all aristocrats, shall be put under arrest; that the sans-culottes shall be paid at the charge of the public exchequer, which shall be sustained by the rich, and that this measure be extended over the whole republic.

I move that forges be established on all the public places.

I demand that the commune of Paris foster with all its power the revolutionary zeal of the people of Paris.

I demand that the revolutionary tribunal do its duty, and punish those who, during these latter days, have blasphemed against the republic.

I demand that this tribunal delay not to inflict exemplary chastisement upon certain generals taken in flagrant crime, and who ought to be brought to trial.

I demand that the sections of Paris unite with the commune of Paris, and counteract by their joint influence the perfidious writings of journalists subsidised by foreign potentates.

By pursuing all these measures, without furnishing any pretext for the charge that you have violated the laws, you will give an impulse to the departments, which will coalesce with you to save liberty."

SITTING OF SUNDAY 12TH MAY 1793.

Robespierre.—"I have never been able to comprehend how it happens that, in critical moments, so many men are found to make propositions which compromise the friends of liberty, whilst no one supports those which tend to save the republic. Until it has been proved to me that it is not necessary to arm the sans-culottes, that it is not advisable to pay them for mounting guard and assuring the tranquillity of Paris; until it has been proved to me that it is not advisable to convert our thoroughfares into workshops for the fabrication of arms, I will uphold and assert that those who, thrusting those measures aside, propose to you mere partial measures, howsoever violent they may be, understand nothing of the means of saving the country; for it is only

which promised to impart to the revolution the most sure and rapid progress. Master of the Cordeliers and the committee of six, it may be fairly presumed he took an influential part in the movement under preparation; and it would seem his main and primary design was to annul the commission of twelve, reserving for after consideration the course to be pursued with regard to the Girondists.

At length the scheme of insurrection was settled in the minds of the plotters at the central revolutionary club. According to their own expressions, they designed to make, not a *physical*, but an *entirely moral* insurrection; to respect persons and property; in short, to violate the laws and the liberty of the convention with the greatest order. Their plan was to constitute the commune in a state of insurrection; to summon in its name all the armed force which it had the privilege of calling out; to surround the convention, and then present to it an address, which in appearance would be simply a petition, but in reality an imperious command. In fact, they proposed to beg sword in hand.

On Thursday the 30th the delegates of the sections assembled at the Evêché, and formed what they called the *Republican Union*. Invested with full powers from all the sections, they declared themselves in insurrection for the safety of the commonwealth, menaced by *an aristocratic and liberty-oppressing faction*. The mayor, adhering to his usual policy, ventured certain expostulations upon the tendency of the resolution, offered to its adoption a faint opposition, and eventually succumbed to the insurgents, who ordered him to repair to the commune and announce the decision they had just taken. It was afterwards determined that the forty-eight sections should be assembled in the course of the day, to express their sentiments on the insurrection, and that immediately thereafter the tocsin should be rung, the barriers closed, and the tattoo beaten in all the streets. The sections were accordingly collected, and the day passed in gathering their stormy sanction of the insurrection. The committee of public welfare, and the commission of twelve, called the authorities before them to obtain information. The mayor communicated, with apparent regret, the plan fixed at the Evêché. L'Huillier, procurator-syndic of the department, avowed openly and with calm assurance the scheme of an insurrection *purely moral*, and then placidly withdrew to his colleagues.

Thus the hours of daylight were consumed, and as soon as darkness began to overshadow the city, the tattoo reverberated through all the streets, the barriers were shut, the tocsin rang with its ominous knell, and the terrified citizens asked themselves whether fresh massacres were about to drench the capital in blood. All the deputies of the Gironde, and the threatened ministers, passed the night out of their own dwellings. Roland concealed himself in the house of a friend; Buzot, Louvet, Barbaroux, Guadet, Bergoing, and Rabaut Saint-Etienne, barricaded themselves within a secluded apartment, well provided with arms, and ready, in case of an attack, to defend their lives to the last gasp. At five in the morning they left their retreat for the convention, where, under favour of the breaking day, several members, summoned by the tocsin, had earlier assembled. Their arms, hanging visibly to the eye, secured them from molestation on the part of the various groups they traversed, and they reached the convention in safety, finding several Mountaineers already in their places, and Danton engaged in conversation with Garat. "See," said Louvet to Guadet, "what a horrible hope sparkles on those countenances!" "Yes," replied Guadet, "it is to-day that Clodius exiles Cicero." And Garat, apparently surprised to meet Danton so early at

after exhausting all the measures which do not compromise the society, that recourse ought to be had to extreme measures, which measures, again, ought not to be proposed within a society claiming to be wise and enlightened. It is not a moment of transitory effervescence that can save the country. We have for enemies the most dexterous and subtle of men, who have at their disposal all the treasures of the state.

The measures that have been proposed have had and can have no result; they have served only to foster calumny, to furnish pretexts for journalists to represent us under the most odious colours.

When men neglect the first means that reason points out, and without which the public welfare cannot be accomplished, it is evident they are not in the right path. I will say no more; but I declare that I protest against all means which tend only to compromise the club without advancing the public welfare. Such is my profession of faith: the people will always be in a condition to eradicate aristocracy; it is merely requisite that the club should avoid gross blunders.

When I see men uselessly striving to make enemies to the society, and encouraging the miscreants who desire its destruction, I am tempted to believe they are either blind or ill-intentioned.

I propose that the society adhere to the measures I suggested, and I look upon all as in the highest degree culpable who do not aid their execution. How can such measures be objected to? How can their necessity be unappreciated? And if it be appreciated, how hesitate to support them and ensure their adoption? I propose to the society to hear a discussion upon the principles of the constitution preparing for France; for it behoves us to embrace all the plans of our enemies. If the society can unmask the machiavelism of its foes, it will not have lost time. I therefore move that, discarding the unsuitable propositions, the club permits me to read to it my thoughts on the constitution."

SITTING OF SUNDAY 26TH MAY 1793.

Robespierre.—"I told you that the people ought to rest upon their might; but when the people are oppressed, when no resource is left them but themselves, he would be a poltroon who did not advise them to rise. It is when all the laws are violated, when despotism is at its climax, when good faith and decency are trodden under foot, that the people are called into insurrection. That moment is arrived; our enemies openly oppress the patriots; they are labouring, in the name of the law, to replunge the people into misery and slavery. I will never be the friend of those corrupt men, whatever treasures they may offer me. I prefer to die with republicans rather than triumph with miscreants. (Applause.)

I am acquainted with but two modes of existence for a nation; either it governs itself or confides that care to its mandatories. We, the republican deputies, wish to establish the government of the people through their delegates, with responsibility; it is upon these principles that our opinions are based, but most frequently we claim in vain to be heard. A rapid signal, given by the president, deprives us of the right of suffrage. I hold that the sovereignty of the people is violated, when their mandatories give to their own creatures the offices belonging to the people. According to these principles, I am grievously concerned" ——

(The speaker is interrupted by the announcement of a deputation—tumult.) "I continue my speech," exclaimed Robespierre, "not for those who interrupt me, but for the republicans.

I exhort every citizen to be steadfast in the feeling of his right; I admonish him to rely on his own strength and on that of the whole nation; I invite the people to put themselves in insurrection, in the National Convention, against all the corrupt deputies. (Applause.) I declare, that having received from the people the privilege of defending their rights, I regard as my oppressor him who interrupts me or refuses me a hearing; and I declare, that I myself, alone, will put myself in insurrection against the president, and against all the members who sit in the convention. (Applause.) When a criminal scorn is affected for the sans-culottes, I declare that I put myself in insurrection against the corrupt deputies. I invite all the Mountaineer deputies to rally and oppose the aristocracy; and I say there is for them but one alternative, either to resist with all their strength, with all their power, the efforts of intrigue, or to give in their resignations.

It is necessary, at the same time, that the French people understand their rights; for the faithful deputies can effect nothing without liberty of speech.

If treachery call the foreign enemies into the heart of France; if, when our artillerymen hold in their hands the thunder which ought to scatter the tyrants and their satellites, we see the enemy approach our walls, then I declare I will myself chastise the traitors; and I give warning I shall consider every conspirator as my personal enemy, and treat him as such." (Loud cheers.)

assembly, stood observing him with attention. "Why all this noise?" he asked; "what do they want?" "It will be nothing," answered Danton, coolly; "they must be allowed to break a few presses, and then sent home." Twenty-eight deputies were present. Fermont occupied the chair for the moment, and Guadet boldly seated himself as secretary. The number of deputies gradually increased, and the opening of the sitting was impatiently awaited.

During this interval, the insurrection was consummated at the commune. The members of the central revolutionary committee, having at their head the president Dobsen, presented themselves at the town-hall, furnished with full revolutionary powers. Dobsen advanced, and made known to the council-general that the people of Paris, assailed in their rights, appeared there to abrogate all the constituted authorities. The vice-president of the council requested to know the powers of the committee. He examined them, and finding them to contain resolutions adopted by thirty-three sections, he declared that the majority of the sections annulled the constituted authorities. In consequence, the council-general and its officers retired. Dobsen and the delegates took the vacant places, amidst shouts of "Long live the republic!" He forthwith addressed the new assembly, and proposed to reinstate the municipality and council-general in their functions, inasmuch as both the one and the other had always discharged their duties towards the people. The motion met with a favourable reception, and the former municipality, together with the former council-general, was speedily reinstalled amid boisterous applause. These pretended formalities were simply designed to renovate the municipal powers, or in other words, to render them illimitable, and sufficient for the exigencies of insurrection. The next step was to nominate a new provisional commander-in-chief; and the choice fell upon Henriot, a brutal personage, but devoted to the commune, and already commander of the battalion of sans-culottes. In order to ensure the aid of the populace, and keep them under arms during the period of commotion, a resolution was passed that forty sous a-day should be allowed to all poor citizens on service, which forty sous should be immediately taken from the produce of the forced loan, in effect, from the rich. This was a certain mode of calling to the aid of the commune, and rousing against the *bourgeoisie* of the sections, all the workmen who preferred gaining forty sous by participating in revolutionary movements, to earning thirty by attending to their accustomed labours.

Whilst these proceedings passed at the commune, the citizens of the capital poured forth at the sound of the tocsin, and gathered in arms around the banner planted at the door of each captain of a section. Many were uncertain as to the light in which they ought to view the intended movement, and several were even ignorant of the measures taken in the sections and the commune during the previous evening, and asked with surprise the reason they were called out. But in this state of mind they were unfit to act of themselves or oppose what might be done contrary to their feelings; and thus they were made, although disapproving of the insurrection, to aid it by their presence. Upwards of 80,000 men under arms traversed Paris in the greatest quietness, and permitted themselves to be led with perfect docility by the audacious authority which had usurped the command. The sections Butte-des-Moulins, Mail, and Champs-Elysées, alone, having long before declared against the commune and the Mountain, and being somewhat encouraged by the energy of the Girondists, in whose dangers they shared, were prepared to resist. They had assembled in arms, and awaited events in the attitude of men threatened, and ready to defend themselves. The Jacobins, the sans-culottes, alarmed at these dispositions, and exaggerating them in their terror, rushed through the Faubourg Saint-Antoine, vociferating that these malecontent sections were about to mount the white cockade, and that the patriots were required in the centre of Paris to crush an outbreak of the royalists. The better to stimulate a general agitation, it had been determined to fire the alarm-gun. That piece was planted on the Pont-Neuf, and the penalty of death was adjudged against him who should rashly discharge it without a decree of the convention. Henriot had issued orders to fire it, but the captain of the post had refused obedience, and insisted upon a decree. But the messengers from Henriot had returned in force, overcome the opposition of the post, and at this moment the roar of the alarm-gun was added to the din of the tocsin and tattoo.

The convention, partially assembled since the dawn, as we have seen, had immediately upon its formation summoned all the authorities before it to report on the situation of Paris. Garat, present in the hall, and absorbed in scanning Danton, first appeared at the tribune, and related what every one knew, to wit, that an assembly had been held at the Evêché, which demanded reparation for the injuries heaped upon Paris, and the abolition of the commission of twelve. Garat had scarcely ceased speaking when the members of the new institution, describing themselves as "The administration of the department of the Seine," appeared at the bar, and declared that the affair in progress was simply an insurrection *purely moral*, having for its object to vindicate the city of Paris from the calumnies propagated against it. They added, that the most exemplary order was observed; that each citizen had sworn to respect persons and property; that the armed sections traversed the town in peace and quietness; and that all the united authorities would come during the day to announce their profession of faith and their demands to the convention.

The president Mallarmé then communicated a letter from the captain of the post on the Pont-Neuf, detailing the contest that had occurred on the seizure of the alarm-gun. Dufriche-Valazé thereupon moved that an inquiry be instituted as to the original movers of the commotion, that the persons guilty of sounding the tocsin be sought out, and that an order of arrest be issued against the commander-in-chief, for his audacity in firing the alarm-gun without a decree of the convention. At this motion, the galleries and the left side raised the boisterous shouts it was but natural to expect. Valazé was not discouraged: he said they would not lead him to forfeit his character; that he was the representative of twenty-five millions of men, and that he would fearlessly discharge his duty to the end. He concluded by proposing that the assembly should forthwith grant a hearing to the so much reviled commission of twelve, and give heed to its report, for the occurrences then passing were a sufficient proof of the plots it had incessantly denounced. Thuriot rose to answer Valazé, whereupon the bitter feelings hitherto suppressed burst forth, and the storm began to rage. Mathieu and Cambon attempted to interfere as mediators; they exhorted the galleries to silence, the orators of the right side to moderation, and all parties to the reflection that at this critical moment a contest in the capital would be fatal to the cause of the revolution; and they moreover admonished the convention that tranquillity was the only mode of maintaining its dignity, and that dignity again was its only instrument to enforce respect from the ill-disposed. Vergniaud, inclined like Mathieu and Cambon to employ conciliatory means, said that he likewise viewed as fatal to liberty and the revolution the impending contest; he consequently refrained from reproaching Thuriot, save gently, for having augmented the danger of the commission of twelve, by describing it as the pest of France, at a period when all the popular passions were roused against it. He held it ought to be dissolved if it had committed arbitrary acts, but allowed a hearing in the first place; and as its report would inevitably be of a nature to excite animosities

he proposed that both its perusal and the discussion consequent thereupon should be postponed to a less irritable moment. That was, as he insisted, the only way to maintain the dignity of the assembly, and demonstrate its freedom. Its immediate object ought to be, above all things, to ascertain who had given orders to ring the tocsin and fire the alarm-gun, which necessarily implied the obligation to call the provisional commander-in-chief to the bar. "I repeat to you," exclaimed Vergniaud, in conclusion, "that whatever may be the issue of the combat which threatens this day to be fought, it will lead to the loss of liberty; let us therefore swear to remain steadfast to our duty, and all die at our post rather than abandon the commonwealth."

The members instantly rose with acclamations, and took the oath proposed by Vergniaud. The debate then turned upon the motion to summon the commander-in-chief to the bar. Danton, upon whom all eyes were fixed at this moment, both Girondists and Mountaineers seeming to ask him whether he were indeed the author of the day's events, appeared in the tribune, and immediately obtained profound attention. "The act of primary importance," said he, "is to suppress the commission of twelve. This is of infinitely greater consequence than ordering the commander-in-chief to the bar. I speak to men gifted with certain political endowments. To summon Henriot will have no effect on the state of things; for it is not the instrument but the cause of the troubles it behoves you to deal with. Now, the cause is this commission of twelve. I do not pretend to judge its conduct or its acts: it is not as having ordered arbitrary arrests that I attack it; I ask you to suppress it as *unpolitical*."

"Unpolitical!" cried the right side; "we do not understand that."

"You do not understand the expression?" resumed Danton; "it must be explained to you, then. This commission was instituted merely to repress the popular energy; it was conceived only in that spirit of moderatism which will ruin the revolution and France. It has applied itself to assailing energetic magistrates, whose only fault was stimulating the ardour of the people. I also refrain from considering whether it has yielded to personal antipathies in its attacks; but this is certain, it has exhibited dispositions which it is incumbent on us to condemn. You yourselves, upon the report of your minister of the interior, whose character is so mild, his judgment so impartial and enlightened, have liberated men whom the commission of twelve had confined. What, then, is your opinion of the commission itself, since you abrogate its acts? The cannon has sounded, the people have arisen; but we ought to thank the people for their energy, in the name of that very cause we defend; and, if you be *political legislators*, you will yourselves applaud their ardour, reform your own errors, and abolish your commission. I address myself, I repeat, only to those men who have some comprehension of our situation, and not to those stupid beings who, in such great movements, listen only to the dictates of their passions. Hesitate not, therefore, to satisfy this people" —— "What people?" asked voices on the right. "That people," answered Danton—"that immense population, which is our advanced sentinel, which abhors tyranny and the base moderatism which would recall it. Hasten to satisfy it, rescue it from the aristocrats, save it from its own wrath; and if, when it shall be satisfied, perverse men, no matter to what party they belong, attempt to prolong a movement become unnecessary, Paris itself will bray them into nonentity."

Rabaut Saint-Etienne appeared to justify the commission of twelve in its political character, and proceeded to argue that it was strictly with political views a commission was organised to discover the plots of Pitt and Austria, who instigated with gold all the disorders in France. "Down!" shouted numberless voices; "take the word from Rabaut!" "No," exclaimed Bazire, "leave it him, for he is a liar; I will prove that his commission has organised the civil war in Paris." Rabaut strove to resume. Marat moved that a deputation from the commune be introduced. "Let me finish first," urged Rabaut. "The commune! the commune! the commune!" vociferated the possessors of the galleries and the Mountain. "I aver," said Rabaut, in the intervals of the din, "that when I wished to declare the truth, you interrupted me." "Well, conclude then!" Rabaut accordingly brought his speech to a conclusion, by moving that the commission be suppressed, if it were so determined, but that the committee of public welfare be immediately charged to prosecute all the inquiries it had initiated.

A deputation from the insurrectional committee was then introduced. "A grand conspiracy has been formed," it said, "but it is discovered. The people who arose on the 14th July and 10th August to overthrow tyranny, have arisen again to arrest the counter-revolution. The council-general sends us to make known to you the measures it has taken. The first was to place property under the safeguard of the republicans; the second to give forty sous a-day to the republicans who remain under arms; the third to form a committee for correspondence with the convention during this period of agitation. The council-general begs you to assign a room near your hall to this committee, where it may sit and concert with you."

Scarcely had the deputation ceased to speak, ere Guadet appeared in the tribune to answer it. He was not the fittest of the Girondists to calm the passions of their adversaries. "The commune," said he, "when pretending that it has discovered a conspiracy, has erred simply in a word, meaning that it has executed one." The shouts of the galleries interrupted him. Vergniaud rose with indignation, and moved that they be cleared. The tumult that ensued is not to be designated; for a length of time nothing but a confused roar of sounds was heard. The president Mallarmé repeated, but in vain, that if the convention were not respected, he would put in force the authority vested in him by the law. Guadet continued to occupy the tribune, and occasionally succeeded in pitching a phrase above the uproar in its intervals of reflux. He moved, in substance, that the convention should intermit its deliberations until its liberty were assured; and that the commission of twelve should be instructed to proceed without delay against those who had rung the tocsin and fired the alarm-gun. Such a proposition was not calculated to allay the tumult. Vergniaud was about to reappear in the tribune to restore some degree of tranquillity, when a fresh deputation from the municipality came to reiterate the demands already urged. The convention, thus inexorably pressed, could hold out no longer, and decreed that the working men required to watch over the maintenance of public order and the safety of property should receive forty sous a-day, and that a room should be assigned to the commissioners of the Paris authorities to deliberate in concert with the committee of public welfare.

After this decree was passed, Couthon undertook to answer Guadet, and the day, now pretty far advanced, was wasted in discussions without result. The entire population of Paris, assembled together in arms, continued to march through the city without the slightest infringement of order, and in the same uncertainty as to purpose. The commune occupied itself in drawing up renewed addresses relative to the commission of twelve, and that unfortunate commission was still the unceasing object of contention in the national assembly. Vergniaud, who had quitted the hall for a moment, and witnessed the singular spectacle of an immense population undecided what part to take, and blindly obeying the first authority assumed over it, deemed that advantage might be drawn from these

dispositions, and accordingly submitted a motion designed to establish a distinction between the agitators and the Parisian people, and to conciliate the latter by a testimony of confidence. "I am far from accusing the majority or the minority of the inhabitants of Paris," said he to the assembly; "this day will show how Paris loves liberty. It is sufficient to walk the streets, to witness the order observed in them, and the numerous patrols moving in all directions; it is sufficient, I repeat, to behold this glorious spectacle, to induce a decree that Paris has deserved well of the country!"

At these words, the whole convention arose, and voted by acclamation that Paris had deserved well of the country. The Mountain and the galleries vehemently applauded, greatly surprised to hear such a proposition fall from the lips of Vergniaud. The manœuvre itself was doubtless very dexterous, but it was not by a flattering testimonial that the Girondists could expect to arouse the zeal of the sections, rally those that were inimical to the commune, and impart to them the courage and the union necessary to oppose the insurrection successfully.

During this interval, the section of the Faubourg Saint-Antoine, instigated by the emissaries who had traversed it with the cry that the section Butte-des-Moulins had mounted the white cockade, had penetrated to the centre of Paris with cannon, and halted a few paces from the Palais-Royal, where the Butte-des-Moulins had intrenched itself. The latter had drawn up in battle array in the garden, closed all the wickets, and, guarded by its cannon, stood ready to maintain a siege in case of an assault. Outside the enclosure the report was still industriously circulated that it had assumed the white cockade and banner, and every art was used to excite the section Saint-Antoine to attack it. But certain officers of the latter represented that, before proceeding to extremities, it was but proper to be assured of the facts, and to attempt a parley. They accordingly presented themselves at the wickets, and requested to speak with the officers of the Butte-des-Moulins. These willingly admitted them, and throughout the garden they perceived none but the national colours. Then mutual explanations were given, speedily followed by a general embrace. The officers returned to their battalions, and in a short time the two sections were intermingled and parading together the streets of Paris.

Thus submission became more and more general, and the new commune was left at leisure to pursue its strife with the convention. In the mean time, Barrère, ever prone to suggest medium projects, submitted a motion, in the name of the committee of public welfare, to abolish the commission of twelve, but, at the same time, to place the armed force at the disposition of the convention. Whilst he was developing his scheme, a fresh deputation arrived, the third during the day, to express its final resolves to the national assembly, speaking as the organ of the department, the commune, and the delegates of the sections, congregated in an extraordinary meeting at the Evêché.

The procurator-syndic of the department, L'Huillier, took the lead. "Legislators," said he, "for a length of time the city and department of Paris have been calumniated before the whole universe. The same men who have laboured to destroy Paris in public estimation instigate the massacres of La Vendée; it is they who flatter and uphold the hopes of our enemies; it is they who degrade the constituted authorities, and strive to mislead the people in order to gain a pretext for complaining of them; it is they who denounce to you imaginary plots in order to promote real ones; it is they who have sought from you the committee of twelve in order to crush the liberty of the people; it is they, in fine, who, by a criminal agitation, by surreptitious addresses, by active correspondence, inflame animosities and divisions in your assembly, and rob the country of the greatest of all blessings, a good constitution, which it has merited by such inordinate sacrifices."

After this vehement apostrophe, L'Huillier proceeded to denounce schemes of federalism, declaring that Paris was prepared to perish in behalf of the republican unity, and claiming expiation for the celebrated phrase of Isnard—"Paris shall be erased from the list of cities."

"Legislators!" he exclaimed, "the project of destroying Paris is actually formed! Will you then allow this sacred repository of the arts and of human intelligence to be swept away?" These affected lamentations over, he demanded vengeance upon Isnard, the ill-fated twelve, and *several other criminals*, such as Brissot, Guadet, Vergniaud, Gensonné, Buzot, Barbaroux, Roland, Lebrun, Clavière, &c.

The right side preserved a mournful stillness. The left side and the tribunes applauded with fury. The president Grégoire replied to L'Huillier by emphatic eulogies on the city of Paris, and invited the deputation to the honours of the sitting. The persons composing it were blended with a multitude of other individuals, the more froward of the rabble. Too many to find space at the bar, they pressed onwards in the direction of the Mountain, which eagerly welcomed them to its ranks. Then was a strange incongruous host scattered through the hall, and undistinguishably commingled with the deputies. The galleries rent the air with joyful acclamations at this spectacle of *fraternity* between the representatives and the people. Osselin forthwith moved that the petition be printed, and its conclusions, digested into the form of an edict by Barrère, be now decided upon.

"President," exclaimed Vergniaud, "put the question to the assembly whether it will legislate in its present state." "The project of Barrère to the vote!" shouted the left. "We protest against all determination," retorted the right. "The convention is not free," said Doulcet. "If so," replied Levasseur, "let the members of the left side pass over to the right, and then the convention will be distinct from the petitioners, and can pronounce its decision." Upon this suggestion the Mountain hastily crossed the floor, and for a time the two antagonist sides were mingled together, and the benches of the Mountain exclusively occupied by the petitioners. The question upon the printing of the address was thereupon put to the vote and declared to be carried. "The project of Barrère to the vote!" again cried the rejoicing Mountain. "We are not free," responded several voices in the assembly. "I move," said Vergniaud, with impassioned action, "that the convention join the armed force which surrounds it, to seek protection from the violence assailing it." Upon delivering these words, he moved to the door, followed by a great number of his friends. The Mountain and the galleries greeted the secession of the right side with ironical cheers; the Plain sat undecided and terror-struck. "I move," said Chabot, "that the assembly be called over, in order that the names of those who desert their post may be marked." At this moment, Vergniaud and those who had accompanied him returned with an air of dejection, and as if utterly overwhelmed; for, in fact, the step they had taken, which might have been noble and impressive if generally adopted, became pitiful and ridiculous in the reverse alternative. Vergniaud claimed to speak, but Robespierre refused to yield him the tribune, of which he was in possession. Retaining his advantage, he (Robespierre) vehemently urged prompt and energetic measures to satisfy the people; and demanded that not only should the commission of twelve be suppressed, but severe measures taken against its members. He subsequently expatiated at great length upon the terms of Barrère's project, and opposed the clause which assigned the disposal of the armed force to the convention. "Conclude," said Vergniaud, impatiently. "Yes," retorted Robespierre, "I am about

to conclude, and against you!—against you, who, after the revolution of the 10th August, would have consigned to the scaffold those who had accomplished it!—against you, who have never ceased to provoke the destruction of Paris!—against you, who would have saved the tyrant!—against you, who conspired with Dumouriez! My conclusion is a decree of impeachment against all the accomplices of Dumouriez, and also against those designated by the petitioners."

After long and boisterous cheering, a decree was drawn up, put to the vote, and adopted amidst a tumult sufficiently bewildering to remove the possibility of judging whether or not the adequate number of deputies were present. It imported that the commission of twelve was suppressed; that its papers should be seized and made the subject of a report within three days; that the armed force was in permanent requisition; that the constituted authorities should render an account to the convention of the measures taken to ensure public tranquillity; that the denounced conspiracies should be diligently pursued, and a proclamation issued to give France a correct idea of this day, which the malignant would doubtless seek to misrepresent.

It was now ten o'clock, and the Jacobins and the commune had begun to complain that the day was elapsing without any beneficial result. But this decree, although it decided nothing as to the persons of the Girondists, was a first success which elicited infinite gladness, and for which the oppressed convention itself was forced to evince a reluctant thankfulness. The commune ordered the whole city to be illuminated; a civic procession was formed to the glare of flambeaux; the sections walked in confused harmony, the Faubourg Saint-Antoine blended with the Butte-des-Moulins and the Mail. Several deputies of the Mountain and the president were compelled to take part in the procession; the conquerors coerced the vanquished themselves to celebrate their victory.

The character of the day was sufficiently obvious. The insurgents had pretended to adhere to formalities in all their proceedings. They hesitated to break up the convention, but wrung from it all they required, whilst they preserved towards it an appearance of respect. The pusillanimous members of the Plain willingly lent themselves to a deception which allowed them to assume they were yet free even when abjectly obeying. Thus they had abolished the commission of twelve, and deferred the examination of its conduct for three days, so as to avoid the imputation of an absolute surrender. They had not assigned to the convention the disposal of the armed force, but ordained an account of all measures adopted to be duly rendered, in order again to keep up the pretence of supremacy. Lastly, they commanded a proclamation, to promulgate officially that the convention was not influenced by fear, but had acted with perfect freedom.

The following day, Barrère was charged to frame this proclamation, and he travestied the events of the 31st May with that rare dexterity, which always recommended him when it was needful to provide the weak with a specious pretext for yielding to the strong. Certain measures of too rigorous a tendency, he said, had excited discontent; the people had arisen with energy, but with calmness, had appeared throughout the day apparelled in arms, had proclaimed the sanctity of property, had respected the liberty of the convention and the personal safety of each of its members, and had demanded a redress which the national representation was eager and happy to grant. It was thus Barrère expressed himself on the abolition of that committee of twelve whereof he was himself the author.

Tranquillity was far from being re-established on the 1st of June. The association at the Evêché continued its deliberations; the department and the commune, still extraordinarily constituted, were in permanence; the commotion had not subsided in the sections; and on all sides it was clamoured that but the half of the essential good had been obtained, since the twenty-two proscribed deputies yet sat in the convention. Paris, therefore, still remained the theatre of violent agitation, and a fresh outbreak was too surely anticipated for Sunday the 2d of June.

All positive and physical power was centred in the insurrectional association of the Evêché, and the legal power in the committee of public welfare, to which had been delegated all the paramount authority of the convention. A room had been appropriated during the storm of the 31st, to which the constituted authorities might resort to hold communication with that committee. The whole of the 1st of June was devoted by the committee to examining members of the insurrectional association, in order to ascertain definitely what was still desired by the insurgent commune. Its real wish was but too manifest, pointing undisguisedly to the arrest or expulsion of the deputies who had so courageously resisted its violent encroachments. This design occasioned deep inquietude to all the members of the committee, though affecting them variously. Delmas, Treilhard, and Bréard, were sincerely grieved at such a project. Cambon, a great partisan, as he himself always boasted, *of revolutionary power*, but scrupulously attached to the cause of legality, was indignant at the effrontery of the commune, and said to Bouchotte, the successor of Beurnonville, who, treading in the footsteps of Pache, bowed submissively to the Jacobins—"Minister of war, we are not blind; I see very plainly that persons holding office in your department are amongst the leaders and instigators of all this." Barrère also, despite his accustomed caution, began to express the dissatisfaction he could not avoid feeling. "We must see," he often repeated during that mournful day, "whether it be the commune of Paris that represents the French republic, or the convention." The Jacobin Lacroix, the friend and instrument of Danton, appeared embarrassed in presence of his colleagues at the outrage in perspective against the laws and the national representation. Danton himself, who had not exceeded an approval of, grounded on a strong desire for, the abolition of the commission of twelve, originating in his abhorrence, all-powerful with him, of every thing which fettered popular energy, would have wished that the national representation should be respected; but he foresaw on the part of the Girondists fresh assaults and a renewed opposition to the progress of the revolution, and he would have willingly devised some expedient for removing without proscribing them. Garat offered him a suggestion, which he seized upon with avidity.

All the ministers were in attendance upon the committee, and Garat, of course, with his colleagues. Pensively brooding over the position in which the chiefs of the revolution stood with regard to each other, his mind was struck with a noble conception, fitted to restore harmony.

"Recall to your recollection," said he to the members of the committee, and addressing himself particularly to Danton, "the quarrels of Themistocles and Aristides; the obstinacy of the one in repudiating whatever the other proposed, and the dangers they thereby caused their common country to incur. Remember the generosity of Aristides, who, painfully convinced of the evils they both occasioned to their country, had the magnanimity to exclaim—'Athenians, you never can be tranquil and happy until you have thrown Themistocles and me into the Barathrum!'* Let the leaders on both sides of the assembly repeat the words of Aristides, and voluntarily exile themselves in equal numbers from its sanctuary. From that moment discord will cease; sufficient ability will remain in the assembly to save the commonwealth, and in their sublime ostracism, the country

* [The Barathrum was a deep pit in Athens, into which malefactors were cast.]

will bless the men who have descended into obscurity to ensure its pacification."

All the members of the committee were moved at this generous idea. Delmas, Barrère, the ardent Cambon, were enchanted with the project. Danton, who would be of course the first sacrifice, rose, with tears in his eyes, and said to Garat, "You are right: I will go to the convention, and propose this plan. I will offer myself as the first hostage to Bordeaux." They separated, full of this brilliant conception, for the purpose of communicating it to the leaders of the two parties. They addressed themselves particularly to Robespierre, in whose eyes such a self-denial could scarcely find favour, and who in fact replied that it was a mere snare to induce the Mountain to discard its most courageous defenders. Consequently, but one portion of the project remained feasible, namely, the voluntary retirement of the Girondists, since the Mountaineers refused their concurrence. Barrère was selected as the organ through whom the committee of public welfare thought fit to propose a sacrifice to the one party, which the other had not the generosity to accept. He accordingly composed a formal scheme for submission to the twenty-two deputies and the members of the commission of twelve, to voluntarily divest themselves of their functions.

In the mean time, the plan of the second insurrection was definitively settled at the association of the Evêché. It was a subject of complaint there, as at the Jacobin Club, that the energy of Danton had relaxed since the abolition of the committee of twelve. Marat urged a demand upon the convention for the impeachment of the twenty-two, and its exaction by force, if necessary. A petition, brief and pithy in its terms, was accordingly drawn up for that object. The scheme of the insurrection was planned, not in the association at large, but in the committee of execution, charged with what was called *the means of public welfare*, and composed of Varlet, Dobsen, Gusman, and all those who had been engaged in a constant course of agitation since the 21st January. This committee determined to surround the convention with the armed force, and confine the deputies in the hall until they passed the required decree. For this purpose, it was judged expedient to order back the battalions destined for La Vendée, which had been designedly retained, under different pretexts, in the barracks of Courbevoie. These battalions, and some others of undoubted pliancy, were expected to be less scrupulous than the guards of the sections might possibly prove. By encompassing the national palace with these devoted men, and maintaining, as on the 31st May, the remainder of the armed force in docility and ignorance, the resistance of the convention would, it was considered, be easily overcome. Henriot was again selected to command the troops around the national palace.

Such was the exploit these insurgents promised themselves for the next day, Sunday the 2d June; but in the evening of Saturday, a sudden thought came upon them to try whether a last appeal would not suffice; to make, in short, a repetition of their demands. Forthwith, orders were issued to beat the tattoo and ring the tocsin, and the committee of public welfare hastily summoned the convention to assemble amidst this new tempest.

At this moment, the Girondists were dining together, for the purpose of holding a consultation upon the line of conduct still open to them. It was obvious to their eyes that the impending insurrection could not be designed merely *to break presses*, as Danton had said, or to suppress a hateful commission, but that their persons were its sole and definite aim. Certain of them gave their counsel for remaining steadfast at their posts, and dying on the curule chair, vindicating to the last the character with which their countrymen had invested them. Pétion, Buzot, and Gensonné, inclined towards this grave and magnanimous resolution. Barbaroux, regardless of consequences, yielding only to the inspirations of his heroic mind, declared for braving the enemy with a valiant defiance. Others, again, and Louvet was the warmest in supporting this latter opinion, proposed at once to abandon the convention, where they could effect nothing more of an advantageous nature, where the Plain had not sufficient courage to give them their suffrages, and where the Mountain and the galleries were determined to drown their voices by obstreperous howls. These desired to withdraw into their departments, foment the insurrection almost on the point of explosion, and return in force to Paris, to avenge the insulted laws and national representation. Each enforced his own opinion, with the usual effect of promoting general irresolution. At length, the sound of the tocsin and the tattoo obliged the unfortunate guests to rise from table, and seek an asylum before arriving at a determination. They repaired to the house of a colleague, less compromised than the other Girondists, and not inscribed on the famous list of the twenty-two, Meilhan, who had already sheltered them, and who occupied a spacious residence in the Street des Moulins, in which they could assemble under arms. Thither, then, they proceeded in all haste, excepting some who had other means of concealing themselves.

The convention had met under the knell of the tocsin. Very few members were present; the benches on the right side were vacant. Lanjuinais alone, resolute to brave all dangers, had come to denounce a plot, the revelation whereof was information to none. After a stormy and brief debate, the convention answered the petitioners of the Evêché, that, considering the decree which enjoined the committee of public welfare to present a report upon the twenty-two, it was debarred from deciding on the new demand of the commune. The assembly broke up in disorder, and the insurgents deferred till the following morning the definitive execution of their scheme.

The tattoo and the tocsin reverberated throughout the night, from Saturday to Sunday morning the 2d June 1793. The alarm-gun emitted its startling roar, and the whole population of Paris rushed to arms at the break of day. Nearly eighty thousand men were drawn up around the convention, but at least sixty-five thousand took no part in the event, contenting themselves as spectators, and holding their weapons loosely on their arms. Devoted battalions of artillerymen were stationed around the national palace, under the immediate command of Henriot. They had one hundred and sixty-three pieces of ordnance, ammunition-waggons, apparatus for heating balls, lighted matches, and all the military display fitted to impose on the imagination. Before dawn, the battalions whose departure for La Vendée had been purposely retarded, were brought back into Paris, exasperated by the assurance, diligently inculcated upon them, that plots had just been discovered, the leaders of which were in the convention, and whose expulsion was indispensable to the national welfare. It is alleged that these assertions were fortified by assignats of a hundred sous. These battalions, thus gained over, marched from the Champs-Elysées to the Madeleine, from the Madeleine to the Boulevards, and thence to the Carrousel, prepared to execute whatever the conspirators might please to order them.

Thus the convention, actually hemmed in by but a few thousands of hairbrained ruffians, seemed besieged by eighty thousand men. But, although it were not really besieged, the danger it incurred was not the less, for the few thousands which pressed more closely upon it, were disposed to proceed to the last extremities against it.

The deputies of all parties were present at the sitting. The Mountain, the Plain, the right side, occupied their places. The proscribed deputies, of whom the majority remained at Meilhan's, where all had passed the night, were likewise anxious to appear at their posts. Buzot struggled violently to disengage

himself from those who detained him, resolved to expire in the sanctuary of the convention; but they succeeded in restraining him. Barbaroux alone, successfully baffling all vigilance, repaired to the convention, to manifest a sublime heroism on that fatal day. The others were persuaded to remain in their asylum, and await the issue of these dismal portents.

The sitting of the convention opened, and Lanjuinais, determined upon a last effort to vindicate the respect due to the national representation—he whom neither galleries, nor Mountain, nor imminent peril could intimidate, was the first to claim a hearing. The most furious shouts followed his request. "I am here," said he, "to address you upon the means of checking the fresh commotions now threatening us!" "Down! down!" cried the Jacobins; "he wants to provoke a civil war!" "As long as it is permitted me," resumed Lanjuinais, "to raise my voice, I will not suffer the character of a representative of the people to be degraded in my person. Hitherto you have done nothing, but endured every outrage; you have sanctioned all that has been demanded from you. An insurrectional association is formed, it names a committee charged to prepare rebellion, and a provisional commander to command the rebels; and this association, this committee, this commander, you leave unquestioned!" Fearful yells interrupted every moment the words of Lanjuinais, and at length the rage he inspired became such that several deputies of the Mountain, Drouet, the younger Robespierre, Julien, Legendre, rose from their seats, rushed to the tribune, and endeavoured to drag him down. Lanjuinais resisted, and clung to its sides with all his might. Indescribable confusion prevailed in all parts of the hall, and the deafening vociferations of the galleries contributed to render the scene by far the most horrible that had yet been witnessed. The president put on his hat, and succeeded in making his voice be heard. "The scene that has occurred," said he, "is truly afflicting. Liberty will perish if you continue to conduct yourselves in such a manner. I call you to order, you who have thus assaulted the tribune."

Tranquillity was partially restored, and Lanjuinais, who disregarded the imputation of making chimerical propositions, when they involved fortitude and courage, moved that the revolutionary authorities of Paris be annulled, or, in other words, that those who were disarmed should inflict condign chastisement on those who held arms in their hands. He had scarcely propounded this motion, ere the petitioners on behalf of the commune presented themselves afresh. Their language was more terse and short than ever.

"*The citizens of Paris have not laid down their arms for four days. For four days they have sought from their mandatories their rights, flagrantly violated, and for four days their mandatories have laughed at their calmness and inaction. It is indispensable that the conspirators be put under provisional arrest, that the people be immediately saved, or they will save themselves!*"

When the petitioners had concluded, Billaud-Varennes and Tallien demanded a report upon this petition, forthwith and before separating. Other deputies, in great number, insisted upon the order of the day. Eventually, amidst the roar of tumult, the assembly, inspirited by the sense of danger, rose and voted the order of the day, on the ground that a report had been ordered from the committee of public welfare within three days. Upon this decision being pronounced, the petitioners issued forth, uttering shouts of indignation, gesticulating furious menaces, and half-displaying their concealed weapons. All the men in the galleries retired as if to execute some project, and the women alone remained in their seats. Soon a noise ensued outside, and cries of "To arms! to arms!" were heard. At this moment, several deputies laboured to impress upon the convention that the resolution it had just adopted was imprudent, and that it ought to terminate a dangerous crisis by granting what was demanded, and placing under provisional arrest the twenty-two accused deputies. "We will all go!" exclaimed Laréveillière-Lepeaux—"all go to prison!" Cambon here announced that the committee of public welfare would make its report in half an hour. The report was enjoined within three days, but the danger, becoming more imminent with every moment that elapsed, had induced the committee to hasten its labours.

Barrère accordingly appeared in the tribune, and submitted the idea of Garat, which had so greatly struck the members of the committee yesterday; which Danton had embraced with ardour, but Robespierre repudiated; and which, as the reader is aware, consisted in a voluntary and mutual exile on the part of the leaders on both sides. Barrère, prevented from proposing it to the Mountaineers, now recommended it to the twenty-two. "The committee," said he, "has not had time to elucidate any fact or to hear a single witness; but, considering the political and moral state of the convention, it is of opinion that the voluntary suspension of the deputies particularised would produce the happiest effect, and save the republic from a fatal crisis, the issue of which is fearful to contemplate."

When Barrère ceased, Isnard presented himself in the tribune, and said that, so soon as an individual and the country were put in the balance, he could not hesitate, and that he not only renounced his functions, but his life, if it were needful. Lanthenas followed the example of Isnard, and gave up his seat. Fauchet tendered his resignation and his life to the republic. Lanjuinais, who held that no surrender should be made, ascended the tribune, and said, "I believe that, up to this moment, I have shown sufficient energy for you not to expect any suspension or resignation from me." At these words, angry exclamations broke from the assembly. He surveyed with an undaunted eye those that interrupted him. "The sacrificer of old," said he, "as he drew his victim to the altar, decorated it with flowers and garlands, and assuredly goaded it not. You ask the sacrifice of our powers, but sacrifices ought to be free, and we are not free. We cannot leave this hall by the usual avenues, or even throw ourselves from the windows; the guns are pointed upon us, all expression of our sentiments is interdicted, and I am silent."

Barbaroux succeeded Lanjuinais, and refused, with equal courage, the resignation demanded from him. "If the convention," said he, "ordain my expulsion, I will submit; but how can I divest myself of my powers, when several departments write to me with an assurance that I have employed them beneficially and with urgent entreaties to continue so to employ them? I have sworn to die at my post, and I will keep my word." Dusaulx appeared, and offered his resignation. "What!" exclaimed Marat, "are criminals to be allowed the honour of patriotic devotion? A man must be pure to offer sacrifices to the country; it is for me, a true martyr, to devote myself. Thus I offer my suspension from the moment you have ordered the arrest of the accused deputies. But," he added, "the list is badly framed; instead of the old dotard Dusaulx, of the weak-headed Lanthenas, and of Ducos, guilty only of some erroneous opinions, there ought to be substituted Fermont and Valazé, who well deserve to be upon it, and are not."

At this moment a loud noise was heard at the door of the hall. Lacroix entered in visible agitation, vociferating with vehemence. Advancing, he stated it was too true the convention was no longer free; he had wished to leave the hall, and egress had been denied him. Although a Mountaineer and an advocate for the arrest of the twenty-two deputies, Lacroix was indignant at the assumption of the commune in thus confining the representatives of the people.

Since the refusal to proceed upon the petition of the commune, the word had been passed at all the doors

not to allow a single deputy to emerge. Several had fruitlessly attempted to escape; Gorsas alone had succeeded in outwitting the guards, and hastened to the residence of Meilhan, to entreat the Girondists there assembled to conceal themselves wherever they could, and on no account to approach the convention. All the members who struggled to get out were driven back with violence. Boissy-d'Anglas, presenting himself at a door, received most injurious treatment, and was chased into the assembly, where he held up to view his coat with an unseemly rent. The spectacle threw the whole assembly into a paroxysm of wrath, and the Mountain itself looked on with amazement. Yielding to the impulse, an immediate order was issued against the authors of the watchword, and even an illusory decree was passed, summoning the commander of the armed force to the bar.

Barrère now rose to speak, and expressed himself with an energy the more effective as it was most unusual. He said that the assembly was not free; that it sat under the yoke of concealed tyrants; that in the insurrectional committee were men for whom none could answer—suspicious foreigners, such as the Spaniard Gusman, and others; that at the door of the hall assignats for five livres were distributed to the battalions destined for La Vendée; and that it was necessary to ascertain decisively whether the convention was still respected or had lost all hold upon public opinion. In consequence, he proposed that the assembly should proceed in a body into the midst of the armed force, in order to be assured that it had nothing to apprehend, and that its authority was implicitly recognised. This proposition, previously submitted by Garat on the 25th May, and renewed by Vergniaud on the 31st, was immediately adopted. Hérault-Séchelles, whose services were always in request upon difficult emergencies, was stationed at the head of the assembly as president, and the whole of the right side and the Plain rose to follow him. The Mountain, however, gave no indication of a design to move, whereupon the ultimate deputies of the right returned, and upbraided it with evading the common danger. The people in the galleries, on the other hand, urged the Mountaineers by signs to remain in their places, as if some great peril awaited them outside. But a feeling of shame prevailed over these friendly warnings, and the Mountaineers joined their colleagues. Then the whole convention, with Hérault-Séchelles in the van, appeared in the courts of the national palace, on the side of the Carrousel. The sentinels stepped aside and allowed the assembly to pass. It came in presence of the artillery-men, at whose head stood Henriot. The president directed him to open a passage for the assembly. "You will not get out," said Henriot, "until you have surrendered the twenty-two." "Seize this rebel," said the president to the soldiers. Thereupon Henriot, reining up his horse, and addressing his artillerymen, cried, "Engineers, to your pieces!" Some one rudely seized Hérault-Séchelles by the arm, and drew him in another direction. The deputies then proceeded into the garden, to renew the experiment. Some of the groups vociferated, "The nation for ever!" others, "The convention for ever!" "Marat for ever!" "Down with the right side!" Beyond the garden, certain battalions, otherwise disposed than those surrounding the Carrousel, made signs to the deputies to come and join them. The convention, with the view of doing so, advanced to the Turning-Bridge, but was there met by a battalion which sternly refused it egress from the garden. At this moment, Marat, followed by a group of children shouting "Marat for ever!" approached the president, and exclaimed, "I summon the deputies who have abandoned their duty to return to it."

And the assembly, which by these repeated trials did but prolong its humiliation, re-entered in fact the hall of its sessions, and each member dejectedly resumed his seat. Couthon mounted the tribune. "You have had demonstration," said he, with an effrontery which confounded the assembly, "that you are respected and obeyed by the people; you have seen that you are free, and can vote upon the question submitted to you. Hasten, then, to satisfy the hopes of the people." Legendre proposed to expunge the names of those who had offered their resignation from the list of the twenty-two, and likewise to except from the list of the twelve Boyer-Fonfrède and Saint-Martin, who had opposed the arbitrary arrests. He proposed to replace them by Lebrun and Clavière. Marat again insisted upon Lanthenas, Ducos, and Dusaulx being erased from the proscription, and Fermont and Valazé added to it. These amendments were adopted, and the whole decree was ready for the final vote. The intimidated Plain began to mutter that, after all, the deputies placed under arrest at their own houses would have not so much to complain of; and that it was absolutely necessary to bring the present frightful scene to a conclusion. The right side demanded that the convention be called over, in order to make the members of the *Belly* feel the ignominy of their pusillanimity; but one of them supplied his colleagues with a specious mode of escaping so painful an exposure. He refused to vote, on the allegation that he was not free. The others followed his example, and adhered to the like declaration. Whereupon the Mountain and a few other members decreed the arrest of the deputies denounced by the commune.

Such was the celebrated catastrophe of the 2d June, better known under the name of the 31st May. It was an actual 10th of August against the national representation; for the deputies being once under arrest at their own residences, one step more led them to the scaffold, and that was of easy accomplishment. It finished a principal era of the revolution, which served as a state of transition to the most terrible and astounding of all, and whereof we must needs retrace the principal features fully to appreciate its character.

On the 10th August, the revolution, goaded by irresistible distrust, assailed the palace of the monarch, to free itself from fears become insupportable. The first idea entertained was to suspend Louis XVI., and postpone his ultimate fate until the meeting of a national convention. The monarch being suspended, and power vested in the hands of different popular authorities, there arose the material question how this power was to be employed. Then the divisions, which had already manifested themselves between the partisans of moderation and those of inexorable energy, broke forth without reserve; the commune, composed of uncompromising zealots, attacked the legislature, and insulted it with threats of the tocsin. At this moment, the European coalition, stimulated by the 10th August, hastened to advance; the danger increasing, provoked more and more to violence, exposed moderation to obloquy, and stirred the passions to the height of frenzy. Longwy and Verdun fell into the possession of the enemy. The approach of Brunswick precipitated the atrocities he himself announced in his manifestos; and his concealed partisans were struck with terror by the horrible days of September. Thereafter, saved by the incomparable fortitude of Dumouriez, France had again leisure to agitate that momentous question of the moderate or merciless exercise of power. September became the exulting topic of invective to the indignant moderates; the violent desired that a veil should be dropped over evils which they held inevitable and irreparable. Bitter personalities soon added individual animosities to differences of opinion, and discord attained its highest pitch. Then arrived the moment for deciding on the fate of Louis XVI. On his person the two systems came into direct collision; that of moderation was vanquished, that of violence gained supremacy; and, in the king's immolation, the revolution broke definitively with royalty and with all thrones.

The coalition, exasperated by the 21st of January,

as it had already been by the 10th August, again took the offensive and gained several advantages. Dumouriez, impeded in his progress by adverse circumstances, and by the disorder in all the war departments, was moved with anger against the Jacobins, to whom he imputed his reverses, threw aside his political indifference, declared all at once for moderation, compromised its cause by employing his sword and foreigners for its advancement, and finally sunk in his efforts against the revolution, after placing the republic in the greatest peril. At this identical moment, La Vendée rose; the departments, all moderate, assumed a threatening posture; never had the danger seemed greater for the revolution. Reverses and treason furnished the Jacobins with pretexts for calumniating the moderate republicans, and demanding a judicial and executive dictatorship. They proposed the expedients of a revolutionary tribunal and a committee of public welfare. Vehement disputes ensued on these topics. The two parties fought with desperation on these questions, and it became impossible for them longer to subsist in common. On the 10th March, the Jacobins essayed to smite the heads of the Girondists, but their attempt, ill-contrived and premature, miscarried. Then they prepared their plans better; they instigated petitions, stirred up the sections, and organised insurrection under legal sanctions. The Girondists resisted by instituting a commission empowered to take measures against the plots of their adversaries. This commission proceeded against the Jacobins, excited them to fury, and was swept away in a storm. Re-installed the following day, it was finally engulfed in the horrible turmoil of the 31st May. Lastly, on the 2d June, its members and the deputies it was appointed to defend were torn from the sanctuary of the national representation; and, as in the instance of Louis XVI., the decision upon their fate was postponed to an era when the violence should be sufficient to conduct them to the scaffold.*

Such was the interval between the 10th August and the 31st May. It was a long struggle between two systems on the employment of means. The ever-increasing danger rendered the contest more fierce, more envenomed; and the ingenuous deputation of the Gironde, exhausted in its indefatigable exertions to avenge the enormities of September, to prevent the catastrophe of the 21st January, and the institution of the revolutionary tribunal and the committee of public welfare, sunk when that danger had reached a point which rendered violence more urgent and moderation less admissible. Henceforth, all legality being trodden down, all reclamation stifled, in the suspension of the Girondists; and the peril becoming more terrible than ever by the insurrection to avenge the fate of the Gironde, violence pursued its course without control as without measure, and the fearful dictatorship of the revolutionary tribunal and the committee of public welfare took its full development. Now began scenes a hundred times more startling and horrible than all those that moved the indignation of the Girondists. For them history is closed; it has merely to add the recital of their heroic death. Their opposition was hazardous, their anger impolitic; they endangered the revolution, liberty, and France; they compromised moderation itself by advocating it with bitterness; and in their fall they involved all that France contained most generous and most enlightened. And yet, who would not have acted their part?—who would not have committed their faults? Is it possible, in fact, to witness the shedding of blood without an attempt at resistance—without a feeling of indignation?

* ["Thus fell the party of the Gironde—a party illustrious for great talent and lofty courage—a party which shed lustre on the new-born republic by abhorrence of cruelty, detestation of crime, disgust of anarchy, love of order, justice, and liberty—a party unhappily placed between the middle class, whose revolution it had opposed, and the multitude, whose government it repudiated. Condemned to the defensive, its inevitable lot was simply to illustrate a certain defeat by a courageous struggle and an heroic death. Its fate could be foretold with certainty; it had been driven from post to post—from the Jacobin Club by the cohorts of the Mountain; from the commune by the retirement of Pétion; from the ministry by the retreat of Roland and his colleagues; from the army by the defection of Dumouriez. Nothing remained to it but the convention; it was there it intrenched itself, there it fought, and there it succumbed. Its enemies attempted against it alternately plots and insurrections. The plots gave rise to the commission of twelve, which appeared to give a momentary advantage to the Gironde, but which only irritated its adversaries more violently. These put the people in movement, and despoiled the Girondists, first of their authority by suppressing the commission, and then of their political existence by proscribing their leaders."—*Mignet*, vol. i. p. 326.]

CHAPTER XXIII.

PROJECTS OF THE JACOBINS AFTER THE 31ST MAY.—THE GIRONDISTS EXCITE THE DEPARTMENTS AGAINST THE CONVENTION.—MILITARY EVENTS ON THE RHINE AND IN THE NORTH.—SIEGE OF MAYENCE BY THE PRUSSIANS. — ASSASSINATION OF MARAT BY CHARLOTTE CORDAY.

THE decree passed on the 2d June against the twenty-two deputies of the right side, and against the members of the commission of twelve, enacted that they should be detained at their own residences, and watched by gendarmes. Some voluntarily submitted to the decree, and constituted themselves in a state of arrest, as a proof of obedience to the law, and with the view of accelerating a trial which should demonstrate their innocence. Gensonné and Valazé could have easily escaped the vigilance of their guards, but they constantly refused to seek safety in flight. They remained prisoners with their colleagues, Guadet, Pétion, Vergniaud, Biroteau, Gardien, Boileau, Bertrand, Mollevaut, and Gommaire. Others, holding themselves relieved from submission to a law extorted by force, and despairing of justice, either withdrew from Paris, or sought concealment within it until opportunities occurred for effecting a safe retreat. Their design was to repair to the departments, with the view of exciting a movement against the capital. Those who adopted this resolution were Brissot, Gorsas, Salles, Louvet, Chambon, Buzot, Lydon, Rabaut Saint-Etienne, Lasource, Grangeneuve, Lesage, Vigée, Larivière, and Bergoing. The two ministers, Lebrun and Clavière, superseded immediately subsequent to the 2d June, were included in a warrant of arrest issued by the commune. Lebrun succeeded in evading the contemplated seizure. The same proceeding was taken against Roland, who, displaced since the 21st January, had in vain demanded an investigation of his accounts. He eluded the researches of the commune, and sought shelter at Rouen. Madame Roland, likewise an object of persecution, thought only of securing the escape of her husband; which effected, intrusting her daughter to the care of a faithful friend, she surrendered herself with noble intrepidity to the committee of her section, and was forthwith cast into prison with a multitude of other victims of the 31st May.

Exuberant joy sparkled in every eye at the club of Jacobins. Boisterous were the congratulations on the energy of the people, on their glorious conduct during the latter days, and on the overthrow of all the obstacles the right side had so pertinaciously opposed to the march of the revolution. At the same time it was not forgotten to imitate the usage after all great events, by assigning the character under which the insurrection should be presented. "The people," said Robespierre, "have confounded all their calumniators by their conduct. Eighty thousand men have been in motion for a whole week, without a single violation of the rights of property, without a drop of blood being shed; and they have thereby shown whether, as their

foes alleged, their aim was in reality to profit by the disorder for a general abandonment to pillage and murder. Their insurrection was spontaneous, because it resulted from a general conviction; and the Mountain itself, vacillating, amazed at the movement, proved sufficiently that it had not concurred in producing it. Thus has this insurrection been *purely moral* and wholly popular."

This mode of representing the event served at once to give a favourable aspect to the insurrection, cast an indirect censure upon the Mountain, which had undoubtedly exhibited hesitation on the 2d June, repel the imputation of conspiracy fastened on the leaders of the left side, and agreeably flatter the popular party, which had accomplished all, and so excellently, of itself. After this interpretation, received with acclamations by the Jacobins, and afterwards re-echoed by all the organs of the victorious party, Marat was called to account for an expression which had caused considerable excitement. As Marat rarely discerned any means of terminating revolutionary hesitations, save one, dictatorship, when he perceived symptoms of tergiversation on the 2d June, he had then, as on all other occasions, repeatedly exclaimed, "We must have a chief." Required to explain this phrase, he justified it in his own peculiar manner, and the Jacobins were speedily satisfied, content with having manifested their scruples and the severity of their republican principles. Some observations were likewise hazarded on the lukewarmness of Danton, who appeared somewhat enervated since the suppression of the committee of twelve, and whose energy, so ardent up to the 31st May, had strangely cooled by the 2d June. Danton was not present; Camille-Desmoulins, his friend, warmly defended him; and the discussion was abruptly terminated, from respect for so important a personage, and to avoid topics of too delicate a texture; for, in sooth, albeit the insurrection was consummated, it was far from being universally approved even in the victorious party. It had sufficiently transpired that the committee of public welfare, and several Mountaineers, viewed with alarm this popular act of interference. The exploit achieved, to profit by it became the essential consideration, without reviving unnecessary debates. Consequently, how to use their victory promptly and usefully was the paramount object of the conquerors.

Divers measures were necessary for the requisite consummation. To remodel the committees, all of which were filled with partisans of the right side; to monopolise through the committees the direction of affairs; to change the ministers; to set a watch upon correspondence; to stop at the post-office dangerous publications, and prevent any but well-accredited journals circulating in the provinces (for, quoth Robespierre, the liberty of the press ought to be unrestricted, doubtless, but not when endeavouring to destroy freedom); to form without further delay the revolutionary army, the enrolment whereof had been already decreed, since its intervention would be indispensable to enforce the execution of the decrees of the convention throughout the country; and to realise the forced loan of a thousand millions from the rich—such were the measures proposed and unanimously adopted by the Jacobins. But an additional measure was deemed more essential than all the others, namely, the digestion, within a week, of the republican constitution. It was important to show that the opposition of the Girondists had alone prevented the accomplishment of this great task, had been the sole impediment to France rejoicing in good laws and enjoying a charter of union around which all her sons could rally. This was the simultaneous idea of Jacobins, Cordeliers, sections, and commune.

The convention, pliant before an irresistible opinion reiterated in various forms, remodelled its committees of general safety, finance, war, legislation, &c. The committee of public welfare, which was greatly overburdened with affairs, not being yet sufficiently obnoxious to suspicion to justify an abrupt dismissal of all its members, was alone preserved intact. Lebrun was replaced in the foreign office by Deforgues, and Clavière in the ministry of finance by Destournelles. The plan of a constitution presented by Condorcet, in accordance with the views of the Girondists, was regarded as inchoate or as if not rendered, and the committee of public welfare was enjoined to submit another within eight days. Five members were added to it for this extraordinary duty. Moreover, it received an order to prepare a plan of execution for the forced loan, and a scheme of organisation for the revolutionary army.

The sittings of the convention bore a perfectly novel aspect subsequent to the 31st May. They were held in silence, and almost all the decrees were adopted without discussion. The right side, and a portion of the centre, no longer voted; they seemed, by their non-participation, to protest against all the proceedings adopted since the 2d June, and to be awaiting intelligence from the departments. Marat had conceived himself bound, in justice, to declare his own suspension, until his adversaries, the Girondists, were tried. Until then he renounced his functions, he said, and contented himself with illuminating the convention in the columns of his journal. The two deputies, Doulcet and Fonfrède of Bordeaux, alone disturbed the stillness of the assembly. The first denounced the committee of insurrection, which still continued to meet at the Evêché, and, seizing letters at the post-office, broke open their seals, and returned them thus loose to their writers, with the words stamped thereon: "*Revolution of the 31st May.*" The convention passed to the order of the day. The other, Fonfrède, a member of the commission of twelve, but excepted from the decree of arrest, because he had opposed the measures of that commission, appeared in the tribune, and demanded the execution of the decree which ordained a report upon those imprisoned within three days. This reclamation excited some tumult. "The innocence of our colleagues ought to be proved as soon as possible," said Fonfrède. "I have remained here only to vindicate it; and I warn you that an armed force is advancing from Bordeaux to avenge the outrages committed upon them." Vociferations followed the utterance of these words, the order of the day consigned Fonfrède's proposition to oblivion, and all again relapsed into profound silence. They were "*the last croakings of the toads in the quagmire*," said the Jacobins.

The menace held out by Fonfrède from the tribune was not an oratorical flourish, for not only the inhabitants of Bordeaux but of almost all the departments were ready to take up arms against the convention. Their discontent dated from a period long anterior to the 2d June; it had commenced, in fact, with the quarrels between the Girondists and the Mountaineers. It will be recollected that throughout the whole of France the municipalities and the sections were opposed. The partisans of the Mountaineer system occupied the municipalities and clubs; the moderate republicans, who desired to preserve the ordinary rules of justice even in the convulsions of the revolution, had all retreated, on the contrary, into the sections. In several towns the parties had come to an open rupture. At Marseilles the sections had despoiled the municipality of its powers, and transferred them to a *central committee*. Moreover, they had instituted a popular tribunal of their leaders, to try the patriots accused of revolutionary excesses. The commissioners Bayle and Boisset in vain annulled this committee and this tribunal; their authority was contemned, and the sections had remained in permanent insurrection against the revolution. At Lyons, the struggle had ended in the effusion of blood. Opinion was divided whether a municipal ordinance, directing the levy of a revolutionary army and a war-tax upon the rich, should be executed. The sections which refused to

acknowledge it had declared themselves in permanence; the municipality had endeavoured to dissolve them; but, aided by the departmental directory, they had resisted. On the 29th May, a general engagement was fought, notwithstanding the presence of the two commissioners of the convention, who made fruitless efforts to prevent the combat. The victorious sections, after having taken by assault the arsenal and the town-hall, had deposed the municipality, closed the Jacobin Club, where Chalier excited violent commotions, and usurped the sovereignty of Lyons. Some hundreds of the combatants fell during the conflict. The representatives, Nioche and Gauthier, remained prisoners a whole day; subsequently released, they withdrew to their colleagues Albite and Dubois-Crancé, who, like themselves, had a mission for the army of the Alps.

Such was the situation of Lyons and the south during the last days of May. Bordeaux presented a not more cheering aspect. That town, with all those of the west, Brittany and Normandy, was merely waiting, before entering upon action, until the threats, so long repeated against the provincial deputies, should be realised. It was under these feelings that the departments learnt the events at the close of May. The occurrence of the 27th, when the commission of twelve was suppressed for the first time, had caused considerable irritation, and on all sides it was proposed to pass condemnatory resolutions upon the excesses of Paris. But the 31st May and the 2d June carried indignation to the highest pitch. Rumour, which magnifies at all times, exaggerated the facts. It was reported that thirty-two deputies had been put to death by the commune, that the public treasury had been given up to pillage, and that the brigands of Paris had seized upon all authority, which they purposed to hand over to the foreigner, to Marat, or to Orleans. Assemblies were immediately held to draw up petitions and make arrangements for assuming arms against the capital.

At this moment the fugitive deputies arrived, to relate in person what had passed, and to give additional consistence to the movements preparing on all sides. Besides those who had already escaped, several eluded the vigilance of the gendarmes; others even quitted the assembly to foment the insurrection. Gensonné, Valazé, and Vergniaud, persisted in remaining, saying, that if it were advisable a part of them should hasten to arouse the zeal of the departments, it was likewise essential that others should remain as hostages in the hands of their enemies, in order to demonstrate by a trial and at the hazard of their lives the innocence of all. Buzot, who had from the first refused submission to the decree of the 2d June, proceeded to his own department of the Eure, to stimulate a rising amongst the Normans, and thither Gorsas followed him with the like intention. Brissot betook himself to Moulins. Meilhan, who was not included in the decree of arrest, but who had given an asylum to his colleagues from the night of the 31st May to the 2d June, and Duchâtel, whom the Mountaineers called the ghost of the 21st January, because he had risen from his bed to vote in favour of Louis XVI., left the convention to stir up Brittany. Biroteau escaped from the gendarmes, and went with Chasset to direct the proceedings of the Lyonnese. Rebecqui, preceding Barbaroux, who was still detained, repaired to the Bouches-du-Rhone. Rabaut Saint-Etienne speeded to Nîmes, to bring Languedoc into co-operation with the general movement against the oppressors of the convention.

On the 13th June, the department of the Eure assembled and gave the first signal of insurrection. The convention, it said, not being free, and it being the duty of all citizens to restore it to freedom, it resolved that a force of 4000 men should be raised to march upon Paris, and commissioners be sent into all the neighbouring departments, to urge them to imitate the example and organise their operations in concert. The department of the Calvados, convoked at Caen, arrested the two deputies Rome and Prieur, of the Côte-d'Or, commissioned by the convention to expedite the formation of an army on the coasts of Cherbourg. It was agreed that the departments of Normandy should congregate in an extraordinary association at Caen, to form a confederation. All the departments of Brittany, as those of the Côtes-du-Nord, Finisterre, Morbihan, Ille-et-Vilaine, Mayenne, and Loire-Inférieure, passed a similar resolution, and deputed commissioners to meet at Rennes to establish a central authority for Brittany. The departments of the Basin of the Loire, excepting those which were occupied by the Vendéans, followed the general example, and even proposed to send delegates to Bourges, to form in that town a convention composed of two deputies from each department, and to march upon Paris and destroy the usurping or coerced convention there sitting.

At Bordeaux the excitement was very great. All the constituted authorities met in general assembly, designated as the *Popular Commission of Public Welfare*, and, premising that the convention was no longer free and ought to be restored to liberty, they resolved that an armed force should be forthwith levied, and in the interim a petition be addressed to the National Convention, praying it to afford explanations, and make known the truth with respect to the days of May and June. They subsequently dispatched commissioners into all the departments, to invite them to a general coalition. Toulouse, an old parliamentary city, in which numerous partisans of the old government were concealed behind the Girondists, had already instituted a departmental force of a thousand men. Its administrations declared, in presence of the commissioners deputed to the army of the Pyrenees, that they no longer acknowledged the convention. They moreover liberated several persons who had been placed in confinement, incarcerated others accused of being Mountaineers, and openly proclaimed that they were ready to form a confederation with the departments of the South. The higher departments of the Tarn, Puy-de-Dôme, Lot-et-Garonne, Aveyron, Cantal, and Herault, followed the example of Toulouse and Bordeaux. Nîmes declared itself in a state of resistance; Marseilles prepared a petition couched in terms of vengeance, put in activity its popular tribunal, began a process against *the slayers*, and organised a force of 6000 men. At Grenoble, the sections were convoked, and their presidents, in conjunction with the constituted authorities, arrogated the possession of all powers, dispatched delegates to Lyons, and manifested an intention to arrest Dubois-Crancé and Gauthier, the commissioners of the convention to the army of the Alps. The department of the Ain adopted similar resolutions. That of Jura, which had previously levied a body of cavalry and a departmental force of 800 men, protested with animation against the authority of the convention. Lastly, at Lyons, where the sections reigned paramount since the battle of the 29th May, they both received and deputed envoys, with the view of acting in concert with Marseilles, Bordeaux, and Caen. They likewise instituted proceedings against Chalier, president of the Jacobin Club, and against several other Mountaineers. Thus there remained under the authority of the convention only the departments of the North and those comprised in the basin of the Seine. The insurgent departments amounted to sixty or seventy, and Paris, with fifteen or twenty, had to resist this imposing mass, and continue the war with all Europe.

At Paris, opinions were divided on the measures to be pursued in this crisis. The members of the committee of public welfare, Cambon, Barrère, Bréard, Treilhard, and Mathieu, well-accredited patriots, though they had disapproved of the 2d June, were desirous that the ways of conciliation should be tried. It was necessary, according to their views, to demonstrate the freedom of the convention by energetic steps

against agitators, and, instead of exasperating the departments by severe decrees, to win them back by expostulations on the fearful danger of civil war in the presence of foreign armies. Barrère submitted, in the name of the committee of public welfare, a decree altogether conceived in this spirit.

By the proposed enactment, the revolutionary committees, which had rendered themselves so formidable by their numerous arrests, were to be suppressed throughout France, or restricted to the object of their institution, the surveillance of suspected strangers; the primary assemblies were to be convoked at Paris to nominate a commander of the armed force, in lieu of Henriot, who owed his appointment merely to the insurgents; lastly, thirty deputies were to be sent into the departments as hostages. These measures appeared calculated to pacify and tranquillise the provinces. The abolition of the revolutionary committees would put an end to the inquisition in force against the suspected; the selection of a good commanding officer would ensure order in Paris; and the thirty deputies would serve at once as hostages and peacemakers. But the Mountain was in no humour to negotiate. Proudly boasting of what it called the national authority, it rejected all schemes of conciliation. Robespierre caused the project of the committee to be adjourned. Danton, again raising his voice in this perilous conjuncture, recalled the famous crises of the revolution; the dangers of September at the period of the invasion of Champagne and the capture of Verdun; the dangers of January, before the condemnation of the last king was decided; finally, the still greater dangers of April, when Dumouriez was about to march on Paris, and La Vendée raised the standard of revolt. The revolution, he said, had surmounted all these perils; it had come forth victorious from all these crises, and it would again emerge triumphantly from this the last one. "It is in the throes of their mightiest efforts," he exclaimed, "that political, like physical bodies, always seem threatened with imminent dissolution. Hark! the thunder roars, and amidst its crashes the great labour, in which the happiness of twenty-four millions of men is involved, shall be accomplished."

Danton recommended that, by a decree common to all the departments, they should be enjoined to succumb within twenty-four hours after its receipt, under pain of the ban of outlawry. The commanding voice of Danton, whose inspiriting tones were never heard in seasons of peril without arming all minds with courage, produced its accustomed effect. The convention, although it scrupled to adopt exactly the proposed measure, nevertheless passed most energetic resolutions. With respect to the 31st May and the 2d June, it declared* that the people of Paris, in its insurrection, had deserved well of the country. It decreed that the deputies who had been originally ordered into arrest at their own houses, and of whom some had taken to flight, should be transferred to prison, and there detained like ordinary prisoners; that a call of the whole convention should be made, and the absent without leave or orders unseated and replaced by substitutes; that the departmental and municipal authorities could be neither superseded nor removed from one place to another; that it was not competent for them to correspond together, and that all delegates sent from one department into another, with the design of concocting coalitions, were to be instantly seized by all good citizens, and forwarded under escort to Paris. After adopting these general measures, the convention annulled the ordinance of the department of the Eure; put under impeachment the members of the department of Calvados, who had arrested two of its commissioners; fulminated the like sentence against Buzot, the instigator of the revolt of Normandy; and intrusted two deputies, Mathieu and Treilhard, with a mission to the departments of the Gironde, Dordogne, and Lot-et-Garonne, which requested explanations before rising in insurrection. It summoned before it the authorities of Toulouse, dissolved the tribunal and central committee of Marseilles, denounced Barbaroux by especial stigma, and proclaimed the incarcerated patriots under the safeguard of the law. Lastly, it dispatched Robert Lindet to Lyons, in order to take cognisance of facts and draw up a report upon the state of that city.

These decrees, passed in quick succession before the close of June, materially damped the ardour of several departments, unsuited by habit to contend with the central authority. Intimidated and irresolute, they deemed it best to await the example which might be furnished them by departments more powerful, or more committed in the quarrel.

The administrative bodies of Normandy, animated by the presence of the deputies who had joined Buzot, to wit, Barbaroux, Guadet, Louvet, Salles, Pétion, Bergoing, Lesage, Cussy, and Kervélégan, followed up their first resolutions, and fixed upon Caen as the seat of a central committee for the departments. Those of the Eure, Calvados, and Orne, sent delegates. The departments of Brittany, which had previously congregated at Rennes, determined to effect a junction with the central association of Caen, and to appoint delegates to represent them therein. Accordingly, on the 30th June, the envoys of Morbihan, Finisterre, Côtes-du-Nord, Mayenne, Ille-et-Vilaine, and Loire-Inférieure, being united with those of Calvados, L'Eure, and L'Orne, constituted themselves *A Central Assembly of Resistance to Oppression*, promising to maintain equality and the unity and indivisibility of the republic, but swearing hatred to anarchists, and pledging themselves to use their power solely for the purpose of ensuring respect to persons and property, and upholding the sovereignty of the people. After having thus taken formal constitution, they resolved that contingents should be furnished by each department, to form a sufficient force to march upon Paris and re-establish the national representation in its integrity. Felix Wimpffen, general of the army directed to be organised along the coasts of Cherbourg, was named commander of the departmental army. He accepted the post, and forthwith assumed the new title conferred upon him. Ordered to Paris by the minister of war, he replied that but one mode of promoting peace could be effectual, namely, the revocation of all the decrees passed subsequent to the 31st May; that upon this condition the departments would fraternise with the capital; but, in the reverse alternative, he would visit Paris only at the head of sixty thousand Normans and Bretons.

At the same time that he called Wimpffen to Paris, the minister directed the dragoon regiment of La Manche, stationed in Normandy, to proceed without delay to Versailles. Upon this order transpiring, the federalists already assembled at Evreux drew up in battle array; the national guards joined them, and the road to Versailles was blocked against the dragoons. The latter, not disposed to engage in combat, undertook not to depart, and feigned to fraternise with the federalists. The officers wrote secretly to Paris that they could not obey the minister without commencing a civil war. They were consequently suffered to remain.

The assembly of Caen decided that the Breton battalions, already arrived, should be marched from Caen to Evreux, as the general rendezvous of all the forces. To this point were likewise forwarded provisions, arms, munitions, and funds taken from the public repositories. Thither, too, were dispatched officers recently gained to the cause of federalism, and numbers of concealed royalists, who eagerly participated in all commotions, and assumed the mask of republicanism to oppose the revolution. Amongst the counter-revolutionists of this class, was the well-known Puisaye,

* Decree of the 13th June.

who affected a prodigious zeal for the cause of the Girondists, and whom Wimpffen, himself a disguised royalist, named general of brigade, and intrusted with the command of the advanced guard collected at Evreux. This advanced guard might amount to five or six thousand men, and was daily increased by fresh contingents. The brave Bretons hastened from all parts, and announced that other battalions were following them in greater force. They were prevented from mustering more rapidly by the necessity of guarding the coasts of the sea from the English fleets, and of detaching battalions against the Vendéans, who already touched upon the Loire, and seemed preparing to cross it. Although the Bretons of the rural districts were blindly devoted to the clergy, those of the towns were sincere republicans, and, even when combating Paris, they were not the less disposed to continue an obstinate war against La Vendée.

Such was the situation of affairs in Brittany and Normandy at the commencement of July. In the neighbouring departments of the Loire, zeal had greatly slackened. Certain commissioners of the convention, who were opportunely in the district for the purpose of directing the new levies on La Vendée, had induced the administrative bodies to await further events before finally compromising themselves. Consequently, all idea in those quarters of sending delegates to Bourges was given up for the moment, and a studied reserve succeeded the first evanescent impetuosity.

At Bordeaux the insurrection was steady and energetic. The deputies Treilhard and Mathieu were closely watched upon their arrival, and it was even debated to arrest them as hostages; however, without proceeding to that extremity, they were ordered to appear before the popular commission, where the citizens, who viewed them as *Maratist* envoys, extended to them but an untoward reception. They were interrogated as to the events that had occurred at Paris; and after hearing them, the commission resolved that, even according to their own statement, the convention had not been free on the 2d June, nor ever had been so since that period; that they were themselves but the envoys of an assembly without a legal character, wherefore they had simply, with all expedient dispatch, to betake themselves forth the department. They were thereupon formally reconducted to the limits of the province, and the Bordelese were left at liberty to mature plans similar to those that had been already acted upon at Caen. They prepared stores of provisions and arms, appropriated the public funds, and sent forward an advanced guard to Langon, to await the main body, which was appointed to start within a few days. These occurrences passed also during the latter days of June and the first of July.

The deputies Mathieu and Treilhard, experiencing less resistance and a somewhat more favourable appreciation in the departments of the Dordogne, Vienne, and Lot-et-Garonne, succeeded in allaying the ferment to a certain extent, and by their conciliatory manners prevented an immediate resort to hostilities, thereby gaining time, which was of infinite service to the convention. But in the higher departments, in the mountains of the Upper Loire and on their further flanks, in L'Herault and Le Gard, all along the banks of the Rhone, the insurrection was general. Le Gard and L'Herault put their battalions in motion, and sent them to the Pont-Saint-Esprit, to occupy the passage of the Rhone, and effect a junction with the Marseillese, who were to ascend that river. The latter, refusing all obedience to the decrees of the convention, had persisted in maintaining their tribunal, continued under confinement the arrested patriots, and even commenced a series of executions. They formed an army of 6000 men, which, advancing from Aix to Avignon, and then uniting with the Languedocians collected at the Pont-Saint-Esprit, was intended to stir up on its march the districts along the Rhone, the Isère, and the Drôme, and finally coalesce with the Mountaineers of the Ain and Jura. At Grenoble, the federalised administrations contended against Dubois-Crancé, and even held out threats of arrest. Not yet venturing to levy troops, they had simply dispatched envoys to fraternise with Lyons. Dubois-Crancé, with the disorganised army of the Alps, found himself in the midst of a half-revolted city, which intimated to him daily the significant hint that the south could very easily dispense with the north. He had, moreover, to guard Savoy, where the illusions originally inspired by liberty and French dominion were dissipated, where constant murmurs were raised against the levies of men and the issue of assignats, and where nothing was understood of that revolution, so convulsive and so different from what had been at first imagined. On his flanks he had Switzerland, in which the emigrants kept up a busy agitation, and where Berne was again contemplating the occupation of Geneva by a garrison, and in his rear he had Lyons, which intercepted his correspondence with the committee of public welfare.

At Lyons, Robert Lindet had been indeed received, but in his very presence the federalist oath had been solemnly administered:—"THE UNITY AND INDIVISIBILITY OF THE REPUBLIC, HATRED TO ANARCHISTS, AND THE NATIONAL REPRESENTATION ENTIRE." So far from sending the apprehended patriots to Paris, the proceedings instituted against them were the more diligently prosecuted. A new authority, composed of deputies of the communes and members of the constituted bodies, had been formed under the title of the *Popular and Republican Commission of Public Welfare for the Rhone and Loire.* This assembly had decreed the organisation of a departmental force, to operate in concert with the federalists of the Jura, Isère, Bouches-du-Rhone, Gironde, and Calvados. This force was already enrolled. It had likewise been determined to levy a subsidy; and there, as in the other departments, the signal alone was awaited to commence the movement. In the Jura, when intelligence arrived that the two deputies Bassal and Garnier of Troyes, commissioned to re-establish obedience towards the assembly, had collected at Dôle 1500 troops of the line, upwards of 14,000 mountaineers had taken arms and made dispositions to envelop them.

If, then, we consider the state of France at the commencement of July 1793, we shall perceive that a column issuing from Brittany and Normandy, and propelled as far as Evreux, was only a few leagues from Paris; that another was advancing from Bordeaux, which threatened to draw in its train all the departments in the basin of the Loire, still irresolute; that 6000 Marseillese, posted at Avignon, awaiting the Languedocians at the Pont-Saint-Esprit, already occupied by 800 Nîmois, were in a position to unite at Lyons with all the federalists of Grenoble, the Ain, and the Jura, and pour through Burgundy upon Paris. In the interim, until this general junction were effected, the federalists appropriated all the moneys in the public coffers, intercepted the supplies and munitions forwarded to the armies, and returned into circulation the assignats redeemed by the sale of the national domains.*

It is a remarkable circumstance, highly characteristic of the spirit of party, that both factions addressed the same reproaches and attributed the same designs to each other. The party of Paris and the Mountain upbraided the federalists with purposing to ruin the republic by dividing it, and with harbouring a scheme, in concert with the English, to establish a king, who was to be either the Duke of Orleans, Louis XVII., or the Duke of York. On the other hand, the party of the departments and federalists charged upon the Mountain an intention to effectuate a counter-revolution by anarchy, and said that Marat, Robespierre,

* Report of Cambon on the labours of the committee of public welfare, from the 10th of April to the 10th July.

Danton, were all sold to England or to Orleans. Thus on both sides, it was the republic they pretended to save, and the monarchy they professed to abhor, and its return chiefly to oppose. Such is the deplorable and ordinary infatuation of parties!

But all that we have recently sketched affords a picture of only one portion of the dangers that hung over France. The enemy within was to be dreaded solely on account of the enemy without, who had at this time become more formidable than ever. Whilst armies of Frenchmen were advancing from the extremities towards the centre, armies of foreigners were again encompassing France, and menacing it with an almost inevitable invasion. Since the battle of Neerwinden and the defection of Dumouriez, a constant series of reverses had driven the French from all their conquests and laid open the northern frontier. It will be remembered that Dampierre, being appointed general-in-chief, had rallied the army under the walls of Bouchain, and had succeeded in restoring to it a degree of organisation and courage. Luckily for the revolution, the allies, true to the methodical plan settled at the opening of the campaign, refrained from penetrating on any point, and resolved to enter France only when the King of Prussia, after taking Mayence, should be prepared to advance into the heart of the country. If amongst the generals of the coalition had sparkled a ray of genius, or if a spirit of union had cemented them, the cause of the revolution had been lost. After Neerwinden and the defection of Dumouriez, they ought to have marched forward, and given no rest to their beaten, divided, and betrayed foes; and, whether they had made the French prisoners, or driven them into their strongholds, the country would have remained open to their victorious hosts. But the allies thought fit to hold a congress at Antwerp, in order with due deliberation to regulate the ulterior operations of the war. To the Duke of York, the Prince of Cobourg, the Prince of Orange, and divers generals, was left the important decision upon the course it behoved the allies to take. And they resolved to beleaguer Condé and Valenciennes, in order to give the house of Austria additional fortresses in the Low Countries, and to seize upon Dunkirk, to gratify England with so desirable a port upon the continent. These stipulations entered into, operations were resumed. The English and Dutch arrived in line. The Duke of York commanded 20,000 Austrians and Hanoverians, the Prince of Orange 15,000 Dutchmen, and the Prince of Cobourg 45,000 Austrians and 8000 Hessians. The Prince of Hohenlohe occupied Namur and Luxumbourg with 30,000 Austrians, and connected the allied army in the Low Countries with the Prussian army employed in the siege of Mayence. Thus from 80,000 to 90,000 men menaced the north.

The allies lost no time in forming the blockade of Condé, and to raise that blockade became an object of the greatest ambition to the French government. Dampierre, distrustful of his soldiers, scrupled to attack the formidable masses of the enemy. But, goaded by the commissioners of the convention, he drew his army to the camp of Famars under Valenciennes, and on the 1st of May attacked in several columns the Austrians, intrenched in the woods of Vicogne and Saint-Amant. Military combinations were still conceived in a timid spirit at that time; to compose a mass, seize the weak point of the enemy, and vigorously assault it, were tactics unknown to both sides. Dampierre threw himself with signal valour, but in small bodies, upon an enemy who was himself divided, and whom it would have been easy to overwhelm on any given point. Chastised for his blunder, he was repulsed after an obstinate engagement. On the 9th May he renewed the attack, on which occasion his forces were less scattered than before; but his wary antagonists were likewise more compact, and whilst he was making heroic efforts to ensure the capture of a redoubt, which stood an obstacle to the junction of two of his columns, he was struck by a cannon-ball and mortally wounded. General Lamarche, succeeding provisionally to the command, ordered a retreat, and led back the army into the camp of Famars.

This camp of Famars, being situated beneath the walls of Valenciennes and connected with that fortress, prevented its being besieged. The allies determined to attack it on the 23d May. They subdivided their troops according to their wonted method, uselessly diverting corps upon a multitude of points which Austrian prudence deemed it expedient to guard, and assaulting the camp with a less force than a more skilful adversary would have deployed. Kept in check a whole day by the artillery, the pride of the French army, they did not effect the passage of the Ronelle, which defended the front of the camp, until the evening. Lamarche decamped during the night in good order, and proceeded to plant himself in the camp of Cæsar, which was connected with the fastness of Bouchain, as that of Famars with Valenciennes. Here again the allies ought to have pursued and dispersed the French; but narrow-sighted selfishness and methodical precision fixed the imperialists around Valenciennes. A part of their army, disposed as a corps of observation, was posted between Valenciennes and Bouchain, and fronted Cæsar's camp. Another division undertook the siege of Valenciennes, and the remnant continued the blockade of Condé, which was greatly straitened for food, and the reduction whereof was confidently anticipated within a few days. The siege of Valenciennes was commenced in regular form. One hundred and eighty pieces of ordnance were sent from Vienna, and one hundred others from Holland; ninety-three mortars were already on the spot. Thus, during June and July, Condé was exposed to starvation, Valenciennes was laid in ashes, and the French generals occupied Cæsar's camp with a defeated, dispirited, and disorganised army. The most gloomy prognostications were coupled with the fall of those two frontier bulwarks, Condé and Valenciennes.

The army of the Moselle, forming the connecting link between the army of the north and that of the Rhine, had passed under the orders of Ligneville, upon the nomination of Beurnonville to the ministry of war. That general found himself in presence of the Prince of Hohenlohe, from whom he had little to dread, inasmuch as that personage, occupying at once Namur, Luxumbourg, and Treves, with 30,000 men at the utmost, and having before him the fastnesses of Metz and Thionville, was effectually debarred from attempting any dangerous enterprise. He had been recently still further crippled by a detachment of from 7000 to 8000 men sent to join the Prussian army. Thenceforth, it became both more practicable and more expedient than ever to unite the active force on the Moselle with that on the upper Rhine, to prosecute important operations.

On the Rhine, the preceding campaign had terminated at Mayence. Custine, after his absurd demonstrations around Frankfort, had been constrained to fall back and shut himself up in Mayence, where he had collected a considerable artillery, abstracted from other French fortresses, and particularly from Strasbourg. There he formed a thousand projects; sometimes he would resume the offensive, at others defend Mayence to the last, and again abandon the place altogether. He had finally resolved to maintain his possession; and his representations induced the executive council to sanction that determination. The King of Prussia thus found himself compelled to invest the town in form; and it was the resistance he encountered at this point that delayed the advance of the allies on the north.

The Prussian monarch passed the Rhine at Bacharach, a little below Mayence; Wurmser, with 15,000 Austrians and a few thousands of the corps of Condé, crossed it a little above; and the Hessian corps of Schoenfeld remained on the right bank before the

suburb of Cassel. The Prussian army was not, however, so strong as it ought to have been, according to the obligations contracted by Frederick William. Having detached a considerable corps into Poland, there remained with him only 55,000 men, including the different contingents, Hessians, Saxons, and Bavarians. Thus, reckoning the corps of imperialists under Wurmser, the 5000 or 6000 emigrants of the Prince of Condé, and the 55,000 men under the King of Prussia, the army which at this moment hovered so threateningly on the eastern frontier could certainly not muster beyond 80,000 men. The fortresses on the Rhine contained of garrison troops nearly 38,000; the active army was from 40,000 to 45,000 strong; that of the Moselle 30,000; and if these two latter had been combined under one command, and with a basis (*point d'appui*) such as that of Mayence, they might have feasibly gone in quest of the Brandenburgher, and given him adequate occupation on his own side of the Rhine.

At all events, the two French generals on the Moselle and Rhine might have acted in concert; they assuredly might have disputed, if not prevented, the passage of the river; but they in reality did nothing. In the course of the month of March, the King of Prussia crossed the Rhine without hindrance, and only encountered in his progress some advanced posts, which he easily drove back. At that particular moment, Custine was at Worms. He had not cast a thought upon defending either the banks of the Rhine or the ridges of the Vosges, which, forming a circle round Mayence, might have checked the march of the Prussians. He repaired to the scene with promptitude, but speedily took fright at the reverses experienced by his advanced guards; he concluded he had at least 150,000 men on his hands; above all, he was haunted with the idea that Wurmser, who had been directed to debouch by the Palatinate and above Mayence, was in his rear, and preparing to separate him from Alsace. He hastily demanded succours from Ligneville, who, trembling for himself, refused to detach a single regiment. Thereupon, he hesitated no longer, but moved back with the utmost precipitancy upon Landau, thence upon Weissembourg, and even thought of seeking protection under the cannon of Strasbourg. This inconceivable retreat threw open all the inlets to the Prussians, who proceeded with composure to group themselves around Mayence, and invest it on both banks.

Twenty thousand men were immured in the place; and if such a force were ample for defence, it was much too considerable for consumption, since the stores of provisions were quite inadequate to maintain so numerous a garrison. The uncertainty which attended all the military plans at that period, had prevented any measures being taken to provision the town. Fortunately, it contained two representatives of the people, Rewbel and the undaunted Merlin de Thionville, the generals Kléber, Aubert-Debayet, and Meunier (of the engineers); and, lastly, a garrison signally endowed with all martial virtues—valour, sobriety, and fortitude. The investment was completed in April. General Kalkreuth conducted the siege with a Prussian corps. The King of Prussia and Wurmser rested in observation at the foot of the Vosges, and presented a front to Custine. The garrison made repeated sallies, and extended to a great distance its scope of defence. The French government, sensible too late of the fault it had committed in separating the two armies of the Moselle and Rhine, now united them under Custine. That general, having from 60,000 to 70,000 men at his disposal, with the Austrians and Prussians lying dispersed before him, and beyond them Mayence, defended by 20,000 intrepid Frenchmen, never dreamt, it would seem, of bearing down in a concentrated mass upon the corps of observation, scattering it before him, and bearing succour to the brave garrison stretching out its arms to him in vain. About the middle of May, it is true, becoming aware of the perilous consequences of his inaction, he made an abortive, ill-combined, ill-sustained attempt, which ultimately degenerated into a complete rout. According to his approved method, he threw the blame upon his subordinates, and was transferred to the army of the north, to restore organisation and courage to the troops intrenched in Cæsar's camp. Thus the coalition, left to prosecute the sieges of Valenciennes and Mayence, might, after the capture of those two fortresses, advance towards the centre of France, and accomplish without serious impediment the long-projected invasion.

From the Rhine to the Alps and the Pyrenees a series of revolts threatened the rear of the French armies, and interrupted their communications. The Vosges, Jura, Auvergne, and Lozère, form from the Rhine to the Pyrenees an almost continuous chain of mountains, of different height and compass. Mountainous districts are invariably, touching their institutions, manners, and customs, regions of conservatism. In almost all those we have just mentioned, the population retained a lingering attachment for its former mode of life, and, without being so fanatical as in La Vendée, it was sufficiently disposed to take up arms against the present rulers of France. The Vosges, nearly half German, were agitated by nobles and priests, and manifested intentions the more hostile as the army of the Rhine swerved from its positions. The Jura was wholly insurgent in the cause of the Girondists; and if in its revolt it evinced a decided zeal for liberty, it was not on that account the less dangerous, seeing that from fifteen to twenty thousand of its mountaineers were collected around Lons-le-Saulnier, in connexion with the insurrectionists of the Ain and Rhone. We have already sketched the state of Lyons. The mountains of Lozère, which separate the Upper Loire from the Rhone, were filled with insurgents of similar character to the Vendéans. Commanded by a member of the first Constituent Assembly, named Charrier, they amounted to nearly 30,000 fighting men, and might by the Loire effect a junction with La Vendée. After them were the federalist insurgents of the south. Thus, extensive revolts, differing in aim and principles, but all equally formidable, threatened the rears of the armies of the Rhine, the Alps, and the Pyrences.

Upon the line of the Alps, the Piedmontese were in arms, coveting the resumption of Savoy and the county of Nice. The snow delayed the commencement of hostilities along the Saint-Bernard, and each army kept its posts in the three valleys of Sallenche, La Tarentaise, and La Maurienne. In the Maritime Alps, and to the army designated "of Italy," it chanced otherwise. Hostilities in that direction had been early resumed, and during the month of May the contest for the important post of Saorgio, on which depended the tranquil possession of Nice, had been renewed. The occupancy of this post, in fact, would have rendered the French masters of the Col-de-Tende, and given them the command of the great chain. Consequently, the Piedmontese had displayed as much energy in defending it as the latter in attacking it. They had, as well in Savoy as in the direction of Nice, 40,000 men reinforced by 8000 Austrian auxiliaries. Their troops, dispersed in several divisions of equal force, from the Col-de-Tende to the Great Saint-Bernard, had pursued, like all the forces of the allies, the system of cordons, and scrupulously guarded all the valleys. The French army of Italy was in the most deplorable condition. Composed of 15,000 men at the utmost, destitute of every necessary, and unskilfully commanded, any great efforts on its part were quite impossible. General Biron, who had appeared at its head for a brief interval, strengthened it with 5000 recruits, but failed in providing it with the still more essential matter of supplies. Had some grand conception been started in the south, such as

had lacked so signally in the north, the ruin of France would have been with equal certainty accomplished on that side. The Piedmontese might with ease, under favour of the snows which paralysed all action on the High Alps, have transported all their forces to the southern Alps, and, debouching on Nice with a mass of 30,000 men, have fallen irresistibly on the dilapidated army of Italy, driven it back on the insurgent departments, completely scattered it, stimulated the movements on both banks of the Rhone, advanced possibly even to Grenoble and Lyons, taken in the rear the army entangled in the valleys of Savoy, and thus overrun the whole of that portion of France. But, in truth, they could no more boast a Victor-Amadeus amongst them, than the Austrians a Eugene or the English a Marlborough. So they contented themselves with defending Saorgio.

Brunet, who succeeded Anselme, had, with regard to this post of Saorgio, made efforts similar to those which had illustrated the close of Dampierre's career before Condé. After several fruitless and sanguinary conflicts, a decisive action was fought on the 12th June, which ended in a total overthrow. Then again, if the enemy had derived a portion of boldness from his success, he had a fair opportunity of dispersing the French, and forcing them to evacuate Nice and repass the Var. Kellermann hastened on the intelligence from his head-quarters in the Alps, rallied the army in the camp of Donjon, fixed its defensive positions, and ordered absolute inaction until a reinforcement should arrive. The situation of this army was rendered additionally critical at this moment by the appearance in the Mediterranean of the English Admiral Hood, who had put out from Gibraltar with thirty-seven sail, and of Admiral Langara, who had ventured from the Spanish ports with a flotilla of nearly equal strength. Troops disembarked from these squadrons might readily occupy the line of the Var, and take the French on their rear quarters. The cruising of the fleets, moreover, prevented supplies being forwarded by sea, encouraged the rebels in the south, and stimulated Corsica to throw itself into the arms of the English. The French fleets were in Toulon, repairing the damage sustained in the ill-fated expedition to Sardinia, and scarcely ventured to protect the coasters bringing corn from Italy. The Mediterranean ceased to recognise French predominance, and the valuable commerce of the Levant passed from Marseilles to the Greeks and English. Thus, then, the army of Italy had in front the Piedmontese, victorious in several conflicts, and in rear the revolted south and two hostile squadrons.

In the Pyrenees, the war with Spain, declared on the 7th March as a sequel to the death of Louis XVI., had scarcely as yet commenced. The preparations had been tardy on both sides, for Spain, slow, lethargic, and miserably administered, was unfitted to act with promptitude, and France had almost as many enemies on her hands as she could well attend to. Servan, nominated to the command in the Pyrenees, had occupied several months in organising his army, inveighing the while against Pache with such bitterness as Dumouriez had not exceeded. Circumstances had not improved, it would seem, under the auspices of Bouchotte; for, when the campaign was about to open, the general was still loud in his complaints against the minister, who, he alleged, left him in total destitution. France and Spain communicate at two points, Perpignan and Bayonne. To throw an invading corps upon Bayonne and Bordeaux, and so touch La Vendée, was too bold a scheme for that period; besides, the Spanish generals gave the French credit for more powerful means of resistance in that quarter than they actually possessed. In fact, they must have crossed the Landes, Garonne, and Dordogne, obstacles sufficiently formidable to scare them from the project, even had it entered their comprehension. The court of Madrid preferred an attack by Perpignan for several reasons. On that side it had a more solid basis in fortified towns; it relied on the royalists of the south, according to the flattering assurances of the emigrants, and, lastly, it had not entirely forgotten its old pretensions on Roussillon. Accordingly, 4000 or 5000 men being left to guard Arragon, and 15,000 or 18,000, half regulars and half militia, being planted in the Western Pyrenees under General Caro, General Ricardos was dispatched, with 24,000 men, to make a serious attack on Roussillon.

Two principal valleys, that of the Tech and that of the Tet, protrude from the chain of the Pyrenees, and, expanding towards Perpignan, form the first defensive lines on the French side. On the second of these lines, that of the Tet, Perpignan is situated. Ricardos, apprised of the weakness of the French, began by a bold idea. He masked the forts Bellegarde and Les Bains, situated on the first line, and rapidly advanced, with the design of reducing all the detachments scattered in the valleys to lay down their arms, by passing beyond them. The attempt almost answered his expectations. He debouched on the 15th April, repulsed the detachments sent to stop him under General Villot, and spread consternation along the whole frontier. By pushing forward with 10,000 men, he had rendered himself master of Perpignan, but he lacked the requisite daring; besides, all his preparations were not made, and he left the French time to recover from their first surprise.

The command on the French frontier, appearing too extensive for one person, was divided. Servan had the Western Pyrenees assigned to him, and General Deflers, who has been favourably mentioned in the expedition to Holland, the Eastern Pyrenees. The latter rallied the army in front of Perpignan, in a position called the *Mas d'Eu*. On the 19th May, Ricardos, having then under his command 18,000 men, assaulted the French camp. An obstinate and bloody combat ensued. The brave General Dagobert, retaining in advanced age all the fire of youth, and uniting sound judgment with his courage, succeeded in maintaining himself on the field of battle. Deflers came up with 1800 men of the reserve, and the ground was preserved. The close of day was at hand, and appearances were in favour of an auspicious termination of the strife, when the French soldiers, exhausted with fatigue, suddenly abandoned their positions, and retreated in disorder under Perpignan. The garrison, in alarm, shut the gates and fired upon the troops, whom it mistook for Spaniards. Here another opportunity was presented for falling boldly upon Perpignan and gaining possession of that fortress, which would have offered but a feeble resistance; but Ricardos, who had merely masked Bellegarde and Les Bains, deemed he had carried his daring to its legitimate limits, and returned to invest in form those two petty forts. He captured them towards the end of June, and then again advanced upon the French troops, which occupied very nearly the same positions as before. Thus, on the side of the Pyrenees, at the beginning of July, the fate of Roussillon hung on the issue of a battle.

Emerging upon another theatre of war, more sanguinary and terrible than any we have hitherto described, we shall find an augmentation of its horrors and calamities. La Vendée, vomiting fire and blood, was about to project a formidable column beyond the Loire. When we last traced that scene of hostility, we left the Vendéans flushed with unexpected successes, masters of the town of Thouars, which they had wrested from Quétineau, and contemplating more important enterprises. Instead of marching on Doué and Saumur, they had swept to the south of the theatre of war, designing to dislodge their enemies from the country in the direction of Fontenay and Niort. Lescure and Larochejacquelein, charged with this expedition, marched upon Fontenay towards the middle of May. At first, repulsed by General Sandos, they fell back some distance; but, speedily profiting

by the blind confidence with which his first success had inspired the republican officer, they reappeared in a swarm of from 15,000 to 20,000 fighting men, carried Fontenay, despite the efforts of the young and valiant Marceau in the defence, and obliged Chalbos and Sandos to retire in the greatest disorder to Niort. The Vendéans found in Fontenay arms and munitions in great abundance, and they fortified themselves with additional resources, which, joined to those they had gathered at Thouars, enabled them to push the war with increased hopes of success. Lescure published a proclamation to the inhabitants, in which he held out terrible denunciations against those who should extend aid to the republicans. After which, the Vendéans separated, according to their usual custom, in order to superintend the labours of harvest; and a rendezvous was fixed for the 1st of June in the vicinity of Doué.

In the Lower Vendée, where Charette held the sole command, and had not yet connected his movements with those of the other chiefs, the successes had been balanced. Canclaux, commanding at Nantes, had maintained his position at Machecoul, but with difficulty. General Boulard, who was at the head of the troops in Sables, owing to his excellent dispositions and the discipline of his army, had occupied the Lower Vendée for two months, and even pushed his advanced posts to the very environs of Palluau. On the 17th May, however, he was obliged to retreat to La Motte-Achart, in the immediate vicinity of Sables, and he there found himself in the greatest embarrassment, because his two best battalions, entirely composed of citizens of Bordeaux, determined to withdraw, either from a wish to look after their own affairs, which they had relinquished on a sudden impulse, or from discontentment with the 31st May.

The labours of the field had induced some repose in the Lower as in the Higher Vendée, and for a few days the war was intermitted, and its more active scourge deferred till the beginning of June.

General Berroyer, whose command extended originally over the whole theatre of war, had been displaced, and his province divided amongst several generals. Saumur, Niort, and Sables, were assigned to the army known as that of the coasts of Rochelle, which was intrusted to Biron; Angers, Nantes, and the Lower Loire, were comprehended in the portion of the army known as that of the coasts of Brest, which was confided to Canclaux, general at Nantes; and, lastly, the coasts of Cherbourg had been given to Wimpffen, who had since become, as we have seen, the leader of the insurgents of Calvados.

Biron, transferred from the frontier of the Rhine to that of Italy, and thence to Vendée, repaired with repugnance to that scene of devastation, where in truth his aversion to participate in the excesses of civil war eventually compromised his reputation for patriotism. He arrived on the 27th May at Niort, and found the army in frightful disorder. It was composed of recruits enrolled by compulsion, or through their own zeal, in the neighbouring districts, and confusedly cast upon La Vendée, without instruction or training, and without any supplies in store. Chiefly peasants and industrious citizens, who had left their occupations with regret, they were ready to disperse at the first untoward accident. Indeed, advantage would have accrued by sending the greater part of them back at once, for they did nothing but mischief both in towns and in the country. They were a useless incumbrance in the insurgent districts, eating up the provisions, propagating disorder, giving way to causeless panics, and often drawing into their flight organised battalions, which, if left to themselves, would have fought to better purpose. These bands all appeared with their leaders ready named in the respective localities, who styled themselves generals, boasted of their armies, refused to obey, and even opposed the dispositions of the superior officers. About the city of Orleans battalions were formed, well known in this war as "the battalions of Orleans." They were composed of clerks, shop-boys, lacqueys, and of all the youths gathered from the sections of Paris and sent at the heels of Santerre. They were amalgamated with troops drafted from the army of the north, fifty men having been detached from each battalion. But it was a difficult task to assimilate such heterogeneous materials, and equally so to find them arms and clothing. Every thing was deficient; even the pay could not be furnished, and as it was unequal between the troops of the line and the volunteers, it occasioned frequent turmoils and mutinies.

The convention dispatched commissioner upon commissioner to organise this multitude. These functionaries were to be found at Tours, Saumur, Niort, Rochelle, and Nantes. They disputed with and thwarted each other, and effectually puzzled the generals. The executive council likewise maintained agents on the spot, and the minister Bouchotte had inundated the country with his emissaries, all chosen from amongst the Jacobins and Cordeliers. These latter exercised conflicting powers as against the representatives, deemed it an exhibition of zeal to exhaust a district with requisitions, and accused of despotism and treason the generals who endeavoured to check the insubordination of the troops, or prevent useless vexations. From this conflict of authorities there resulted multitudinous accusations and recriminations, and an inextricable confusion in the issuing of orders. Biron found it hopeless to expect obedience, and he dared not put his army in motion lest it should disband at the first shock, or pillage right and left on its march. Such is a faithful picture of the forces which the republic had at that period in La Vendée.

Biron repaired to Tours, and arranged an eventual plan with the representatives, which consisted in marching four columns of 10,000 men each from the circumference to the centre, so soon as this confused multitude should be brought into some degree of organisation. The four points of departure were to be the Bridges of Cé, Saumur, Chinon, and Niort. In the mean time, he proceeded to visit the Lower Vendée, where he considered the danger greater than elsewhere. He was with reason apprehensive that communications would be established between the Vendéans and the English. Supplies and troops disembarked in the Marais might greatly aggravate the evil, and render the war interminable. A fleet of ten sail had been telegraphed, and it was known that the Breton emigrants had received orders to assemble in the islands of Jersey and Guernsey. Thus appearances fully justified the fears of Biron and his visit to the Lower Vendée.

Meanwhile, the Vendéans had gathered, true to their appointment, on the 1st of June. They had, since last in the field, introduced a greater degree of regularity amongst themselves, and named a council to govern the country occupied by their armies. An adventurer, who represented himself as Bishop of Agra and nuncio from the pope, presided over this council, and by his activity in blessing standards and celebrating solemn masses, he wound up the enthusiasm of the Vendéans to an extraordinary height, and thus rendered his imposture highly beneficial. They had not yet chosen a generalissimo, but each chief commanded the peasants of his own quarter, an agreement subsisting amongst them that they should act in concert in all their operations. These chiefs had issued a proclamation in the name of Louis XVII., and of the Count de Provence, as regent of the kingdom during the minority of the young prince; and they called themselves "Commanders of the royal and catholic armies." Their project at the present moment was to occupy the line of the Loire, and advance upon Doué and Saumur. The enterprise was boldly conceived, and easy of execution in the actual state of affairs. On the 7th they entered Doué, and arrived on the 9th

before Saumur. As soon as their object transpired, General Salomon, who was in Thouars with 3000 good soldiers, received orders to march upon their track. He obeyed, but found them too strong; he could not have molested them without ensuring his own destruction, so he returned to Thouars, and from Thouars to Niort. The troops at Saumur had taken post in the vicinity of the town, on the road to Fontevrault, in the intrenchments of Nantilly, and on the heights of Bournan. The Vendéans appeared, attacked the column under Berthier, were repulsed by a well-directed fire, but returned in force and drove back Berthier, who was wounded. The dismounted gendarmes, two battalions of Orleans, and the cuirassiers, still resisted. They unfortunately lost their colonel, whereupon the flight commenced, and all rushed pell-mell into the town, with the Vendéans at their heels. General Coustard, commanding the battalions planted on the heights of Bournan, still remained outside. He perceived himself separated from the republican troops, who had been driven into Saumur, and formed the daring resolution of re-entering it also, taking the Vendéans in the rear. It was necessary to cross a bridge on which the conquerors had just placed a battery. The brave Coustard ordered a corps of cuirassiers he had under his orders to charge the battery. "Where are you sending us?" said they. "To death!" replied the general; "the welfare of the republic requires it." The cuirassiers sprang forward, but the battalions of Orleans broke up and abandoned their general and the cuirassiers as they were charging the battery. The cowardice of this rabble rendered fruitless the heroism of the warriors, and Coustard, finding it impossible to penetrate into Saumur, retired to Angers.

Saumur was occupied on the 9th June, and the citadel surrendered the day after. The Vendéans, thus masters of the course of the Loire, had the option of marching on Nantes or on La Flèche, Le Mans, and Paris. Terror would have gone before them, and all had inevitably succumbed to their power. During this period, Biron was in the Lower Vendée, where, by an inspection of the coasts, he considered he was obviating dangers still more serious and substantial.

France was menaced by all these various perils simultaneously. The allies, pressing the sieges of Valenciennes, Condé, and Mayence, were on the eve of reducing those fortresses, the bulwarks of her frontiers. The Vosges in agitation, and the Jura in open revolt, afforded an easy access to invasion on the side of the Rhine. The army of Italy, shattered by the Piedmontese, had at its back the revolt of the south and the English squadrons. The Spaniards, in front of the French camp under Perpignan, threatened to carry it by an assault, and to render themselves masters of Roussillon. The insurgents of Lozère were ready to join the Vendéans along the Loire, and such was the project of the author of that revolt. The Vendéans, masters of Saumur and the course of the Loire, had only to choose their theatre, since they possessed all the means of executing the boldest incursions into the interior. Lastly, the federalists, marching from Caen, Bordeaux, and Marseilles, were preparing to stir up all the districts on their routes.

The situation of France, in the month of July 1793, was the more desperate, since on each individual point a mortal blow could be struck at her independence. The allies of the north, by neglecting the fortresses, had only to march upon Paris, and they must have driven the convention on the Loire, where it would have been received by the Vendéan rifles. The Austrians and Piedmontese were able to have executed an invasion by the Maritime Alps, extinguished the French army, and swept along the whole south as conquerors. The Spaniards might have readily advanced by Bayonne, and effected a junction with the Vendéans; or, if they preferred Roussillon, have thrown their columns boldly on the Lozère, but a short distance from the frontier, and set the south in a flame on that side. Lastly, the English, instead of cruising in the Mediterranean, had every inducement to have disembarked troops in La Vendée, and propelled them from Saumur on Paris.

But the foreign and domestic foes of the convention lacked that which assures victory in a war of revolution. The allies acted without union, and, under the boastful pretence of a *holy* war, concealed the most selfish views. The Austrians coveted Valenciennes; the King of Prussia, Mayence; the English, Dunkirk; the Piedmontese, the recovery of Chambéry and Nice; the Spaniards, the most disinterested of all, nevertheless indulged a lurking inclination for Roussillon; in fine, the English, again, were more eager to sweep the Mediterranean with their fleets, and secure a convenient port within it, than carry opportune succours to La Vendée. Besides this universal emulation for individual aggrandisement, which prevented the allies from extending their views beyond objects of immediate profit, they were all dull method and timidity in war, and defended with the antiquated military routine the antiquated political routine in behalf of which they had taken up arms.

As to the Vendéans, insurgents against the genius of the revolution, from which their simple and contracted minds revolted, they fought as valiant riflemen, but without comprehensive views. The federalists, distributed over the extensive surface of the country, having to communicate at great distances in order to concert their operations, rising with hesitation and secret dread against the central authority, and animated by but lukewarm passions, could scarcely act otherwise than with tardiness and vacillation. Moreover, they inwardly reproached themselves with endangering their country by a culpable diversion. They began to feel that it was criminal to discuss whether a man should be a revolutionist after Pétion and Vergniaud, or after Robespierre and Danton, at a moment when all Europe was assailing their native land; and they perceived that, in such an emergency, there was only one expedient course of action, namely, the most energetic. Already, in fact, the various factions starting up around them warned them of their folly. It was not alone the old Constituents, but the agents of the extinguished court, the sectaries of the church, all the partisans, in short, of absolute power, who arose at once; and it became obvious to their understandings, that all further opposition to the revolution would inevitably tend to the advantage of the enemies of all liberty and nationality.

Such were the causes that rendered the allies so shortsighted and timid, the Vendéans so confined and stunted, the federalists so uncertain, and the ultimate triumph of the convention over the internal rebels and over Europe so sure. The Mountaineers alone, animated by an absorbing passion, one sole idea, the safety of the revolution, and invigorated by that exaltation of mind which discovers resources in the moments of peril, detecting means novel and daring, never deeming them too hazardous, unscrupulous, or costly, if they be salutary, were appointed to disconcert, by an unexpected and sublime defence, enemies slow, formal, and loosely cemented, and crush factions which were labouring for behoof of the old order of things in various degrees, for the revolution in like variety, and bound together by no common tie or distinct determinate aim.*

* ["For all the advantages they gained, the convention were indebted to the energy of their measures, the ability of their counsels, and the enthusiasm of their subjects. If history has nothing to show comparable to the crimes they committed, it has few similar instances of undaunted resolution to commemorate. Impartial justice requires that this praise should be bestowed on the committee of public safety; if the cruelty of their internal administration exceeded the worst despotism of the emperors, the dignity of their external conduct rivalled the noblest instances of Roman heroism."—*Alison's History of Europe.*]

The convention, amidst the extraordinary circumstances in which it was placed, gave way to no emotion of despondency. Whilst the fortified places or intrenched camps checked for a time the enemies upon the different frontiers, the committee of public welfare devoted every hour of the day to the duties of re-organising the armies, completing them by means of the levy of 300,000 men decreed in March, forwarding instructions to the generals, and expediting funds and supplies. It negotiated with all the local administrations which evinced an intention of retaining, for behoof of the federalist cause, the stores destined for the armies, and succeeded in persuading them to desist, upon the all-sufficient motive of public safety.

Whilst such expedients were employed with regard to the external enemy, the convention pursued measures not less efficacious against its internal adversaries. The best resource against an antagonist who is doubtful of his rights and power, is to assume a full self-consciousness of legitimacy and might. It was thus the convention acted. We have already mentioned the energetic decrees it had passed on the first intelligence of disaffection. Several towns having failed in immediate submission, not for an instant was the idea entertained of treating, in a spirit of concession, with those whose proceedings took the decided character of rebellion. The Lyonnese having firmly refused to obey, and to send the apprehended patriots to Paris, it ordered its commissioners attendant upon the army of the Alps to employ force, without heeding the difficulties or the dangers those commissioners were incurring at Grenoble, where they had the Piedmontese in front, and all the insurgents of the Isère and Rhone in their rear. It also enjoined them to make Marseilles return to its duty. It allowed only three days for all the administrations to retract their equivocal resolutions; and, lastly, it sent to Vernon certain gendarmes and a few thousands of the Parisian citizens, in order promptly to put down the insurgents of the Calvados, who were nearest in position to the capital.

The great instrument of the constitution was not neglected; and eight days sufficed to accomplish that work, which was intended rather as a centre of union and attraction than a substantial plan of legislation. It had been chiefly composed by Hérault Séchelles. According to the scheme propounded, every Frenchman, twenty-one years of age, was a citizen, and capable of exercising political rights, without any qualification of fortune or property. The citizens being assembled together, were to nominate a deputy for every fifty thousand souls. The deputies, composing a single chamber, could only sit one year. They were to frame decrees for all that might concern the pressing exigencies of the state, and such decrees were to be of immediate efficacy. They were also to make laws for all that concerned matters of general interest and of minor urgency; but such laws became obligatory only if within a given period the primary assemblies lodged no reclamation. On the 1st of May in each year, the primary assemblies were to meet, of right and without convocation, to renew the deputation. The primary assemblies might demand conventions to modify the constitutional act. The executive power was to be intrusted to twenty-four members named by electors, and this was the only indirect election. The primary assemblies were to name electors, which electors nominated candidates, and the legislative body reduced by elimination these candidates to twenty-four. These twenty-four members of council were to choose the generals, ministers, and agents of all kinds, selecting them forth their own body. They were to direct and superintend them, and always to remain responsible. The executive council was to be renewed as to half its members every year. Lastly, this very brief and democratic constitution, in which the government was reduced to a mere temporary delegation, respected a solitary vestige of the former system, the communes, altering neither their functions nor the extent of their jurisdiction. The energy they had so often displayed ensured their retention on this planed tablet, this *tabula rasa*, where not a trace of the past was to be found. Almost without discussion, and in the course of a few days, this constitution was adopted;* and at the moment the whole measure was finally voted, a salvo of cannon reverberated through Paris, and exclamations of joy and rapture broke forth in all quarters. Thousands of copies were printed and distributed throughout the whole of France. The only opposition it encountered was on the part of certain of the agitators who had been instrumental in preparing the 31st of May.

The reader will probably remember one Varlet, vociferating in public thoroughfares; one Leclerc, a Lyonnese, so violent in his harangues at the Jacobin Club as to be even suspected by Marat for his frantic ebullitions; and one Jacques Roux, so morose to the unfortunate Louis XVI., when he would have confided his last testament to his keeping: well, all these men had signalised themselves in the last insurrection, and now exercised great influence in the committee of the Evêché and in the club of Cordeliers. They were dissatisfied that the constitution contained no stringent provision against forestallers; wherefore they drew up a petition, got it signed in the streets, and then flew to arouse the Cordeliers, exclaiming that the constitution was incomplete, since it pronounced no pains or penalties upon the worst enemies of the people. Legendre vainly strove to resist this movement; he was stigmatised as a moderate; and the petition, being adopted by the society, was presented in its name to the convention. The Mountain murmured indignantly upon its being brought to the bar; and Robespierre and Collot d'Herbois inveighed with warmth against its terms, and eventually procured its rejection. They then repaired to the Jacobin Club, to descant upon the danger of these perfidious exaggerations, which merely tended, they said, to bewilder the people, and could only originate with men subsidised by the implacable foes of the republic. "The most popular constitution that ever existed," said Robespierre, "has just ema-

* It was decreed on the 24th June, and the scheme had been submitted on the 10th.

["Hérault de Séchelles was the legislator of the Mountain, as Condorcet was to have been of the Gironde. In a few days this new constitution was adopted in the convention, and submitted to the approval of the primary assemblies. It may be easily imagined in what spirit it was framed, with the ideas then predominant on democratic government. The Constituents passed for aristocrats: the law they had established was viewed as an infraction on the rights of the people, because it imposed conditions upon the exercise of political franchises; because it did not consecrate the most absolute equality; because it appointed deputies and magistrates to be nominated by electors, and those electors by the people; because it limited, in certain cases, the national sovereignty, excluding a portion of the active citizens from high political functions, and the purely indigent from the functions of active citizens; in fine, because, instead of fixing population as the sole basis of rights, it combined that essential in all its arrangements with a pecuniary test. The constitutional law of 1793 established the pure government of the multitude: not only did it recognise the people as the source of all power, but it likewise conferred upon them its exercise. A sovereignty without restrictions; magistracies exposed to constantly occurring changes; immediate elections, in which every individual had a concurrent voice; primary assemblies, which met without convocation, at a fixed period, to nominate representatives and control their acts; a national assembly, annually renewed, which was, properly speaking, but a committee of the primary assemblies—such was that constitution. As it called the multitude to govern, as it entirely disorganised authority, it was impracticable at any era; but it was pre-eminently so at a moment of general war. The Mountaineer party, instead of the extremest democracy, had need of the most concentrated dictatorship. The constitution was suspended as soon as made, and the revolutionary government, additionally strengthened, was maintained until the peace."—*Mignet*, vol. ii. pp. 13, 14.]

nated from an assembly formerly counter-revolutionary, but now purged of men who impeded its progress and threw obstacles before all its endeavours. At the present moment, all brightness and purity, that assembly has perfected the most estimable, the most popular work that was ever given to man; and an individual, cloaked with the pretence of patriotism, who boasts of loving the people better than we, stirs up the citizens of all grades, to show, forsooth, that a constitution, fitted to unite all France in the closest union, is unsuitable to them! Beware of such manœuvres, distrust those unfrocked priests,* the emissaries of Austria! Beware of the new mask assumed by the aristocrats! I discern fresh guilt in the future, which is perhaps not far from bursting into light; but we will at once expose it, and crush the enemies of the people under whatever form they may present themselves." Collot d'Herbois spoke with equal vehemence. He maintained that the enemies of the republic were above all things anxious to be justified in saying to the departments—"Behold, Paris approves the language of Jacques Roux!"

Unanimous acclamations greeted the two orators. The Jacobins, who piqued themselves on uniting political talent with revolutionary passion, prudence with energy, sent a deputation to the Cordeliers. Collot-d'Herbois was appointed its leader. He was received by the Cordeliers with the consideration due to one of the most renowned members of the Jacobin Club and the Mountain. For the society which had deputed him, also, profound respect was professed. The petition was retracted, Jacques Roux and Leclerc were expelled, Varlet obtained pardon solely on account of his youth, and Legendre received an apology for the somewhat unpalatable expressions wherewith he had been assailed during the previous sitting. The constitution, thus promptly vindicated, was forthwith distributed through France, to be sanctioned by the primary assemblies.

Thus the convention held out to the departments, on the one hand a constitution, and on the other a decree which left them but three days to form their decision. The constitution justified the Mountain from any selfish scheme of usurpation, and furnished a pretext for rallying round a legalised authority; the decree specifying three days allowed no time for hesitation, but imposed obedience as a matter of involuntary choice.

Several departments in fact succumbed, and others persisted in their first resolutions. But these latter, wasting time in exchanging addresses and deputations, seemed each to throw upon the other the initiative in action. Besides, the intervening distances were sad obstacles to rapid correspondence and concentration. But, above all, the lack of revolutionary fire caused that strenuous exertion and exalted capacity of drawing forth resources necessary for success, which are its attendant qualities, to lie dormant. However well inclined the masses may be, they are always repugnant to sacrifices, unless superinduced by some commanding, impassioned spirits. It would have needed violent measures, in truth, to stimulate effectually the moderate tradesmen of the boroughs, to induce them to strap on the knapsack and march, to contribute funds, and to quicken their determinations. But the Girondists, who condemned all such measures in the Mountaineers, were debarred from themselves employing them. The Bordeaux merchants thought they had performed a feat when they spoke with unusual vivacity in the sections, and they had never issued beyond their own walls. The Marseillese, somewhat more prompt, had sent 6000 men to Avignon; but they did not compose even that small army of their own citizens—they had substituted paid soldiers. The Lyonnese were awaiting the junction of the men of Provence and Languedoc; the Normans appeared a little cooled in their zeal; the Bretons alone were true to their purpose, and had of themselves filled up the ranks of their battalions.

At Caen, the main centre of the insurrection, considerable agitation prevailed. The columns which had moved from that point were the earliest destined to encounter the troops of the convention, and a first engagement was naturally anticipated with great anxiety. The proscribed deputies, congregated around Wimpffen, complained of his tardiness, and thought they detected the royalist in him. Wimpffen at length, urged on all sides, ordered Puisaye, on the 13th July, to push his advanced guard to Vernon, and intimated at the same time that he was himself on the point of marching with all his forces. Accordingly, on the 13th, Puisaye advanced towards Pacy, and fell in with the levies from Paris, accompanied by a few hundreds of gendarmes, when some shots were exchanged between the two parties in the woods. The next day, the federalists occupied Pacy, and appeared to have slightly the advantage. But the day after, the troops of the convention came up with artillery. At the first discharge, terror spread through the ranks of the federalists; they dispersed and fled in confusion to Evreux. The Bretons, displaying greater firmness, retired in comparative order, but they were enveloped in the precipitate flight of the others. Intelligence of this defeat caused great consternation in Calvados, and the various administrations began heartily to repent of their imprudence. Upon its being known at Caen, Wimpffen assembled the deputies, and proposed they should intrench themselves in the town and defend it to the last extremity. Then, opening his mind more freely, he told them there was only one mode of sustaining the contest, which was to interest a powerful ally in their behalf, and, if they were agreeable, he could procure them one; intimating, in sufficiently intelligible terms, that he alluded to the English cabinet. He concluded by expressing his belief that a republic was impracticable, and that a return to monarchy would be no great calamity. The Girondists repudiated with disdain all offers of this description, and testified the most sincere indignation. Some amongst them were then made sensible of the rashness of their enterprise, and the danger of unfurling any standard whatsoever, since all the discomfited factions would assuredly rally under it, to vent their malice against the republic. They lost not all hope, however, but determined to withdraw to Bordeaux, where certain of the more sanguine deemed it possible to operate a movement thoroughly republican, and more auspicious in its result than that of Calvados and Brittany. They accordingly departed with the Breton battalions, who wended their way homewards, designing to embark at Brest. They assumed the garb of common soldiers, and sought concealment in the ranks of the battalion of Finisterre. It was necessary to adopt this precaution since the defeat of Vernon, as all the administrations, eager to submit and to give the convention proofs of zeal, would have undoubtedly apprehended them. They thus traversed a great part of Normandy and Brittany, amid continual perils and deplorable sufferings, and ultimately reached Brest, in the environs whereof they lurked until an opportunity offered for proceeding to Bordeaux. Barbaroux, Pétion, Salles, Louvet, Meilhan, Guadet, Kervélégan, Gorsas, Girey-Dupré, a co-editor with Brissot, Marchenna, a young Spaniard who had visited France in quest of freedom, and Riouffe, a young man attached by enthusiasm to the Girondists, composed that band of illustrious fugitives, hunted as traitors to their country, although all were ready to lay down their lives for it, and still conceived they were serving it even when compromising it by a most hazardous diversion.

In Brittany, and in the departments of the west and the upper basin of the Loire, the administrations hastened to record their contrition, in order to avoid

* [Jacques Roux had been a priest.]

the ban of outlawry. The constitution, disseminated in all quarters, was the pretext for universal submission. The convention, it was said, intended neither to perpetuate itself nor to usurp power, inasmuch as it presented a constitution, and such a constitution, also, as promised a speedy termination to the reign of faction, and established the simplest government that had ever been devised. At the same time, the Mountaineer municipalities and Jacobin Clubs redoubled their energy, and the quiet, well-meaning partisans of the Gironde shrunk before a revolution which they lacked strength to combat, and which they would have equally failed in vigour to defend. From this moment Toulouse sought to justify itself in the eyes of Paris. The people of Bordeaux did not formally submit, but they recalled their advanced guard, and ceased to boast of a march upon Paris. Two other important events concurred to terminate the dangers of the convention in the west and south, namely, the defence of Nantes and the dispersion of the rebels of the Lozère.

We left the Vendéans at Saumur, masters of the course of the Loire, and able, if they had appreciated their position, to make an attempt on Paris, which would have probably succeeded, as La Flèche and Le Mans were without any means of resistance. Young Bonchamps, who alone carried his views beyond La Vendée, upheld the expediency of an incursion into Brittany, with the design of gaining a port on the ocean, and afterwards marching upon Paris. But his companions in arms were incapable of estimating such suggestions, and he had the mortification of exhorting in vain. The true capital upon which, in their eyes, it behoved them to march, was Nantes; neither their comprehension nor their hopes went beyond that point. It must be allowed, however, there were several good reasons for so concluding: Nantes opened communications with the sea, assured the possession of the whole country, and after its capture bolder projects might be attempted; moreover, the soldiers were not torn from their homes, an important consideration with peasants, who never willingly lost sight of their village steeple. Charette, also, master of the Lower Vendée, after having made a false demonstration on Sables, had seized upon Machecoul, and was now at the gates of Nantes. He had never acted in concert with the chiefs of the Upper Vendée, but he offered to combine with them upon this occasion. He undertook to assault Nantes on the left flank, whilst the main army should attack it on the right; and with such a combination of means it was scarcely possible to anticipate failure.

The Vendéans accordingly evacuated Saumur, descended towards Angers, and prepared to march from Angers to Nantes by defiling along the right bank of the Loire. Their army was much diminished, because many of the peasants refused to engage in so distant an expedition; nevertheless, it was still composed of nearly 30,000 men. They appointed a generalissimo, making choice of Cathelineau, in order to flatter the peasants and win their attachment the more strongly. Lescure, having been wounded, was left in the interior of the country to beat up for additional recruits, to keep the troops in Niort in check, and to prevent the siege of Nantes being troubled.

In the interim, the commission of representatives sitting at Tours applied for succours in all quarters, and pressed Biron, who was upon the coast, to proceed with all dispatch upon the track of the Vendéans. Not contented with recalling Biron, it ordered movements in his absence, and directed upon Nantes all the troops that could be mustered from Saumur. Biron lost no time in replying to the exhortations of the commission. He sanctioned, he said, the movement executed without his orders, but for himself he was obliged to guard Sables and Rochelle, towns of greater importance, in his estimation, than Nantes; the battalions from the Gironde, the best in his army, were about to leave him, and he had to replace them as best he could; it was impossible for him to move his army without seeing it disband and give way to pillage before his eyes, so loose was its discipline: at the utmost, therefore, he could detach from it 3000 organised troops, with which inconsiderable force, he added, it would be mere folly to march on Saumur and adventure into the heart of a hostile country. Biron wrote at the same time to the committee of public welfare, tendering his resignation, on account of the representatives thus arrogating the command. The committee rejoined, that he was justified in his remonstrance, inasmuch as the representatives might advise or propose operations, but ought not to order them, and that it was his province alone to take the measures he judged fitting for the safety of Nantes, Rochelle, and Niort. Biron, notwithstanding, used all possible exertions to form a small moveable army, wherewith he might hasten to the relief of the besieged town.

During this interval, the Vendéans had quitted Angers, and on the 28th came in sight of Nantes. They summoned the garrison in threatening terms, but being scornfully disregarded, they got ready for an attack. It was appointed to be made on both sides, at two in the morning of the 29th. Canclaux had under his orders merely 5000 regular troops, and nearly as many national guards, to defend an extensive circuit, intersected by several streams from the Loire. He made the best dispositions, and imparted the highest courage to the garrison. At the prescribed hour, Charette attacked on the side of the bridges; but Cathelineau, who operated on the right bank, and had the most difficult part of the enterprise committed to him, was stopped at the post of Niort, where a few hundred men made a most heroic resistance. The attack, thus retarded on that side, became more difficult of execution. The Vendéans, however, spread out behind the hedges and garden-walls, gained ground and pressed closely on the town. Canclaux, general-in-chief, and Beysser, commandant of the place, kept the republican troops firm in all quarters. Cathelineau, on his part, redoubled his efforts, and already he had fought his way far into a suburb, when a ball struck him in a vital part. His soldiers retired with precipitation, bearing him away on their shoulders. From that moment the attack slackened. After a conflict of eighteen hours' duration, the Vendéans dispersed, and the town was saved.

There was no part of the defensive force but did its duty efficiently on that day. The national guard had emulated the fortitude of the troops of the line, and even the mayor of the place had received a wound. The next day the Vendéans threw themselves into boats, and returned to the interior of the country. Henceforth, the opportunity for great undertakings was lost to them; they could no longer aspire to execute any important movement, or extend their hopes beyond, at the utmost, the occupation of their own districts. At this period, Biron, hastening to succour Nantes, arrived at Angers with such efficient troops as he had been enabled to collect, and Westermann appeared in La Vendée with his Germanic legion.

Nantes was no sooner delivered from this imminent peril, than the authorities, entirely disposed in favour of the Girondists, determined to unite with the insurgents of Calvados. They actually passed a resolution hostile to the convention; but Canclaux denounced it with such vehemence, that the Nantese were speedily reduced to order.

Thus dangers of the most serious character were happily obviated on that side. An event not less important occurred in Lozère, namely, the submission of 30,000 insurgents, who might have readily opened a communication with the Vendéans, or with the Spaniards through Roussillon.

By a truly fortunate chance, the deputy Fabre, commissioned to the army of the Eastern Pyrenees, was on the spot at the moment of the revolt, and displayed that manly promptitude in the conjuncture

which subsequently carried him into the arms of death on the Pyrenees. He made sure of the administrations, put the whole population under arms, summoned to his aid all the forces in the vicinity, both gendarmes and regular troops, and stirred up the Cantal, the Upper Loire, and the Puy-de-Dôme. The insurgents, thus stricken by superior vigour at the first onset, and assailed on all sides, were scattered with rapidity, driven for refuge into the woods, and their leader, the ex-Constituent Charrier, himself captured by the vigilance of the conquerors. In his papers evidence transpired that his project was a ramification of the grand plot discovered six months previously in Brittany, the chief whereof, La Rouarie, had died without being able to realise his schemes. Tranquillity was consequently assured in the mountains of the centre and the south, the communications of the army of the Pyrenees were guaranteed, and the valley of the Rhone had no longer one of its flanks infested by revolted mountaineers.

An unexpected victory over the Spaniards in Roussillon fully re-established the submission of the south. When last on that scene of action, we saw the Spaniards, after their first march into the valleys of the Tech and the Tet, retrograde to capture Bellegarde and Les Bains, and subsequently return to plant themselves in front of the French camp. After indulging in a long survey, they at length attacked it on the 17th July. The French scarcely mustered 12,000 raw recruits; the Spaniards, on the other hand, boasted 15,000 or 16,000 well-disciplined troops. Ricardos, too much bent on enveloping the French positions, distributed his assault over too wide a space. The young volunteers of France, encouraged by Barbantane and the valiant Dagobert, held firm in their intrenchments, and, after the most desperate efforts, the Spaniards gave token of a disposition to retire. Dagobert, who had been awaiting that critical moment, rushed furiously upon them; but one of his battalions suddenly disbanded and retreated in disorder. On witnessing this untoward accident, Deflers and Barbantane moved opportunely to the aid of Dagobert, and their combined forces fell with such violence upon the Spaniards, that they were driven to a considerable distance. This engagement, fought on the 17th July, raised the courage of the French soldiers, and, in the opinion of one historian, produced all the effect on the Pyrenean frontier of Valmy on that of Champagne the year preceding.

In the direction of the Alps, Dubois-Crancé, placed between malecontent Savoy, unfriendly Switzerland, and insurgent Grenoble and Lyons, conducted himself in so arduous a position with equal vigour and judgment. Whilst the sectional authorities took in his presence the federalist oath, he administered the opposite oath to the club and his army, and stood prepared to avail himself of the first favourable opportunity for acting. Thus, having seized the correspondence of the authorities, he found distinct proof of their scheme to coalesce with the Lyonnese, whereupon he denounced them to the people of Grenoble as striving to provoke the dissolution of the republic by a civil war; and, profiting by the momentary exasperation he aroused, he obtained their deprivation of office, and the restoration of all authority to the old municipality. Thenceforth at ease regarding Grenoble, he devoted himself to re-organise the army of the Alps, with the view of ensuring possession of Savoy and executing the decrees of the convention against Lyons and Marseilles. He changed all the staffs, re-established order in the battalions, and incorporated therein the recruits from the levy of 300,000 men. Seeing the departments of La Lozère and La Haute Loire had employed their contingents in stifling the revolt of their mountainous districts, he endeavoured to supply their deficiency by requisitions. After these first cares were attended to, he dispatched General Carteaux with a strong body of infantry, and the legion levied in Savoy, under the name of "the legion of the Allobroges," to plant himself at Valence, in order to occupy the course of the Rhone, and prevent the junction of the Marseillese with the Lyonnese. Carteaux, taking his departure in the early part of July, proceeded by forced marches on Valence, and from Valence on Saint-Esprit, where he enveloped the corps of Nîmois, dispersing a part and ingrafting the remainder on his own ranks, and thus secured both banks of the Rhone. Without a moment's delay, he threw himself on Avignon, where the Marseillese had established themselves some time previously.

Whilst these events were passing in and around Grenoble, Lyons, always affecting the stanchest fidelity to the republic, and vowing to maintain its *unity* and its *indivisibility*, refused obedience to the decree of the convention, which removed to the revolutionary tribunal of Paris the proceedings instituted against divers patriots. Its committee and its staff were filled with concealed royalists. Rambaud, president of the committee, and Précy, commander of the departmental force, were secretly devoted to the cause of the emigration. Misled by designing and dangerous instigators, the unfortunate Lyonnese were bent on compromising themselves past recall with the convention, which, from this time forth universally obeyed and victorious, was sure to visit on the last city in revolt the full measure of vengeance reserved for vanquished federalism. Meanwhile, they assembled in arms at Saint-Etienne, and harboured deserters of all kinds; but still labouring to avoid the appearance of open revolt, they gave free passage to the convoys proceeding to the frontiers, and ordered the liberation of the deputies Noël-Pointe, Santeyra, and Lesterpt-Beauvais, who had been arrested by the neighbouring communes.

The Jura was partially tranquillised. The representatives Bassal and Garnier, whom we left with 1500 men nearly encompassed by 15,000, had withdrawn their inadequate force, and attempted the ways of negotiation. In them they were more successful, the insurgent administrations having undertaken to terminate the movement by the acceptance of the constitution.

Nearly two months had now elapsed since the 2d of June (for the close of July was at hand); Valenciennes and Mayence were still threatened, but Normandy, Brittany, and almost all the departments of the west, had returned to obedience. Nantes had just been delivered from the Vendéans, the malecontents of Bordeaux dared not venture beyond their own walls, La Lozère was reduced, the Pyrenees were rendered secure for a time, Grenoble was quieted, Marseilles was isolated from Lyons by the successes of Carteaux, and Lyons, albeit refusing to obey decrees, still shrunk from declaring war. The authority of the convention, therefore, was almost fully re-established in the interior. On the one hand, the tardiness of the federalists, their want of union and concert, and their half-measures—on the other, the prompt energy of the convention, the unity of its power, its central position, its habit of command, and its alternate policy of conciliation and peremptory enforcement—had decided the triumph of the Mountain over this the last effort of the Girondists. We, as Frenchmen, must rejoice at the result, for at a moment when France was assailed on every side, the most worthy to wield supremacy was the strongest. Out of their own mouths the federalists were condemned: "Honest men," said they, "have never known how to employ energy."

But, whilst they, the federalists, were falling in every quarter before the ascendancy of the convention, a tragical accident occurred to stir up relentless wrath against them.

At this period lived in Calvados a young female, in her twenty-fifth year, uniting to great beauty a firm and independent character. Her name was Charlotte Corday d'Armans. Her manners were pure and fault

less, but her mind was active and unquiet. She had quitted the paternal roof, to live with greater freedom in the house of a friend at Caen. Her father had formerly vindicated, in certain publications, the privileges of his province, at a time when France was reduced to uphold burghal and provincial privileges as precious immunities. His daughter Charlotte had, like many females of the time, embraced the cause of the revolution with ardour, and, after the manner of Madame Roland, was intoxicated with the idea of a republic based on the authority of laws and teeming with virtues. The Girondists appeared to her striving to realise her dreams; the Mountaineers seemed the only obstacles to that happy issue; and, upon learning the events of the 31st May, she resolved to avenge her cherished orators. The war of Calvados commenced; she conceived that the death of the chief of the anarchists, concurring with the insurrection of the departments, would ensure the victory of the latter; she consequently resolved to perform a signal act of devotedness, and consecrate to her country a life whereof no partner, children, or family, formed the absorbing care or charm. Deceiving her father, she wrote to him that the troubles of France becoming every day more terrible, she was on the point of seeking security and quietude in England. When so writing, she was already directing her steps to Paris. Before her departure from Caen, she was solicitous to see the deputies who were the objects of her enthusiasm. With this view, she feigned a pretext, and requested from Barbaroux a letter of recommendation to the minister of the interior, having, she said, papers to claim on behalf of a friend, a late canoness. Barbaroux gave her one for the deputy Duperret, the friend of Garat. His companions, who were present at the interview, and heard her express her hatred against the Mountaineers, and her zeal for a pure and regular republic, were struck with her beauty and affected by her ingenuous sentiments. Not the remotest allusion to her project started suspicion in their minds.

Arrived at Paris, Charlotte Corday reflected for a time on the choice of her victim. Danton and Robespierre were sufficiently renowned in the ranks of the Mountain to merit her preference, but Marat was the man whom the provinces regarded as the most detestable of all, and as the chief of the anarchists. Her first wish was to smite Marat on the summit of the Mountain and in the midst of his friends; but this design was no longer practicable, for Marat was in a condition which prevented him from attending the convention. The reader can have scarcely forgotten that he had voluntarily suspended his functions for a certain interval; but, perceiving that the trial of the Girondists could not be speedily determined, he put an end to the farce and re-appeared in his place. Soon after, one of those inflammatory attacks, which, in revolutions, terminate such tempestuous existences as are not cut short by the scaffold, obliged him to retire into the tranquillity of his own abode. But even there, nothing could restrain his insatiable activity; he passed great part of the day in his bath, abundantly supplied with pens and paper, writing without intermission, editing his journal, addressing letters to the convention, and complaining that sufficient attention was not given to them. He indited his last communication, saying, that if it were not read, he would have himself transported in his sickness to the tribune, and read it in person. In this letter, he denounced two generals, Custine and Biron. "Custine," said he, "now transferred from the Rhine to the north, was proceeding in the same manner as Dumouriez, railing against *anarchists*, forming his staffs according to his own caprice, arming certain battalions, disarming others, and distributing them conformably to his plans, which were doubtless those of a conspirator." (It will be recollected that Custine was profiting by the siege of Valenciennes to re-organise the army of the north in Cæsar's camp.) "As to Biron, he was an old valet of the court. He affected a mighty dread of the English, in order to keep himself in Lower Vendée and leave the enemy in possession of Upper Vendée. He was evidently only waiting for a descent to unite with the English, and deliver up our army to them. The war of La Vendée ought to have been already finished. A man of judgment, after witnessing the discomfiture of the Vendéans once, ought to understand the means of destroying them. For his own part, likewise possessing as he did military science, he had devised an infallible manœuvre, and if his health were not so precarious, he would have had himself removed to the banks of the Loire, in order to put his plan in execution by personal superintendence. Custine and Biron were the two Dumouriez's of the moment; and, after having secured them, it was essential to adopt a final measure, which would stifle all calumnies, and commit all the deputies past recall to the revolution. This was to put to death the imprisoned Bourbons, and set a price on the heads of the fugitive Bourbons. By this expedient, the accusations against some of destining Orleans to the throne would be no more heard of, and the intrigues of others to make their peace with the family of Capet would be prevented."

Thus, to the last, he exhibited the inordinate vanity, the wild fury, and the prompt talent of anticipating popular hatred, which had always marked his career. In fact, Custine and Biron were shortly to become the objects of general execration, and it was Marat, sick and on the eve of death, who, as upon many former occasions, enjoyed the honour of the initiative.

Charlotte Corday was thus obliged to seek him at his own house to attain her aim. In the first place, she delivered the letter she held for Duperret, executed her commission with the minister of the interior, and then made ready to accomplish her purpose. She inquired of a coachman the residence of Marat, proceeded straightway thither, and was refused admittance. She then wrote to him, saying that, having just arrived from Calvados, she had important news to communicate to him. This was sufficient to ensure her an interview. On the 13th July, accordingly, she presented herself about eight in the evening. Marat's housekeeper, a young woman of twenty-seven, with whom he lived maritally, demurred to her entrance; but Marat, who was in his bath, heard Charlotte Corday, and ordered her to be admitted. Remaining alone with him, she related what she had seen at Caen; then pausing, she listened to him and surveyed him ere she struck the blow. Marat eagerly demanded the names of the deputies present at Caen. She repeated them, and he, seizing a pencil, prepared to write them down, exclaiming—"Very good, they shall all go to the guillotine." "To the guillotine!" echoed the young girl, in an indignant tone; and drawing a knife from her bosom, she struck Marat under the left breast, and plunged the steel to his heart.

"Help!" he cried; "help, my love!" His housekeeper flew at the call; a messenger employed in arranging journals also hastened to the spot. They found Marat weltering in his blood, and the young girl calm, serene, motionless. The messenger knocked her down with a chair, and the housekeeper spurned her with her feet. The noise attracted visiters, and the whole quarter was speedily in commotion. Charlotte Corday rose from the floor, and encountered with dignified placidity the threats and outrages of those who surrounded her. Certain members of the section, drawn to the scene by the pervading tumult, struck by her beauty, her courage, and the calmness wherewith she avowed her action, interfered to save her from brutal immolation, and conducted her to prison, where she continued to confess all with the same tranquil assurance.

This assassination, like that of Lepelletier, caused an extraordinary sensation. It was immediately propagated that the Girondists had armed and instigated

Charlotte Corday. An analogous report had attended the death of Lepelletier, and on all similar occasions such will be the case. A proscribed opinion is very generally illustrated by some signal act of revenge; simply one mind, more highly exasperated than others, conceives and executes the deed; but it is nevertheless imputed to all the partisans of the same opinion, and thus authority is derived for wreaking additional vengeance upon them, and for decking the victim with the crown of martyrdom. Some difficulty had been felt in charging crimes on the imprisoned deputies. The departmental revolt had furnished one specious pretext for taking their lives, by declaring them accomplices of the fugitive deputies; the death of Marat served to eke out their supposititious crimes, and the reasons in request for consigning them to the scaffold.

The Mountain, the Jacobins, and especially the Cordeliers, who gloried in having first possessed Marat, in having remained more intimately connected with him, and in having never disavowed him, testified great and unfeigned sorrow. It was agreed that he should be interred in the garden of the Cordeliers, beneath the same trees under which he was accustomed to read his journal to the people in the evenings. The convention resolved to attend his obsequies in a body. At the Jacobin Club it was proposed to assign him extraordinary honours; several even demanded the Pantheon as his sepulchre, though the law prohibited any one being deposited within it until twenty years after death. It was moved that the whole society should walk in the funeral procession; that the presses of the "Friend of the People" should be purchased by the society, in order to prevent them falling into unworthy hands; and that his journal should be continued by successors capable, if not of rivalling him, at least of recalling his energy and supplying his watchfulness. Robespierre, whose aim at all times was to render the Jacobins more imposing by stifling all their inconsiderate ebullitions, and who moreover was desirous of fixing upon himself the attention too exclusively bestowed upon the martyr, came forward to address the club upon this occasion.

"If I speak to-day," said he, "it is because I have a right to do so. The question is concerning poniards; they are pointed at me, I have deserved them, and it is merely the result of chance that Marat has been struck before me. I have therefore a right to interfere in the discussion, and I do so to express my astonishment that your energy should exhaust itself in vain declamations, and your thoughts be directed solely upon idle pomp and ceremonies. The best manner of avenging Marat is to pursue remorselessly his enemies. The vengeance which seeks satisfaction in vain funereal honours is soon appeased, and speedily foregoes the determination of exhibiting itself in a more real and beneficial form. Cease, then, your useless discussions, and revenge Marat in a manner more worthy of himself." All further debate was cut short by this peremptory inhibition, and no more heed was given to the propositions that had been so eagerly submitted.

Nevertheless, the convention, the Jacobins, the Cordeliers, all the popular societies, and all the sections, concurred in decreeing him great honours. His body lay in state for several days; it was uncovered, and the wound he had received left open to view. The popular societies and the sections defiled in procession past his bier, strewing it with flowers. Each president pronounced an oration. The section of La Republique was the first to approach. "He is dead!" exclaimed its president, lugubriously—"the friend of the people is dead, and by assassination! Let us waive all eulogy over his inanimate remains. His eulogium is in his career, his writings, his gory wound, his death! Scatter flowers over the pallid corpse of Marat, my countrywomen! Marat was our friend, he was the friend of the people: it was for the people he lived, it is for the people he died." At these words, young maidens made the circuit of the bier, and threw fragrant flowers on the body of Marat. The orator resumed: "But sufficient are the lamentations; hear the mighty soul of Marat, shaking off its bonds, and saying, Republicans, abstain from further weeping. To republicans is permitted but one tear, after which their country claims all their sympathies. It was not I who was marked for assassination, but the republic; it is not I who call for vengeance, but the republic, the people, yourselves!"

All the societies and all the sections came one after the other around the coffin in which the body of Marat lay extended; and if history record such scenes with some minuteness, it may teach men to reflect on the influence of prepossessions, and lead them to ponder seriously, when they mourn the mighty of this earth, or revile the unfortunate of their era.

Meanwhile, the trial of the young murderess was expedited with that rapidity for which republican forms of process were remarkable. Two deputies were implicated in the arraignment; the one, Duperret, with whom she had had intercourse, and who had accompanied her to the minister of the interior; the other Fauchet, late a bishop, previously suspected on account of his connexion with the right side, and whom a woman, insane or malignant, falsely asserted to have seen in the galleries with the prisoner.

Charlotte Corday, when conducted before the tribunal, preserved her wonted calmness. The indictment was read over to her, after which the court proceeded to call the witnesses. The first who appeared was stopped by the prisoner, without allowing him time to commence his deposition. "It was I," she said, "who killed Marat." "Who incited you to commit this murder?" demanded the president. "His crimes." "What do you mean by his crimes?" "The calamities he has caused since the revolution." "Who are they who have instigated you to this action?" "Myself alone," proudly answered the young girl. "I had long revolved it in my mind; nor would I ever have taken counsel of others for such a deed. I wished to restore peace to my country." "But do you imagine you have sacrificed all the Marats?" "No," responded the prisoner, with a sigh; "alas! no."

She then permitted the witnesses to conclude, and, after each testimony, repeated, "That is true; the deponent is right." She defended herself from one charge alone, namely, her pretended concert with the Girondists; and she confronted only one witness, the woman who implicated Duperret and Fauchet in the case; after which she seated herself, and listened to the remainder of the process with perfect serenity. "You perceive," said her advocate, Chaveau-Lagarde, briefly compressing her defence, "that the accused confesses all with imperturbable firmness. Such composure and self-oblivion, sublime in one respect, can only be explained by the most exalted political fanaticism. It is for you to judge what weight is due to this moral consideration in the scales of justice."

Charlotte Corday was condemned to undergo the penalty of death. Her beautiful countenance evinced no emotion as the sentence was delivered, and she returned to prison with a smile on her lips. She wrote to her father, craving his pardon for having disposed of her life. She wrote also to Barbaroux, to whom she related her journey and achievement in a letter full of feminine grace, spirit, and elevation of mind; she told him her friends ought not to regret her, for a lively imagination and a susceptible heart threaten stormy lives to those who may possess them. She added, that she was now fully avenged on Pétion, who had, when at Caen, suspected for a moment her political sentiments. She begged him also to tell Wimpffen that she had assisted him to gain more than one battle. She concludes in these words: "What a deplorable community to form a republic!

Peace ought, at all events, to be made; some government will follow in its track."

On the 15th, Charlotte Corday underwent her sentence with the calm assurance that had never quitted her. She opposed to the outrages of the vile populace a modest and becoming firmness. All, however, did not insult her; many pitied a female so young, so beautiful, and so disinterested in her crime, and followed her to the scaffold with eyes of sympathy and admiration.

Marat's body was transported in great pomp to the garden of the Cordeliers. "This pomp," said the report of the commune, "had nothing in it but what was simple and patriotic. The people, gathered under the banners of the sections, followed quietly. A disorder in some sort imposing, a reverential silence, a general consternation, presented a most affecting spectacle. The procession continued in motion from six in the evening until midnight; it was composed of citizens from all the sections, members of the convention, of the commune, and of the department, electors, and popular societies. Upon reaching the garden of the Cordeliers, the body of Marat was deposited beneath the trees, the leaves whereof, slightly agitated, reflected and multiplied the soft and subdued light. The people pressed around the coffin in silence. The president of the convention delivered an eloquent discourse, in which he stated that the time would soon come when Marat should be avenged, but that no hasty or inconsiderate measures should be allowed to justify the reproaches of the country's enemies. He added that liberty could not perish, and that the death of Marat would only consolidate it. After several other speeches, which were all warmly applauded, the body of Marat was laid in the grave. Tears flowed plenteously, and all slowly retired, with hearts oppressed by grief."

The heart of Marat, whereof the possession was contested by several societies, was ultimately adjudged to the Cordeliers. His bust, universally treasured as a fitting adjunct to those of Brutus and Lepelletier, was installed in all the assemblies and public places. The seal put upon his papers was removed; an assignat for five francs was all the wealth found in his possession, and his poverty became a fresh subject of admiration. His housekeeper, whom, according to the words of Chaumette, he had "*one fine day, in the face of the sun*," taken as his wife, was dignified with the name of Marat's widow, and supported at the cost of the state.

Such was the end of this man, the most singular of an epoch so abundant in diversified character. Entering the career of science, he attempted to overturn all the systems in vogue; then cast into political troubles, he forthwith imagined a frightful conception—still such a conception as revolutions realise every day of their progress, in proportion as their dangers increase, but which they never openly avow, namely, the destruction of all their adversaries. Marat, perceiving that, in spite of all repudiations, the revolution in truth obeyed his counsels, that the men whom he had denounced were execrated and sacrificed as he had predicted, came to look upon himself as the greatest politician of modern times, and gave way to an overweening vanity and effrontery, appearing to his enemies as the most horrible of the human species, and to his friends themselves as, at the least, wayward and strange. He quitted the scene by an accident as singular as his whole life, disappearing at the very moment the leaders of the republic, concentrating all their powers to establish an inexorable and sombre government, must have inevitably broken with a frantic, systematic, and presumptuous colleague, who would have deranged all their plans by his inordinate pretensions. Incapable, in fact, of being an active and commanding leader, he was simply the apostle of the revolution; and when that office was no longer needed, but instead thereof, practical energy and continuity, the knife of a young enthusiastic maiden came opportunely to convert him into a martyr, and give a saint to the people, who, weary of their ancient idols, were longing for new ones.

CHAPTER XXIV.

DISTRIBUTION OF PARTIES SINCE THE 31ST MAY.—DISCREDIT OF DANTON.—REVERSES IN LA VENDEE.—CAPTURE OF MAYENCE AND VALENCIENNES.—IMMINENT PERIL OF THE REPUBLIC IN AUGUST 1793, AND MEASURES OF VIOLENCE CONSEQUENT THEREON.

Of the famous triumvirs, there now remained but Robespierre and Danton. To form a correct idea of their influence, it behoves us to inquire how power had been distributed, and in what direction opinion had flowed, since the suppression of the right side.

From the very day of its convocation, the convention had been in reality possessed of all power. It was unwilling, however, to keep it openly in itself, in order to avoid the imputation of despotism, and consequently permitted to subsist out of its own pale a phantom of executive power, under the title of ministers. Discontented with their administration, whereof the vigour was wholly unequal to the circumstances, it established, immediately after the defection of Dumouriez, a committee of public welfare, which entered on its functions on the 10th April, being invested with a faculty of superior inspection over the government. It was empowered to suspend the execution of measures ordered by the ministers, to supply deficiencies when it judged them inadequate, and totally to revoke them when it deemed them prejudicial. To its care, also, were committed the instructions given to representatives dispatched on missions, and with it alone were the latter entitled to correspond. Thus placed above the ministers and representatives, who were themselves placed above other functionaries of all grades, it had under its control the whole fabric of government. Although this authority, as may be judged from its appellation, was only contemplated as a simple inspection, it in reality became action itself; for the head of a state rarely executes any thing immediately, but is contented to set and witness the machine in motion, to select his agents, and direct the operations. Consequently, through its function of superintendence, the committee was enabled to effect all this, and it was not slow to act upon the capacity. It regulated the military operations, apportioned the supplies, ordered measures of security, nominated the generals and agents of all kinds; and the trembling ministers were too happy to be freed from all responsibility by reducing themselves to the scale of mere clerks. The members who composed the committee of public welfare were Barrére, Delmas, Bréard, Cambon, Robert Lindet, Danton, Guyton-Morveau, Mathieu, and Ramel. They were known as able and laborious men, and though somewhat suspected of a leaning to moderation, they were not deemed capable, like the Girondists, of being accomplices of the stranger. In a short time they united in their hands all the affairs of the state; and although they had been appointed but for one month, it was held impolitic to interrupt them in their labours, and they were protracted from month to month, from the 10th April to the 10th May, from the 10th May to the 10th June, and from the 10th June to the 10th July. Beneath this committee, the committee of general safety exercised the high police, so important a department in times of distrust; but even in its functions it depended on the committee of public welfare, which, being charged in general terms with what concerned the welfare of the state, necessarily included in its powers a right of inquiry into plots against the republic.

Thus, by means of its decrees, the convention had the supreme fiat; by means of its commissioners and

its committee, it held the executive power; so that albeit unwilling to concentrate all power in itself, it had been invincibly led to do so by circumstances, and by the necessity imposed upon it of confiding the execution of what it considered imperfectly performed by strange agents to its own members, under its own immediate vigilance.

Nevertheless, whilst all authority was thus exercised within its pale, it participated no further in the operations of government than by its approbation, ceasing even to deliberate thereon. This is easily accounted for. The great questions of social organisation were settled by the constitution, which established a pure democracy. The question whether, in promotion of public safety, the most revolutionary means should be adopted—whether, in truth, there should be an unreserved abandonment to all that passion might dictate—was answered by the 31st May. Accordingly, the constitution of the state and its moral policy were fixed. Nothing remained to discuss, therefore, but measures of administration, finance, and war. Now, subjects of this nature can rarely be understood by a numerous assembly, and are invariably left to the discretion of men who devote their attention more specifically to such matters. The convention, upon this principle, willingly threw the burden of them on the committees it had charged with affairs. It had implicit reliance on their probity, talents, and zeal. Hence it sunk into silence; and the last revolution, whilst stifling the freedom of debate, had likewise removed all occasion for it. It resolved into a mere council of state, to which the committees, as the heads of administrations, repaired to present accounts always applauded, and to propose decrees always adopted. The sittings, taciturn, sombre, and brief, were no longer protracted as formerly during whole days and nights.

Next to the convention, which, in the manner explained, attended to the general concerns of government, came the commune, regulating the municipal system, and effecting therein a complete revolution. Giving up, since the 31st May, all intentions of conspiring, or using the local force of Paris against the convention, it devoted its attention to matters of police, supplies of food, the markets, the churches, theatres, and even courtesans, publishing, upon all these subjects of internal and private concern, ordinances which soon became models throughout France. Chaumette, procurator-general of the commune, was by his reports, always attentively heard and applauded by the people, the chief mover of this municipal legislature. Incessantly on the alert in quest of fresh matter to regulate, and continually encroaching on private liberty, this legislator of the halls and markets became every day more importunate and intolerable. Pache, as impassible as ever, looked calmly on, gave his approbation to whatever was proposed, and freely abandoned the honours of the municipal tribune to his subordinate Chaumette.

The convention leaving its committees to act at discretion, and the commune restricting its interference exclusively to its own province, all discussion upon matters of government had devolved upon the Jacobins. They alone canvassed, with their accustomed audacity, the operations of the executive and the conduct of each of its agents. It has been already shown, that, long ago, they had acquired a prodigious importance by their numbers, by the reputation and the influential position of several of their members, by the vast ramifications of their affiliated societies, in fine, by their seniority and their long influence over the revolution. But since the 31st May, having reduced to silence the right side of the convention, and secured predominance to the system of inordinate energy, they had obtained a sway over opinion almost boundless, and usurped the faculty of speech, in some sort abdicated by the convention. They assailed the committees with an unremitting interposition, and scrutinised their conduct, as also that of the representatives, the ministers, and the generals, with that rage for personalities for which they were so remarkable; thus exercising over all the agents of government an inexorable censorship, often unjust, but always useful, by the terror it inspired, and the devotedness it imposed upon all. The other popular societies also enjoyed their license and their influence, but succumbed, notwithstanding, to the authority of the Jacobins. The Cordeliers, for example, more turbulent and prompt to act, nevertheless acknowledged the mental superiority of their seniors, and always yielded to the restraint of their counsels, when they chanced to outrun the fitting moment for a project, through a superfluity of revolutionary ardour. The petition of Jacques Roux against the constitution, retracted by the Cordeliers on the summons of the Jacobins, afforded an instance of this deference.

Such, since the 31st May, was the distribution of power and of influence. We perceive in concurrent activity a governing committee, a commune occupied with municipal regulations, and the Jacobin Club exercising over all the details of government a constant and rigorous supervision.

Two months had not passed away without opinion expressing itself strongly against the existing administration. The minds of men could not stop short with the 31st May; their urgency was sure to go far beyond; nor can it be a matter of surprise that they should incessantly demand additional vigour, greater celerity, and, above all, more results. In the general remodelling of the committees, as demanded on the 2d June, the committee of public welfare had been excepted, being composed, as was universally acknowledged, of men indefatigable in toil, alien to all factions, and charged with labours which it was dangerous to interrupt; but it was not forgotten that it had hesitated on the 31st May and the 2d June, that it had proposed to negotiate with the departments and send them hostages, and it was thus speedily assailed with invectives of incompetency to the crisis. Instituted at one of the most difficult periods, on it was unscrupulously thrown the blame of reverses occasioned by the calamitous situation of affairs, and scarcely avoidable by human wisdom. As the centre of all operations, it was overwhelmed with business, and it was reproached with burrowing in papers, beguiling time with details, in a word, with being emasculated and incapable. And yet, established at the time of Dumouricz's defection, when all the armies were disorganised, when La Vendée was rising in rebellion and Spain commencing hostilities, it had reorganised the army of the north and that of the Rhine, it had created the armies of the Pyrenees and La Vendée, which were not in existence, and provisioned one hundred and twenty-six towns and forts; and although much remained to be done to place the forces on the necessary footing, it bespoke extraordinary industry to have accomplished such labours in so short an interval, and amidst the obstacles of the departmental insurrection. But public discontent always required more than was actually performed—more, indeed, than could be performed; and by that very insatiableness it provoked the amazing energy which was alone commensurate with the danger. In order to increase the strength of the committee and invigorate its revolutionary ardour, to its former members had been added Saint-Just, Jean-Bon-Saint-André, and Couthon. Notwithstanding this popular infusion, dissatisfaction was not appeased, the remark passing into vogue that the adjuncts were unquestionably most excellent, but that their influence was neutralised by the others.

Against the ministers, also, opinion was not less ruthlessly directed. The minister of the interior, Garat, at first rather favourably viewed on account of his neutrality between the Girondists and the Jacobins, fell under the category of a moderate after the

2d June. Being instructed to compose a document calculated to enlighten the departments touching the late events, he had digested a long dissertation, in which he explained and weighed all wrongs with an impartiality creditable to his philosophy, doubtless, but rather inappropriate to the dispositions of the moment. Robespierre, to whom he imparted this over-wrought production, spurned it malevolently. The Jacobins were soon apprised of its tone, and they reproached Garat with culpable indifference to the duty of counteracting the poison disseminated by Roland. In the like position was D'Albarade, the minister of marine, who was accused of leaving all the old aristocrats as superior officers in the squadrons. There is no doubt, in fact, that he had retained a great number, and the events at Toulon but too speedily demonstrated the truth; but it was more difficult to purge the navy of objectionable subjects than the army, because the peculiar acquirements requisite in naval service prevented the possibility of replacing the old officers with new, or of converting in six months a peasant into a sailor, a midshipman, or an admiral. Bouchotte, the minister of war, had alone preserved his popularity, because, after the example of Pache, his predecessor, he had thrown open his offices to the Jacobins and Cordeliers, and allayed their mistrust by calling themselves into his department. Almost all the generals were assailed, especially those who were nobles; but above all, two had become the clamour of the hour—Custine in the north, and Biron in the west. Marat, as we have related, had denounced them a few days before his death; and since that denunciation, it is a fact that men perpetually inquired why Custine was loitering in Cæsar's camp without relieving Valenciennes, and why Biron, inactive in the Lower Vendée, had allowed Saumur to be taken and Nantes to be besieged.

Similar distrust prevailed every where; calumny smote all heads, and brooded over even the firmest patriots. As there was no longer a right side upon which all crimes might be heaped, as there was no longer a Roland, a Brissot, or a Guadet, to whom, at every alarm, treachery could be imputed, invective turned upon the most decided republicans. An incredible rage for suspicions and accusations possessed the public mind. The longest and most persevering of revolutionary careers was no longer a guarantee; and in a single day, in a single hour, any man might be assimilated with the fiercest enemies of the republic. Imagination could be hardly made to forego its illusions touching that Danton, whose undaunted boldness and inspiriting eloquence had so often stimulated courage in critical emergencies; but Danton carried into the revolution a passion of extreme violence for ultimate objects, but no animosity towards individuals, and that was not sufficient. The spirit of a revolution is composed of passion for objects and hatred for those who oppose obstacles; Danton had but one of these two feelings. In promoting revolutionary measures tending to smite the rich, to goad the indifferent into action, and to develop the resources of the nation, he had scrupled at nothing, but devised and employed the most reckless and violent means; nevertheless, tolerant and placable towards individuals, he looked not upon all as his enemies, but viewed them as men differing in character and in mind, whom it was expedient to gain or accept with their respective powers and degrees of energy. He had not considered Dumouriez as a traitor, but rather as a malecontent driven to extremities. He had not deemed the Girondists accomplices of Pitt, but honest imbeciles, and his wish was to have removed without injuring them. It was even said that he had expressed himself indignantly upon the orders given by Henriot on the 2d June. He gave his hand to noble generals, dined with contractors, lived on familiar terms with men of all parties, and indulged in pleasures whereof he had not been chary in the course of the revolution. All these things were notorious; and sinister rumours crept abroad, implicating alike his energy and his probity. One day it was said that Danton no longer appeared at the Jacobin Club; and insinuations were levelled at his idleness, at his continual distractions, and at the fact of the revolution not having been without its enjoyments to him. Another day, some malignant Jacobin said in the tribune—"Danton left me to go and shake hands with a general." Sometimes complaints were directed against the individuals he had recommended to the ministers. Again, not venturing too often to attack him personally, his detractors assailed his friends. Thus, the butcher Legendre, his colleague in the Parisian deputation, his lieutenant in the faubourgs and public places, and the imitator of his wild and boisterous eloquence, was treated as a moderate by Hébert and the other unruly spirits at the Cordelier Club. "I a moderate!" exclaimed Legendre to the Jacobins; "I, who often reproach myself with exaggeration—who am accused from Bordeaux of having dispatched Guadet—who am charged in all the journals with having seized Lanjuinais by the collar, and dragged him on the pavement!"

Another friend of Danton was stigmatised as a moderate, an equally known and tried patriot, Camille-Desmoulins, at once the most lively, satirical, and eloquent writer distinguished in the revolution. Camille was intimately acquainted with General Dillon, who, when stationed by Dumouriez at the post of the Islettes in the Argonne, had displayed exemplary firmness and gallantry. Camille was aware, from personal intercourse, that Dillon was simply a brave soldier, without political opinions, endowed with the true martial instinct, and sincerely desirous of serving the republic. Suddenly, from the effect of that incredible distrust pervading the very air, it was reported that Dillon was preparing to place himself at the head of a conspiracy to establish Louis XVII. upon the throne. The committee of public welfare caused him to be instantly arrested. Camille, who had convinced himself by inquiry that the rumour was a mere fable, rose to defend Dillon in the convention. Cries from all sides interrupted him: "You dine with the aristocrats!" Billaud-Varennes, interfering to stop him, exclaimed—"We must not allow Camille to disgrace himself!" "I am prevented speaking," retorted Camille; "no matter, I have my pen!" And he speedily published a pamphlet, entitled "A Letter to Dillon," replete with intellect and fancy, wherein he dealt his blows on all sides and at all heads. To the committee of public welfare he said—"You have usurped all powers, engrossed all affairs, and you terminate none. There were three of you charged with the war department; the one is absent, the other ill, and the third understands nothing of such concerns. You leave at the head of our armies the Custines, Birons, Menous, Berthiers, all aristocrats, or Lafayettists, or imbeciles." To Cambon he said—"I comprehend nothing of thy system of finance, but thy paper greatly resembles that of Law, and flies as rapidly from hand to hand." To Billaud-Varennes he said—"Thou art wroth with Dillon, because, being a commissioner to his army, he exposed thee to the enemy's fire." To Saint-Just—"Thou reverest thyself, and bearest thy head like a priest elevating the host:" to Bréard, Delmas, Barrère, and others—"You wished to give in your resignations on the 2d June, because you were unable to contemplate that revolution with composure, so frightful did it seem to your imaginations."

He added, that Dillon was neither a republican, nor a federalist, nor an aristocrat, but a soldier, asking only to serve as such; that he equalled in patriotism the whole committee of public welfare, and all the staffs retained at the head of the armies; that he was at all events a distinguished officer, such as it was fortunate to have an opportunity of employing, and that it must not be imagined every corporal was competent to become a general. "Since," he concluded,

"an obscure officer, Dumouriez, conquered in spite of himself at Jemappes, and took possession of all Belgium and of Breda, like a quartermaster *with his pencil*, the successes of the republic have inspired us with the same infatuation which the successes of his reign communicated to Louis XIV. He selected his generals in his antechamber, and we conceive we may take ours from the streets; certain sanguine temperaments have indeed proclaimed that we possess three millions of generals!"

We learn from such language, such cross-firing, that the Mountain was in an unsettled state. This situation ordinarily ensues to every party emerging from victory, vibrating with incipient discord before the separate fractions have taken distinct development. No fresh party had as yet sprung or seceded from the conquering ranks. The imputation of moderatism or exaggeration hung over all heads, without resting positively on any. Amidst this confusion of opinion, one reputation always remained inaccessible to attacks, that of Robespierre. He certainly had never evinced indulgence towards individuals; he had cherished no outlaw, nor consorted with any general, financier, or deputy. None could accuse him of having sacrificed to pleasure during the revolution, for he lived obscurely with a carpenter, and, it is said, prosecuted an unsuspected intercourse with one of his daughters. Austere, reserved, upright, he enjoyed the reputation of being, and was in reality, incorruptible. He could be reproached only with pride—a species of vice which defiles not like corruption, but which causes great calamities in civil broils, and becomes most fearful in men of severity and sternness, in religious or political votaries, because, being their sole passion, they gratify it without distraction and without remorse.

Robespierre was the only individual who could repress certain movements of revolutionary impatience, without his moderation being imputed to the influences of pleasure or interest. His resistance, whenever he offered it, was always attributed to reason alone. He felt this position, and now commenced for the first time to construct a system. Hitherto, totally absorbed in hatred, he had laboured merely to drive the revolution over the Girondists; but at present, discerning in a new outbreak of violent opinions danger to the patriots, he deemed it essential to enforce respect for the convention and the committee of public welfare, because all authority was vested in them, and could not be transferred to other hands without interminable confusion. Moreover, he was himself in that convention; he must speedily be in the committee of public welfare; and, therefore, in defending them, he at once sustained an authority altogether indispensable, and an authority which he was about to share. As every opinion first took consistence in the Jacobin Club, he was assiduous in his endeavours to strengthen his sway over it, and attach it to the convention and the committees, reserving the faculty of future alienation, if he should judge it necessary. Constantly attentive to the Jacobins alone, he flattered them by his presence; and whilst he rarely spoke in the convention, where, as we have observed, silence was but seldom broken, his voice was repeatedly heard in their tribune—for he never allowed an important proposition to pass without discussing it, either to modify or repudiate it. In this, his conduct was more discreetly calculated than Danton's. Nothing is more offensive to men, or more favours sinister rumours, than neglect and absence. Danton, careless as a being of ardent and impassioned spirit, was too negligent in his attendance at the Jacobin Club. When he did appear, he was compelled to justify himself, to give assurances that he would always be a good patriot, to say that, "if sometimes he used certain conciliatory means to recover weak but excellent persons, his energy was not on that account diminished; that he always watched with the same ardour over the interests of the republic, and that it would assuredly be victorious." Vain and dangerous excuses! Whenever a man is reduced to explain, to enter into a justification of himself, he is more or less subdued by those to whom he addresses his exculpation. Robespierre, on the contrary, always present, always prepared to rebut insinuations, was never obliged to humble himself by apologetic appeals; so far was it the reverse, indeed, that he assumed an accusing tone, and rated at times his faithful Jacobins. He had adroitly seized that point, when the feelings inspired by a favourite leader having become unequivocal and decided, he does but stimulate them by rebukes.

We have already related the manner in which he treated Jacques Roux, who had proposed a petition against the constitutional act; and he pursued the same course upon all occasions when the conduct of the convention was brought into question. That assembly, he said, was purified; it merited all respect, whoever accused it was a bad citizen. The committee of public welfare had doubtless not done all it ought to have done (for even when vindicating any, Robespierre never failed to plant a censure); but it was now in a better course; to attack it was to destroy the necessary centre of all authority, to weaken the energy of the government, and to compromise the republic. When endeavours were made to annoy the convention or the committee by reiterated petitions, he opposed them, saying, that the influence of the Jacobins was trifled with, and that the time of the depositaries of power should not be lightly wasted or invaded. One day, a clamour arose that the sittings of the committee should be public. He inveighed bitterly against such a proposal, asserting there were concealed enemies, who, under the mask of patriotism, broached the most incendiary suggestions, and proceeding to show that the foreigner subsidised two orders of conspirators in France—"the *exaggerators*, who pushed things to the verge of chaos, and the *moderates*, who would fain paralyse the world by a mission of meekness."

The committee of public welfare had been prolonged three separate times; on the 10th July it fell to be continued a fourth time, or remodelled. On the 8th a great muster took place at the Jacobin Club. From all parts came voices, crying "that the members of the committee ought to be changed, and not continued again, as had happened thrice previously."

"There is no doubt," said Bourdon, "the committee has good intentions; I am not disposed to criminate it; but a misfortune inherent in human nature is to possess energy only for a few days. The present members of the committee have already passed that period; they are emasculated; let us supersede them. At this moment we need revolutionary men—men to whom we can intrust the fate of the republic, and who will answer to us for its safety, body and soul."

The ardent Chabot succeeded Bourdon. "The committee," said he, "must be remodelled undoubtedly, and no fresh prolongation endured. To add some additional members, ascertained good patriots, is not sufficient, as has been proved by previous trial. Couthon, Saint-Just, and Jean-Bon-Saint-André, recently adjoined, are nullified by their colleagues. Neither ought the committee to be renewed by ballot, for the new one may be no better than the old, which is worth exactly nothing. I have heard Mathieu," pursued Chabot, "hold the most *incivic* language at the club of revolutionary females. Ramel has written to Toulouse that the possessors of property can alone save the commonwealth, and that care must be taken to withhold arms from the sans-culottes. Cambon is an imbecile, who sees all objects through a magnifying-glass, and stares in terror a hundred yards off. Guyton-Morveau is an honest man, a quaker, who is perpetually trembling. Delmas, who had the province of appointments, has made abominable selections, and

filled the army with counter-revolutionists. In short, this committee was the friend of Lebrun, and is the enemy of Bouchotte."

Robespierre hastened to answer Chabot. "In each sentence, in each word," said he, "of Chabot's speech, I perceive the purest patriotism to glow; but I discern also that too exalted patriotism, which is indignant that all things are not ordered according to the bent of its own desires, which frets because the committee of public welfare has not attained in its operations an impossible perfection, which Chabot will seek for in vain.

I am of opinion with him that this committee is not composed of men equally enlightened, equally virtuous; but what body will he find composed in such a manner? Can he prevent men from being liable to error? Has he not seen the convention, since it vomited from its bosom the traitors who dishonoured it, derive a fresh energy—a grandeur which was unknown to it previous to that auspicious day—a character altogether more august as the national representation? Is not this example sufficient to demonstrate that it is not always necessary to destroy, but that it is sometimes more prudent simply to reform?

Yes, certainly, there are in the committee of public welfare men capable of wielding the machine, and giving additional impetus to its powers. These men require encouragement alone. Who can forget the services this committee has rendered to the commonwealth, the numerous plots it has discovered, the beneficial observations we owe to it, the sapient and profound views it has developed to us?

The assembly did not institute a committee of public welfare to influence itself or direct its decrees; but this committee has been useful in severing what was good, in measures propounded, from what, presented under a seductive form, might have led to dangerous consequences; it has given the first impulse to several essential enactments which have probably saved the country; it has obviated the inconveniences of protracted deliberation, so often fruitless, by presenting the results, happily elicited and combined, of investigations to which the assembly itself could scarcely bring the requisite stock of knowledge, from want of familiarity with their topics.

All this suffices to prove that the committee of public welfare has not been of such inconsiderable assistance as many profess to believe. It has committed faults, doubtless; am I likely to palliate them? Would I incline towards indulgence, who uphold that sufficient has not been done for the country when all has not been accomplished? Yes, it has committed faults, and I am willing with you to upbraid it on account of them; but it would be impolitic at this moment to excite the discontent of the people towards a committee which has need of unrestricted confidence, which is charged with great interests, and from which the country anxiously anticipates important aid; and although it may labour under the displeasure of the revolutionary republican female citizens, I do not the less esteem it adequate to its momentous duties."

All discussion was closed after the reflections of Robespierre had been propounded. Two days afterwards, the committee was remodelled, and reduced to nine members, as at its first formation. The future members were Barrère, Jean-Bon-Saint-André, Gasparin, Couthon, Hérault-Séchelles, Saint-Just, Thuriot, Robert Lindet, and Prieur de la Marne. All the members accused of weakness were superseded except Barrère, whose great facility in digesting reports and bending to circumstances procured him pardon for the past. Robespierre was not yet upon the list; but a few days more, a slight increase of danger on the frontiers and of terror in the convention, were alone needed to carry him within its fold.

Robespierre had soon several other occasions of employing his new policy. The navy beginning to excite uneasiness, incessant complaints were urged against the minister D'Albarade, his predecessor Monge, and the deplorable inefficiency of the fleet, which on its return from Sardinia had been brought into the docks of Toulon; but the repairs were not proceeded with, and the ships were commanded by old officers, almost all aristocrats. Certain individuals recently added to the navy-office were also excepted against on various grounds. One individual, named Peyron, who had been sent on a mission to reorganise the force at Toulon, was more especially assailed. This man had failed to do, as was alleged, what he ought to have done, and the minister was held responsible for his omissions; but the minister threw the responsibility upon a distinguished patriot, who had recommended Peyron to his confidence. This "distinguished patriot" was referred to with affected wonder, without venturing to designate him. "His name?" cried several voices. "Well, then, this celebrated patriot," replied the denouncer, "is Danton!" At these words, deep murmurs broke forth. Robespierre darted to the tribune: "I demand," said he, "that this farce be terminated and the sitting opened. Some accuse D'Albarade; I know him only by public fame, which avouches him a patriot minister; but with what is he now reproached? An error! What man is incapable of error? A selection he has made has not answered general expectation! Bouchotte and Pache have also made unfortunate appointments, and yet they are both true republicans—both sincere friends of the country. A man is in office; that is enough, he is calumniated. Alas! when shall we cease to put faith in the ridiculous or perfidious tales with which we are deluged from all quarters?

I perceived that to this sufficiently general denunciation of the minister was added a particular denunciation levelled at Danton. Is it, then, he whom they would fain cover with opprobrium? But if, instead of discouraging patriots by assiduously searching for crimes against them, when scarcely the most venial error can be traced, these persons would devote a portion of their time to facilitate the operations of those same patriots, to render their labours more lightsome and less harassing, it would be somewhat more honest, and the country would be greatly profited. They have denounced Bouchotte, they have denounced Pache, for it was predestined that the best patriots should be denounced. It is truly time to put an end to these absurd and afflicting scenes; would that the society of Jacobins confined itself to that range of matters which it can treat with advantage—that it interdicted many of those which are agitated within its pale, and which, for the most part, are equally futile and dangerous!"

Thus Robespierre, discerning all the peril of a new convulsion, which might have swept away every trace of a government, laboured to fix the attachment of the Jacobins upon the convention, the committees, and the old patriots. This laudable and beneficial policy redounded likewise to his own immediate advantage. By strengthening the power of the committees, he prepared the way for his own; by defending the patriots of the same date and energy as himself, he fortified his own position, and prevented victims from falling at his side; he placed far beneath himself those of whom he became the protector; finally, he rendered himself, even by his severity, adored by the Jacobins, and secured a high reputation for sagacity. In this Robespierre was actuated by no other ambition than such as had moved all the revolutionary leaders, who had hitherto attempted to arrest the revolution at the point whereat they themselves stopped short; and this policy, which had consigned them to such odium, failed to subject him to the like vicissitude, because the revolution was approaching the term of its dangers and excesses.

The incarcerated deputies had been voted under impeachment immediately after the death of Marat, and their trial was in preparation. Frequent and

sharp clamours began to be raised at this time that the heads of the remaining Bourbons should be made to fall, though those heads belonged to two females, the one the widow, the other the sister, of the late monarch, and to the Duke of Orléans, so remarkable for fidelity to the revolution, and at present a prisoner in the jail of Marseilles as the reward of his services.

A festival in celebration of the acceptance of the constitution had been ordered. All the primary assemblies were to send deputies empowered to express their sentiments, and to meet together on the field of the federation in a solemn gathering. The period was no longer fixed for the 14th July, but for the 10th August, since the capture of the Tuileries had produced the republic, whilst that of the Bastille, leaving the monarchy in subsistence, had merely abolished feudalism. Thus the republicans and constitutional royalists were distinguished in the fact that the first celebrated the 10th August, and the latter the 14th July.

The cause of federalism was rapidly on the wane, and the acceptance of the constitution general. Bordeaux still preserved an attitude of reserve, performing no decisive act of submission or hostility, but accepting the constitution. Lyons continued the proceedings appealed to the revolutionary tribunal; but, rebellious on that point alone, it succumbed as to others, and likewise adhered to the constitution. Marseilles alone refused its concurrence. But its petty army, previously separated from that of Languedoc, was driven at the end of July from Avignon, and compelled to re-cross the Durance. Thus federalism was vanquished, and the constitution triumphant. But the danger was growing greater on the frontiers; alike in Vendée, on the Rhine, and in the north, it was becoming more than ever imminent. New victories indemnified the Vendéans for their check before Nantes, and Mayence and Valenciennes were most closely pressed by the enemy.

We intermitted our recital of military events, as the Vendéans, repulsed from Nantes, were returning to their own districts, and we took leave of Biron as he was entering Angers, after the deliverance of Nantes, and purposing to form a combined plan of operations with General Canclaux. During that interval, Westermann had reached Niort with the Germanic legion, and obtained permission from Biron to advance into the interior of the country. This was the same Westermann, the Alsatian, who had distinguished himself on the 10th August, and decided the success of that day; who had afterwards served with reputation under Dumouriez, joining in the ties which subsisted between that general and Danton; and was finally denounced by Marat, whom he had caned, it was said, for divers abusive expressions. He was of the number of those patriots whose great services were acknowledged, but against whom reproaches began to be urged, on account of dissipated habits in the course of the revolution, and a feeling of antipathy to be engendered, because they exacted discipline in the armies and acquirements in the officers, and hesitated to exclude every officer who happened to be noble, or stigmatise as a traitor every general unfortunate enough to be defeated. Westermann had collected a legion called *Germanic*, consisting of 4000 or 5000 men, including infantry, cavalry, and artillery. At the head of this small army, of which he had rendered himself thoroughly master, and wherein he maintained an exact discipline, he had displayed a most notable prowess, and executed many brilliant exploits. When transferred into La Vendée, he had subjected it to a fresh organisation, and expelled the poltroons, who had furnished matter of denunciation against him. He testified an undisguised contempt for those disorderly battalions which pillaged and ravaged the country; and recorded the same sentiments as Biron, for which he was ranked with him amongst the military aristocrats. The minister of war, Bouchotte, had, as we have before remarked, distributed his Jacobin and Cordelier agents throughout La Vendée. These men professed open rivalry with the representatives and the generals, upholding all excesses and spoliations under the title of military requisitions, and insubordination, under pretext of defending the soldier against the tyranny of his officers. The chief clerk in the war department under Bouchotte was Vincent, a young frantic Cordelier, one of the most dangerous and turbulent spirits of the era. This person had gained complete sway over the mind of Bouchotte, disposed of all appointments, and assailed the generals with an effrontery and rigour truly surprising. Ronsin, the same comptroller who had been commissioned to Dumouriez when his contracts in Belgium were cancelled, being in great esteem with Bouchotte and his minion Vincent, was the chief of their agents in La Vendée, under the appellation of assistant-minister. Beneath him were Momoro, a printer, Grammont, a comedian, and several others, who acted in the same spirit and with the like violence.

Westermann, previously on indifferent terms with these parties, came to an open rupture with them by an act of promptitude and vigour. One Rossignol, formerly a journeyman jeweller, who had gained notoriety on the 20th June and the 10th August, and who commanded one of the battalions of the Orleans muster, was in the list of those new officers favoured by the Cordelier minister. Carousing one day with some of Westermann's troops, he told them that soldiers ought not to be the slaves of officers, that Biron was a *ci-devant** and a traitor, and that the inhabitants ought to be turned out of their houses to accommodate the troops. Westermann caused him to be arrested and delivered over to the military tribunals: Ronsin forthwith demanded his release, and forwarded to Paris a denunciation against Westermann.

Westermann, disregarding the maledictions of the Cordelier emissaries, marched forward with his legion, designing to penetrate into the very heart of the country. Starting from the side opposite the Loire, that is to say, from the south of the theatre of the war, he first of all seized upon Parthenay, and next entered Amaillou, setting fire to this latter town in reprisal of enormities on the part of M. de Lescure. That Vendéan chief, on entering Parthenay, had treated with great severity the inhabitants, who were suspected of revolutionary tendencies. Westermann drove out all the inhabitants of Amaillou, and sent them to Parthenay by way of indemnity; he then burnt the mansion of Clisson, belonging to Lescure, and every where spread terror by the rapidity of his march and the exaggerated reports of his military executions. Westermann was not of a cruel disposition, yet he commenced those disastrous reprisals which desolated neutral districts, always accused by each party of having favoured its adversaries. All fled before him to Châtillon, where the families of the Vendéan chiefs and the remnants of their armies were assembled. Westermann, not fearing to risk himself in the centre of the insurgent country, penetrated to Châtillon on the 3d July, driving precipitately from its protection the supreme council and the staff, which were there located as in their capital. The fame of this daring exploit was propagated far and wide; but the position of Westermann was full of hazard. The Vendéan chiefs had fallen back, rung the tocsin throughout the land, assembled a considerable army, and made dispositions to surprise him on the side he least expected an attack. He had planted a post upon an eminence out of Châtillon, which commanded all the environs. The Vendéans, creeping stealthily forward, according to their usual tactics, suddenly surrounded this post, and commenced an assault on all sides. Westermann, apprised of the attack somewhat tardily, hastened to

* [Meaning a *late* member of the extinguished privileged classes.]

support the position, but the detachments he sent out were repulsed and thrown back upon Châtillon. A panic then seized upon the republican troops, and they abandoned the place in disorder. Westermann himself, after performing prodigies of valour, was borne away in the flight, and obliged to save himself in all haste, leaving behind him a great number of men dead and prisoners. This check caused as much despondency in the public mind, as the early temerity and success of the expedition had given rise to presumption and sanguine expectations.

Whilst these events were passing at Châtillon, Biron had agreed upon a plan of operations with Canclaux. They were both to descend as far as Nantes, sweep the left bank of the Loire, diverge towards Machecoul, effect a junction with Boulard, who was to advance from Sables; and, after having thus separated the Vendéans from the sea, march into Upper Vendée to subdue the whole country. The representatives protested against this plan; they alleged that in order to penetrate into the country, the generals ought to start from the points they then occupied, push forward to the bridges of Cé, with the troops assembled at Angers, and support their movement by a parallel column to advance from Niort. Biron, finding his views thus thwarted, gave in his resignation. But, at that precise moment, the discomfiture of Châtillon was learnt, and the entire disaster charged upon Biron. He was upbraided with having left Nantes to incur the hazard of a siege, and with not having seconded Westermann. Upon the denunciation of Ronsin and his comrades, he was ordered to the bar of the convention. Westermann was put under accusation also, and Rossignol immediately liberated. Such was the fate of the generals in La Vendée amongst the Jacobin emissaries.

General Labarolière succeeded to the command of the troops left at Angers by Biron, and prepared to advance into the country by the bridges of Cé, according to the views of the representatives. After fixing 1400 men at Saumur and 1500 at the bridges of Cé, he pushed on to Brissac, where he stationed a post to secure his communications. His undisciplined army committed the most frightful ravages in a country devoted to the republic. On the 15th July, it was attacked in the camp of Fline by 20,000 Vendéans. The advanced guard, composed of regular troops, resisted with fortitude. The main body, however, was on the verge of flight, when the Vendéans, forestalling it in that purpose, themselves retreated in great disorder. The new battalions thereupon exhibited some degree of ardour; and, in order to encourage them, they were rewarded with praises which the advanced guard alone had merited. On the 17th, the army proceeded to the vicinity of Vihiers; and a fresh attack, received and sustained with the same vigour by the advanced guard, was again repelled. In the course of the day Vihiers itself was occupied. Several of the general officers entertaining the opinion that the battalions of Orleans were too indifferently organised to keep the field, and that with such an army it was impossible to remain amidst a hostile country, strongly counselled a retreat. Labarolière decided that it was expedient to remain at Vihiers, and act on the defensive if attacked. On the 18th, an hour after mid-day, the Vendéans made their appearance; the republican advanced guard displayed its usual gallantry, but the rest of the army shrunk at sight of the enemy, and recoiled in spite of all the efforts of the generals. The Parisian battalions, more disposed to shout "treachery" than to fight, retreated in the utmost disorder. The confusion became general. Santerre, who had dashed into the fray with the greatest intrepidity, narrowly escaped being taken prisoner. The representative Bourbotte was exposed to similar danger; and the army fled so swiftly that in a few hours it had gained Saumur. The division of Niort, which was preparing to move forward, stopped short, and on the 20th it was decided that it should await the re-organisation of the column of Saumur. As some one was to be made answerable for the defeat, Ronsin and his agents denounced the head of the staff, Berthier, and General Menou, who both passed for aristocrats, because they recommended the enforcement of discipline. Berthier and Menou were forthwith ordered to Paris, as had previously been Biron and Westermann.

The fortune of this war, up to the present period, therefore, had thus ruled. The Vendéans, suddenly rising in April and May, had taken Thouars, Loudun, Doué, and Saumur, favoured by the wretched quality of the troops opposed to them, who were nearly all raw recruits. Pouring down as far as Nantes in June, they had been repulsed from that town by Canclaux, and from Sables by Boulard, two generals who possessed the art of establishing order and discipline amongst their soldiers. Westermann, impetuous and valiant, and having some good troops under his command, had penetrated even to Châtillon towards the close of June; but, betrayed by the inhabitants and surprised by the insurgents, he had sustained a signal defeat. Lastly, the column of Tours, designing to advance into the country in conjunction with the battalions of Orleans, had experienced the fate usual to disorganised armies. At the end of July, therefore, the Vendéans were victorious throughout the whole extent of their territory. As to the brave and unfortunate Biron, accused of not being at Nantes when he was visiting Lower Vendée, and of not being with Westermann whilst he was settling a plan of campaign with Canclaux, thwarted and interrupted in all his operations, he had been removed from the army without enjoying any opportunity of signalising himself, his whole sojourn with it having been one continued persecution. Canclaux still remained at Nantes, but the brave Boulard was no longer in command at Sables, and the two battalions of the Gironde had recently withdrawn. The description of La Vendée in July may consequently be thus summed up:—total discomfiture of all the columns in the upper country; complaints and denunciations of the ministerial agents against the generals as alleged aristocrats, and recriminations of the generals against the disorganisers commissioned by the minister and the Jacobins.

Towards the east and the north, the sieges of Mayence and Valenciennes were making alarming progress.

Mayence, situated on the left bank of the Rhine, on the French side, and opposite the mouth of the Maine, forms a large semicircle, whereof the Rhine may be deemed the cord. A considerable suburb, that of Cassel, built on the other bank, communicates with the place by a bridge of boats. The islet of Petersau, situated below Mayence, elongates upwards, its extreme point projecting sufficiently far to be within gunshot of the bridge of boats, and to take the defences of the fortress in flank. On the side of the river, Mayence is protected only by a wall of brick, but on the land side it is fortified most elaborately. Starting from the shore, opposite the point of Petersau, it is defended by an enclosure and a moat, into which flows the rivulet of Zahlbach on its course to the Rhine. At the extremity of this moat, the fort of Hauptstein sweeps its length, combining the protection of its fire to that of the water. Proceeding from this point, the wall continues and rejoins the upper course of the Rhine, but the moat intermits, and is replaced by a second enclosure parallel to the first. Thus, on this side, two rows of walls require a double siege. The citadel, connected with the double enclosure, serves materially to augment its strength.

Such was Mayence in 1793, even before all its fortifications had been completed. The garrison amounted to 20,000 men, because General Schaal, who was directed to retire with a division, had been thrown back into the town, after unsuccessfully attempting to join Custine's army. The magazines of victual

were sadly disproportioned to so large a garrison. In the uncertainty that had prevailed whether Mayence was to be retained or not, little alacrity had been manifested in provisioning it. Custine had eventually issued his orders to that effect. The Jews had come forward, but proposed terms of characteristic astuteness; they demanded that all the convoys intercepted on the route by the enemy should be paid for. Rewbel and Merlin refused this offer, apprehensive that the Israelites would themselves contrive to rob the convoys. The granaries, notwithstanding, were well filled with corn; but it was foreseen that if the mills planted on the river were destroyed, it would be impossible to grind it. Animal food was in scanty store, and the forage especially was quite insufficient for the 3000 horses of the garrison. The artillery was composed of one hundred and thirty pieces of bronze, and sixty of iron, which had been found in the place, and were extremely defective; the French had brought eighty in an efficient state. There was consequently an ample supply of guns to mount the ramparts, but powder was in deficient quantity. The scientific and intrepid Meunier, who had executed the works at Cherbourg, was charged with the defence of Cassel and the posts on the right bank; Doyré directed the operations in the body of the place; Aubert-Dubayet and Kléber commanded the troops; the representatives Rewbel and Merlin encouraged the garrison by their presence. The troops were encamped in the interval between the two enclosures, and occupied at a distance advanced posts. They were animated with the best spirit, reposing great confidence in the strength of the place, in the ability of their leaders, and in their own powers. Moreover, they were deeply sensible that to them was intrusted the defence of a most important point for the safety of France.

General Schoenfeld, encamped on the right bank, encompassed Cassel with 10,000 Hessians. The Austrians and Prussians conjoined formed the grand attack on Mayence. The Austrians occupied the right of the besieging force. In front of the double enclosure, the Prussians composed the centre at Marienbourg, where the head-quarters of the King of Prussia were fixed. The left, likewise composed of Prussians, encamped in front of the fort Hauptstein and the moat inundated by the waters from the rivulet of Zahlbach. The besieging army scarcely amounted to 50,000 men. The aged Kalkreuth held the chief direction. Brunswick commanded a corps of observation on the side of the Vosges, where he acted in concert with Wurmser to protect the main operations. Proving deficient in heavy besieging artillery, a negotiation was opened with the states of Holland, who again denuded their arsenals to aid the progress of their most formidable neighbours.

The investment began in April. Whilst awaiting the convoys of artillery, the offensive fell to the garrison, which omitted no opportunity of making most vigorous sallies. On the 11th April, a few days after the investment, the French generals resolved to attempt a surprise upon Schoenfeld and his Hessians, who were too widely extended on the right bank. Accordingly, during the night, they left Cassel in three columns. Meunier marched straight forward on Hocheim; the two others descended the river towards Biberich; but a musket suddenly discharged in the column of General Schaal threw the ranks into confusion. The troops, still new in war, had not yet acquired that firmness they soon after attained under their able leaders. It was found necessary to retire. Kléber protected the retreat with his column in a manner sufficient to impose respect. This sally availed the besieged forty oxen and cows, which were salted.

On the 16th, the enemy attempted to carry the post of Weissenau, which, placed near the Rhine and to the right of his attack, greatly incommoded him. The French, despite the conflagration of the village, intrenched themselves in a cemetery; the representative Merlin vaulted into the midst of them, and by an admirable display of cool intrepidity they preserved the post.

On the 26th the Prussians dispatched a pretended envoy, who stated he had been sent by the general of the army of the Rhine to advise the garrison to surrender. Generals, representatives, soldiers, already attached to the place, and convinced they were rendering signal service by detaining the army of the Rhine on the frontier, all indignantly rejected the suggestion. On the 3d May the King of Prussia determined to take a post on the right bank, near Cassel, that of Kosteim. Meunier superintended the defence in person. The assault, attempted on the 3d May with formidable obstinacy, and renewed on the 8th, was finally repelled with considerable loss to the besiegers. Meunier, on his part, essayed an attack on the islets situated at the mouth of the Maine. He took them, then lost them, and in each instance displayed an exemplary valour.

On the 30th May, the French executed a general sally on Marienbourg, which King Frederick William had selected as his station. Favoured by the darkness, 6000 men passed through the hostile lines, seized upon the intrenchments, and penetrated even to the royal quarters. However, the alarm being given, they had shortly the whole Prussian army upon their hands, and they retreated, leaving a considerable number of their comrades in the dust. The following day, the King of Prussia, full of wrath at the insult, opened a tremendous fire on the town. That same day, Meunier made a fresh attempt on one of the isles of the Maine. Wounded in the knee, he breathed his last, less as a consequence of his wound than of the irritation he suffered in being obliged to quit the operations of the defence. The whole garrison assisted at his obsequies; the King of Prussia caused the fire to be suspended whilst the last honours were rendering to this hero, and saluted his interment by a salvo of artillery. The body was deposited at the angle of the bastion of Cassel, which he had himself erected.

In the mean time, the heavy convoys arrived from Holland, and the serious business of the siege commenced. A Prussian officer tendered counsel to the effect, that the islet of Petersau, the extremity of which projected between Cassel and Mayence, should be taken possession of, batteries thereon erected, the bridge of boats and the mills destroyed, and Cassel assaulted, so soon as it was isolated and deprived of aid from the fortress. Thereafter he proposed to advance to the moat through which the Zahlbach flowed, cross it under protection of the batteries of Petersau, which would enfilade the moat, and attempt an assault upon that side, which was defended by only one enclosure. This project was daring and hazardous, since it involved the necessity of disembarking at Petersau, and subsequently crossing a moat filled with water and swept by the fire of Hauptstein; but the results it promised would be of speedy realisation if successful. It was deemed expedient, however, to go more cautiously to work; to open a trench on the side of the double enclosure, and in front of the citadel, even under the penalty of making a double siege.

On the 16th June, a first parallel was traced, eight hundred paces from the first wall. The besieged threw the works into disorder, and it was found necessary to abandon them. On the 18th, a fresh parallel was traced at a much greater distance, that is to say, at fifteen hundred paces, which cautious interval provoked sundry sneers on the part of those who had supported the bolder scheme by the isle of Petersau. Between the 24th and the 25th, a further approach was made; the besiegers established themselves at eight hundred paces, and erected batteries. The besieged again molested the works and spiked the guns but they were ultimately repulsed, and overwhelmed by an exterminating fire. On the 28th and 29th, two

hundred pieces were brought to bear upon the place, and covered it with projectiles of all sorts. Floating batteries, constructed upon the Rhine, bombarded the interior of the town on its most unprotected quarter, and caused considerable damage.

Nevertheless, the last parallel was not yet opened, the outer enclosure was not yet scaled, and the garrison, full of undiminished ardour, gave not a thought towards surrender. To get rid of the floating batteries, some hardy Frenchmen swam into the stream, and cut the cables of the enemy's boats. In presence of both armies, these men were seen hauling as they swam a large boat, filled with eighty soldiers, who were all made prisoners.

But deplorable distress began to prevail. The mills had been burnt, and in order to grind the corn it was necessary to employ hand-mills. The workmen soon refused to labour at them, because the enemy, advertised of the fact, took care to pour a constant shower of shells on the spot where they were placed. Moreover, the corn was almost entirely exhausted; for some time, the only animal food to be obtained had been the flesh of horses. The common soldiers devoured rats, and went on the banks of the Rhine to hook up any dead horses the river might bear past. Such food proved fatal to many amongst them; it became indispensable to issue a prohibition against its use, and even to plant guards on the shore of the river to prevent them searching for it. A cat was worth six francs; the flesh of a dead horse forty-five sous the pound. The officers fared no better than the soldiers, and Aubert-Dubayet, regaling his staff at dinner, set before its members, as the complement of viands, a cat flanked by twelve mice.

What was still more afflictive to this unfortunate garrison, was the total deprivation of intelligence. The communications were so effectually intercepted, that for three months it was kept in absolute ignorance of what was passing in France. It had endeavoured to make known its distress, first by a lady who was about to travel in Switzerland, next by a priest who had taken the road to the Low Countries, and lastly, by a spy who was to traverse the hostile camp. But all of these dispatches had miscarried. Conceiving that the plan of transmitting intelligence from the Upper Rhine by means of bottles thrown into the river might probably be adopted, the besieged extended nets across the stream. They assiduously drew them every day, but never found any thing to relieve their anxiety. The Prussians, who had practised every variety of stratagem, caused false Moniteurs to be printed at Frankfort, importing that Dumouriez had overturned the convention, and that Louis XVII. was on the throne with a regency. The German soldiers on the advanced posts handed these false *Moniteurs* to the soldiers of the garrison, and their perusal occasioned the greatest disquietude, adding to the sufferings already in endurance the dreadful apprehension of their possibly defending a ruined cause. Nevertheless, they were content to wait, saying to each other, "The army of the Rhine will soon arrive." Sometimes their hopes were more eager, and they said, "At last, it is here." One night they heard a brisk cannonade at a considerable distance. They started joyfully to their feet, grasped their arms, and prepared to march towards the French cannon, and place the enemy between two fires. Delusive expectation! The sound died away, and no liberating army appeared. At length, the misery had reached so insupportable an extremity, that 2000 inhabitants demanded leave to quit the town. Aubert-Dubayet granted their request; but they were not received by the besiegers, and, remaining between two fires, many cruelly perished beneath the walls. In the morning, the soldiers were seen carrying wounded children in their cloaks.

During all this period, the army of the Rhine and Moselle moved not a step in advance. Custine had commanded it until the month of June. Still in the deep dejection of his retreat, he had continued in a state of irresolution during the entire months of April and May. He alleged that he was not sufficiently strong; that he needed a powerful body of cavalry to cope with that of the enemy in the plains of the Palatinate; that he had no provender to feed his horses; that he must wait until the rye was sufficiently advanced to convert it into forage, and that he would then march to the relief of Mayence.* Beauharnais, his successor, hesitating with the like infirmity of purpose, allowed the opportunity of saving the place to escape. The line of the Vosges, as we know, skirts the Rhine, and terminates not far from Mayence. By occupying the two flanks of the chain and its principal passes, an army possesses a great advantage, because it can be concentrated either wholly on one side or wholly on the other, and thus enabled to overwhelm an enemy by its united masses. Such was the position of the French. The army of the Rhine occupied the eastern flank, and that of the Moselle the western. Brunswick and Wurmser were scattered, at the termination of the chain, along a very extensive cordon. In possession of the passes, the two French armies might have united upon one or other of the two flanks, overpowered either Brunswick or Wurmser, taken the besiegers in the rear, and saved Mayence. Beauharnais, brave but unenterprising, merely executed some uncertain movements, and afforded no relief to the garrison.

The representatives and generals immured in Mayence, reflecting upon the situation of affairs, considered that they were by no means called upon to drive things to the very last extremity; that if they waited eight days longer, they would be in complete destitution, and must surrender as prisoners of war; but that, on the other hand, by capitulating, they would obtain free egress with the honours of war, and preserve 20,000 men, become under Kléber and Dubayet the best soldiers of the republic; for which sufficient reasons they came to the conclusion that the town ought to be surrendered. Doubtless Beauharnais might in a few days advance to its relief, but after having waited so long in vain, they were justified in abandoning all hope of such aid, and the motives inducing them to surrender were potential. The King of Prussia was compliant as to conditions; he allowed the garrison to march out with arms and baggage, and imposed but one stipulation, namely, that it should not serve for one year against the allies. But there were sufficient enemies in the interior to beneficially occupy those admirable soldiers, subsequently known as the *Mayencers*. They were so attached to their post, that they hesitated to obey their generals when it became necessary to move out of the town—a singular instance of military spirit fixing doggedly on a particular point, and of attachment formed for a place solely recommended by a hazardous defence of some months! However, the garrison yielded upon remonstrance; and whilst it defiled past, the King of Prussia, seized with admiration for its valour, called by their names those officers who had distinguished themselves during the siege, and complimented them with chivalric courtesy. The evacuation took place on the 25th July.

We left the Austrians blockading the fortress of Condé and prosecuting the regular siege of Valenciennes. These operations, carried on simultaneously with those on the Rhine, were also approaching their termination. The Prince of Cobourg, at the head of the corps of observation, took up a position in front of Cæsar's camp, whilst the Duke of York commanded the besieging force. The attack, first projected on the citadel, was ultimately directed between the suburb of Marly and the Mons gate. An ample range of defences was developed on this surface, but it was less guarded by the garrison, and was preferred as being more easy of approach. It was determined to cannonade the works during the day, and to bombard the

* The reader may consult the report of Custine's trial.

town during the night, the more effectually to spread desolation amongst the inhabitants, and the sooner terrify them into submission. The place was summoned on the 14th June. General Ferrand and the representatives Cochon and Briest returned an answer couched in terms of befitting dignity. They had mustered a garrison of 7000 men, and inspired the inhabitants with most favourable sentiments, a part of whom they organised into artillery companies, which rendered essential service.

Two parallels were successively opened during the nights of the 14th and 19th June, and endowed with formidable batteries. These caused frightful ravages in the town. The inhabitants and the garrison briskly responded to the vigour of the attack, and several times destroyed the works of the besiegers. The 25th June, in particular, was terrific beyond example. The enemy bombarded the place until mid-day, without any rejoinder on its part; but at that hour an awful fire, bursting from all the ramparts, swept into the trenches, retorting the confusion, dismay, and death, which had prevailed in the town. On the 28th June, a third parallel was traced, and the courage of the inhabitants began to give way. A considerable part of that flourishing town was already laid in ashes. The children, old men, and women, had been deposited in the cellars as places of security. The reduction of Condé, which had just been taken by famine, still further augmented the dejection of the besieged. Emissaries also had been sent to agitate amongst them. Crowds began to collect, demanding a capitulation. The municipality partook the feelings of the inhabitants, and secretly acted in concert with them. The representatives and General Ferrand repudiated with emphatic determination the demands addressed to them, and with the aid of the garrison, whose courage had warmed into high exaltation, they dispersed the riotous assemblages.

On the 25th July the besiegers prepared their mines and made dispositions to assault the covered way. Fortunately for them, three globes of compression exploded at the very moment the mines of the besieged were about to start and destroy their works. They thereupon sprang forward in three columns, cleared the palisades, and penetrated into the covered way. The garrison, struck with terror, recoiled, and abandoned its batteries, but General Ferrand led it back to the ramparts. The artillery, which had worked marvels during the whole siege, again caused tremendous havoc amongst the besiegers, and stopped them almost on the threshold of the fortress. On the morrow, being the 26th July, the Duke of York summoned General Ferrand to surrender, announcing that, after the lapse of that day, he would listen to no proposition, but that both the inhabitants and the garrison would be put to the edge of the sword. At this terrible menace, the people flocked together in considerable crowds: one vast multitude, in which were interspersed men armed with pistols and daggers, surrounded the municipality. Twelve individuals emerged as representatives of all, and presented a formal requisition to surrender. A council of war was sitting amidst the tumult; none of its members could gain egress, all of them being confined until they had decided upon the surrender. Two practicable breaches, hostile inhabitants, and a vigorous assailant, rendered further resistance fruitless. The town was yielded up on the 28th July. The garrison issued forth with the honours of war, was constrained to lay down its arms, but had permission to re-enter France, under the sole condition of not serving for a year against the allies. Thus other 7000 brave soldiers were provided to do efficient service against the enemies of the interior. Valenciennes had sustained a bombardment of forty-one days, and 84,000 balls, 20,000 shells, and 48,000 bombs had been thrown into the town. The general and the garrison had performed all that duty demanded, and the artillery had reaped a vast renown.

At this instant, the war of federalism was reduced to its two grand calamities—the revolt of Lyons on the one hand, and that of Marseilles and Toulon on the other.

Lyons, indeed, consented to acknowledge the convention, but refused to obey two decrees, the one removing to Paris the proceedings commenced against the patriots, the other superseding the authorities, and enjoining the formation of a new provisional municipality. The secret royalists in Lyons affrighted imaginations by depicturing the return of the old Mountaineer municipality, and, by instilling alarm at doubtful and uncertain dangers, drew the city into all the real and inevitable hazards of an open insurrection. On the 15th July, the Lyonnese put the two patriots Chalier and Riard to death, and from that moment they were proclaimed in a state of rebellion. The two Girondists, Chasset and Biroteau, perceiving royalism rearing its head, withdrew from the scene. The president of the popular commission, who was devoted to the emigrants, having, however, been displaced, the manifestations abated somewhat of their hostility. The constitution was recognised, and offers of submission tendered, but always on condition of not executing the two obnoxious decrees. In the interim, the leaders were indefatigable in founding cannon and forming magazines of all warlike stores; and it seemed but too certain that the difficulties could be terminated only by an appeal to arms.

Marseilles was infinitely less formidable. Its battalions, driven beyond the Durance by Cartaux, were incapable of sustaining a long resistance; but it had communicated its spirit of revolt to the city of Toulon, hitherto so emphatically republican. This port, one of the first in the world, and incomparably the first in the Mediterranean, excited the cupidity of the English, who were cruising before its docks. Emissaries of England were furtively at intrigue within it, and laying the train for an infamous perfidy. The sections had assembled on the 13th July, and, proceeding like all those of the south, had superseded the municipality and closed the Jacobin Club. Authority, now transferred to the hands of the federalists, might readily pass, as it moved successively from faction to faction, into those of the emigrants and the English. The army of Nice, in its existing state of weakness, was utterly unable to prevent so direful a calamity. The worst anticipations, therefore, became feasible: that murky tempest, long piled upon the whole horizon of the south, had eventually settled over two prominent points, Lyons and Toulon.

During the last two months, the situation of France had been more clearly displayed, and the danger, less general and astounding, was more distinctly ascertained, more decisively critical. In the west was the corroding sore of La Vendée; at Marseilles an obstinate sedition; at Toulon an impending treason; at Lyons an open resistance and a siege. On the Rhine and in the north was the loss of two bulwarks, which had so long stopped the coalition, and prevented the enemy from marching on the capital. In September 1792, when the Prussians were advancing on Paris, and had taken Longwy and Verdun; in April 1793, after the retreat from Belgium, the defeat of Neerwinden, the defection of Dumouriez, and the first rising of La Vendée; on the 31st May 1793, after the general insurrection of the departments, the invasion of Roussillon by the Spaniards, and the loss of the camp of Famars—at these three periods the dangers had been truly alarming, doubtless, but never perhaps so real as at this fourth and last crisis of the revolution. France was less raw and untutored in war than in September 1792, less bewildered with the dread of treachery than in April 1793, and less embarrassed with insurrections than on the 31st May and the 2d June 1793; but if it were more inured to war and better obeyed, it was invaded at once on all points—on the north, the Rhine, the Alps, and the Pyrenees.

But we should have an imperfect conception of the evils which afflicted the republic at this era, if we restricted our contemplation to the five or six battle-fields on which human blood was so freely shed. The interior offered a spectacle equally deplorable. Corn was still scarce and dear. The people contended at the doors of the bakers to obtain a trifling quantity of bread. They vainly disputed with the dealers to induce them to accept assignats in exchange for objects of the first necessity. The wretchedness of want was exhibited in all its most startling colours. The people complained of forestallers, who engrossed the articles of consumption, and of jobbers, who enhanced their price, and threw discredit on the assignats by their traffic. The government, in the same predicament as the people, possessed as its means of existence assignats alone, which it was compelled to disburse in triple or fourfold amount, in purchase of supplies or services, and which it dared not increase in quantity, lest it should still further depreciate their value. It was therefore a matter of equal doubt how either government or people were to subsist.

The general produce, nevertheless, had not diminished. Although the famous night of the 4th August* had not yet produced all its boundless consequences, France was deficient neither in corn nor in raw or manufactured commodities; but their equal and peaceable distribution had become impossible from the inherent evils of the paper money. The revolution having, when abolishing monarchy, determined notwithstanding to pay its debts; when annulling the future sale of offices, become bound to make good their value; when, in short, defending the new order of things against confederated Europe, been obliged to incur the charges of an universal war—it, that same revolution, possessed, to support all these various burdens, the national domains taken from the clergy and the emigrants. In order to bring into circulation the value of those domains, it had imagined the assignats, which formed its representation, and which, by means of progressive sales, were intended to revert to the public exchequer, and be there committed to the flames. But as men began to doubt the ultimate success of the revolution and the validity of its dispositions, they abstained from purchasing its domains. The assignats, therefore, remained in circulation, somewhat like an unaccepted bill of exchange, and fell in credit from the conjoined influence of doubt and superabundant issue.

Specie always remained the sole standard of value; and it is scarcely necessary to say, that a suspicious and unrecognised currency suffers irreparably in competition with an undoubted and incontestible medium. The latter is kept close, and refused to be parted with, whilst the former is offered in profusion, and acquires discredit by the alacrity shown in getting rid of it. Such was the fate of the assignats with reference to the precious metals. But the revolution, long condemned to violent expedients, could not now be checked. It had put into *forced* circulation the anticipated value of the national domains; it had next to attempt the maintenance of that circulation by *forced* means. On the 11th April, despite the efforts of the Girondists, who generously though imprudently contended against the force of this revolutionary position, the convention decreed the penalty of six years' imprisonment against any person selling specie, that is to say, exchanging a certain quantity of gold or silver for a greater nominal amount of assignats. It enacted the same penalty against any person stipulating different prices for goods, according as the payment was to be made in coin or paper.

These measures were unavailing to prevent the difference from becoming daily more glaring. In June, a metallic franc was worth three paper francs; and in August, only two months afterwards, it commanded six francs in assignats. The depreciation, which was at the rate of three to one, had therefore advanced to six to one.

Under such circumstances, the dealers refused to vend their commodities at the same price as formerly, for the substantial reason, that the money offered them in exchange was but the fifth or sixth fraction of what it professed to be worth. They accordingly retained with vigilance their various stores, and resolutely withheld them from anxious purchasers. This depreciation of value in the assignats would have been of no moment whatever, undoubtedly, if the whole community, accepting them for precisely what they were worth, had taken and given them at the same standard. In such case, they might have performed the symbolic functions in exchanges, and availed as a circulating medium, equally well with any other description of currency; but the fact was differently ordered. Capitalists who lived on their incomes, and creditors of the state who received either an annual dividend or compensation for an office, were obliged to accept the paper according to its nominal value. All debtors eagerly acquitted their liabilities, and creditors, constrained to allow the factitious value, realised but the fourth, the fifth, or the sixth of their outstanding accounts. Lastly, the labouring population, from its redundancy compelled to sue for employment, to toil for whomsoever would give it, and incompetent to combine in order to enforce a triple or quadruple increase of wages in proportion to the depreciation of assignats, earned but a scanty portion of what was necessary to provide it with essential articles of consumption. The capitalist, despoiled of his legitimate property, was discontented and silent; but the people, wrathful and infuriated, stigmatised as engrossers the dealers who refused to sell them commodities at the ordinary price, and insisted that all engrossers should be sent to the guillotine.

This deplorable situation was the necessary result of the creation of assignats, as the assignats themselves were provoked by the necessity of satisfying obligations imposed by old debts, the abolition of offices, and the prosecution of a ruinous war; and, from the same inevitable tendency, it was obvious the maximum must speedily result from assignats. Trifling indeed was the benefit in rendering that currency *forced*, if the trader, by enhancing his prices, might elude the obligation to accept it. Hence it became clear, that an assize of commodities must be made imperative equally with that of money. So soon as the law had taken upon itself to declare, "this slip of paper is worth six francs," it ought to have added, "so much merchandise shall be sold for six francs;" for otherwise, the merchant, by upholding it at twelve, adroitly evaded the compulsory exchange.

It had therefore been found indispensable, regardless of the Girondists, who advanced admirable arguments based upon the ordinary economy of things, to establish the maximum on corn. The severest privation to the people is the want of bread. The crops were not deficient, but the farmers, unwilling either to face the tumult of the markets, or to part with their grain at the coercive rate of assignats, kept both themselves and their stocks in seclusion. The small quantity of produce that appeared was quickly snatched up by the communes, and by such of the affluent as apprehensions moved to lay in stores. The scarcity was more sensibly felt at Paris than in any other town of France, because the providing of supplies for so immense a city required more multifarious labours, the markets were more tumultuous, and the terror of the farmers proportionably greater. On the 3d and 4th May, the convention had found it impossible to avoid passing a decree, whereby all farmers and corn-factors were enjoined to declare the quantities of grain in their possession, to thrash out such as might be in sheaf, to convey the same to the markets, and exclusively

* [The night in the Constituent Assembly, when the feudal services were abolished. See Chapter III p. 52.]

to the markets, and there dispose of it at an average price, to be fixed by each commune, regulated according to the prices ranging from the 1st of January to the 1st of May. Moreover, by this enactment, no person was allowed to purchase, in satisfaction of his wants, more than a month's consumption; any who should buy or sell at a price exceeding the maximum, or prevaricate in their declarations, were punished by confiscation and a fine of from 300 to 1000 francs. Domiciliary visits were ordered to ascertain the truth, and a statement of all the declarations was to be sent by the municipalities to the minister for the home department, in order therefrom to construct a general statistical table of the resources of France in pulse.

The commune of Paris, superadding its ordinances of police to the decrees of the convention, had regulated the mode of distribution by the bakers of their bread. No individual was competent to present himself for a loaf, unless provided with a certificate of good conduct. Upon this certificate, which was issued by the revolutionary committees, was prescribed the quantity of bread demandable, which allowance was duly proportioned to the number of mouths in each family. These regulations extended even to the manner in which applicants were to stand at the doors of the bakers' shops. A rope was to be attached to each door, which every person was enjoined to hold in his hand, so as not to lose his turn, and to avoid confusion. Malevolent women, however, often cut these ropes. whereupon fearful tumults ensued, rendering the interposition of the armed force necessary to restore order. Thus do we see to what multifarious cares a government is condemned, and to what vexatious measures it finds itself constrained, when circumstances impose upon it the difficult task of providing for every possible contingency, even to the minutest details. But in the course of events, one measure had hung in close connexion with another. Forcing the circulation of assignats had led to forcing exchanges, to forcing prices, to forcing even the quantity, the hour, the mode of purchases; the last fact resulted from the first, and the first had been as inevitable as the revolution itself.

At the same time, the high prices which had provoked the maximum were not confined to grain, but extended to all commodities of primary importance. Animal and vegetable food as well, groceries, candles, fuel, liquors, articles of clothing, leather for shoes, all had risen in proportion as assignats had fallen, and the people grew daily more stubborn in the conviction that the dealers, in refusing to accept a valueless currency, were detestable engrossers. It will be recollected that in February they had pillaged the stores of the grocers, according to the advice of Marat. In July, they plundered some boat-loads of soap, which arrived by the Seine at Paris. The commune, indignant at the outrage, passed severe ordinances on the occasion, and Pache published the following simple and laconic warning:—

"PACHE, THE MAYOR, TO HIS FELLOW-CITIZENS.

Paris contains seven hundred thousand inhabitants. The surface of Paris produces nothing towards feeding, clothing, nourishing them; hence it follows that Paris must derive all from the other departments and from foreign countries.

If, upon the arrival of provisions and articles of merchandise at Paris, the inhabitants pillage them, they will cease to be sent.

Paris will then possess nothing to feed, clothe, or nourish its numerous inhabitants.

And seven hundred thousand men, destitute of every thing, will turn upon and devour each other."

The people plundered no more, but they fiercely clamoured for some terrible retribution on the dealers; and we have already witnessed, in fact, how readily the priest Jacques Roux stirred up the Cordeliers to insist upon an article being inserted in the constitution against engrossers and forestallers. They inveighed with equal fury against stockjobbers, who, they said, contributed to enhance prices by speculating in assignats, gold, silver, and foreign paper.

The popular imagination ran wild in its chimeras, shadowing the obnoxious parties as horrible monsters and relentless enemies, whereas in truth they were but cunning traffickers, profiting by a public calamity, but not producing it, and assuredly without the power to have produced it. The depreciation of assignats hung upon a concatenation of causes: their profuse issue—the insecurity of their hypothec, which would utterly disappear if the revolution succumbed—their comparison with specie, which never lost its intrinsic worth, and with commodities, which, always continuing valuable, could not be obtained in exchange for a debased currency. In this condition of matters, capitalists avoided keeping their funds in assignats, because in such a form they underwent a constant process of atrophy. Their first solicitude had been to procure bullion, but years of sad constraint had effectually scared both buyers and sellers of specie. Their next idea was to purchase merchandise; but it afforded a transitory investment, since it could not be kept for any considerable period, and also a dangerous possession, inasmuch as the wrath against engrossers was undiscriminating and furious. Consequently, their eyes wandered into foreign lands in quest of securities. All who held assignats eagerly sought to procure bills of exchange on London, Amsterdam, Hamburg, Geneva, on all the towns of Europe, in short; and to obtain these foreign remittances they lavished their own domestic securities, and thus greatly contributed to degrade assignats by throwing them superabundantly on the market. Some of these drafts were realised out of France, and their amounts absorbed by emigrants. Magnificent furniture, the wreck of former luxury, consisting of rich cabinets, mirrors, curious clock-work, gilded bronzes, porcelain, pictures, rare editions, &c., paid for these letters of credit, which were transmuted into guineas or ducats. But the greater part of them were not attempted to be realised. In anxious request amongst alarmed capitalists, who had no intention of emigrating, but desired simply to ensure a solid guarantee for their wealth, they almost all remained in the country, and passed currently from one shuddering money-owner to another. They thus formed a peculiar floating capital, guaranteed by foreigners, and became formidable competitors with the home assignats. There is reason to believe that Pitt had engaged the English bankers to accept a great quantity of this paper, and had even opened for the purpose a considerable credit, in order to augment the mass in circulation, and by such means to accelerate the utter discredit of the assignats.

Considerable eagerness was likewise evinced to obtain shares in banking associations, which seemed beyond the influence of either revolution or counter-revolution, and which offered, moreover, an advantageous investment. Those of the discount company were in great demand; but the stock of the India company was sought after with especial avidity, because it rested, as it were, on an unseizable basis, the capital being invested in ships and factories established in various quarters of the globe. It was in vain that a heavy duty had been imposed on transfers; the directors evaded the law by abolishing bonds, and substituting for them a simple inscription on the registers of the company, which was effected without any formality. They thus defrauded the state of a considerable revenue, for several thousands of bargains were made every day, and all the precautions taken to suppress stockjobbing were rendered futile. It was likewise in vain that, in order to lessen the attraction of this stock, the profits had been subjected to a tax of five per cent.; the dividends were distributed to the shareholders as repayment of capital, by which ingenious device the directors again evaded the law. Consequently, from six hundred francs, these

shares rose to one thousand twelve hundred, and even two thousand francs. They also formed so much floating medium opposed to the revolutionary currency, which contributed to discredit it.

Furthermore, the assignats had not only to contend with all these varieties of credits, but with certain parts of the public debt, and even with other peculiar assignats. Loans were still in subsistence that had been contracted at different periods and in various forms. Some went as far back as the reign of Louis XIII. Amongst the last contracted under Louis XIV., several were of separate creation. The moneyed interest generally preferred those which were anterior to the constitutional monarchy before such as had been opened for the wants of the revolution. All were in rivalry with the assignats hypothecated on the possessions of the clergy and the emigrants. In fine, between the assignats themselves certain distinctions were drawn. Out of five thousand millions issued since the first fabrication, one thousand had been redeemed by sales of national domains, leaving scarcely four thousand millions in circulation, out of which there might be five hundred millions created under Louis XVI., and impressed with the royal effigy. These last-named would be more favourably considered, it was imagined, in the event of a counter-revolution, and admitted for at least a portion of their value. Accordingly, they bore a premium of ten or fifteen per cent. above the others. The republican assignats, the sole resource of the government, the only currency of the people, were thus infinitely depressed, competing at such heavy disadvantage against bullion, merchandise, foreign drafts, commercial and banking shares, various state obligations, and, lastly, royal assignats.

The compensation for offices, the payment for the extensive supplies furnished to the state in its war contracts, and the promptitude of debtors in redeeming their liabilities, had occasioned great accumulations of funds in a few hands. The war and the brooding dread of fresh convulsions had deplorably interrupted commercial operations, led to divers considerable windings-up and liquidations, and thus further augmented the mass of stagnant capital seeking for safe investment. The funds thus amassed were recklessly abandoned to constant stockjobbing on the Parisian Exchange, being alternately converted into gold, silver, commodities, bills, stocks, old state debts, &c. Upon that busy scene, as usual, appeared those adventurous spirits who cast themselves headlong into all schemes of hazard, speculating on the accidents of trade, on army and other government contracts, on the stability and good faith of states, &c. Close observers of all avenues to gain, they derived profit on every successive enhancement, caused by the constant depression of assignats. The debasement of the assignat, in fact, first of all commenced on the exchange, by quotations of its relative value to specie and all the other floating securities. It afterwards extended with reference to commodities, which were held at advanced rates in the shops and markets. At the same time, the augmentation was not so rapidly developed on commodities as on the precious metals or more favoured investments, because the markets were distant from the exchange, and were less sensitive; moreover, because the dealers could not enter into concert with the promptitude of jobbers gathered into a single hall. The difference, therefore, first determined on 'Change, was not acted upon elsewhere until after an interval of longer or shorter duration; and the assignat of five francs, which had been ruled on the stock-market as worth but two francs, being still current outside for three francs, the speculators had ample opportunity of operating to advantage. Holding their funds disposable, they caught at bullion before the rise; when it advanced in relation to assignats, they exchanged it for the latter; thus obtaining an increased amount, before merchandise had time to be affected by the enhancement, they therewith purchased a larger quantity of goods, which they re-sold when the proportion was re-established. Consequently their trade consisted in monopolising specie and merchandise, whilst both were rising in value with reference to assignats. Their gain was simply the constant profit deducible from the enhancement of all articles as to the assignat; and it was natural that an advantage so peculiarly owing to a public calamity should be viewed with disgust. Their speculations extended to variations in all sorts of securities, such as foreign paper, shares in companies, &c. &c. They availed themselves of all accidents capable of provoking differences or fluctuations, such as a defeat, an important motion, or false intelligence.

The persons engaged in this species of traffic formed a considerable class. Amongst them were foreign bankers, contractors, usurers, former priests and nobles, recent revolutionary upstarts, and deputies, who, for the honour of the convention, did not exceed five or six, and who enjoyed the disgraceful advantage of contributing to fluctuations by adroitly designed motions. They lived in a course of dissipation with actresses, or former nuns and countesses, who sometimes forsook their character of mistresses to interfere in more serious affairs. The two principal deputies immersed in these intrigues were Julien of Toulouse and Delaunay of Angers, who cohabited, the first with the Countess of Beaufort, the second with the actress Descoings. It is alleged that Chabot, of dissolute manners as an ex-capuchin, and often occupied on financial subjects, was devoted to this abominable jobbing, in concert with two brothers named Frey, expelled from Moravia for their revolutionary opinions, and settled at Paris in the calling of bankers. Fabre d'Eglantine was likewise implicated, and even Danton was accused, though without any overt act being assigned, of not being altogether free from the foul reproach.

The most shameless scheme of all was that devised by the Baron de Batz, a banker and astute financier, in conjunction with Julien of Toulouse and Delaunay of Angers, the two deputies most decidedly bent on making money. These persons formed the project of denouncing the malversations of the India Company, thereby depressing its stock, buying-in at the reduction, restoring the value by means of milder motions, and thus reaping the profit of the rise. D'Espagnac, that reprobate abbé whom we remember as Dumouricz's contractor in Belgium, who had since that period obtained the general contract for waggons, and whose bargains Julien protected in the convention, was from gratitude to furnish the funds for this operation. Julien purposed to draw into this scheme likewise Fabre, Chabot, and others, who might become useful as members of different committees.

The majority of these men were attached to the revolution, and were actuated certainly by no wish to injure it; but at the same time, and at all hazards, they were resolute to secure money and the means of commanding enjoyments. The public was unacquainted with the full extent of their secret manœuvres, but, as they were known to speculate on the discredit of assignats, the evil by which they profited was laid to their charge. Inasmuch as there were several foreign bankers associated with them in the same pursuits, they were styled agents of Pitt and the coalition; and here again the mysterious and dreaded influence of the English minister was imagined to be at work. In short, indignation was equally aroused against stockjobbers and engrossers, and the condign punishment of both orders of delinquents was invoked with uniform vehemence and pertinacity.

Thus, whilst towards the north, the Rhine, the south, and La Vendée, the enemies of France were predominant, its financial resources depended on a repudiated currency, whereof the security was uncertain as the revolution itself, and which, at every accident, fell in value according to the extent of the danger.

Hence resulted this singular position: in proportion as the peril augmented, and the means ought to have become greater, they on the contrary contracted; munitions of war were unattainable by the government and provisions by the people. It was therefore necessary to create at once soldiers, armies, and an effective currency for the government and for the people; and after all these marvels, to perform the still greater miracle of ensuring victories.

CHAPTER XXV.

FESTIVAL OF THE 10TH AUGUST, AND INAUGURATION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF 1793.—EXTRAORDINARY MEASURES, MILITARY, ADMINISTRATIVE, AND FINANCIAL, OCCASIONED BY THE IMMINENT DANGERS OF THE COUNTRY.—DECREES OF VENGEANCE.

The delegates commissioned by the primary assemblies to attend the celebration of the anniversary of the 10th August, and to accept the constitution in behalf of all France, had in the interim arrived at Paris. It was determined to seize this occasion to excite a movement of enthusiasm, to reconcile the provinces with the capital, and to elicit heroic resolutions. A brilliant reception was prepared for them. The dealers were summoned into the city from all the environs, with their commodities. Vast quantities of provisions were accumulated, in order that no dearth might mar the festivities, and the delegates enjoy the spectacle of combined peace, order, and abundance. Attention was carried to so scrupulous a point, that the directors of public conveyances were ordered to give them seats, even those which might have been already secured by travellers. The administration of the department, which emulated that of the commune in the harsh austerity of its language and proclamations, published an address to "the brethren" of the primary assemblies, couched in these terms:—

"Here, men, assuming the mask of patriotism, will speak to you with enthusiasm of liberty, of equality, of the republic one and indivisible, whilst in the recesses of their hearts they crave and pray only for the re-establishment of royalty and the dismemberment of their country. Such men are the rich: the rich in all eras have abhorred virtue and contaminated manners. There, you will meet depraved women, too seductive in their charms, who will conspire with them to beguile you into vice. Beware—beware, above all, of the former Palais-Royal; it is in that garden you will encounter such snares. That famous garden, the cradle of the revolution, of old the asylum of the friends of liberty and equality, is at this day, in spite of our active precautions, the mere common sewer of society, the haunt of miscreants, the den of all conspirators. Shun that infected spot; prefer, to the dangerous spectacle of luxury and debauchery, the inspiring scenes of industrious virtue; visit the faubourgs, the founders of our liberty; enter the workshops, where men, active, simple, and virtuous as yourselves, and like you ready to defend the country, have long expected you, to tighten the bands of fraternity. Come, especially, into our popular societies. Let us unite, let us animate our courage before these fresh dangers of the country, and let us swear for the last time the death and destruction of all tyrants!"

The first care was to entice them to the Jacobin Club, which greeted them with a most cordial welcome, and offered them its hall to assemble in during their stay. The delegates accepted the offer; and it was agreed they should deliberate in the society itself, and be incorporated with it whilst at Paris. Hence it occurred that the capital was merely favoured for a time with four hundred Jacobins the more. The club, which was accustomed to sit every alternate day, resolved to meet daily for the important purpose of discussing measures of public welfare with the delegates of the departments. A report was circulated that some amongst these delegates were inclined towards indulgence, and held instructions to demand a general amnesty on the day set apart for the acceptance of the constitution. In fact, certain individuals had suggested this expedient as a means of saving the Girondists and all others detained for political causes. But the Jacobins were adverse to any composition, energy and vengeance being to them indispensable concomitants. "The delegates of the primary assemblies had been calumniated," said Hassenfratz, "by a rumour busily propagated that they purposed proposing an amnesty; they were incapable of such conduct, and would unite with the Jacobins in demanding, conjointly with urgent measures for public safety, the punishment of all traitors." The delegates deemed this a significant intimation; and if any, few at all events, ever entertained the project of an amnesty, none ventured to give it utterance.

On the morning of the 7th August, they were conducted to the commune, and from the commune to the Evêché, where the club of electors was held, and wherein had been concocted the 31st May. Therein it was determined should be effected the reconciliation of the departments with Paris, since the attack upon the national representation had thence originated. The Mayor Pache, the procurator Chaumette, and the whole municipality, marching at their head, ushered the delegates into the association of the Evêché. On both sides satisfactory harangues were pronounced; the Parisians declared they had never dreamt of contemning or usurping the rights of the departments; the delegates in return acknowledged that Paris had been calumniated; whereupon they mingled in a general embrace, and gave way to the spontaneous feelings of enthusiasm. The idea suddenly started in their minds to repair to the convention, in order that it might rejoice in the knowledge of this happy reconciliation. Accordingly, they forthwith proceeded thither, and were introduced the moment of their arrival. The debate was suspended, and one of the delegates stepped forward to address the assembly.

"Citizen representatives," said he, "we have come to let you know how joyful and affecting a scene has just occurred in the hall of the electors, whither we had gone to give the kiss of peace to our brethren of Paris. Speedily, we trust, the heads of all calumniators of this republican city will fall under the sword of the law. We are all Mountaineers. Long live the Mountain!"

Another suggested that the representatives should give the delegates the kiss fraternal. Instantly the members of the assembly left their seats and rushed into the arms of the departmental delegates. After some moments passed in the tender emotions natural to such a scene, the delegates defiled through the hall, uttering cries of "Long live the Mountain! The republic for ever!" and chanting in full chorus—

"La Montagne nous a sauvé
En congediant Gensonné;
La Montagne nous a sauvé
En congediant Gensonné.
Au diable les Buzot,
Les Vergniaud, les Brissot!
Dansons la carmagnole," &c.*

They ultimately returned to the Jacobin Club, where they drew up, in the name of all the delegates of the primary assemblies, an address intended to assure the departments that Paris had been calumniated. "Friends and brethren," they wrote, "calm, calm your disquietude. We are all here of one feeling. All our souls are blended; and triumphant liberty sur-

* [This "Carmagnole" was a celebrated dance in the revolution, which was accompanied by such doggrel verses as those given in the text, which merely contain stupid anathemas against the chief Girondists.]

veys none but Jacobins, brothers, and friends. *The Bog* (Marais) is no more. We form but one enormous and terrible MOUNTAIN, which is preparing to vomit its fires on all royalists and partisans of tyranny. Perish the infamous slanderers who have calumniated Paris! We all keep watch here night and day; and we labour, in concert with our brethren of the capital, for the common safety. We will not return to our hearths until we can announce to you that France is free and that the country is saved." This address, having been read aloud and enthusiastically applauded, was immediately dispatched to the convention, in order that it might be inserted in the bulletin of its sitting. A general rapture pervaded the meeting; all desired to speak, the tribune was besieged by an eager throng of excited orators, and a bewildering intoxication was rapidly affecting all heads. Observing the brewing trouble, Robespierre asked to be heard. Every one hastened to yield him the tribune. Jacobins and delegates, all combined in applauding the celebrated orator, whom many of the latter had not yet seen or heard.

He congratulated the departments on having recently saved France. "They saved it," he said, "for the first time in 1789, by spontaneously flying to arms; for the second time, by repairing to Paris to execute the 10th August; the third time, by giving, in the heart of the capital, a spectacle of union and general reconciliation. At this moment, untoward events have afflicted the republic and put its existence in danger; but republicans are not allowed to fear; they have to discard emotions which may incite them to disorders. Many are on the watch to produce a factitious scarcity and instigate a tumult—men who would lead the people to the arsenal to plunder its stores and set it on fire, as has happened in several towns, and who do not despair of again provoking a catastrophe in the prisons, in order to calumniate Paris and dissolve the union which has so recently been sworn. Beware all such snares; be calm and firm; look the calamities of the country fearlessly in the face, and let us all strenuously labour to save it."

These words tended to allay the ferment; and the meeting separated, after bestowing on the sagacious orator reiterated plaudits.

No disturbance occurred to embroil Paris during the succeeding days; but nothing was omitted to move the imaginations of men and stimulate them to a generous ardour. No danger was concealed, no sinister intelligence withheld from the people. Official announcements made known successively the defeats in La Vendée; the alarming accounts from Toulon; the retrograde movement of the army of the Rhine, which was receding before the conquerors of Mayence; and, lastly, the extreme peril of the army of the north, which was intrenched in Cæsar's camp, and which the imperialists, the English, and the Dutch, masters of Condé and Valenciennes, and forming a twofold mass, might at any hour carry by a sudden assault. Between Cæsar's camp and Paris there were scarcely forty leagues, and not a regiment, not a single obstacle capable of arresting an enemy. If any signal disaster befel the army of the north, all was lost; and accordingly the slightest rumours coming from that quarter were gathered with intense anxiety.

The alarm was well founded, for at this moment Cæsar's camp was exposed to imminent hazard. On the evening of the 7th August, the allies had appeared in force before it, and threatened it on all sides. Between Cambray and Bouchain stretches a chain of heights, protected by the course of the Scheldt. Here was placed the so-called Cæsar's camp, resting on two fortresses and skirted by a river. The Duke of York, commissioned to turn the French, debouched in view of Cambray, which formed the right of Cæsar's camp, on the afternoon of the 7th. He summoned the place, to which the commandant replied by closing his gates and burning the suburbs. Cobourg, on the same evening, arrived with a mass of 40,000 men, in two columns, on the banks of the Scheldt, and bivouacked in front of the French camp. A scorching heat paralysed the strength of both men and horses; several soldiers, struck by the rays of the sun, had expired during the day. Kilmaine, who had been nominated to replace Custine, but had merely consented to hold the command provisionally, deemed it impossible to retain so hazardous a position. Menaced with having his right flank turned by the Duke of York, and possessing scarcely 35,000 discouraged troops to oppose to 70,000 men flushed with victory, he judged it more prudent to retreat, and gain time by seeking another post. The line of the Scarpe, running behind that of the Scheldt, seemed to him an advisable position to occupy. Between Arras and Douay, heights skirted by the Scarpe form a camp similar to Cæsar's, being like it supported by two fortresses and defended by a river. Kilmaine made preparations for his retreat the following morning, the 8th August. His main body was to cross the Ceuse, a small river meandering in the rear of the ground he occupied, and he himself was to move with a strong rearguard towards the right, where the Duke of York stood in full readiness to debouch.

On the morrow, accordingly, at daybreak, the heavy artillery, the baggage, and the infantry, got in motion, passed the Ceuse, and destroyed the bridges. An hour afterwards, Kilmaine, with some batteries of light artillery and a strong division of cavalry, moved to the right, in order to protect the retreat against the English. He could not have arrived more opportunely. Two battalions, having wandered in their route, found themselves entangled in the little village of Marquion, and were then engaged stoutly resisting the English. Despite their efforts, however, they were on the point of being overwhelmed. Kilmaine, arriving at the critical moment, planted his light artillery on the enemy's flank, sent upon him a charge of cavalry, and compelled him to retire. The battalions were then disengaged and enabled to rejoin the rest of the army.

In the mean time, the English and imperialists, debouching at once on the right and front of the camp of Cæsar, found it completely evacuated. Finally, towards the close of day, the French were united in the camp of Gavarelle, resting on Arras and Douay, and having the Scarpe before them.

Thus, on the 8th August, Cæsar's camp was evacuated as that of Famars had been, and Cambray and Bouchain were left to their own resources like Condé and Valenciennes. The line of the Scarpe, running behind that of the Scheldt, is not, as a glance at the map will show, between Paris and the Scheldt, but between the Scheldt and the sea. Kilmaine therefore had diverged to one side instead of marching backwards, and a part of the frontier was consequently exposed. The allies had it in their power to burst over the whole department of the north. What course they should adopt was a question fraught with deep solicitude. Were they to devote a day's march to attack the new-formed camp of Gavarelle, and dissipate the enemy who had just escaped them? Were they to march on Paris, or return to their old project upon Dunkirk? In this state of suspense, they pushed their stragglers as far as Péronne and Saint-Quentin, and terror spread to Paris, where it was repeated with dismay that Cæsar's camp was lost, like that of Famars, and that Cambray was abandoned like Valenciennes. On all sides execrations arose against Kilmaine, the essential service he had rendered by his dexterous retreat being utterly overlooked.

The preparations for the solemn festival of the 10th August, destined to electrify the national mind, proceeded amidst these sinister forebodings. On the 9th, a report on the analysis of votes was presented to the convention, by which it appeared the forty-four thousand municipalities had accepted the constitution. Only in the complement of votes there lacked those

of Marseilles, Corsica, and La Vendée. A solitary commune, that of Saint-Tonnant, in the department of the Côtes-du-Nord, was daring enough to demand the re-establishment of the Bourbons on the throne.

On the 10th the festival commenced with the day. To the celebrated painter David had been left the chief direction and arrangement. At four in the morning the procession assembled on the square of the Bastille. The convention, the delegates of the primary assemblies (out of whom the eighty-six seniors had been selected to represent the eighty-six departments), the popular societies, and all the sections under arms, were drawn up around a vast fountain, styled "of Regeneration." This fountain was formed by a colossal statue of Nature, pouring water from its breasts into an immense basin. When the beams of the rising sun were seen on the summits of the edifices, the great luminary was saluted with stanzas sung after the air of the *Marseillaise*. The president of the convention took a cup, sprinkled on the earth the water of regeneration, then put it to his lips, and passed the vessel to the seniors of the departments, who all drank from it in turn. After that ceremony, the procession advanced along the Boulevards. The popular societies, displaying a banner on which was painted the eye of Vigilance, marched in the van. Then came the entire convention. Each of its members held a bouquet of ears of wheat; and eight of them, occupying the centre, bore on an ark the Constitutional Act and the Rights of Man. Encompassing the convention, the seniors formed a chain, holding together by a tricoloured cord. These carried in their hand branches of olive, the symbol of reconciliation between the provinces and Paris, and pikes, intended to form part of the national fasces, illustrative of the concord amongst the eighty-six departments. Following this portion of the procession, came groups of artisans with the implements of different trades. In the midst of them appeared a cart containing an old man and his aged spouse, and drawn by their youthful sons. This cart was followed by a chariot of war, on which rested an urn in honour of the soldiers who had died for their country. Finally, the march was closed by hurdles loaded with sceptres, crowns, armorial bearings, and stuffs interwoven with *fleurs de lis*.

The procession traversed the Boulevards and proceeded to the Place de la Revolution. When passing the Boulevard Poissonnière, the president of the convention presented a branch of laurel to the heroines of the 5th and 6th October, who were seated on their cannon. On the Place de la Revolution he again paused, and set fire to all the emblems of royalty and nobility dragged in the hurdles. He afterwards removed a veil thrown over a statue, which, emerging to public view, displayed the august features of Liberty. Salvos of artillery announced the moment of its inauguration; and, at the same instant, thousands of birds, bearing diminutive streamers, were launched into the air, seeming, as they regained their native liberty, to be typical of the earth's enfranchisement.

The procession then moved on towards the Champ-de-Mars by the Place des Invalides, and defiled before a colossal figure representing the French people in the act of overthrowing federalism, and stifling it in the slime of a quagmire. At length it reached the Field of the Federation. There it divided into two columns, which drew up around the altar of the country. The president of the convention and the eighty-six seniors occupied the summit of the altar; the members of the convention and the mass of departmental delegates occupied the steps. Each group of artisans approached in succession to deposit around the altar the produce of its trade, manufactures, fruits, and commodities of all kinds. The president of the convention, uniting together the records upon which the primary assemblies had registered their votes, laid them upon the altar of the country. A general discharge of artillery instantly rent the air, the vast concourse of people joined their voices to the roar of the cannon, and all swore, with the same enthusiasm as on the 14th July 1790 and 1792, to defend the constitution—a vain solemnity, if we regard the letter of the constitution, but a heroic and well-sustained pledge, if we consider merely the territory and the revolution. Constitutions passed away, indeed, but the soil and the revolution were defended with undeviating fortitude and constancy.

After this ceremony, the eighty-six seniors delivered their pikes to the president, who, uniting them into one *fascis* or bundle, confided it, together with the constitutional act, to the delegates of the primary assemblies, exhorting them to combine all their powers around the ark of the new covenant. A separation then took place: one portion of the procession accompanied the urn, sacred to the ashes of the French killed in fighting for their country, to the temple destined for its reception; the remainder proceeded to deposit the ark of the constitution in a sanctuary fitted as a temporary resting-place, its ultimate destination being the hall of the convention, whither it was to be removed the following day. A grand representation, pourtraying the siege and bombardment of Lille, and the heroic resistance of its inhabitants, occupied the residue of the day, and disposed the minds of the people to warlike scenes.

Such was the federation of France as a republic. We no longer perceive, as in 1790, all the classes of a great nation, rich and poor, patricians and plebeians, blended for an instant in a common rapture, and, weary of corroding animosities, pardoning for a few hours their differences of rank and opinion; but we perceive an immense population, speaking no more of pardon, but of danger, devotedness, and resolutions based on despair, and enjoying with a species of delirium those imposing ceremonies on the eve of rushing into the field of battle. One circumstance tended to heighten the character of this scene, and obviate the ridicule which scornful or hostile minds might seek to throw upon it, namely, the undoubted peril and the enthusiasm with which it was braved. On the first federation of the 14th July 1790, the revolution was as yet innocent and benignant, but it was quite possible it might not prove earnest, might be put an end to, in fact, as an absurd farce, by foreign bayonets; in August 1793 it was stained with tragedies, but great, signalised by victories and defeats, and earnest as could be an irrevocable and heroic resolution.

The crisis was such as led irresistibly to extreme measures. Ideas, which at any other time would have been denounced as at once extraordinary and monstrous, were every where in fermentation. It was proposed to exclude all nobles from employments; to decree the general incarceration of the suspected, against whom no law sufficiently precise existed; to ordain a levy of the population in a mass; to seize upon all the stocks of food, and transport them into magazines belonging to the republic, which should take upon itself the distribution to each individual; in short, all were bent upon devising, but unavailingly, some project by which sufficient resources might be instantaneously forthcoming. It was especially demanded that the convention should continue its functions, and not resign its powers to the new legislature which ought to succeed it, but that the constitution should be veiled as the statue of the law, until the general defeat of the enemies of the republic.

It was at the Jacobin Club these ideas were successively propounded. Robespierre, no longer striving to moderate the exaggerated tone of opinion, but on the contrary fostering it, insisted with particular force on the necessity of maintaining the National Convention in its functions; and he therein gave sound advice. The dissolution at this moment of an assembly which had taken upon itself the entire government, and in which divisions had ceased, in order to replace it by a new and inexperienced assembly, which would be again

torn by factions, was much too hazardous an experiment. The provincial delegates, surrounding Robespierre, exclaimed that they had sworn to remain together until the convention had adopted measures of public welfare, and that they would constrain it to continue in power. Audoin, the son-in-law of Pache, afterwards spoke, and proposed to demand the levy *en masse*, and the general arrest of the suspected. Thereupon the delegates of the primary assemblies digested a petition, and the following day, the 12th, proceeded to present it at the bar of the convention. In this document they prayed that the convention might itself undertake to save the republic; that no amnesty should be granted; and that the suspected should be apprehended, sent in the van against the enemy, and the people levied *en masse* march behind them. Part of these propositions were adopted. The arrest of the suspected was decreed in principle; but the project of a national levy, appearing too violent a measure, was remitted for consideration to the committee of public welfare. The Jacobins were dissatisfied with this slight concession, and continued strenuously to uphold in their club that the exigency required not a partial but a universal movement.

On the following day the committee made its report, and recommended a decree much too vague, and a proclamation infinitely spiritless and insipid.

"The committee," said Danton, "has not declared all; it has not declared that if France be vanquished, if she be desolated, the rich will be the first victims to the rapacity of the tyrants; it has not declared that the vanquished patriots will rend and consume with fire this republic rather than see it fall into the hands of their insolent conquerors! Such are the truths these selfish rich must be taught. What are your hopes," added Danton—"you who will do nothing to save the republic? Do you reflect upon what will be your lot should liberty succumb? A regency directed by an imbecile, an infant king whose minority will be long; in short, the dismemberment of our provinces, and a frightful convulsion! Yes, ye wealthy, you will be taxed, you will be squeezed, more, a thousand times more, than you are asked to contribute in order to save your country and perpetuate liberty! The convention has in its hands the popular thunder; let it make use of it, and hurl it at the head of tyrants. It has the delegates of the primary assemblies, it has its own members; let it send both of them to operate a general arming."

The proposed enactment was again remitted to the committee. The next day, the Jacobins once more dispatched the delegates of the primary assemblies to the convention. These reiterated their demands, repudiating any partial recruiting, but insisting upon the national levy, "because," they urged, "half measures are fatal, and the whole nation is more easily electrified than a portion of its citizens."—"If you require," they added, "one hundred thousand soldiers, they will not be found; but millions of men will respond to a general invocation. Let there be no dispensation for any citizen physically competent to bear arms, whatever may be his calling; let agriculture alone preserve the labourers necessary to draw from the earth its alimentary products. Let the course of trade be temporarily stayed, let all business stagnate, let the great, the absorbing and universal object of the French be—to save the republic!"

The convention could no longer resist so energetic an appeal. Itself partaking the enthusiasm of the petitioners, it directed its committee to retire and draw up, on the very instant, the resolution for the levy *en masse*. The committee reappeared in a few minutes, and submitted the following formula, which was adopted amidst universal transport:—

"Art. 1. The French people declare, by the medium of their representatives, that they are prepared to rise in one aggregate mass for the defence of their liberty and constitution, and to deliver the soil from their enemies.

Art. 2. The committee of public welfare will present to-morrow the mode of organisation for this great national movement."

By other articles, eighteen representatives were named, to proceed over the whole of France, and direct the delegates of the primary assemblies in their requisitions of men, horses, munitions, and victuals. This vast impulse given, all became possible. When once it was resolved that entire France, men and things, belonged to the government, that government was placed in a position enabling it to accomplish all that it might deem useful or indispensable with reference to existing danger, and as impelled by its own increasing capacity and vigour. Of course, it was not necessary to levy the population *en masse*, and interrupt production, even the labours essential to human subsistence; but it was necessary that the government should have the power to insist upon every sacrifice, so that it did not exact more than might be sufficient for the exigencies of the moment.

The month of August, then, was the epoch of those renowned decrees which put all France in motion, all its resources in activity, and terminated to the advantage of the revolution its last and most terrible crisis.

The stupendous task imposed was to draw the population into the field, to provide it with arms, and liquidate, by some new financial measure, the expense of this vast displacement; to bring the paper money into relation with the price of food and commodities; to distribute armies and generals in the manner best adapted to each theatre of war; and, finally, to satisfy revolutionary anger by signal and terrible executions. We are about to show what the government did to meet at once both these urgent wants and these evil passions, which it could not avoid appeasing, since they were inseparable from the energy which rescues a nation in the climax of danger.

To demand from each locality a determinate contingent in men was unsuitable to the circumstances; it would have involved a doubt of the enthusiasm of the French, and that enthusiasm was to be presumed for the very purpose of exciting it. That German mode of imposing so many men, like so much dross, on each district, was, moreover, in contradiction with the principle of a national levy. A general enrolment by the system of drawing lots was equally inappropriate. In such a plan, all not being called out, each would seek to gain exemption, and deplore the chance which compelled him to serve. On the other hand, an actual levy *en masse* exposed France to universal disorder, and was laughed to scorn by the moderates and counter-revolutionists. In this difficulty, the committee of public welfare devised a scheme the best adapted to the circumstances of the moment, which consisted in placing the whole population in a state of disposition, dividing it by generations, and draughting these generations according to age and the exigencies arising. "From this moment," bore the decree,* "until that in which all enemies shall have been driven from the territory of the republic, all Frenchmen shall be in permanent requisition for the service of the armies. The young men will go to battle; the married will manufacture arms and transport supplies; the women will make tents, clothes, and tend the hospitals; the children will prepare lint from old linen; the old men will congregate in public places to stimulate the courage of the warriors, and uphold hatred to kings and love to the republic."

All young men, unmarried or widowers without children, from the age of eighteen to twenty-five, were to compose the first levy, called *the first requisition*. They were directed to assemble forthwith, not in the chief towns of the departments, but in those of the districts, for, since the date of federalism, alarm was felt at any large muster in departments, which might

* 23d August 1793.

suggest a feeling of strength and ideas of revolt. Another motive likewise existed for the regulation, derived from the difficulty of amassing, in the chief towns, food and other supplies adequate to satisfy such large bodies. The battalions formed in the district-towns were immediately to commence military exercises, and hold themselves ready to depart at a moment's notice. The generation from twenty-five to thirty was enjoined to prepare for active service, and in the interim to perform the duty of a home force. The residue, from thirty to sixty, was disposable at the pleasure of the representatives commissioned to operate this gradual levy. But notwithstanding these general arrangements, the aggregate and instantaneous levy of the entire population was ordained in certain of the more threatened localities, such as La Vendée, Lyons, Toulon, along the Rhine, *et cetera*.

The means employed to arm, lodge, and subsist the levies, were in accordance with the circumstances. All horses and beasts of burden with which agricultural and manufacturing industry could dispense, were declared under requisition, and placed at the disposal of the army purveyors. The best weapons were to be given to the generation destined for immediate service; fowling-pieces and pikes were appropriated to the duty of the interior. In the departments where manufactories of arms could be established, the public places and promenades, and the large buildings included in the national domains, were to be used in constructing workshops. The principal establishment of this description was at Paris. Forges were planted in the gardens of the Luxembourg, and machines for boring cannon on the banks of the Seine. All gunsmith artisans were put under requisition, as well as clock and watchmakers, who had but indifferent employment at the moment, and could be made useful in certain parts of gun fabrication. Thirty millions were placed at the disposition of the minister at war for this manufactory alone. These extraordinary measures were to be pursued until a supply of one thousand muskets daily were produced. This immense establishment was fixed at Paris, because, under the immediate vigilance of the government and the Jacobins, indolence became impossible, and all the marvels of dispatch and energy were ensured. And, in truth, the interval was not long before this manufactory fulfilled its stipulated duties.

Saltpetre proving deficient, it was thought possible to extract it from the mould of cellars. A resolution was accordingly adopted to have them all inspected, in order to judge whether the soil in which they were dug contained any such particles. Each individual, therefore, was called upon to allow his cellars to be visited and dug up, so that the soil might be separated when it contained saltpetre.

The houses which had become national property were set apart as barracks and magazines.

The different measures taken to provide food for these great armed masses were equally extraordinary in their character. The Jacobins held the creed, that the republic, obtaining a general statement of the quantities of corn in the country, should purchase the whole, and constitute itself the distributor thereof, both giving to the soldiers who had taken up arms for it, and selling to other citizens at a moderate price. This tendency to undertake all operations, to supersede nature herself, when her dispositions were not according to their desires, was not so blindly followed as the Jacobins would have wished. Nevertheless, injunctions were forwarded that the statements respecting the quantities of food, already ordered from the municipalities, should be promptly concluded and sent to the minister of the interior, in order that a general statistical table of deficiencies and resources might be prepared. It was furthermore ordained that the thrashing of the grain should be completed where any still remained in sheaf; and that if obstinate individuals refused to expedite this process, the municipalities should themselves cause it to be performed; that the farmers and holders of corn should pay their overdue contributions, and two-thirds of those for the year 1793, in kind; and, lastly, that the farmers and tenants of property become national should likewise furnish their rents in kind.

The execution of these measures was necessarily to be as extraordinary as themselves. Limited powers, wielded by local authorities which would have been incessantly thwarted by resistances, and which, moreover, could not, in the nature of things, have manifested uniform energy and alacrity, were utterly inappropriate, both as regarded the measures themselves and their indispensable urgency. The dictatorial authority of the commissioners of the convention, was again the only medium which could be efficiently employed. They had been previously engaged in accelerating the first levy of 300,000 men decreed in March, and that mission they had promptly and successfully accomplished. When sent to the armies, they kept watch upon the generals and their operations, sometimes contradicted trained officers, but on all occasions stimulated zeal, and communicated a resolute determination. When immured in fortified towns, they had sustained sieges with heroic fortitude, as at Valenciennes and Mayence; when distributed through the interior, they had powerfully contributed to stifle federalism. They were consequently again employed in this emergency, and invested with unlimited powers to execute the decreed requisitions of men and things. Having under their orders the deputies of the primary assemblies, with authority to direct them according to pleasure, and delegate to them a part of their powers, they held as their instruments men zealously devoted, accurately informed of the state of each locality, and possessing no sway but such as they themselves might permit for the advantage of this extraordinary service.

There were already various representatives in the interior, as in La Vendée, at Lyons, and at Grenoble, commissioned to eradicate the remains of federalism, and now eighteen more were named, with instructions to divide France amongst them, and take measures, in concert with those already executing missions, to get into marching train the youths of the first requisition, to arm them, to lay in stores for their subsistence, and to direct them upon the expedient points, according to the advice and demands of the generals. They were furthermore empowered to complete the unqualified submission of the federalist administrations.

These military arrangements were only a portion of the difficulties to be encountered and overcome. The expenses occasioned by the war, and all the preparations to meet it, required some financial operations, extraordinary of course, like all the rest. We are acquainted with the situation of France under its financial aspect. A national debt in a loose and disorderly state, comprising loans of every variety in form and date, in direct hostility with the debts contracted under the republic; depreciated assignats, labouring under a most unequal competition with specie, foreign paper, commercial and banking stock, and quite incompetent to avail the government in defraying the public expenditure, or the people in acquiring the commodities essential to existence;—such is the summary of the fiscal condition. What course should be adopted in so dismal a conjuncture? Ought money to be borrowed, or assignats issued? To borrow was out of the question, amid the confusion already prevailing in the public debt, and the want of confidence in the engagements of the republic. To issue assignats was easy; the national press only needed to be set in motion. But the smallest outlay would require an enormous emission of paper, or at all events five or six times more than its nominal value, whereby the great calamity of its depression would be necessarily augmented, and a further en-

hancement in the price of commodities provoked. We shall proceed to expound the policy wherewith genius inspired the men now charged with the safety of France.

The first and most indispensable step was to infuse order into the debt, and terminate that division into contracts of all forms and epochs, which, from their differences in origin and nature, gave occasion to an obnoxious and counter-revolutionary system of stock-jobbing. A knowledge in these old obligations, their verification and their classification, required a particular study, and were attended with abominable complication in the accounts. It was only at Paris that a stockholder could receive his dividends, and sometimes the division of his capital amongst the various portions of the debt obliged him to present himself before twenty different cashiers. The state obligations were composed of the funded debt, the debt exigible at a fixed term, and the debt exigible at current periods as compensation; consequently, the exchequer was daily subjected to expiries, and obliged to procure funds to meet the engagements falling due. "We must uniformise and republicanise the debt," said Cambon; and he proposed to convert all the bonds held by the state creditors into an enrolment on the pages of a register, which should be styled the Great Book of the Public Debt. This inscription, and the certificate thereof delivered to the creditors, were to be henceforth their only titles. In order to allay apprehension respecting the safety of this book, a duplicate was to be deposited in the archives of the treasury; and, at all events, it would not be more exposed to fire or other accidents than the deeds of notaries. The creditors were, therefore, within a stipulated interval, to present their securities, in order that they might be inscribed and subsequently burnt. The notaries were enjoined to produce all the titles wherewith they had been intrusted, and an imprisonment of ten years was imposed on any who, before the surrender, should take or deliver copies. If the fundholder allowed six months to elapse without causing his name to be enrolled, he lost his dividends; if he permitted a year to expire, he was denuded and lost his capital.

"In this manner," said Cambon, "the debt contracted by despotism will be no longer distinguishable from that which has been contracted since the revolution; and I defy *his highness Despotism*, if he should ever be resuscitated, to recognise his old debt when it shall be confounded with the new. This operation once accomplished, you will see the capitalist, who desires a king because he has a king for his debtor, and who is afraid of losing his security if his debtor be not re-established, become fond of the republic when it ranks as his debtor, because he will be afraid of losing his capital by its destruction."

This was, however, far from being the only advantage of the arrangement; it held out others equally great, and first gave a foundation to the system of public credit. The capital stock of each fundholder was converted into a perpetual annuity at the rate of five per cent. Thus, the creditor for a sum of one thousand livres was inscribed in the great book for an annuity of fifty francs. By this means, the old debts, whereof some bore an usurious interest and others were subjected to unjust deductions or grievous imposts, were all placed on an uniform and equitable scale; the state, changing its debt into a perpetual rent-charge, was no longer exposed to inconvenient demands, and could never be obliged to reimburse capital so long as it punctually discharged the interest. Furthermore, an easy and advantageous mode of satisfying its obligations was presented to the state, by the redemption of the annuity altogether, whensoever it should fall below its value: for example, when an annuity of fifty livres, representing a capital of one thousand francs, was worth but eight hundred or nine hundred livres, the state would gain, as Cambon propounded, a tenth or a fifth, as the case might be, of the capital stock, by re-purchasing out and out. This kind of extinguishment was not yet organised by means of a fixed redemption, but the process itself was contemplated, and the science of public credit began to be more accurately understood.

Thus the inscription in the great book simplified the forms of title, linked the stability of the state debt to that of the republic, and converted the stocks into perpetual annuities, whereof the capital was not exigible, and the interest identical for all portions. This idea was simple, and borrowed in part from the English; but it required high courage in confronting difficulties to apply it to France, and there was the further merit of its introduction at the most fitting moment. Unquestionably, an appearance of force may be objected to an operation destined thus abruptly to change the nature of titles and funds, to reduce interest to an uniform rate, and smite with forfeiture the creditors who should repudiate the conversion; but, for a state, justice consists in the best order possible; and this great and energetic simplification of the debt was in perfect harmony with a hardy and sweeping revolution, of which the main design was to subject all things to one common standard of natural law.

The project of Cambon united with this boldness of spirit a scrupulous respect for engagements contracted with foreigners, to whom pledges of reimbursement at stipulated periods had been given. It provided that, in consequence of assignats not having currency out of France, foreign creditors should be paid in specie and at stated dates. Moreover, the communes having incurred particular liabilities, and their creditors being greatly incommoded by their breach of punctuality in liquidating them, the state took their debts upon itself, sequestrating their property only to the extent of the sums appropriated to the redemption. The project was adopted in all its particulars,* and executed with the same ability that marked its conception. The capital of the debt, when thus reduced to uniformity, was converted into a mass of annuities amounting to two hundred millions yearly. In order to replace the old imposts of different kinds with which it had been charged, it was deemed expedient to burden it with an indefeasible tax of one-fifth, which reduced the aggregate of interest to one hundred and sixty millions. In this manner all was lucidly and simply organised; a prolific source of stockjobbing was destroyed, and confidence revived, because a partial bankruptcy, with regard to such or such peculiar descriptions of stock, could no longer possibly occur, and a general bankruptcy for the whole debt was not to be presumed.

From this time it became more easy to have recourse to a loan. We shall see in what manner such a measure was called in aid of the assignats.

The national domains always formed the only fund upon which the revolution could rely for its extraordinary expenses. This fund, as represented by the assignats, was floating in the circulation. The essential object was to force sales, in order to draw in assignats, and thus enhance their value by rendering them more scarce. Victories were the surest, but certainly not the easiest, way to hasten sales. As a substitute, divers expedients had been suggested. For instance, purchasers had been permitted to scatter their payments over several years. But this indulgence, introduced to encourage the peasants in becoming proprietors, was found practically to stimulate sales, doubtless, but no returns of assignats. In order the more certainly to diminish the quantity in circulation, it had been determined to pay the compensation for offices, partly in assignats, and partly in *certificates of liquidation*. The compensation sums amounting to less than three thousand francs were to be discharged in assignats; the others, in certificates of liquidation, which had not the currency of money, could not be

* 24th August 1793.

divided into amounts of less than ten thousand francs, nor otherwise transferred than as checks payable to bearer, and were receivable in payment of national domains. By this device was greatly lessened the proportion of national property transmuted into a forced currency; all that might be converted into certificates of liquidation consisted of indivisible sums, not easily transferable, fixed exclusively in the hands of the rich, and completely withdrawn from circulation and the arts of jobbers.

To expedite still more the sale of the national estates, on the creation of the great book it was resolved that inscriptions of annuity should be received to the extent of a moiety in all payments for such possessions. This boon was eminently calculated to facilitate sales and resumptions of assignats.

But all these measures were insufficient, and the mass of paper money was still much too considerable. The Constituent Assembly, the Legislative Assembly, and the convention, had successively decreed the emission of 5,100,000,000 of assignats; 484,000,000 had not been yet issued, and remained in store, consequently there had been put into circulation merely 4,616,000,000. A portion had returned by sales; purchasers being allowed to pay in instalments, there were due for dispositions effected from twelve to fifteen millions. In all, 840,000,000 had been repaid into the exchequer, which had been burnt, leaving in actual circulation, in the month of August 1793, 3,776,000,000 of assignats.

A preliminary expedient was to sweep the assignats bearing the royal effigy from the currency, they being in greater request, and enjoying higher credit than the republican assignats, which they proportionally injured and deteriorated. Although denuded of current value, their validity was still recognised; they were, in fact, metamorphosed into drafts to bearer, and might be received either in payment of contributions, or in payment of national domains, until the 1st of January next ensuing. After the lapse of that date, they were to be without any value whatsoever. These assignats comprised an amount of 558,000,000. This proceeding would necessarily cause them to disappear from the circulation within four months; and as it was well known that they were all in the hands of counter-revolutionary speculators, a sense of justice was evinced in not annulling them, but simply insisting upon their prompt liquidation.

It will be recollected that during the month of May, when it was declared in principle that there should be armies distinguished as revolutionary, a decree was at the same time adopted establishing a forced loan of 1,000,000,000 upon the rich, to defray the expenses of a war whereof they, as aristocrats, were deemed the authors, and to which they refused to devote either their persons or fortunes. This loan, assessed as we shall hereafter explain, was intended, according to Cambon's project, to withdraw 1,000,000,000 of assignats from circulation. In order to allow an option to citizens of patriotic sentiments, and ensure them certain advantages, a voluntary loan was opened; those who came forward to fill it receiving an inscription of annuity at the rate already fixed of five per cent., thus obtaining interest for their contributions. With this inscription, they were entitled to claim exemption from the forced loan, or, at all events, to the extent of the sum subscribed in the voluntary list. The rich of malecontent dispositions, who awaited the compulsion of the forced loan, received a certificate which bore no interest, and which, of course, only formed, like the annuity inscription, a republican obligation, wanting the five per cent. Again, as, according to the new law, inscriptions were available in the proportion of a moiety in paying for national property, voluntary lenders, receiving an annuity inscription, enjoyed the faculty of speedily reimbursing themselves by purchasing national domains; whereas, on the contrary, the certificates of the forced loan could not be taken in payment for property purchased of the state, until two years after the peace. It was necessary, said the project of Cambon, to interest the rich in the prompt termination of the war, and in the pacification of Europe.

The forced or voluntary loan was calculated to bring in 1,000,000,000 of assignats, which were to be burnt. By the contributions in arrear, there would furthermore be recalled 700,000,000, of which 558,000,000 in royal assignats were already struck from the currency, and only received in satisfaction of taxes. It was therefore certain, that in two or three months there must be withdrawn from the circulation, first the 1,000,000,000 of the loan, and secondly, the 700,000,000 of imposts in arrear. The floating sum of 3.776,000,000 would consequently be reduced to 2,076,000,000. Supposing, as was probable, that the faculty of converting inscriptions of debt into national domains would lead to additional purchases, by that method, perhaps, five or six hundred millions might be further redeemed. The total mass would then, in all probability, be reduced to fifteen or sixteen hundred millions. Thus, by reducing for the moment the floating mass more than a half, the assignats would be restored to their legitimate value, and the 484,000,000 remaining in store would become disposable. The 700,000,000 paid in for taxes, whereof 558,000,000 were to receive the republican impression and be re-issued, would likewise recover their value, and might be used during the following year. For the time, at least, the depreciation of assignats would be removed, and that was the essential consideration. If the republic should be eventually saved, victory would at once enhance their value, permit fresh emissions from the treasury, and expedite the realisation of the residue of the national domains, a residue which was very considerable, and daily augmenting by emigration.

The mode of executing the forced loan was, from its nature, necessarily prompt and arbitrary. How estimate fortunes without error, without injustice, even in times of tranquillity, when ample opportunity is afforded for proper deliberation, and for comparing proofs and probabilities? What is scarcely possible under the most favourable circumstances, was of course utterly impracticable in a time of violence and precipitation. But at a period when it was found indispensable to convulse an entire population, and to smite so many heads, could much disquietude be excited lest a mistake might occur in the calculation of wealth, or any inaccuracy in the assessment? For the forced loan, therefore, as for the requisitions, a species of dictatorship was instituted, and conferred on the communes. Every individual was obliged to declare the amount of his income. In each commune, the council-general named authenticators, who decided, upon their knowledge of local affairs, whether the declarations were probable; and if they suspected them to be false, they had the power to double them. In the income of each family were set apart one thousand francs for each individual—husband, wife, and children; the excess was judged to constitute superfluous revenue, and as such taxable. The imposition amounted to a tenth on taxable incomes, ranging from one thou sand to ten thousand francs. Thus, a superfluity of one thousand francs paid one hundred francs; a superfluity of two thousand francs paid two hundred francs, and so in proportion. All superfluous revenue exceeding ten thousand francs, was absorbed by an imposition of equal amount; whereby every family, which, beyond the one thousand francs allowed to each individual, and the ten thousand francs of superfluity subjected to a tenth, enjoyed a still larger income, was bound to contribute the whole excess to the loan. Thus, for example, taking the case of a family comprising five individuals, and possessing a revenue of fifty thousand livres, five thousand were deemed necessary, and ten thousand stricken with a tax of one-tenth, which, reducing the latter to nine thousand,

gave fourteen thousand as the whole allowance; and it was called upon to abandon, for this year, the remaining thirty-six thousand to the forced or voluntary loan. To take a year's superfluity from the opulent classes of society was assuredly not so overwhelming a hardship, when so many thousands were torn from their homes, and sent to bleed in fields of battle, and especially when the actual contribution, which might have been extorted unconditionally as an indispensable war-tax, was acknowledged by a republican certificate, convertible either into state annuities or into portions of national domains.*

This great operation, therefore, consisted in extracting from the circulation one thousand millions of assignats, by taking them from the rich, or, in other words, in depriving these one thousand millions of the property of money and of all current value, and making them a simple charge on the national possessions, which the rich might exchange or not as they fancied, into a corresponding portion of these possessions. In this manner they were constrained either to become purchasers or to furnish the same amount in assignats as if they had actually become so. It was, in short, a forced investment of one thousand millions of assignats.

To these measures, intended more especially to sustain the credit of the national paper-money, others were superadded. After destroying the rivalry of the old state obligations and the assignats bearing the royal effigy, it was held expedient to stifle the competition of the stocks of financial and commercial companies. A decree was consequently passed abolishing the Company of Life Assurances, the Company of Discounts (*Caisse d'Escompte*), and all others, in fact, whose capital was distributed into bonds to bearer, negotiable securities, and inscriptions in a book transferable at pleasure. It was ordained that their affairs should be wound up within a short given period, and that for the future none but the government could create similar establishments. An immediate report on the India Company was ordered, that institution requiring, from its importance, a more particular examination. It was impossible to prevent the existence of bills of exchange on foreign countries, but all Frenchmen were declared traitors to their country who should place their funds in the banks or establishments of countries with which the republic was at war. Furthermore, fresh severities were denounced against the evasions practised with regard to bullion, and generally against the traffic carried on in the precious metals. A penalty of six years' imprisonment had been already decreed against whomsoever should buy or sell specie, that is to say, receive or give it for a larger sum in assignats; and in the same manner a fine had been imposed on every buyer or seller of commodities, who should stipulate for a different price according as the payment was to be made in specie or in assignats. But these delinquencies being of difficult detection, revenge was sought by augmenting the punishment. Every individual convicted of refusing assignats in payment, or of giving or receiving them at any depreciation howsoever slight, was condemned in an amercement of three thousand livres and an imprisonment of six months for the first offence, and, in the event of a repetition, to a double penalty and twenty years' incarceration. Lastly, as copper money was indispensable in the markets, and could not be easily supplied, it was ordered that the bells should be used for coining decimes, demi-decimes, &c., worth two sous, one sou, &c.

But whatsoever means might be employed to rescue the assignats from depression, and annihilate the competitors who were so injurious to them, it was a hopeless expectation to elevate them to the level of general prices; wherefore it became necessary to force down the value of commodities. This was the more imperative, inasmuch as the people implicitly believed that the high prices were owing to the malignity of the dealers; their faith in the prevalence of forestalling was sincere, and whatever might be the opinion of the legislators, they could not moderate, in this particular matter, the passions of a population which they were instigating to the utmost in all others. Hence there was no doubt but that the regulations already issued respecting corn must be extended to every variety of produce. A decree was passed classing engrossment in the number of capital crimes, and punishing it with death. The definition of an engrosser was "one who withdrew from circulation commodities of the first necessity, and failed to expose them publicly to sale." The articles declared "of the first necessity" were bread, wine, animal food, corn, meal, vegetables, fruits, coal and charcoal, wood, butter, candles, hemp, flax, salt, leather, liquors, salted and preserved provisions, cloths, woollens, and all haberdasheries except silks. The forms to be observed in putting such a decree into execution were unavoidably vexatious and inquisitorial. Every dealer was enjoined to make preliminary declarations of what he possessed in his stores. The correctness of these declarations was to be tested by means of domiciliary visits. Any fraud or prevarication was punished, like the chief crime itself, with death. Commissioners, nominated by the communes, were empowered to enforce the production of invoices, and according to those vouchers to fix a price, which, leaving a moderate profit to the trader, should not exceed the resources of the people. If, however, added the decree, the exorbitancy of the invoice cost should preclude any profit to the merchant, the sale must notwithstanding proceed at a price within reach of the purchaser. Thus, in this enactment, as in that enjoining the declarations touching corn and its maximum, to the communes was unreservedly delegated the power of assigning prices according to the state of affairs in each locality. After a brief interval, the rulers of the epoch were led to further generalise these measures, and in their extension to render them yet more violent, as we shall have occasion to record.

The military, administrative, and financial operations adopted at this eventful period were, then, as ably conceived as the situation of the country permitted, and as energetic as the danger which called them forth was imminent. The whole population, divided into generations, was at the disposition of the representatives, even the feeblest being exigible, either to manufacture arms or tend the wounded. All the old state debts, amalgamated into one republican debt, were doomed to undergo an identical fate, and to bear no greater value than the assignats. The interminable rivalries of the ancient obligations, the royal assignats, and the stocks of companies, were swept away; capitals were prevented from centering on those favoured securities by assimilating the whole; and assignats not flowing back into the coffers of the state with the desired rapidity, one thousand millions were abstracted from the rich, which were struck from the condition of money into a simple charge on the national domains. Lastly, for the purpose of establishing a forced relation between the current money and articles of the first necessity, the communes were invested with authority to drag forth all stores of grain and commodities, and compel their sale at a suitable price in each locality. Never did any government take at one time measures equally comprehensive and daring in conception; and they only will accuse their authors of violence who choose to overlook the danger of an universal invasion, and the necessity of supporting the country on national possessions which found no purchasers. The entire system of forced measures was derived from those two causes. At the present day, a superficial and giddy generation snarls at these operations, finding some unduly violent, others opposed to the approved maxims of political economy.

* The decree regulating the forced loan bears date the 3d September.

and in all its animadversions crowning profound ignorance of the era and of the situation with black ingratitude. Let us revert to facts, and at length do justice to those men who made such gigantic efforts and underwent such inordinate perils to save France.

After these general measures upon matters of finance and administration, came others more specifically adapted to each theatre of war. The extraordinary measures long since resolved upon with regard to La Vendée, were at length decreed. The character of that war was by this time well understood. The strength of the rebellion did not lie in organised troops, whom victories could dissipate, but in a population which, apparently peaceable and occupied in agricultural labours, flew suddenly to arms upon a given signal, and overwhelmed particular points in a concentrated mass, surprising by impetuous and unforeseen attacks the republican forces, or, in case of defeat, retreating into the woods and fields, and resuming the pursuits of rural life with such outward placidity, as to baffle the eye of discernment in detecting the recent soldiers from the other peasants. An obstinate contest of six months, distinguished by repeated risings, sometimes amounting to nearly one hundred thousand men, and by exploits of surpassing temerity, the formidable renown acquired by the insurgents, and the confirmed opinion that the greatest danger threatening the revolution was in this cankering civil war, were motives sufficiently powerful to fix the most anxious attention of the government on La Vendée, and provoke resolutions eminently energetic and vindictive. The remark had long been current that the only mode of subjecting that unfortunate district was, not to fight it, but to destroy it, since its armies were at once no where and every where. Such were the doctrines embodied in a terrible decree,* whereby La Vendée, the remaining Bourbons, and foreigners, were simultaneously doomed to the direst chastisement. In fulfilment of this decree, the minister of war was ordered to send into the revolted departments combustible materials to consume the forests, copses, and brushwood. "The forests shall be levelled," said these orders, "the haunts of the rebels destroyed, the crops cut down by bands of labourers, the cattle seized, and the whole transported out of the district. The old men, women, and children, shall be also conducted out of the country, and their maintenance provided for with the regards due to humanity." The generals and representatives on missions were furthermore enjoined to collect around La Vendée supplies sufficient to subsist large masses, and immediately thereafter to evoke in the surrounding departments, not a gradual levy as in other parts of France, but a prompt and universal levy, and thus pour one entire population upon another. The selection of men was in accordance with the character of these measures. We have seen Biron, Berthier, Menou, and Westermann, compromised and superseded for having upheld a system of discipline, and Rossignol, the disturber of that discipline, liberated from custody by the agents of the minister. The triumph of the Jacobin system was complete. Rossignol, from the simple colonel of a regiment, was suddenly exalted into the command-in-chief of the army on the coasts of Rochelle. Ronsin, the chief of those emissaries of the minister who carried into La Vendée all the passions of the Jacobins, and maintained the creed that there was no occasion for experienced generals, but for generals thoroughly republican; that the war required was not a regular but an exterminating system of warfare; and that every man of the new levy was a soldier, and every soldier capable of being a general—Ronsin, the chief of these agents, was in four days made a captain, a colonel, and a general of brigade, and joined in commission with Rossignol, wielding all the powers of the minister himself, in order to preside over the execution of this new order of tactics. At the same time directions were given that the garrison of Mayence should be forwarded with all speed from the Rhine to La Vendée. Distrust was so prevalent and undiscriminating, that the generals of that intrepid garrison had been put under arrest for having capitulated. Merlin, whose heroic character always commanded the highest consideration, was fortunately present to testify to their zeal and courage. Kléber and Aubert-Dubayet were restored to their soldiers, who were disposed to liberate them by main force, and they proceeded to La Vendée, where they were destined by their ability to repair the disasters occasioned by the agents of the minister.

It is a truth indispensable to be borne in mind, that passion is never either sage or enlightened, but that passion alone can save nations in great extremities. The appointment of Rossignol betrayed a strange audacity, but it bespoke at the same time a fixed determination; it showed that half measures were no longer to be permitted in this corroding war of La Vendée, and obliged all the local administrations which were still wavering to declare themselves. Those furious Jacobins, scattered through the armies, often threw them into disorder; but they, nevertheless, communicated that energy of resolution, without which there would have been no armament, no supplies, no means of any sort. They exhibited great injustice towards many generals, but they suffered none to relax or hesitate. We shall shortly see their blind ardour, when combined with the prudence of cooler men, produce striking and happy results.

Kilmaine, who had executed the brilliant retreat which saved the army of the north, was forthwith superseded for Houchard, formerly general of the army of the Moselle, and recommended by a high reputation for valour and zeal. In the committee of public welfare some changes occurred. Thuriot and Gasparin resigned in consequence of indisposition. The one was succeeded by Robespierre, who at length forced admission into the government, his vast influence being eventually recognised and submitted to by the convention, which had hitherto refrained from nominating him on any committee. The other made way for the celebrated Carnot, who, when formerly commissioned to the army of the north, had given proofs of eminent military talents.

These various administrative and military measures were accompanied by measures of vengeance, according to the established practice of illustrating acts of energy by acts of cruelty. We have already mentioned that, upon the demand of the delegates of the primary assemblies, a resolution had been passed against the suspected. It remained to frame a law embodying this resolution. Daily clamours were raised for its production, because, it was vociferated, the decree of the 27th March, which put aristocrats out of the pale of the law, was not sufficient for the emergency. That decree, in fact, required a trial, and another was desired authorising the imprisonment, without trial, and merely to secure their persons, of all citizens suspected for their opinions. Whilst awaiting this decree, it was determined that the possessions of all those who were placed without the pale of the law should belong to the republic. More stringent enactments respecting aliens were likewise demanded. They had already been declared under the surveillance of committees styling themselves revolutionary; but regulations of much greater severity were contemplated.

At this time the idea of a foreign conspiracy, whereof Pitt was supposed the mover, more than ever occupied the public mind. A pocket-book, found under the walls of one of the frontier towns, contained letters written in English, which had passed between English agents residing in France. Reference was made in these letters to considerable sums remitted to secret agents disseminated through the camps, for-

* This decree bears date the 1st of August 1793

tresses, and principal cities. Some were instructed to form connexions with the generals for the purpose of corrupting them, and to gather exact accounts of the state of the troops, the fortifications, and the magazines; others were commissioned to gain admittance into the arsenals and public stores with phosphoric matches, and to watch opportunities for setting them on fire. "Contrive to raise the rate of exchange," said these letters, moreover, "to two hundred livres the pound sterling. Assignats must be discredited as much as possible, and all those refused which want the royal effigy. Enhance the price of commodities. Give orders to your merchants to engross all articles of primary necessity. If you can persuade Cott—ti to purchase tallow and candles at any price, see that the public be made to pay five francs a-pound. My lord is well pleased at the manner in which B—t—z has acted. We hope the assassinations will be conducted with prudence. Disguised priests and women are the fittest for such an operation."

These letters merely proved that England had some military spies in the French armies, and some emissaries in the commercial towns, with the view of aggravating the calamities of scarcity, and that certain of them, perhaps, obtained money by pretending to contemplate opportune assassinations.* But such designs were scarcely to be dreaded, and their probable effects were unquestionably exaggerated by the usual boasting of agents employed in similar manœuvres. It is true conflagrations had happened at Douay in Valenciennes, in the sail-yards of Lorient at Bayonne, and in the parks of artillery near Chemillé and Saumur. It is possible that these agents were the authors of such disasters, but they assuredly had not directed either the poniard of the guardsman Pâris against Lepelletier, or the knife of Charlotte Corday against Marat; and if they operated in foreign paper and assignats, if they purchased goods by means of the credits opened in London by Pitt, they exercised but a trifling influence on the commercial and financial situation of France, which depended on causes much more general and important than any such vile intrigues could be. Nevertheless, these letters, taken in conjunction with several fires, two assassinations, and the stockjobbing in foreign paper, excited universal horror. The convention denounced the English government in a formal decree to all nations, and proclaimed Pitt the enemy of the human race. At the same time it ordained that all aliens domiciled in France, subsequent to the 14th July 1789, should be put under arrest without further delay.†

The convention, yielding to the full impetuosity of wrath, likewise enjoined the prompt conclusion of the proceedings against Custine, and consigned Biron and Lamarche to immediate trial. The impeachment of the Girondists was urged with renewed fierceness, and the revolutionary tribunal directed to take up their case in the briefest interval. Finally, indignation fell on the surviving Bourbons, and on the unfortunate family which deplored in the tower of the Temple the fate of the late king. It was decreed that all the Bourbons remaining in France should be banished, except those who were under the ban of the law; and that the Duke of Orleans, who had been transferred to Marseilles in the month of May, and whom the federalists had abstained from calling to judgment, should be re-conducted to Paris in order to appear before the revolutionary tribunal.‡ His death was calculated to silence those who accused the Mountain of designing to create a king. The miserable Marie-Antoinette, notwithstanding her sex, was like her consort doomed to the scaffold. She was generally regarded as the instigator of all the plots hatched in the old court, and as infinitely more culpable than Louis XVI. She had the misfortune, above all, to be a daughter of Austria, which at this moment was deemed the most formidable of all the hostile powers. According to the custom of bearding with chief effrontery the most dangerous enemy, it was judged desirable to select this moment, when the imperial armies were already marching on the French soil, to smite the head of Marie-Antoinette. She was accordingly transferred to the jail of the Conciergerie to await her trial, like an ordinary criminal, before the revolutionary tribunal. The Princess Elizabeth, destined to banishment, was retained to give evidence against her sister-in-law. The two children were to be kept and reared by the republic, which would decide, on the conclusion of peace, what was fitting to be done for their behoof. Hitherto, the expenditure at the Temple had been ordered with a certain profuseness which recalled the rank of the captive family; it was directed to be henceforth limited to bare necessity. Lastly, as a consummation to all these acts of revolutionary vengeance, a decree consigned the royal sepulchres at Saint-Denis to destruction.

Such were the measures that the imminent dangers in the month of August 1793 provoked for the defence and vengeance of the revolution.

* [This assumption, and the nonsensical letters upon which it is ostensibly founded, will be treated with derision. It is a pity that M. Thiers should so far forget the dignity of the historian as to stoop to such preposterous calumnies.]

† Decree of the 1st August.

‡ These measures were also adopted on the 1st of August.

CHAPTER XXVI.

MILITARY OPERATIONS IN AUGUST AND SEPTEMBER 1793.—TOULON DELIVERED TO THE ENGLISH.—DEFEAT OF THE DUKE OF YORK.—REVERSES IN LA VENDEE.—ESTABLISHMENT OF THE REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT.—TRIAL OF CUSTINE, AND HIS EXECUTION.

After the retreat of the French from Cæsar's camp to the camp of Gavarelle, the allies had another opportunity of pursuing their discouraged army, which had been unfortunate from the opening of the campaign. Since the month of March, in fact, beaten at Aix-la-Chapelle and Neerwinden, it had lost Dutch Flanders, Belgium, the camps of Cæsar and Famars, and the fortresses of Condé and Valenciennes. One of its generals had passed over to the enemy, and the other had been slain. Thus, from the battle of Jemappes, it had been distinguished only for retreats, meritorious in themselves, doubtless, but by no means exhilarating. Without forming the bold enterprise of a direct march on Paris, the allies might have annihilated this nucleus of an army, and left themselves at liberty to take all such places as their cupidity prompted. But shortly after the capture of Valenciennes, the English, appealing to the convention concluded at Antwerp, insisted upon the siege of Dunkirk. Accordingly, whilst the Prince of Cobourg, remaining in the vicinity of his camp at Hérin, between the Scarpe and the Scheldt, undertook to occupy the French, and contemplated the additional possession of Quesnoy, the Duke of York, marching with the English and Hanoverian army by Orchies, Menin, Dixmude, and Furnes, proceeded to establish himself before Dunkirk, between Langmoor and the sea. Two sieges to be prosecuted by the allies, therefore, afforded a welcome respite to the French army. Houchard, having assumed the command at Gavarelle, hastily mustered all the disposable forces to fly to the relief of Dunkirk. To debar the English from gaining a port on the continent, to contend individually with the great antagonists of France, to deprive them of all advantage from the war, and to furnish fresh weapons to the opposition in England against Pitt—such were the reasons that made Dunkirk be considered as the most important point in the whole

theatre of war. "The safety of the republic lies there," wrote the committee of public welfare to Houchard; and Carnot, perceiving that the troops assembled between the frontier of the north and that of the Rhine, that is to say, on the Moselle, were of little use in their present position, obtained an ordinance that a reinforcement should be drafted from that army and sent into Flanders. Twenty or twenty-five days thus elapsed in preparations, a very natural delay on the part of the French, who had to concentrate troops, lying dispersed at great distances, but somewhat inconceivable on the part of the English, who had only four or five marches to accomplish in order to reach the walls of Dunkirk.

We left the two armies of the Moselle and the Rhine essaying to advance, when a little too late, towards Mayence, and failing to prevent the capture of that town. Thereafter, they had fallen back on Saarbruck, Hornbach, and Weissembourg. To enable the reader to understand these different movements, it will be essential to give an idea of the theatre of war. The French frontier is somewhat oddly fashioned on the north and east. The Scheldt, the Meuse, the Moselle, the chain of the Vosges, and the Rhine, run towards the north, forming almost parallel lines. The Rhine, when it reaches the extremity of the Vosges, takes a sudden turn, ceases to flow in a parallel direction with those lines, and terminates them by turning the foot of the Vosges and receiving in its course the Moselle and the Meuse. The allies, on the northern frontier, had advanced between the Scheldt and the Meuse; between the Meuse and the Moselle they had made no progress, because the feeble corps left by them between Luxumbourg and Trèves had been unable to attempt any thing, but they were in a position of greater capacity between the Moselle, the Vosges, and the Rhine. We have stated that they had planted themselves on the heights of the Vosges as a man bestrides a horse, part on the eastern flank and part on the western. The plan open to both parties was, as we have previously explained, perfectly simple. Considering the ridge of the Vosges as a river whose passages it had been deemed necessary to occupy, an army could transfer all its masses to one bank, overwhelm the enemy on that side, and then return to annihilate him on the other. However, neither to the French nor to the allies did any such idea present itself; and since the fall of Mayence, the Prussians, stretching along the western flank, fronted the army of the Rhine. The French had retired into the famous lines of Weissembourg. The army of the Moselle, to the number of 20,000 men, was posted at Saarbruck, on the Saar; the corps of the Vosges, amounting to 12,000, was stationed at Hornbach and Kettrick, and connected along the mountain range with the extreme left of the army of the Rhine. The army of the Rhine, 20,000 strong, guarded the Lauter, from Weissembourg to Lauterbourg. Such are the lines of Weissembourg: the Saar flows from the Vosges into the Moselle, the Lauter from the Vosges into the Rhine, and both form a single line which cuts almost diagonally the Moselle, the Vosges, and the Rhine. An army became master of it by occupying Saarbruck, Hornbach, Kettrick, Weissembourg, and Lauterbourg. This was what the French had done. They had scarcely 60,000 men on all that frontier, since it had been found necessary to detach succours to Houchard. The Prussians had contrived to waste two months in approaching them, but had eventually advanced to Pirmasens. Being reinforced by 40,000 men relieved from the siege of Mayence, and having effected a junction with the Austrians, they might have readily crushed the French on one or other of the flanks; but a coolness had arisen between Austria and Prussia on the iniquitous topic of the partition of Poland. Frederick William, who was still in the camp on the Vosges, declined to second the impatient ardour of old Wurmser. This veteran, despite his years, full of impetuosity, made every day fresh attacks on the lines of Weissembourg; but his partial onslaughts were productive of no decisive effect, and ended in nothing but the useless sacrifice of human life. Such then, once more, was the state of affairs on the Rhine, during the early days of September.

In the south, events had taken more full development. The long uncertainty of the Lyonnese had finally terminated in open resistance, and the siege of their city was rendered inevitable. We remember that they offered to submit and recognise the constitution, but refused to explain themselves respecting the decrees which enjoined them to send the imprisoned patriots to Paris, and to dissolve the new sectional authority. Speedily, indeed, they set those decrees at nought in the most signal manner possible, by sending Chalier and Riard to the scaffold, by making incessant preparations for war, abstracting money from the public coffers, and intercepting the convoys destined for the armies. Numerous partisans of the emigrants had insinuated themselves amongst them, who terrified their imaginations by depicting in horrible colours the re-establishment of the old Mountaincer municipality. They flattered them, moreover, with the speedy arrival of the Marseillese, who, they represented, were ascending the Rhine, and with the advance of the Piedmontese, who were described as on the point of debouching from the Alps with 60,000 men. Although the Lyonnese, as sincere federalists, bore equal hatred to the alien and the emigrant, the Mountain and the old municipality inspired them with such mortal dread, that they were ready to expose themselves to the danger and ignominy of a foreign alliance rather than confront the ire of the convention.

The Saône, flowing between the Jura and the Côte-d'Or, and the Rhone, issuing from the Valais between the Jura and the Alps, unite at Lyons. That opulent city is situated at their confluence. Ascending the Saône from the town of Maçon, the country was entirely republican, and the deputies Laporte and Reverchond, having mustered a few thousands of the requisitionary force, cut off the communication with the Jura. Dubois-Crancé, with the reserve of the army of Savoy, appeared on the side of the Alps, and guarded the upper course of the Rhone. But the Lyonnese were entirely masters of the lower course of the river, and of its right bank to the mountains of Auvergne. They prevailed in the whole Forez, made frequent incursions into it, and pillaged Saint-Etienne of arms. A skilful engineer had erected excellent fortifications around their town, and a foreigner had cast for them pieces to line the ramparts. The population was distributed into two portions: the young men followed General Précy in his excursions, and the married men, the fathers of families, guarded the town and its intrenchments.

At length, in the beginning of August, Dubois-Crancé, who had suppressed the federalist revolt at Grenoble, prepared to march on Lyons, conformably to the decree which enjoined him to reduce that rebellious city to obedience. The army of the Alps was composed at the utmost of 25,000 men, and it was soon to have on its quarters the Piedmontese, who, ultimately profiting by the advanced season of August, were making ready to debouch by the great chain. This army had been recently weakened, as we have seen, by two detachments, one drafted to reinforce the army of Italy and another sent to reduce the Marseillese. The Puy-de-Dôme, which was to have furnished recruits, had kept them back to stifle the revolt of the Lozère, whereunto previous reference has been made. Houchard had retained the legion of the Rhine, which was originally destined for the Alps; and the minister perpetually promised a reinforcement of a thousand horse which never appeared. Nevertheless, Dubois-Crancé detached 5000 men of the regular troops, and joined to them 7000 or 8000 of the young conscripts. He advanced with these forces to take

up a position between the Saône and the Rhone, so as to occupy their upper courses, to intercept the supplies which the Lyonnese received by water, to preserve his communications with the army of the Alps, and to cut off those of the besieged with Switzerland and Savoy. By these dispositions, he still left the Forez to the Lyonnese, and, moreover, the important heights of Fourvières; but in his situation it was impossible to do otherwise. The most essential point was to occupy the two streams of water, and intercept Lyons from Switzerland and Piedmont. In order to complete the blockade, Dubois-Crancé awaited the arrival of the fresh troops which had been promised him, and of the siege artillery, which he was obliged to draw from the Alpine fortresses. The transport of that artillery required the aid of 5000 horses.

On the 8th August he summoned the city, imposing as conditions the complete disarming of all the citizens, their retirement to their own houses, the surrender of the arsenal, and the formation of a provisional municipality. But the secret royalists in the commission and the staff continued even at this moment to deceive the Lyonnese, alarming them with the prospective incubus of a Mountaineer municipality, and assuring them that 60,000 Piedmontese were on the point of debouching on their town. An engagement which took place between two advanced posts, and terminated to the advantage of the Lyonnese, exalted them to an insane pitch, and decided their resistance and their calamities. Dubois-Crancé commenced the fire on the side of the Croix-Rousse, between the two rivers where he had taken his position; and from the first day his artillery made terrible devastation. Thus, one of the most important manufacturing towns in France was exposed to the horrors of a bombardment, which bombardment had to be prosecuted almost before the very eyes of the Piedmontese, moving down the Alps.

In the mean time, Carteaux had marched on Marseilles, and succeeded in clearing the Durance by the middle of August. The Marseillese had fallen back from Aix upon their own city, having formed the design of defending the gorges of Septèmes, through which winds the road from Aix to Marseilles. On the 24th General Doppet attacked them with Carteaux's advanced guard. A warm action ensued; but a section, which had always been in opposition to the others, passed over to the side of the republicans, and decided the engagement in their favour. The gorges were carried; and on the 25th, Carteaux entered Marseilles with his little army.

This event led to another, the most disastrous that had yet befallen the republic. The city of Toulon, which had always manifested a tendency to the most violent republicanism so long as its municipality had been maintained, had undergone a marked change since the establishment of the new authority of the sections, which was speedily to effect a signal revulsion in the state of matters. The Jacobins, rallying round the municipality, were clamorous against the aristocratic officers of the navy, incessantly complaining of the delay in repairing the fleet, of its long uselessness in harbour, and loudly demanding the punishment of the officers, to whom they attributed the ill success of the expedition against Sardinia. The moderate republicans maintained, on the other hand, that the old officers were alone capable of commanding the vessels; that the ships could not be repaired with greater dispatch; that to send them out against the Spanish and English fleets would be highly imprudent; and, lastly, that the officers whose punishment was so fiercely insisted upon were not traitors, but simply unfortunate in the chances of war. The moderates gained the ascendancy in the sections. Speedily a multitude of secret agents, intriguing for behoof of the emigrants and the English, crept into Toulon, and urged the inhabitants much farther than they ever thought of proceeding. These agents were in communication with Admiral Hood, and had obtained assurances that the allied squadrons would cruize in the offing, and be ready to appear at the first signal.

In the first place, following the example of the Lyonnese, they brought to trial and executed the president of the Jacobin Club, a person called Sévestre. Thereafter they restored the service of the refractory priests, and caused to be disinterred and borne in triumph the bones of some victims who had perished during the disturbances for the royalist cause. The committee of public welfare having ordered the fleet to stop all vessels bound for Marseilles, in order to famish that city, the navy prevented the execution of such orders, and claimed the gratitude of the sections of Marseilles for the contravention. Eventually they began to speak of the dangers to which the town was exposed in resisting the convention, and of the necessity of securing aid against its fury; and to hint the possibility of obtaining the assistance of the English by proclaiming Louis XVII. The purveyor of the navy was, it appears, the chief instrument of the conspiracy; he appropriated the money in the public coffers, sent to gather contributions along the coasts, even to the department of L'Herault, and wrote to Genoa with instructions to keep back cargoes of grain, in order to render the situation of Toulon more critical. The staffs were all remodelled; an officer of marines, compromised in the Sardinian expedition, was taken out of prison and invested with the command of the place; an old bodyguardsman was placed at the head of the national guard, and the forts were intrusted to returned emigrants; lastly, means were taken to secure the co-operation of Admiral Trogoff, an alien whom France had loaded with favours. A negotiation was opened with Admiral Hood, under pretext of treating for an exchange of prisoners; and just after Carteaux had entered Marseilles, when terror was at its height in Toulon, and when eight or ten thousand Provençals, the most counter-revolutionary of the whole country, had taken refuge within its walls, the ignominious proposal was submitted to the sections to receive the English, who would take possession of the place for behoof and in the name of Louis XVII. The navy incensed at the infamy in agitation, sent a deputation to the sections to remonstrate against so villanous an expedient. But the counter-revolutionists of Toulon and Marseilles, moved to extraordinary arrogance, scornfully repudiated the reclamations of the navy, and procured the acceptance of the proposition on the 29th August. Immediately afterwards the signal was given to the English. Admiral Trogoff, putting himself at the head of the partisans for delivering the port, hoisted the white flag, and issued orders for the fleet to join him. The brave Rear-Admiral Saint-Julien, pro claiming Trogoff a traitor, displayed at his masthead the flag of commander, and attempted to rally all who remained faithful. But at this moment the traitors, already in possession of the forts, threatened to blow Saint-Julien and his vessels out of the water, whereupon he felt it incumbent to seek safety in flight, accompanied by a few officers and sailors. The remainder were persuaded to submit, without very well knowing what designs were in cogitation. At length, Admiral Hood, who had manifested considerable hesitation, made his appearance; and, under pretence of accepting the port of Toulon in trust for Louis XVII., entered it for the ulterior purpose of burning and destroying it.

During this interval, no movement had occurred in the Pyrenees; in the west, preparations were in progress for executing the measures decreed by the convention.

We left all the columns in Upper Vendée re-organising at Angers, Saumur, and Niort. The Vendéans had meanwhile seized upon the bridges of Cé, and, in the terror they inspired, Saumur was put in a state fit to stand a siege. The column of Luçon and Sables was alone capable of acting offensively. It was com-

manded by a certain Tuncq, one of the generals reputed to belong to the military aristocracy, and whose dismissal was strenuously demanded from the minister by Ronsin. In association with him were the two representatives Bourdon de L'Oise and Goupilleau of Fontenay, animated with the like sentiments, and strongly opposed to Ronsin and Rossignol. Goupilleau, especially, being born in the district, was disposed, from family and friendly relations, to conciliate the inhabitants, and spare them the rigours contemplated by Ronsin and his adjuncts.

The Vendéans, whom the column of Luçon disquieted, resolved to direct their victorious troops against it. Besides, they were anxious to carry succour to the division of M. de Roïrand, which, at that time stationed before Luçon, and isolated between the two main armies of Upper and Lower Vendée, was dependent on its own resources alone, and stood greatly in need of prompt support. Accordingly, in the beginning of August, they pushed several detachments towards Luçon, which were utterly discomfited by General Tuncq. They determined to make a more decisive effort. All their leaders, D'Elbée, Lescure, Larochejacquelein, and Charette, mustered their forces to the number of 40,000 fighting men, and on the 14th August again presented themselves in the neighbourhood of Luçon. Tuncq had only 6000 soldiers under his orders. Lescure, trusting to the great superiority of strength, gave the fatal advice to attack the republican army in the open field. Lescure and Charette took the command of the left wing, D'Elbée that of the centre, and Larochejacquelein that of the right. Lescure and Charette charged with admirable vigour on the republican right, but in the centre, the soldiers, unaccustomed to contend on even terms with regular troops, showed hesitation. Larochejacquelein, having mistaken his way, failed to reach the republican left in proper time. General Tuncq, sending his light artillery, at the opportune moment, upon the staggering centre, threw it into complete disorder, and, in a few minutes, the whole of the Vendéans, 40,000 in number, were put to flight. Never had they experienced so disastrous an overthrow. They lost all their artillery, and retired precipitately to their homes, overwhelmed with consternation.

At this identical moment arrived the order for cashiering General Tuncq, in accordance with Ronsin's demands. Bourdon and Goupilleau, highly indignant at such unworthy treatment, maintained him in his command, writing to the convention, at the same time, urging it to revoke the decision of the minister, and lodging fresh complaints against the disorganising party at Saumur, which, they alleged, propagated nothing but confusion, and was bent on superseding all the competent generals in favour of ignorant demagogues. After the dispatch of this document, Rossignol himself, pursuing an inspection of the different columns under his command, arrived at Luçon. His interview with Tuncq, Bourdon, and Goupilleau, was a mere exchange of reproaches; notwithstanding two victories, he was dissatisfied that any engagement should have been fought without his sanction, for he held, with some show of reason doubtless, that all serious encounters were to be avoided until the general re-organisation of the different armies. The parties separated; but shortly afterwards, Bourdon and Goupilleau, being informed of certain acts of rigour committed by Rossignol in his progress, had the hardihood to issue an ordinance degrading him from his command. Thereupon, the representatives sitting at Saumur, Merlin, Bourbotte, Chondieu, and Rewbell, annulled the ordinance of Goupilleau and Bourdon, and reinstated Rossignol. The dispute was carried before the convention: Rossignol once more triumphed over his adversaries, and was confirmed in his authority; Bourdon and Goupilleau were recalled, and Tuncq suspended.

Such was the situation of affairs when the garrison of Mayence arrived in La Vendée. A difference of opinion prevailed as to the plan of operations it was expedient to adopt, and as to the direction in which that valiant garrison should act. Ought it to be attached to the army of Rochelle, and placed under the orders of Rossignol; or to the army of Brest, and confided to Canclaux? Such was the question. Both commanders longed to possess it, because it was sure to prove predominant wheresoever it might appear. All parties were agreed on the necessity of enveloping the country by simultaneous attacks, which, directed from all the points of the circumference, should meet in the centre. But as the column possessing the *Mayencers* would have to take a more decisive offensive, and drive the Vendéans back upon the other columns, it was of great importance to determine from what quarter it was most advisable to assail them with the chosen troop. Rossignol and his friends maintained, that the most advantageous course was to lead the Mayencers from Saumur, in order to sweep the Vendéans back upon the sea and the Lower Loire, where they might be entirely destroyed; that the columns of Angers and Saumur, being extremely weak, required the assistance of the Mayencers to enable them to act at all, since, if left to themselves, it would be impracticable for them to advance into the country and attempt a junction with the other columns of Niort and Luçon; that they could not even stop the Vendéans when they were beaten back, or prevent them from spreading over the interior; and, lastly, that by allowing the Mayencers to advance by Saumur, no valuable time would be lost, whereas, by preferring Nantes, they would be obliged to make a considerable circuit, and waste unprofitably ten or fifteen days. Canclaux, on the other hand, was deeply impressed with the danger of leaving the sea open to the Vendéans. An English squadron had been recently descried off the shores of the west, and it was natural to imagine that the English intended to effect a descent in the Marais. Such was, at the time, the general persuasion, and although it proved to be erroneous, it filled all minds with apprehension. As the case stood, the English had only then sent an emissary into La Vendée. He had arrived under disguise, and inquired the names of the leaders, their intentions, and their precise aim; so profound was the ignorance in Europe touching the internal circumstances of France! The Vendéans had replied by a demand for money and warlike stores, and by a promise to appear with 50,000 men on any point where it might be proposed to attempt a disembarkation. All schemes of this sort were therefore as yet remote, but it was the universal belief they were on the very verge of execution. Hence the argument of Canclaux, who urged the expediency of employing the Mayencers on the side of Nantes, in order thus to cut the Vendéans off from the sea, and throw them back on the upper country. Should they spread themselves in the interior, added Canclaux, they would be very soon destroyed; and as to any loss of time, the consideration was without weight, inasmuch as the army of Saumur was in such a condition as to be incapable of acting in less than ten or twelve days, even with the aid of the Mayencers. One reason not adduced was, that the garrison of Mayence, already trained in the art of war, preferred serving with men of its own profession, and inclined to Canclaux, an experienced general, rather than to Rossignol, an ignorant intruder, and to the army of Brest, distinguished for glorious feats, rather than to that of Saumur, known only for its reverses. The representatives, being favourable to the cause of discipline, also leaned to the same opinion, fearing to compromise the army of Mayence by mingling it with the Jacobin and disorganised soldiers of Saumur.

Philippeaux, the most determined antagonist of the Ronsin party amongst the representatives, repaired to Paris and obtained an ordinance from the committee of public welfare in favour of Canclaux's plan. Ronsin

caused the order to be revoked; and it was eventually settled that a council of war should be held at Saumur to decide on the employment of the forces. The council assembled on the 2d September. It included several representatives and generals. Sentiments were, as might be expected, much divided. Rossignol, who had unbounded faith in his own opinions, offered Canclaux to resign the command to him if he would allow the Mayencers to march from Saumur. The advice of Canclaux, however, prevailed in the council; the Mayencers were attached to the army of Brest, and it was determined that the principal attack should be directed from the Lower upon the Upper Vendée. The plan of the campaign was signed, and pledges were exchanged to start, on a given day, from Saumur, Nantes, Sables, and Niort.

The greatest discontent prevailed in the party of Saumur. Rossignol possessed energy and sincerity, but was deficient both in mental acquirements and bodily robustness, and in spite of his devoted zeal, he was quite incapable of acting beneficially. He evinced less resentment at the decision adopted by the council than his partisans, Ronsin, Momoro, and all the ministerial agents. These lost no time in writing to Paris with complaints against the plan just resolved upon, lamenting, moreover, the calumnies in circulation against the sans-culotte generals, and the prejudices instilled into the army of Mayence; thus evincing dispositions which foreboded badly for their zeal in seconding the project decided upon at Saumur. Ronsin carried his spleen to such an extent as to stop the distribution of provisions to the Mayencers, under pretext that, having passed from the army of Rochelle to that of Brest, they ought to be supported by the purveyors of the latter. The Mayencers forthwith took their departure for Nantes, and Canclaux made the necessary dispositions to ensure the execution of the plan adopted by the council in the early part of September.

Such is the general summary of events on the various theatres of war, in the course of August and beginning of September. It now behoves us to trace the great operations resulting from these different preparations.

The Duke of York had arrived before Dunkirk with 21,000 English and Hanoverians and 12,000 Austrians. Marshal Freytag was at Ost-Capelle with 16,000 men; the Prince of Orange at Menin with 15,000 Dutch. These two latter corps were planted as an army of observation. The remainder of the allies, scattered around Quesnoy, and even to the Moselle, amounted to about 100,000 men. Thus 160,000 or 170,000 men were distributed along that immense line, occupied in making sieges and guarding all the passages. Carnot, who now began to direct the operations of the French, had already formed a dim perception that the approved method of battling on all points was injudicious, and that the better course was to concentrate a mass upon a decisive point at the fitting moment. He had therefore advised the removal of 35,000 men from the Moselle and the Rhine to the north. His counsel had been followed, but only 12,000 could be spared for Flanders. Nevertheless, with this reinforcement, and the different parties encamped at Gavarelle, Lille, and Cassel, the French might have formed a mass of 60,000 men, and, in the scattered condition of the enemy, have struck some signal blows.

To be convinced of this truth, we need only to cast our eyes upon the scene of warfare. Following the coast of Flanders to enter France, we first stumble on Furnes and then on Dunkirk. These two towns, washed on one side by the ocean, and bounded on the other by the vast marsh of the Grande-Moëer, can only communicate by means of a narrow tongue of land. The Duke of York, arriving by Furnes, which first presents itself coming from the frontier, had planted himself on this tongue of land, between the sea and the Grande-Moëer, with the view of besieging Dunkirk. Freytag's corps of observation had not been posted at Furnes so as to protect the rear of the besieging army; it was, on the contrary, a considerable distance from that position, in advance of the marsh and Dunkirk, so disposed as to intercept any succours which might come from the interior of France. The Dutch, under the Prince of Orange, being stationed at Menin, three days' march from that point, became utterly useless. A mass of 60,000 men, marching rapidly between the Dutch and Freytag, might reach Furnes in the rear of the Duke of York, and then manœuvring between the hostile corps, successively overwhelm Freytag, the Duke of York, and the Prince of Orange. For such a purpose, one compact mass and expeditious movements were alone necessary. But in those days captains thought only of pushing straight forward, opposing one detachment with another of similar force. The committee of public welfare had, however, almost conceived the plan of which we speak. It had given directions to form a single corps and march on Furnes. Houchard appreciated the idea for a brief moment, but receded from it, and resolved simply to advance against Freytag, drive him back on the rear of the Duke of York, and subsequently endeavour to interrupt the siege.

Whilst Houchard was hastening his preparations, Dunkirk opposed a vigorous resistance. General Souham, seconded by young Hoche, who behaved in this siege with great intrepidity, had already repulsed several attacks. The besiegers could not very easily open trenches in a sandy soil, wherein the sappers found water at a depth of three feet. The flotilla which was to have left the Thames to bombard the place did not appear, but on the contrary a French flotilla, issuing out of Dunkirk harbour and mooring along the shore, did great execution upon the besiegers, pent up upon their narrow neck of land, in want of water fit to drink, and exposed to every variety of danger. The opportunity was tempting for a prompt and decisive blow. The month of August was nearly at an end. Following the antiquated system of tactics, Houchard commenced by a demonstration on Menin, which resulted merely in a bloody and useless combat. After considerately giving this preliminary alarm, he advanced by several routes towards the line of the Yser, a small stream of water which separated him from Freytag's corps of observation. Instead of proceeding to plant himself between the observing and the besieging armies, he intrusted to Hédouville the task of marching on Rousbrugghe, with the view simply of disturbing the retreat of Freytag upon Furnes, and he in person pushed in front of Freytag, advancing with all his forces by Houtkerche, Herseele, and Bambeke. Freytag had disposed his corps over an extensive line, and had with him only a portion of his force when he received Houchard's first shock. He gave battle at Herseele; but, after a warm engagement, he was obliged to repass the Yser and fall back on Bambeke, and subsequently from Bambeke on Rexpœde and Killem. By thus recoiling beyond the Yser, he left his wings compromised in advance. The division of Walmoden was thrown to a considerable distance from him on his right, and his own retreat was menaced by Hédouville towards Rousbrugghe.

Freytag then resolved, the same day, to move again in advance and retake Rexpœde, in order to keep open his communication with Walmoden. He reached Rexpœde as the French were entering it. A fiercely contested combat ensued, in the course of which Freytag was wounded and taken prisoner. The day beginning to wane, however, and being apprehensive of a night attack, Houchard retired out of the village, and left in it only three battalions. Walmoden, who was falling back with his compromised division, arrived at this moment, and determined to make a brisk attack on Rexpœde, in order to force a passage. A sanguinary conflict was the result, fought in the dead of night; the passage was forced, Freytag delivered, and the enemy retreated in a mass on the village of

Hondtschoote. This village, situated over against the Grande-Moëer, and on the road to Furnes, was one of the points by which it was necessary to pass on retiring upon Furnes. Houchard having abandoned the essential project of manœuvring towards Furnes, between the besieging and the observing corps, he had no other course left than to keep continually pushing forward on Marshal Freytag, and to storm the village of Hondtschoote. The 7th was passed in reconnoitring the positions of the enemy, defended by a formidable artillery, and on the 8th the decisive attack was resolved upon. At dawn, the French army moved forward upon the whole line to attack in front. The right, under the orders of Hédouville, stretched between Killem and Beveren; the centre, commanded by Jourdan, marched directly from Killem upon Hondtschoote; the left attacked between Killem and the canal of Furnes. The action began in the copses which covered the centre. On both sides, the greatest force was culminated on the same point. The French repeatedly returned to the attack of the positions, and finally succeeded in becoming masters of them. Whilst they triumphed in the centre, the intrenchments were carried to the right, and the enemy adopted the resolution of retiring on Furnes by the route of Houthem and Hoghestade.

Whilst these events were passing at Hondtschoote, the garrison of Dunkirk made a vigorous sortie under the conduct of Hoche, and placed the besiegers in a predicament of great peril. The day after the action, they held a council of war, wherein, taking into consideration that they were threatened in the rear, and that the naval armament which was intended to have bombarded the town had never made its appearance, they determined to raise the siege and retire on Furnes, where Freytag had just arrived. They consequently effected a junction with that general on the evening of the 9th September.

Such were those three days, which had for object and for result the repelling of the observing corps upon the rear of the besieging corps, by following a direct line of march. The final struggle gave its name to this operation, and the battle of Hondtschoote was considered as the salvation of Dunkirk. The operation, in fact, broke the long chain of French reverses on the northern frontier, subjected the English to an inglorious check, defeated the most cherished of their hopes, rescued the republic from a calamity than which none could have been felt more sensibly, and imparted fresh courage to the people of France.

The victory of Hondtschoote was hailed with infinite joy at Paris, where it inspired the youth with additional ardour, and gave ground of hope that the national energy was not destined to be fruitless. Reverses are of little moment if they be blended with successes, so that the vanquished may not be entirely deprived of hope and courage. The alternation tends, indeed, to augment energy, and heighten the enthusiasm of resistance.

When the Duke of York betook himself to Dunkirk, the Prince of Cobourg had resolved an attack upon Quesnoy. That place was destitute of all the means necessary to defence, and Cobourg pressed it with unrelenting vigour. The committee of public welfare, equally attentive to that portion of the frontier as to the others, had immediately ordered the reserve columns to move from Landrecies, Cambray, and Maubenge. Unhappily, these columns were unable to act simultaneously; one was immured in Landrecies; and another, being surrounded on the plain of Avesnes, although thrown into the form of a square, was broken, after a highly creditable resistance. Accordingly, Quesnoy was obliged to capitulate on the 11th of September. This loss was but a trifling drawback from the gain in the delivery of Dunkirk, yet it threw a dash of sadness upon the joy elicited by that event.

Houchard, after having driven the Duke of York to concentrate his forces with those of Freytag at Furnes, had nothing to induce him to attempt any further enterprise in that direction. He could merely have charged with an equal force soldiers better disciplined than his own, without any of those favourable or pressing circumstances which justify a general in hazarding a doubtful battle. In this situation, he had nothing more engaging to occupy him than to fall foul of the Dutchmen, who lay scattered in several detachments around Menin, Halluin, Roncq, Werwike, and Ypres. Houchard, proceeding with caution, sent orders for the camp at Lille to make a sally on Menin, whilst he himself should operate by Ypres. During two entire days the advanced posts of Werwike, Roncq, and Halluin, were warmly contested. On both sides exemplary valour, but mediocre judgment, was evinced. The Prince of Orange, although pressed on all sides, and having lost his advanced posts, resisted with great obstinacy, fortified by the intelligence he had received of the surrender of Quesnoy and the approach of Beaulieu, who was bringing him succours. Eventually, on the 13th September, he was constrained to evacuate Menin, after losing, during these encounters, from two to three thousand men and forty pieces of cannon. Although the French army had certainly not secured all the advantages possible in its position, and, disregarding the instructions of the committee of public welfare, had acted in bodies too subdivided, it had nevertheless succeeded in accomplishing the occupation of Menin.

On the 15th it left Menin, and marched on Courtray. At Bisseghem it encountered Beaulieu. An engagement ensued, which promised to result in the advantage of the French; but the sudden appearance of a squadron of cavalry on one of the wings, spread an alarm which was founded on no real danger. The whole army swerved, and finally fled in the utmost disorder to Menin. Nor did this inconceivable rout end there; the panic was communicated to all the camps, to all the posts, and the entire French army flew for refuge under the guns of Lille. This panic-terror, whereof many previous examples had occurred, and which proceeded from the youth and inexperience of the troops, perhaps from perfidious cries of "*Sauve qui peut*" (Every man for himself), caused the loss of many substantial advantages, and the recoil even to Lille. The tidings of this disaster, when borne to Paris, produced a very dismal impression, stripping Houchard of all the credit of his late victory, and arousing against him feelings of the utmost wrath, whereof he averted a portion on the committee of public welfare itself. A new series of checks speedily followed, and threw France back into the perilous predicament whence she had for an instant emerged by the victory of Hondtschoote.

The Prussians and the Austrians, planted on the two slopes of the Vosges, in front of the two French armies of the Rhine and the Moselle, had at length made some serious demonstrations. The veteran Wurmser, more ardent than the Prussian commanders, and discerning all the advantages of possessing the passes of the Vosges, determined upon occupying the important post of Bodenthal, towards the Upper Lauter. Accordingly, he detached a corps of 4000 men, which, effecting a passage across frightful mountains, succeeded in surprising Bodenthal. On their part, the representatives commissioned to the army of the Rhine, yielding to the universal impulse which every where provoked a spirit of redoubled energy, resolved upon a general sortie from the lines of Weissembourg on the 12th September. The three generals, Desaix, Dubois, and Michaud, simultaneously charging the Austrians, made fruitless efforts, and were driven back into the lines. Moreover, all the attempts directed against the Austrian corps thrown on Bodenthal were completely parried. However, a plan for a fresh attack was digested for the 14th. Whilst General Ferrette should march on Bodenthal, the army of the

Moselle, acting on the other flank, was to attack Pirmasens, occupying a position corresponding with that of Bodenthal, and in which Brunswick was stationed with a part of the Prussian army

General Ferrette perfectly succeeded in the object of his enterprise; his soldiers assaulted the positions of the Austrians with heroic temerity, carried them in spite of all resistance, and recovered the important defile of Bodenthal. But the result was somewhat different on the opposite flank. Brunswick was keenly alive to the importance of Pirmasens, which closed the defiles; he held under his command a considerable force, and occupied excellent positions. Whilst the army of the Moselle forced the rest of the Prussian army on the Saar, 12,000 men were thrown from Hornbach on Pirmasens. The only hope of the French was to carry Pirmasens by surprise; but descried, and played upon by a galling fire from their first advance, nothing remained for them but to retire. Such, at least, was the wish of their commander; but the representatives repudiated the suggestion, and ordered the attack in three columns and by three ravines which met at the height whereon Pirmasens is situated. Already the French soldiers, animated with the truest gallantry, had pushed forward a considerable interval; the column on the right was even on the point of clearing the ravine in which it marched, and turning Pirmasens, when a double fire, opened on both flanks, suddenly arrested its progress. The French resisted for some time, but the fire poured upon them with redoubled fury, and they were finally driven back along the ravine wherein they had entangled themselves. The other columns were repelled in like manner, and all fled along the narrow valleys in the utmost disorder. The army was obliged to retire to the post whence it had originally moved. Most fortunately, the Prussians never thought of pursuing it, and failed even to occupy its camp of Hornbach, which it had quitted to march on Pirmasens. The French lost in this affair twenty-two pieces of cannon, and 4000 men, killed, wounded, and prisoners. This check of the 14th September might lead to consequences of the greatest moment. The allies, flushed with success, contemplated operating with all their forces, and made dispositions to march on the Saar and the Lauter, in order thus to force the lines of Weissembourg. With which designs we must leave them for a time.

The siege of Lyons was tardily prosecuted. The Piedmontese, debouching by the Upper Alps into the valleys of Savoy, had effected a diversion, and obliged Dubois-Crancé and Kellermann to divide their forces. The latter had advanced into Savoy, whilst the former, remaining before Lyons with insufficient forces, kept up an incessant but fruitless discharge of artillery and shells on that unfortunate city, which, resolved to undergo every extremity, bade defiance to all the horrors of a blockade and bombardment, and was to be reduced only by an attack of overpowering force.

On the Pyrenean frontier, the French had in the mean time sustained a severe check. Since the last recorded events, they had remained in the environs of Perpignan, whilst the Spaniards occupied their camp of Mas-d'Eu. These, confident in their numbers, their discipline, and the talents of their general, were full of ardour and hope. We have already described the theatre of war. The two nearly parallel valleys of the Tech and the Tet fall from the great mountain chain and expand towards the sea. Perpignan is in the latter of these valleys. Ricardos had crossed the first line of the Tech, as his position at Mas-d'Eu implies, and had resolved to pass that of the Tet considerably above Perpignan, so as to turn that fortress and constrain the French army to abandon it. With this view he deemed it essential, in the first place, to secure Villefranche. That little fastness, situated in the upper part of the Tet, would serve to protect his left wing against General Dagobert, who, at the head of 3000 men, was pursuing a successful career in Cerdagne. Accordingly, in the early part of August, he detached General Crespo with a few battalions in that direction, who no sooner presented himself before Villefranche than its commandant basely threw open the gates to him. Crespo placed a garrison in his conquest, and rejoined Ricardos.

During this interval, Dagobert with his inconsiderable force overran Cerdagne, repelled the Spaniards to Seu-d'Urgel, and even contemplated driving them as far as Campredon. However, the weakness of Dagobert's detachment, and the possession of Villefranche, rendered Ricardos indifferent to the successes of the French on his left wing, and he persisted in his scheme of taking the offensive. On the 31st August he made a threatening demonstration towards the camp under Perpignan, and passed the valley of the Tet above Soler, driving before him the French right wing, which fell back to Salces, some leagues in the rear of Perpignan, and quite close to the sea. Thus the French were thrown into a position of the utmost danger, one portion of them being detained at Perpignan and the other forced to the edge of the sea at Salces. Dagobert, it is true, had gained fresh advantages in Cerdagne, but too unimportant to alarm Ricardos. The representatives Fabre and Cassaigne, who had retired with the army to Salces, resolved to call Dagobert in substitution of Barbantane, with the hope of restoring fortune to the French flag. Whilst awaiting the arrival of the new general, they projected a combined movement between Salces and Perpignan, in order with all speed to extricate the army from its perilous position. They accordingly ordered a column to advance from Perpignan and take the Spaniards in the rear, whilst they, quitting their present stations, should attack them in front. On the 15th September, therefore, General Davoust left Perpignan with 6000 or 7000 men, at the same time that Perignon moved from Salces upon the Spanish force. At a given signal, the French commanders charged the hostile camp on both sides, and the Spaniards, unable to resist the multifarious assault, were obliged to fly beyond the Tet, leaving behind them twenty-six pieces of cannon. They forthwith resumed their old quarters at Mas-d'Eu, occupying the same camp whence they had marched to execute their bold but unproductive enterprise.

Such was the situation of affairs when Dagobert reached the French camp and assumed the command. That experienced warrior, now in the seventy-fifth year of his age, and uniting all the fire of youth with the exemplary discretion characteristic of age, hastened to signalise his arrival by an attempt upon the camp of Mas-d'Eu. He divided his attacking force into three columns; the first, diverging from his right and marching by Thuir upon Sainte-Colombe, was intended to turn the Spaniards; the second, acting in the centre, was appointed to charge in front, and bear them down before it; lastly, the third, operating on the left, was to plant itself in a wood and intercept the retreat. This latter division, commanded by Davoust, made a faint attack and fled in disorder. The Spaniards were thus enabled to direct their whole strength upon the two other columns of the centre and right. Ricardos, judging the principal danger lay to the right, moved his greatest force in that direction, and succeeded in repulsing the French. In the centre, Dagobert, animating the troops by his presence, carried the intrenchments in front of him, and was on the point of deciding the victory, when Ricardos, returning with the victorious corps from the right and left, overwhelmed his adversary with all his combined forces. Still the intrepid Dagobert resisted, however, until a battalion threw down its arms, and cried, "Long live the king!" Dagobert, greatly incensed, pointed two pieces of ordnance on the traitors, and fired desperately upon them, whilst he rallied around his person a band of faithful warriors; with these few hundred soldiers he eventually retired, the enemy, intimidated by his undaunted front, not venturing to pursue him.

Assuredly that brave commander had merited high eulogium for his firmness amidst such difficulties, and if his column on the left had acted with better spirit, if his battalions in the centre had not shamefully disbanded, his dispositions would have been followed with complete success. Notwithstanding this obvious truth, the gloomy suspicions of the representatives attributed the whole disaster to him. Disgusted at such outrageous injustice, he immediately returned to his subaltern command in Cerdagne. The French army was in this manner once more driven back upon Perpignan, and exposed to the imminent risk of losing the important line of the Tet.

In La Vendée, the plan of campaign settled on the 2d September had been put into execution. The division of Mayence was destined, as we have related, to act by Nantes. The committee of public welfare, which had received alarming intelligence touching the designs of the English upon the west, fully approved the idea of directing the main strength towards the coasts. Rossignol and his party were extremely chagrined at this sanction, and addressed letters to the ministry, indicating a spirit prophetic of but a reluctant co-operation in the plans agreed upon. The division of Mayence forthwith marched to Nantes, where it was received with public rejoicings, and other lively demonstrations of joy. A sumptuous banquet was prepared, for which the guests sharpened their appetites by a preliminary skirmish with the hostile parties hovering upon the banks of the Loire. If the column of Nantes felt delight at being united with the celebrated garrison of Mayence, the latter was not less gratified at serving under Canclaux, and in concert with his detachment, already renowned for the defence of Nantes, and for a variety of honourable achievements.

The essence of the plan laid down consisted in columns starting from all the points of the theatre of war, meeting in the centre, and there crushing the enemy. Canclaux, general of the army of Brest, taking his departure from Nantes, was to descend the left bank of the Loire, wind round the large lake of Grand-Lieu, sweep Lower Vendée, then re-ascend towards Machecoul, and reach Leger on the 11th or 13th. His arrival at this last point would be the signal for marching to the columns of the army of Rochelle, which were appointed to overrun the country from the southern and eastern extremities. It will be recollected that the army of Rochelle, under the supreme command of Rossignol as general-in-chief, was composed of several divisions—that of Sables, commanded by Mieszkousky, that of Luçon by Beffroy, that of Niort by Chalbos, that of Saumur by Santerre, and that of Angers by Duhoux. The instant Canclaux should arrive at Leger, the column of Sables was enjoined to get under movement, attain Saint-Fulgent on the 13th, Herbiers on the 14th, and finally, Mortagne on the 16th, there to join Canclaux. The columns of Luçon and Niort were, in conjunction, to advance upon Bressuire and Argenton, reaching that height by the 14th; lastly, the columns of Saumur and Angers, moving from the Loire, were likewise to arrive on the 14th in the vicinity of Vihiers and Chemillé. Thus, according to this scheme, the whole country would be traversed by the 14th and 16th, and the rebels hemmed in by the republican troops between Mortagne, Bressuire, Argenton, Vihiers, and Chemillé. Their destruction might be then deemed inevitable.

Twice repulsed from Luçon with considerable loss, the Vendéans had it greatly at heart to retrieve the disgrace. They assembled in force before the republicans had executed their project, and whilst Charette assailed the camp of Naudières on the side of Nantes, they attacked the division of Luçon, which had pushed forward as far as Chantonay. These two enterprises took place on the 5th September. The attempt of Charette on Naudières was repelled, but the assault on Chantonay, unexpected and well-combined, threw the republicans into deplorable confusion. The young and valorous Marceau effected prodigies to obviate a disaster, but his division, after losing its baggage and artillery, retreated pell-mell to Luçon. This check was capable of deranging the concerted plan, inasmuch as the disorganisation of one of the columns left a void between the division of Sables and that of Niort; but the representatives made all possible efforts to repair the mischief by infusing order into the discomfited battalions, and couriers were dispatched to Rossignol with swift intimation of the occurrence.

All the Vendéans were at this moment gathered at Herbiers, around their generalissimo D'Elbée. The spirit of discord was at work amongst them, as amongst their adversaries, for the human heart is every where the same, and nature certainly does not reserve disinterestedness and manifold virtues for one party, leaving to the other exclusively pride, selfishness, and all vice. The Vendéan chiefs, equally with the republican, were envious and jealous of each other. The generals entertained little regard for the superior council, which affected a species of sovereignty. Possessing the actual force, they were not at all disposed to yield the supremacy to a power which owed its ephemeral existence to themselves alone. Moreover, they viewed D'Elbée with feelings of repugnance, and alleged that Bonchamps was much better calculated to form a generalissimo than he. Charette, on his part, was anxious to remain the sole master of Lower Vendée. Thus they were ill prepared to act in common, and to concert a plan in opposition to that of the republicans. An intercepted dispatch had recently apprised them of the project conceived by their enemies. Bonchamps was the only leader amongst them who proposed a bold system of operations, and manifested profound ideas. He held that it would be impossible to resist, for any considerable period, the forces of the republic when concentrated in La Vendée; that it behoved them to emerge from those woods and hollows, wherein they might be interminably buried, without ever knowing, or being known, of the allies; and, consequently, that instead of waiting to be exterminated, they ought to leave Vendée in a close column and advance into Brittany, where their presence would be hailed with gladness, and where the republic had no expectation of being assailed. According to his views, the Vendéans would have marched to the shores of the ocean, seized upon a port, opened a communication with the English, received an emigrant prince amongst them, moved upon Paris, and thus prosecuted at once offensive and decisive hostilities. This counsel, which is attributed to Bonchamps, was not followed by the Vendéans, whose ideas were still as confined, and their repugnance to quit their native district as strong as ever. The principal leaders thought only of dividing the country into portions, in order to exercise individual sway in each. Thus Charette had Lower Vendée, M. de Bonchamps the banks of the Loire on the side of Angers, M. de Larochejacquelein the remainder of Upper Anjou, and M. de Lescure all the insurgent part of Poitou. M. d'Elbée retained his nominal title of generalissimo, and the superior council its disregarded authority.

On the 9th, Canclaux commenced his movement; he left a strong reserve in the camp of Naudières, under the orders of Grouchy and Haxo, to protect Nantes, and pushed the column of Mayence towards Leger. In the mean time, the old army of Brest, under the orders of Beysser, making the circuit of Lower Vendée by Pornic, Bourneuf, and Machecoul, was appointed to rejoin the cohort of Mayencers at Angers.

These movements, directed by Canclaux, were executed without encountering any serious obstacles. The cohort of Mayence, whereof Kléber commanded the advanced guard and Aubert-Dubayet the main body, drove all enemies before it. Kléber, as merciful as intrepid, caused his troops to encamp without the

villages to prevent spoliations. "In winding," says he, "along the beautiful lake of Grand-Lieu, we enjoyed a charming landscape, and views equally delightful and diversified. Numerous flocks, abandoned to themselves, were roaming at hazard over an immense plain. I could not avoid sighing at the fate of those unfortunate inhabitants, who, misled and fanaticised by their priests, rejected the benefits of a new order of things to incur certain destruction." Kléber used unremitting exertions to protect the country from the excesses of the soldiery, and usually succeeded. A civil commission had been joined with the staff to put into execution the decree of the 1st of August, which ordained the devastation of the country and the removal of the population. The soldiers, meanwhile, were forbidden to apply the torch, as the means of destruction were only to be employed according to the express injunctions of the generals and the members of the civil commission.

Leger was reached by both divisions on the 14th, and the column of Mayence united with that of Brest, commanded by Beysser. In the interim, the column of Sables, under the orders of Mieszkouski, had advanced to Saint-Fulgent, in accordance with the settled plan, and already extended its posts to those of Canclaux's army. The division of Luçon, retarded for an interval by its defeat at Chantonay, had hung back; but, owing to the indefatigable efforts of the representatives, who had given it a new general, Beffroy, it had finally moved forward. That of Niort was at Châtaigneraie. Thus, although the general movement had been delayed for a day or two on all the points, and Canclaux had not arrived at Leger until the 14th, whereas he ought to have been there on the 12th, the delay being common to all the divisions, the combination was not affected, and the plan of the campaign was in the course of successful execution. But, whilst these operations were in progress, the news of the defeat sustained by the division of Luçon had reached Saumur; Rossignol, Ronsin, and the whole staff, had taken the alarm, and fearing that similar misfortunes might happen to the two other columns of Niort and Sables, the strength of which they judged inadequate, they determined to recall them immediately to their former posts. This order was in the highest degree imprudent, but it was not given in bad faith or with the intention of uncovering Canclaux and exposing his wings; the fact was, they had no confidence in his plan, and were well inclined, at the first impediment, to proclaim it impossible and to abandon it. This was doubtless what induced the staff of Saumur to order the retrograde movement of the columns of Niort, Luçon, and Sables.

Canclaux, pursuing his march, gained fresh ground. He attacked Montaigu on three points: Kléber by the road to Nantes, Aubert-Dubayet by that to Roche-Servière, and Beysser by that to Saint-Fulgent, charged simultaneously, and speedily dislodged the enemy. On the 17th Canclaux took Clisson, and perceiving no symptoms of Rossignol's co-operation, he resolved to halt and confine himself to reconnoitring until he acquired further information.

Canclaux, therefore, on the 18th September, had established himself in the environs of Clisson, having left Beysser at Montaigu, and dispatched Kléber with the advanced guard to Torfou. The counter orders issued from Saumur had reached the division of Niort, and been communicated to the two other divisions of Luçon and Sables, whereupon they forthwith retired, throwing by their retrograde movement the Vendéans into amazement and Canclaux into great perplexity. The Vendéans mustered nearly 100,000 men under arms. A very large body was assembled towards Vihiers and Chemillé, in front of the columns of Saumur and Angers; a still more considerable number towards Clisson and Montaigu, observing Canclaux. The columns of Angers and Saumur, seeing their enemies so numerous, exclaimed that it was the army of Mayence which thus drove them back upon them, and denounced a plan which exposed them to such formidable hazards. Their clamours, however, were groundless; for the Vendéans were every where in sufficient force to occupy the republicans on all points. At that very moment, so far from charging the columns of Rossignol's army, they were marching on Canclaux; D'Elbée and Lescure were in the act of quitting Upper Vendée to confront the Mayencers.

By a singular complication of circumstances, Rossignol, upon learning Canclaux's successes and his advance into the very centre of La Vendée, countermanded his first orders to retreat, and enjoined his columns to resume their movement in advance. The divisions of Saumur and Angers, being stationed within a short distance, were the first to act in obedience to these orders, and engaged in skirmishes with the enemy, the one at Doué, the other at the bridges of Cé. No decisive advantage resulted to either party. On the 18th, the Saumur column, commanded by Santerre, attempted to advance from Vihiers to a little village called Coron. In consequence of most wretched dispositions, artillery, cavalry, and infantry were confusedly crowded in the streets of this village, which was, moreover, within range of commanding heights. Santerre, perceiving the fatal error, was eager to repair it, and ordered the troops to fall back, with the view of drawing them up in form of battle on an eminence; but Ronsin, who, in the absence of Rossignol, arrogated a superior authority, upbraided Santerre with beating a retreat, and opposed his manœuvre. At this moment, the Vendéans made a furious charge upon the republicans, and a frightful disorder was communicated to the whole division. It contained a large proportion of recruits enlisted under the impulse of the tocsin, who broke from their ranks, and imparting their terror to the rest, all fled precipitately from Coron to Vihiers, to Doué, and to Saumur. The following day, the Vendéans marched against the Angers division, commanded by Duhoux. Equally fortunate as before, they repelled the republicans beyond Erigné, and once more obtained possession of the bridges of Cé.

The same activity was manifested in attacking Canclaux. Twenty thousand Vendéans, occupying positions near Torfou, fell on Kléber's advanced guard, which counted at the utmost 2000 men. Kléber placed himself amidst his soldiers, and encouraged them to resist this multitude of assailants. The ground on which he fought was a road commanded by heights; but, despite the disadvantage of his position, he retired with order and firmness. Unluckily, a piece of artillery having been dismounted, some confusion spread through the ranks, and those brave battalions gave way for the first time. At this sight, Kléber, as the only means of stopping the enemy, planted an officer with some soldiers at the end of a bridge, saying to them, "My friends, you must sell your lives." They obeyed the injunction with admirable heroism. In the mean time, the main body arrived and restored the combat; the Vendéans were driven back a considerable distance, and retribution taken for their early success.

All these events had occurred on the 19th. The order to resume the movement in advance, which had succeeded so ill with the Saumur and Angers divisions, had not yet reached, on account of the greater distance, the Luçon and Niort columns. Beysser was still at Montaigu, forming Canclaux's right wing, and completely unmasked. Canclaux, desirous to cover Beysser, ordered him to leave Montaigu and draw nearer the main body, directing Kléber, at the same time, to move towards Beysser for the purpose of protecting his manœuvre. Beysser, lacking foresight, had not taken sufficient precautions to guard his detachment in Montaigu. Messieurs de Lescure and Charette surprised it, and would have certainly annihilated it, but for the intrepidity of two battalions, who, by indomitable stubbornness, succeeded in arresting

the rapidity of the pursuit. The artillery and the baggage were lost; and the remnant of this shattered cohort fled to Nantes, where the reserve left in protection of the town was prompt in extending succour. Canclaux now came to the determination of likewise retrograding, to avoid remaining so far advanced in a hostile country, exposed to the whole force of the Vendéans. He accordingly fell back on Nantes with his valiant Mayencers, who were not molested, owing as well to their own imposing attitude as to the conduct of Charette, who refused to join D'Elbée and Bonchamps in the pursuit of the retiring republicans.

The causes which had prevented the success of this expedition are obvious. The staff at Saumur was dissatisfied with a plan which adjudged the cohort of Mayence to Canclaux, and the check of the 5th September was a sufficient pretext for feigning discouragement and abandoning the plan altogether. A counter-order was immediately given to the columns of Sables, Luçon, and Rochelle. Canclaux, who had advanced without impediment, thus found himself uncovered, and the affair of Torfou rendered his position still more difficult. Upon learning his progress, however, the army of Saumur marched from that town, and Angers to Vihiers and Chemillé; and if it had not been so speedily put to flight, it is probable that the retreat of the wings would not have marred the ultimate success of the enterprise. Thus, too much eagerness to throw up the concerted plan of operations, the bad organisation of the new levies, and the might of the Vendéans, who gathered to the amount of 100,000 fighting men, were the causes of these fresh reverses. But there was neither treachery on the part of the Saumur staff, nor any radical defect in Canclaux's plan. The effect of the disaster was most calamitous; for the continued resistance of La Vendée aroused sanguine hopes in the counter-revolutionists, and singularly aggravated the perils of the republic. For the rest, if the legions of Brest and Mayence were not intimidated, the army of Rochelle was again completely disorganised, and all the conscripts brought forward by the levy *en masse* returned to their homes, propagating their own dejection far and wide.

The two parties in the army lost no time in accusing each other. Philippeaux, ever the most eager, instantly wrote to the committee of public welfare, in a strain of passionate invective, attributing the counter-order given to the columns of the army of Rochelle to treachery. Choudieu and Richard, commissioners at Saumur, retorted in the most injurious language, and Ronsin hastened in person to unfold the inherent vices in the plan of campaign before the minister and the committee of public welfare. Canclaux, he urged, by acting with too strong a force in Lower Vendée, had thrown upon Upper Vendée the whole insurgent population, and had provoked the defeat of the Saumur and Angers columns. Moreover, returning calumny for calumny, Ronsin answered the reproach of treachery by the charge of aristocracy, and denounced at once the two armies of Brest and Mayence as filled with suspected and ill-intentioned men. Thus continually grew in virulence the quarrel between the Jacobin party and the party which upheld the policy of discipline and a regular system of warfare.

The inexplicable rout of Menin, the abortive and costly attempt upon Pirmasens, the reverses at the foot of the Pyrenees, and the disastrous issue of the last expedition in La Vendée, were known in Paris almost at the same time, and caused in that city a most dismal impression. The particulars of these untoward events were communicated in quick succession between the 18th and 25th September, and, as usual, excessive alarm stirred up violent passions. We have already stated that the most ardent agitators were accustomed to meet at the Cordelier Club, where less restraint was imposed on language than even at the Jacobin Club, and that they ruled over the war department, under the nominal sway of the imbecile Bouchotte. Vincent was their leader at Paris as Ronsin in La Vendée, and they seized this calamitous occasion to renew their wonted clamours. Placed beneath the convention, they would have willingly shaken off its inconvenient authority, which they encountered in the armies in the persons of the representatives, and at Paris in the committee of public welfare. The representatives on missions restrained them from executing the revolutionary measures with all the violence they were eager to develop; the committee of public welfare, regulating paramountly all operations according to views comparatively elevated and impartial, perpetually thwarted them, being, therefore, of all obstacles, that which chiefly moved their ire: thus it chanced that the idea often occurred to them, that they ought to demand the establishment of the new executive power after the form prescribed by the constitution.

To put the constitution in force, as frequently and malevolently insisted upon by the aristocrats, would be attended with incalculable danger. It involved a fresh general election, replacing the convention by another assembly, necessarily inexperienced, unknown to the country, and composed of heterogeneous draughts from all the factions. The enthusiastic revolutionists, aware of this peril, shrunk from proposing the renewal of the national representation, but restricted their demands to the enforcement of the constitution so far only as consorted with their own views. Nearly all of them occupying places in the public offices, they simply desired the formation of the constitutional ministry, which would be independent of the legislative power, and consequently of the committee of public welfare. Vincent, therefore, had the assurance to submit a petition to the Cordeliers, claiming the organisation of the constitutional ministry, and the recall of the deputies out on missions. The motion occasioned the greatest excitement. Legendre, the friend of Danton, and already classed amongst those whose energy seemed on the wane, vainly strove in opposition; the petition was adopted, save the article demanding the recall of the deputies on missions. The utility of those representatives was so manifest, and something so personal against the members of the convention appeared in the clause, that it was felt prudent to drop it. This petition excited an extraordinary tumult in Paris, and seriously affected the incipient authority of the committee of public welfare.

Besides these violent adversaries, the committee had others in the new moderates, who were accused of reviving the system of the Girondists, and trammelling revolutionary energy. These, emphatically pronouncing against the Cordeliers, Jacobins, and military disorganisers, besieged the committee with incessant complaints, and even railed at it for not denouncing the anarchists with sufficient vigour.

Thus, the committee had the two new parties which were beginning to be formed arrayed against it. According to inveterate usage, these parties took advantage of every calamity to found accusations; and both being cordial in condemning its operations, censured it, each after its peculiar fashion.

The flight of Menin on the 15th was already fully known; the final discomfiture in La Vendée began to be darkly hinted at. Uncertain rumours were propagated of defeats at Coron, Torfou, and Montaigu.* Thuriot, who had refused to serve as a member on the committee of public welfare, and who was upbraided with being one of the new moderates, mounted the tribune one morning in the convention to protest against intriguers and disorganisers, from whom propositions of extreme violence regarding provisions had just emanated. "Our committees and the executive council," said he, "are harassed and worried by a pack of intriguers, who pretend patriotism only because it is

* [There is a slight inconsistency in this passage with one immediately preceding, but it is chargeable on the author.]

profitable to them. Yes, the time is come when we must repudiate these men of rapine and the torch, who think the revolution has been made for them, whilst the honest and pure support it only for the happiness of the human race." The propositions controverted by Thuriot were rejected. Briez, one of the commissioners sent to Valenciennes, then read a critical essay on the military operations. He held that at no time had the warfare been brisk and conformable to the French genius; that the fighting had always been in detail, and in petty masses; and that the causes of the reverses were to be found in this defective system. Proceeding, without openly attacking the committee of public welfare, he seemed to insinuate that it had failed to apprise the convention of all circumstances; that, for example, a corps of 6000 Austrians had been near Douay, which might have been enveloped but had not been so. The convention, after having attentively listened to Briez, added him to the committee of public welfare. At this moment, detailed intelligence from La Vendée, contained in a letter from Montaigu, arrived. The alarming tidings excited a general emotion. "Instead of giving way to dejection," exclaimed one of the members, "let us swear to save the republic!" At these words the whole assembly rose, and once again swore to save the republic, whatsoever perils might threaten it.

The members of the committee of public welfare, who had not yet appeared at the sitting, entered the hall immediately afterwards. Barrère, the usual reporter, claimed to be heard. "Every suspicion," said he, "directed against the committee of public welfare is a victory gained by Pitt. We must avoid giving our enemies the too signal advantage of ourselves, discrediting the power appointed to save us." He subsequently made known the measures taken by the committee. "For several days," he continued, "the committee has had grounds for suspecting that serious faults were committed at Dunkirk, where the English might have been exterminated to the last man, and at Menin, where no exertion was made to obviate the strange effects of the panic. The committee has superseded Houchard, as well as the general of division Hédouville, who failed to do at Menin what he ought to have done; and the conduct of those two generals will be forthwith investigated. The committee next intends to purify all the staffs and departments in the armies; it has placed the fleets on a footing which will permit them to measure strength with the enemy; it has just raised 18,000 men; and it has ordered a new system of attack in masses. Finally, it is in Rome itself that it designs to attack Rome; and 100,000 men, disembarking in England, will extinguish Pitt's system in London. The committee of public safety, therefore, has been wrongly accused; it has never ceased to merit the confidence you have hitherto reposed in it."

Robespierre then appeared in the tribune. "For some time," said he, "efforts have been made to defame the convention, and the committee to which its authority is delegated. Briez, who ought to have died in the breach at Valenciennes, comes unblushingly to Paris, from the scene of his cowardice, to serve Pitt and the coalition, by bringing the government into odium. It is not enough," he added, "that the convention continues to us its confidence; it must proclaim the fact in solemn form, and rescind its vote regarding Briez, whom it has added to our number." Applause hailed this demand; the assembly decided that Briez should not be joined to the committee of public welfare, and resolved by acclamation that that committee retained the full confidence of the national convention.

The moderate party was in the convention alone, and there the debate we have just recorded had ended in its repulse; but the most formidable adversaries of the committee, that is to say, the ardent revolutionists, were to be found in the Jacobin and Cordelier Clubs. From them it was deemed expedient to seek prompt deliverance. Robespierre accordingly visited the Jacobins, and exerted all his ascendancy over them. He explained the conduct of the committee, vindicated it from the twofold attacks of the moderates and the exaggerators, and inculcated the peril of petitions demanding the formation of the constitutional ministry. "It is necessary," said he, "that some government should succeed the one we have destroyed. The plan of organising at this moment the constitutional ministry, means nothing else than a scheme for dissolving the convention itself, and decomposing the government in presence of the hostile armies. Pitt alone can have originated such an idea. His agents have propagated it, and seduced patriots of pure faith; whilst the credulous and suffering people, always prone to complain of the government, which is unable to remedy all their griefs, have become the ready echo of their calumnies and insidious suggestions. You, Jacobins!" exclaimed Robespierre, "too sincere to be gained, too enlightened to be seduced, will defend the Mountain which they assail; you will support the committee of public welfare which they calumniate the better to compass your ruin; and thus with you it will triumph over all the devices of the enemies of the people."

Robespierre was loudly cheered, and in his person the whole committee. The Cordeliers were rebuked, and their petition consigned to oblivion. Vincent's rash attack, therefore, being thus victoriously repelled, recoiled upon his own head, and left the committee unscathed.

Nevertheless, it was felt incumbent to adopt some resolution touching the new constitution. To give place to new revolutionists, equivocal, unknown, and in all probability divided, since they would be drawn from all the factions agitating beneath the convention, was fraught with danger. Hence it became necessary to declare boldly to all the parties that the supreme power would be usurped, and that before abandoning the republic to itself and to the action of the laws that had been framed for it, it must be governed revolutionarily until it was finally rescued. Numerous petitions had already besought the convention to remain at its post. On the 10th October, Saint-Just, speaking in the name of the committee of public welfare, proposed new measures of government. He drew a most dismal picture of France, darkening it with the saddest colours of his own sombre imagination; and with the aid of those eminent talents he possessed, and of facts unfortunately too real, he produced a species of terror in the minds of his hearers. He then presented, and induced the convention to adopt, a decree containing the following provisions:—

By the first article, the government of France was declared revolutionary until the peace; which signified that the constitution was provisionally suspended, and an extraordinary dictatorship instituted until the expiration of all dangers. This dictatorship was conferred on the convention and the committee of public welfare. "The executive council," ran the decree, "the ministers, generals, and constituted bodies, are placed under the superintendence of the committee of public welfare, which will render accounts every week to the convention." We have already explained how superintendence was converted into supreme authority, from the ministers, generals, and functionaries, who were obliged to submit their operations to the committee, having finished by no longer venturing to act upon their own judgment, and waiting for orders from the committee itself. The decree proceeded to declare—"The revolutionary laws must be executed rapidly. The inertness of government being the cause of the reverses, the periods for the execution of those laws will be fixed. The non-observance of those periods will be punished as a crime against liberty." Regulations on the subject of food were added to these measures of government, "for bread is the right of the people," said Saint-Just. The general table of

existing resources, now definitively completed, was to be sent to all the authorities. The exigency of each department was to be approximatively estimated and guaranteed, whilst the superfluity was subjected to requisitions, either for the armies or for districts which lacked the exigency. These requisitions were to be controlled by a subsistence commission. Paris was to be, like a fortified town, provisioned for a year, dating from the 1st of March ensuing. Lastly, it was decreed that a tribunal should be instituted to inquire into the conduct and fortunes of those who had disbursed the public money.

By this great and important declaration, the government, consisting of the committee of public welfare, the committee of general safety, and the extraordinary tribunal, was consolidated and rendered permanent during the continuance of danger. The effect was tantamount to declaring the revolution in a state of siege, and applying to it the extraordinary laws of that condition, whilst it should endure. The establishment of this revolutionary government was accompanied by various measures long demanded, and now become unavoidable. A revolutionary army, that is to say, a force specifically devoted to enforcing the execution of the government mandates in the interior, had been a subject of frequent reclamation. It had been decreed some time previously, but it was finally organised by a new decree passed on the 3d of September. It was composed of 6000 soldiers and 1200 artillerymen. It was intended to be moveable, and to march from Paris into towns where its presence might be necessary, there to remain in garrison at the expense of the wealthiest inhabitants. The Cordeliers desired one for each department; but their ideas were controverted by the argument, that to give an individual force to each department would savour of a return to federalism. The same Cordeliers, moreover, insisted that the detachments of the revolutionary army should be followed by a guillotine on wheels. No limit can be assigned to the extravagant conceptions of the people when once fairly left to themselves. The convention, however, repudiated these demands, and adhered to its decree. Bouchotte, being charged with the composition of this army, levied it from all those characters abounding in Paris who followed no occupation, and were ready to become the janissaries of the prevailing power. He filled the staff with Jacobins, but especially with Cordeliers, and deprived La Vendée and Rossignol of Ronsin, to place him at the head of this revolutionary army. He submitted the list of the staff to the Jacobins, and made each officer undergo the ordeal of a scrutiny. Not one of them, in fact, was confirmed by the minister without being sanctioned by that society.

The formation of a revolutionary army was coupled with a law against the suspected, so repeatedly bespoken, and ordained in principle the same day as the national levy. The extraordinary tribunal, although organised so as to smite on simple probabilities, did not sufficiently satisfy the revolutionary imagination. Power was craved to incarcerate those whom it might be difficult to send to the scaffold; hence the cry for enactments authorising their persons to be secured. The decree placing aristocrats beyond the pale of the law was too vague, and required the formality of a trial. The object desired was, that, on the mere denunciation of the revolutionary committees, an individual declared to be suspected might be immediately thrown into prison. Accordingly, the convention decreed the provisional arrest, until the peace, of all suspected individuals.* Considered as such were—

1st, Those who, either by their conduct, by their intercourse, by their words, or by their writings, had shown themselves partisans of tyranny or federalism, and enemies of liberty.

2d, Those who could not give a satisfactory account, in the manner prescribed by the law of the 20th March last, of their means of existence, and of the performance of their civic duties.

3d, Those to whom certificates of civism had been refused.

4th, Public functionaries suspended or degraded from their functions by the national convention or its commissioners.

5th, Late nobles, and the husbands, wives, fathers, mothers, sons, daughters, brothers, sisters, and agents of emigrants, who had not constantly manifested their attachment to the revolution.

6th, Those who had emigrated in the interval between the 1st July 1789 and the publication of the law of the 8th April 1792, although they had returned to France within the stipulated periods.

The prisoners were to be confined in the national buildings, and detained at their own expense. They were allowed the privilege of removing into these houses such furniture as they might require. The committees empowered to order arrests, could only do so by a majority of their members, and under restriction of transmitting to the committee of general safety a list of the suspected, and the reasons for each arrest. Their duties becoming thenceforth very arduous, and almost continuous, constituted a species of profession, which it was held just to remunerate. They consequently received, from that time forth, a salary under the title of an indemnity.

At the urgent entreaties of the commune of Paris, these regulations were completed by an additional measure, which rendered this law of the suspected still more formidable: this was the revocation of the decree prohibiting domiciliary visits during the night. From that moment, every proscribed citizen was threatened at all hours, and no longer enjoyed an interval of repose. By immuring themselves during the day in the ingenious and confined hiding-places which necessity had suggested, the suspected had hitherto possessed the faculty of breathing freely during the hours of darkness; now, even that boon was denied them, and the arrests, multiplied day and night, speedily filled all the prisons of France.

The sectional meetings were accustomed to be held daily; but the working part of the community had not time to attend them, and in its absence revolutionary motions were indifferently supported. The convention enjoined, on the express proposition of the Jacobin Club and the commune, that those meetings should take place for the future only twice a-week, and that each citizen giving his attendance thereat, should receive forty sous per sitting. No expedient could be better adapted for securing the populace, than assembling them at intervals, not too quickly recurring, and liberally rewarding their presence. The ardent revolutionists were incensed at a regulation which fettered their zeal, and limited its manifestations to two days out of seven. They accordingly drew up an energetic petition, expostulating against what they decried as an invasion upon the rights of the sovereign, he being debarred from sitting in council as often as it pleased his fancy. Young Varlet was the author of this petition; but it was unheeded, sharing in that respect the same fate as divers other demands inspired by the revolutionary mania.

Thus the machine was complete in the two most important ramifications with reference to a country at hazard, war and police. In the convention, a committee directed the military operations, selected the generals and agents of every kind, and wielded, by means of the decree of permanent requisition, a disposing power over both men and things. It exercised these functions, either by itself, or by the representatives dispatched on missions. Under this committee, the committee styled that of general safety had the control of the superior police, and employed, as its superintending agents, revolutionary committees in-

* This famous decree was passed on the 17th September. It is known under the title of the *Law of the Suspected*.

stituted in each municipality. Individuals slightly suspected of hostility, or even of indifference, were incarcerated; others, more seriously compromised, were struck by the revolutionary tribunal, but fortunately in small number, for that court had not yet pronounced many condemnations. A special army, the veritable moving guard or gendarmerie of the dominant system, enforced the orders of the government, whilst the people, paid for frequenting the sections, were always ready to support it. Thus war and police all centred in the committee of public welfare. Absolute master, holding at discretion the fortunes of all citizens, and empowered to consign their persons to military service, to the dungeon, or to the scaffold, it was invested, in defence of the revolution, with an unlimited and terrible despotism. True, it was enjoined to render a weekly account of its transactions to the convention; but that account was invariably approved, for all criticism was confined to the Jacobins, whom it swayed since Robespierre had become a component member. In opposition to this exorbitant power, there were simply the moderates, shrinking backward, and the new exaggerators, harking onward, but neither the one nor the other calculated to excite much apprehension.

We have seen that Robespierre and Carnot had been named on the committee of public welfare, in lieu of Gasparin and Thuriot, who retired from ill health. Robespierre had carried with him his powerful influence, and Carnot his military science. The convention wished to have coupled Robespierre with Danton, his colleague and rival in renown; but the latter, fatigued with exertion, averse to the tedious details of administration, and moreover disgusted with the calumny of faction, declined serving on any committee. He had already done enough for the revolution: he had sustained drooping courage in the hours of danger; he had furnished the first idea of the revolutionary tribunal, the revolutionary army, the permanent requisition, the tax upon the rich, and the subsidy of forty sous per sitting to the members of sections; he was the author, in short, of all the measures which, rendered howsoever cruel in the execution, nevertheless imparted that energy to the revolution which eventually saved it. At this period, Danton began to be no longer so necessary, for as to mere physical danger, since the first invasion of the Prussians, it had become, as it were, one of the elements of revolutionary existence. The inexorable vengeance to be wreaked on the Girondists was abhorrent to him; he had recently espoused a young wife, of whom he was deeply enamoured, and whom he had endowed with the gold of Belgium, as his detractors averred, and with the compensation awarded him for his old office of advocate to the council, according to the more favourable version of his friends; he was, like Mirabeau and Marat, labouring under an inflammatory malady; finally, he was desirous of repose: wherefore he demanded leave to visit Arcis-sur-Aube, his birthplace, to enjoy the charms of nature, for his spirit could luxuriate in such recreation. He had been advised to seek this temporary retreat, in order that calumny might in the interim waste its force. The triumph of the revolution could be now consummated without him; two months of war and energy would suffice; and he proposed to return after the victory, and make his potential voice be heard in favour of the vanquished and of a better order of things. Such the vain illusion of indolence and discouragement! To abandon for two months, for even one, a revolution so supremely rapid, was to become, with regard to it, a stranger devoid of influence.

Thus Danton refused to enter the committee of public welfare, and obtained leave of absence. Billaud-Varennes and Collot-d'Herbois were nominated as members, and bore to its deliberations, the first his cold and implacable disposition, and the other his impetuosity of character, and his sway over the turbulent Cordeliers. The committee of general safety was remodelled. Of its eighteen members, nine were lopped off, those whose severity of temper was sufficiently accredited being retained.

Whilst the government was thus taking organisation in the strongest possible manner, all its resolutions manifested redoubled energy. The vigorous measures adopted in the month of August had not yet produced their anticipated results. La Vendée, although attacked in pursuance of a regular plan, had successfully resisted; the defeat of Menin had almost wholly lost the advantages of the victory at Hondtschoote; fresh efforts, then, were indispensable. Revolutionary enthusiasm inspired the idea that the *will* must have, in war as in all other matters, a decisive influence; and, for the first time, injunctions were laid upon an army to conquer within a given period.

The full extent of danger to the republic in the war of La Vendée was appreciated. "Destroy La Vendée," said Barrère, in a report, "and Valenciennes and Condé will be no longer in the power of the Austrian. Destroy La Vendée, and England will no longer turn its eyes on Dunkirk. Destroy La Vendée, and the Rhine will be delivered from the Prussians. Destroy La Vendée, and Spain will find itself pressed and conquered by the southerns, joined to the victorious cohorts of Mortagne and Cholet. Destroy La Vendée, and a part of the army of the interior will reinforce that intrepid army of the north, so often betrayed, so often disorganised. Destroy La Vendée, and Lyons will no longer resist, Toulon will rise against the Spaniards and the English, and the spirit of Marseilles will rebound to the height of the republican revolution. In a word, every blow you strike at La Vendée will reverberate in the rebellious cities, in the federalist departments, on the invaded frontiers! La Vendée—the watchword is still La Vendée! It is there you must strike, between this and the 20th October, before the winter, before the roads become impracticable—before the brigands find impunity in the climate and the season!

The committee, casting a rapid and comprehensive glance, discovers all the vices at work in La Vendée in this short summary:—

Too many representatives
Too much moral division;
Too many military divisions;
Too much want of discipline in success;
Too many false reports in the relation of events;
Too much avidity and love of money in a portion of the leaders and administrators."

After hearing this exposition, the convention reduced the number of representatives on missions, united the two armies of Brest and Rochelle into one, to be called the army of the west, and gave the command of it, not to Rossignol or to Canclaux, but to Léchelle, general of brigade in the division of Luçon. Lastly, it assigned the day upon which the war of La Vendée was to be ended, and that day was the 20th October. The following proclamation accompanied the decree:—*

"THE NATIONAL CONVENTION TO THE ARMY OF THE WEST.

Soldiers of liberty!—The brigands of La Vendée must be exterminated before the end of October! The safety of the country demands it; the impatience of the French nation commands it; its courage shall accomplish it. The national gratitude attends at this epoch all whose valour and patriotism consolidate imperishably liberty and the republic."

Measures not less prompt and vigorous were taken with regard to the army of the north, with the view of retrieving the disgrace at Menin, and conducing to a new career of victory. Houchard, already superseded, was placed under arrest. General Jourdan, who had commanded the centre at Hondtschoote, was

* Decree of the 1st of October

appointed general-in-chief of the armies of the north and of Ardennes. He had orders to assemble at Guise large masses, to make an onslaught upon the enemy. Attacks in detail were condemned to universal odium. Without investigating the plan or operations of Houchard around Dunkirk, it was sufficient that he had not fought in masses, for that mode of combat was exclusively demanded, being better adapted, it was alleged, to the impetuosity of the French character. Carnot had left Paris for Guise to be near Jourdan, and to put in execution a new system of war altogether revolutionary. Three additional commissioners were joined to Dubois-Crancé, charged to raise levies *en masse* and precipitate them upon Lyons. They were enjoined to renounce the system of methodical attacks, and at once to assault the refractory city. Thus, on all sides, redoubled efforts were made to conclude the campaign victoriously.

But rigour was the invariable accompaniment of energy. The trial of Custine, too long delayed, according to the Jacobins, was at length commenced, and conducted with all the violence and barbarity of the new judicial forms. No general-in-chief had as yet appeared on the scaffold; a certain impatience was felt to smite a lofty personage, and make the leaders of armies quail before popular supremacy; above all, a desire had long lurked to visit upon some general the defection of Dumouriez, and Custine was recommended for the atonement, by the circumstance of his opinions and tendencies constituting him in popular estimation another Dumouriez. Advantage had been taken of the moment when, holding the command of the army of the north, Custine had visited Paris to concert his future operations with the minister, to accomplish his arrest. He was at first thrown into prison, but after a short interval a decree was craved and obtained for his arraignment at the bar of the revolutionary tribunal.

Let us recall the campaign of Custine on the Rhine. Intrusted with a division of the army, he had found Worms and Spire indifferently guarded, because the allies, in their eagerness to march on Champagne, had given no heed to any thing on their wings and in their rear. German patriots, flocking from all directions, offered him their towns; he advanced, took Spire and Worms, which were delivered into his hands, and neglected Manheim, which lay on his route, from respect for the neutrality of the elector-palatine, and from a presentiment, likewise, that its possession would not be easily compassed. He at length reached Mayence, seized upon it, gladdened all France with his unexpected conquests, and procured a command which rendered him independent of Biron. At this moment, Dumouriez had repulsed the Prussians, and driven them back on the Rhine. Kellermann was at Treves. Custine ought then to have descended the Rhine to Coblentz, effected a junction with Kellermann, and thus rendered himself master of the course of the river. A combination of reasons pointed out this plan. The inhabitants of Coblentz invoked the presence of Custine, those of Saint-Goard and Rheinfels stretched out their hands to him; in short, no limit can be assigned to his probable career had he frankly resigned himself to the course of the Rhine. It was quite possible for him to have descended even into Holland. But, from the interior of Germany, other patriotic voices came to beguile his ear; for the belief was prevalent, from his bold advance, that he had at least 100,000 men under his command. To penetrate the hostile land and carry his standards beyond the Rhine, was too tempting an exploit to the fancy and vanity of General Custine. He rushed onward to Frankfort, where he paused to levy contributions and exercise other impolitic severities. Fresh solicitations there assailed him. There were madmen who urged him to advance to Cassel, in the midst of electoral Hesse, for the alluring purpose of grasping the treasures of the elector. The wiser counsels of the French government exhorted him to return upon the Rhine and march towards Coblentz. But he heeded not, completely absorbed in the idea of revolutionising Germany.

Nevertheless, Custine was not insensible to the peril of his position. Reflecting that, if the elector-palatine should break his neutrality, his rear would be endangered from Manheim, he would have willingly taken that fortress, which was offered to him, but he durst not venture upon the step. As to being attacked in Frankfort, which he could not hope to hold, he was loath to abandon that city and return upon the line of the Rhine, as that step led of course to an inglorious surrender of his pretended conquests, and exposed him to the obligation of sharing in the operations of the other generals by descending to Coblentz. In this situation he was surprised by the Prussians; lost Frankfort; fell back on Mayence; halted uncertain whether he should retain that place or not; threw into it some artillery drawn from Strasburg; gave tardy orders for provisioning it; was once more surprised by the Prussians amidst these uncertainties; retreated from Mayence, and, seized with terror, conceiving himself pursued by 150,000 men, retired into Upper Alsace, almost under the guns of Strasburg. Stationed on the Upper Rhine with a considerable army, he had it in his power to march on Mayence and place the besiegers between two fires, but he could never muster sufficient hardihood for the enterprise; at length, shocked at his own inactivity, he hazarded a disastrous attack on the 15th May, was discomfited, and sulkily betook himself to the army of the north, where he consummated his ruin by talking in a strain of moderation, and inculcating a policy of undoubted prudence, to wit, retaining the army in Cæsar's camp for the purpose of re-organising it, instead of leading it forth to unavailing bloodshed under the idea of relieving Valenciennes.

Such was the career of Custine. In it were assuredly numerous faults, but no treason. His trial was opened, and as deponents against him were summoned representatives acting on missions, agents of the executive power, inveterate foes to generals, discontented officers, members of clubs in Strasburg, Mayence, and Cambray, and, lastly, the terrible Vincent, the tyrant of the war-offices under Bouchotte. Here was an array of accusers, heaping unjust and contradictory charges—charges altogether foreign to a military inquiry, but founded on accidental misfortunes, for which the general was not blameable, and which could with no regard to fairness be imputed to him. Custine replied with a peculiar soldierly vehemence to all these accusations, but he was overborne. Jacobins from Strasburg upbraided him with not endeavouring to take the gorges of Porentruy, when Luckner ordered him to do so; and he proved fruitlessly that it was impossible. A German reproached him with not having occupied Manheim, which he had offered him. Custine sought exoneration by alleging the neutrality of the elector and the difficulties of the project. The inhabitants of Coblentz, Rheinfels, Darmstadt, Hanau, and all the towns which had been anxious to open their gates to him, and which he had declined to occupy, inveighed against him with one accord.

When accused of refusing to march on Coblentz, he offered but a lame defence, and calumniated Kellermann, who, he asserted, had objected to second him. To the charge of refusing to occupy other towns, he answered with reason that he was invoked by numberless persons in Germany, and that if he had met every demand upon him, he must have occupied upwards of a hundred leagues of ground. By a singular contradiction, whilst he was blamed for not having taken one town, or drawn contributions from another, he was specifically criminated for having taken Frankfort, plundered the inhabitants, failed to make the necessary dispositions for resisting the Prussians, and exposed the French garrison to the risk of being massacred.

The chivalric Merlin de Thionville, one of those who deposed against him, justified him on that point with equal candour and good sense. Had he even left 20,000 men in Frankfort, asseverated Merlin, he could not have retained its possession; he was bound to retire on Mayence, and his only default consisted in not doing so earlier. But at Mayence, exclaimed a crowd of other witnesses, he had made no essential preparations; he had collected neither victuals nor munitions; he had thrown in the artillery whereof he despoiled Strasburg, merely to ensure its capture by the Prussians, together with a garrison of 20,000 men and two deputies. Custine proved that he had given orders for supplies; that the artillery was scarcely sufficient; and that it had not been uselessly accumulated for the purpose of being captured by the Prussians. Merlin supported all the assertions of Custine, but could not be brought to pardon his pusillanimous retreat, or his inaction on the Upper Rhine, whilst the garrison of Mayence was effecting prodigies. Here Custine had nothing to offer in extenuation. He was next reproached with having burnt the magazines in Spire when retiring; an absurd reproach, for a retreat once unavoidable, it was better to consume the magazines than leave them for the enemy. He was likewise accused of shooting volunteers at Spire, on account of pillaging; to which he answered, that the convention had approved his conduct. Then he was impugned for having deliberately spared the Prussians; for having voluntarily exposed his army to be defeated on the 15th May; for having tardily repaired to his command in the north; for having attempted to strip Lille of its artillery to convey it to Cæsar's camp; for having prevented the relief of Valenciennes; for not having opposed obstacles to the disembarkation of the English—accusations excelling one another in absurdity. Lastly, it was objected to him—"You pitied Louis XVI.; you were melancholy on the 31st May; you would have fain hanged Dr Hoffmann, president of the Jacobins at Mayence; you have prevented the distribution of Père Duchêne's journal and of the Mountain journal in your army; you have stated that Marat and Robespierre were public disturbers; you have been surrounded by aristocratic officers; you have never had at your table good republicans." These reproaches were fatal, and comprehended the real crimes for which he was persecuted.

The trial, meanwhile, proceeded tediously; the various imputations were so vague that the tribunal hesitated. Custine's daughter, and several persons who were interested in his behalf, had made exertions to save him; for at this period, although the terror was already great, friends still ventured to evince some interest in victims. The revolutionary tribunal itself was speedily denounced at the Jacobin Club. "It is painful to me," said Hebert to the Jacobins, "to have to denounce an authority which was the hope of the patriots, which at first merited all their confidence, and which will soon become their abomination. The revolutionary tribunal is on the point of absolving a miscreant, in whose favour, it is true, the prettiest women in Paris are soliciting all the world. Custine's daughter, as cunning a comedian in this city as her father was at the head of armies, sees every body, and promises every thing to obtain his pardon." Robespierre also, on his part, inveighed against the spirit of chicanery and the passion for formalities which had suddenly seized upon the tribunal; and averred that simply for having purposed to unfurnish Lille, Custine richly deserved to die.

Vincent, summoned as a witness, had ransacked the repositories of the war-office, and produced the letters and orders wherewith Custine was reproached, but which were certainly far from constituting crimes. Fouquier-Tinville summed up the case with a parallel between Custine and Dumouriez, which was decisive against the unfortunate general. Dumouriez, he alleged, had advanced rapidly into Belgium, to abandon it with equal rapidity, and deliver to the enemy soldiers, magazines, and representatives. Even so had Custine advanced rapidly into Germany, abandoned soldiers at Frankfort and at Mayence, and laid his plans for delivering to the enemy, with the latter town, 20,000 men, two representatives, and the whole park of artillery which he had wickedly taken from Strasburg. Like Dumouriez, also, he reviled the convention and the Jacobins, and sentenced brave volunteers to be shot, under pretext of maintaining discipline. At this parallel the scruples of the tribunal vanished. Custine spoke for two hours in justification of his military operations. Tronçon-Ducoudray defended his administrative and civil conduct, but unavailingly. The tribunal pronounced the general guilty, to the great joy of the Jacobins and Cordeliers, who filled the court, and gave loud demonstrations of their satisfaction. He had not been condemned unanimously, however. Upon the three questions, there had been against him successively ten, nine, and eight voices out of eleven. The president having asked him whether he had any thing further to say, he looked around him, and not perceiving his defenders, he replied, "My defenders are gone—I die resigned and innocent."

He was executed the following morning. A warrior, and distinguished for high personal courage, he was startled at sight of the guillotine. However, falling on his knees at the foot of the ladder, and repeating a short prayer, his presence of mind revived, and he met death with fortitude. Such was the end of this unfortunate commander, who lacked neither ability nor boldness of character, but combined therewith a remarkable degree of instability and presumption, and doubtless committed three capital faults—the first, by overstepping his veritable line of operation to move upon Frankfort; the second, by not returning to it when strongly urged; and the third, by remaining in cowardly inaction during the siege of Mayence. Still, none of these delinquencies merited death; but he underwent the fate which could not be inflicted on Dumouriez, and which he had not provoked like that general by formidable and criminal projects. His execution was a terrible example to all the generals, and a warning for them to render an absolute obedience to the injunctions of the revolutionary government.

After this act of implacability, all attempts were vain to check other immolations. The order for hastening the trial of Marie-Antoinette was forthwith renewed. The articles of impeachment against the Girondists, so long demanded and never hitherto digested, were now presented to the convention. They were drawn up by Saint-Just. Petitions from the Jacobins poured in to constrain their adoption by the convention. They were directed not only against the twenty-two and the members of the commission of twelve, but also against seventy-three members of the right side, who had observed an unbroken silence since the victory of the Mountain, but were known to have framed a protest against the events of the 31st May and the 2d June. Certain frantic Mountaineers advocated an impeachment, that is to say, a consignment to death, against the twenty-two, the twelve, and the seventy-three; but Robespierre controverted such wholesale slaughter, and proposed a middle course, namely, to send before the revolutionary tribunal the twenty-two and the twelve, and to place the seventy-three under arrest. According as he advised, so it was ordered; the doors of the hall were instantly closed, the seventy-three arrested, and injunctions laid upon Fouquier-Tinville to give his attention to the unfortunate Girondists. Thus the convention, becoming daily more docile, allowed an ordinance to be wrung from it devoting a large portion of its members to certain death. In truth, it could no longer delay the ungrateful task, for the Jacobins had presented five petitions, the one more imperious than the other, to extort these last decrees of impeachment.

CHAPTER XXVII.

CAPTURE OF LYONS, AND TERRIBLE RETRIBUTION ON ITS INHABITANTS. — VICTORY OF WATIGNIES. — REDUCTION OF LA VENDÉE. — REVERSES ON THE RHINE.

Every reverse aroused revolutionary energy, and that energy generated success. This had been constantly the case during this ever-memorable campaign. From the defeat of Neerwinden to the month of August, an unbroken series of disasters had eventually provoked desperate exertions. The annihilation of federalism, the defence of Nantes, the victory of Houdtschoote, and the relief of Dunkirk, had been the consequences of those exertions. Fresh reverses at Menin, Pirmasens, the Pyrenees, and Torfou and Coron in La Vendée, had again excited energy to the highest pitch, and decisive successes on all the theatres of war were speedily to follow.

The siege of Lyons was, of all the operations, that whereof the termination was demanded with the chiefest impatience. We left Dubois-Crancé encamped before that city, with 5000 men of the regular army, and from 7000 to 8000 conscripts. He was threatened with having quickly on his rear the Sardinians, whom the feeble army of the Great Alps could no longer keep in check. As we have already explained, he had planted himself on the north, between the Saône and the Rhone, in front of the redoubts of the Croix-Rousse, and not on the heights of Sainte-Foy and Fourvières, situated to the west, by which the principal attack might have been best directed. But there were substantial reasons for this preference. It was of primary importance to remain in communication with the Alpine frontier, where the bulk of the republican army was stationed, and whence the Piedmontese might approach to the succour of the Lyonnese. He had, moreover, the advantage in this position of occupying the upper course of the two rivers, and intercepting the supplies which came down the Rhone and the Saône. It is true the western side thus remained open to the Lyonnese, and they were enabled to make continual excursions towards Saint-Etienne and Montbrison; but the arrival of the contingents from the Puy-de-Dôme was daily announced, and whenever those new levies were mustered, Dubois-Crancé would be able to perfect the blockade on the western side, and select the true point of attack. In the mean time, he was content to press the enemy unremittingly, cannonade the Croix-Rousse on the north, and commence his lines to the east before the bridge of La Guillotière. The transport of munitions was difficult and tedious; they had to be brought from Grenoble, Fort Barreaux, Briançon, and Embrun, and thus made to traverse sixty leagues of mountainous roads. Such an extraordinary wainage could only have been accomplished by the mode of forced requisitions, and by devoting 5000 extra horses to the service; for the conveyance to Lyons was required of 14,000 bombs, 34,000 balls, 300,000 pounds of powder, 800,000 cartridges, and 130 pieces of ordnance.

At the first commencement of the siege, the Piedmontese were advertised to be on the move, and debouching from the Little Saint-Bernard and Mount Cenis. Kellermann immediately departed, on the pressing entreaties of the department of the Isère, and left General Dumay as his substitute before Lyons. But, in fact, Dumay only succeeded him in name, for Dubois-Crancé, at once a representative and a skilful engineer, alone directed all the operations of the siege. To accelerate the levy of the conscripts in the Puy-de-Dôme, Dubois-Crancé detached General Nicolas with a small body of cavalry; but that officer was enveloped in the Forez, and fell a prey to the Lyonnese. Dubois-Crancé then dispatched 1000 of his best troops with the representative Javognes. His mission was more fortunate; he repressed the aristocrats of Montbrison and Saint-Etienne, and levied 7000 or 8000 peasants, whom he conducted before Lyons. Dubois-Crancé stationed them at the bridge of Oullins, situated to the north-west of Lyons, so as to harass the communications of the besieged with the Forez. He next summoned the deputy Reverchon, who had assembled a few thousand conscripts at Mâçon, and planted him high up the Saône directly to the north. In this manner, the blockade began to be somewhat more rigorous; but the operations were slow, and attacks actively offensive impracticable. The fortifications of the Croix-Rousse, between the Rhone and Saône, before which the principal corps was extended, could not be carried by assault. Towards the east, and on the left bank of the Rhine, the Morand bridge was defended by a horse-shoe redoubt most skilfully constructed. To the west, the all-important heights of Sainte-Foy and Fourvières could only be surmounted by a powerful army; and for the moment nothing more could be attempted than intercepting supplies, and beleaguering and bombarding the town. From the beginning of August to the middle of September, Dubois-Crancé had been incapable of effecting more, and at Paris his tardiness was reviled without its imperative causes being much regarded. Nevertheless, he had worked infinite mischief on the devoted city. His bombs had destroyed the magnificent square of Belle-Cour, the arsenal, the quarter of Saint-Clair, and the gate of the Temple, and seriously damaged the fine building of the Hospital, which rises so majestically on the banks of the Rhone. The Lyonnese did not the less resist with unabated obstinacy. A report had been propagated amongst them that 50,000 Piedmontese were on the point of debouching on their town; the emigrants were profuse in their promises, without venturing, however, to share their dangers; and those honest burghers, albeit sincere republicans, were, by their false position, reduced to the wretched extremity of desiring the dangerous and disgraceful aid of emigrants and aliens. Their real feelings transpired more than once in a manner not to be mistaken. Précy having proposed to mount the white cockade, had soon been convinced that the design was premature. A paper currency having been manufactured for the exigencies of the siege, and *fleurs-de-lis* being interwoven on the notes, it was found necessary to destroy them and adopt a different pattern. Thus the Lyonnese were republicans; but the dread of vengeance by the convention, and the false promises of Marseilles, Bordeaux, Caen, and, above all, the emigrants, had allured them into an abyss of error and calamity.

Whilst they thus cherished the hope of shortly descrying 50,000 Sardinians from their ramparts, the convention had ordered the representatives Couthon, Maignet, and Châteauneuf-Randon, to proceed into Auvergne and the neighbouring departments, for the purpose of stimulating a general levy, and Kellermann was scouring the valleys of the Alps, confronting the Piedmontese.

An admirable opportunity here again presented itself to the Piedmontese of accomplishing a bold and grand manœuvre, which could not have failed to be successful—namely, to concentrate their principal forces on the Little Saint-Bernard, and debouch on Lyons with 50,000 men. The map acquaints us that the three valleys of Sallenche, La Tarentaise, and La Maurienne, adjacent one to the other, wind almost spirally, and that, starting from the Little Saint-Bernard, they open upon Geneva, Chambéry, Lyons, and Grenoble. Meagre French corps were scattered in these valleys. To descend rapidly by one of them, and occupy their apertures, was a certain mode, according to all the principles of strategy, to intercept the detachments engaged in the mountains and make them lay down their arms. Any attachment on the part of the Savoyards towards the French was little to be dreaded, for assignats and requisitions had as yet acquainted them with liberty only through its dilapidations and

severities. The Duke of Montferrat, intrusted with the expedition, took with him but 20,000 or 25,000 men, threw a corps to his right into the valley of Sallenche, descended with his main body into La Tarentaise, and left General Gordon to traverse La Maurienne with the left wing. His movement, commenced on the 14th August, endured until September, so considerate was he in his progress. The French, although greatly inferior in number, opposed a vigorous resistance, and contrived to spin out a retreat of eighteen days. Arrived at Moustier, the Duke of Montferrat paused to connect himself with Gordon, on the chain of the Grand-Loup, which separates the two valleys of La Tarentaise and La Maurienne, and never bethought himself of striding onward to Conflans, the point of junction to the valleys. Such dilatoriness, and his inadequate force, prove rather significantly that he had no serious intention of risking himself in an excursion to Lyons.

In the mean time, Kellermann, hastening from Grenoble, had levied the national guards of the Isère and the neighbouring departments. He had reanimated the Savoyards, who began to fear the vengeance of the Piedmontese government, and succeeded in mustering an army of nearly 12,000 strong. Then, detaching a reinforcement to the corps in the valley of Sallenche, he moved upon Conflans, at the issue of the two valleys of La Tarentaise and La Maurienne. All this he had accomplished by the 10th September. At this moment, the Duke of Montferrat received an express order to march forward. But Kellermann anticipated his excellency, and ventured to attack him in the position of Espierre, which he had taken up on the chain of the Grand-Loup, in order to preserve a communication between the two valleys. Unable to reach this position in front, he caused it to be turned by a detached corps. This corps, formed of soldiers half naked, made, nevertheless, heroic efforts, and by mere muscular strength raised cannon up heights almost inaccessible. To their amazement and consternation, the French artillery suddenly thundered upon the heads of the Piedmontese; Gordon immediately withdrew into the valley of La Maurienne upon Saint-Michel, and the Duke of Montferrat wheeled back into the heart of the valley of La Tarentaise. Kellermann, continuing to goad the Duke on his flanks, quickly induced him to re-scale the ridge to Saint-Maurice and Saint-Germain, and finally drove him, by the 4th October, beyond the Alps. Thus, the rapid and successful campaign which the Piedmontese might have compassed by debouching with twice the mass, and descending by a single valley on Chambéry and Lyons, proved a mere abortion, from the same reasons which had caused the failure of all the enterprises projected by the allies, and which conduced so providentially to the salvation of France.

Whilst the Sardinians were thus repulsed beyond the Alps, the three deputies dispatched into the Puy-de-Dôme to stimulate a general levy, stirred up the country by preaching a sort of crusade, and inculcating the fact that Lyons, far from defending the republican cause, was the head-quarters of the emigrant and foreign factions. The paralytic Couthon, possessing an activity of mind which his bodily infirmities could not repress, excited a general ferment. He was enabled to detach Maignet and Châteauneuf with a first column of 12,000 men, remaining himself behind to bring up another of 25,000, and to make the necessary requisitions of supplies. Dubois-Crancé placed the new levies on the western side towards Saint-Foy, and thus completed the blockade. He received at the same time a detachment from the garrison of Valenciennes, which, according to the terms of surrender, could only, like that of Mayence, serve in the interior. He took care to station companies of regular troops in front of the requisitionary soldiers, so as to form efficient heads of columns. His army might at this time amount to 25,000 conscripts and 8000 or 10,000 disciplined troops.

At midnight of the 24th, he succeeded in carrying the redoubt commanding the bridge of Oullins, which led to the foot of the Saint-Foy heights. On the following day, General Doppet, a Savoyard, who had distinguished himself under Carteaux in the expedition against the Marseillese, arrived to replace Kellermann. That officer had been previously superseded on suspicion of lukewarmness, the short interval of command requisite to complete his discomfiture of the Piedmontese being simply continued to him. General Doppet lost no time in making arrangements with Dubois-Crancé for an assault on the heights of Saint-Foy. All the preparations were completed for the night between the 28th and 29th September. Simultaneous attacks were to be directed on the north at the Croix-Rousse, on the east in front of the Morand bridge, and on the south by the Mulatière bridge, which stands below the city at the confluence of the Saône and Rhone. The main enterprise was to take place by the Oullins bridge on Saint-Foy. It was not commenced till five in the morning of the 29th, an hour or two after the other three. Doppet, animating his soldiers, led them precipitately on the first redoubt, and then carried them into the second, with such vivacity as to allow no time for their courage to evaporate. The Great and the Little Saint-Foy were alike carried. Meanwhile, the column ordered to attack the Mulatière bridge succeeded in storming it, and advanced into the isthmus at the point whereof the two rivers unite. It was on the verge of penetrating into Lyons, when Précy, hastening to the spot with his cavalry, encountered and repulsed it, and saved the city. On his side, Vaubois, general of artillery, who had directed a most vigorous attack on the Morand bridge, penetrated into the horse-shoe redoubt, but was eventually compelled to abandon it.

Of all these attacks, one only had completely succeeded, but the most important, that on Saint-Foy. It now remained to pass from the heights of Saint Foy to those of Fourvières, which were much more regularly intrenched and difficult to be stormed. The opinion of Dubois-Crancé, who acted systematically and on scientific principles, was against risking the chances of a fresh assault, and for the following reasons. It was ascertained that the Lyonnese, reduced to subsist on ground peas, had food for a few days only, and must speedily surrender at discretion. They had shown distinguished bravery in the defence of the Mulatière and Morand bridges; and he concluded, that should an attack on the heights of Fourvières prove unsuccessful, such a check might disorganise the army, and render it incumbent to raise the siege. "The greatest favour," said he, "we can confer on brave men driven to despair, is to afford them an opportunity of saving themselves by a conflict. Let us leave them to fall by the effect of a few days' famine."

Couthon arrived at this moment, the 2d October, with a further levy of 25,000 peasants, drawn from Auvergne. "I am coming," he wrote, "with my rocks of Auvergne, and I will hurl them into the Faubourg of Vaise." He found Dubois-Crancé amidst an army under his absolute chieftainship, wherein he had established the rules of military subordination, and more frequently appeared in his uniform of a superior officer than in the garb of a representative of the people. Couthon was dissatisfied that a representative should cast aside equality for military rank, but, above all, he utterly discountenanced regular warfare. "I understand nothing of tactics," said he; "I come with the people; their holy wrath will overcome all obstacles. Lyons must be inundated with our masses, and carried by pure force. Besides, I have promised my peasants to let them free on Monday, as they must go home and attend to their vineyards." It was now Tuesday. Dubois-Crancé, full of professional prepossessions in favour of regular troops, manifested some

contempt for these ill-armed and incongruous peasants: he proposed to select the youngest amongst them, to incorporate in the battalions already organised, and to dismiss the rest. Couthon would listen to no such prudential counsels, but extorted an immediate decision that Lyons should be attacked by assault on all quarters, by the 60,000 men encamped beneath its walls; for such was now the strength of the army with the last levy. He wrote at the same time to the committee of public welfare, urging the recall of Dubois-Crancé. In the council of war the assault was fixed for the 8th October.

The recall of Dubois-Crancé and of Gauthier, his colleague, arrived in the interval. The Lyonnese entertained the utmost horror for Dubois-Crancé, whom they had beheld for two entire months desolating their beloved city, and had stated they never would surrender to him. On the 7th, Couthon addressed to them a final summons, apprising them that it was he, Couthon, and the representatives Maignet and Laporte, whom the convention had intrusted with the prosecution of the siege. The fire was suspended until four in the afternoon, when it was resumed with extreme vigour. The preparations were proceeding for the assault, when a deputation came to negotiate in the name of the Lyonnese. It appeared that the object of this negotiation was to afford Précy, and two thousand of the inhabitants chiefly compromised, time to save themselves in a serried column. They accordingly profited by the opportunity, and issued forth through the suburb of Vaise, with the intention of retiring into Switzerland.

The conferences were scarcely opened ere a republican column penetrated into the suburb of Saint-Just. There was no further occasion to grant conditions, and, moreover, the convention would allow none. On the 9th the army entered the town, the representatives marching in the van. The inhabitants had concealed themselves, but all the persecuted Mountaineers poured out to greet the victorious troops, and composed for them a species of popular triumph. General Doppet enforced upon his soldiers the strictest discipline, and left to the representatives the task of wreaking revolutionary vengeance on the unfortunate city.

Meanwhile, Précy, with his 2000 fugitives, was advancing towards Switzerland. But Dubois-Crancé, having foreseen the probability of his seeking that asylum, had long ago caused all the routes to be blocked. The disconsolate Lyonnese were pursued, dispersed, and cut down by the peasants. Of the whole number, only eighty, with their leader Précy, succeeded in reaching the Helvetian territory.

The first act of Couthon after his entry was to reinstall the old Mountaineer municipality, and charge it to seek out and denote the rebels. He constituted a popular commission to try them by martial law. He then wrote to Paris that there were three classes of inhabitants—1st, the guilty rich; 2d, the selfish rich; 3d, the ignorant operatives, attached to no cause whatever, and incapable equally of good and evil. It was necessary to guillotine the first and raise their dwellings, to amerce the second in all their wealth, and to transport the last, and replace them by a republican colony.

The reduction of Lyons produced extravagant joy at Paris, and in some degree made amends for the disastrous tidings so constant in September. However, notwithstanding the ultimate success, complaints were urged against Dubois-Crancé for his delays, and he was held responsible for the flight of the Lyonnese by the suburb of Vaise—a flight which, after all, had only saved eighty persons. Couthon accused him, especially, with having assumed an absolute command over the army; with having appeared oftener in the costume of a superior officer than in that of a representative of the people; with having manifested the pride of a tactician; and, in short, with having done all in his power to support the system of regular warfare in preference to that of attacks *en masse*. An inquiry was immediately commenced by the Jacobins against Dubois-Crancé, the man whose activity and vigour had rendered such essential services at Grenoble, in the south, and before Lyons itself. At the same time, the committee of public welfare digested most rigorous decrees, designed to render the authority of the convention more formidable and more implicitly obeyed. The following enactment was reported by Barrère, and passed on the instant:—

"Art. 1. There shall be nominated by the national convention, on the presentation of the committee of public welfare, a commission consisting of five representatives of the people, who shall proceed to Lyons without delay, to ensure the seizure and military trial of all the counter-revolutionists who took up arms in that city.

2. All the Lyonnese shall be disarmed; their arms shall be given to those who are ascertained to have held aloof from the revolt, and to the defenders of the country.

3. The city of Lyons shall be destroyed.

4. There shall be excepted only the houses of the poor, the factories, the workshops of art, the hospitals, the public buildings, and those of education.

5. This city shall cease to be called Lyons. It shall be called the *Enfranchised Borough*.

6. On the ruins of Lyons shall be reared a monument whereon these words shall be read:—*Lyons made war against liberty—Lyons is no more!*" *

Intelligence of the capture of Lyons was immediately communicated to the two armies of the north and of La Vendée, from which decisive operations were sanguinely anticipated; and a proclamation exhorted them to imitate the army of Lyons. The army of the north was told—"The standard of liberty waves over the walls of Lyons, and purifies them. It is the presage of victory—victory is the reward of courage. It is prepared for you: strike, exterminate the satellites of tyrants! The country fixes its eyes upon you, the convention aids your generous zeal: yet a few days, and the tyrants will be no more—the republic will owe to you its happiness and its glory!" To the soldiers of La Vendée it was said—"And you also, brave soldiers, will gain a victory. Too long has La Vendée distressed the republic: march, strike, terminate! All our enemies must succumb at once; each army is on the way to conquer. Will you be the last to reap the laurel—to merit the glory of having extirpated the rebels and saved the country?"

Thus we see the committee omitted no expedient to turn the fall of Lyons to the best advantage. That event, in fact, was of the utmost importance. It delivered the east of France from the last traces of insurrection, and extinguished the hopes of the emigrants intriguing in Switzerland, and of the Piedmontese, who could not thenceforth reckon upon any favourable diversion. It repressed the Jura, assured the rear of the army of the Rhine, and permitted the transport to Toulon and the Pyrenees of succours in men and munitions, which had become quite indispensable. Finally, it intimidated all the towns in any degree disposed to rebel, and ensured their definitive submission.

It was on the northern frontier that the committee had resolved to display the greatest vigour, and that it imposed on the generals and troops the duty of evincing the most determined energy. Whilst Custine was consigned to the scaffold, Houchard, for not having accomplished all that was possible at Dunkirk, had been sent before the revolutionary tribunal. The late reproaches addressed to the committee, in the month of September, had constrained it to remodel all the staffs. It had in consequence completely recomposed them, and raised to the highest grades officers of subaltern rank.

* Decree of the 18th day of the first month of the second year of the republic.

Houchard, a colonel at the commencement of the campaign, and before it was finished a commander-in-chief, and now accused before the revolutionary tribunal; Hoche, a simple officer at the siege of Dunkirk, and now promoted to the command of the army of the Moselle; Jourdan, leader of a battalion, then commanding the centre in the battle of Hondtschoote, and finally nominated general-in-chief of the army of the north—were striking examples of the vicissitudes of fortune in the republican armies. These sudden promotions prevented soldiers, officers, and generals, from having time to know each other and reciprocate confidence; but they presented a terrible idea of that wrath which swept over all grades, not only in the case of proved treason, but simply on suspicion, for insufficiency of zeal, for a half-victory; and hence there resulted an absolute devotion on the part of the armies, and boundless hopes for genius sufficiently bold to encounter the perilous hazards of command.

It is to this period we must refer the first advancement in the art of war. Undoubtedly, the principles of that science had been known and practised at all eras by captains who joined boldness of enterprise to hardihood of mind. Very recently, indeed, Frederick the Great had given an example of most admirable combinations in strategy. But so soon as the man of genius disappears, and gives place to ordinary men, the art of war relapses into circumspection and routine. They contend eternally in defence or attack of some line, and become skilful in calculating the advantages of ground, and adapting thereto the different varieties of force; but, with all these attainments, they dispute for whole years the possession of a province which an energetic commander might gain in one manœuvre; and this prudence of mediocrity wastes more blood than the temerity of genius, for it immolates men without results. Thus had acted the scientific tacticians of the coalition. Each battalion they confronted with another; all the routes menaced by their enemy they scrupulously guarded; but, when by one bold march they might have suppressed the revolution, they dared not advance a step lest they should uncover their flanks. The art of war was, like other things, to be regenerated. To form a compact mass, inspire it with confidence and determination, carry it promptly beyond a river or a chain of mountains, and smite an enemy in unsuspecting security, dividing his forces, isolating him from his resources, and occupying his capital, was a grand and difficult system, which required genius of the highest order, and could only be developed amidst a revolutionary ferment.

The revolution, by calling into activity all the human energies, produced the era of vast military combinations. In the first place, it stimulated in its cause enormous masses of men, far more considerable than were ever raised in the cause of kings. Next, it aroused an impatience for extraordinary achievements, excited disgust for slow and methodical warfare, and suggested the idea of sudden and powerful irruptions upon one point. "We must fight in masses!" was the universal shout—the cry equally of the soldiers on the frontiers and of the Jacobins in the clubs. Couthon, upon his arrival at Lyons, had replied to all the arguments of Dubois-Crancé by the one aphorism: "The assault *en masse* is indispensable." Finally, Barrère had presented an able and comprehensive report, in which he demonstrated that the cause of the reverses lay in the system of fighting by detail. It was thus by forming masses, infusing into them the spirit of audacity, freeing them from all antiquated routine, and inspiring them with the zeal and courage of innovation, that the revolution provoked the revival of grand warfare. Such a change could not be operated without disorder. Peasants and artisans, transported to the field of battle, carried with them ignorance, want of discipline, and an aptitude for panics, the necessary consequences of imperfect organisation. The representatives who went to stir up revolutionary excitement in the camps, often required impossibilities, and committed iniquities with regard to many brave commanders. Dumouriez, Custine, Houchard, Brunet, Canclaux, Jourdan, perished or retired before the torrent; but in a month, those handicraftsmen became, from Jacobin declaimers, docile and valiant soldiers; those representatives communicated extraordinary hardihood and determination to the armies; and, by means of changes, by the force of exigency, they succeeded in finding men of commanding genius equal to the circumstances.

Eventually a man arose to regulate this great movement—Carnot. Formerly an officer of engineers, latterly a member of the convention and of the committee of public welfare, and partaking in some sort its inviolability, he was able to introduce order into operations heretofore too unconnected, without incurring the risk of the guillotine, and, above all, to impart to them a combination such as no minister before him had been sufficiently obeyed to impose. One of the chief causes of all previous discomfitures was the confusion inseparable from a state of ferment. The committee being firmly established and rendered irresistible, and Carnot being invested with all the power of that committee, obedience was yielded to the deductions of a reflective mind, which, surveying the aggregate of circumstances, enjoined movements perfectly co-ordinate with respect to one another, and all tending to one identical object. Generals could no longer, as Dumouriez and Custine had done formerly, act each on his own quarter, drawing to himself the whole war and monopolising all the resources. Representatives could no longer order or check manœuvres, or modify superior orders. All were henceforth constrained to bow before the supreme fiat of the committee, and conform to the comprehensive plan it prescribed. Thus planted in the centre, soaring over all the frontiers, the mind of Carnot naturally expanded in proportion to its elevation: he conceived extensive plans, wherein prudence was equally conspicuous with boldness of enterprise. The instructions sent to Houchard furnish a signal evidence of the fact. Unquestionably, his plans sometimes laboured under the defect common to all plans digested in cabinets: when his orders arrived, they were not always adapted to the locality, or practicable at the moment; but they amply redeemed by unity of purpose any deficiency in details, and secured the French, during the following year, universal triumphs.

Carnot had proceeded to the northern frontier for the purpose of conferring with Jourdan. The resolution was taken to act with hardihood, and attack the enemy, despite his formidable aspect. Carnot demanded a plan from the general, to ascertain his views and reconcile them with those of the committee, or in other words with his own. The allies, having returned from Dunkirk towards the middle of their line, had mustered between the Scheldt and the Meuse, forming at that point a redoubtable mass, capable of effecting great things. We have already explained the theatre of war. Several lines intersect the space between the Meuse and the ocean, namely, the Lys, the Scarpe, the Scheldt, and the Sambre. The allies, by the capture of Condé and Valenciennes, had secured two important posts on the Scheldt. Quesnoy, whereon they had recently seized, gave them a basis between the Scheldt and the Sambre, but they had none as yet upon the Sambre itself. They had their eyes on Maubeuge, which, from its position on that river, would render them, to a considerable extent, masters of the space between it and the Meuse. Thus, at the opening of the next campaign, Valenciennes and Maubeuge would have formed an excellent basis of operations, and their campaign of 1793 would not have been quite so fruitless as the French were fain to deem it. Their final project for the season, therefore, consisted in occupying Maubeuge

On the part of the French, amongst whom the spirit of combination was beginning to manifest itself, it was held advisable to act by Lille and Maubeuge, on the two wings of the enemy, the demonstration on his two flanks being expected to lead to the recoil of his centre. By this plan, it is true, the French were exposed to the risk of having his whole force directed against one or other of their wings, since they left him all the advantage of his mass; but there was certainly less of servile routine in the conception than in those that had been previously started. Meanwhile, the exigency of the moment was to succour Maubeuge. Jourdan, leaving scarcely 50,000 men in the camps of Gavarelle, Lille, and Cassel, to form his left wing, mustered at Guise the utmost possible strength. He had composed a mass of about 45,000 men, already organised, and the new levies accruing from the permanent requisition he threw into regimental form with all practicable speed. But those levies were in such hopeless disorder, that he found it necessary to leave detachments of regular troops to guard them. Fixing, therefore, the general rendezvous for the recruits at Guise, Jourdan advanced in five columns to the relief of Maubeuge.

The enemy had already invested that place. Like the fortresses of Valenciennes and Lille, it was supported by an intrenched camp, situated on the right bank of the Sambre, in the same direction as that by which the French were advancing. Two divisions, those of Generals Desjardins and Mayer, guarded the course of the Sambre, the one above, the other below Maubeuge. The enemy, in lieu of advancing in two grand masses, sweeping Desjardins back on Maubeuge and repelling Mayer on Charleroi, where he must have been destroyed, passed the Sambre in meagre masses, and allowed the two divisions of Desjardins and Mayer to rally in the intrenched camp of Maubeuge. It was highly expedient to have separated Desjardins from Jourdan, and have thus prevented him from swelling the active army of the French; but by leaving Mayer to unite with Desjardins, both generals were permitted to form under Maubeuge with a corps of 20,000 men, well capable of foregoing the part of a mere garrison, especially on the approach of Jourdan with the main army. At the same time, the difficulty of victualling so numerous a body was a serious drawback on Maubeuge, and might, to a certain extent, excuse the allied generals for suffering the junction.

The Prince of Cobourg planted the Dutch, numbering 12,000, on the left bank of the Meuse, and applied himself to burn the magazines of Maubeuge with the view of augmenting the scarcity. He pushed General Colloredo to the right bank, and ordered him to invest the intrenched camp. In advance of Colloredo, Clairfayt, with three divisions, formed the corps of observation intended to oppose the march of Jourdan. The allies counted nearly 65,000 men.

With a moderate share of hardihood and genius, the Prince of Cobourg would have left at the utmost 15,000 or 20,000 men to overawe Maubeuge, and marched with 45,000 or 50,000 upon General Jourdan, whom he must have infallibly defeated; for, with the advantage of the offensive and of equal numbers, his troops could not fail to prevail over the French in their deficient organisation. Instead of adopting this plan, however, the Prince of Cobourg left about 35,000 men around the fortress, and remained in observation with about 30,000 in the positions of Dourlers and Watignies.

In this state of things, it was not impossible for General Jourdan to have pierced on one point the line occupied by the corps of observation, marched on Colloredo, who was prosecuting the investment of the intrenched camp, placed him between two fires, and, after overwhelming him, incorporated the entire army of Maubeuge, formed with it a mass of 60,000 men, and repulsed the whole allied force on the right bank of the Sambre. For this purpose, it was incumbent on him to make an undivided attack on Watignies as the weakest point; but by advancing exclusively in that direction, the French left open the Avesnes road leading to Guise, which was their base and the point of junction for all their depôts. Jourdan preferred a more prudential but less conclusive plan, and resolved to attack the corps of observation on four points, so as still to guard the road to Avesnes and Guise. On his left, he detached the division under Fromentin upon Saint-Waast, with orders to march between the Sambre and the right of the enemy. General Balland, with several batteries, was to plant himself in the centre, facing Dourlers, to keep Clairfayt in check by a vigorous cannonade. To the right, General Duquesnoy advanced upon Watignies, which formed the left of the enemy, a little in the rear of the central position of Dourlers. That point was held by but a feeble corps. A fourth division, that of General Beauregard, stationed still farther to the right, was appointed to second Duquesnoy in his attack on Watignies. These different movements were but slenderly combined, and did not bear upon decisive points. They were put in execution on the morning of the 15th October. General Fromentin occupied Saint-Waast; but not having taken the precaution to near the woods so as to shelter himself from a charge of cavalry, he was assailed and driven back into the ravine of Saint-Remy. In the centre, where Fromentin was deemed to be master of Saint-Waast, and where it was known that the right had succeeded in approaching Watignies, a resolution was taken to move forward, and, instead of merely cannonading Dourlers, to carry it by storm. It appears that this was the counsel of Carnot, who decided the attack in spite of General Jourdan. The French infantry rushed into the ravine which separated it from Dourlers, clambered up the reverse bank under a galling fire, and arrived on a level where it had in front formidable batteries and in flank a numerous cavalry ready to charge. At the same moment, a fresh corps, which had just contributed to put Fromentin to rout, threatened to envelop it on the left. General Jourdan incurred the greatest hazards to maintain the division, but it swerved, fell back with disorder into the ravine, and by great good fortune was allowed to resume its positions without being pursued. In this enterprise the French lost nearly 1000 men, and on the left Fromentin lost his artillery. General Duquesnoy on the right had alone succeeded, by contriving to approach Watignies.

After this attempt, the position became better understood by the French. They were convinced that Dourlers was too strongly defended to direct the principal attack on that point; but that Watignies, inadequately guarded by General Tercy, and situated to the rear of Dourlers, was easily to be carried; and that this village once occupied by the main strength of the army, the position of Dourlers would necessarily fall. Jourdan therefore detached 6000 or 7000 men to his right, in order to reinforce General Duquesnoy; he ordered General Beauregard, who was too far off with his fourth column, to wheel about from Eule upon Obrechies, so as to effect a concentric operation upon Watignies, in conjunction with General Duquesnoy; but he persisted in continuing his demonstration upon the centre, and in enjoining Fromentin to resume the movement on the left, for the purpose of embracing the whole of the enemy's front.

The next day, the 16th, the attack commenced. The French infantry, debouching by the three villages of Dinant, Demichaux, and Choisy, advanced on Watignies. The Austrian grenadiers, who connected Watignies with Dourlers, were forced back into the woods. The hostile cavalry was kept in check by light artillery appositely disposed, and Watignies was carried. General Beauregard, less fortunate, was surprised by a brigade which the Austrians had detached against him. His troops, exaggerating the strength of the enemy, broke rank and ceded a portion of the

ground. At Dourlers and Saint-Waast, each party had held the other at bay; but Watignies was occupied, and the essential manœuvre accomplished. To ensure its possession, Jourdan again reinforced his right with 5000 or 6000 men. Cobourg, too readily startled at danger, retreated, notwithstanding the success obtained over Beauregard and the arrival of the Duke of York, who came by forced marches from the opposite side of the Sambre. It is probable that the apprehension of seeing the French army effect a junction with the 20,000 men in the intrenched camp, scared him from persisting in his occupation of the right bank of the Sambre. There is little doubt that if the army of Maubeuge, on the signal of the firing at Watignies, had attacked the investing corps, and sallied forth towards Jourdan, the allies might have been overwhelmed. The soldiers demanded to be led on with loud cries; but General Ferrand opposed the attempt, and General Chancel, who was erroneously deemed guilty of this refusal, was sent before the revolutionary tribunal. The successful attack on Watignies caused the siege of Maubeuge to be raised: it was called the victory of Watignies, and produced a very powerful impression on the public mind.

The allies were thus, after these operations, concentrated between the Scheldt and the Sambre. The committee of public welfare was eager to take instant advantage of the victory of Watignies whilst the discouragement it had thrown upon the enemy and the energy it had aroused in its own army were still rife; and it resolved to hazard a final effort, calculated, before the winter set in, to hurl the allies beyond the French soil, and leave them with the disheartening conviction of having made a completely abortive campaign. The opinions of Jourdan and Carnot were not in harmony with the ideas of the committee. They held that the rains, already abundant, the broken state of the roads, and the fatigue of the troops, were sufficient reasons for entering into winter-quarters; and they recommended that the bad season should be devoted to disciplining and organising the army. However, the committee insisted upon having the territory cleared, declaring that at this period of the year even a defeat could be attended with no important consequences. In accordance with the newly conceived idea of acting upon the wings, the committee ordained the troops to march by Maubeuge and Charleroi on one side, by Cysaing, Maulde, and Tournay on the other, and thus envelop the enemy on the land he had overrun. The ordinance was signed on the 22d October. Orders were issued in conformity; the army of Ardennes was to join Jourdan, and the garrisons in the strongholds were to be drawn out, and replaced by the new requisitions. We revert, meanwhile, to another quarter.

The war of La Vendée had been resumed with unabated ardour. We have seen that Canclaux had recoiled upon Nantes, and that the columns of the Upper Vendée had returned to Angers and Saumur. Before the new decrees which amalgamated the two armies of Rochelle and Brest, and conferred the supreme command on Léchelle, were known, Canclaux had arranged a fresh offensive movement. The soldiers known as the Mayencers were already reduced, by war and sickness, to 9000 or 10,000. The division of Brest, repulsed under the auspices of Beysser, was almost disorganised. Canclaux determined, nevertheless, upon a bold advance into the heart of La Vendée, and he conjured Rossignol to support him with his army. Rossignol forthwith assembled a council of war at Saumur on the 2d October, and procured a decision that the columns of Saumur, Thouars, and La Châtaigneraye, should unite on the 7th at Bressuire, and thence march to Châtillon, so that their inroad might be co-ordinate with that of Canclaux. At the same time, he ordered the two columns of Luçon and Sables to keep on the defensive, both on account of their recent discomfitures, and of the dangers threatening them from Lower Vendée.

In the interim, Canclaux had advanced on the 1st October to Montaigu, pushing reconnoitring parties as far as Saint-Fulgent, with the design of communicating on his right with the column of Luçon, in case it should compass the resumption of the offensive. Emboldened by the success of his march, he ordered the advanced guard, still under the command of Kléber, to push on to Tiffauges. Four thousand Mayencers encountered the army of D'Elbée and Bonchamps at Saint-Simphorien, put it to flight after a sanguinary conflict, and pursued it a considerable distance. During the same evening arrived the decree superseding Canclaux, Aubert-Dubayet, and Grouchy. The utmost discontent was manifested by the cohort of Mayence, and Philippeaux, Gillet, Merlin, and Rewbel, seeing the army deprived of an excellent general when exposed to imminent hazards in the centre of La Vendée, were highly incensed at so inopportune an ordinance. The measure itself, concentrating the entire command of the west in one person, was unquestionably beneficial; but some individual more competent to sustain the charge ought to have been selected. Léchelle was both ignorant and pusillanimous Kléber avers in his memoirs, and never once confronted a ball. A subaltern in the army of Rochelle, he underwent a rapid advancement, like Rossignol, on the credit of a high reputation for patriotism; but it was unknown that, devoid equally of Rossignol's natural talents and of his personal courage, his incapacity as a general was rivalled by his cowardice as a soldier. Whilst awaiting his arrival, Kléber held the command. The army remained in cantonments between Montaigu and Tiffauges.

Léchelle arrived on the 8th October, and a council of war was immediately held in his presence. Intelligence had just been brought of the march of the Saumur, Thouars, and La Châtaigneraye columns on Bressuire, whereupon it was resolved to persist in advancing upon Chollet, where a junction might be operated with the three columns assembled at Bressuire; and at the same time orders were signed to the remainder of the Luçon division to move towards the general rendezvous. Léchelle was incompetent to appreciate the reasonings of the generals, and signified his approval of their recommendations by saying—"We must march with majesty and in mass." Kléber folded up his map with ill-dissembled scorn. Merlin declared that ingenuity had been taxed to pick out the most ignorant of living mortals to take charge of the most endangered army. From this moment, Kléber was empowered by the representatives to direct the operations, contenting himself with the formality of rendering accounts to Léchelle from time to time. That prudential personage profited by the arrangement to keep between himself and the field of battle a considerate interval. Shrinking from exposure to danger, he cordially hated the valiant men who fought in his behalf, but at all events left them to fight when and where they pleased.

At this period, Charette, perceiving the dangers which threatened the chiefs of Upper Vendée, separated from them, alleging feigned grounds of discontent, and retired to the coast with the design of seizing upon the isle of Noirmoutiers. He became master of it, in fact, on the 12th October, by surprise, and by treachery on the part of the officer in command. He thus made sure of saving his own division, and of maintaining a communication with the English; but he left the party in Upper Vendée exposed to almost inevitable destruction. For behoof of the common cause, a more beneficial course was open to him: he might have attacked the cohort of Mayence in the rear, and possibly destroyed it. The leaders of the main army sent letter upon letter, urging him to the attempt, but they never received any answer.

Those unfortunate chiefs of Upper Vendée were

closely pressed on all sides. The republican columns appointed to assemble at Bressuire had appeared on the prescribed day, and marched on the 9th from Bressuire upon Châtillon. On the road they encountered the army of M. de Lescure, and threw it into disorder. Westermann, reinstated in his command, was always at the head of the advanced guard with a few hundred resolute men. He entered Châtillon on the evening of the 9th. The whole army reached it the following day. During this movement, Lescure and Larochejacquelein had called to their aid the main Vendéan army, which was at no great distance from them; for, already much cooped up in the centre of the country, they fought at comparatively short intervening spaces. All the leaders, in solemn conclave, resolved to bear down upon Châtillon. They were in motion on the 11th. Westermann was already advancing from Châtillon on Mortagne, with 500 men of the advanced guard. At first he had no suspicion an entire army was on his hands, and asked from his superior in command but slight aid. But suddenly perceiving himself on the point of being enveloped, he was fain to beat a rapid retreat, and scampered into Châtillon with his whole troop. The greatest disorder instantly prevailed through the town, and the republican army abandoned it with precipitation. Westermann, joining the general-in-chief Chalbos, and calling around him a few intrepid soldiers, checked the flight, and even moved back to the immediate vicinity of Châtillon. At nightfall he said to some of his companions who had fled—"You have lost your honour to-day; it must be recovered." Thereupon he took a hundred troopers, seated a hundred grenadiers behind them, and in the dead of night, when the Vendéans, heaped confusedly in Châtillon, were stupified by sleep or wine, had the hardihood to enter the town and rush into the midst of an immense army in its cantonments. The confusion that ensued baffles description, and the carnage was terrific. The Vendéans, unable to recognise their comrades, fell foul of one another; and amidst the horrible disorder, women, children, and old men, were slaughtered indiscriminately. Westermann retired at the dawn of day with the thirty or forty soldiers who survived, and rejoined the bulk of the army a league from the town. With daylight a most dismal spectacle met the eyes of the Vendéans; horror-struck, they forthwith evacuated Châtillon, swimming with blood and enveloped in flames, and shrunk away in the direction of Chollet, precisely where the Mayencers were prowling. Chalbos, after re-establishing order in his division, re-occupied Châtillon on the 14th, and prepared again to move forward, with the view of accomplishing the desired junction with the army of Nantes.

The Vendéan leaders, therefore, D'Elbée, Bonchamps, Lescure, and Larochejacquelein, were now assembled with all their forces in the environs of Chollet. The Mayencers, who had begun to move on the 14th, were approaching that point; the column of Châtillon was only at a short distance; and the division of Luçon, which had been summoned, was likewise advancing, with orders to plant itself between the columns of Mayence and Châtillon. Thus, the moment of general junction was at hand. On the 15th the cohort of Mayence marched in two bodies to Mortagne, which had just been evacuated. Kléber, with the main army, formed the left, and Beaupuy the right. At the same moment the column of Luçon neared Mortagne, expecting to find a direction-battalion which Léchelle had been intrusted to station on its route. But that general, who was a mere incumbrance, had failed to acquit himself even of this trifling duty. The column was speedily surprised by Lescure, and found itself beset on all sides. Fortunately, Beaupuy, who was within a short distance by his position towards Mortagne, hastened to its relief, and succeeded in disengaging it. The Vendéans were finally repulsed. The ill-fated Lescure received a ball above the eyebrow, and fell into the arms of his soldiers, who bore him off the field and took to flight. The column of Luçon then joined that of Beaupuy. The youthful Marceau had just assumed the command of it. At the same time, Kléber sustained a contest on the left towards Saint-Christophe, and repulsed the enemy. On the evening of the 15th, all the republican troops bivouacked in the fields before Chollet, whither the Vendéans had retreated. The division of Luçon was about 3000 strong, making, with the cohort of Mayence, between 12,000 and 13,000 veteran troops.

The following morning, the 16th, the Vendéans, after a few rounds of artillery, evacuated Chollet, and fell back on Beaupréau. Kléber forthwith effected an entrance, and, prohibiting pillage under pain of death, enforced the observance of strict order. The column of Luçon manifested the same forbearance at Mortagne. Consequently, all the historians who have stated that Chollet and Mortagne were burnt, have laboured under error or propagated a falsehood.

Kléber lost no time in making his dispositions, for as to Léchelle, he was two leagues behind. The river Moine passes before Chollet; beyond is a hilly, unequal surface, forming a semicircle of heights. To the left of this semicircle stretches the wood of Chollet; in the centre of Chollet itself, and to the right, stands a lofty castle. Kléber placed Beaupuy, with the advanced guard, in front of the wood; Haxo, with the reserve of the Mayencers, behind the advanced guard, and in a manner to support it; and he stationed the column of Luçon, commanded by Marceau, in the centre, and Vimeux, with the remainder of the Mayencers, to the right, upon the heights. The column of Châtillon arrived in the night between the 16th and 17th. It amounted to between 9000 and 10,000 men, which rendered the total strength of the republicans about 22,000. On the morning of the 17th a council of war was held. Kléber disliked his position in front of Chollet, because it possessed but one point of retreat, the bridge over the Moine leading to the town. He advocated a march forward, with the view of turning Beaupréau and intercepting the Vendéans from the Loire. The representatives controverted his counsel, because the column just arrived from Châtillon required a day's repose.

In the mean time the Vendéan chiefs deliberated at Beaupréau, amidst a scene of distressing confusion. The peasants had collected around them their wives, children, and flocks, and composed an emigrant population of more than one hundred thousand souls. Larochejacquelein and D'Elbée upheld the plan of selling their lives on their own side the river; but Talmont and D'Autichamp, who had great influence in Brittany, impatiently urged the passage to the opposite shore. Bonchamps, who beheld a great enterprise in prospective by making an excursion on the northern coasts, and who had, it is understood, a project in concert with England, gave his voice for crossing the Loire. Nevertheless, he was sufficiently inclined to attempt a last effort, and wage one desperate struggle before Chollet. He sent a detachment of 4000 men to Varades, before moving to battle, in order to ensure a passage over the Loire in the event of discomfiture.

A battle was accordingly resolved upon. The Vendéans advanced, to the number of 40,000 men, upon Chollet, an hour after mid-day of the 18th October. The republican generals had no expectation of being attacked, and had just proclaimed a day of rest. The Vendéans were gathered into three columns—the first confronting the left of the republicans, where Beaupuy and Haxo exercised command; the second directed on the centre, held by Marceau; and the third on the right, confided to Vimeux. The Vendéans marched in line and rank like regular troops. All the wounded chiefs who could support the motion of a horse appeared in the midst of their peasants, and encouraged them on a day which was to decide their future fate and the possession of their homes. Between Beau-

preau and the Loire, in every hamlet still remaining to them, mass was solemnised, and Heaven earnestly supplicated in behalf of their tottering cause.

The Vendéans moved forward and engaged the advanced guard of Beaupuy, planted, as already mentioned, in a plain before the wood of Chollet. Part of them advanced in close column, and charged in the manner of regular troops; others spread out as sharpshooters to turn the advanced guard, and even the left wing, by penetrating into the wood of Chollet. The republicans, overwhelmed by superior numbers, were forced to recoil; Beaupuy had two horses killed under him; he fell entangled in his stirrup, and was on the point of being taken, when he threw himself behind an ammunition-waggon, caught a third horse, and galloped off to his column. At this moment, Kléber hastened to the threatened wing. He ordered the centre and right not to weaken themselves, and directed Chalbos to bring one of his columns out of Chollet and speed to the aid of the left. He himself took up his station near Haxo, re-established confidence in his battalions, and led again into the thickest of the fire those who had fallen back upon the first onslaught. The Vendéans were repulsed in their turn, recovered, and repeated their desperate charge, and were again repulsed. Meanwhile the battle raged with equal fury in the centre and on the right. Vimeux, however, was so admirably stationed on the right that all the efforts of the enemy were fruitless in that direction.

But in the centre the Vendéans made greater progress than on the two wings, and penetrated into the hollow where Marceau was planted. Kléber flew thither to support the column of Luçon, and, at that very instant, one of Chalbos's divisions, which he had earlier summoned, issued out of Chollet to the number of 4000 men. This reinforcement was of essential importance at so critical a conjuncture; but, at sight of the plain enveloped in smoke and flame, that division, wretchedly organised like all those in the army of Rochelle, disbanded and ran back in disorder into Chollet. Kléber and Marceau remained in the centre with the single column of Luçon. Young Marceau, who commanded it, was not intimidated; he allowed the enemy to come within musket-shot, then suddenly unmasked his artillery, and, by so unexpected a fire, checked and swept down the Vendéans. They stood their ground for some time, rallying and closing rank under a dreadful shower of grape; but shortly they recoiled, and finally fled in disorder. At this moment their rout was general in the centre, on the left, and on the right. Beaupuy, with his reanimated advanced guard, pursued them with remorseless vigour.

The columns which had taken part in the battle were those of Mayence and Luçon alone. Thus 13,000 men had defeated 40,000. On both sides the greatest valour had been displayed; but regularity and discipline decided the advantage in favour of the republicans. Marceau, Beaupuy, and Merlin, who pointed the guns in person, had shown the utmost heroism, and Kléber had exhibited his usual judgment and promptitude on the field of battle. On the part of the Vendéans, D'Elbée and Bonchamps, after many feats of intrepidity, had been mortally wounded; Larochejacquelein then remained alone of all the chiefs, and he had omitted nothing to win participation in their glorious fate. The battle lasted from two until six o'clock.

Darkness had already fallen on the scene of carnage. The Vendéans fled with all speed, throwing away on the roads their heavy clogs. Beaupuy followed closely at their heels. To him was added Westermann, who, burning to escape the inaction of Chalbos's troops, had taken a regiment of cavalry, and hastened at full gallop after the fugitives. After keeping up the pursuit for a considerable distance, Beaupuy and Westermann halted and took counsel how they should refresh their soldiers "We shall find more bread at Beaupréau than at Chollet," said some; and they were actually rash enough to march on Beaupréau, where it was concluded by all that the Vendéans had retired in a mass. But the flight had been so rapid that one portion of them was already at Saint-Florent, on the edge of the Loire. The remainder, on the approach of the republicans, evacuated Beaupréau in disorder, and surrendered without a struggle a post they might have easily defended.

The following morning the whole army marched from Chollet to Beaupréau. Beaupuy's advanced guard, stationed on the road to Saint-Florent, suddenly perceived a multitude of individuals drawing near, uttering shouts of "The republic for ever! Bonchamps for ever!" Being interrogated, they replied by proclaiming Bonchamps their liberator. In fact, that young hero, stretched on a mattrass and about to expire from a shot in the abdomen, had demanded and obtained the lives of four thousand prisoners, whom the Vendéans dragged along with them, and whom they had destined to be shot. These prisoners now rejoined the republican army.

At this moment eighty thousand persons, comprising women, children, old men, and warriors, were congregated on the edge of the Loire, with the sad relics of their possessions, and struggling amongst themselves for the occupancy of some twenty boats to cross to the opposite side. The superior council, composed of the leaders still capable of expressing an opinion, deliberated whether they ought to separate or carry the war into Brittany. Some were desirous that they should disperse and seek concealment in La Vendée to await happier times: Larochejacquelein was of the number, and he held, moreover, they ought to die on the left bank of the Loire rather than pass to the right shore. However, the contrary opinion prevailed, and it was decided to keep together and move across the river. But Bonchamps had just breathed his last, and no one survived capable of accomplishing the projects he had formed with regard to Brittany. D'Elbée, in a dying state, had been sent to Noirmoutiers; Lescure, mortally wounded, was transported in a litter. Eighty thousand people, then, quitted their homes, to carry devastation into neighbouring lands, and there to perish—for what object? Just Heaven! for an absurd cause, forsaken on all sides, or at the most hypocritically defended! And at the very time this unfortunate population was thus generously exposing itself to so many evils, the allies scarcely bestowed a thought upon it; the emigrants were busy intriguing in the different courts, only a few amongst them fighting courageously on the Rhine, but in the ranks of the foreigner; and none had cared to send a soldier or a coin to that ill-fated La Vendée, renowned for numerous heroic achievements, and now vanquished, fugitive, and desolated.

The republican generals held a council at Beaupréau, wherein it was resolved to divide, one party proceeding to Nantes and the other to Angers, in order to shield those two towns from the danger of a sudden assault. According to this opinion of the representatives, not shared however by Kléber, La Vendée was utterly prostrated. "La Vendée has ceased to be," they wrote to the convention. That assembly had given the army till the 20th October to conclude the war, and it was terminated on the 18th. The army of the north had on the same day gained the battle of Watignies, and finished the campaign by raising the blockade of Maubeuge. Thus, on all sides, the convention apparently had but to decree victory to ensure it. Enthusiasm was at its height in Paris and throughout France, and the belief began to prevail that before the end of the season the republic would be victorious over all the thrones leagued against it.

One event only was calculated to mar this general joy, namely, the loss of the lines of Weissembourg on the Rhine, which had been forced on the 13th and

14th of October. After the check of Pirmasens, we left the Prussians and Austrians confronting the lines of the Sarre and the Lauter, and threatening every instant to storm them. The Prussians, having assailed the French on the banks of the Sarre, obliged them to fall back. The corps of the Vosges, repulsed beyond Hornbach, recoiled as far as Bitche, in the centre of the mountains; the army of the Moselle, thrown back on Sarreguemines, was separated from the corps of the Vosges and the army of the Rhine. In this state of affairs, it became easy for the Prussians, who had on the western ridge passed the common line of the Sarre and the Lauter, to turn the lines of Weissembourg on their extreme left. Thereupon those lines were necessarily doomed to fall. The event accordingly came to pass on the 13th October.

We have previously remarked that a coolness had arisen between Prussia and Austria; this had now given way to perfect cordiality. The King of Prussia had repaired to Poland, and left the command to the Duke of Brunswick, with orders to act in concert with Wurmser. On the 13th and 14th October, whilst the Prussians were marching along the line of the Vosges to Bitche, far beyond the eminence of Weissembourg, Wurmser moved to attack the lines of the Lauter in seven columns. The first, under the Prince of Waldeck, being ordered to cross the Rhine at Seltz and turn Lauterbourg, encountered invincible obstacles, as well in the nature of the ground as in the courage of a demi-battalion from the Pyrenees; the second, although it had cleared the lines below Lauterbourg, was repulsed; the others, after obtaining above and around Weissembourg advantages long counterpoised by a determined resistance on the part of the French, finally succeeded in occupying Weissembourg. The French retired to the post of Geisberg, situated a little in the rear of Weissembourg, and much more difficult to storm. Thus, the lines of Weissembourg could not yet be regarded as completely lost; but the tidings of the march of the Prussians on the western ridge obliged the French general to fall back on Haguenau and the lines of the Lauter, and consequently to yield a fragment of the Gallic soil to the allies. On this point, therefore, the frontier was invaded; but the successes in the north and La Vendée relieved the impression caused by so untoward a catastrophe. Saint-Just and Lebas were forthwith dispatched into Alsace to repress the movements which the Alsacian nobility and the emigrants were exciting in Strasburg. Numerous levies were likewise directed upon the same quarter; and the firm resolution to conquer, on that point as on all others, sufficed to calm public apprehension.

The dismal alarm that had prevailed during the month of August, before the victories of Hondtschoote and Watignies, before the reduction of Lyons and the retreat of the Piedmontese beyond the Alps, and before the successes in La Vendée, was greatly dissipated. At this moment, the frontier of the north, the most important and the most endangered, was delivered from the enemy, Lyons restored to the republic, La Vendee subjected, and all rebellion quelled in the interior, even to the frontier of Italy, where the seaport of Toulon still resisted, it is true, but resisted alone. One more advantage at the foot of the Pyrenees, at Toulon, and on the Rhine, and the republic was completely victorious; nor did this threefold success seem more difficult of accomplishment than those already secured. Undoubtedly, the mighty task was not fully perfected, but it might soon become so by a continuation of the same exertions, by a further development of the same resources; and though complete confidence was not yet re-established in the public apprehension, the dread of almost inevitable destruction had gradually subsided.

CHAPTER XXVIII.

PROSCRIPTIONS AT LYONS, MARSEILLES, AND BORDEAUX. —EXECUTION OF MARIE-ANTOINETTE, THE GIRONDISTS, THE DUKE OF ORLEANS, BAILLY, AND MADAME ROLAND.—INSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLICAN CALENDAR AND THE WORSHIP OF REASON.

The revolutionary measures adopted for the safety of France were executed throughout its confines with inexorable rigour. Imagined by men of most ardent temperaments, they were in principle sufficiently violent; but enforced at a distance from the leaders who had originated them, and by inferior instruments, whose blinder passions were so much the more brutal, in application they became additionally violent. A large portion of the citizens was compelled to quit home and pursuits; another portion was immured under the title of "suspected;" stores of food and merchandise were forcibly abstracted for the necessities of the armies; compulsory labour was imposed to accelerate transit; and in remuneration of articles confiscated or services extorted were given assignats only, or a credit upon the commonwealth, which was regarded as valueless. The assessment of the forced loan was despotically prosecuted; the surveyors of the communes said to one—"You have an income of ten thousand livres;" to another—"You have twenty thousand;" and all, without the privilege of remonstrance, were obliged to furnish the sum demanded. Pitiable vexations resulted from a system so purely arbitrary; but the armies at the same time were supplied with men, abundant stores were transported to the depôts, and the thousand million of assignats appointed to be withdrawn from the circulation were gradually falling into the exchequer. Operations so rapidly completed, the salvation of a state in such imminent hazard, necessarily involved a large amount of individual calamity.

In all the localities where pressing danger had required the presence of the conventional commissioners, the revolutionary measures had taken the most inexorable character. Near the frontiers and in the departments suspected of royalism or federalism, those commissioners had levied the population in a general mass; they had placed all things under requisition, and smitten the rich with revolutionary taxes beyond the general imposition resulting from the forced loan; they had accelerated the incarceration of the suspected, and sometimes, indeed, had consigned those forlorn individuals to revolutionary tribunals instituted upon their own fiat. Laplanche, envoy in the department of Le Cher, addressed the Jacobin Club in the following strain:—

"I have every where inscribed terror as the order of the day; I have every where imposed contributions on the rich and the aristocrats. Orleans has furnished me fifty thousand livres; and two days sufficed me at Bourges for a levy of two millions. Unable to be at all points, my delegates have made amends; an individual, named Mamin, worth seven millions, and assessed by one of them at forty thousand livres, complained to the convention, which approved my conduct; and if he had been taxed by me in person, he should have paid two millions. At Orleans I made my agents render a public account; it was in the bosom of the popular society they acquitted themselves of the task, and their account was sanctioned by the people. I have every where caused the bells to be melted, and have joined several parishes together. I have cashiered all federalists, immured all suspected, and put the sans-culottes in force. Priests had all their conveniences in the houses of seclusion; the sans-culottes slept on straw in the jails: the first have furnished me with mattrasses for the latter. In all directions I have made the priests marry. I have every where electrified hearts and minds. I have organised manufactures of arms, and inspected the workshops, the hospitals, and the prisons. I have dispatched several

battalions of the general levy. I have reviewed many of the national guards, in order to republicanise them, and I have guillotined divers royalists. In short, I have carried out my imperative mandate. I have throughout acted as a zealous Mountaineer, as a revolutionary representative."

It was more especially in the three principal federalist cities, Lyons, Marseilles, and Bordeaux, that the commissioners had impressed the deepest terror. The avenging decree fulminated against Lyons ordained that the rebels and their accomplices should be tried by a commission according to martial law, that the sans-culottes should be maintained at the cost of the aristocrats, that the dwellings of the rich should be destroyed, and that the name of the town should be changed. The execution of that decree was intrusted to Collot d'Herbois, Maribon-Montaut, and Fouché of Nantes.* These men had proceeded to the "Enfranchised Borough," taking with them forty Jacobins, for the purpose of organising a new club and properly inculcating the principles of the parent society. Ronsin had followed them with 2000 men of the revolutionary army, and they had immediately afterwards entered upon their revolting functions. The representatives gave the first blow with a hammer on the houses doomed to demolishment, and 800 workmen forthwith commenced to pull down some of the finest streets in the town. The proscriptions began at the same time. The Lyonnese suspected of having borne arms were guillotined or shot, to the number of fifty and sixty daily. The wretched inhabitants were plunged in terror; but the commissioners sent to punish them, rendered savage and frantic by multitudinous slaughter, believing at every shriek they heard that rebellion was again reviving, wrote to the convention that the aristocrats were not yet reduced; that they were merely awaiting an opportunity for resuming their plans; and that it was necessary, to avoid all further ground of apprehension, to transplant one part of the population and exterminate the other. As the means put in vogue were not held to be sufficiently rapid, Collot-d'Herbois conceived the idea of employing mines to destroy the buildings and grape-shot to dispatch the proscribed; and he wrote to the convention that he was preparing to make speedy use of means more prompt and more efficacious to chastise the refractory city.

At Marseilles, several victims had already fallen. But the wrath of the representatives was chiefly directed against Toulon, the siege whereof they were at this period prosecuting.

In the Gironde, vengeance was wreaked with unbridled fury. Isabeau and Tallien had planted themselves at Réole, where they were occupied in forming the nucleus of a revolutionary army wherewith to enter Bordeaux, and, in the interim, they attempted to disorganise the sections of that town. For that purpose, they made use of a section of pure Mountaineer principles, which, eventually contriving to frighten all the others, had successively broken up the federalist club and superseded the departmental authorities. Thereupon the deputies had made a triumphal entry into Bordeaux, and forthwith re-established the Mountaineer municipality and authorities. As a corollary to that proceeding, they issued an ordinance importing that the government of Bordeaux should be military, all the inhabitants disarmed, a special commission named to try federalists and aristocrats, and an extraordinary tax immediately levied upon the rich to defray the expenses of the revolutionary army. This ordinance was put in execution without a moment's delay; the citizens were disarmed, and a multitude of heads struck off.

It was at this very moment that the fugitive deputies, who had embarked in Brittany for the department of the Gironde, arrived at Bordeaux. They all proceeded to seek an asylum in the residence of a female relative of Guadet, in the grotto of Saint-Emilion. An indistinct rumour was circulated that they were concealed in that quarter, and Tallien made indefatigable efforts to discover them. In this design he had been hitherto unsuccessful, but he unfortunately contrived to seize Biroteau, who had fled from Lyons with the view of embarking at Bordeaux. That deputy had been already declared out of the pale of the law. Tallien therefore contented himself with proving his identity, and then consigned him to the guillotine. Duchâtel was likewise discovered; but as he had not been outlawed, he was transferred to Paris to be tried by the revolutionary tribunal. He was accompanied by the three friends, Riouffe, Girey-Dupré, and Marchenna, who had, as we have previously recorded, zealously attached themselves to the fortune of the Girondists.

Thus all the chief cities of France were visited with the implacable vengeance of the Mountain. But Paris, crowded with the most illustrious victims, was soon to become the scene of yet more appalling cruelties.

Whilst preparations were in progress for the trial of Marie-Antoinette, late Queen of France, of the Girondists, the Duke of Orleans, Bailly, and a long list of generals and ministers, the prisons were filled with the suspected. The commune of Paris had arrogated, as we have already stated, a species of legislative authority over the various matters of police, food, commerce, religion; and to each decree of the convention it appended an explanatory ordinance, extending or limiting its objects. At the instance of Chaumette, for example, it had given the definition of the term "suspected," as laid down in the law of the 17th September, a singularly free interpretation. In a municipal instruction, Chaumette enumerated the characters to whom it ought to be applied. This instruction, addressed to the sections of Paris, and soon afterwards to all the sections in the republic, was conceived in these terms:—

"To be considered as suspected are—1st, Those who, in the assemblies of the people, check energy by laboured discourses, or turbulent cries and menaces: 2d, Those who, more cunning, speak mysteriously of the calamities of the republic, deplore the fate of the people, and are always ready to communicate unfortunate tidings with affected grief: 3d, Those who have shaped their conduct and language according to events; who, mute as to the crimes of royalists and federalists, declaim with warmth against the trifling faults of patriots, and affect, in order to seem republicans, an austerity of manners, a studied severity, and move quickly away when any thing is said of a moderate or an aristocrat: 4th, Those who pity farmers and rapacious traders, against whom the law is obliged to enforce certain measures: 5th, Those who, having the words *liberty*, *republic*, and *country* perpetually on their lips, visit the late nobles, priests, counter-revolutionists, aristocrats, Feuillants, moderates, and interest themselves in their fate: 6th, Those who have taken no active part in all that chiefly concerns the revolution, and who, to exculpate themselves, boast of the payment of their contributions, of their patriotic gifts, and of their services in the national guard, as a set-off or otherwise: 7th, Those who received the republican constitution with indifference, and have participated in fraudulent fears touching its establishment and durability: 8th, Those who, having done nothing against liberty, have at the same time done nothing for it: 9th, Those who do not frequent their sections, and allege as an excuse that they are unaccustomed to public speaking, or that their affairs prevent them: 10th, Those who talk contemptuously of the constituted authorities, of the manifestations of the law, of the popular societies, and of the defenders of liberty: 11th, Those who have signed counter-revolutionary petitions, or attended anti-civic clubs and societies: 12th, Those

* [This was the same Fouché afterwards so well known as the French minister of police.]

who are known to have been insincere, and partisans of Lafayette; and those who marched to the charge on the Champ de Mars."

Under such a sweeping definition, the number of the suspected might be swelled to an unlimited extent; and accordingly we find that, in the prisons of Paris alone, it speedily rose from a few hundreds to three thousand. At first they were thrust into La Mairie, La Force, La Conciergerie, the Abbey, Sainte-Pelagie, the Madelonnettes, and all the ordinary state prisons; but those spacious receptacles becoming inadequate to the demand, it was determined to establish additional places of arrest, specifically appropriated to political offenders. The expenses of detention being borne by the prisoners, houses were hired on their account. One was selected in the street D'Enfer, which was known under the name of the *House of Port-Libre*, and another in the street De Sèvres, called the *House of Lazarus*. The Duplessis College was also transformed into a place of confinement. Lastly, the Luxembourg palace, originally appointed to receive the twenty-two Girondists, was filled with a multitude of prisoners, and enclosed, strangely commingled, all that yet remained of the brilliant circle of the Faubourg Saint-Germain. These sudden arrests having completely choked the prisons, the captives were at first but indifferently accommodated. Confounded with felons and thrown upon straw, the early moments of their detention were full of bitterness. Shortly, however, after the first confusion, order was introduced, and certain alleviations were permitted. Communication with the outer world being freely allowed, they enjoyed the consolation of embracing their kindred, and the privilege of obtaining funds. Thereupon they hired beds, or had them brought from their own domiciles; after which they no longer slept on straw, or associated with malefactors. In fact, all the conveniences which could render their situation more supportable were granted them; for the decree sanctioned the removal into houses of arrest of all such objects as the detained might require. Those who occupied the buildings newly established were still better treated. At Port-Libre, the House of Lazarus, the Luxembourg, where affluent prisoners were congregated, comfort and abundance prevailed. The tables were delicately served, owing to the fees of entry allowed to the jailors. However, the resort of visiters having become too considerable, and intercourse with the exterior appearing too great a boon, that mitigation was subsequently denied, and the captives were for the future allowed to communicate by writing alone, and then simply for articles whereof they stood in need. From that moment the association seemed to become more intimate amongst those unfortunate persons, condemned to pass their time exclusively together. Each drew closer the bands of sympathy according to his tastes, and petty societies were formed within the narrow confines. Regulations also were established; the domestic cares were equitably distributed, and each sustained their burden in rotation. A subscription was opened to defray the expenditure incurred for rent and sustenance, whereby the rich were made to contribute for the poor.

After providing for their household cares, the inmates of the different rooms assembled in a common apartment. Parties gathered around a table, a stove, or a fireplace. Some applied themselves to labour, others to reading—the majority to conversation. Poets —for they too were cast into confinement with all who excited jealousy by any species of superiority—recited verses; musicians gave concerts—and from those places of proscription most excellent music was daily heard to issue. After a short interval, luxury lent its aid to the pleasures of society. The females appeared in elegant attire, intimacies of love and friendship were established, and, till the very moment for mounting the scaffold, all the ordinary scenes of life were in active repetition. A singular evidence of the French character—of its versatility, of its careless gaiety, of its aptitude for recreation in the most dismal conjunctures of fate.

The charms of poetry, tales of romantic adventure, acts of kindliness and sympathy, the singular diversity and confusion of rank, fortune, and opinion, beguiled the first three months of detention. A sort of voluntary equality realised that chimerical equality which morose sectaries endeavoured to enforce throughout the whole social fabric, but truthfully succeeded in establishing in prisons alone. The pride of some prisoners, however, rejected the level of misfortune. Whilst many were seen, otherwise very unequal in fortune and in education, to live happily together, and with exemplary disinterestedness rejoice in concert at the victories of that republic which persecuted them, certain nobles and their wives, found by chance in the mansions of the deserted Faubourg Saint-Germain, held aloof, still assumed the proscribed titles of count and marquis, and made no secret of their vexation when tidings came that the Austrians had fled at Watignies, or that the Prussians had been unable to clear the Vosges. Nevertheless, affliction eventually brings back all hearts to nature and the impulses of humanity. In a little while, when Fouquier-Tinville, knocking every day at the door of those desolate abodes, incessantly demanded fresh heads — when friends and relatives were hourly separated by death —the chastened survivors mourned together, seeking and offering consolation; and thenceforth all differences were merged in the sentiment of a common misery.

All the prisons, however, did not present the like scenes. The Conciergerie, adjoining the Palace of Justice, and on account of that proximity containing the prisoners destined to the revolutionary tribunal, offered the melancholy spectacle of some hundreds of people having but three or four days to live. They were transferred to that building immediately before their trial, and only passed there the short interval between their sentence and their execution. In it were now confined the Girondists, who had been taken from their first prison, the Luxembourg; Madame Roland, who, after assisting in the escape of her husband, had given herself up to incarceration without attempting to fly; the young friends Riouffe, Girey-Dupré, and Bois-Guion, attached to the cause of the proscribed deputies, and brought from Bordeaux to Paris to be tried conjointly with them; Bailly, who had been apprehended at Melun; the ex-minister of finance, Clavière, who had not succeeded in evading pursuit like Lebrun; the Duke of Orleans, transported from the jail of Marseilles to the dungeons of Paris; and Generals Houchard and Brunet—all reserved for the same fate; and, lastly, the unfortunate Marie-Antoinette, who was doomed to precede those illustrious victims on the scaffold. In this last resting-place, the captives never even thought of procuring such comforts as alleviated the lot of those detained in the other prisons. They occupied bare and gloomy cells, to which neither the rays of the sun, the voice of consolation, nor the sounds of pleasure, ever penetrated. They were scarcely allowed the privilege of sleeping on beds, instead of being stretched on straw. Unable to shake off the idea of death like the mere suspected, who looked forward to be detained only till the peace, they strove to convert it into a source of distraction, and made of the revolutionary tribunal and the guillotine the most whimsical parodies. The Girondists, in their apartment, improvised and enacted strange and terrible dramas, whereof their own destiny and the revolution were the subjects. It was at midnight, when all the jailors had retired, that they commenced those lugubrious diversions. We will give one of the entertainments they had conceived. Seated each upon a bed, they represented both the judges and the jurymen of the revolutionary tribunal, and Fouquier-Tinville himself. Two of them, confronting the others, appeared as the accused with his advocate. In conformity to the custom of that sanguinary

court, the accused was always condemned. Forthwith, stretched on a bedstead, reversed for the purpose, he underwent the form of execution even to its most trifling details. After divers executions, the accuser became the accused, and suffered in his turn. Then returning, enveloped in a sheet, he depicted the tortures he was enduring in the shades, foretold their destiny to all those iniquitous judges, and, seizing upon them with lamentable cries, dragged them into the regions below. "It was thus," says Riouffe, "we sported in the jaws of death, and described the truth in our prophetic jests, amidst spies and hangmen."

Since the death of Custine, men had begun to grow habituated to those political trials, in which simple errors of opinion were transformed into crimes worthy of the last punishment. They accustomed themselves, by the practice of shedding blood, to drive away all scruples, and to look upon it as quite natural to send every member of an antagonist faction to the scaffold. The Cordeliers and Jacobins had constrained the convention to decree the impeachment of the queen, the Girondists, the Duke of Orleans, and several generals. They now imperiously demanded that faith should be kept with them; and it was with the queen they were chiefly desirous of commencing the long series of immolations. It may seem that a woman ought to have disarmed political fury; but more hatred was borne to Marie-Antoinette than to Louis XVI. Upon her principally were charged the several treasons of the court, the disorder in the finances, and, above all, the relentless hostilities of Austria. Louis XVI., it was repeated, had suffered all to be done; but Marie-Antoinette had done all, and upon her all must be visited.

We have already alluded to the restrictions that had been introduced into the Temple. Marie-Antoinette had been separated from her sister-in-law, her daughter, and her son, in virtue of the decree which ordained the trial or exile of the surviving members of the Bourbon family. She was transferred to the Conciergerie, where, alone and in a narrow room, she was reduced to the same strict regimen as all the other prisoners. The imprudence of a devoted friend rendered her situation still more painful. A member of the municipality, Michonnis, in whose breast she had awakened a lively interest, undertook to introduce into her apartment an individual who desired, as he said, merely to gratify his curiosity. This person was a courageous but imprudent emigrant, who threw her a carnation containing a slip of very fine paper, with the words, "*Your friends are ready!*"—a deceptive hope, and as dangerous for her who received it as for him who gave it. Michonnis and the emigrant were discovered in the act, and immediately apprehended; and from that time the watch kept over the ill-fated queen was more rigorous than ever. Gendarmes were appointed to stand continually on guard at her door, and they were expressly forbidden to give any heed to her remarks or queries.

The despicable Hébert, Chaumette's deputy, and editor of the disgusting journal called *Père-Duchêne*, the writer of the party whereof Vincent, Ronsin, Varlet, and Leclerc, were the leaders, had particularly devoted himself to torment the remaining members of the dethroned family. He maintained that the family of the tyrant ought not to be better treated than a sans-culottes family; and he had caused a resolution to be passed abolishing the remnant of luxury wherewith the prisoners in the Temple had been hitherto regaled. They were interdicted the delicacies of poultry and confectionery; for breakfast they were to be allowed but one sort of food; for dinner, soup, boiled meat, and some other dish; and for supper, two dishes and half a bottle of wine each. Wax candles were replaced by tallow, silver by pewter, and porcelain by clay. The bearers of wood or water were alone permitted to enter their apartments, accompanied by two commissioners. All articles of food were conveyed to them by means of a turning-box. The numerous domestics were cut down to one cook, an assistant, two servitors, and a sempstress for the linen.

Immediately subsequent to that ordinance, Hébert had repaired to the Temple, and inhumanly deprived the two helpless ladies of every convenience, down to trifling pieces of furniture for which they pleaded in vain. Eighty louis-d'ors which the Princess Elizabeth had in reserve, and which she had received from the Princess de Lamballe, were taken from her. There is no character so dangerous or cruel as the unenlightened and uneducated man invested with recent authority. But if, moreover, he hath a vile soul—if, like Hébert, who distributed checks at the door of a theatre, and made fraudulent returns of the receipts, he is without natural morality—and if he suddenly springs from the mire of degradation to power—he will inevitably prove as basely malignant as atrocious. Such was Hébert in his conduct at the Temple. Nor did he content himself with the vexations we have just specified; he and some others conceived the idea of separating the young prince from his aunt and sister. A shoemaker, named Simon, and his wife, were the instructors to whom they deemed it fitting to confide him, in order that he might receive the education of a young sans-culottes. Simon and his wife were shut up in the Temple, and becoming prisoners with the unfortunate boy, were commissioned to tend him after their own fashion. Their accommodation was superior to that of the two princesses, and they shared the table of the municipal commissioners on guard. Simon had the privilege, when accompanied by two commissioners, to descend into the courtyard of the Temple with the young prince, in order to afford him a little air and exercise.

Hébert next imagined the infernal project of extorting from this child revelations against his wretched mother. Whether the miscreant attributed false statements to the boy, or took advantage of his age and forlorn condition to wring from him all he suggested, he obtained a revolting deposition; and as the young prince was too tender in years to be conducted before the tribunal, Hébert appeared in his behalf to relate the abominations he himself had dictated or fabricated.

It was on the 14th October that Marie-Antoinette was led before her judges. Dragged to the sanguinary tribunal by inexorable revolutionary vengeance, she appeared there with no chance of an acquittal, for it was assuredly not to have her absolved that the Jacobins had called her from her dungeon. Nevertheless it was expedient to assign crimes. Fouquier collected the various rumours current amongst the people since the arrival of the princess in France; and in his articles of impeachment he charged her with having dilapidated the public treasury, first to gratify her own love of pleasure, and afterwards to transmit funds to her brother the emperor. He laid great stress on the scenes of the 5th and 6th October, and on the banquet of the body-guards, alleging that she had hatched a plot at that period, which obliged the people to proceed in a body to Versailles for the purpose of counteracting its fell designs. He subsequently accused her of having swayed her husband, interfered in the choice of ministers, conducted in person the intrigues with the deputies gained over to the court, instigated the journey to Varennes, provoked the war, and revealed to the hostile generals the different plans of campaign. He upbraided her with having arranged a fresh conspiracy on the 10th August, caused the people to be fired upon during that day, and urged her consort to defend himself, by taxing him with cowardice; in fine, with having incessantly continued to plot and correspond with the exterior since her captivity in the Temple, and with having treated her young son as king. We see how every thing is tortured and converted into crime on those terrible occasions when the vengeance of nations,

long repressed, eventually breaks forth and assails such of their princes as have least merited it. We see how profuseness and the love of pleasure, so natural to a young princess, how her attachment to her kindred, her influence over her husband, her regrets—always more indiscreet in a woman than in a man—even her loftier courage, were blackened by exasperated or malevolent imaginations.

Witnesses were required: the public accuser called Lecointre, deputy for Versailles, who had witnessed the 5th and 6th October; Hébert, who had often visited the Temple; divers functionaries in the ministries, and several domestics of the court. To confront the arraigned queen were drawn from their cells—Admiral d'Estaing, former commander of the national guard of Versailles; Latour-du-Pin, minister of war in 1789; the venerable Bailly, who, it was asserted, had been an accessary, together with Lafayette, in the criminal journey to Varennes; and lastly, Valazé, one of the Girondists doomed to the guillotine.

No precise fact was proved. Some had seen the queen delighted when the body-guards testified their attachment to her; others had seen her sad and irritable when she was conducted to Paris or brought back from Varennes; some, again, had been present at splendid fêtes, which must have cost large sums; and others had heard rumours in the ministerial offices that the queen was accustomed to oppose the sanction being given to decrees. One of the late waiting-women at court averred that, in 1788, she had heard the Duke de Coigny say that the emperor had already received 200,000,000 from France to carry on the war against the Turks.

The malignant Hébert, being then called to confront the queen, scrupled not to repeat the accusations extorted from the young prince. He said that Charles Capet had related to Simon the particulars of the journey to Varennes, and had mentioned Lafayette and Bailly as accessaries to the flight. He deposed, moreover, that the boy indulged in deplorable vices, premature for his age; that Simon, having surprised and questioned him, had learned that he derived from his mother the vices to which he was addicted. Hébert intimated that Marie-Antoinette doubtless designed, by early weakening the physical constitution of her son, to ensure the means of governing him should he mount the throne.

The scandal escaping from the atmosphere of an envious court from time to time, in the course of twenty years, had given the people a most unfavourable idea of the queen's morals. Still, the auditory, all Jacobin as it was, gave token of abhorrence at the accusations of Hébert. He, however, did not the less persist in asseverating them. The unfortunate mother had made no reply; urged again to afford explanations, she said with extraordinary emotion, "I thought that the feelings of humanity would have spared me the necessity of repelling such an imputation; but I refer it to the hearts of all the mothers here present." This answer, so expressive in its noble simplicity, deeply affected the whole court.

The depositions of some of the witnesses, at the same time, were characterised by circumstances which must have been consolatory to the arraigned princess. The brave D'Estaing, of whom she had been the enemy, refused to depone any thing to her prejudice, and could recollect only the courage she had evinced on the 5th and 6th October, and the noble resolution she had expressed to die by the side of her husband rather than fly. Manuel, notwithstanding his bitter hostilities with the court during the Legislative Assembly, declared that he had nothing to allege against the accused. When the venerable Bailly was led in, he who had so often forewarned the court of the calamities its imprudences would provoke, he appeared most painfully moved; and when he was asked if he knew "the woman Capet:" "Yes," said he, inclining his body with respect, "I have known *Madame*." He testified that he could speak to nothing criminal, and strenuously insisted that the declarations wrung from the young prince, relative to the journey to Varennes, were fabrications. In reward of his candour he received outrageous abuse, and had a foretaste of the doom in store for himself.

In the whole proceedings there were but two serious facts, attested by Latour-du-Pin and Valazé, who gave evidence only because they were constrained. Latour-du-Pin confessed that Marie-Antoinette had demanded from him an exact account of the armies whilst he filled the post of minister of war. Valazé, ever cold and stern, but respectful towards misfortune, would state nothing against the accused; but pressed, he could not avoid divulging that, when a member of the committee of twenty-four, and charged with his colleagues to inspect the papers found in the house of Septeuil, treasurer of the civil list, he had seen checks for various sums signed "*Antoinette*"—which was very natural; but he added that he had seen a letter wherein the minister prayed the king to transmit the copy of the plan of campaign then in his possession to the queen. These two facts—the demand for the account of the armies and the communication of the plan of campaign—were at once interpreted in the most unfavourable light; and the conclusion was held indisputable, that she wished them in order to send to the enemy, since it was not to be supposed that a young princess would devote attention, merely from taste, to details of administration and military plans. After these depositions, several others were heard on the expenses of the court, on the influence of the queen over affairs, on the scenes of the 10th August, on all that had passed at the Temple; and the vaguest rumours, the most insignificant circumstances, were held admissible as proofs.

Marie-Antoinette frequently repeated, with great presence of mind and energy, that there was no distinct fact adduced against her, and that furthermore, as the wife of Louis XVI., she was not responsible for any acts of his reign. Fouquier, however, declared her sufficiently convicted. Chaveau-Lagarde exerted himself in fruitless efforts as her advocate; and the unfortunate queen was condemned to undergo the same fate as her husband.

Reconducted to the Conciergerie, she passed the night preceding her execution with great composure; and early on the following day, the 16th October, she was conveyed, amidst an immense concourse, towards the fatal square, on which, ten months previously, Louis XVI. had perished. She listened with calmness to the exhortations of the ecclesiastic who attended her, and cast a look of indifference over that multitude which had so often applauded her beauty and grace, and now with equal ardour hailed her progress to execution. On her arrival at the foot of the scaffold, she perceived the Tuileries, and seemed affected; but she hastened to mount the fatal ladder, and gave herself with courageous resignation into the hands of the executioner. That infamous functionary held up the head to the people, as he was wont to do when he had sacrificed an illustrious victim.

The Jacobins were beside themselves with joy. "Let them bear this news to Austria!" they cried. "The Romans sold the ground occupied by Hannibal; we strike off the heads dearest to the princes who have invaded our territory."

This execution was but the prelude to others. Immediately after the trial of Marie-Antoinette, the cry for vengeance arose the louder against the Girondists, and with their trial it was next found necessary to proceed.

Before the revolt of the south, it was possible only to reproach them with opinions. It was said, indeed, that they were accomplices of Dumouriez, of La Vendée, of Orleans; but such connivance, easy to impute at the tribune, could not be proved, even before a revolutionary tribunal. But when, on the contrary, they



raised the standard of civil war, and supplied against themselves positive overt acts, it became an easy task to secure their condemnation. True, the detained deputies were not the men who had provoked the insurrection of Calvados and the south, but they were members of the same party, advocates of the same cause; a moral conviction prevailed that they had been in concert with each other; and although the intercepted letters failed in establishing a complete case of guilty concurrence, they were sufficient for a tribunal which, by its very institution, was bound to admit probabilities. The long moderation of the Girondists was converted into a continued conspiracy, whereof the civil war had been the natural catastrophe. Their reluctance, under the Legislative Assembly, to rise in insurrection against the throne, their opposition to the project of the 10th August, their contest with the commune from that time till the 20th September, their vehement protestations against the massacres of September, their commiseration for Louis XVI., their resistance to the inquisitorial system which was so repugnant to generals, their opposition to the extraordinary tribunal, to the maximum, to the forced loan, to all the revolutionary resources, in fact; finally, their efforts to establish a repressive authority by instituting the committee of twelve, and their despair after their discomfiture at Paris, a despair which drove them to apply for succour to the provinces—all these things were adduced as inseparable and dependent facts in one and the same conspiracy. In such a system of accusation, opinions propounded from the tribune were deemed symptoms and preparatives of the civil war which soon after broke out; and whoever had spoken in the Legislative and the Convention in the spirit of the deputies assembled at Caen, Bordeaux, Lyons, and Marseilles, was held equally criminal. Although no direct proof of co-operation was available, it was found in their community of sentiment, in the friendship which united most of them, and in their habitual meetings at the residences of Roland and Valazé.

The Girondists, on the other hand, were firmly of opinion that it was impossible to condemn them if they were allowed the advantage of discussion. Their principles, they argued, might lead them to form different conclusions from the Mountaineers on the policy of certain revolutionary measures, without being necessarily criminal; their doctrines evinced neither personal ambition nor a premeditated scheme. On the contrary, it was on record that they had disagreed amongst themselves on a variety of important points. For the rest, their connexion with the revolted deputies was a mere assumption, and their letters, their friendship, or their habit of sitting on the same benches, did not suffice to prove so conclusive a fact. "If we are permitted to plead," said the Girondists, "we are surely saved." A vain idea, which, without promoting their safety, caused them to forfeit a part of that dignity wherein lies the only solace of an unjust death.

If parties were to display greater candour, they would be at all times more worthy of respect. The victorious party might have said to the vanquished—"You have carried your attachment to the system of moderation so far as to make war on us—so far as to bring the republic to the verge of ruin by a hazardous diversion: you have been overcome, and must die." The Girondists, on their side, had language of a noble tenor to hold to their opponents. They could retort—"We regard you as miscreants who are destroying and dishonouring the republic whilst pretending to defend it, and we have done our utmost to combat and defeat you. Yes, we avow ourselves equally guilty; we are all accomplices of Buzot, Barbaroux, Pétion, and Guadet; they are great and virtuous citizens, whose worth we proclaim to your teeth. When they departed to avenge the republic, we remained to glorify it in despite of executioners. You are the conquerors—take our lives"

But the human mind is not so constituted as thus to simplify all things by an ingenuous frankness. The victors are anxious to convict by a parade of reason, and they transgress truth; a remnant of hope induces the vanquished to defend themselves, and they speak falsely: hence we see in civil broils those disgraceful trials, where the strongest listens with closed ears, and the weakest pleads in cheerless desperation, vainly demanding the life not to be accorded. It is only after the judgment is pronounced, after all hope is extinguished, that the mind resumes its native dignity, and generally shows itself in fullest possession when on the very verge of eternity.

The Girondists, then, determined to attempt a defence, and in the purpose they must of necessity employ modes of concession and duplicity. Their adversaries, on the other hand, desired to prove their delinquency, and they sent to confront them, at the bar of the revolutionary tribunal, some of their most inveterate foes—Pache, Hébert, Chaumette, Chabot, and others equally vile or equally forsworn. The attendant crowd was great, for as yet the spectacle of so many republicans arraigned for behoof of the republic was recommended by novelty. The accused were twenty-one in number, all in the vigour of manhood and mental power, some even in the blossom of youth and beauty. The mere announcement of their names and ages was sufficient to excite emotion.

Brissot, Gardien, and Lasource, were thirty-nine years of age; Vergniaud, Gensonné, and Lehardy, thirty-five; Mainvielle and Ducos, twenty-eight; Boyer-Fonfrède and Duchastel, twenty-seven; Duperret, forty-six; Carra, fifty; Valazé and Lacase, forty-two; Duprat, thirty-three; Sillery, fifty-seven; Fauchet, forty-nine; Lesterpt-Beauvais, forty-three; Boileau, forty-one; Antiboul, forty; and Vaigée, thirty-six.

Gensonné was calm and collected; Valazé indignant and scornful; Vergniaud betrayed greater emotion than was usual with him; young Ducos was gay; and Fonfrède too, he who had been spared on the 2d June because he had not voted for the arrests ordered by the committee of twelve, but from his reiterated outbreaks in favour of his friends, had since proved himself worthy to partake their doom, seemed, in so glorious a cause, ready to abandon without a pang his splendid fortune, his young wife, and all the charms of existence.

Amar had drawn up the articles of impeachment on behalf of the committee of general safety. Pache was the first witness heard in corroboration. Wily and prudent, as he had always shown himself, he stated that he had long ago perceived a faction opposed to the revolution; but he particularised no fact proving a premeditated plot. He averred simply that when the convention was menaced by Dumouriez, he repaired to the committee of finance to procure funds and means to provision Paris, and that the committee refused them; he added, moreover, that he had been severely handled in the committee of general safety, and that Guadet had threatened him to move the arrest of all the municipal authorities. Chaumette, next examined, recounted all the contests of the commune with the right side, such as they had been described in the journals, winding up his evidence with one solitary statement of a specific nature, to wit, that Brissot had procured the nomination of Santonax as commissioner to the colonies, and was consequently the author of all the calamities in the New World. The despicable Hébert related his apprehension by the commission of twelve, and asserted that Roland corrupted all the public writers, for Madame Roland had endeavoured to buy his paper of "Père Duchêne." Destournelles, minister of justice, and formerly employed at the commune, spoke in a manner equally vague, and repeated what was matter of notoriety, that the accused had assailed the commune, inveighed against the massacres, and laboured to establish a departmental guard, &c. &c.

The most inveterate and prolix of the witnesses, however, was the ex-capuchin Chabot, a hot-headed, weak, and worthless character, whose deposition lasted for several hours. Chabot had always been treated by the Girondists as an extravagant fool, and their disdain wrankled deeply in his heart. He prided himself on having advocated the outbreak of the 10th August in opposition to their opinion; and always maintained, that if they had consented to send him to the prisons, he would have rescued their inmates as he had before saved the Swiss soldiers. He was well disposed, therefore, to take vengeance on the Girondists, and more especially when, by calumniating them, he might regain the popularity he was in danger of losing at the Jacobin Club, on account of certain suspicions that he was connected with stockjobbing. He fabricated a long and malignant charge, in which he represented the Girondists scheming to gain over the minister Narbonne; then, after having chased away Narbonne, seizing upon three ministries at once; perpetrating the 20th June in order to reanimate their creatures; opposing the 10th August because they were inimical to a republic; in short, always pursuing a calculated plan of ambition; and, what was more atrocious than all the rest, allowing the massacres of September, and the robbery of the Garde-Meuble, with the view of ruining the reputation of the patriots. "If they had been so disposed," said Chabot, "I would have saved the prisoners. Pétion caused the murderers to be supplied with intoxicating liquors, and Brissot had no wish to have them checked, because in the prisons there was one of his own enemies, Morande!"

When power gives the signal, plentiful are the base-minded ready to press forward to criminate even the worthiest of the human race. No sooner have the leaders cast the first stone, than all who grovel in the dirt start up and overwhelm the victim. Fabre-d'Eglantine, against whom suspicions were directed, as against Chabot, on account of stockjobbing, had likewise occasion to redeem his popularity; and he gave evidence in a more cautious but equally perfidious spirit, insinuating that the policy of the Girondists might undoubtedly consist in permitting the massacres and the robbery of the Garde-Meuble. Vergniaud, unable longer to restrain his feelings, exclaimed with indignation, "I shall not attempt to clear myself from a charge of fellowship with robbers and assassins!"

No precise fact, however, was alleged against the accused; they were charged merely with opinions publicly avowed, and they urged in reply that such opinions might have been erroneous, but that it was no crime to be mistaken. It was objected to them that their doctrines were not the result of an involuntary and therefore excusable error, but of a conspiracy hatched in the houses of Roland and Valazé. They averred in rejoinder that those very doctrines were so little the result of any express agreement amongst themselves, that great diversity existed upon several points. One said, "I did not vote for the appeal to the people;" another, "I did not vote for the departmental guard;" a third, "I did not partake the opinions of the committee of twelve—I was not in favour of the arrest of Hébert and Chaumette." All this was true, but the adducement destroyed the uniform character of the defence; the accused seemed almost to abandon one another, and each to condemn the measure in which he had not participated. Boileau carried the care of self-justification to extreme weakness, and even covered himself with disgrace. He confessed that a conspiracy had existed against the unity and indivisibility of the republic; that he was now convinced of it, and accordingly made declaration thereof to the insulted laws; stating, moreover, that he could not designate the guilty, but that he desired their punishment as a true Mountaineer, which he avowed himself to be. Gardien, too, had the baseness to utterly disavow the commission of twelve. However, Gensonné, Brissot, Vergniaud, and especially Valazé, corrected the bad effect of their two colleagues' weakness. They alleged, indeed, that they had not always thought alike, and that consequently they had taken no concert in their opinions, but they denied neither their friendship nor their principles. Valazé frankly avowed the meetings held under his roof, maintaining that they had an undoubted right to meet and interchange ideas in the same manner as all other citizens. When, finally, their connivance with the fugitives was charged upon them, they repudiated it. Thereupon Hébert exclaimed, "The accused deny the conspiracy! When the Roman senate had to pronounce on the conspiracy of Catiline, if it had interrogated each confederate, and rested satisfied with a denial, they would have all escaped the punishment awaiting them; but the meetings at the house of Catiline, his flight, the arms found in the house of Lecca, were held material proofs, and sufficed to determine the judgment of the senate." "Well," replied Brissot, "I accept the comparison drawn between us and Catiline. Cicero said to him, 'We have found arms in thy house; the ambassadors of the Allobroges accuse thee; the signatures of Lentulus, Cethegus, and Statilius, thy accomplices, prove thy infamous projects.' Here we are accused by the senate, it is true; but have arms been found in our houses?—can signatures be objected against us?"

Unfortunately, complaints written by Vergniaud to Bordeaux, expressing the liveliest indignation, had been discovered, as also a letter from the cousin of Duperret detailing the preparations for the insurrection. Furthermore, a letter from Duperret to Madame Roland had been intercepted, in which he stated that he had received intelligence from Buzot and Barbaroux, and that they were getting ready to punish the crimes perpetrated at Paris. Vergniaud, being called upon to explain, answered, "If I were to lay before you the motives which urged me to write, I should perhaps appear to you more worthy of pity than of blame. I could not avoid believing, after the attempt of the 10th March, that the design of assassinating us was united with the project of dissolving the national representation. Marat thus expressed himself on the 11th March. The petitions subsequently presented against us with such virulence confirmed me in that opinion. It was under this persuasion that my mind was oppressed with grief, and I wrote to my fellow-citizens that I stood beneath the knife. I exclaimed against the tyranny of Marat. It was he alone that I named. I respect the opinion of the people regarding Marat, but assuredly Marat was to me a tyrant." At these words, a juryman arose and said, "Vergniaud complains of having been persecuted by Marat. I have to observe, that Marat has been assassinated, and that Vergniaud is still here." This stupid remark was applauded by a part of the audience; and all the candour and reason of Vergniaud remained without impression on the insensate multitude.

Vergniaud, however, succeeded in gaining a hearing, and recovered, when speaking of the conduct of his friends, of their zeal and sacrifices for the republic, all his pristine eloquence. The whole assemblage was moved; insomuch that the condemnation, although enjoined, seemed no longer so perfectly inevitable. The pleadings had continued several days. The Jacobins, indignant at the tardiness of the tribunal, addressed a final petition to the convention, praying it to accelerate the process. Robespierre thereupon caused a decree to be passed, whereby, after a three days' hearing, the jury was authorised to declare itself sufficiently enlightened, and to proceed to judgment without further delay. Moreover, to render the title more conformable to the fact, he obtained an ordinance that the name of extraordinary tribunal should be changed to that of REVOLUTIONARY TRIBUNAL.

The jurymen scrupled to put this new decree in force upon the first day, and declared themselves not yet sufficiently informed. But on the morrow, they

used their privilege to shorten the case, and demanded its termination. The accused had already given up all hope, and prepared themselves to die with dignity. They repaired to the last sitting of the court with serene countenances. Whilst the guards were searching them at the gate of the Conciergerie, with the view of removing from them any murderous weapon wherewith they might attempt self-destruction, Valazé, giving his friend Riouffe a pair of scissors, said to him in presence of the gendarmes, "See, my friend, here is a prohibited weapon; we must not attempt our lives!"

At midnight, on the 30th October, the jurymen entered to pronounce their verdict. Antonelle, the foreman, bore a mournful expression on his face. Camille-Desmoulins, on hearing the fatal sentence, exclaimed, "Alas! it is I who kill them—it is my *Brissot Unmasked!** Let me begone!" and he rushed wildly from the court. When the doom of death was irrevocably pronounced, Brissot let fall his arms, and his head suddenly dropped on his breast; Gensonné endeavoured to say a few words on the application of the law, but his efforts to command attention were fruitless. Sillery, throwing away his crutches, exclaimed, "This is the happiest day of my life!" Hopes had been entertained for the young brothers Ducos and Fonfrède, who had appeared to be less compromised, and who had become attached to the Girondists more from admiration of their character and talents than from similarity of opinion. They were condemned, however, like the rest. Fonfrède embraced Ducos, saying, "Brother, I am to be blamed for thy death." "Be of good cheer," replied Ducos, "we will die together." The Abbé Fauchet, with his eyes cast down, seemed absorbed in prayer; Carra preserved his austere aspect; Vergniaud had in all his bearing an air of haughty scorn; Lasource delivered the celebrated saying of the ancient—"I die on the day the people have lost their reason; you will die on the day they recover it." Not even Boileau and Gardien, who had displayed such weakness, were spared. Boileau, hurling his hat into the air, cried out, "I am innocent!" "We are innocent," repeated all the prisoners; "people, you are deceived!" Some of them had the indiscretion to throw assignats amongst the crowd, as if to enlist it for their rescue, but it remained inert. The gendarmes immediately surrounded them to reconduct them to their cells. Suddenly one of the condemned fell at their feet; they raised him bathed in blood: it was Valazé, who, when giving the scissors to Riouffe, had retained a dagger, wherewith he had now dealt himself a mortal stab. The tribunal forthwith directed that his corpse should be dragged upon a cart in the train of the condemned. When leaving the court, they all, by a spontaneous impulse, struck up the Marseillese hymn:—

Contre nous de la tyrannie
L'étendard sanglant est levé.

Their last night on earth was sublime. Vergniaud had poison, but he cast it aside to die with his friends. They partook of a final repast together, in the course of which they were alternately gay, serious, and eloquent. Brissot and Gensonné were grave and contemplative; Vergniaud discoursed upon expiring liberty with the noblest sorrow, and upon the destiny of mankind with glowing fervour; Ducos repeated some verses he had made whilst in prison, and all in chorus chanted anthems to France and liberty.

The following day, the 31st October, an immense crowd congregated to witness their passage to the scaffold. As they went they repeated that same Marseillese hymn which the French soldiers were accustomed to sing when marching upon the enemy. Arrived on the Place de la Revolution, and alighted from their carts, they took a last embrace, with cries of "The republic for ever!" Sillery was the first to mount the ladder, and after directing a grave salutation to the assembled multitude, in which he still testified respect for weak and deceived humanity, he received the fatal stroke. All imitated Sillery, and died with the like dignity. In thirty-one minutes the executioner had struck off the whole of those illustrious heads, and thus in a few rapid seconds ruthlessly exterminated so many beings redolent in youth, beauty, talents, and virtues. Such was the end of those noble and courageous citizens, the victims of generous but utopian theories. Comprehending neither humanity nor its vices, nor the means of conducting it in a revolution, they became indignant at its obstinacy in refusing to be better, and eventually provoked it to destroy them by persisting in thwarting it. Honour to their memory! never did so much virtue and talent illustrate civil contests; and it must be allowed to their glory, that if they did not discern the necessity of violent means to save the cause of France, the majority of their adversaries, who preferred such means, were influenced by passion rather than genius. Above them only he amongst the Mountaineers can be ranked, who was moved to advocate revolutionary measures by political sagacity alone, and not by the instigations of hatred.

Scarcely had the Girondists sighed their last, ere fresh victims were called out for immolation. The tribunal reposed not for an instant. On the 2d November, it consigned to death the unfortunate Olympe de Gouges, for pretended counter-revolutionary writings, and Adam Luxe, deputy of Mayence, accused of the same crime. On the 6th November, the wretched Duke of Orleans, transferred from Marseilles to Paris, was conducted before the revolutionary tribunal, and condemned for the suspicions wherewith he had inspired all parties. Odious to the emigrants, and distrusted by the Girondists and Jacobins alike, he aroused none of those regrets which in some degree compensate for an unjust death. More the enemy of the court than an enthusiast for liberty and a republic, he lacked that inward conviction which sustains at the extremest moment, and of all the victims of the time he was the least indemnified and the most to be pitied. A general repugnance, an absolute cynicism, seized upon him at the last, and he proceeded to the scaffold with a calmness and indifference truly extraordinary. Dragged along the Rue Saint-Honoré, he surveyed his palace with a cold and passionless eye, and winced not in the slightest from his settled disgust with men and life. His aid-de-camp Coustard, a deputy like himself, was the associate of his fate. Two days afterwards, Roland's interesting and noble-hearted wife followed them to the scaffold. She, combining the graces of a French with the heroism of a Roman matron, bore all her griefs in her bosom. She loved and reverenced her husband as a father; she felt for one of the proscribed Girondists an ardent passion, which she had always repressed; she left a young and orphan daughter to the care and hazard of friends; and whilst trembling for these cherished beings, she was doomed to the belief that the cause of liberty, to which she was so enthusiastically attached, and for which she had made such heavy sacrifices, was irremediably lost. Thus at once, in all the affections of her soul, she suffered acutely. Condemned on the charge of confederacy with the Girondists, she heard her sentence with a species of rapture, and seemed, from the moment of her condemnation to that of her execution, as it were inspired, exciting in the breasts of all who saw her a degree of admiration partaking of religious awe. She went to the scaffold clad in white; during the route she cheered the spirits of a companion in misfortune who was to perish with her, whose courage drooped, and even succeeded in twice moving him to a smile. When arrived at the place of execution, she bowed her head to the statue of Liberty, and exclaimed, "Oh, Liberty! how many crimes are committed in thy

* The title of a pamphlet he had written against the Girondists.

name!" She then underwent the last penalty with unshaken fortitude. So perished that charming and courageous woman, who was worthy to partake the destiny of her friends, but who, if less aspiring and more subdued to the passive duties of her sex, would have, not indeed escaped death, a homage due to her talents and accomplishments, but averted from herself and her husband many sarcasms and calumnies.

Her husband had fled in the direction of Rouen. On learning her tragical end, he determined not to survive her. He quitted the hospitable abode in which he had found an asylum, and, with the view of not compromising any friend, he went to seek death on the highway. He was found pierced to the heart with a sword, and lying at the foot of a tree against which he had propped the deadly weapon. In his pocket was concealed a manuscript on his life and his conduct in the ministry.

Thus, amidst the frightful delirium which rendered every thing bearing the attributes of genius, virtue, and courage suspected, all that France contained most noble and generous perished either by suicide or the hands of the executioner.

Amongst so many illustrious and heroic deaths, there was one especially more lamentable and sublime than all the others—it was that of Bailly. We have already been enabled to surmise, from the manner in which he was treated on the trial of the queen, what his reception would be when at the bar of the revolutionary tribunal. The scene on the Champ de Mars, the proclamation of martial law, and the discharges of musketry which followed it, were events the most frequently and the most virulently charged upon the constituent party. And upon Bailly, the friend of Lafayette, and the magistrate who had caused the red flag to be displayed, it was determined to visit all the pretended delinquencies of the old constituents. He was condemned, and appointed to be executed on the Champ de Mars, the theatre of what was designated his crime. The day fixed was the 11th November; and the weather chanced to be chilly, rainy, and cheerless. Conducted on foot, and amidst the outrages of a barbarous populace, whom he had preserved from famine whilst he was mayor, he retained a meek and imperturbable serenity. During the long track from the Conciergerie to the Champ de Mars, the people kept shaking in his face the red flag, which had recently been discovered at the town-hall deposited in a mahogany case. At length he reached the foot of the scaffold, and seemed on the point of escaping his tormentors; but one of the ruffians collected to persecute him cried out that the field of the federation ought not to be polluted with his blood: and the crowd rushed upon the guillotine, bore it away with such zealous eagerness as it had once before exhibited in digging up that same field of the federation, and proceeded finally to rear it on the edge of the Seine, on a heap of ordure, and opposite the quarter of Chaillot, where Bailly had passed his life and composed his works. This operation occupied several hours, and in the interim he was made to traverse the Champ de Mars numerous times. His head bare and his hands bound behind, he walked with difficulty. Some cast mud upon him, others struck him with their feet or with clubs. Overpowered, he fell to the ground; he was speedily forced up. The wet and cold had communicated to his frame an involuntary tremor. "Thou tremblest!" said a soldier, addressing him. "My friend," replied the old man, "it is with cold." After undergoing this horrible torture for many hours, the task was consummated; the red flag was burnt under his nose, the executioner seized him as his prey, and the world lost a distinguished scholar, and his country one of the most virtuous men who have reflected honour upon its name.

Since the era when Tacitus beheld it applaud the atrocities of Roman emperors, the populace has not changed. Ever abrupt and irreflective in its impulses, now it rears an altar to the country, now with equal ardour it prepares scaffolds; and is good and noble in the sight only when, embodied in armies, it falls courageously on hostile hosts. Let not despotism impute its crimes to liberty, for, under despotism itself, it was always as revolting as under the republic; but let us never cease to invoke the blessings of education and instruction for those barbarians, swarming in the heart of societies, and always ready to sully them with all enormities, at the beck of any influence and to the disgrace of any cause.

On the 25th November occurred also the death of the unfortunate Manuel, who had become, from procurator of the commune, a deputy in the convention, and who had announced his resignation after the trial of Louis XVI., because he was accused of having evaded the scrutiny. Before the tribunal he was charged with having instigated the massacres of September with the view of stimulating the departments against Paris. Upon Fouquier-Tinville devolved the task of conceiving such insidious calumnies, which were even more atrocious in character than the condemnation. On the same day was condemned the luckless General Brunet, for not having sent a part of his army of Nice before Toulon; and on the morrow, the 26th, death was pronounced against the victorious Houchard, for having failed to comprehend the plan traced out for him, and not having proceeded with sufficient rapidity upon the road to Furnes, so as to intercept the whole English army. His fault was egregious, but did not merit death.

These executions began to spread a general terror, and to render the reigning authority formidable. Consternation prevailed not only in the prisons, in the hall of the revolutionary tribunal, on the Place de la Revolution, but was every where predominant—in the markets and in the shops, where the maximum and the laws against forestalling had been recently brought into effective operation. We have already explained how the depreciation of assignats and the enhancement of commodities had led to the enactment of the maximum, with the design of restoring the proportion between produce and the circulating medium. The first consequences of this maximum were most disastrous, and caused a vast number of stores to be altogether closed. The tariff fixed for articles of necessity had only affected the stock lying with the retailer, and ready to pass from his hands into those of the consumer. But the retailer who had purchased from the wholesale merchant or the manufacturer before the institution of the maximum, and at a price higher than the new compulsory scale, suffered enormous loss, and raised bitter complaints. Nor was his loss much less even when he bought after the maximum, since in the rates assigned for articles styled of the first necessity, such only were designated as lay exposed for sale to the general community, and a price was fixed only upon those brought to this last stage of traffic. But nothing was said of the value they were to bear under the form of raw material, nor what was to be paid to the labourer who fabricated them, or to the carrier and navigator who transported them; consequently the retailer, who was compelled to furnish the consumer according to the tariff, but was unable to treat with the artisan, the manufacturer, or the wholesale trader, upon corresponding terms, fell into the impossibility of continuing so ruinous a traffic. The majority of the dealers closed their shops, or evaded the law by covin, vending at the maximum only the vilest wares, and reserving the good for those who repaired furtively to purchase at a fair and remunerating price.

The people, discerning this fraudulent manœuvre, and perceiving numerous shops shut up, broke into furious cries, and thronged to assail the commune with remonstrances, urging that all the dealers should be obliged to keep open their stores, and continue their trade whether willing or not. Disposed to complain of all, they denounced the butchers and pork-mer-

chants, for buying animals diseased or accidentally killed, and not sufficiently bleeding the carcasses, with the intention of rendering the flesh heavier; the bakers, who, for the purpose of supplying fine flour to the rich, were charged with reserving the foul for the poor, and with not baking the bread sufficiently, in order to increase its weight; the wine merchants, for mixing villanous drugs with their liquors; the salt-sellers, for adulterating the quality of their commodity so as greatly to augment the weight; the grocers, and, in short, all the retailers, for deleteriously compounding their articles by a multitude of devices.

Of such abuses, some were of all times and inherent, others sprung from the peculiar crisis; but when impatience under calamity seizes upon the minds of men, their complaints are indiscriminating, and they are moved to reform and punish with sweeping violence.

The procurator-general Chaumette delivered on this topic a virulent oration against the dealers.

"We remember," said he, "that in 1789 and the following years all these men drove a flourishing trade; but with whom?—with the alien. We are aware they are the parties who caused assignats to fall, and that they have enriched themselves by means of stockjobbing upon the paper-money. What was their conduct after they had completed their fortunes? They retired from trade, they threatened the people with a dearth of commodities; but if they have gold and assignats, the republic has something more precious—it has arms. Hands and not gold are wanted to keep machines and manufactories in activity. If these men abandon their factories, the republic will seize upon them, and put in requisition all raw materials. Let them know that it depends on the republic to reduce, when it so wills, the gold and assignats in their coffers to dust and ashes. It may behove the giant of the people to crush these mercantile speculators.

We feel the calamities of the people, because we are of the people ourselves. The entire council is composed of sans-culottes—it is a popular legislature. Little does it concern us if our heads fall, provided posterity deigns to collect our skulls. It is not the gospel I shall invoke, but Plato. He who strikes with the sword, says that philosopher, shall perish by the sword; he who smites with poison, shall perish by poison; starvation shall waste him who would famish the people. If food and commodities be deficient, upon whom ought the people to fasten? Upon the constituted authorities? No. They will fall foul of contractors and purveyors. Rousseau, also, was of the people, and he said, *When the people have nothing more to eat, they will eat the rich.*"*

Coercive measures lead to further stringent expedients, as we have previously had occasion to observe. In the first ordinances manufactured articles only were affected, but it was found essential to extend them to the raw material; even the idea of appropriating raw produce and manufacturing it for account of the republic, floated in the public mind. It is a redoubtable task to force nature and regulate all its movements. The obligation soon arises to supply the want of spontaneous action in all instances, and to replace the vital principle itself by commandments of the law. The commune and the convention were compelled to take additional measures, each according to its powers.

The commune of Paris obliged every dealer to declare the quantity of goods he possessed, the orders he had given for further supplies, and the expectation he indulged of their execution. Every dealer, carrying on business for a year past, who forsook or allowed it to languish, was declared suspected, and incarcerated as such. To obviate all confusion and obstruction, arising from eagerness to acquire stocks, the commune likewise directed that the consumer should apply to the retailer only, the retailer to the wholesale merchant, and it fixed the quantities each was competent to demand. Thus, for example, the grocer could exact from the wholesale dealer not more than twenty-five pounds of sugar at one time, and the lemonade-vender not more than twelve. The revolutionary committees exercised the duty of dispensing certificates of purchase, and apportioning the quantities. The regulations of the commune were not limited to these points. As the concourse at the doors of the bakers continued considerable, occasioning tumultuous scenes, and as many persons actually passed a part of the night waiting in the streets, Chaumette obtained an order that the distribution should commence with the last comers, which diminished neither the tumult nor the eagerness of the public. Moreover, as the people complained that the worst flour was reserved for them, it was ordained that in the whole city of Paris there should be but one sort of bread baked, composed of three parts wheat and one part rye. Finally, a commission of inspection was appointed, to ascertain the quality and condition of articles of consumption, to investigate frauds and punish them. These measures, being imitated by the other communes, often indeed embodied in decrees, speedily became general laws; and it was thus, as we have already intimated, that the commune of Paris exercised a prodigious influence over all that appertained to internal government and to the functions of police.

The convention, pressed to reform the law of the maximum, framed a new one, which no longer stopped at articles in the warerooms of shopkeepers, but struck them in their first condition. It directed that an account should be taken of the prices of produce in 1790 at the place of production. To such value were added—first, a third, an account of contingencies; secondly, a fixed price for the carriage from the place of production to that of consumption; and, thirdly, a sum of five per cent. for the profit of the wholesale merchant, and of ten per cent. for that of the retailer; from all which elements was to be henceforth determined the price of commodities of the first necessity. The local administrations were charged to undertake this labour, each for what was produced and consumed within its own jurisdiction. An indemnity was granted to every retail dealer who, having a capital of less than 10,000 francs, could prove that he had lost his capital by the operation of the maximum. The communes were to judge each case by inquisition, as all things were judged at that time, and at every other era of dictatorship. Thus the law, without yet descending to actual production, to the raw material, or to the manufacture, took commodities when ready for market, fixed their price, the cost of transport, the profit of the merchant and the retailer, and substituted, throughout the half at least of social operations, absolute rules for the variations of the natural course. But these ulterior steps, we repeat, resulted inevitably from the first maximum, the first maximum from the assignats, and the assignats from the imperative necessities of the revolution.

To enforce this system of government introduced into trade, the convention nominated a committee for food and supplies, whose authority was to extend over the whole republic, and which consisted of three members, enjoying almost equal importance with the ministers themselves, and possessing a voice at the council board. This committee was empowered to compel the observance of the tariffs, and to superintend the conduct of the communes in that respect; to cause perpetual statements to be furnished of the quantities of food and wares throughout France; to direct their transmission from one department to another; and to assign the requisitions for the armies, conformably to the celebrated decree which constituted the revolutionary government.

The financial situation was not less extraordinary than the rest of matters. The two loans, the one forced, the other voluntary, had been rapidly filled up.

* Commune, 14th October.

Great eagerness especially was manifested in contributing to the second, because the advantages it presented rendered it decidedly preferable; and thus the period was approaching when a thousand millions of assignats would be withdrawn from circulation. There were in the state coffers, for current charges, nearly four hundred millions, remaining from the old creations, and five hundred millions of royal assignats, returned in accordance with the decree which proscribed them, and converted into an equal amount of republican assignats. About nine hundred millions, therefore, were available to the public service.

It will appear surprising that the assignat, which was depreciated three-fourths, and even four-fifths, had risen to par with bullion. In that rebound, however, there was something factitious as well as real. The gradual suppression of a floating thousand millions, the success of the first levy, which had produced six hundred thousand men in the space of one month, and the last victories of the republic, which almost assured its existence, had stimulated the sale of national domains and restored some confidence in assignats, but not sufficient to place them on a level with the precious metals. The following are the causes which brought them, in appearance, to a par with specie. It will be remembered that a law prohibited, under severe penalties, all traffic in bullion, that is to say, the exchange at a loss of assignats for coin; and that another law also punished with heavy amercements him who should bargain for different prices in contracts, according as payment was intended in paper or specie. In consequence, gold or silver, when exchanged either for assignats or for merchandise, could not command its real value, and the only course left was to hoard it. But an additional enactment declared that all concealed money or jewels should belong, part to the state, part to the informer. Thenceforth, specie could be neither used in commerce nor privily retained; it became a burden, exposing the owner to the denunciation of "suspected," insomuch that men began to shun it, and to prefer assignats for current expenditure. Such were the circumstances that temporarily re-established the equilibrium, which had never really existed for the paper, even at the first moment of its emission. Many of the communes, subjoining their own regulations to the laws of the convention, had even prohibited the circulation of specie, and directed that it should be brought to the public coffers in order to be changed into assignats. The convention had certainly annulled all such peculiar ordinances on the part of communes, but nevertheless the general statutes promulgated by itself continued to render coin useless and dangerous. Numerous individuals carried it to the loan and the tax-gatherer, or paid it away to foreigners, who prosecuted a considerable traffic therein, frequenting the frontier towns to receive it in barter for merchandise. The Italians, and especially the Genoese, who imported large quantities of grain into France, scoured the ports of the Mediterranean, and purchased gold and silver articles at singularly low prices. Specie, therefore, had re-appeared in consequence of these terrible laws, and the party of revolutionary zealots, apprehensive lest its interference might again prove prejudicial to the paper-money, held that bullion, which had not hitherto been excluded from the circulation, ought to be entirely interdicted; they demanded that its transmission should be forbidden, and that it should be obligatory on all who possessed any to appear at the public offices for the purpose of exchanging their store for assignats.

Terror had almost banished stockjobbing. Speculations in specie were, as we have already shown, effectually suppressed. Foreign paper, anathematised on all sides, no longer circulated as two months previously; and the bankers, accused by every mouth of being the agents of the emigrants and of being addicted to stockjobbing, were in the utmost consternation. For an interval, a seal had been set upon their establishments; but the fact soon becoming evident how dangerous it might be to interrupt all banking operations, and thereby check the circulation of capitals, the seals were taken off. Nevertheless, the terror was sufficiently great to stifle all tendency to any species of speculation.

The India Company had been at length abolished. We have seen that certain intrigues had prevailed amongst divers deputies with the view of realising profit on the shares of that company. The Baron de Batz, in concert with Julien of Toulouse, Delaunay of Angers, and Chabot, formed a scheme to depreciate the shares by threatening motions, and then to buy in; afterwards, by milder motions, to induce a reaction, then to sell out, and by the operation secure all the gain of this fraudulent enhancement. The Abbé d'Espagnac, whose interests Julien advocated in the committee of contracts, was to lend the funds for these speculations. These wretches succeeded, in fact, in driving the shares down from 4500 to 650 livres, and reaped considerable profits. However, it was impossible to avert the abrogation of the company, wherefore they applied themselves to negotiate with it so as to mitigate the terms of suppression. Delaunay and Julien of Toulouse discussed the subject with its directors, and said to them, "If you give us such a sum, we will present such a decree; if not, we will present another very different." They agreed upon a sum of 500,000 francs, in consideration whereof they were, when proposing the dissolution of the company, which was unavoidable, to obtain for it the boon of winding up its own affairs, a process whereby its duration might be indefinitely prolonged. The bribe was to be divided amongst Delaunay, Julien of Toulouse, Chabot, and Bazire, to whom his friend Chabot had imparted the secret of the scheme, but who refused to participate in its spoils. Delaunay presented the decree of suppression on the 17th Vendemiaire. He therein proposed to dissolve the company, oblige it to refund the sums it owed to the state, and especially to pay the duty on transfers, which it had contrived to evade by transforming its shares into inscriptions in books. He finally proposed to leave to itself the care of liquidating its affairs. Fabre-d'Eglantine, to whom the intrigue had not yet been communicated, and who, as it would seem, was speculating in the opposite direction, immediately raised his voice against the latter clause, alleging, that to permit the company to liquidate its affairs, was to perpetuate it, since, under such a pretext, it might remain indefinitely in activity. He therefore advised that the government should be invested with the charge of that liquidation. Cambon moved, as a sub-amendment, that the state should not, by undertaking the liquidation, be held responsible for debts, if the assets of the company were unequal to its liabilities. The decree and the two amendments were adopted, and then remitted to the committee to be definitively framed. Thereupon the members in the plot conceived it would be expedient to gain Fabre, in order to obtain, by means of the remit, some modifications in the decree. Chabot was deputed to Fabre with 100,000 francs, and succeeded in winning him over. The following manœuvre was then perpetrated: The decree was drawn up such as it had been passed by the convention, and given for signature to Cambon and the members of the committee who were not confederates in the scheme. To this authentic copy were afterwards added certain words which completely altered the sense. To the clause upon transfers which had escaped the duty, whereby they were intended to be made subject to it, these words were subjoined—"*except those fraudulently made;*" which proviso revived all the pretensions of the company touching exemption from the duty. Into the paragraph affecting the liquidation, an interpolation was introduced—"*according to the statutes and regulations of the company;*" which brought the company

forward in the management thereof. These insertions materially varied the purport of the decree. Chabot, Fabre, Delaunay, and Julien of Toulouse, subsequently affixed their names, and transmitted the falsified copy to the commission for publishing the laws, which caused it to be printed and promulgated as an authentic enactment. The confederates expected that the members who had signed before the alterations were introduced, would either forget or overlook the difference, and they complacently divided the sum of 500,000 francs. Bazire alone refused his share, stating that he would not partake the wages of turpitude.

Chabot, however, whose luxury began to attract censure, trembled at the consciousness of his guilt. He had hung the 100,000 francs, received for his participation, in a privy; and as his accomplices saw him ready to betray them, they threatened to be beforehand with him, and to reveal all if he abandoned them. Such was the issue of the shameful intrigue hatched between the Baron de Batz and three or four deputies. The universal terror pervading France, affecting the innocent as well as the culpable, extended to them, and they lived in constant dread of being discovered and punished.

Thus, for the moment at least, all speculative spirit was damped, and none were rash enough to think of entangling themselves in stockjobbing.

It was at this period, when no repugnance was felt at outraging all received ideas, all established habits, that the project of remodelling the system of weights and measures, and changing the calendar, was executed. The passion for regularity and contempt for obstacles were destined to signalise a revolution which partook so essentially both of the philosophical and political character. It had divided the territory into eighty-three equal portions; it had reduced to uniformity the civil, religious, and military administrations; it had annihilated all distinctions in the public debt; and it could not stop short in its career without regulating weights, measures, and the divisions of time. Doubtless that desire of uniformity, inflamed into the spirit of system, into fury even, too often provoked disregard for the necessary and pleasing varieties of nature: but it is only in such eras of zeal that the human mind grapples with and operates great and difficult reformations. The new system of weights and measures, one of the most admirable productions of the age, was the fruit of this bold spirit of innovation. The idea was acted upon of taking for unity in weight and for unity in measure natural and invariable quantities in all countries. Thus, distilled water was assumed as the unity of weight, and a part of the meridian as the unity of measure. These unities, multiplied or divided by ten, *ad infinitum*, formed that perfect system, known under the name of the *decimal calculus*.

Similar regularity was to be applied to the divisions of time; and the difficulty of subverting the habits of a nation on that point wherein they are most inveterate, failed to scare men so resolute as those who then presided over the destinies of France. They had already changed the Gregorian into the republican era, and fixed its date from the first year of liberty. They made the year and the new era commence on the 22d September 1792, a day which, by a fortunate conjuncture, was that of the institution of the republic and of the autumnal equinox. The year ought to have been divided into ten parts, in conformity with the decimal system; but taking as foundation for the division of months the twelve revolutions of the moon round the earth, it was necessary to admit twelve. In this instance nature rendered the infraction of the decimal system imperative. The month was of thirty days, divided into three portions of ten days, called *decades*, and equivalent to the four weeks. The tenth day of each decade was devoted to rest, supplying the place of the old Sunday. There was consequently a day of rest the less in the month. The Catholic religion had multiplied holidays to an inconvenient extent; the revolution, fostering labour, deemed it fitting to reduce them as much as possible. The months were called after the seasons to which they respectively belonged. The year commencing in autumn, the three first months belonged to that season: they were named—the first, *Vendemiaire*, the second, *Brumaire*, the third, *Frimaire*; the three next, occurring in winter, were designated *Nivose*, *Pluviose*, and *Ventose*; the three following, answering to spring, *Germinal*, *Floreal*, and *Prairial*; and the three last, comprehending summer, *Messidor*, *Thermidor*, and *Fructidor*. These twelve months, of thirty days each, only made three hundred and sixty days in all. There remained five days to complete the year; these were called *complementary*, and the egregious idea was entertained of setting them apart for national festivals, under the title of *sans-culottides*, an appellation judged essential in deference to the times, and one not at all more absurd than many others adopted by communities. The first was to be consecrated to *genius*; the second, to *labour*; the third, to *glorious actions*; the fourth, to *rewards*; and the fifth, to *opinion*. This last festival, perfectly original and excellently adapted to the French character, was intended as a species of political carnival for twenty-four hours, during which it should be allowable to say and write with impunity, concerning every public man, whatever imagination might suggest to the people or to writers. It was, as it were, opinion doing justice upon opinion itself, and imposing upon magistrates the necessity of shielding themselves by virtuous lives from the shafts both of truth and calumny on that day. Nothing could be grander, or in a moral sense more effective, than such an idea. We must not, because an overpowering destiny has swept away the opinions and institutions of that era, visit with ridicule its bold and vast conceptions. The Romans are not amenable to ridicule, because on days of triumph the soldier, placed behind the chariot of the triumphant general, had full license given to all his hatred or rude wit prompted. Every four years, the bissextile year giving six complementary days in lieu of five, that sixth *sans-culottide* was appointed to be held as the festival of the *revolution*, and to be set apart for a grand solemnity, in which the French should gather to celebrate the epoch of their enfranchisement and the institution of the republic.

The day was divided, according to the decimal system, into ten portions or hours, these into ten other subdivisions, and so further. New dials were ordered to bring this novel mode of calculating time into practical operation; nevertheless, in order to avoid forcing every thing at once, this latter reform was postponed for a year.

The last innovation, the most hazardous of all, and the most denounced as tyrannical, was that attempted with regard to public worship. The revolutionary laws relative to religion had remained almost exactly as the Constituent Assembly had made them. It will be recollected that that first assembly, with the view of reducing the ecclesiastical to the uniformity of the civil administration, determined that the boundaries of dioceses should be the same as those of the departments; that the bishop should be elected like all other functionaries; and, in short, without interfering with dogmas, that church discipline should be regulated, in like manner as had been every part of the political organisation. Such was the civil constitution of the clergy, to which ecclesiastics were obliged to swear obedience. From that moment, as the reader will remember, a schism arose; the priests who conformed to the new institution were called constitutional or juring, and they who rejected it, refractory priests. These latter were merely deprived of their functions and endowed with a pension. The Legislative Assembly, perceiving that they laboured diligently to poison opinion and array it against the new system, subjected

them to the supervision of the departmental authorities, and even issued a decree that upon a sentence from such authorities they might be banished from the territory of France. The convention, eventually more severe in proportion as their conduct became more seditious, condemned all refractory priests to exile. The excitement in the public mind augmenting every day, men began to ask why, when all the old monarchical superstitions were abolished, they should still retain a phantom of religion, in which scarcely any one even professed to believe, and which formed an unseemly contrast to the new institutions and the new manners of republican France. Previously, demands had been made for laws in favour of married priests, and for protecting them against certain local administrations, which attempted to degrade them from the ecclesiastical office. The convention, exhibiting a marked reserve on the subject, had abstained from passing any enactment regarding them, but by its mere silence it had authorised them to preserve their functions and revenues. Moreover, in certain petitions the convention was entreated to withdraw all further support from any sect, to leave each to remunerate its own ministers, to prohibit external ceremonies, and to oblige all religions to confine themselves within their temples. It contented itself with curtailing the income of bishops to the maximum of 6000 francs, seeing that the revenues of some amounted to 70,000. As to all the rest required from it, the convention would adopt no steps, observing a discreet silence, and leaving France itself to take the initiative in the abolition of religious observances. It was apprehensive, should it, the supreme power, interfere with creeds, that a portion of the population, still attached to the Catholic religion, might be rendered discontented. The commune of Paris, less scrupulous, seized the favourable opportunity for a signal overthrow of old ideas, and hastened to present the first public example of the abjuration of Catholicism.

Whilst the patriots of the convention and the Jacobin Club, Robespierre, Saint-Just, and the other revolutionary leaders, stopped short at deism, Chaumette, Hébert, and all the notables of the commune and the Cordelier Club, standing in a lower capacity both as to functions and to enlightenment, were sure, according to the ordinary law in all such cases, to overleap the boundary and rush into the darkness of atheism. They did not, indeed, openly profess such a doctrine, but it might be readily surmised in them: never in their discourses or their writings did they pronounce the name of God, and they perpetually repeated that a nation ought to be governed by reason alone, and admit no other worship than that of reason. Chaumette was not the villanous or ambitious character that Hébert might be justly described; he sought not, by inflaming to extravagance the predominant feelings, to supplant the actual chiefs of the revolution; but, devoid of political views, possessed by a vulgar philosophy, urged by an extraordinary craving for declamation, he preached, with the ardour and spiritual pride of a missionary, morals, labour, patriotic virtues, and reason, in fine, invariably abstaining from all mention of the Supreme Being. He had inveighed with vehemence against the popular pillages; he had sternly reprimanded the women who neglected the care of their households to take part in political contentions, and been courageous enough to shut up their club; he had promoted the abolition of mendicity, and the establishment of public workshops to provide the poor with adequate employment; he had raised his voice against female prostitution, and procured an ordinance of the commune disallowing the profession of common women, every where tolerated as an inevitable evil. Those wretched creatures were forbidden to show themselves in public, and even to exercise in the privacy of houses their deplorable calling. Chaumette maintained that they were incidental only to monarchical and Catholic countries, where lazy aristocrats and unmarried priests abounded, and that industry and marriage would ensure their disappearance from republics.

Chaumette, therefore, leading the way in advocacy of the system of reason, inveighed at the commune against the publicity of the Catholic worship. He maintained that it involved a privilege which no sect was entitled to enjoy more than another, and that if all religious persuasions possessed such a faculty, the streets and public places would shortly become the scenes of ridiculous exhibitions. The commune holding the local police, he moved it to enjoin, on the 23d Vendemiaire (14th October), that the ministers of no religion whatsoever should be allowed to celebrate rites without the walls of temples. He enforced also the institution of new ceremonies for rendering the last duties to the dead. The friends and relatives of the deceased were alone to follow the corpse. All religious symbols were obliterated in the cemeteries, and replaced by a statue of Sleep, according to the example furnished by Fouché in the department of the Allier. Instead of cypresses and other lugubrious vegetables, the cemeteries were planted with cheerful and odoriferous shrubs. "The beauty and perfume of flowers," said Chaumette, "ought to awaken agreeable recollections: I would, were it possible, that I could inhale the spirit of my father." All the external marks of worship were entirely abolished. It was moreover decided, in the same ordinance, and still on the requisition of Chaumette, that for the future no sales should be permitted on the streets of any kinds of jugglery, such as consecrated winding-sheets, handkerchiefs of Saint Veronica, Ecce-homos, crosses, Agnus-Dei's, virgins, corns and rings of Saint-Hubert, nor in like manner, of powders, medicinal waters, and other quack drugs. The image of the Virgin was every where thrown down, and all the Madonnas found in niches or at the corners of streets were replaced by busts of Marat and Lepelletier.

Anacharsis Clootz, that Prussian baron who, with an income of 100,000 livres, had abandoned his country for the capital of France, as the representative, so he said, of the human race; who had figured in the federation of 1790 at the head of the pretended envoys from all the nations of the earth; and who had been subsequently nominated a deputy to the National Convention—he, this Anacharsis Clootz, was incessantly heard extolling universal republicanism and the worship of reason. Full of these two ideas, he dilated upon them without intermission in his writings, and, sometimes in manifestos, sometimes in addresses, he recommended them to all populations. Deism appeared in his understanding equally culpable with Catholicism itself; he never ceased to propose the destruction of tyrants and of every species of divinity; and asserted that there ought to remain with enfranchised and enlightened humanity nought but pure reason, and its beneficent and immortal creed. He said to the convention:

"I have only been able to escape all sacred and profane tyrants by continual wayfaring: I was at Rome when they sought to incarcerate me at Paris, and I was at London when they were seeking to burn me at Lisbon. It was thus, by being tossed from one end of Europe to the other, that I escaped alguazils and spies, masters and slaves. My emigrations ceased when the emigration of miscreants commenced. In the capital of the globe, at Paris, was the post of the orator of the human race. I have not quitted it since 1789; it was then that I redoubled my zeal against the pretended sovereigns of heaven and earth. I openly preached that there was no other god but nature, no other monarch but the human race—the people-god. The people are every thing to themselves, they will never stoop. Nature bends not the knee before herself. Judge of the majesty of the free human race by that of the French people, who form of it but a fraction. Judge of the infallibility of all by the wisdom

of a portion, which, of itself alone, makes the enslaved world tremble. The surveillance committee of the universal republic will have less trouble than the committee of the smallest section in Paris. A general confidence will succeed universal distrust. In my republic there will be few officials, few imposts, and no executioner. Reason will unite all men in a single representative cluster, without other tie than epistolary correspondence. Citizens, religion is the only obstacle to this Utopia; the time is arrived for eradicating it. The human race has burnt its leading-strings. Nations only evince vigour, says one of the ancients, on the day succeeding a bad reign. Let us profit by this first day, which we will prolong until the morrow of the world's deliverance."

The motions of Chaumette reanimated all the hopes of Clootz: he hastened in quest of Gobel, a restless intriguer from Porentruy, who had become constitutional bishop of the department of Paris by that same rapid movement which had raised Chaumette, Hébert, and so many others to the highest municipal functions. He represented to him that the moment had arrived for abjuring, in the face of France, the Catholic faith, whereof he was the chief pontiff; that his example would sway all the ministers of religion, enlighten the nation, provoke a general abjuration, and compel the convention to pronounce the abolition of Christianity. Gobel declined to renounce his faith exactly, and thereby declare that he had been deceiving mankind all his life; but he consented to abdicate his episcopacy, and subsequently induced his vicars to follow the example. It was consequently agreed with Chaumette and the members of the departmental directory, that all the constituted authorities of Paris should accompany Gobel, and form part of the deputation, in order to give more solemnity to the act of renunciation.

On the 17th Brumaire (7th November 1793), Momoro, Pache, L'Huillier, Chaumette, Gobel and all his clergy, repaired to the convention. Chaumette and L'Huillier, both procurators, the one of the commune and the other of the department, announced that the clergy of Paris had come to render a signal and ingenuous homage to reason. They then introduced Gobel. He, bonneted with the red cap, and holding in his hand his mitre, crosier, cross, and ring, addressed the assembly. "Born a plebeian," said he, "an incumbent in Porentruy, sent by my brother clergy to the first assembly, and ultimately elevated to the archbishopric of Paris, I have never ceased to obey the people. I accepted the duties which the people formerly confided to me; and to-day I again obey them by attending to resign them. I became a bishop when the people wanted bishops; I cease to be one now when the people are tired of them." Gobel added that all his clergy, animated by the like sentiments, authorised him to make a similar declaration on their behalf. On concluding these words, he laid down his mitre, cross, and ring. His clergy testified their approbation. The president replied to him, with much address, that the convention had decreed the freedom of religion, which it had left unshackled to every sect, and that it had never interfered with articles of faith, but that it applauded men who, enlightened by reason, were moved to abjure their errors and superstitions.

Gobel had not renounced the priesthood and Catholicism, nor ventured to declare himself an impostor who had been eventually induced to avow his falsehood; but others stretched his declaration to that extent. "Redeemed," said the incumbent of Vaugirard, "from the prejudices which fanaticism had planted in my heart and in my mind, I cast down my letters of ordination." Divers bishops and priests, members of the convention, followed this example, and deposited their letters of ordination, or abjured Catholicism. Julien of Toulouse likewise shook off his gown as a Protestant minister. Vociferous plaudits from the assembly and the galleries greeted these renunciations. At this moment, Gregoire, Bishop of Blois, entered the convention. He was informed of what had passed, and many urged him to imitate the conduct of his colleagues. He refused with courage. "Is the question concerning the income attached to the office of bishop?" said he; "if so, I give it up without regret. Does it concern my quality as a priest and bishop? I cannot divest myself of it; my faith forbids me. I invoke the liberty of religion." The words of Gregoire were closed amidst tumult, but they scarcely checked the extravagant joy otherwise excited by the scene. The deputation quitted the assembly amidst an immense crowd, and proceeded to the town-hall, in order to receive the felicitations of the commune.

So flagrant an example once given, it was not difficult to instigate the sections of Paris and all the communes in the republic to imitate it. The sections speedily gathered, indeed, and appeared at the bar of the convention to declare, one after the other, that they renounced all the errors of superstition, and recognised for the future but one creed, that of reason. The section of L'Homme-Armé averred that it acknowledged no other creed than that of truth and reason, no other fanaticism than that of liberty and equality, no other dogma than that of fraternity and the republican laws decreed since the 31st May 1793. The section of La Réunion announced that it purposed to make a bonfire of all the confessionals and all the books used by Catholics, and to shut up the church of Saint-Méry. The section of William Tell renounced for ever the creed of error and falsehood, as it stated. The section of Mucius-Scævola abjured Catholicism, and intimated its intention the following decade, on the chief altar of Saint-Sulpice, to celebrate the inauguration of the busts of Marat, Lepelletier, and Mucius-Scævola. The section of Pikes would henceforth adore no other god than the god of liberty and equality. The section of the Arsenal likewise foreswore the Catholic faith.

Thus the sections, taking the initiative, abjured Catholicism as the public religion, and appropriated its edifices and property, as resolving into the communal domain. The deputies on mission in the departments had already induced a number of the communes to seize upon the moveables in the churches, which, they alleged, were not necessary to religion, and in truth belonged to the state as public property, and were legally available to its exigencies. Fouché had transmitted from the department of the Allier several boxes of plate, and similar spoils had arrived from divers other departments. The example was not lost on Paris and its environs; and the bar of the convention was speedily choked with the rich fruits of this new-born zeal. All the churches were stripped, and the various communes sent deputations with the gold and silver accumulated in the niches of saints, or in places consecrated by the piety of foregone ages. They repaired in processions to the convention, and the populace, indulging in their tendency to burlesque, parodied in most fantastic forms the rites of religion, and found as much pleasure in profaning as they had ever done in celebrating them. Men clothed in surplices, hoods, and copes, chanting hallelujahs and dancing the carmagnole, came to the bar of the convention, where they deposited glories, crucifixes, chalices, and statues of gold and silver, pronouncing burlesque orations, and often addressing to the saints themselves strange and ludicrous invocations. "Oh ye, instruments of fanaticism!" exclaimed a deputation from St Denis, "blessed saints of all kinds, be at length patriots; rise in a body, serve the country by proceeding to the mint to be melted, and promote our happiness in this world as you would fain do in the next." To such scenes of mirth succeeded upon some sudden impulse occurrences disposing, at that time, to respect and emotion. Those same personages who trod under foot the saints of Christianity, appeared

bearing a canopy; throwing open the curtains and showing the busts of Marat and Lepelletier, they said, "Behold, not gods made by men, but the images of respectable citizens, assassinated by the slaves of kings!" The processions subsequently defiled before the convention, still chanting the hallelujah and dancing the carmagnole, and marched to deposit the rich spoils of the altar at the mint, and the venerated busts of Marat and Lepelletier in the churches, now become the temples of a new faith.

At the instance of Chaumette, it was determined that the metropolitan cathedral of Notre-Dame should be converted into a republican edifice, to be called the *Temple of Reason*; and a festival was instituted for every tenth day, intended as a substitute for the Catholic ceremonies of the Sunday. The mayor, the municipal officers, and other public functionaries, repaired to the Temple of Reason, read aloud the Declaration of the Rights of Man, as also the Constitutional Act, communicated an analysis of the tidings from the armies, and recounted the important events that had occurred in the course of the decade. *A mouth of truth*, similar to the mouths of denunciation usual in Venice, was placed in the Temple of Reason, with the view of receiving *suggestions*, *reproaches*, or *opinions* useful to the commonwealth. These notes were collected every tenth day, and read aloud for public edification; an orator delivered a moral discourse, after which pieces of music were executed, and the whole concluded by the congregation singing republican hymns. In the temple two galleries were reserved, the one for old men, the other for pregnant women, decorated with these words—"Reverence for age—Respect and attention to pregnant women."

The first festival of Reason was celebrated with pomp on the 20th Brumaire (November 10). All the sections attended it in conjunction with the constituted authorities. A young woman personated the goddess of Reason; she was the wife of the printer Momoro, one of the friends of Vincent, Ronsin, Chaumette, Hébert, and similar personages. She was clad in white drapery, a sky blue mantle hung over her shoulders, and her luxuriant hair was crowned with the cap of liberty. She was seated on an antique chair adorned with ivy, and borne by four citizens. Young girls, dressed in white and crowned with roses, preceded and followed the goddess. Then came the busts of Marat and Lepelletier, musicians, troops, and all the armed sections. Speeches were delivered and hymns chanted in the Temple of Reason, and the procession moved on to the convention, which assembly Chaumette addressed in these words:—

"Legislators—fanaticism has given place to reason. Its craven eyes have been unable to bear the lustre of light. To-day an immense concourse has been gathered under those Gothic arches, which for the first time have served as the echo of truth. There the French have celebrated the only true worship—that of liberty and reason. There we have offered vows for the success of the republican arms. There, in fine, we have abandoned inanimate idols for reason—for this animated image, the masterpiece of nature." As he uttered these words, Chaumette pointed to the living goddess of Reason. The young and beautiful female who represented it descended from her seat, and advanced to the president, who gave her the fraternal embrace amidst universal bravos, and shouts of "The republic for ever!" "Reason for ever!" "Down with fanaticism!" The convention, which had hitherto abstained from directly countenancing these performances, was hurried away and obliged to follow the procession, which again returned to the Temple of Reason, and sang within it a solemn patriotic anthem. Important intelligence, avouching the recapture of Noirmoutiers from Charette, augmented the general rapture, and supplied a more substantial motive for it than the downfal of fanaticism.

All reflect, doubtless, with disgust upon such scenes, devoid of true emotion, hollow and spurious, wherein a populace changed its creed without comprehending either the old or the new. But when is the populace sincere? When is it capable of understanding the dogmas that are given it to believe? What are its cravings ordinarily? Large assemblages which gratify its passion for congregating; symbolical spectacles whereby it is continually impressed with the idea of a power superior to its own; and festivals in which homage is rendered to men who have the nearest approached to the good, the glorious, the grand—in a word, temples, ceremonies, and saints. Here, then, were temples, Reason, Marat, and Lepelletier. It had assembled, adored a mysterious power, and celebrated the memory of two men. All its longings, therefore, were satisfied, and it only gave way to that wherewith it is swayed at all periods.

If we calmly contemplate the condition of France at this epoch, we cannot but remark that never was constraint exercised with such crushing weight as at present upon that inert and patient part of the population, whereon all political experiments are tried. Men no longer ventured to hazard an opinion; they feared to see even their friends and relatives, lest they might be compromised with them, and lose liberty if not life itself. One hundred thousand arrests, and a few hundreds of condemnations, rendered always present to the imaginations of twenty-five millions of Frenchmen the jail and the guillotine. The general taxes exigible were felt oppressive; but if an individual chanced, according to a purely arbitrary classification, to be inscribed in the list of *rich*, he lost for that year a material portion of his income. Sometimes, upon the requisition of a representative or of any agent whatsoever, he was bound to surrender his harvest, or his most precious moveables in gold and silver, as the case might be. None presumed to affect any degree of luxury, or to indulge in outward pleasures. Specie laboured under a ban, and might not be safely used; it was necessary to accept or disburse a depreciated paper, wherewith it was difficult to procure such articles as were needful. The merchant felt himself coerced to sell at a ruinous price; the consumer had to content himself with the worst of commodities, since the really good fled markets possessed by the maximum and assignats; sometimes, indeed, he was fain to dispense with any at all, for at times both good and bad were equally withdrawn. By both rich and poor was obtainable only one species of brown bread, to be struggled for at the doors of the bakers after a dreary expectancy of several hours. The designations of weights and measures, the names of months and days, were changed; only three Sundays instead of four were permitted in the lunar revolution; and, in fine, women and old men suddenly found themselves deprived of those religious ceremonies which they had been accustomed to attend all their lives.

Never, then, in the history of the world, did power more violently assail all the cherished habits of a nation. Menacing all existences, decimating fortunes, regulating coercively the course of exchanges, altering the appellations of familiar objects, abrogating the offices of religion, it was without contradiction the most atrocious of tyrannies; but we are bound to consider the danger of the state, the inevitable hazards of trade, and the spirit of system inseparable from the spirit of innovation.

CHAPTER XXIX.

RETURN OF DANTON.—DIVISIONS IN THE PARTY OF THE MOUNTAIN.—ABOLITION OF THE WORSHIP OF REASON.—FINAL CONSOLIDATION OF THE REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT.—ARREST OF RONSIN, VINCENT, AND FOREIGN EMISSARIES.

Since the fall of the Girondists, the Mountaineer party, remaining alone and victorious, had begun to

break into factions. The constantly growing excesses of the revolution produced a more decided division, which was on the verge of resolving into a complete rupture. Several deputies had been painfully affected at the unworthy fate of the Girondists, of Bailly, of Brunet, of Houchard; others blamed the violences perpetrated with respect to religion, judging them most impolitic and dangerous. These maintained that new superstitions would inevitably succeed those so frantically decried; that the pretended creed of reason was no other than that of atheism; that atheism could not consist with any nation; and that such extravagances must be instigated by foreign gold. On the other hand, the party predominant at the Cordelier Club and the commune, which boasted Hébert as its literary champion, Ronsin and Vincent as its leaders, Chaumette and Clootz as its apostles, upheld that its adversaries were intent on resuscitating a moderate faction, and provoking fresh discords in the republic.

Danton had returned from his retreat. He avoided declaring his opinion; but a party-leader would in vain strive to conceal it; it was whispered from ear to ear, and soon became obvious to all comprehensions. It was notorious that he had desired to avert the execution of the Girondists, and that he had been deeply moved at their tragical end; it was known that, though the partisan and inventor of revolutionary means, he began to censure their blind and ferocious employment; that the system of violence seemed to him unnecessarily prolonged after the cessation of danger; and that at the conclusion of the present campaign, and upon the entire expulsion of the foreign foe, he was solicitous to see restored the reign of mild and equitable laws. None were as yet bold enough to attack him in the tribune of the clubs; even Hébert presumed not to assail him in his sheet "Père Duchêne;" but by word of mouth the most insidious reports were circulated: suspicions were hinted as to his probity; the exactions in Belgium were recalled with most industrious perfidy, and partly charged upon him; during his retreat at Arcis-sur-Aube, indeed, malicious rumour had averred the fact of his emigration with hoards of wealth. With him were associated, as equally reprehensible, Camille-Desmoulins, his friend, who had partaken his commiseration for the Girondists and defended Dillon; and Philippeaux, who had returned from La Vendée furious against disorganisers, and intent on denouncing Ronsin and Rossignol. Moreover, in his party were classed all those who, in any manner, had discountenanced the revolutionary zealots, whereof the number was beginning to grow somewhat considerable.

Julien of Toulouse, previously regarded with jealousy in consequence of his connexion with D'Espagnac and the contractors, had completely compromised himself by a report on the federalist administrations, in which he laboured to extenuate the faults of the great majority. He had no sooner presented it than the Jacobins and Cordeliers in multitudinous deputations obliged him to withdraw it. They instituted an inquiry into his private life upon the occasion, when the fact transpired that he passed his time with stockjobbers, and that he maintained as his mistress an abandoned countess; whereupon they denounced him as thoroughly corrupt, and as an undisguised moderate. Fabre-d'Eglantine, too, was observed to have suddenly altered his mode of life, and to display a luxury altogether unwonted in him heretofore. Chabot, the well-known capuchin, who, when first mingling in the revolution, possessed nothing beyond his ecclesiastical pittance, likewise surprised the community by ostentatious decorations in his mansion, and by espousing the sister of the two Freys with a portion of 200,000 livres. So startling a change of circumstances suggested doubts touching the honesty of the newly enriched; and in a short time a proposition they submitted to the convention effectually sealed their ruin. A deputy, Osselin, had been recently arrested for harbouring an emigrant, as it was alleged. Fabre, Chabot, Julien, and Delaunay, who were not at ease as to themselves—Bazire and Thuriot, who had no cause for self-reproach, but who saw with alarm that all respect for members of the convention was cast aside—proposed a decree enacting that no deputy could be arrested without being preliminarily heard at the bar. This decree was adopted, but all the clubs and the Jacobins reclaimed with fury, maintaining it was a covert scheme to re-establish the *inviolability*. They caused it to be rescinded, and forthwith commenced a severe scrutiny touching those who had introduced it, both as to their course of life and the origin of their rapid fortunes. Julien, Fabre, Chabot, Delaunay, Bazire, and Thuriot, stripped of all popularity within the briefest interval, were ranked in the party of "equivocals and moderates." Hébert exhausted the vocabulary of abuse on their heads in his journal, and recommended them to the execrations of the populace.

Four or five other personages fell under the same anathema, although hitherto reputed exemplary patriots. These were Proli, Pereyra, Gusman, Dubuisson, and Desfieux. Almost all denizens of a foreign soil, they had been moved, like the two Freys and Clootz, to cast themselves into the French revolution by enthusiasm, and probably likewise by the expectation of acquiring wealth. So long as they worked diligently in the onward cause of the revolution, the question of who they were was never started. Proli, who belonged to Brussels, had been sent with Pereyra and Desfieux to the camp of Dumouriez, in order to sound his intentions. They succeeded in drawing from him an explanation; and returned, as we have previously recounted, to denounce him to the convention and the Jacobin Club. So far all was well; but they had been subsequently employed by Lebrun, because, being foreigners and well-informed men, they were able to render essential services in the department of foreign affairs. By communication with Lebrun, they learned to estimate his qualities, and at a later period they warmly defended him. Proli had enjoyed opportunities of appreciating Dumouriez, and notwithstanding the defection of that commander, he had persisted in extolling his talents, and in maintaining that he might have been preserved to the republic. Furthermore, nearly all of them, possessing superior knowledge as to the dispositions of other countries, had blamed the application of the Jacobin system to Belgium and other provinces united to France. Their words were treasured for the evil day; and when a general distrust evoked a belief in the secret intervention of an alien faction, men began to suspect them and to quote their past declarations. It was known that Proli was the natural son of Kaunitz, and he was surmised to be the leading plotter, the whole of them being at once set down as spies of Pitt and Cobourg. The popular wrath speedily wore a more threatening aspect; and the very exaggeration of their patriotic pretensions, which they deemed calculated to establish their justification, only served to compromise them the more. They were universally classed with the equivocals and moderates.

Thus it came to pass, that when Danton or his friends hazarded an observation on the faults of the ministerial agents, or on the violences exhibited towards the cause of religion, the Hébert, Vincent, and Ronsin party retorted by vociferations against moderation, corruption, and foreign factions. According to custom, the moderates threw back the accusation on their adversaries, saying to them—"It is you who are the accomplices of these foreigners: every thing avouches your confederacy—the common violence of your language, and the manifest design of uprooting all social order by driving things to the worst. Behold," continued they, "that commune arrogating a legislative authority, and enacting laws under the specious title of resolutions; extending its regulations to all matters,

police, trade, religion; substituting, of its own motion, one creed for another; replacing the old by new superstitions; openly preaching atheism; and enforcing its example on all the municipalities in the republic. Behold those offices of the war department, whence emerge a multitude of agents who infest the provinces, upholding rivalry with the representatives, committing deplorable excesses, and shaming the revolution by their conduct. We say, look at that commune and those offices: what are their designs, if not to usurp both legislative and executive authority, to neutralise the convention and its committees, and to dissolve the government? And who can urge them to such an aim but the foreigner?"

Amidst these agitations and quarrels, the supreme authority was preparing to assume a stern course of action. Robespierre held, with all the committee, that such mutual accusations were extremely dangerous. His policy, as we have already intimated, had, since the 31st May, consisted in preventing a fresh revolutionary outbreak, in rallying opinion around the convention, and the convention itself around the committee of public welfare, so as to concentrate a strong governing power; and for these his purposes he had used the Jacobins, then all-powerful over opinion. The imputations cast upon well-accredited patriots, such as Danton and Camille-Desmoulins, seemed to him pregnant with hazard. He began to fear that no reputation might withstand the assaults of frenzied agitators; he was apprehensive, too, that the violences with regard to religion might indispose a part of France, and cause the revolution to be identified with atheism; and, lastly, in all this confusion he thought he detected the hand of the foreigner. In this mood, he failed not to seize the opportunity, which Hébert soon afforded him, of explaining his sentiments at the Jacobin Club.

The views of Robespierre had partly transpired. A rumour was secretly propagated that he intended to direct the stream of obloquy against Pache, Hébert, Chaumette, and Clootz, the authors of the movement against religion. Proli, Desfieux, and Pereyra, already compromised and threatened, determined to unite their cause with that of Pache, Chaumette, and Hébert; with which intention they visited the latter, and pointed out to them that since a conspiracy was formed against the best patriots, and all were equally in danger, it behoved them to support and vindicate each other. Hébert forthwith repaired to the Jacobin Club, the 1st Frimaire (21st November), and complained of a plan in agitation tending to divide the patriots. "On all sides," said he, "I meet persons who congratulate me on not being arrested. It is reported that Robespierre has resolved to denounce me—me, Chaumette, and Pache. As to me, who daily put myself forward in the cause of the country, and who utter every thing that comes into my head, the rumour may have some foundation; but Pache!—I know all the regard Robespierre has for him, and I cast any such idea far from me. It has been likewise stated that Danton had emigrated, that he had gone into Switzerland loaded with the spoils of the people. I met him this morning at the Tuileries; and since he is in Paris, he ought to come and fraternally explain himself to the Jacobins. All patriots are bound to repudiate injurious statements circulated respecting them." Hébert subsequently asserted that he derived a portion of this information from Dubuisson, who had offered to unfold to him a conspiracy hatching against the patriots; and, adhering to the usage of throwing all odium on the vanquished, he added that the cause of the troubles lay in the accomplices of Brissot who were still alive, and in the Bourbons remaining at the Temple.

Robespierre succeeded him at the tribune. "Is it true," said he, "that our most dangerous enemies are the impure remnants of our tyrants' race? I pray with all my heart for the disappearance of the race of tyrants from the earth, but can I be blind to the situation of my country, disposed to believe that such an event would suffice to extinguish the flames of those conspiracies now distracting us? Who will be persuaded that the punishment of Capet's contemptible sister would have a more imposing effect on our enemies than that of Capet himself and his guilty consort?

Is it, moreover, true that the cause of our calamities is fanaticism? Fanaticism! it is expiring—I may even say that it is dead. When directing all our attention for many days in opposing it, have you not diverted our vigilance from the real sources of danger? You are afraid of priests, and they are all alacrity to throw aside their calling, so that they may exchange it for the prerogatives of municipal officers, administrators, and even of presidents of popular societies. They were formerly much attached to the pastoral office, when it produced them 70,000 livres a-year; but they have abjured it when it is not worth more than 6000. Ay, dread not their fanaticism, but their ambition—not the habit which they wore, but the new skin which they have assumed. Dismiss your apprehensions as to the old superstition, but beware the new and corrupt superstition which is insidiously affected to promote our ruin!"

Then Robespierre, entering upon the subject of religion in the frankest mood, added:

"When citizens, animated by a pure zeal, come to deposit on the altar of the country the useless and ostentatious monuments of superstition, in order that they may be made serviceable to the triumphs of liberty, the country and reason approve such offerings; but by what right have aristocracy and hypocrisy ventured to mingle their baneful influence with that of civism? By what right have men, unknown to this day in the career of the revolution, come forward, amidst all these events, studying the means of usurping a false popularity, drawing patriots themselves into wayward measures, and exciting amongst us trouble and discord? By what right do they appear to challenge the liberty of religious faith in the name of liberty, and assail fanaticism by a new and worse fanaticism? By what right have they caused the solemn homage paid to pure truth to degenerate into a revolting and contemptible farce?

Many have supposed that the convention, by welcoming certain civic offerings, had actually proscribed the Catholic worship. No; the convention has not adopted that step, and never will. Its intention is to maintain the liberty in matters of conscience it has long ago proclaimed, and at the same time to keep all those in check who would abuse that liberty to disturb public order. It will not permit the peaceable ministers of the different persuasions to be persecuted; and it will also punish them with severity whensoever they shall dare to turn their functions into means of public delusion, and to instigate prejudices or royalism against the republic.

There are men who would go much farther; who, under pretext of eradicating superstition, would make a species of religion out of atheism itself. Every philosopher, every individual, can adopt such opinion upon the subject as he pleases; whoever should attempt to charge it upon him as a crime, must be a fool; but the public man, the legislator, would be a tenfold greater fool who should adopt such a system. The National Convention abhors it. The convention is not a fabricator of books or systems. It is a political and popular body. Atheism is *aristocratic*. The idea of a great being, who watches over oppressed innocence and punishes triumphant crime, is truly popular. The people, the unfortunate, will applaud me; if I find censors, it will be amongst the rich and the criminal. I have been, from boyhood, but an indifferent Catholic; I have never been a cold friend or a faithless defender of humanity. I am only the more attached to those moral and political ideas I have but now propounded to you. *If God did not exist, it would be fitting to invent him.*"

Robespierre, after delivering this profession of faith, imputed to foreign intrigues the persecutions instituted against religion, and the calumnies propagated against undoubted patriots. Being of a singularly distrustful character, as his belief that the Girondists were royalists well avouches, he put implicit credit in the existence of a foreign faction, which, as we have previously explained, was only represented by a few spies distributed amongst the armies, and by certain bankers, the upholders of stockjobbing and the correspondents of emigrants. "The foreigner," said he, "has two sorts of armies: the one on our frontiers is powerless and on the verge of ruin, thanks to our victories; the other, more dangerous, is in the midst of us. It is an army of spies, of suborned knaves, who creep in every where, even into the bosom of our popular societies. It is this faction which persuaded Hébert that I designed to provoke the arrest of Pache, Chaumette, Hébert, the whole commune, in short. I assail Pache!—I, who have always admired and vindicated his manly and modest virtue, and have fought for him against Brissot and his accomplices!"

Robespierre praised Pache, and was silent as to Hébert. He contented himself with saying that he had not forgotten the services of the commune during the days liberty was in peril. Subsequently venting his wrath upon what he styled the foreign faction, he turned the rage of the Jacobins against Proli, Dubuisson, Pereyra, and Desfieux. He recapitulated their history, and pourtrayed them as agents of Lebrun and the foreigner, commissioned to envenom animosities, to sow discord amongst the patriots, and to stimulate them into actual conflict. From the terms in which he expressed himself, it was obvious that the hatred he harboured against the former friends of Lebrun entered largely into the elements of his distrustful aversion. In conclusion, he prevailed to have all four expelled the society, amidst vociferous plaudits; and he proposed, moreover, a purifying scrutiny applicable to all the Jacobins.

Thus did Robespierre strike with his anathema the new worship, reading a severe lesson to all froward intermeddlers; not only avoiding to praise Hébert, but intimating significantly his dissatisfaction with the vile editor; and directing the whole storm against certain foreigners who were unfortunate enough to have been friends of Lebrun, to have admired Dumouriez, and to have censured the political system adopted in conquered countries. Furthermore, he had secured to himself the recomposition of the entire society, by the resolution he had procured enjoining a purifying scrutiny.

During the following days Robespierre followed up his system: he appeared in the Jacobin tribune to read both anonymous and intercepted letters, proving that the foreigner, if he were not the actual author of the extravagances attending the new creed, and of the calumnies affecting the best patriots, at all events approved of and rejoiced at them. Danton had in some sort been challenged by Hébert to exculpate himself. He had refrained from doing so immediately, lest he might seem to obey a summons; but a fortnight afterwards he seized a favourable occasion to present himself. The question under discussion was the expediency of supplying the popular societies with localities at the expense of the state. On that subject he proffered various observations; and in the course of his speech took the opportunity of declaring, that if the constitution were intended to slumber whilst the people were smiting and intimidating their enemies by revolutionary operations, still those ought to be viewed with distrust who laboured to excite the people beyond the limits of the revolution. Coupé, deputy from the Oise, replied to Danton, and perverted his sentiments whilst professing to combat them. Danton immediately returned to the tribune, and was met with murmurs. He thereupon invited all who had grounds of suspicion against him to assign their charges, in order that he might publicly rebut them. He complained of the disapprobation manifested at his presence. "Have I then lost those traits which characterise the aspect of a free man?" he exclaimed; and as he uttered those words, he elevated the countenance that had been so often seen, so often encountered in the storms of the revolution, and which had always animated the courage of republicans and spread terror amongst aristocrats. "Am I no longer," he added, "that same man who was found at your side in all the moments of critical emergency? Am I no longer that man, so persecuted and so well known to you all; that man whom you have so often embraced as your friend, and with whom you have taken the oath to perish in the same hazards?" He then called to recollection that he had been the defender of Marat, and was thus obliged to cover himself with the shade of that being whom he had formerly protected and despised. "You will be astonished," said he, "when I unfold to you my private conduct, to find that the colossal fortune which my enemies and yours attribute to me, is comprised in the small amount of property I have always possessed. I defy the most malevolent to adduce any proof against me. All their efforts will not avail to stagger me. I will stand upright in the face of the people: you shall judge me in their presence. I am not more disposed to tear out the page of my history than you are of your own." In conclusion, Danton demanded a committee to examine the accusations objected against him.

Robespierre ascended the tribune with unwonted eagerness. "Danton," he exclaimed, "asks from you a committee to investigate his conduct: I consent to its appointment, if he thinks such a measure will be beneficial to him. He desires that the complaints harboured against him may be particularised: so be it, I will undertake the task. Danton, thou art accused of having emigrated. It has been stated that thou hadst passed into Switzerland; that thy illness was feigned to conceal thy flight from the people; that thy ambition was to be regent under Louis XVII.; that at a determinate period, all was prepared for proclaiming that shoot of the Capets; that thou wert the leader of the conspiracy; that not Pitt, or Cobourg, England, Austria, or Prussia, were our real foes, but thou alone; that the Mountain was composed of thy accomplices; that it was futile to devote attention to the agents employed by foreign powers; that their plots were fables worthy of contempt only; in a word, that it behoved us to slaughter thee, and thee alone!" —Universal applause drowned the voice of Robespierre. He resumed: "Art thou not aware, Danton, that the more a man is distinguished for courage and patriotism, the more strenuously do the enemies of the public weal strive to effect his ruin? Art thou not aware, and are you not all aware, citizens, that this result is inevitable? Ah! if the champion of liberty were not calumniated, it would be a proof that we had no more nobles or priests to combat!" Then alluding to the publications of Hébert, in which he, Robespierre, was highly extolled, he added—"The enemies of the country seem to select me exclusively for their praises. But I repudiate them. Is it imagined that, alongside the eulogies repeated in certain prints, I do not discern the knife with which their authors would willingly dispatch the country? The cause of patriots is like that of tyrants; they are equally exposed. I am deceived, perhaps, respecting Danton; but, with regard to his domestic affairs, he merits full approbation. In political matters I have observed him; a difference of opinion induced me to study him with attention, frequently with anger; he was not sufficiently prompt, I allow, in suspecting Dumouriez; he did not sufficiently hate Brissot and his accomplices; but if he has not always been of my opinion, shall I thence conclude that he betrayed the country? No; I have constantly seen him serve it with zeal. Danton desires that he may be put upon his trial: he

is right. Let me be put upon my trial also. Let those men come forward who are greater patriots than we! I'll wager they are nobles or priests. You will find a marquis amongst them, and will hence learn the just measure of patriotism in the persons who accuse us."

Robespierre concluded by moving that all who had any reproach to urge against Danton should then be heard. None ventured to appear. Momoro himself, one of Hébert's friends, was the first to exclaim that the fact of no person presenting himself was a proof that nothing could be alleged against Danton. A member thereupon proposed that the president should give him the fraternal embrace. The general approval was manifested, and Danton being led to the table, there received the brotherly salute amidst tumultuous cheers.

The conduct of Robespierre upon this occasion was generous and dexterous. The common danger to all tried patriots, the signal ingratitude towards such services as Danton's, in fine, an undisputed superiority, had disarmed Robespierre of his habitual egotism, and, for once actuated by amiable sentiments, he had spoken with more true eloquence than seemed consistent with his nature. But the service he rendered Danton was more advantageous to the cause of the existing government and the old patriots who composed it than to Danton himself, whose popularity was lost for ever. Enthusiasm is not easily rekindled when suffered to expire, and it could scarcely happen that such great public dangers should occur as to give Danton an opportunity, by the display of his undaunted courage, of regaining his influence.

Robespierre, intent upon his purpose, never omitted being present at each sitting of the Jacobins devoted to the process of purification. The name of Clootz being paused upon, he was accused of a connexion with the foreign bankers, Vandenivers. He endeavoured to justify himself, but Robespierre arose and claimed attention. He recalled the alliance of Clootz with the Girondists, and his rupture with them, in consequence of a pamphlet entitled, "Neither Roland nor Marat," a production wherein he attacked the Mountain equally with the Gironde; he spoke of his extravagant doctrines, his obstinacy in descanting upon an universal republic, in stimulating a rage for conquests, and in compromising France towards all Europe. "And how can M. Clootz be so warmly interested in the welfare of France," added Robespierre, "when he is so strongly affected for the prosperity of Persia and Mesopotamia? There is a late catastrophe of which he is probably very proud. I refer to the movement against religion, a movement which, if conducted with prudence and caution, might have conduced to excellent results, but the violence which marked it was calculated to produce most serious mischief. M. Clootz had a nocturnal conference with Bishop Gobel. Gobel passed his word for the following day, and sure enough he came, with a sudden alteration of language and garb, to deposit his letters of ordination. M. Clootz believed we were the dupes of such buffoonery. No, no; the Jacobins will never regard as a friend of the people this pretended sans-culottes, who is a Prussian and a baron, who possesses 100,000 livres a-year, who dines with conspiring bankers, and who is, in short, not the orator of the French people, but of the human race."

Clootz was, without further deliberation, erased from the list of the society; and, at the instance of Robespierre, it was determined to expel without distinction all nobles, priests, bankers, and foreigners.

At the subsequent sitting came the turn of Camille-Desmoulins. He was reproached with his letter to Dillon, and with symptoms of sensibility exhibited towards the Girondists. "I had judged Dillon brave and skilful," said Camille in vindication, "and I accordingly defended him. As to the Girondists, I was in a peculiar position with regard to them. I have always loved and served the republic, but I have been often deceived respecting those who promoted it. I adored Mirabeau, I cherished Barnave and the Lameths; I confess it; but I sacrificed my friendship and my admiration as soon as I knew they had ceased to be Jacobins. A singular fatality has so willed it, that out of sixty revolutionists who signed my marriage-contract, there remain to me but two friends, Danton and Robespierre. All the others are emigrants or guillotined. In that number were seven of the twenty-two. A movement of sensibility, therefore, was very pardonable on that occasion. I have stated," added Desmoulins, "that they died republicans, but federalist republicans; for, I assure you, I do not think there were many royalists amongst them."

The easy disposition, the lively and original wit of Camille-Desmoulins, rendered him a general favourite. "Camille has chosen his friends badly," remarked a Jacobin; "let us show him we know how to choose ours better by admitting him without scruple." Robespierre, still the protector of his old colleagues, but careful always to observe a tone of superiority, defended Camille-Desmoulins. "He is weak and confiding," said he, "but he has always been a republican. He admired Mirabeau, Lameth, and Dillon; but he himself broke his idols whenever he was undeceived. Let him pursue his career, and be more cautious for the future." After these opinions, Camille was retained amidst great applause. Danton was subsequently admitted without observation. Fabre-d'Eglantine also successfully passed through the ordeal, though not without undergoing interrogation respecting his fortune, which was considerately attributed to his literary talents. This purification was continuously prosecuted, and occupied a considerable interval. Commenced in November 1793, it endured through several months.

The views of Robespierre and the government were now well known. The energy with which those views had been manifested intimidated the agitators, promoters of the new worship, and they bethought themselves how to retract and neutralise their indiscreet proceedings. Chaumette, who had all the ready pertness of a club or communal orator, but was entirely devoid of the ambition or courage befitting a party leader, never contemplated entering upon a rivalry with the convention, or constituting himself the founder of a new creed; wherefore he hastened to seize an occasion to amend his error. He determined to recommend a supplementary interpretation to the ordinance closing all places of worship, and accordingly moved the commune to declare that it had no intention of curtailing religious liberty, or of interdicting the followers of each persuasion from the privilege of assembling in buildings rented and supported at their own charges. "Let no one pretend," said he, "that it is weakness or policy which induces me to act thus; I am incapable of being moved by either the one or the other. It is the conviction that our enemies will abuse our zeal so as to push it beyond legitimate bounds, and provoke us into mischievous measures. It is the conviction that, if we prevent the Catholics from exercising their worship publicly and with the sanction of the law, bilious beings will hide in caverns to foster fanaticism or to conspire; and it is this conviction which alone inspires me and urges me to speak."

The resolution proposed by Chaumette, after obtaining the strenuous support of the mayor Pache, was ultimately adopted, not without dissonant murmurs however, quickly stifled in hearty acclamations. On its part, also, the convention declared that it had never purposed in its decrees to oppress religious liberty; and it strictly prohibited the removal of such plate as still remained in the churches, since the exchequer no longer stood in so pressing need of that description of aid. Henceforth, therefore, the indecent frivolities in which the populace had unwittingly indulged ceased in Paris, and the ceremonies appointed for the worship

of Reason, which had afforded so much spurious diversion, were abolished.

The committee of public welfare, amidst this bewildering confusion, became every day more firmly convinced of the necessity that existed for rendering authority stronger and prompter, and for ensuring it more implicit obedience. The experience of the obstacles it had to encounter, gave it daily a greater insight into the deficiencies of the government, and it added fresh parts to the revolutionary machine contrived for the duration of the war. It had already prevented the transfer of power into new and inexperienced hands, by prolonging the convention and declaring the government revolutionary until peace. At the same time, it had concentrated that power in itself by bringing under its control the revolutionary tribunal, the police, the military operations, and even the distribution of articles of consumption. Two months' experience enabled it to estimate the impediments which local authorities, either from excess or defect of zeal, opposed to the action of the supreme authority. The transmission of decrees was frequently interrupted or delayed, and their promulgation altogether neglected in certain departments. Several of those federalist administrations which had rebelled were yet extant, nor was the faculty of concert absolutely debarred them. And if, on the one hand, the departmental administrations offered some danger of federalism, the communes, on the other hand, acting in a directly opposite spirit, exercised, in imitation of the Parisian commune, a vexatious sway, enacting laws and imposing taxes, whilst the revolutionary committees of sections exerted arbitrary and inquisitorial powers against persons. Revolutionary armies, formed in different localities, completed those petty distinct governments, tyrannical to the last degree, disunited amongst themselves, and highly embarrassing to the superior government. Moreover, the authority of the representatives on missions, entering into the general rivalry, aggravated the confusion as to prerogatives; for the representatives levied imposts and published penal laws like the communes and the convention itself.

Billaud-Varennes, in a badly expressed but very able report, unfolded these inconveniences, and introduced the decree of the 14th Frimaire, year 2 (4th December 1793), which, being adopted, may serve as a model for all provisional, energetic, and absolute governments. "Anarchy," said the reporter, "menaces republics in their infancy and their decay. Let us strive to avert it." The decree instituted the *Bulletin of Laws*, a new and admirable invention, of which no idea had been previously entertained. Hitherto the laws, sent by the assembly to the ministers, and by the ministers to the local authorities, without any specified periods for so doing, and without any records authenticating their transmission or receipt, were frequently passed for lengthened intervals before they were promulgated or known. According to the new decree, a committee, a press, and a particular paper, were exclusively assigned for the publication and dispatch of laws. The committee, formed of four individuals, independent of all control and relieved from every other duty, received the law, caused it to be printed, and then transmitted it by the post within fixed and invariable periods. The dispatch and the receipt were verified by the convenient agency of the post-office; and the operations being thus regulated, became sure and effective. The convention was subsequently declared *the centre of impulse to the government.* Under these words was concealed the sovereignty of the committees, which transacted all affairs for the convention. The departmental authorities were in some sort abolished: they were shorn of all political attributes, and were left, like the department of Paris at the crisis of the 10th August, with no functions beyond the assessment of contributions, the repair of roads, and other purely economical matters. Thus, those too powerful interveners between the people and the supreme authority were suppressed. The district and communal administrations were alone suffered to exist with their prerogatives unimpaired; every local administration, at the same time, was prohibited from coalescing with others, from removing its seat, from sending out agents, from passing resolutions extending or limiting the scope of decrees, and from levying men or taxes. All the revolutionary armies established in the departments were disbanded, and none was allowed to subsist but the revolutionary army enrolled at Paris, as sufficient for the service of the whole republic. The revolutionary committees were enjoined to correspond with the district authorities set in superintendence over them, and with the committee of general safety. Those of Paris were debarred from communicating with the commune, or any other body than the committee of general safety. Lastly, the representatives were forbidden to levy taxes unless authorised by the convention, and also to publish penal laws.

Thus all the authorities were restricted to their proper spheres, and their conflict or coalition became impossible. They received the laws by an assured routine, and they could neither modify them nor defer their execution. The two committees were fortified in their supremacy. That of public welfare, besides its predominance over the committee of general safety, continued to engross diplomacy and war, and to exercise a sovereign superintendence over all things. Henceforth it alone was entitled to assume the designation of a committee of public welfare. No committee in the various communes could arrogate that title.

This new decree upon the regulation of the revolutionary government, although restrictive touching the power of the communes, and aimed chiefly indeed at their abuses of authority, was received by the commune of Paris with signal demonstrations of respect. Chaumette, who affected docility as a proof of patriotism, delivered a long oration in praise of the decree. In his witless eagerness to comply with the novel system of government, he even drew upon himself a humiliating rebuff; for, carrying his ardour to obey too far, he fell into the predicament of infraction. The decree, as we have stated, placed the revolutionary committees of Paris in direct and exclusive communication with the committee of general safety. These, in their fiery zeal, were accustomed to issue warrants of arrest in indiscriminate multifariousness; insomuch that they were accused of having incarcerated numerous patriots, and of containing men who now began to be stigmatised as ultra-revolutionists. Chaumette arraigned their conduct before the council-general, and proposed to summon them to the bar of the commune with the view of reading them a severe admonition. His motion was adopted: but, in his anxiety to reap the credit of submission, he had overlooked the fact that, according to the new decree, the revolutionary committees of Paris could hold correspondence with the committee of general safety alone. The committee of public welfare, equally averse to an exaggerated obedience as to disobedience itself, and moreover disinclined to allow the commune, even when teaching rightly, to lecture committees placed under the supreme authority, caused Chaumette's resolution to be annulled, and prohibited the committees from attending before the commune. Chaumette bowed to the correction with exemplary meekness. "Every man," said he at the commune, "is subject to error. I frankly confess that I have been misled. The convention has annulled the resolution I was instrumental in passing; it has dealt justly with the fault I committed; it is our common parent, let us show our inseparable union."*

It was only by such uncompromising energy that the committee could hope to suppress unruly movements

* 19th Frimaire.

arising either from fervour or from resistance, and to introduce the utmost possible precision into the action of government. The ultra-revolutionists, viewed with suspicion and kept in check since their proceedings against religion, were now doomed to undergo a further discomfiture, more fatal than the preceding. Ronsin had returned from Lyons, whither he had accompanied Collot-d'Herbois with a detachment of the revolutionary army, arriving in Paris at a moment when the relation of the sanguinary atrocities perpetrated at Lyons excited general pity and remorse. Ronsin signalised his return by affixing a placard which aroused the ire of the convention. In this document he asserted that out of the one hundred and fifty thousand inhabitants of Lyons, only fifteen hundred were not accomplices in the revolt; and that before the end of Frimaire (December) all the guilty would have perished, and the Rhone have borne their bodies to Toulon. Other revolting expressions of his were cited, and indignation was stimulated against the despotism of Vincent in the war department, against the conduct of the ministerial agents in the provinces, and against their audacious rivalry with the representatives. Some amongst them were alleged to have let fall words plainly indicating a scheme to precipitate the constitutional organisation of the executive power. The energy so recently displayed by Robespierre and the committee encouraged declarations adverse to these agitators. In the convention, on the 27th Frimaire (17th December), the sitting was opened by bitter complaints against certain revolutionary committees. Lecointre denounced the arrest of a courier from the committee of public welfare by one of the ministerial agents. Boursault stated that when passing through Longjumeau, he had been stopped by the commune; and though he proclaimed his rank of deputy, it nevertheless insisted upon having his passport accredited by the resident agent of the executive council. Fabre-d'Eglantine inveighed against Maillard, the leader of the September assassins, who had been sent on a mission to Bordeaux by the executive council, whereas his demerits called for universal reprobation; against Ronsin and his placard, the objects of all honest men's abhorrence; and, lastly, against Vincent, who had usurped all authority in the offices of the war department, and had affirmed he would either blow up the convention or force it to organise the executive power, since he was determined to be no longer the menial of committees. The convention forthwith declared under arrest Vincent, secretary-general of the war-office; Ronsin, general of the revolutionary army; Maillard, envoy to Bordeaux; three other agents of the executive power, whose vexations at Saint-Girons were detailed; and a person named Mazuel, adjutant in the revolutionary army, who had been heard to state that the convention was conspiring, and that he would spit in the face of every deputy. The assembly subsequently proclaimed the penalty of death against the officers of revolutionary armies illegally formed in the provinces, which were not immediately disbanded. Finally, it enjoined the executive council to appear on the morrow to justify itself.

This act of vigour struck the Cordeliers with deep dejection, and provoked certain murmurs amongst the Jacobins. The latter refrained from taking any decided part on behalf of Vincent and Ronsin, but they demanded that an inquiry should be instituted to ascertain the extent of their delinquencies. The executive council came, in all humility, to exculpate itself before the convention, asseverating that it had never purposed to compete with the national representation, and that the stoppage of couriers and the impediments experienced by the deputy Boursault wholly proceeded from an order of the committee of public welfare itself, an order which directed all passports and dispatches to be verified.

At the same time that Vincent and Ronsin were consigned to prison as ultra-revolutionists, the committee proceeded with undiminished rancour against the party of "equivocals" and stockjobbers. It ordered under arrest Proli, Dubuisson, Desfieux, and Pereyra, accused of being foreign agents and accomplices in all foregone intrigues. Furthermore, it caused to be seized, in the middle of the night, the four deputies Bazire, Chabot, Delaunay of Angers, and Julien of Toulouse, accused of being moderates, and of having too rapidly acquired fortunes.

We have already recounted the particulars of the clandestine association formed by these representatives, and of the fraud which had been its consequence. We recollect that Chabot, struck with affright, was preparing to denounce his confederates, and to throw all the odium upon them. The rumours current respecting his marriage, and the invectives daily repeated by Hébert, filled up the measure of his terror, and he hastened to unfold the whole manœuvre to Robespierre. He pretended that throughout the plot he had been actuated solely by a desire to penetrate and reveal it; the plot itself he attributed to the foreigner, who was bent, as he alleged, upon degrading the national representation by corrupting the deputies, and who made use of Hébert and his accomplices to defame, after having succeeded in debauching them. Thus there were, so he maintained, two branches in the conspiracy, the one corruptive and the other defamatory, both subtlely contrived to dishonour and dissolve the convention. The participation of foreign bankers in this intrigue, the expressions of Julien of Toulouse and Delaunay, who often said that the convention would soon finish by devouring itself, and that it behoved wise men to gain wealth with all possible dispatch, and a certain intimacy between Hébert's wife and the mistresses of Julien and Delaunay, served Chabot as proofs to support his fable of a two-sided conspiracy, in which corrupters and defamers were secretly leagued to attain the like ultimate aim. At the same time Chabot proved himself not altogether unscrupulous, for he exculpated Bazire; and as he in person had bribed Fabre, and might provoke his denunciation by accusing him, he affirmed that his offers had been rejected, and that the 100,000 francs, suspended on a thread in the privy, were the same intended for Fabre and refused by him. These tales of Chabot were devoid of even the semblance of truth, for had he entered into the conspiracy merely to betray it, he would naturally have forewarned some members of the one or the other committee, and deposited the money in their hands. Robespierre referred Chabot to the committee of general safety, who caused the implicated deputies to be apprehended. Julien of Toulouse alone succeeded in effecting his escape; Bazire, Delaunay, and Chabot were taken and lodged in prison.*

The detection of this shameful machination caused a prodigious clamour, and was held to confirm all the calumnies heaped by the various parties upon each other. The belief became more prevalent than ever in the existence of a foreign faction, corrupting the patriots, and instigating them to fetter the march of the revolution, some by an inopportune moderation, others by an insane exaggeration, by a constant course of defamation, and by an odious profession of atheism. In such suppositions, however, there was but little reality. On the one hand were men less fanatical, more prone to pity the vanquished, and for that very reason more susceptible to the allurements of pleasure and wealth; on the other hand were men more violent and blind in their passions, resting on the lowest portion of the populace, assailing with their outcries all who did not partake their fanatical insensibility, and profaning the ancient objects of reverence with reckless indecency; and amidst these two parties were bankers profiting by every crisis to deal in stockjobbing, and four deputies, out of 750, incapable of re-

* 27th Brumaire (17th November).

sisting corruption, and becoming accomplices in such impure practices; lastly, certain sincere revolutionists, but foreigners, and suspected on that account, compromising themselves by that very exaggeration under favour of which they sought to have their origin forgotten: so much of reality there was, and therein nothing but what might arise in the ordinary course of circumstances—nothing, certainly, which required for elucidation the surmise of some deep-laid conspiracy.

The committee of public welfare, resolute in its purpose to overawe all parties, determined to smite and brand them, for which end it strove to represent them all as accomplices of the foreigner. Robespierre had already often expatiated on a foreign faction, in the existence of which his jealous spirit moved him firmly to believe. With regard to the turbulent faction that thwarted the superior authority and dishonoured the revolution, he hesitated not to denounce it as in alliance with this foreign faction; but hitherto he had not made any such accusation against the moderate party, and had even defended it, as we have seen, in the person of Danton. That he still respected the latter, arose from its having done nothing as yet to impede the march of the revolution, and from its containing but few members, and those not obstinate opponents like the old Girondists, since it only comprised certain scattered individuals, who more highly reprobated the ultra-revolutionary extravagancies.

Such was the situation of parties, and the policy of the committee of public welfare regarding them, in Frimaire, year 2 (December 1793). Whilst it was using authority with so much vigour, and perfecting the machine of revolutionary government in the interior, it displayed equal energy in outward affairs, and secured the safety of the revolution by signal victories.

CHAPTER XXX.

CLOSE OF THE CAMPAIGN OF 1793.—RETREAT OF THE AUSTRIANS AND PRUSSIANS.—SIEGE AND CAPTURE OF TOULON.—IRRUPTION OF THE VENDEANS BEYOND THE LOIRE.—THEIR DEFEAT AT MANS, AND DESTRUCTION AT SAVENAY.—GENERAL RETROSPECT AS TO THE CAMPAIGN OF 1793.

The campaign of 1793 terminated on all the frontiers in the most brilliant and auspicious manner. On the side of Belgium, the French had eventually decided upon retiring into winter quarters, notwithstanding the project entertained by the committee of public welfare for profiting by the victory of Watignies to envelop the enemy between the Scheldt and the Sambre. Accordingly, on that point events had not varied, and the advantages consequent upon Watignies had remained with the French.

On the Rhine, the campaign was greatly prolonged by the loss of the lines of Weissembourg, forced on the 13th October (22d Vendemiaire), which the committee of public welfare determined to recover at any cost, and likewise to raise the blockade of Landau, as it had previously effected with regard to Dunkirk and Maubeuge. The state of the French departments bordering on the Rhine was an additional motive with the convention to hasten the departure of the enemy. The country of the Vosges was singularly impressed with the feudal spirit; the priests and nobles had preserved considerable influence within it; the French language being only partially disseminated, the new revolutionary ideas had slowly penetrated its confines; in several of the communes the decrees of the convention were unknown; many were entirely devoid of revolutionary committees, and in almost all the emigrants moved to and fro without molestation. The nobles of Alsace had followed the army of Wurmser in great numbers, and spread themselves from Weissembourg to the environs of Strasburg. In this latter city a plot had been formed to deliver it up to Wurmser. The committee of public welfare forthwith dispatched Lebas and Saint-Just thither, to exercise the usual dictatorship of commissioners from the convention. It, moreover, named young Hoche, who had so greatly distinguished himself at the siege of Dunkirk, general of the army of the Moselle; draughted from the inactive army of the Ardennes a strong division, which was divided between the two armies of the Moselle and the Rhine; and, lastly, raised general levies in all the neighbouring departments, and directed them upon Besançon. These new levies occupied the fortresses, and the garrisons were incorporated in the line. Saint-Just displayed all his accustomed energy and intelligence at Strasburg. He struck the malecontents with awe, and consigned to a commission those who were suspected of having intrigued to deliver up the city, who were thence speedily conducted to the scaffold. He communicated fresh alacrity to both generals and soldiers, and exacted daily attacks along the whole line, in order to exercise the young conscripts. Equally a stranger to fear as to pity, he himself advanced into the fire and partook all the dangers of the war. A high enthusiasm animated the whole army, which was incited with the hope of regaining the lost territory; the universal cry of the French soldiers was, "Landau or death!"

The manœuvre expedient to be executed on this part of the frontiers still consisted in conjoining the two armies of the Rhine and the Moselle, and operating *en masse* on a single flank of the Vosges. For that purpose it was necessary to recover the passes which intersected the mountains, and which the French had lost since Brunswick had proceeded to the centre of the Vosges and Wurmser under the walls of Strasburg. The plan of the committee was quickly formed: it determined to seize upon the chain itself, in order to separate the Prussians from the Austrians. Hoche, full of ardour and talent, was charged to execute this project, and his first movements at the head of the army of the Moselle warranted anticipations of most strenuous action.

With the view of strengthening their position, the Prussians had attempted to carry by surprise the castle of Bitche, situated in the very midst of the Vosges. The enterprise was defeated by the vigilance of the garrison, which hastened in time to the ramparts; and Brunswick, either disconcerted at his failure, or dreading the activity and energy of Hoche, or perhaps dissatisfied with Wurmser, between whom and himself feelings not the most friendly prevailed, retrograded first to Bisingen on the line of the Erbach, and subsequently to Kayserlautern in the centre of the Vosges. He had not apprised Wurmser of this backward movement; and whilst the latter was engaged on the eastern flank almost abreast of Strasburg, he, Brunswick, on the western flank, was actually in the rear of Weissembourg and nearly abreast of Landau. Hoche had closely followed Brunswick in his retrograde movement; and after vainly endeavouring to surround him at Bisingen, and to anticipate him at Kayserlautern, he formed the design of attacking him at the latter place, notwithstanding the difficulty of the ground. Hoche had about 30,000 men; he engaged on the 28th, 29th, and 30th November; but the localities were little known and replete with obstacles. The first day General Ambert, who commanded the left wing, encountered the enemy, whilst Hoche in the centre was seeking his route. The following day Hoche found himself in presence of the hostile army, whilst Ambert was wandering in the mountains. Thus, owing to the difficulties of the ground, his strength, and the advantage of his position, Brunswick obtained complete success. He only lost about 1200 men, whereas Hoche was obliged to retire with a loss of nearly 3000; but he was not discouraged, and succeeded in rallying his forces at Pirmasens, Hornbach, and Deux-Ponts.

Although discomfited, Hoche had exhibited a hardihood and resolution which secured him the confidence of the representatives and the army. The committee of public welfare, which, since the accession of Carnot, had become sufficiently enlightened to be just, and was henceforth severe only against lack of zeal, addressed to him encouraging letters, and, for the first time, bestowed encomiums on a defeated general.

Hoche, without allowing his reverse to depress the spirit of enterprise, instantly took a resolution to effect a junction with the army of the Rhine, in order to overwhelm Wurmser. That general, who had remained in Alsace whilst Brunswick was retrograding to Kayserlautern, had his right flank uncovered. Hoche directed General Taponnier with 12,000 men on Werdt, to pierce the line of the Vosges and fall on Wurmser's flank, whilst the army of the Rhine was to make a general attack on his front. Between that army and the Austrians, the presence of Saint-Just had induced continual combats during the close of November and the commencement of December, so that by daily exposure to fire it was beginning to acquire discipline and steadiness. Pichegru held the command. The corps sent into the Vosges by Hoche encountered numerous difficulties in its progress, but it eventually succeeded in penetrating the mountains, and seriously incommoded Wurmser's right. On the 22d December (2d Nivose), Hoche marched in person across the mountains, and appeared at Werdt on the summit of the eastern ridge. He rushed impetuously on Wurmser's right wing, captured several guns, and took numerous prisoners. The Austrians felt constrained to quit the line of the Motter, and betake themselves first to Sultz, and eventually on the 24th to Weissembourg, on the very lines of the Lauter. Their retreat was effected in disorder and confusion. The emigrants and Alsatian nobles, flocking in the track of Wurmser, fled with the utmost precipitation. Whole families covered the roads, anxiously endeavouring to escape. The Prussian and Austrian armies were mutually discontented, and slackly aided each other against an enemy buoyant with ardour and enthusiasm.

The two armies of the Rhine and the Moselle were at length conjoined. The representatives gave the command-in-chief to Hoche, who immediately prepared to retake Weissembourg. The Prussians and Austrians, now concentrated by their retrograde movements, were better enabled to act in concert. They accordingly resolved to assume the offensive on the 26th December (6th Nivose), the same day fixed by the French general for an attack on them. The Prussians were in the Vosges and around Weissembourg; the Austrians extended in front of the Lauter, from Weissembourg to the Rhine. Had they not determined to take the initiative, they would certainly not have stood an attack in front of the lines, having the Lauter in their rear; but they had decided upon being the first to assail, and when the French advanced upon them, they found their advanced guards in motion. General Dessaix, commanding the right of the army of the Rhine, marched on Lauterbourg; General Michaud was directed on Schleithal; the centre engaged the Austrians drawn up on Geisberg; and the left penetrated the Vosges in order to turn the Prussians. Dessaix carried Lauterbourg, Michaud occupied Schleithal, and the centre, dislodging the Austrians, drove them from Geisberg even to Weissembourg. The immediate occupation of Weissembourg must have proved signally disastrous to the allies, and it seemed inevitable; but Brunswick, who was stationed at Pigeonnier, flew to the spot and checked the French with the greatest firmness. The retreat of the Austrians was consequently effected with less disorder; but on the following day the French occupied the lines of Weissembourg. The imperialists fell back on Gemersheim, and the Prussians on Bergzabern. The French soldiers continually advanced with cries of "Landau or death!" The Austrians hastened to repass the Rhine, indisposed to hazard another day on the left bank, and without giving the Prussians time to reach Mayence. The siege of Landau was raised, and the French took up winter quarters in the Palatinate. The two allied generals forthwith accused each other in contradictory accounts of the operations, and the Duke of Brunswick tendered his resignation to the King of Prussia. Thus, on that portion of the theatre of war, the French had gloriously recovered their frontiers, despite the united force of Prussia and Austria.

The army of Italy had undertaken nothing of importance, having, since its defeat in the month of June, remained on the defensive. In the month of September, the Piedmontese, seeing Toulon attacked by the English, were tardily moved to profit by an occasion which might ensure the destruction of the French army. The King of Sardinia repaired in person to the scene of warfare, and a general attack on the French camp was determined for the 8th September. The most effectual mode of operating against the French consisted in occupying the line of the Var, which separated Nice from their own territory. This manœuvre would have been attended with the recovery of all the positions they had seized beyond the Var, and would have compelled them to evacuate Nice, or perhaps even to lay down their arms. A direct assault upon their camp, however, was preferred; which, being attempted with detached corps and by different valleys at once, was unsuccessful, and the King of Sardinia retired into his own dominions much dissatisfied with the result. Shortly thereafter, the Austrian general Dewins at length resolved to move upon the Var; but he executed his intention with but 3000 or 4000 men, advanced no further than Isola, and, being stopped by a slight check, re-ascended the Upper Alps, without prosecuting his enterprise. Such had been the insignificant operations of the army of Italy.

A more grave solicitude fixed all attention on Toulon. That place, being held by the English and Spanish, gave them a dangerous footing in the south, and a basis for adventuring a further invasion. Hence it behoved France to recover it with all practicable speed; the committee, indeed, had issued the most urgent orders on the subject, but the means of instituting a siege were almost wholly deficient. Carteaux, after effecting the subjection of Marseilles, had debouched with 7000 or 8000 men by the gorges of Ollioules, whereof he gained possession after a slight engagement, and established himself at their outlet within view of Toulon; at the same time, General Lapoype, being detached from the army of Italy with about 4000 men, had drawn up on the opposite side towards Sollies and Lavalette. The two French corps thus planted, the one to the west the other to the east, were so distant that they could scarcely discern each other, and were quite incapable of reciprocating succour. The besieged, with a little more activity, might have easily attacked them separately and overwhelmed them in succession. Happily, they were bent only on fortifying the town and filling it with troops. Eight thousand Spaniards, Neapolitans, and Piedmontese were disembarked, who, with two English regiments drawn from Gibraltar, swelled the garrison to 14,000 or 15,000 men. They perfected all the defences and manned all the forts, especially those on the coast, which protected the road where their squadrons lay at anchor. They applied themselves more particularly to render inaccessible the fort of L'Eguillette, placed at the extremity of the promontory which shuts up the inner or little road. They in sooth rendered its approach so difficult, that it was called in the army "the Little Gibraltar." The Marseillese and all the Provençals who had sought refuge in Toulon, bestirred themselves at the works, and displayed the greatest zeal. It was impossible, however, for union to be of long duration in the interior of the town, inasmuch as

the reaction against the Mountain had revived all the dormant factions. Every shade of the republican and royalist parties had its adherents. The allies themselves were not in strict concord. The Spaniards were offended at the superiority affected by the English, and distrusted their intentions. Admiral Hood, taking advantage of this disunion, stated, that since the inhabitants could not agree amongst themselves, it was expedient to avoid proclaiming any authority for the present. He even prevented the departure of a deputation appointed by the Toulonese to wait upon the Count de Provence, with the view of soliciting that prince to appear in their city under the title of regent. From that moment the designs of the English were shrewdly suspected, and a painful impression prevailed as to the blind and culpable precipitancy wherewith Toulon had been delivered to the bitterest enemies of the French navy.

With their existing means, the republicans could have no hope of retaking Toulon. The representatives, indeed, recommended the army to be moved beyond the Durance, and the siege deferred until the following season. However, the capture of Lyons having placed additional forces at disposal, troops and munitions were forthwith transported towards Toulon. General Doppet, to whom the reduction of Lyons was attributed, was appointed to supersede Carteaux. Doppet himself was speedily displaced by Dugommier, a man of much greater experience and of distinguished intrepidity. Twenty-eight or thirty thousand men were eventually mustered, and orders arrived to finish the siege before the close of the campaign.

The French commenced by closely pressing the place, and by establishing batteries against the forts. General Lapoype, with his detachment from the army of Italy, was still to the east, and the general-in-chief Dugommier to the west, in front of Ollioules. Upon the latter devolved the principal attack. The committee of public welfare had already caused a regular plan of attack to be framed by the committee of fortifications. The general assembled a council of war to discuss the plan transmitted from Paris. This plan was very ably conceived, but another was suggested more suitable to circumstances, and promising more prompt results.

In this council of war appeared a young officer, who commanded the artillery in the absence of its superior chief. His name was Bonaparte, a native of Corsica. Faithful to France, in the bosom of which he had been educated, he had fought in Corsica for the cause of the convention against Paoli and the English; he had subsequently joined the army of Italy, and was now serving before Toulon. He evinced excellent judgment and great activity, and always slept at the side of his guns. This young officer, upon a survey of the localities, was struck with an idea, which he propounded to the council. The fort L'Eguillette, surnamed the Little Gibraltar, barred the road in which the allied squadrons were riding. If this fort were occupied, the squadrons could no longer anchor in the road without incurring the hazard of being burnt, nor could they, moreover, vacate it without leaving a garrison of 15,000 men cut off from all communication or succour, and sooner or later doomed to surrender at discretion: wherefore it was to be inferred, that if the fort L'Eguillette were once in possession of the republicans, the squadrons and the garrison would evacuate Toulon together. Thus the key of the fortress lay in L'Eguillette, but it was almost impregnable. Young Bonaparte strenuously enforced his conception, and succeeded in imparting his own convictions.

The first operations were directed to straiten the investment. Bonaparte, under favour of some olive-trees which concealed his artillerymen, planted a battery near the fort of Malbosquet, one of the most important of those encompassing Toulon. One morning this battery suddenly opened, and greatly surprised the besieged, who never imagined a fire could be established so close to the fort. O'Hara, the English general who commanded the garrison, resolved to make a sally for the purpose of destroying the battery and spiking the guns. On the 30th November (10th Frimaire), accordingly, he issued forth at the head of 6000 men, quickly penetrated the republican posts, seized upon the battery, and forthwith commenced to spike the guns. Bonaparte fortunately chanced to be within a short distance, accompanied by a battalion. A trench led up to the battery; into this Bonaparte plunged with his battalion, crept noiselessly into the midst of the English, gave the word to fire, and by so unexpected an appearance threw them into the greatest confusion. O'Hara, much astonished, thought his own soldiers must have fallen into some strange mistake, and were firing on their comrades. He consequently advanced towards the republicans to satisfy himself, but was wounded in the hand, and taken in the trench by a sergeant. At the same moment, Dugommier, who had beat to arms throughout the camp, gathered his troops for the attack, and moved between the battery and the fort. The English, thus threatened to be cut off, retired, after losing their general and failing to rid themselves of the obnoxious battery.

This success highly animated the besiegers, whilst it spread infinite discouragement amongst the besieged. Distrust was excited in the latter to such a height, that they alleged General O'Hara had contrived his capture with the view of selling Toulon to the republicans. Meanwhile these, resolute to conquer the place, and devoid of means to purchase it, were preparing for the hazardous assault of L'Eguillette. They had already thrown numerous shells into it, and endeavoured to raze the defences with projectiles from twenty-four pounders. On the 18th December (28th Frimaire), the assault was fixed for midnight. A simultaneous attack was to be made by General Lapoype on Fort Faron. At midnight, amidst a frightful storm, the republicans were in motion. The soldiers who guarded the fort usually kept in quarters, so as to be under shelter from the bombs and balls. The French hoped to reach it before they were perceived; but at the foot of the height they encountered some of the enemy's sharpshooters. An engagement immediately ensued. At the noise of the musketry, the garrison of the fort flew to the ramparts, and opened a murderous discharge on the assailants. These recoiled and returned, time after time. A young captain of artillery, by name Muiron, profiting by the inequalities of the ground, succeeded in attaining the height without losing many of his men. Reaching the base of the fort, he vaulted through an embrasure; the soldiers followed him, penetrated into the battery, seized the guns, and speedily effected a conquest of the fastness itself.

In this action, General Dugommier, the representatives Salicetti and Robespierre the younger, and the commandant of artillery Bonaparte, had stood in the midst of the fire, and communicated to all the troops an exalted courage. On the side of General Lapoype, the attack was likewise crowned with success, a redoubt of Fort Faron having been carried by storm.

The instant Fort L'Eguillette was occupied, the republicans hastened to dispose the guns so as to cannonade the fleet. But the English afforded them no time for the visitation. They immediately decided upon evacuating the place, in order to shun the further chances of a difficult and perilous defence. Before retiring, they resolved to burn the arsenal, the dockyards, and the ships they were unable to remove. On the 18th and 19th, without notifying their intention to the Spanish admiral, or even to the unfortunate community about to be left at the mercy of the victorious Mountaineers, orders were issued for the evacuation. Each English vessel proceeded in its turn to ship supplies at the arsenal. The forts were subsequently all vacated, except Fort Lamalgue, which was intended

to be the last abandoned. This evacuation was executed so rapidly, that two thousand Spaniards, too tardily warned, remained outside the walls, and only saved themselves by a miracle.

At last the command was given to fire the arsenal. Twenty ships and frigates suddenly appeared in the docks wrapped in flames, a spectacle calculated to excite despair amongst the wretched inhabitants and indignation amongst the republicans, who were condemned to witness the conflagration without the ability to arrest it. Thereupon, upwards of twenty thousand individuals, male and female, including the aged and the young, bearing with them their most precious moveables, rushed upon the quays, stretching forth their arms towards the squadrons, and imploring an asylum against the vengeance of the victorious army. They comprised all those Provençal families, who, at Aix, Marseilles, and Toulon, had been compromised in the sectional movements. Not a single boat put off to receive those imprudent Frenchmen, who had placed their trust in foreigners, and surrendered to them the first port of their country. Ultimately, Admiral Langara, more moved by humanity, ordered his boats to be lowered, and as many refugees brought on board the Spanish ships as they would contain. Admiral Hood durst no longer resist this example and the imprecations shrieked against him. He gave directions in his turn, but almost too late, to receive the Toulonese. Those unfortunate persons wildly precipitated themselves into the boats dispatched for their rescue. In the confusion some fell into the sea, and others were separated from their families. Mothers were seen seeking their children, wives and daughters calling upon their husbands and parents, all roaming to and fro on the quays, amid the lurid glare of the conflagration. At that terrible moment, brigands, seizing the occasion to pillage, charged the forlorn creatures accumulated on the quays, and fired amongst them, with howls of "The republicans are on you!" Consternation fell upon the multitude; all pressed forward, clashing with lamentable cries, and, thinking only of flight, abandoned the spoils to the atrocious ruffians who had planned the stratagem.

The republicans eventually entered, and found the city half deserted and a large proportion of the naval establishments destroyed. The convicts had fortunately checked the fire, and prevented all its possible devastation. Out of fifty-six ships and frigates, there remained but seven ships and eleven frigates; the rest had been either taken or burnt by the English. The horrors of the siege and evacuation were soon succeeded by those of revolutionary rage. We will hereafter recount the train of disasters visited upon that guilty and unfortunate city. The capture of Toulon caused extraordinary joy, and produced as powerful an impression as the victory of Watignies, the reduction of Lyons, or the relief of Landau. Thenceforth, all apprehension was removed lest the English, resting on Toulon, might carry desolation or rebellion into the southern districts of France.

The campaign had closed less auspiciously on the Pyrenees. However, notwithstanding numerous reverses and remarkable ignorance on the part of their generals, the French had merely lost the line of the Tech, whilst that of the Tet had remained to them. After the untoward action of Truillas, fought on the 22d September (1st Vendemiaire), against the Spanish camp, and wherein Dagobert had manifested such exemplary valour and coolness, Ricardos, instead of marching forward, had retrograded to the Tech. The recapture of Villefranche, and a reinforcement of 15,000 men received by the republicans, had induced him to make this retrograde movement. After raising the blockade of Collioure and Port-Vendre, he had moved to the camp of Boulon, between Ceret and Ville-Longue, whence he watched over his communications, with the high-road to Bellegarde in his keeping. The representatives Fabre and Gaston, giving way to their impetuous ardour, urged an attack on the Spaniards' camp, in order that they might be repelled beyond the Pyrenees; but the assault was abortive, resulting simply in a fruitless effusion of blood.

The representative Fabre, impatient to attempt some signal enterprise, had long dwelt upon the practicability of a march beyond the Pyrenees, with the view of compelling the Spaniards to retreat. He had been persuaded that the fort of Roses might be gained by a sudden attack. In accordance with his ideas, and despite the contrary opinion of the generals, three columns were thrown beyond the Pyrenees, with instructions to unite at Espola. But, too weak and too far separated, they were unable to effect the intended junction, and being defeated, were driven back on the great chain, after suffering a considerable loss. This disaster had occurred in October. In November, unusually stormy weather for the season swelled the mountain torrents, interrupted the communications between the different Spanish camps, and placed them in a perilous predicament.

An opportunity was thereby offered for revenging on the Spaniards the reverses sustained at their hands. The bridge of Ceret alone remained to them for repassing the Tech, and they lay inundated and famished on the left bank at the mercy of the French. But nothing that ought to have been done was performed. To General Dagobert had succeeded General Turreau, and to him General Doppet. The army was disorganised. It fought languidly in the vicinity of Ceret, and even lost the camp of Saint-Ferréol, whereby Ricardos escaped the dangers of his position. In a little while he avenged with somewhat greater ability the peril he had encountered, falling, the 7th November (17th Brumaire), upon a French column stationed at Ville-Longue, on the right bank of the Tech, between the river, the sea, and the Pyrenees. He repulsed that column, 10,000 strong, and threw it into such disorder that it could not be rallied earlier than at Argeles. Immediately afterwards, Ricardos directed an attack on the division of Delatre at Collioure, gained possession of Collioure, Port-Vendre, and Saint-Elme, and drove the French completely beyond the Tech. It was thus the campaign terminated towards the latter days of December. The Spaniards took up winter quarters on the banks of the Tech; the French encamped around Perpignan and on the banks of the Tet. A portion of French territory was occupied by the enemy, but less than so many disasters gave reason to apprehend. This, however, was the only frontier on which the campaign had not closed gloriously for the arms of the republic. On the side of the Western Pyrenees both parties had stood on the defensive.

La Vendée had been again the scene of further and desperate struggles, concluding in the issue to the advantage of the republican cause, but involving serious evil to France, since all who fell in the antagonist ranks were to be mourned as Frenchmen.

The Vendéans, defeated at Chollet on the 17th October (26th Vendemiaire) had fled, as we remember, to the edge of the Loire, in a promiscuous multitude of 80,000 souls, men, women, and children. Not venturing to return to their own districts, now in the occupation of the republicans, and unable longer to keep the field in presence of a victorious army, they resolved to pass into Brittany, and accomplish the views of Bonchamps, although that young hero, being dead, could no more direct their mournful destinies. We have mentioned, that on the eve of the battle of Chollet he had sent a detachment to occupy the post of Varade on the Loire. That post, inefficiently guarded by the republicans, was taken during the night between the 16th and 17th. After the loss of the battle, therefore, the Vendéans were enabled to cross the river without hindrance, by means of boats left along the shore, and sheltered from the republican

cannon. The danger having hitherto existed on the left bank alone, the government had overlooked the necessity of defending the country on the other side the Loire. All the towns of Brittany were unguarded; a few detachments of national guards, scattered here and there, were quite incapable of checking the Vendéans, and could only fly at their approach. The latter consequently advanced without impediment, and traversed successively Candé, Château-Gonthier, and Laval, without encountering any resistance.

Meanwhile the republican army was uncertain of their course, their numbers, or their designs. For a moment, indeed, it had deemed them exterminated, and the representatives had so written to the convention. Kléber alone, who still commanded the army under the auspices of Léchelle, formed a different judgment, and strove to remove a dangerous security. Nor was it long before intelligence arrived that the Vendéans were far from being destroyed; but that, on the contrary, in the fugitive column there yet remained 30,000 or 40,000 armed men fit for combat. A council of war was immediately assembled, and as it was unknown whether the fugitives would move on Angers or on Nantes, whether they would pass into Brittany or proceed by the Lower Loire to join Charette, it was decided that the army should be divided; that one portion, under General Haxo, should march to keep Charette in check and recover Noirmoutiers; that another, under Kléber, should occupy the camp of Saint-George near Nantes; and that the remainder should continue at Angers, in order to cover that town and observe the motions of the enemy. Doubtless, if the republicans had been better informed, they would have understood how much it behoved them to keep united, and follow with all diligence the track of the Vendéans. In their confusion and panic the latter might have been easily dispersed, if not entirely cut off; but the direction they had taken being unknown, the course adopted by the republicans, in their state of doubt, was certainly the most prudent. Shortly, however, more accurate tidings were gathered, and the march of the Vendéans on Candé, Château-Gonthier, and Laval, became known. Thereupon an instant resolution was taken to pursue them, with the hope of overtaking them before they could throw Brittany into a flame, and seize upon any important city or a port on the ocean. The Generals Vimeux and Haxo were left at Nantes and in Lower Vendée; all the rest of the army moved towards Candé and Château-Gonthier. Westermann and Beaupuy formed the vanguard; Chalbos, Kléber, and Canuel, each commanded a division; and Léchelle, holding aloof from scenes of conflict, left the movements to be directed by Kléber, who engrossed the confidence and admiration of the army.

On the evening of the 25th October (4th Brumaire), the republican vanguard arrived at Château-Gonthier; the bulk of the forces lagged a day's march in the rear. Although the soldiers were greatly fatigued, although, moreover, it was nearly dark, and a distance of six leagues intervened to Laval, Westermann proposed to advance thither without halting. Beaupuy, not less brave but more circumspect than Westermann, vainly attempted to impress upon him the danger of attacking the Vendéan mass in the middle of the night, so far in advance of the main army, and with troops exhausted by fatigue. Beaupuy being constrained to submit to his senior in command, the march forward was at once commenced. Reaching Laval in the dead of night, Westermann detached an officer to reconnoitre the enemy's position; but he, carried away by his ardour, made a charge instead of an observation, and suddenly drove back the outermost posts. The alarm was immediately given in Laval, the tocsin rung, and the whole power of the enemy speedily mustered and brought in array against the republicans. Beaupuy, evincing his accustomed firmness, intrepidly withstood the efforts of the Vendéans. Westermann, displaying all the energies of heroic valour, sustained a most obstinate struggle, which the obscurity of night rendered more sanguinary. The republican vanguard, albeit very inferior in number, would, notwithstanding, have succeeded in maintaining its ground to the end, had not Westermann's cavalry, which sometimes lacked the gallantry of its leader, all at once disbanded and obliged the vanguard to retreat. Under favour of Beaupuy, Château-Gonthier was regained in comparative order. The main body arrived there the following day. The whole army was thus conjoined on the 26th October, the vanguard weakened by a bootless and sanguinary conflict, and the main body harassed by a long route, travelled without provisions, without shoes, and over the broken roads of autumn. Westermann and the representatives urged a fresh movement in advance. Kléber strenuously controverted their project, and procured a determination to proceed no farther than Villiers, midway between Château-Gonthier and Laval.

The immediate topic of discussion was a plan for the attack of Laval. That town is situated on the Mayenne. To march directly by the left bank, then occupied by the republicans, was highly injudicious, as a distinguished officer, Savary, who was perfectly acquainted with the localities, forcibly inculcated. The Vendéans might easily seize the bridge of Laval, and there withstand all attacks; moreover, whilst the republican army was uselessly accumulated on the left bank, they would have it in their power to defile along the right bank, cross the Mayenne in its rear, and fall suddenly upon it with terrible effect. He consequently proposed to divide the attack, and push forward one part of the army by the right bank. On that side there was no bridge to carry, nor any material obstacle to the occupation of Laval. This suggestion, recommended by the approbation of the generals, was sanctioned by the fiat of Léchelle. On the morrow, however, that commander, who sometimes started from his virtual nullity to commit blunders, transmitted a grossly stupid order, in distinct opposition to the arrangement of the previous day. He therein enjoined the generals to march, according to his ordinary expression, *majestically and in mass* on Laval, by defiling along the left bank. Kléber and all his colleagues were indignant, but obedience was imperative. Beaupuy led the van, and Kléber closely followed him. The whole Vendéan army was drawn up on the heights of Entrames. Beaupuy began the battle; Kléber deployed to the right and left of the route, so as to extend himself as far as possible. Aware, however, of the disadvantages attending his position, he sent to Léchelle requesting him to lead the division of Chalbos upon the enemy's flank, a movement calculated to throw him into confusion. But that column, composed of the battalions formed at Orleans and Niort, which had so often fled, disbanded without marching a step in advance. The commander-in-chief was the first to speed away at full gallop; and the larger half of the army, without having engaged, fled precipitately at the heels of Léchelle, hastening to Château-Gonthier, and thence to Angers. The brave Mayencers, who had never previously yielded ground, gave way for the first time. The rout then became general; Beaupuy, Kléber, Marceau, and the representatives Merlin and Turreau, made incredible but fruitless efforts to stop the fugitives. Beaupuy received a shot in the centre of his breast. Being borne into a cabin, he exclaimed, "Leave me here, and display my bloody shirt to the soldiers." The valiant Bloss, who commanded the grenadiers, and was distinguished for his extraordinary intrepidity, met death at their head. A part of the army eventually halted at Lion-d'Angers; the remainder paused not until under shelter of Angers.

General indignation was expressed at the cowardly example given by Léchelle in being the first to fly. The soldiers openly murmured. The next day, during

a review, the few warriors who had remained beneath their standards, and who were all Mayencers, raised cries of "Down with Léchelle! Kléber and Dubayet for ever! Give us back Dubayet!" Léchelle, who heard these shouts, was still more incensed against the cohort of Mayence, and against the generals whose valour caused his own shame. The representatives, perceiving that the troops despised Léchelle, decided upon suspending him, and offered the command to Kléber. He declined it, because he was averse to the situation of general-in-chief, so incessantly assailed by the representatives, the ministry, and the committee of public welfare, and consented merely to direct the army in another's name. The command was consequently bestowed on Chalbos, one of the oldest generals in the army. Léchelle, forestalling the ordinance of the representatives, demanded his discharge on the plea of illness, and retired to Nantes, where he shortly afterwards quietly departed this life.

Kléber, taking into consideration the deplorable state of the army, partly dispersed at Angers and partly at Lion-d'Angers, proposed to concentrate it altogether at Angers, to allow it a few days' repose, to supply it with shoes and clothes, and to re-organise it in an efficient manner. This plan was adopted, and all the troops were united at Angers. Léchelle, when offering his resignation, had not failed to denounce the cohort of Mayence, and to charge upon brave men a flight which was owing solely to his own cowardice. A jealousy had long been rankling against that corps, founded on its spirit of union, its attachment to its generals, and its opposition to the staff of Saumur. The recent shouts of "Dubayet for ever! down with Léchelle!" completed its delinquency in the eyes of the government. The committee of public welfare, accordingly, promptly issued an ordinance enjoining its dissolution and amalgamation with the other corps, and intrusting the execution of the measure to Kléber. Although the proceeding was levelled at him and his companions in arms, he cheerfully aided its enforcement, for he was sensible of the danger at hazard from the spirit of rivalry and hatred prevailing between the garrison of Mayence and the rest of the troops; and, above all, he foresaw much advantage would accrue from forming trustworthy heads of columns, which, being judiciously distributed, might communicate their own energy to the whole army.

Whilst these things were passing at Angers, the Vendéans at Laval, freed from the republicans and from every apparent obstacle to their progress, were nevertheless undecided what course they ought to take, or, in other words, upon what theatre to carry the war. They had the choice of two, equally inviting; their dilemma seemed to lie between the extremity of Brittany and that of Normandy. Ulterior Brittany was thoroughly fanaticised by priests and nobles; the population would have joyfully received them; the country, mountainous and intersected, would have afforded them ample facilities for resistance; and there they would have gained the sea-coast and means of communication with the English. Ulterior Normandy, or the peninsula of Cotentin, was somewhat more distant, but even more easy to defend; for by seizing on Port-Beil and Saint-Cosme, they would have entirely barred all access. Moreover, they would there have found the important fortress of Cherbourg, quite open to them on the land side, stocked with supplies of all kinds, and especially adapted to hold intercourse with the English. Both these projects, therefore, were recommended by eminent advantages, and in the execution of neither were any serious impediments to be apprehended. The route to Brittany was guarded only by the army of Brest, under the charge of Rossignol, and consisting, at the utmost, of five or six thousand ill-organised troops. The route to Normandy was defended by the army of Cherbourg, composed of levies *en masse* ready to disperse at the first shot, and of merely a few thousand men of more regular training who had not yet quitted Caen. Thus, neither of these two armies could be formidable to the Vendéan horde. In fact, by a little celerity, even their encounter might have been avoided. But the nature of the localities was unknown to the Vendéans; they had not a single officer who could enlighten them concerning Brittany and Normandy, or explain to them what were their military advantages or their strongholds. They believed, for example, that Cherbourg was fortified on the land side. They were consequently incapacitated for forming just appreciations as they progressed, for deciding with promptitude, or, in short, for acting with any degree of vigour or precision.

Although numerous, their army was in a desperate plight. All the principal chiefs were dead or wounded. Bonchamps had expired on the left bank; D'Elbée, wounded, had been transported to Noirmoutiers; and Lescure, pierced by a ball in the forehead, was borne in a dying state in the track of the army. Larochejacquelein, the sole survivor, had received the command-in-chief, Stofflet ranking next in authority. The soldiers, being now obliged to abandon their native districts and to keep in constant locomotion, ought to have been organised, instead of which they moved without order like a wandering tribe, having their wives, children, and wains interspersed amongst them. In a regular army, the brave, the weak, and the cowardly, incorporated one with the other, remain per force together, and afford reciprocal aid. A few men of courage often suffice to impart their energy to an entire mass. Here, on the contrary, no rank being maintained, no division into companies or battalions being observed, but every one marching with whom he listed, the more valiant spirits had associated together, and formed a body of five or six thousand men, always the first ready to confront emergent hazards. After them came a troop less to be relied upon, and adapted mainly to decide a victory, by bearing upon the flanks of an enemy already shattered. Lastly, the mass, ever prompt to fly at the first discharge, lagged confusedly in the rear of those two bands. Thus, the thirty or forty thousand armed men were reduced in reality to a few thousands, whose martial temperament predisposed them for adventurous conflict. The lack of subdivisions prevented the formation of detachments, the direction of a corps upon any particular point, or the execution of any stratagetic disposition. Some followed Larochejacquelein, others Stofflet, and in sooth themselves only. The promulgation of orders was impracticable; all that could be obtained was the observance of a signal for moving forward. Stofflet kept by him some trusty peasants, who circulated his wishes amongst their comrades. In the whole army, the Vendéans scarcely mustered two hundred ill-mounted cavalry and thirty pieces of ordnance, badly conditioned and badly served. The baggage encumbered their march; the women and old men, seeking for the post of greatest security, crept into the midst of the best troops, and by crowding their ranks embarrassed their movements. Distrust was likewise beginning to gather in the breasts of the soldiers with respect to their officers. It was rumoured that the latter desired to reach the ocean merely for the purpose of embarking, and abandoning to their fate the unfortunate peasants they had torn from their homes. The council, whose authority, indeed, had become purely illusory, was furthermore divided: the priests expressed infinite dissatisfaction with the military leaders. In a word, nothing would have been more easy than to destroy such an army, had not the utmost disorder in the exercise of command reigned amongst the republicans.

The Vendéans, therefore, we must conclude to have been unfitted to frame or execute any advantageous plan. They had quitted the Loire for twenty-six days, and in that long interval had substantially effected nothing. After a procrastinated hesitation, they eventually adopted a determination. On the one hand,

they had been told that Rennes and Saint-Malo were guarded by considerable forces, and on the other that Cherbourg was strongly fortified on the land side: wherefore they decided upon besieging Granville, a town seated on the brink of the sea, between the extremity of Brittany and that of Normandy. This design was recommended by its drawing them into proximity with Normandy, a land that had been depicted to them as of matchless fertility and superabundantly furnished. In consequence, they moved onward towards Fougères. Fifteen or sixteen thousand men of the forced levy had been drawn together to oppose their progress, but they dispersed without waiting to be attacked. The Vendéans reached Dol on the 10th November, and Avranches on the 12th.

On the 14th November (24th Brumaire), they proceeded towards Granville, leaving at Avranches half their numbers and all their baggage. The garrison having ventured to make a sally, they repulsed it, and pursued it into the suburb which precedes the body of the place. The garrison had sufficient time to re-enter and close the gates; but the suburb remained in their possession, and they thus secured great facilities for continuing the attack. They advanced from the suburb to some palisades which had just been planted; and without endeavouring to carry them, they contented themselves with rifle-shooting on the ramparts, retorted on the part of the besieged with cannon-balls and grape-shot. At the same time they fixed some pieces on the neighbouring heights, and fired them innocuously over the parapet of the walls and the roofs of the houses. At night they dispersed and abandoned the suburb, where the fire from the fortress allowed them no repose. They proceeded in quest of quarters, provisions, and especially fuel (for the weather began to grow intensely cold), beyond the range of the artillery. The officers could with difficulty retain a few hundred men in the suburb to keep up the rifle-shooting.

The following day their inability to reduce a fortified town was rendered still more manifest. They again put their batteries in vogue, but without effect. They renewed their fire along the palisades, but were speedily discouraged. Suddenly one of them started the idea of profiting by the ebb-tide to traverse a beach and take the town on the side of the harbour. They were preparing for this new enterprise, when the suburb was set on fire by the representatives immured in Granville. The Vendéans were thereupon compelled to evacuate it; and, utterly disheartened, they thought only of retreat. The attempt on the harbour was altogether abandoned, and on the morrow they all returned to rejoin their reserve and baggage at Avranches. From that moment extreme dejection reigned amongst them; they complained more bitterly than ever of the chiefs who had forced them from their hearths, and who, they alleged, were revolving the means of forsaking them; and they demanded with loud shouts to be reconducted to the Loire. It was in vain that Larochejacquelein, at the head of the most chivalric, essayed a fresh attempt to draw them into Normandy; in vain he marched on Ville-Dieu, whereof he gained possession; scarcely a thousand men volunteered to follow him. The residue of the horde retook the road to Brittany, marching on Pontorson, through which it had arrived. It seized upon the bridge at Beaux, which, affording a passage over the Selune, was indispensable for reaching Pontorson.

Whilst these events were occurring at Granville, the republican army had been re-organised at Angers. No sooner had the time necessary to give it a little rest and order elapsed, than it was conducted to Rennes, for the purpose of joining the 6000 or 7000 men of the army of Brest, commanded by Rossignol. There, in a council of war, the measures to be adopted for resuming the pursuit of the Vendéans were settled. Chalbos having obtained permission to retire into the interior to renovate his health, Rossignol received from the representatives the command-in-chief of the armies of the west and of Brest, forming in the whole 20,000 or 21,000 men. It was resolved that both armies should proceed with all dispatch to Antrain; that General Tribout, who was at Dol with 3000 or 4000 men, should move on Pontorson; and that General Sepher, who led 6000 soldiers of the army of Cherbourg, should follow in the wake of the Vendéans. Thus, encompassed by the ocean, the troops at Pontorson, the army at Antrain, and Sepher, who was already approaching Avranches, those unfortunate fugitives seemed doomed to speedy destruction.

All these dispositions were executed at the moment the Vendéans quitted Avranches, and seized upon the bridge at Beaux in their way to Pontorson. It was now the 18th November (28th Brumaire). General Tribout, a declaimer profoundly ignorant of war, had, effectually to defend Pontorson, merely to occupy a narrow road passing through a marsh which covered the town and could not be turned. In so advantageous a position he might have prevented the Vendéans from advancing a single step. But the instant he descried the enemy, he abandoned his defile and moved forward. The Vendéans, encouraged by their easy capture of the bridge at Beaux, fell vigorously upon him, compelled him to recoil, and, profiting by the disorder of his retreat, rushed at his heels into the causeway traversing the marsh, and thus rendered themselves masters of Pontorson, from all approach to which they might have been so easily foiled.

Owing to this unpardonable blunder, an unexpected route lay open to the Vendéans. They could march on Dol; but from Dol they must proceed to Antrain, and pass through the mass of the grand republican army. However, they evacuated Pontorson and advanced on Dol. Westermann hovered in pursuit. Still impetuous as ever, he urged Marigny and his grenadiers onward, and daringly followed the Vendéans even to Dol, with a mere advanced guard. Despite his discrepancy of force, he immediately attacked and drove them precipitately into the town; but speedily regaining courage, they poured out of Dol, and by that destructive fire they knew so well how to maintain, they compelled the republican advanced guard to retire a considerable distance.

Kléber, who continued to direct the army by his counsels, although another ranked as its commander, proposed, with the view of achieving the complete reduction of the Vendéans, to blockade them, and thus ensure their extermination by the ravages of famine, disease, and destitution. Disbandings were so frequent among the republican troops, that a direct attack exposed them to dangerous chances. On the other hand, by fortifying Antrain, Pontorson, and Dinan, the Vendéans would be enclosed between the sea and three intrenched points; and by subjecting them to daily harassings from Westermann and Marigny, their destruction must inevitably ensue. The representatives approved this plan, and orders were issued in conformity. But an officer suddenly arrived from Westermann, who stated that if his general were seconded, and Dol assailed from Antrain, whilst he was attacking it on the side of Pontorson, the Catholic army was doomed, and its annihilation certain. The representatives were dazzled with this proposition. Prieur de la Marne, equally ardent with Westermann himself, caused the plan previously arranged to be set aside; and it was ultimately resolved that Marceau, at the head of a column, should march on Dol concurrently with Westermann.

On the morning of the 21st Westermann advanced on Dol. In his impatience for action, he took no heed whether Marceau's column, appointed to co-operate from Antrain, was arrived on the field of battle, but began the attack without a moment's delay. The Vendéans answered his onslaught with their deadly volleys. Westermann deployed his infantry, and still kept gaining on his foes; but the cartridges began to

fail, whereupon he was obliged to make a retrograde movement, and he proceeded to establish himself on an eminence in the background. The Vendéans, eager to pursue their advantage, rushed upon his column and dispersed it. In the mean time, Marceau arrived in sight of Dol; the victorious Vendéans united against him, but he resisted with fortitude till the close of day, and succeeded in maintaining himself on the field of battle. But his position was extremely critical, and he sent to Kléber demanding from him succour and advice. Kléber hastened on the summons, and recommended him to take up a very strong, but certainly a retrograde position, in the environs of Trans. He was still hesitating to follow the opinion of Kléber, when the appearance of the Vendéan riflemen caused a panic amongst his troops. They forthwith disbanded, but were speedily rallied on the position indicated by Kléber.

After these reverses, Kléber again urged the original plan he had propounded, which consisted in fortifying Antrain. It was favourably received; but instead of returning to Antrain, it was determined to remain at Trans, and there throw up fortifications, with the view of being nearer the enemy at Dol. Upon some sudden impulse, however, with the fickleness usually evinced in its deliberations, the council again revoked its decision, and once more resolved upon the offensive, regardless of the lesson so recently taught. A reinforcement was detached to Westermann, with orders to attack on his side simultaneously with the principal army from Trans.

Kléber in vain objected that Westermann's troops, discouraged by their yesterday's overthrow, could not be depended upon; the representatives insisted, and the attack was fixed for the morrow. On the following day, in fact, the movement was executed. Westermann and Marigny were anticipated and assailed by the enemy. Their troops, although supported by a reinforcement, broke rank and fled. The generals made all possible efforts to stop them; in vain they gathered a few resolute warriors around them; they were speedily swept off the ground. The Vendéans, completely victorious, left that point and moved to their right, on the army advancing from Trans.

Whilst they were gaining this advantage, and preparing to obtain a second, the roar of the cannon had struck terror throughout the town of Dol, and into the hearts of those amongst the Vendéans who had not yet come forth to combat. The women, old men, and children, mingled with the stalwart poltroons, hurried from all quarters, and fled in the direction of Dinan and the sea. Their priests, holding the cross aloft, squandered fruitless exhortations to stay their precipitancy. Stofflet and Larochejacquelein flew in every direction to allay their fears. At length they succeeded in rallying and diverting them into the road from Trans, in the track of their courageous comrades already far in advance.

A confusion not less deplorable reigned in the principal camp of the republicans. Rossignol and the representatives, all commanding at once, could neither concert nor act. Kléber and Marceau, oppressed with chagrin, had advanced to reconnoitre the ground and check the progress of the Vendéans. Arriving in front of the enemy, Kléber attempted to deploy the vanguard of the army of Brest, but it disbanded at the first volley. He then brought forward the brigade of Canuel, composed in part of the Mayence battalions: these, true to their old renown, resisted throughout the day, and remained alone on the field of battle, forsaken by the rest of the army. But the Vendéan band which had defeated Westermann eventually took them in flank and forced them to retreat. The Vendéans, pushing their advantage, pursued them even to the outskirts of Antrain. That town being no longer tenable, the whole republican army executed a timely retrogression to Rennes.

Now was made manifest all the wisdom of Kléber's counsels. Rossignol, under one of those generous movements whereof he was capable, notwithstanding his repugnance to the Mayence generals, appeared in the council of war with a scroll containing his resignation. "I am not made," so he spoke, "to command an army. Give me a battalion, and I will do my duty; but I am incapable of wielding the command-in-chief. Here, therefore, is my resignation; and if you refuse it, you are enemies to the republic." "Put up thy resignation!" exclaimed Prieur de la Marne, "thou art the first-born of the committee of public welfare. We will give thee generals who will advise thee, and who will cover thy responsibility for the events of the war." Thereupon Kléber, deeply afflicted at the unskilful conduct which paralysed the army, proposed a plan, assuredly the only one adapted to meet the exigency of affairs, but little in accordance with the prepossessions of the representatives. Leaving Rossignol in his rank of generalissimo, he inculcated the necessity of nominating a commander-in-chief of the troops, a commander of the cavalry, and another of the artillery. His suggestion was adopted. He had then the courage to propose Marceau as commander-in-chief of the troops, Westermann as commander of the cavalry, and Debilly as commander of the artillery—all three obnoxious to jealousy as members of the Mayence faction. A momentary contest arose respecting the individuals, but the point was conceded, all bowing to the ascendancy of that able and generous warrior, who loved the republic, not from a mere ebullition of enthusiasm, but in sober preference—a man who served with admirable fidelity and disinterestedness, and possessed, in a rare degree, zeal and genius for his calling. Kléber had recommended Marceau because he swayed that young and gallant officer, and could rely on his entire devotedness. He was assured, if Rossignol adhered to his non-intervention, that he himself would exercise the supreme guidance, and bring the war to a happy termination.

The division of Cherbourg, which had arrived from Normandy, was conjoined with the armies of the west and of Brest, and the united forces quitted Rennes to proceed towards Angers, where the Vendéans were attempting to pass the Loire. These, having secured the means of return, by their twofold victory towards Pontorson and Antrain, had determined to re-enter their own country. They repassed through Fougères and Laval without opposition, and projected the seizure of Angers, with the design of crossing the Loire at the bridge of Cé. The unfortunate experiment they had lately tried at Granville had not sufficiently convinced them of their incapacity to take walled towns. On the 3d December they penetrated into the suburbs of Angers, and opened their volleys on the front of the fortress. They persevered during the following day; but however great their ardour to cut a way to their home, wherefrom merely the Loire now separated them, they quickly despaired of success. The arrival of Westermann's vanguard in the course of the same day, the 4th, completed their discouragement, and decided them to abandon the enterprise. They moved dejectedly away, remounting the Loire, ignorant of where they might accomplish its passage. One party urged the ascent to Saumur, another to Blois; but Kléber, unexpectedly appearing with his division along the Saumur highway, cut short their deliberations, and constrained them to sweep once more into Brittany. Behold, then, those forlorn fugitives, destitute of food, clothes, or vehicles to convey their families, and afflicted with a wasting epidemic, again wandering over Brittany, in fruitless quest of an asylum or an outlet! The roads were strewed with their wrecks; and on the bivouac before Angers many women and children were found dead from cold and hunger. Now the idea began to be entertained amongst them that the wrath of the convention was pointed against their chiefs alone, and numbers threw away their arms hoping to escape

unobserved across the fields. At length the accounts they heard of Mans, touching the abundance there to be found, and the friendly dispositions of the inhabitants, determined them to proceed thither. They marched through La Flèche, into which they forced their way, and entered Mans after a trifling skirmish.

The republican army followed them. Fresh quarrels had arisen amongst its generals. Kléber had overawed the malecontents by his firmness, and obliged the representatives to countermand Rossignol, with his division of the army of Brest, to Rennes. An ordinance of the committee of public welfare next arrived, investing Marceau with the title of commander-in-chief, and superseding all the Mayence generals, leaving to Marceau, however, the privilege of provisionally employing Kléber. Marceau declared that he would not assume the command unless Kléber were at his side to regulate all things. "In accepting this title," said Marceau to Kléber, "I take the rebuffs and the responsibility on myself, and I leave to you the real command and the means of saving the army." "Be at ease, my friend," replied Kléber, "we will fight and get guillotined together."

The march was forthwith commenced, and, from this moment, all was conducted with unity and firmness. The vanguard under Westermann reached Mans on the 12th December, and immediately charged the Vendéans. The latter were thrown into confusion; but a few thousand of their bravest troops, led by Larochejacquelein, contrived to form in front of the town, and forced Westermann to fall back on Marceau, who was approaching with a division. Kléber was still considerably behind with the rest of the army. Westermann proposed to make an instant assault, although it was dark. Marceau, moved by his gallant fervour, but dreading the rebuke of Kléber, whose stern and imperturbable judgment no vivacity could overbear, hesitated; but at length, unable to resist Westermann's importunities, he yielded and attacked Mans. The tocsin tolled its dismal knell, and consternation was paramount within the town. Westermann and Marceau, rushing onward amid the gloom, overthrew all before them, and, despite a galling fire from the houses, succeeded in driving the great bulk of the Vendéans into the large market-place. Marceau caused the streets leading into this square on his right and left to be occupied, and thus held the Vendéans blockaded. His position, nevertheless, was not free from hazard; since, entangled in a town, and enveloped in darkness, he might have been turned and surrounded. He therefore dispatched a courier to Kléber, pressing him to hasten with all speed to his assistance. It was dawn, however, before he came up. The greater number of the Vendéans had fled. The bravest alone remained, striving to protect the retreat: the republicans charged them with fixed bayonets, pierced their ranks, put them to rout, and began a horrible carnage throughout the town.

Never had defeat been more destructive. A multitude of women, left behind, were made prisoners. Marceau saved a young female who had lost her parents, and who in her despair begged for death. She was bashful and beautiful; Marceau, full of scrupulous delicacy, removed her into his carriage, respected her misfortunes, and caused her to be placed in safety. The fields were covered far and wide with mementos of this great disaster. The indefatigable Westermann hunted the flying horde, and choked the avenues with mangled bodies. The wretched Vendéans, knowing not where to hide their heads, crowded into Laval for the third time, and forthwith evacuated it to again seek refuge on the Loire. They purposed to repass it at Ancenis. Larochejacquelein and Stofflet crossed to the opposite shore, with the design, it is stated, of proceeding in quest of boats, and bringing them to the right bank. They returned no more. We are assured that their return was impracticable. The passage could not be effected. The Vendéans, deprived of the presence and support of their two leaders, continued to descend the Loire, always pursued and always vainly searching for the means of transit. At length, driven to despair, completely at a loss whither to betake themselves, they adopted the last resource of flying to the extremity of Brittany, into Morbihan. They repaired to Blain, where their rearguard gained an advantage, and from Blain to Savenay, whence they hoped to make good their entry into Morbihan.

The republicans had followed them without intermission, and they arrived at Savenay on the evening of the day it was occupied by them. Savenay had the Loire on the left, marshes on the right, and a wood in front. Kléber perceived the importance of immediately occupying the wood, and rendering himself master of all the heights, so as to overwhelm the Vendéans on the following day in the town itself, before they had time to leave it. Accordingly, he let loose the vanguard upon them, whilst he himself, seizing the moment when the Vendéans debouched from the wood to repel the vanguard, charged furiously into the midst, and swept them from the shelter. They fled into Savenay, and there ensconced themselves, maintaining, however, throughout the night a continuous fire. Westermann and the representatives urged an immediate assault, eager that the work of destruction might be consummated before another day dawned. Kléber, determined that no mischance should snatch an assured victory from his grasp, pronounced decisively that no attack should be hazarded; after which declaration, resolving himself into a fixed composure, he took no further part in the debate, nor replied to any provocation. He thus prevented every species of movement.

On the morrow, the 23d December, before daybreak, Kléber and Marceau were on horseback traversing the lines, when the Vendéans, hopeless of surviving the day, and frantic with despair, first rushed precipitately upon the republicans. Marceau led the centre, Canuel the right, and Kléber the left. All charged together, and drove back the Vendéans into their quarters. Marceau and Kléber met in the town, collected all the cavalry within hail, and dashed forward in pursuit of the enemy. The Loire and the marshes cut off all retreat; numbers fell by the bayonet, many were made prisoners, and a few found means to escape. On that day, the army was utterly extinguished, and the great war of La Vendée veritably concluded.

Thus that unfortunate population, exiled from its native land by the imprudence of its chiefs, and reduced to wander in quest of a port, anticipating succour from the English, had after all ineffectually gained the shores of the ocean. Unable to take Granville, it had been driven back on the Loire; unable to repass that river, it had been a second time forced into Brittany, and from Brittany upon the Loire again. At last, unsuccessful in all attempts to clear that fatal barrier, it had met its final doom at Savenay, between the Loire and the marshes. Westermann and his troop of cavalry were left to pursue the straggling fugitives. Kléber and Marceau returned to Nantes. Welcomed by the inhabitants of that town, they obtained a species of triumph, and were rewarded by the Jacobin Club with civic crowns.

If we cast a comprehensive retrospect over this memorable campaign of 1793, we shall scarcely refrain from deeming it the greatest effort ever made by a threatened community. In the year 1792, the coalition, not then complete, had acted without combination or energy. The Prussians had attempted an abortive invasion in Champagne; the Austrians had contented themselves with bombarding Lille in Flanders. The French, in their first enthusiasm, repulsed the Prussians beyond the Rhine, and the Austrians beyond the Meuse, and conquered Belgium, Mayence, Savoy, and the county of Nice. The year 1793 opened

in a very different manner. The coalition was strengthened by three powers which had hitherto remained neutral. Spain, provoked to extremity by the 21st January, had concentrated 50,000 men on the Pyrenees. France had obliged Pitt to declare himself; and England and Holland had simultaneously entered into the coalition, which was thus doubled, and which, better instructed of the resources of the enemy it had to encounter, augmented its forces and prepared for a decisive effort. Thus France, as under Louis XIV., had to sustain the assault of combined Europe; with this difference, that it had not stimulated the present confluence of foes by its ambition, but by the just indignation wherewith it resented the interference of foreign powers in its domestic affairs.

In the month of March, Dumouriez took the initiative in an enterprise of great temerity—he attempted to overrun Holland by pushing to its core in boats. In the interim, Cobourg surprised his lieutenants, drove them beyond the Meuse, and constrained him to hasten in person to the head of his army. Dumouriez was obliged to hazard the battle of Neerwinden. That disastrous field was almost won, when the left wing recoiled and repassed the Gette; thenceforth the contest became one of retreat, and the French lost Belgium in a few days. Then reverses fomenting altercations, Dumouriez quarrelled with his government and passed over to the Austrians. At the same moment, Custine, discomfited at Frankfort, thrown back on the Rhine, and finally separated from Mayence, left the Prussians at liberty to blockade that famous stronghold, and commence its siege; the Piedmontese triumphed at Saorgio; the Spaniards swept the Pyrenees; and, lastly, the western provinces, previously deprived of their priests, and further driven to exasperation by the levy of 300,000 men, burst into revolt under the banner of the throne and the altar. It was then that the Mountain, infuriated by the defection of Dumouriez, the defeats sustained in the Low Countries, on the Rhine, and in the Alps, and above all by the insurrection of the west, cast aside every restraining influence, tore by force the Girondists from the sanctuary of the convention, and thus repudiated all who might for the future speak the language of moderation. This new outrage provoked new enemies. Sixty-seven departments out of eighty-three arose against the government, which had then to contend against Europe, royalist La Vendée, and three-fourths of France. Such was the epoch when the camp of Famars and the brave Dampierre were lost, when the blockade of Valenciennes was consummated, when Mayence was on the verge of capture, when the Spaniards passed the Tech and menaced Perpignan, when the Vendéans took Saumur and besieged Nantes, when the federalists were preparing to pour from Lyons, Marseilles, Bordeaux, and Caen, on Paris, the metropolis.

From all points a bold march on the capital was feasible, whereby the revolution might have been terminated in a few days, and European civilisation postponed indefinitely. Fortunately, its enemies were content to besiege fortresses. We recollect with what firmness the convention subjugated the departments by an imposing show of authority, and by dispersing the imprudent federalists who had advanced to Vernon; we recollect, also, with what vigour the Vendéans were repulsed from Nantes and arrested in their victorious march. But whilst the convention triumphed over federalism, its other enemies were making alarming progress. Valenciennes and Mayence were taken after memorable sieges; the war of federalism involved two disastrous events, the siege of Lyons and the treason of Toulon; and La Vendée itself, although confined to the lines of the Loire, the sea, and Poitou, by the successful resistance of Nantes, had recently overthrown the columns of Westermann and Labarolière, who had endeavoured to penetrate into its interior. Never had the situation been more critical. The allies were no longer stayed by sieges in the north and on the Rhine; Lyons and Toulon offered solid points of support to the Piedmontese; La Vendée appeared unconquerable, and presented tempting means of descent to the English. Then it was that the convention convoked at Paris the delegates of the primary assemblies, gave them the constitution of the year 3 to swear by and defend, and decided with them that all France, men and things, was at the disposal of government. Then was decreed the national levy, generation by generation; and the power affirmed of exacting on requisition all that might be necessary for the war. Then were instituted the great book, and the forced loan upon the rich, with the view of withdrawing a portion of the assignats from circulation, and coercing a speedy realisation of the national domains. Then two large armies were directed on La Vendée; the garrison of Mayence was forwarded thither by post relays; and the resolution was promulgated that that unfortunate country should be laid waste by fire, and the population transported elsewhere. Lastly, then Carnot entered the committee of public welfare, and began to introduce order and combination into the military operations.

The French had lost Cæsar's camp; and Kilmaine, by a skilful retreat, had saved the residue of the army of the north. The English had fastened on Dunkirk, and were prosecuting the siege thereof, whilst the Austrians were attacking Le Quesnoy. A mass was rapidly projected from Lille on the rear of the Duke of York. If Houchard, who commanded upon that occasion 60,000 Frenchmen, had comprehended the plan laid down by Carnot, and moved upon Furnes, not a man in the English army would have escaped. Instead of planting himself between the army of observation and the besieging corps, he pursued a direct march; but at all events forced the siege to be raised by the auspicious battle of Hondtschoote. That victory was the first in the campaign won by France; it saved Dunkirk, excluded the English from all advantage in the war, and restored hope and confidence to the French.

Fresh reverses soon converted this confidence into apprehension. Le Quesnoy was taken by the Austrians; the army of Houchard was seized at Menin with a panic, and dispersed; the Prussians and Austrians, to whose progress no material obstacle interposed since the reduction of Mayence, advanced on the two flanks of the Vosges, menaced the lines of Weissembourg, and defeated the French in various encounters. The Lyonnese resisted with energy; the Piedmontese had recovered Savoy and descended towards Lyons with the design of placing the French army between two fires; Ricardos had passed the Tet and swept beyond Perpignan; and, lastly, in the west, the division of the troops into two armies, that of La Rochelle and that of Brest, had caused the plan of campaign arranged at Saumur on the 2d September to miscarry. Canclaux, ill seconded by Rossignol, had found himself unsupported in the heart of La Vendée, and been obliged to fall back on Nantes. The crisis called forth new efforts: the dictatorship was completed, and announced by the institution of the revolutionary government; the power of the committee of public welfare was augmented proportionably with the increase of danger; the levies were enforced, and the armies swelled by multitudes of conscripts; the new recruits served as garrisons, and permitted the organised troops to be draughted into the line; finally, the convention enjoined the armies to conquer within a given interval.

The measures adopted by the government produced their inevitable effects. The reinforced armies of the north were concentrated at Lille and Guise. The allies were fixed at Maubeuge, which they resolved to take before the close of the campaign. Jourdan, proceeding from Guise, gave the Austrians battle at Watignies, and raised the siege of Maubeuge, as Hou-

chard had raised that of Dunkirk. The Piedmontese were driven beyond the Saint-Bernard by Kellermann; Lyons, enveloped by levies *en masse*, was carried by assault; Ricardos was repulsed beyond the Tet; finally, the two armies of La Rochelle and Brest, united under one leader, Léchelle, who devolved the active command on Kléber, overwhelmed the Vendéans at Chollet, and compelled them to cross the Loire as fugitives.

A solitary reverse troubled the general joy which such events were calculated to produce—the lines of Weissembourg were forced. But the committee of public welfare determined not to close the campaign until they were retaken. Young Hoche, general of the army of the Moselle, had failed, despite his intrepidity, at Kayserlautern; but though defeated, he was encouraged. Foiled in his enterprise against Brunswick, he fell on the flank of Wurmser. Then, the two armies of the Rhine and the Moselle conjoined, repelled the Austrians beyond Weissembourg, constrained Brunswick to follow his allies' retrograde movement, broke the blockade of Landau, and encamped in the Palatinate. Toulon was reduced by a brilliant conception and a signal display of valour. The Vendéans, who were thought to be destroyed, but who in their despair had migrated, to the number of 80,000 souls, across the Loire, and were seeking for a port to invite succour from the English, were rejected from the shores of the ocean, equally so from the banks of the Loire; and between those two barriers, which they found impassable, were ultimately extinguished. On the Pyrenees alone the French arms had been unfortunate, but the loss was confined to the line of the Tech, and the army still encamped in advance of Perpignan.

Thus, this famous and terrible year shows us Europe pressing upon the revolution with all its force, exacting from it an atonement for its first successes in 1792, sweeping its armies far into the background, and penetrating by all the frontiers at once; and a portion of France breaking into insurgency, and adding its hostile efforts to those of foreign powers. Then was the revolution lashed to fury; its first ebullition of vengeance ended in the 31st May, whereby it aroused new enemies against itself, and seemed ready to succumb before banded Europe and three-fourths of the French provinces. But it speedily reduced its internal enemies to submission, raised a million of men, defeated the English at Hondtschoote, was beaten in turn, redoubled its efforts, gained a battle at Watignies, recovered the lines of Weissembourg, repelled the Piedmontese beyond the Alps, took Lyons and Toulon, and twice overwhelmed the Vendéans—once in La Vendée itself, and, secondly and lastly, in Brittany. Never was a grander spectacle, or one more worthy to be commended to the admiration and imitation of nations. France had recovered all it had lost, except Condé, Valenciennes, and a few forts in Roussillon: the powers of Europe, on the contrary, though all combined in hostilities against one, had gained nothing, but were left to expend their wrath in mutual accusations, and to fasten on each other the stigma of disgrace. France completed the organisation of its resources, and prepared to assume a more formidable aspect in the following year.

CHAPTER XXXI.

CONTEST BETWEEN THE HEBERTISTS AND DANTONISTS. —THE COMMITTEE OF PUBLIC WELFARE PLACES ITSELF BETWEEN THE TWO PARTIES.—FAMINE IN PARIS. — EFFORTS OF THE HEBERTISTS. — ARREST AND DEATH OF HEBERT, CHAUMETTE, &c.—ARREST, TRIAL, AND EXECUTION OF DANTON, CAMILLE-DESMOULINS, &c.

THE convention had already adopted certain rigorous measures against the turbulent faction of the Cordeliers and the ministerial agents. Ronsin and Vincent were in prison. Their partisans, however, were not scared from agitation. Momoro at the Cordelier, and Hébert at the Jacobin Club, laboured to excite in favour of their friends the influence of the revolutionary zealots. The Cordeliers framed a petition, and, in terms far from respectful, demanded whether it was intended to punish Vincent and Ronsin for having courageously assailed Dumouriez, Custine, and Brissot; declaring, moreover, that, for themselves, they regarded those two citizens as excellent patriots, and would always uphold them as members of their society. The Jacobins presented a more guarded petition, whereof the prayer urged only a speedy report upon Vincent and Ronsin, in order that they might be punished if they were culpable, or restored to liberty if they were innocent.

The committee of public welfare abstained from any intimation of its purpose. Collot-d'Herbois alone, although a member of the committee, and a bounden partisan of the government, evinced an active zeal in behalf of Ronsin. His motive was very obvious: the cause of Vincent did not affect him; but that of Ronsin, an envoy to Lyons with himself, and the executive instrument of his own remorseless ordinances, touched him most nearly. Collot-d'Herbois had maintained with Ronsin that but a hundredth part of the Lyonnese could be ranked as patriots, and that policy imperatively demanded that the vast residue should be banished or slain, the Rhone covered with corpses, the southern departments dismayed by the spectacle, and the rebellious city of Toulon, in particular, struck with consternation. Ronsin had been incarcerated for repeating these horrible expressions in a placard. Collot-d'Herbois, recalled to give an account of his mission, had naturally every inducement to vindicate the conduct of Ronsin, since the approval of his own was involved in the issue. Meanwhile, a petition from certain citizens of Toulon arrived, wherein a most harrowing picture of the calamities inflicted on that city was set forth. It described the massacres by grape-shot succeeding the slower executions by the guillotine, and recounted the horrors of an immense population threatened with extermination, and of a fair and productive city demolished, not by the pick-axe alone, but by the rapid agency of mines. This petition, which four citizens had manifested sufficient hardihood to sign, produced a mournful impression on the convention. Collot-d'Herbois hastened to present his report, and, in his revolutionary frenzy, he therein exhibited those execrable enormities in the light they appeared to his own distorted fancy; that is to say, as indispensable and perfectly natural. "The Lyonnese," he said, in substance, "were vanquished, but they openly declared they would shortly wreak their revenge. Hence the necessity to impress those still refractory rebels with terror, as likewise all disposed to imitate them; hence the necessity of a prompt and terrible example. The ordinary instrument of death lacked the requisite dispatch, and the hammer was but a tardy medium of demolition. Therefore, grape-shot was put in requisition for persons, and the mine for buildings. They who had suffered had all imbued their hands in the blood of patriots. A popular commission had selected them, after a rapid but searching inspection, from out the multitude of prisoners, and no cause of regret existed for any of the doomed."

Collot-d'Herbois prevailed to extort from the astounded convention an acquiescence in deeds that seemed to himself so irreproachable; and he subsequently repaired to the Jacobin Club to complain of the difficulty he had encountered in justifying his conduct, and of the commiseration testified for the Lyonnese. "This morning," he said, "I have needed circumlocutions to get the death of traitors sanctioned. There were tears, and piteous questions *whether they had died at the first discharge*. At the first discharge—

for counter-revolutionists! And Chalier died, forsooth, at the first stroke.* 'You anxiously inquire,' I said to the convention, 'how those men died who were covered with the blood of our brethren! And if they were not dead, you would not be deliberating here!' What think you? They would scarcely endure this language! They could not bear to hear of the dead; they were terrified at the idea of their ghosts!" Then referring to Ronsin, Collot-d'Herbois stated that he had partaken all the dangers of the patriots in the south, that he had there braved with himself the poniards of the aristocrats, and displayed the greatest firmness in enforcing respect for the authority of the republic; moreover, that at this moment all the aristocrats were gladdened at his arrest, and drew from it an augury of hope for themselves. "What has Ronsin done to merit imprisonment?" added Collot. "I have asked the question of all I meet, but none can solve it." In the sitting of the following day, 3d Nivose, Collot, resuming the subject, announced the death of the patriot Gaillard, who, seeing the convention hesitate to approve the energy deployed at Lyons, had committed suicide. "Did I deceive you," exclaimed he, "when I told you that the patriots would be driven to despair, if public spirit began to sink here?"

Thus, two important leaders of the ultra-revolutionists being immured, their partisans laboured diligently in their behalf. The clubs and the convention were importuned with remonstrances against their detention, and even a member of the committee of public welfare, being compromised in their sanguinary system, defended them in self-vindication. Their adversaries began, on their side, to prosecute the attack with redoubled vigour. Philippeaux, who had just returned from La Vendée boiling with indignation against the staff of Saumur, was eager that the committee of public welfare, participating his own wrathful animosity, should discern treachery in the non-success of the plan of campaign fixed on the 2d September, and institute proceedings in consequence against Rossignol, Ronsin, and certain others. We have already explained how many were the reciprocal wrongs, the misunderstandings, and the incompatibilities of character, which signalised the conduct of that war. Rossignol and the staff of Saumur had evinced reprehensible acrimony, but no treachery; and the committee, although disposed to regard them unfavourably, could not consign them to a condemnation neither just nor politic. Robespierre was desirous that friendly explanations should be exchanged; but Philippeaux, too impatient to brook delay, composed a virulent pamphlet, wherein he recounted all the circumstances of the war, and mingled many errors with a large amount of truth. This production was calculated to provoke a lively sensation, for it assailed the most decided revolutionists, and accused them of hideous treasons. "What has Ronsin done?" inquired Philippeaux; "intrigued, robbed, and lied! His only expedition is that of the 18th September, and in that he contrived to have 45,000 patriots overwhelmed by 3000 brigands. It was that fatal day of Coron, when, after disposing our artillery in a gorge, at the head of a column six leagues in flank, he concealed himself in a stable, like a cowardly knave, two leagues from the field of battle, and when our unfortunate comrades were destroyed by their own cannon." From this specimen, we may judge that the expressions in Philippeaux's publication were not peculiarly choice or guarded. Unfortunately, too, the committee of public welfare, which he ought, upon every principle of policy, to have interested in his favour, was not treated with becoming respect. Philippeaux, irritated at finding his indignation but coldly partaken, impliedly attributed to the committee some of the delinquencies he charged upon Ronsin, and even used this offensive phrase—"*If you had only been deceived.*"

The work, as we have stated, produced a considerable sensation. Camille-Desmoulins was unacquainted with Philippeaux; but, gratified to learn that in La Vendée the ultra-revolutionists were equally obnoxious as at Paris, and not imagining that excess of anger had so blinded Philippeaux as to make him convert mere errors into treachery, he read his pamphlet with delight, admired his courage, and said, with his usual frankness, to all he met—"Have you read Philippeaux? Pray, read Philippeaux." Every one, in his opinion, ought to peruse a work which demonstrated the dangers the republic had incurred by means of the faction of exaggerated revolutionists.

Camille was warmly attached to Danton, and the feeling was reciprocated. Both thought that since the republic was placed beyond danger by its recent victories, the time had arrived for putting an end to cruelties henceforth useless; that such cruelties, if further prolonged, could only serve to disgrace the revolution; and that the foreigner alone could desire or instigate their continuation. Camille conceived the project of publishing a new journal which he entitled the *Old Cordelier*, for Danton and he were the oldest members of that celebrated club. The object of the paper was to attack the new revolutionists, who were striving to cast down and sweep over the earliest and best tried revolutionists. Never had this writer, the most remarkable of the revolution, and one of the most natural and lively in the French language, displayed so much grace, originality, and even eloquence. He thus opened his first number (15th Frimaire):—

"Oh Pitt! I pay homage to thy genius! What new emigrants from France to England have offered thee such excellent counsels and means so sure to ruin my country? Thou hast seen that thou wouldst perpetually miscarry against her, unless thou took measures to destroy in public opinion those who, for the last five years, have foiled all thy designs. Thou hast well comprehended that they who have always conquered thee were such as it behoved thee mainly to subdue; that thy surest course lay in causing to be accused of corruption those precisely whom thou hadst been unable to corrupt, and of lukewarmness those whose zeal thou hadst ever failed to cool!" "I have opened my eyes," he added, "and beheld the multitude of our enemies: their numbers roused me from the house of invalids, and carried me again into the conflict. I must write, I must quit the slow pencil of the history of the revolution, which I was drawing at my fireside, to resume the quick and beating pen of the journalist, and follow headforemost the revolutionary torrent. A consulting deputy, whom no one has consulted since the 3d June, I leave my cabinet and easy chair, where I have enjoyed ample leisure to study the new system of our enemies."

Camille highly extolled Robespierre for his conduct at the Jacobin Club, and for the generous aid he had rendered the old patriots; and he expressed himself in the following manner with regard to religion and the proscriptions:—

"With the diseased human mind is necessarily associated the bed of superstitious dreams: and looking at the festivals and processions that are enjoined, the altars and saints that are set up, it seems to me that they do but change the bed of the invalid; save that they take from him the pillow of hope in an after life. For myself, I thus spoke the very day on which I saw Gobel come to the bar, with his double cross borne in triumph before the philosopher Anaxagoras.* If it were not a crime of *lese-Mountain* to suspect a president of the Jacobins and a procurator of the commune, such as Clootz and Chaumette, I should be tempted to believe that at the tidings of Barrère, 'La Vendée exists no longer,' the King of Prussia

* That Mountaineer, condemned to death by the Lyonnese federalists, had been awkwardly executed by the hangman, who required three attempts before he succeeded in severing the head from the body.

* A name assumed by Chaumette.

mournfully cried out, 'All our efforts, then, will fail against the republic, since the nucleus of La Vendée is destroyed;' and that the subtle Luchesini, to console him, might thus address him—'Invincible hero, I discern a resource; leave me to develop it. I will buy some priests to confess themselves cheats, and inflame the patriotism of others to make a similar declaration. There are at Paris two famous patriots, who will be, by their talents, their exaggerations, and their well-known religious ideas, admirably adapted to receive and second our impressions. All we have to do is, to instruct our friends in France to act in concert with the two great philosophers Anacharsis and Anaxagoras, to stir up their bile effectually, and to dazzle their civism by the rich temptation of the sacristies. [I hope that Chaumette will not complain of this inuendo; the Marquis de Luchesini cannot speak of him in more honourable terms.] Anacharsis and Anaxagoras will imagine they are driving the wheel of reason, whilst it will be that of the counter-revolution; and instead of allowing papistry, now ready to heave its last groan, quietly to expire from decay and inanition, I promise you that, by intolerance and persecution against those who want to mass and be massed, many will be the recruits forced into the ranks of Lescure and Larochejacquelein.'"

Subsequently reverting to the era of the Roman emperors, and pretending to give merely a translation from Tacitus, Camille made a startling allusion to the law against "the suspected." "In former times, at Rome," said he, "according to Tacitus, there was a law specifying crimes of lese-majesty and against the state, and inflicting capital punishment. These crimes of lese-majesty under the republic had never exceeded four kinds—if an army had been abandoned in a hostile country; if seditions were excited; if the members of the constituted bodies had wickedly administered the affairs or the finances of the commonwealth; if the majesty of the Roman people had been degraded. The emperors only required to add a few articles to this law, in order to include in the proscription an indefinite number of citizens, and even entire cities. Augustus was the first to extend this law of lese-majesty, by comprehending within it writings he called counter-revolutionary. Shortly the applications stretched beyond all limitation. When words had become state crimes, only a single step was needed to convert into evidences of treason mere expressions of countenance, melancholy, compassion, sighs, silence itself.

Soon it was adjudged a crime of lese-majesty, or counter-revolution, in the town of Nursia, the rearing of a monument to its inhabitants killed at the siege of Modena; a crime of counter-revolution in Drusus, the inquiry from fortune-tellers whether he should not one day possess great wealth; a crime of counter-revolution in the writer Cremuntius Cordus, having styled Brutus and Cassius the last of the Romans; a crime of counter-revolution in a descendant of Cassius, having in his house a portrait of his ancestor; a crime of counter-revolution in Marcus Scaurus, having composed a tragedy containing a verse capable of two interpretations; a crime of counter-revolution in Torquatus Silanus, spending profusely; a crime of counter-revolution in Petræus, having had a dream about Claudius; a crime of counter-revolution in Pomponius, that a friend of Sejanus had sought an asylum in one of his country-houses; a crime of counter-revolution to deplore the calamities of the times, for that was to arraign the government; a crime of counter-revolution not to invoke the divine spirit of Caligula. For having failed therein, numberless citizens were beaten with rods, condemned to mines or wild beasts, and some even sawed through the body. Lastly, it was a crime of counter-revolution in the mother of the consul Fusius Germinus, having wept the mournful death of her son.

It was necessary to testify joy at the death of a friend or a relative, if a citizen wished to avoid perishing himself.

Every thing gave umbrage to the tyrant. Had a citizen popularity? He was a rival of the prince, who might excite a civil war. *Studio civium in se verteret, et si multi idem audeant, bellum esse.** SUSPECTED.

Did he, on the contrary, shun popularity, and hold himself secluded within his domicile? Such a retired life caused him to be remarked, gave him consideration. *Quanto metû occultior, tantò plus famâ adeptus.*† SUSPECTED.

Was he rich? There was imminent danger that the people would be corrupted by his largesses. *Auri vim atque opes Pluti, principi infensas.*‡ SUSPECTED.

Was he poor? How now, invincible emperor? Such a man cannot be too closely watched. There is none so enterprising as he who has nothing. *Syllam inopem, undè præcipuam audaciam.*§ SUSPECTED.

Was he of a sombre, melancholy character, or negligent in his attire? What afflicted him was the successful conduct of public affairs. *Hominem publicis bonis mœstum.*‖ SUSPECTED."

Camille-Desmoulins further continued this striking enumeration of the suspected in the same strain, and drew a dismal picture of what was passing at Paris, by narrating what had been done at Rome. If the pamphlet of Philippeaux had produced a powerful sensation, the journal of Camille-Desmoulins had a tenfold greater effect on the public mind. Fifty thousand copies of each number were sold in a few days. The demand from the provinces was very considerable; and it was secretly circulated amongst the prisoners, who now read with delight, and with some degree of hope for themselves, that revolutionist who had been hitherto so odious in their eyes. Camille, without desiring that the prison gates should be thrown open, or the revolution be made to retrograde, advocated the institution of a committee, to be styled "*of clemency*," charged to examine the incarcerated, liberate the citizens confined without sufficient cause, and stay the effusion of blood, where too much had been already shed.

The publications of Philippeaux and Desmoulins exasperated the revolutionary zealots to the last degree, and both were denounced at the Jacobin Club. Hébert assailed them with more than wonted fury, and even proposed to strike the authors from the list of the society. He moreover designated Bourdon [de l'Oise] and Fabre-d'Eglantine as accomplices of Camille-Desmoulins and Philippeaux. It will be remembered that Bourdon [de l'Oise] had purposed, in concert with Goupilleau, to supersede Rossignol; he had since openly quarrelled with the staff of Saumur, and never omitted an opportunity of inveighing against the Ronsin faction in the convention. It was thus he became classed with Philippeaux. Fabre was accused of having taken part in the affair of the false decree, and many were disposed to believe him implicated, although he had been exonerated by Chabot. Feeling his position perilous, and having the worst to fear from a system of extreme severity, he had twice or thrice raised his voice for the system of indulgence, had consequently been altogether discarded by the ultra-revolutionists, and been stigmatised as an "intriguer" in the *Père Duchêne*. The Jacobins, without adopting the violent propositions of Hébert, decided that Philippeaux, Camille-Desmoulins, Bourdon [de l'Oise,] and Fabre-d'Eglantine, should appear at the bar of the club, to give explanations touching their writings and their speeches in the convention.

The sitting at which they were to appear was at-

* [He fixes the hopes of the citizens on himself; and if many be moved by simultaneous audacity, war ensues.]

† [The more secluded by fear, the more sought out by fame.]

‡ [The power of gold, the possession of wealth, is offensive in the eyes of monarchs.]

§ [From indigence sprung Sylla's egregious daring.]

‖ [A man made mournful by the general prosperity.]

tended by a prodigious concourse. The seats were furiously disputed, and some were sold as high as twenty-five francs. It was, in fact, the trial of the two new classes of patriots about to be heard before the all-puissant tribunal of the Jacobins. Philippeaux, although not a member of the society, took his station at the bar, and repeated the charges he had already chronicled, either in his correspondence with the committee of public welfare or in his pamphlet. He treated individuals with no more forbearance than he had previously observed, and twice or thrice gave Hébert the lie direct in most insulting language. These heedless personalities of Philippeaux began to agitate the assemblage, and the sitting threatened to end in tumult, when Danton, ascending the tribune, observed, that in order to judge so grave a question, the utmost attention and calmness were indispensable; that he himself had formed no opinion upon Philippeaux or on the truth of his accusations; that he had already stated to him in person—"Thou must prove thy charges, or carry thy head to the scaffold;" that possibly the only guilt rested with the events; but that, howsoever the case might be, it was necessary that every one should be heard, and, what was of more consequence, be listened to.

Robespierre, speaking after Danton, said that he had not read Philippeaux's pamphlet; that he was merely aware the committee was therein made responsible for the loss of 30,000 men; that the committee had no time to answer libels or carry on a paper war; that at the same time he did not imagine Philippeaux guilty of evil intentions, but led away by his passions. "I do not pretend," Robespierre continued, "to impose silence on the convictions of my colleague; but let him examine himself, and judge whether he be altogether free from vanity and hatred. I consider him urged not less by patriotism than by anger; but let him reflect—let him ponder on the contest he provokes! He will find that the moderates will assume his defence, that the aristocrats will side with him, that the convention itself will be divided, that an opposition party may probably be aroused, which would prove of disastrous import, reviving the struggle through which we have recently passed, and the conspiracies we have had such trouble to suppress." He accordingly besought Philippeaux to weigh his secret motives, and the Jacobins to afford him an attentive hearing.

Than the observations of Robespierre nothing could be more just and appropriate, save that the tone partook too much of the supercilious and dictatorial qualities which had more remarkably characterised all his speeches since he had attained undoubted sway over the Jacobins. Philippeaux resumed, fell back into his former personalities, and provoked fresh disturbance. Danton exclaimed, in an accent of impatience, that "it behoved them to cut short such quarrels, and at once to name a commission to examine the documents adducible in the case." Couthon objected that, before having recourse to such an expedient, it was fitting they should be satisfied that the question at issue was worth the trouble—that, in fact, it was not merely a dispute between man and man; and he proposed to demand from Philippeaux whether on his soul and conscience he believed there had been treachery. Then addressing Philippeaux—"Dost thou believe," said he to him, "on thy soul and conscience, there has been treachery?" "Yes," imprudently answered Philippeaux. "In that case," resumed Couthon, "there is no other mode of proceeding: it is incumbent on us to nominate a commission which shall hear the accused and the accusers, and make its report to the society." The proposition was adopted, and the commission named was instructed to examine, besides the accusations advanced by Philippeaux, the conduct of Bourdon [de l'Oise], Fabre-d'Eglantine, and Camille-Desmoulins.

This occurrence took place on the 3d Nivose (23d December). During the interval occupied by the commission in framing its report, the war by pen and word of mouth raged without intermission. The Cordeliers excluded Camille-Desmoulins from their club. They likewise drew up fresh petitions on behalf of Ronsin and Vincent, and marched to communicate them to the Jacobins, for the purpose of engaging the latter to support them before the convention. That crowd of adventurers and dissolute characters, too, with whom the revolutionary army had been filled, appeared every where throughout the capital, in the promenades, the taverns, the cafés, and the theatres, distinguished by worsted epaulettes and mustaches, making a prodigious clamour for Ronsin their general, and Vincent their minister. They were surnamed the *Epauletters*, and were much dreaded in Paris. Since the law interdicting the sections from assembling more than twice during the week, those assemblies had resolved themselves into popular societies of a most turbulent character. There were generally two of these societies in each section, and all parties interested in provoking a movement distributed their agents amongst them. The epauletters failed not to frequent such congenial arenas, and, by their assistance, tumult and uproar usually predominated in all.

Robespierre, still firm and inflexible, prevailed with the Jacobins to repudiate the petition of the Cordeliers, and induced them, moreover, to disown all the popular societies formed since the 31st of May. These were acts of energy at once prudential and laudable. The committee, at the same time, amidst all these strenuous efforts to put down the turbulent faction, was obliged to take care lest it might be charged with mild and moderate tendencies. For the preservation of its popularity and strength, it was necessary that it should exert the same rigour against the opposite faction. Wherefore, on the 5th Nivose (25th December), Robespierre was appointed to draw up a new report upon the principles of the revolutionary government, and to adduce reasons for adopting measures of severity against certain eminent prisoners. Always intent, as well from policy as from belief, to charge all disorders upon the pretended foreign faction, he imputed to it the faults of both moderates and zealots. "The foreign courts have vomited on France," he said, "all the artful miscreants whom they hold in their pay. These sit in our administrative bodies, and creep into our sectional assemblies and our clubs; they have even appeared in the national representation; they direct, and will eternally direct, the counter-revolution upon the same plan. They hover around us, surprising our secrets, fomenting our passions, and labouring to influence us even in our opinions." Pursuing this strain, Robespierre exhibited them as alternately stimulating to exaggeration or depressing to effeminacy; exciting at Paris a persecution against religion, and in La Vendée a war of fanaticism; assassinating Lepelletier and Marat, and then agitating amongst the populace, to procure them the assignment of divine honours, with the view of rendering their memory ridiculous and odious; giving to or withholding from the people the necessaries of life, causing specie to appear or disappear at pleasure, and, in short, profiting by all accidents to turn them to account against the revolution and France. Thus, summing up all the evils besetting France at the time, which his prepossessions forbade him to view as inevitable, he attributed them to the foreigner, who, doubtless, might rejoice at them, but had, for his share in their provocation, merely to rely on the inherent vices of human nature, and could never have supplied by conspiracies any agency nearly so effective. In conclusion, denouncing as accomplices of the coalition all the distinguished prisoners still surviving, he proposed to send them forthwith before the revolutionary tribunal. Accordingly, Dietrich, Mayor of Strasburg, Custine, son to the unfortunate general of that name, Biron, and other officers obnoxious as friends of Dumouriez, Custine, and Houchard, were destined for immediate

condemnation. A decree of the convention, undoubtedly, was not needed to ensure the sacrifice of these victims by the revolutionary tribunal; but the resolution manifested by thus hastening their execution, afforded a proof that the government was not disposed to relax its sternness. Robespierre moreover proposed to augment by a third the territorial recompenses promised to the defenders of the country.

After this report, Barrère was charged to frame another on the arrests, which were stated to be daily on the increase, and to propound means for ascertaining the grounds of such arrests. The aim of this report was to answer, without professing to do so, the *Old Cordelier* of Camille-Desmoulins, and his proposition of a committee of clemency. Barrère alluded to "*translations of ancient authors*" in terms of severity, but recommended, nevertheless, the appointment of a commission to inquire into the causes of arrests, which was almost equivalent with the committee of clemency advocated by Camille. However, upon the observations of some of its members, the convention deemed it expedient to adhere to its previous decrees, which made it obligatory on the revolutionary committees to communicate the motives of arrests to the committee of general safety, and permitted the detained to lodge reclamations with that last-named committee.

The government thus pursued its course between the two parties then gathering strength, secretly inclining towards the moderate party, but still afraid to allow its preference to be too marked. Meanwhile, Camille published a number of his journal yet more energetic than its predecessors, which he specifically addressed to the Jacobins. He styled it "My defence;" and it contained the boldest and most unsparing recriminations upon his adversaries.

Adverting to his expulsion from the Cordelier Club, he said—"Pardon, brethren and friends, if I still venture to assume the title of 'Old Cordelier,' after the resolution of the club prohibiting me from using that designation. But, in truth, the revolt of grandchildren against their grandfather, and their injunction against his bearing his own name, involved so incredible an insolence, that I am determined to plead my cause against the ungrateful progeny. I will see to whom of right the name belongs, whether to the grandpapa, or to the children foisted upon him, of whom he never recognised or so much as knew the decimal fraction, and who yet pretend to thrust him from the paternal sanctuary."

He then proceeded to unfold his opinions. "The vessel of the republic floats between two reefs—the rock of exaggeration and the sandbank of moderatism. Perceiving that the Père Duchêne and nearly all the patriot sentinels were standing on deck, telescope in hand, solely occupied in vociferating, 'Take care! you are running on moderatism!' it became imperative on me, an old Cordelier and elder of the Jacobins, to impose on myself the difficult office, which none of the more youthful would attempt from the dread of forfeiting their popularity, of raising the counter cry, 'Take care! you are about to founder on exaggeration!' And estimate the obligation contracted by all my colleagues in the convention towards me, for having thus hazarded my popularity in order to save the ship wherein my stake was not greater than theirs."

He next justified himself touching that expression which had been so often the theme of invective against him, "*Vincent-Pitt governs George-Bouchotte.*" He said, "I called Louis XVI., in 1787, an egregious noodle of a king, without being shut up in the Bastille therefor. Is Bouchotte a more mighty potentate?"

He subsequently passed his antagonists in review. To Collot-d'Herbois he said, that if he (Desmoulins) had his Dillon, he (Collot) had his Brunet and Proli, both of whom he had defended. To Barrère he said, "We no longer know each other on the Mountain. Had it been an old Cordelier like myself, a *rectilineal* patriot, Billaud-Varennes, for example, who had worried me so savagely, *sustinuissem utique* (I would have borne it all); I should have said, 'The hasty Saint Paul gives the good Saint Peter a box on the ear for his sins!' But thou, my esteemed Barrère, the enviable guardian of Pamela!*—thou, the president of the Feuillants, who proposed the committee of twelve!—thou who, on the 2d June, brought under deliberation in the committee of public welfare the question whether Danton should be arrested!—thou, whose other transgressions I could so easily illustrate, if I were inclined to rifle the *old sack*†—*thou* becomest on a sudden a *deputy-Robespierre*, and of a verity apostrophisest me thus sharply!"

"This, after all," added Camille, "is a mere man-and-wife squabble with my friends, the patriots Collot and Barrère; but I am in my turn going to be *in a furious passion*‡ with the Père Duchene, who calls me '*a miserable intriguer—a fit subject for the guillotine—a conspirator who wants to open the prisons to make a fresh La Vendée—a wheedler bribed by Pitt—the long-eared colt of an ass.*' Wait, Hébert, I will be at thee in a moment. But it is not with gross epithets and words I shall assail thee; it is with facts."

Then Camille, who had been upbraided by Hébert with having espoused a wealthy female, and dining at the houses of aristocrats, gave the history of his marriage, which had brought him an income of 4000 livres (£166), and a description of his simple, unostentatious, and indolent life. Reverting to Hébert, he called to recollection the former avocation of the check-taker, the frauds which had caused his dismisssal from the theatre, his sudden and undoubted fortune, and covered him with well-deserved infamy. He recounted and proved that Bouchotte had given Hébert, from the funds of the war-department, first 120,000 francs, then 10,000, and then 60,000, for copies of *Père Duchêne* distributed in the armies; that such copies did not exceed 16,000 francs in value, and that consequently the nation had been robbed of the surplus.

"Two hundred thousand francs," exclaimed Camille, "to this poor sans-culotte Hébert, for supporting the motions of Proli and of Cloots! Two hundred thousand francs for calumniating Danton, Lindet, Cambon, Thuriot, Lacroix, Philippeaux, Bourdon-de-l'Oise, Barras, Fréron, D'Eglantine, Legendre, Camille-Desmoulins, and almost all the commissioners of the convention! For inundating France with his writings, so singularly fitted to improve the mind and heart, 200,000 francs from Bouchotte! Can any one be surprised, after this, at that filial exclamation of Hébert at the sitting of the Jacobins—'*To dare attack Bouchotte! Bouchotte, who has placed sans-culottes generals at the head of the armies! Bouchotte, a patriot so supremely pure!*' I am astonished that, in the transports of his gratitude, the Père Duchêne did not add, 'Bouchotte, who has given me 200,000 francs since June!'

You talk to me of the society I keep: but does not every one know that it is with the confidant of Dumouriez, the banker Kock, and with the woman Rochechouart, the agent of the emigrants, that the grand patriot Hébert, after traducing in his journal the most incorruptible men in the republic, departs full of glee, accompanied by his Jacqueline, to pass the beauteous days of summer in the country, to drink the wine of Pitt, and swallow toasts to the ruin of the reputations of the founders of liberty?"

Camille next proceeded to reproach Hébert with the

* An allusion to the play of Pamela, the representation of which had been prohibited.

† "*Vieux-Sac*," the name by which Barrère was called, when noble.

‡ "*Bougrement en colère*," the phrase of the public hawkers, who, when selling copies of the *Père Duchene*, were accustomed to cry in the streets—"He is in a furious passion, the Pere Duchêne!" (*Il est bougrement en colère, le Père Duchene!*)

style of his journal. "Know'st thou not, Hébert, that when the tyrants of Europe wish to make their slaves believe that France is enveloped in the darkness of barbarism—that Paris, the city so vaunted for its attic wit and taste, is peopled with Vandals—know'st thou not, poor wretch, that it is refuse from thy publication they insert in their gazettes? As if the people were as ignorant as thou wouldst lead M. Pitt to infer—as if we could speak to him only in language equally loathsome—as if such were the language of the convention and the committee of public welfare—as if thy obscenities were those of the nation—as if a sewer of Paris were the Seine!"

Camille subsequently accused him of having added, by his articles, to the scandal of the worship of Reason; and thereafter broke out thus indignantly: "So, it is this vile panderer, at a wage of 200,000 francs, who would upbraid me with my wife's income of 4000 livres! It is this intimate friend of the Kocks, the Rochechouarts, and an army of sharpers, who would hold me up to obloquy for the society I frequent! It is this senseless or perfidious scribbler, who would reproach me with aristocratic writings—he, whose sheets I can demonstrate to be the joy of Coblentz and the sole hope of Pitt! This man, struck from the list of menials at a theatre for theft, would have struck from the list of the Jacobins, for their opinions, certain deputies, the immortal founders of liberty! This author of filthiness and depravity would be the regulator of opinion—the Mentor of the French people!"

"Let it not be imagined," added Camille-Desmoulins, "that I am to be intimidated by the terrors of arrest, wherewith rumour so rifely threatens me. We are forewarned that the miscreants meditate another 31st of May against the most energetic men on the Mountain. Oh, my colleagues! I will say to you, in the words of Brutus and Cicero—'*Nimium timemus mortem et exilium et paupertatem.*' We are too much afraid of death, and exile, and poverty! What! when, day by day, twelve hundred thousand Frenchmen confront batteries bristling with murderous ordnance, and fly from victory to victory, shall we, deputies of the convention, who can never fall, like the soldier, in the obscurity of night, mowed down in the dark without witnesses of his valour—we, whose death suffered for liberty can be none other than glorious and solemn, received, as it must be, in presence of the whole nation, of Europe, and of posterity—shall we be more cowardly than our soldiers?—shall we dread the peril of looking Bouchotte in the face?—shall we not venture to brave the mighty wrath of the Père Duchêne, in order thereby to achieve the victory which the people expect from us—victory over the ultra-revolutionists as well as over the counter-revolutionists—victory over all intriguers, over all knaves, over all the ambitious, over all the enemies of the public weal?

Let it not be believed that, even on the scaffold, being sustained by the inward conviction that I have passionately loved my country and the republic, and rewarded with the esteem and regret of all true republicans, I would exchange my doom for the fortune of this miserable Hébert, who, in his paper, urges to despair and revolt twenty classes of citizens—who, to stupify his mind against the stings of remorse and the recollection of his calumnies, has need of a drunkenness stronger than that of wine, and is fain to lap blood at the foot of the guillotine. What, indeed, is the scaffold to a patriot, but the pedestal to a Sidney or a John de Witt? What, in a time of war wherein I have had two brothers cleaved for liberty, is, after all, this guillotine but a sabre-cut, and the most glorious of all for a deputy, the victim of his courage and his republicanism?"

These quotations will give an idea of the manners of the epoch. The roughness, the stoicism, and the eloquence of Rome and Athens, had revived in France with democratic liberty.

This last number of Camille-Desmoulins caused an agitation yet more considerable than those preceding. Hébert was incessant in his denunciations against him at the Jacobins', and continually urged the production of the report by the commission of inquiry. At length, on the 16th Nivose, Collot-d'Herbois appeared in the tribune to read that report. The audience was as numerous as the day on which the discussion had been first entered upon, and seats were sold equally dear. Collot evinced more impartiality than might have been expected from a friend of Ronsin. He censured Philippeaux for implicating the committee of public welfare in his accusations, for showing favourable dispositions towards suspected individuals, for speaking of Biron with eulogy whilst he assailed Rossignol with virulence; and, in short, for manifesting precisely the same preferences as the aristocrats. He likewise reproached him with a fact, which, under actual circumstances, had some weight; to wit, the having suppressed in his last publication the charges alleged against Fabre-Fond, the brother of Fabre-d'Eglantine. Philippeaux, in truth, being unacquainted with either Fabre or Camille, had at first denounced the brother of the former, whom he deemed to have transgressed in La Vendée. But when he became allied with Fabre by his position, and was associated in accusation with him, he withdrew, from a very natural delicacy, the allegations relative to his brother. This circumstance was of itself sufficient to prove that these parties had been induced, by individual considerations and without concert, to act as they had done, and that they by no means formed a real faction. But the spirit of party inspired different conclusions, and Collot insinuated that there existed a furtive intrigue and cabal amongst the advocates of moderation. He reverted to the past, moreover, and upbraided Philippeaux with his votes respecting Louis XVI. and Marat. As to Camille-Desmoulins, he treated him with much less acrimony; he represented him as a good patriot misled by evil company, whom it was fitting to pardon, with a warning, nevertheless, not again to commit similar delinquencies. He accordingly moved the expulsion of Philippeaux, and a simple censure on Camille.

When he had ceased, Camille, present at the sitting, handed a letter to the president, wherein he declared that his defence was contained in his last number, and craved the society graciously to hear its contents. At this request, Hébert, who justly dreaded the public reading of a paper wherein the villanies of his life were exposed, cried out there was a design to complicate the discussion by adducing calumnies against him, and that, to distract attention, he had been charged with robbing the exchequer, which was an atrocious falsehood. "I have the proofs in my hand!" exclaimed Camille. These words caused prolonged tumult. Robespierre the younger at length said "that personal disputes ought not to be entertained; that the society had met for other purposes than the care of reputations, and that if Hébert were a thief, it was not interested in the matter; that those who were burdened with self-reproach, must not interrupt the general debate." At these somewhat criminatory expressions, Hébert vociferated—"I have nothing to reproach myself with." "The troubles of the departments," retorted Robespierre the younger, "are thy handiwork; thou hast contributed to provoke them by attacking the liberty of religion." Hébert was silenced by this direct assault. Robespierre the elder then ascended the tribune, and observing greater caution than his brother, but without being more favourable to Hébert, said that Collot had presented the question under its genuine aspect; that an untoward incident had disturbed the dignity of the discussion; and that all were censurable—Hébert as well as those who had answered him. "What I am about to say," he added, "has reference to no individual. They show bad grace who complain of calumny when

they themselves have calumniated. They have no ground for complaining of injustice, who have judged others with inconsiderate precipitation and fury. Let every man probe his conscience, and apply these reflections. I was anxious to prevent the present discussion; I desired that in private interviews, in amicable conferences, each should offer explanations and confess his errors. By such means, the parties might have arrived at a mutual understanding, and spared themselves much scandal. But my counsels were unheeded; pamphlets were circulated the very next day, and the utmost eagerness evinced to foment excitement. At present, all that concerns us in these personal quarrels is, not to ascertain whether on all sides passion and injustice have predominated, but whether the accusations directed by Philippeaux against the persons charged with the most important of our wars are well founded. Such is the point it behoves us to elucidate, not in the interest of individuals, but in that of the republic."

Robespierre, in effect, deemed it fruitless to discuss the allegations of Camille against Hébert, for all were aware of their substantial accuracy. He was furthermore of opinion that they involved nothing which the republic was interested in authenticating; but that, on the contrary, it was of material moment to investigate the conduct of the generals in La Vendée. In accordance with these views, the inquiry relative to Philippeaux was resumed. The whole sitting was devoted to the examination of divers witnesses from the theatre of war; but, from out their contradictory statements, Danton and Robespierre declared they could winnow no precise facts whereon to ground a satisfactory judgment. The debate, already tediously prolonged, was adjourned to the following sitting.

On the 18th the society again met. Philippeaux was absent. The discussion of which he was the subject, having led to no important revelation, had become generally wearisome, and attention was directed to Camille-Desmoulins. He was called upon for explanations touching the encomiums he had passed on Philippeaux, and the relations he held with him. Camille knew him not, so he asseverated; certain facts avouched by Goupilleau and Bourdon had at first persuaded him that Philippeaux spoke truly, and he had been filled with indignation; but now that he perceived, from the inquiry, that Philippeaux had tampered with the truth (which began indeed to transpire on all points), he retracted his eulogies, and allowed he had no longer any opinion on the subject.

Robespierre, once more rising to deliver his sentiments respecting Camille, repeated much of what he had previously stated in his behalf; averring that his character indeed was exemplary, but that this acknowledged estimation gave him no warrant to write against patriots; that his publications were eagerly perused by the aristocrats, to whom they gave especial joy, and were circulated through all the departments; that he had translated Tacitus without comprehending him; that he must be treated like a headstrong boy, who had handled dangerous weapons, and used them noxiously—pledged to forsake aristocrats and other evil society whereby he had been corrupted; and that, whilst granting him forgiveness, the numbers of his journal must be burnt. Hereupon Camille, forgetting the circumspection necessary towards the arrogant Robespierre, exclaimed from his seat—"Burning is not answering." "Very well!" retorted Robespierre, splenetically, "let us not burn, then, but answer; let us now read Camille's numbers. Since he will have it so, let him be covered with ignominy; let the society give vent to its indignation, since he obstinately persists in vindicating his diatribes and his dangerous principles. The man who so strenuously adheres to perfidious writings is perhaps more than misled; if he had been truly sincere, if he had written in the simplicity of his heart, he would not have ventured longer to uphold works proscribed by patriots and welcomed by counter-revolutionists. His courage is merely derivative; it reveals the hidden influence under which he has written his journal; it tells that Desmoulins is the organ of a wicked faction, which has borrowed his pen in order to distil its poison with more security and effect." Camille in vain essayed to speak and propitiate Robespierre; the club refused to hear him, and forthwith passed to the perusal of his papers.

With whatever respect and temper individuals may be disposed to treat one another in the contests of party, it is seldom but that ere long egotism is piqued, and its attendant passions become predominant elements in the strife. With such susceptibility as that of Robespierre on the one hand, and such careless frankness as that of Camille on the other, it was inevitable that collision of opinion should eventually provoke the irascibilities of self-love, and resolve into personal animosity. Robespierre held Hébert and his partisans in too great contempt to enter into altercation with them; but it was far different with a writer so celebrated in the revolution as Camille-Desmoulins; and the latter unfortunately lacked sufficient art in conciliation to avert a rupture.

The reading of Camille's journal occupied two entire sittings. Afterwards the inquiry relative to Fabre was opened. That personage was subjected to a long interrogatory, chiefly with the view of extracting from him what share he had taken in composing the writings recently disseminated. On that point he parried his querists by observing, that he did not attend upon an indictment for punctuation; and, with respect to Philippeaux and Bourdon de l'Oise, he stated he could safely affirm himself to be unconnected with them. At length a motion was formally made to adopt a resolution affecting the four individuals arraigned. But Robespierre, albeit little disposed to shield Camille, proposed to leave the question where it stood, and pass to another subject of greater gravity —one more worthy of the society and more beneficial to the public mind—to wit, the vices and crimes of the English government. "That atrocious government," said he, "conceals, under certain appearances of liberty, a principle of frightful despotism and machiavelism; we must denounce it to its own people, and answer its calumnies by proving its vices of organisation and its unparalleled enormities." The Jacobins were heartily enough inclined to the theme, for it promised a vast field to their mania for invective; but some amongst them desired preliminarily to anathematise Philippeaux, Camille, Bourdon, and Fabre. One voice was even heard to accuse Robespierre of arrogating a species of dictatorship. "My dictatorship," he exclaimed, "is that of Marat and Lepelletier; it consists in being daily and hourly exposed to the daggers of the tyrants. But I am weary of the disputes perpetually arising in the heart of the society, and which lead to no useful end. Our veritable enemies are foreigners; it is they we must confront—it is their webs we must unravel." Robespierre, in consequence, renewed his proposition, and prevailed in carrying, amidst loud applause, that the society, setting aside all disputes at issue between individuals, should devote the ensuing sittings to discuss, without interruption, the vices of the English government.

This was adroitly to divert the unquiet imagination of the Jacobins, and direct it upon a topic calculated to afford lengthened occupation. Philippeaux had retired without awaiting the decision. Camille and Bourdon were neither expelled nor confirmed; all further mention of them was avoided, and they were content to withhold attendance at the society. As for Fabre-d'Eglantine, although Chabot had entirely exculpated him, the facts which daily came to the knowledge of the committee of general safety no longer permitted his confederacy to be matter of doubt: it became necessary to issue a warrant of arrest against him, and to unite him with Chabot, Bazire, Delaunay, and Julien of Toulouse.

From all these discussions there remained an impression unfavourable to the new moderates. Amongst the parties lately on trial there had been in reality no sort of concert. Philippeaux, almost a Girondist heretofore, was unacquainted with Fabre, Camille, and Bourdon; Camille alone was indifferently connected with Fabre; and as to Bourdon, he was a complete stranger to the other three. But it was incontinently inferred that a secret faction was in existence, whereof they were the dupes or accomplices. The facility of character, the epicurean tastes of Camille, and two or three banquets he had partaken with the rich financiers of the epoch; the proved confederacy of Fabre with stockjobbers, and his recent opulence, all strengthened the supposition that they were combined with the pretended corrupting faction. None yet ventured to designate Danton as their leader; but, if he were not accused in a public manner, if Hébert in his paper and the Cordeliers in their tribune still respected that redoubtable revolutionist, in conversation such sinister inferences circulated freely.

The most hurtful man to the party was Lacroix, whose exactions in Belgium were so notorious that they might be safely charged upon him without risking a denunciation for calumny, and without his venturing to retort. He was classed with the moderates, on account of his former connexion with Danton, and defiled them by his infamy.

The Cordeliers, meanwhile, indignant that the Jacobins had abstained from passing judgment on the arraigned, resolved—1st, That Philippeaux was a calumniator; 2d, That Bourdon, the inveterate accuser of Ronsin, Vincent, and the war department, had lost their confidence, and was in their estimation but an accomplice of Philippeaux; 3d, That Fabre, who partook the sentiments of Bourdon and Philippeaux, was only a more artful intriguer; and, 4th, That Camille, already excluded from their ranks, had likewise lost their confidence, although he had in times past rendered good service to the revolution.

After Ronsin and Vincent had been detained in prison for some time, they were liberated, for it was impossible to bring them to trial on any feasible ground. Ronsin could not be prosecuted for his conduct in La Vendée, as the events of that war were enveloped in profound obscurity, nor more so for his performances at Lyons, since that would start a dangerous question, and involve a censure on Collot-d'Herbois and the ruling system of the government. It was equally difficult to impeach Vincent for certain acts of alleged despotism in the offices of the war department. An arraignment for political opinions was the only process available against either, and the moment had not yet arrived for hazarding the experiment. They were accordingly set at liberty,* to the great joy of the Cordeliers and all the epauletters of the revolutionary army.

Vincent was a young man of twenty and some years, a species of enthusiast, whose fanaticism amounted to disease, and to whom alienation of mind might be rather imputed than personal ambition. One day, as his wife, who visited him in confinement, was recounting to him the passing events, moved with indignation at the recital, he sprang upon a lump of raw meat, and, as he tore it with his teeth, passionately repeated, "*Thus would I devour all the miscreants!*" Ronsin, alternately a mediocre pamphleteer, a contractor, and a general, combined considerable intelligence with undoubted courage and great activity. Naturally prone to exaggerated dogmas, but ambitious withal, he was the most distinguished of those adventurers who had pressed forward to serve as the instruments of the new government. Nominated chief of the revolutionary army, he revolved the means of turning his position to account, either for his own behoof or for the advancement of his proper system. He and Vincent, when confined together in the prison of the Luxembourg, had always demeaned themselves as superiors; from the first, they boasted they would prevail over intrigue, issue forth in triumph by the exertions of their partisans, and then return to enlarge the captive patriots and dispatch all the other prisoners to the guillotine. Throughout their detention they had cruelly annoyed the unfortunate persons incarcerated with them; and when they were happily removed, they left them full of terror.

No sooner beyond the walls of the Luxembourg than they loudly proclaimed they would have their revenge, and speedily find means to reckon with their enemies. The committee of public welfare had been almost constrained to liberate them; but it was not slow in perceiving it had unchained two furies, whom it was essential to render with all promptitude incapable of injury. At the period of their release there remained at Paris 4000 men of the revolutionary army. These were in great part composed of adventurers, thieves, and *Septembrizers*, who assumed the mask of patriotism, and infinitely preferred a roving and plundering career in the interior to incurring a life of hardship and peril by joining the armies on the frontiers. Those contemptible bullies, with their fierce mustaches and long swords, exercised an insufferable despotism in all public places. Besides, possessing artillery, munitions, and an enterprising leader, they might really become dangerous to the governing power. To them were joined the restless characters swarming in the offices of Vincent's department. That person was their civil chief, as Ronsin was their military one. They held correspondence with the commune through Hébert, the substitute of Chaumette, and through Pache the mayor, who made it a point to entertain all parties and to court men of formidable influence. Momoro, one of the presidents of the Cordelier Club, was their faithful partisan and advocate with the Jacobins. Thus Ronsin, Vincent, Hébert, Chaumette, and Momoro, were classed together; and to the list were added Pache and Bouchotte, as functionaries who allowed them to usurp two important branches of authority.

These men observed no measure in their discourse against the national representatives, who designed, as they alleged, to perpetuate their power and show favour to aristocrats. One day, happening to dine with Pache, they met at his table Legendre, the friend of Danton, formerly the imitator of his vehemence, now of his reserve, and the victim of that imitation, for he encountered the attacks which the boldest shrunk from directing against Danton himself. Ronsin and Vincent took the opportunity of assailing him in terms of contumely. Vincent, who had been under obligations to him, saluted him, saying that he saluted the old and not the new Legendre; that the new Legendre had become a moderate, and had forfeited all title to esteem. Vincent afterwards sneeringly asked him whether he had worn the costume of a deputy in his missions. Legendre having answered that he wore it in the armies, Vincent observed that it was doubtless a very grand uniform, but unworthy of true republicans; adding, that he would dress up an effigy in the costume, assemble the people, and say to them—"Behold the representatives you have given yourselves! They preach equality to you, and deck themselves in gold and feathers!" He moreover intimated that he would set fire to the aforesaid effigy. Legendre, thereupon, told him he was a fool and a seditious knave. The polite dialogists rose to end their encounter by personal combat, but were restrained by the pitiable terror of their host. Legendre, addressing himself to Ronsin, who appeared more calm, urged him to tranquillise Vincent; to which appeal Ronsin responded by stating that his friend Vincent was certainly hot, but that his character suited the circumstances of the times, and that such men were needed in the present emergency. "You have a faction," he added, "in the

* On the 14th Pluviose (2d February)

heart of the convention; unless you take care to get rid of it, you will render us a severe account." Legendre left the house with indignation, and repeated abroad what he had seen and heard during the entertainment. The conversation thus becoming public, gave a more striking idea of the audacity and frenzy of the two men so recently liberated from thraldom.

At the same time, these parties professed a high respect for Pache and his virtues, as the Jacobins had formerly done when he was in the ministry. It was the fortune of Pache to charm by his complaisance and mildness the most violent factionists. They were delighted to find their passions approved by a man bearing all the outward semblance of eminent sagacity. The new revolutionists, they affirmed, would make him an important personage in their government; for, without having any definite aim, without having formed any project, or indeed possessing the requisite hardihood for an insurrection, they vapoured prodigiously, after the fashion of all disturbers, who begin by testing and stimulating their spirit in words of sound and fury. They every where proclaimed the time arrived for new institutions. The only objects that met their approbation in the actual system of the government were the revolutionary tribunal and army. Consequently, they imagined a constitution whereof the prominent features were a supreme tribunal presided by a grand-judge, and a military council directed by a generalissimo. In this government, trials, as well as administrative details, would be conducted upon military principles. The generalissimo and the grand-judge were the two chief personages. To the tribunal would be assigned a grand-accuser, under the title of censor, whose functions were to consist in instituting prosecutions. Thus, in this scheme, the wild offspring of revolutionary ferment, the two material, if not solitary provinces of government, were to condemn and give battle. We are ignorant whether the project originated with some enthusiast in a delirium, or with several amongst the extreme party; and whether it had any other existence than in verbal froth, or was regularly digested; but this much is certain, that its model was to be found in the revolutionary commissions established at Lyons, Marseilles, Toulon, Bordeaux, and Nantes, and that the imagination being heated by the awful occurrences in those great cities, their ruthless executors longed to govern all France on the same plan, and to make the violence of a day the type of a permanent government. As yet one only of the individuals proposed to be elevated to these supreme dignities was designated. Pache was admirably adapted for the office of grand-judge; and, accordingly, the confederates gave out that he was destined to fill it, and should assuredly do so. Without knowing any thing of the scheme in embryo, or of this extraordinary dignity of grand-judge, many repeated as matter of gossip—"Pache is to be made grand-judge." This rumour circulated without being either explained or comprehended. As to the post of generalissimo, Ronsin, although general of the revolutionary army, ventured not to aspire, nor his partisans to propose him for it, because a greater name than his was required for such a dignity. Chaumette, too, was indicated by certain of the initiated as censor, but his name was more rarely mentioned. Amidst the various reports, none became well-established save that which affirmed Pache to be the intended grand-judge.

During the whole course of the revolution, whenever the passions of a party, after long incitement, were ready to burst the trammels of control, it was always a defeat, a treason, a dearth, some calamity, in short, which served as the pretext for explosion. The example was not belied in the present instance. The second law of the maximum, which, stretching beyond the stores of retailers, fixed the value of commodities at the place of production, determined the cost of transport, and settled the profit of the wholesale dealer and also that of the retailer, had, we are aware, been passed; but trade still eluded in various ways the despotism of the law, evading it above all in the most disastrous form—stagnation. Articles of consumption were not less withheld than formerly; and if they were no longer refused to purchasers at the par value of assignats, they were hoarded or not moved, and thus ceased to be transported to the great emporiums of commerce. This general stagnation of trade naturally caused great scarcity. Nevertheless, the extraordinary efforts of the government, and the indefatigable labours of the committee for supplies and provisions, had partly succeeded in preventing an extreme deficiency of grain, and, above all, in allaying the dread of a famine, equally formidable as the reality, on account of the doubts and uncertainties it provokes in commercial relations. But a new calamity had lately happened to aggravate existing difficulties, namely, a falling off in the supply of meat. The droves of cattle that La Vendée sent into the neighbouring provinces before the insurrection, no longer arrived. The departments of the Rhine had likewise ceased to furnish any since they had become the seat of war; whence there resulted a considerable diminution in the actual quantity forwarded from the grazing districts. Furthermore, the butchers, buying animals at a high price and obliged to sell them at the arbitrary rate of the maximum, laboured diligently to evade the law. The good meat was reserved for the rich, or for the thriving tradesmen, who were able and content to pay extravagantly. Clandestine sales were made in great abundance, especially in the environs of Paris and in the country; so that there remained merely the refuse for the people, and for such buyers as visited the public shops, and bargained on the basis of the maximum. Thus the butchers were compensated for the low price at which they were constrained to sell by the inferior quality of their merchandise. The populace raised furious outcries against the weight and quality of the meat, against *merry-makings*, and against the secret markets established around Paris. Upon the failure of cattle fit for the shambles, it had been found necessary to slaughter cows with calf. The populace instantly exclaimed that the butcher aristocrats wished to destroy the species, and loudly demanded the penalty of death against all who should kill cows or ewes with young. But this was far from being the extremity of the evil; vegetables, fruits, eggs, butter, fish, no longer appeared in the markets. A cabbage often realised twenty sous (tenpence). The carts were met on the highways, surrounded by clamorous competitors, and their burdens purchased at any price; little arrived in Paris, where the people were anxiously but fruitlessly awaiting the necessary supplies. Whenever any branch of industry is opened, persons are quickly found to prosecute it. Employment was to be gained by scouring the country, and forestalling gardeners and farmers bringing vegetables and other produce to market; and a multitude of men and women eagerly assumed the labour, buying the articles on account of affluent individuals, by paying for them above the maximum value. Wherever a market better provisioned than others was heard of, thither speeded those active interlopers, and carried away every edible fragment at prices far superior to the fixed tariff. The people were moved with extreme wrath against those who followed this trade; it was even said that in the number were many of those unfortunate public females whom the ordinances of Chaumette had driven from their wretched avocation, and who, as a means of livelihood, had embraced this novel profession.

To obviate all these inconveniences, the commune had ordained, on the reiterated petitions of the sections, that the butchers should no longer be permitted to meet the droves of cattle on the way, or traffic out of the ordinary markets; that they might kill only in the authorised slaughter-houses; that meat should be sold only in the stalls; that none should be allowed

to anticipate the farmers in their progress to town, but that upon their arrival they should be directed by the police, and distributed in equal proportions amongst the different markets; and that it should be unlawful to take station at the butchers' doors before six in the morning, it often happening that persons rose at three for that purpose.

These multiplied regulations were all inadequate to relieve the people from the sufferings they endured. The ultra-revolutionists racked their imaginative powers for additional expedients. A final idea had occurred to them, to wit, that the ornamental gardens so numerous in the faubourgs of Paris, and especially in the Faubourg Saint-Germain, might be put under cultivation. The commune, which refused them nothing, had immediately ordered a survey and allotment of those gardens, upon which being accomplished, it was determined that potatoes and pot-herbs should be there reared. Moreover, they had surmised that the cause of vegetables, dairy produce, and poultry, not arriving in the city, was imputable to the aristocrats who had withdrawn to their country-houses. It was a fact that many of the wealthy classes had retreated to the concealment of their residences around Paris. Certain sections appeared before the commune, urging it to pass an ordinance or to demand a law for the purpose of compelling their return. Chaumette, however, feeling that such an interference would be too odious a violation of personal liberty, contented himself with delivering a threatening oration against the aristocrats in retirement around the city. He addressed to them an invitation to re-enter Paris; and further, at his instance, the village municipalities were exhorted to keep a strict watch on their proceedings.

Impatience under the distress, meanwhile, attained an alarming height. In all the markets a frightful disorder reigned. Tumults arose every instant. Applicants had to stand in a row at the doors of the butchers, and notwithstanding the prohibition to attend there before a certain hour, the same eagerness to anticipate others was still evinced. A custom which had originated at the bakers' shops was adopted here also: a rope was attached to the post of the stall, which each grasped and firmly held to maintain his station. But it happened, as before the bakers', that mischievous or backward persons cut the cords, whereupon the ranks were confounded, the attendant throng was thrown into the direst confusion, and vehement wrangles, nay, pugilistic struggles, repeatedly ensued.

All ingenuity seemed baffled. The people could not, as previous to the 31st May, complain that the convention refused a law for the maximum, the object of all hopes, since it in truth granted every demand. The wildest imagination being now at a loss for devices, the convention indeed was no longer troubled with suggestions or commands. Still, however, it was impossible that the voice of vituperation should be stilled: the epauletters, the clerks in Bouchotte's war-offices, and the Cordeliers, exclaimed that the cause of the dearth lay in the moderate faction of the convention; that Camille-Desmoulins, Philippeaux, Bourdon de l'Oise, and their friends, were the authors of all the evils afflicting the community; that existence was no longer possible under such calamities, and that recourse must be had to extraordinary means; adding the old phrase in requisition during every insurrection—"*We want a chief.*" Then they whispered mysteriously amongst themselves—"*Pache must be made grand-judge.*"

At the same time, although this violent party could bring considerable means to bear, and had in its favour the revolutionary army and a famine, the government and public opinion, as represented by the all-pervading Jacobins, were arrayed against it. Ronsin, Vincent, and Hébert were constrained to profess outward respect for the established authorities, to conceal their designs, and to cabal in the shade. At the eras of the 10th August and the 31st May, the conspirators, masters of the commune, the Cordelier, Jacobin, and all the clubs, and having in the national assembly and its committees numerous and energetic partisans, could prosecute their plots in the face of day, openly instigate the people to abet them, and use large masses in the execution of their purposes; but the case was very different with the party of ultra-revolutionists.

The paramount authority of the time refused no extraordinary measures of defence or even of vengeance; no acts of treachery belied its vigilance; on the contrary, victories on all the frontiers attested at once its strength, ability, and zeal. Consequently, those who assailed that authority and promised superior energy or capacity, were obviously influenced by views of personal ambition or by an inordinate thirst for disorder. Such, in truth, was the public conviction, and the caballists could have but slender hopes of drawing the people in their wake. Thus, although they might become formidable if left to agitate, they were very partially so if timeously grappled with.

The committee narrowly observed them, and it continued, in a series of reports, to analyse the two opposing parties. In the ultra-revolutionists it perceived veritable conspirators to destroy; but in the moderates it beheld merely old friends still participating its opinions, whose patriotism seemed above suspicion. But, to avoid even the semblance of retrogression in the suppression of the ultra-revolutionists, it was necessitated to condemn the moderates, and remind them ever and anon of the sword of terror. These ventured to retort. Camille published further numbers of his journal; Danton and his friends combated in discourse the reasons of the committee; and thus ensued an avowed warfare carried on by the press and by verbal recrimination. Acrimony was of course engendered; and Saint-Just, Robespierre, Barrère, and Billaud, who had originally repudiated the moderates solely from policy and in order to strengthen their hands against the ultra-revolutionists, now began to attack them with the virulence of personal spleen and hatred. Camille had previously assailed Collot and Barrère, as we narrated at the time. In his letter to Dillon, he had ridiculed the dogmatical fanaticism of Saint-Just and the monkish austerity of Billaud, in a strain of sarcasm they bitterly resented. Robespierre, also, he had incensed at the Jacobin Club, and, even whilst grossly lauding him, he had contrived to rouse all the implacable ire of the man. Danton was offensive in their eyes on account of his fame; and now that he stood aloof from the conduct of affairs, censuring the government, and appearing to instigate the caustic and *gossiping** pen of Camille, he necessarily became still more odious to them. It was not probable that Robespierre would again incur the hazard of defending him.

Robespierre and Saint-Just, who were accustomed to draw up expositions of principles in the name of the committee, and were in some sort charged with the moral part of the government, whilst Barrère, Carnot, Billaud, and others, undertook the material and administrative part, presented two reports, the one "on the moral principles which ought to actuate the revolutionary government," and the other on the detentions whereof Camille had complained in his *Old Cordelier*. It is interesting to learn how two such sombre spirits understood the revolutionary government, and what were their means of regenerating a state.

"The principle of the government-democratic is virtue," said Robespierre,† "and its agency, whilst consolidating, is terror. We propose to substitute, in our native country, morality for selfishness, probity for honour, principles for usages, duties for civilities, the empire of reason for the tyranny of fashion, contempt of vice for contempt of mischance, stateliness

* An expression of Camille himself.

† Sitting of the 17th Pluviose, year 2 (5th February).

for insolence of bearing, high-mindedness for vanity, the love of glory for the love of pelf, honest men for polite society, merit for intrigue, genius for wit, truth for show, the charms of content for the lassitude of voluptuousness, the greatness of man for the pettiness of the great, a people magnanimous, puissant, and happy, for a people agreeable, frivolous, and wretched; that is to say, all the virtues and marvels of a republic for all the vices and absurdities of a monarchy."

To attain this desirable end, an austere and energetic government was needed, so he maintained, fitted to surmount resistances of every kind. On the one hand was brutal and lustful ignorance, seeking only for riot and confusion in the republic; and on the other, vile and effeminate corruption, sighing for the enjoyments of former luxuriousness, and incapable of submitting to the hardy virtues of democracy. Hence two factions; the one striving to carry all things to extremes—to dethrone God himself under the plea of attacking superstition, and to shed torrents of blood under the pretext of avenging the republic; the other weak and vicious, boasting itself "not *sufficiently virtuous to be so inexorable*," and ignominiously lamenting over all the sacrifices which the consolidation of virtue rendered necessary. "The first of these factions," Saint-Just averred,* "*wishes to convert liberty into a bacchanal, the latter into a prostitute.*"

Robespierre and Saint-Just set forth the follies of certain agents of the revolutionary government, and of two or three procurators of communes, who had pretended to revive the energy of Marat; and they also alluded to the various extravagances of Hébert and his associates. They afterwards descanted on the failings of weakness, complaisance, and sensibility, imputed to the new moderates; reproaching them with mourning over the lot of generals' widows, of intriguing women belonging to the old nobility, and of all female aristocrats, and with incessantly expatiating on the severities of the republic, although far inferior to the cruelties of monarchies. "You have," said Saint-Just, "one hundred thousand persons in detention, and the revolutionary tribunal has already condemned three hundred of the guilty. But under the monarchy you had four hundred thousand prisoners; fifteen thousand illicit traders were hanged every year; three thousand men were broken on the wheel; and even at the present day, there are four millions of captives in Europe to whose cries you are insensible, whilst your parricidal moderation would allow all the enemies of your own government to triumph! We are overwhelmed with reproaches, whilst kings, a thousand times more cruel than we, are left to slumber in crime!"

The two reporters added, agreeably to the preconceived system, that both factions, in appearance antagonistic, had a common basis, the foreigner, who incited them to their respective agitation with the design of ruining the republic.

We here perceive how much of fanaticism, policy, and hatred was incongruously commingled in the system of the committee. Camille deemed himself and his friends attacked by allusions and even by direct expressions. He replied, in his *Old Cordelier*, to the assumption or theory of virtue by upholding the principle of happiness. He stated that he loved the republic because it was calculated to increase general felicity; because commerce, industry, and civilisation had been developed with greater lustre at Athens, Venice, and Florence, than in any monarchy; and because a republic alone could realise that deceptive promise of the monarchy, "A fowl in the pot." "What would Pitt care that France were free," exclaimed Camille, "if freedom only served to carry us back to the ignorance of the old Gauls, to their coarse and uncouth raiment, their *braccæ* and *sagi*, to their food of acorns, and to their huts of clay? Far from lamenting, it occurs to me that Pitt would give very many guineas to have such liberty established amongst us. But the English government would be rendered frantic if that were said of France which Dicœarchus said of Attica—'In no part of the world can a man live more agreeably than at Athens, whether he have money or have none. Those who have acquired wealth, by commerce or by their industry, are able to procure every imaginable comfort; and as to those who are yet struggling with the world, there are so many workshops where they may earn enough to divert themselves at the *Anthesteries*, and yet put something aside, that none can have cause to complain of poverty, without implying a reproach on himself for idleness.'

I therefore hold that liberty does not exist in an equality of privations, and that it would convey the highest eulogium on the convention if it could thus speak in testimony of itself—'I found the nation *sans culottes* [breechless], and I leave it *culottée* [breeched].'"

"How delectable a democracy was that of Athens!" added Camille. "Solon did not pass therein for a debauchee; he was not less regarded as the model of legislators, and proclaimed by the oracle the first of the seven sages, although he cared not to confess his inclination for wine, women, and music; and he has a reputation for wisdom so firmly established, that even at the present day his name is pronounced in the convention and the Jacobin Club as that of the greatest legislator. How many amongst us are held as aristocrats and Sardanapaluses who have published no such profession of faith!

And the divine Socrates, one day, meeting Alcibiades gloomy and thoughtful, probably because a letter from Aspasia had troubled him—'What distresses you?' said to him that gravest of Mentors; 'have you lost your shield in battle? Have you been overcome in the camp, on the race-course, or in the hall of arms? Has some one sung better or played more sweetly on the lyre than you at the general's table?' How admirably does this depict the manners of the time! What amiable republicans!"

Camille subsequently complained that not only the manners of Athens, but the freedom of language prevalent in that republic, were alike proscribed. Aristophanes, he said, represented generals, orators, philosophers, and the people themselves, on the stage; and the people of Athens, sometimes pourtrayed in the character of an old man, sometimes in that of a youth, far from being irritated, proclaimed Aristophanes victor of the games, and rewarded him with crowns and plaudits. Many of those comedies were directed against the ultra-revolutionists of that age, and were filled with the bitterest raillery. "And if any one," added Camille, "should now translate one of those pieces represented 430 years before Christ, under the Archon Stenocles, Hébert would assert at the Cordelier Club that it could only be a work of yesterday, the invention of Fabre-d'Eglantine, levelled at him and Ronsin, and that the translator was the cause of the scarcity."

"Nevertheless," resumed Camille, mournfully, "I err when I state that men are changed; they have always been the same: liberty of speech met with no greater impunity in ancient republics than in modern. Socrates, accused of having denied the gods, drank hemlock; Cicero, for having attacked Antony, was included in the proscription."

In this passage the writer seemed to predict that license would be no more pardoned in him than in so many of the illustrious dead. His pleasantries, his lively eloquence, in truth, greatly exasperated the committee. Whilst it merely kept a watchful eye on Ronsin, Hébert, Vincent, and the other agitators, it harboured a deadly hatred against the open-hearted Camille, who laughed at its systems; against Danton, who was held to instigate him in the tone of his articles; and, moreover, against all the supposed friends or partisans of those two leaders.

* Report of the 8th Ventose (26th February).

In adherence to its prescribed line of conduct, the committee presented two decrees in connexion with the reports of Robespierre and Saint-Just, tending, it averred, to render the people happy at the expense of their enemies. By these decrees, the committee of general safety was solely invested with the faculty of examining the reclamations of prisoners, and of liberating them if ascertained to be patriots. All those, on the other hand, who were recognised as enemies of the revolution, should remain in confinement until the peace, and then be banished for life. Their possessions, provisionally sequestrated, were appointed to be divided amongst indigent patriots, of whom lists were to be framed by the communes.* This was, in reality, an agrarian law, applied against the suspected for the profit of the patriots. These decrees, conceived by Saint-Just, were intended as answers to the ultra-revolutionists, and as measures calculated to preserve the committee its reputation for energy.

Meanwhile, the caballists bestirred themselves with increasing violence. There is nothing to prove that their designs were definitively considered, or that they had brought Pache and the commune into their confederacy. But they agitated in like manner as before the 31st May; they incited the popular societies, the Cordeliers, and the sections, busied themselves in propagating alarming rumours, and sought all means to profit by the troubles and discontent springing from the scarcity, which every day rendered more general and severe.

Suddenly inflammatory placards and tracts appeared, affixed and distributed in the various markets, insisting that the convention was the cause of all the calamities affecting the people, and that the dangerous faction which was striving to revive the Brissotins and their hateful system must be thence rooted out. Some of these publications even maintained that the entire convention ought to be renewed, a chief nominated, and the executive power organised, &c. In short, all the ideas that Vincent, Ronsin, and Hébert, were known to entertain, formed the staple of these productions and seemed to betray their origin. At the same time, the epauletters, more turbulent and overbearing than ever, were heard openly to threaten that they would scour the prisons and exterminate the enemies whom the corrupt convention persisted in sparing. They asserted, moreover, that numerous patriots were unjustly confounded in captivity with the aristocrats, but whom it was their intention to select from the impure, and invest at once with liberty and arms. Ronsin, in grand costume as general of the revolutionary army, wearing a tri-coloured scarf and a huge scarlet tassel, and accompanied by several of his officers, visited the prisons, inspected the registers, and drew up analogous lists.

On the 15th Ventose (6th March), the section of Marat, under the presidency of Momoro, assembled, and indignant, as it recited, at the machinations of the enemies of the people, it resolved by acclamation that it was in a state of resistance; that the table of the declaration of rights should be veiled; and that it would remain in such state until food and liberty were assured to the people, and their enemies effectually punished. During the same evening, the Cordeliers mustered in a tumultuous gathering; their orators expatiated on the public sufferings, and recounted the persecutions recently undergone by those two pre-eminent patriots, Ronsin and Vincent, who, they alleged, had been ill whilst in the Luxembourg, and been denied the common privilege of a physician to attend them. In consequence, the country was declared in danger, and the declaration of rights ordered to be veiled. It was thus that all the insurrections had commenced, by resolutions purporting the suspension of all law, and the determination of the people to resume the exercise of their sovereignty.

* Decrees of the 8th and 13th Ventose, year 2.

On the morrow, the section of Marat and the Cordeliers appeared before the commune to intimate their resolutions, and induce it to adopt similar proceedings. Pache discreetly avoided attendance. One named Lubin presided at the council-general. He replied to the deputation with evident embarrassment. He said it seemed surprising that the moment when the convention was taking such energetic measures against the enemies of the revolution, and in relief of indigent patriots, should be selected to hoist the signal of distress and to veil the declaration of rights. Then pretending to justify the council-general, as if it were accused, he affirmed that the council had directed all its energies to ensure adequate supplies and their equitable distribution. Chaumette discoursed in a manner equally vague. He recommended peace and concord, and strongly urged the completion of the reports on the cultivation of the ornamental gardens and on the provisioning of the capital, wherein, according to the decrees, supplies were to be accumulated as in a menaced fortress.

Thus the leaders of the commune hesitated: the movement, although tumultuous, was not sufficiently powerful to carry them in its wake, or to inspire them with courage to betray the committee and the convention. The disorder prevailing nevertheless was extreme. An insurrection was commencing precisely as those which had heretofore succeeded, and one calculated to provoke equal apprehension. By an unlucky fatality, too, the committee of public safety was deprived at the time of its most influential members. Billaud-Varennes and Jean-Bon-Saint-André were absent on affairs of administration; Couthon and Robespierre were indisposed, and the latter was disabled from coming forth to rule his faithful Jacobins. Upon Saint-Just and Collot-d'Herbois alone devolved the task of combating the danger. They repaired together to the convention, where the members were congregating in all the hurry and trepidation of unseasonable affright. On their proposition, Fouquier Tinville was immediately summoned, and charged to use all diligence in discovering the distributors of the incendiary writings circulated in the markets, the agitators who stirred up the popular societies, and all the conspirators, in short, who threatened the public tranquillity. He was enjoined by an express decree to arrest them forthwith, and to render within three days his report thereon to the convention.

It availed little to have extorted a decree from the convention, for that body had never refused such means against perturbators; the Girondists, for instance, had been freely armed therewith against the insurgent commune; hence its execution altogether depended on the committee enlisting opinion in its favour. Collot, who enjoyed great popularity amongst the Jacobins and Cordeliers by his proficiency in club oratory, and, moreover, by an acceptable force of revolutionary sentiment, undertook that charge, and proceeded in all haste to the Jacobin Club. Scarcely had the members thereof assembled, than he presented to them a portraiture of the factions then endangering liberty, and of the plots in preparation. "A fresh campaign," he said, "is about to open; the labours of the committee, which so auspiciously terminated the last campaign, were preparing for the republic fresh victories. Relying on your confidence and approbation, which it has always assiduously laboured to merit, the committee was pursuing its operations, when suddenly our enemies have endeavoured to fetter it in its course; they have stimulated patriots against it, with the view of setting them in opposition to it, and of inciting them to slaughter each other. They wish to make us soldiers of Cadmus; they would have us immolated by the hands of our comrades. But no, we will not be the soldiers of Cadmus! Thanks to your excellent spirit, we will remain friends, and we shall be the soldiers of liberty alone! Supported by you, the committee will know how to resist with

energy, to repress the agitators, to expel them from the ranks of the patriots; and, after that indispensable sacrifice, to prosecute its labours and your victories. The post in which you have placed us," added Collot, "is perilous; but none of us trembles before the danger. The committee of general safety accepts its painful mission to watch and pursue all the enemies who manœuvre in secret against liberty; the committee of public welfare neglects nothing to fulfil its vast duties; but both require to be supported by you. In these days of danger, we are but few. Billaud and Jean-Bon are absent; our friends Couthon and Robespierre are ill. We remain therefore in small force to combat the enemies of the public weal: we must either be sustained by you or retire." "No, no," cried the Jacobins; "you need not retire—we will support you!" Vociferous acclamations accompanied these encouraging expressions. Collot continued, and narrated what had passed at the Cordelier Club. "There are men," said he, "who have lacked courage to suffer a few days' detention—men who have undergone no trials during the revolution—men whose advocacy we have undertaken when we deemed them oppressed, and who strive to excite an insurrection in Paris, because they have been confined a few seconds. An insurrection, because two men have suffered—because a physician did not attend them when they were unwell! Cursed be they who seek an insurrection!" "Yes, yes! cursed! cursed!" responded all the Jacobins in chorus.

"Marat was a Cordelier," resumed Collot-d'Herbois, "and Marat was a Jacobin. Well! he was persecuted also, assuredly much more than these men of a day; he was dragged before the tribunal where none but aristocrats ought to appear: did he provoke an insurrection? No. The sacred insurrection, the insurrection appointed to free humanity from its oppressors, takes birth in sentiments purely generous, not in such petty feelings as those wherewith these men would fainly actuate us. But we will not fall into their snares. The committee of public welfare will not yield to intriguers; it is taking strong and vigorous measures; and, though it be destined to perish, it will not recoil from its glorious task!"

When Collot ceased, Momoro essayed to justify the section of Marat and the Cordeliers. He allowed that a veil had been cast over the declaration of rights, but he disavowed the other charges; he denied the design of an insurrection, and asserted that the section of Marat and the Cordeliers were animated with the very purest sentiments. When conspirators are constrained to retract and to prevaricate, they are already doomed. When it comes to pass that they dare not avow their insurrectionary purpose, and that the mere announcement of their aim fails to fire a mine of sympathy in their favour, they are substantially powerless. Momoro was heard with marked disapprobation; and, ultimately, Collot was commissioned to proceed, in the name of the Jacobins, to fraternise with the Cordeliers, and to redeem those erring brethren from the thraldom of pernicious monitors.

The night being already far advanced, Collot was unable to visit the Cordeliers until the following day, the 17th Ventose (8th March); but the danger, however formidable at first, had visibly declined in magnitude. It had been made evident that opinion was not favourably disposed towards the conspirators, if that name could be applied to them. The commune had shrunk at the critical moment, and the Jacobins had adhered to the committee and to Robespierre, although that potential leader was debarred from appearing amongst them. The Cordeliers, albeit excited and impetuous, but feebly directed, and, above all, deserted by the commune and the Jacobins, could scarcely be expected to resist the congenial declamation of Collot-d'Herbois, and the honour of seeing in their tribune so renowned a member of the government. Vincent, with all or more than his wonted frenzy; Hébert, with his despicable journal, of which he multiplied the numbers; and Momoro, with his resolutions of the Marat section—were utterly incompetent to instigate a decisive movement. Ronsin alone, with his epauletters and a considerable store of munitions, was in a position to have attempted a sudden onslaught. Nor did he lack the requisite audacity; but whether he found his friends deficient in the daring which animated his own breast, or whether he could not sufficiently rely on his troop, it is certain he remained inactive; and from the 16th to the 17th, the crisis reached not beyond the ferment of agitation and redundant menaces. The epauletters spread through the popular societies, and threw them all into boisterous tumult; but they were overawed from having recourse to arms.

On the evening of the 17th, Collot repaired to the Cordelier Club, where he was hailed with congratulatory acclaim. He explained to the members "that the secret enemies of the revolution were seeking to beguile their patriotism; that they had been moved to declare the republic in a state of distress, whereas royalty and aristocracy alone were, at the moment, in the throes of agony; that wicked men had endeavoured to divide the Cordeliers and Jacobins, who ought, on the contrary, to compose but one family, united in principles and views; that the project of an insurrection, and the veil thrown over the declaration of rights, had gladdened the hearts of aristocrats, and that yesterday they had all imitated the example, and shrouded in their saloons the declaration of rights; and that consequently, to avoid thus signally gratifying the common enemy, it behoved them with all speed to unveil the sacred code of nature." The Cordeliers were regained by such assurances, although a great number of Bouchotte's subordinates was amongst them; they hastened to signalise their repentance by tearing away the crape hung before the declaration of rights and delivering it to Collot, with an entreaty to assure the Jacobins that they would always march in an identical path.

Within a few minutes Collot-d'Herbois was in the midst of the Jacobins, proclaiming to them their victory over the Cordeliers and the ultra-revolutionists. The conspirators were thenceforth abandoned on all sides; the only resource left them was a bold and sudden attack, which, as we have intimated, was almost impossible. The committee of public welfare promptly resolved to prevent any such desperate movement on their part, by causing the principal leaders to be arrested, and sending them forthwith before the revolutionary tribunal. It ordered Fouquier to collect the facts necessary to prove a conspiracy, and to prepare articles of impeachment without delay. Meanwhile, Saint-Just was commissioned to make a report to the convention against the united factions which threatened the tranquillity of the state.

On the 23d Ventose (13th March), Saint-Just presented his report. In conformity with the adopted system, he still pourtrayed the foreigner as instigating two factions seemingly adverse—the one composed of seditious men, incendiaries, plunderers, defamers, and atheists, who laboured to throw the republic into chaotic confusion by exaggeration; the other composed of corruptionists, stockjobbers, and extortioners, who, having yielded to the seductions and allurements of pleasure, tended to enervate and dishonour the republic. He alleged that the first of these two factions had taken the initiative, and had endeavoured to raise the standard of revolt, but that it would be speedily suppressed; and he concluded by demanding in consequence a decree of death against all, in general terms, who had meditated the subversion of the existing authority, assisted in corrupting the public mind and republican manners, impeded the arrival of supplies, and contributed in any manner to the plan hatched by the alien. Saint-Just subsequently added, that, from this time forth, "*It was necessary to in-*

scribe on the order of the day, justice, probity, and all republican virtues."

In this report, indited in a spirit of fanatical violence, all the factions were equally menaced; but there were explicitly devoted to the mercies of the revolutionary tribunal only the ultra-revolutionary conspirators, such as Ronsin, Vincent, Hébert, &c., and the corruptionists Chabot, Bazire, Fabre, and Julien, the fabricators of the false decree. A sinister reserve was affected towards those whom Saint-Just stigmatised as "indulgents" and "moderates."

In the course of the same evening, Robespierre appeared at the Jacobin Club with Couthon, and both were greeted with enthusiastic cheers. The members surrounded them, congratulated them on the re-establishment of their health, and promised towards Robespierre in particular an unlimited devotion. He moved an extraordinary sitting for the morrow, with the view of elucidating the mystery of the detected conspiracy. The sitting was voted at once. The obsequious eagerness of the commune was equally striking. On the proposition of Chaumette himself, it was resolved to solicit a formal communication of the report delivered by Saint-Just to the convention; and meanwhile messengers were dispatched to the printing-office of the republic to obtain a copy for immediate perusal. All submitted with perfect docility to the triumphant power of the committee of public welfare. During that night, Fouquier-Tinville took into custody Hébert, Vincent, Ronsin, Momoro, Mazuel, one of Ronsin's officers; and, lastly, the foreign banker Kock, an ultra-revolutionary stock-jobber, at whose table Hébert, Ronsin, and Vincent, frequently regaled themselves and arranged all their schemes. Thus the committee had two foreign bankers available to convince the sceptical that the two factions were impelled by the coalition. The Baron de Batz could serve to prove the fact against Chabot, Julien, Fabre, against all alleged corruptionists and moderates, in short; and Kock was adducible to prove the same charge against Vincent, Ronsin, and the ultra-revolutionists.

The prisoners enumerated had surrendered themselves without resistance, and they were consigned the following day to the Luxembourg. Its previous occupants thronged joyfully forward to witness the arrival of those furious characters who had so cruelly terrified them by the threat of a renewed September. Ronsin evinced infinite firmness and indifference; the dastardly Hébert drooped in hopeless depression, Momoro was struck with consternation, and Vincent fell into convulsions. The report of these arrests circulated rapidly through Paris, and produced general satisfaction. Unfortunately, it was attended with a further rumour that all was not yet finished, and that the adherents of every faction were to be instantly crushed. The assertion was accredited in the extraordinary sitting of the Jacobins. After each had recounted what he knew of the conspiracy, of its authors, and of their projects, some were there who roundly intimated that all suspected plots were to be investigated, and that a report would be framed on other men besides those actually seized.

The offices of the war department, the revolutionary army, and the Cordelier Club, were all struck at in the persons of Vincent, Ronsin, Hébert, Mazuel, and Momoro. An inclination was felt to aim a blow at the commune also. The rumour touching the office of grand-judge being destined for Pache, had been universally disseminated; but he was known to be incapable of engaging in a conspiracy, to be docile towards the supreme authority, and to be respected by the people; wherefore it was deemed advisable to refrain from the possibly hazardous experiment of sending him to join his late associates. The arrest of Chaumette seemed preferable; for although he was neither bolder nor more dangerous than Pache, yet he had been, from vanity and a species of infatuation, the author of many most imprudent resolutions on the part of the commune, and one of the most zealous apostles of the worship of Reason. Accordingly, the unfortunate procurator was apprehended and transmitted to the Luxembourg, in company with Bishop Gobel, principal actor in the famous scene of the abjuration, and Anacharsis Clootz, already excluded from the convention and the Jacobin Club on account of his foreign origin, his nobility, his wealth, his universal republic, and his atheism.

When Chaumette arrived at the Luxembourg, its numerous inmates, the whole body of the suspected, pressed eagerly to meet him, and discharged upon his head a storm of raillery. He, poor creature, with an insatiable passion for declamation, was utterly devoid of Ronsin's audacious spirit or of Vincent's furious excitement. His lank hair and demure furtive aspect gave him the appearance of a missionary; and in reality he had filled the part with respect to the newly invented faith. The prisoners derided him for his requisitions against courtesans, against aristocrats, against the suspected, and regarding the famine. One amongst them addressed him, with a low bow, thus—"Philosopher Anaxagoras, I am suspected, thou art suspected, we are suspected." Chaumette attempted to exculpate himself in a deprecatory and trembling tone. But thenceforward he never ventured to leave his cell, or to appear in the court amidst his fellow-captives.

After thus securing the purposed victims, the committee devolved on its consort of general safety the task of framing the articles of accusation against Chabot, Bazire, Delaunay, Julien of Toulouse, and Fabre. All five were included in the same indictment, and remitted to the revolutionary tribunal. At this moment, it was learned that a female emigrant, pursued by a revolutionary committee, had found an asylum under the roof of Herault-Séchelles. Already that well-known deputy, who joined to a large fortune high birth, an elegant exterior, and an accomplished and graceful mind—who was the friend of Danton, Camille-Desmoulins, Proli—and who often shuddered to find himself in the ranks of those fearful revolutionists—had fallen under suspicion, and the merit of being the principal author of the existing constitution had been long forgotten. The committee hastily seized the occasion to order his arrest, first because it bore him no love, and secondly because it desired to show it would proceed without any scruple against all moderates surprised in delinquency, and treat them with no greater measure of indulgence than other offenders. Thus the wrath of the redoubtable committee fell indiscriminately on men of all ranks, all opinions, and all degrees of merit.

The trial of a portion of the conspirators commenced on the 1st Germinal (20th March). In the same arraignment were combined Ronsin, Vincent, Hébert, Momoro, Mazuel, Kock the banker, Leclerc, a young Lyonnese who had become the head of a department in the war-office under Bouchotte; Ancar and Ducroquet, commissioners of supplies; and certain other members of the revolutionary army and the war ministry. To maintain the supposition of confederacy between the ultra-revolutionary faction and that of the foreigner, with these were confounded Proli, Dubuisson, Pereyra, and Desfieux, who had never held any relations with them. Chaumette was reserved to figure hereafter with Gobel and the other instigators of the worship of Reason; except that Clootz, who ought to have been associated with the latter, was tacked to Proli in his capacity of a foreigner. The accused were nineteen in number. Ronsin and Clootz were the most firm and undaunted. "This," said Ronsin to his fellows in misfortune, "is a political trial; what avail your papers and your labours at justification? You will be condemned. When you ought to have acted, you talked; now learn to die! For myself, I swear you will never see me quail; endeavour to do as much.'

The despicable Hébert and Momoro uttered grievous lamentations, asserting, amongst other things, that liberty was ruined. "Liberty ruined!" exclaimed Ronsin, "because a few miserable individuals are about to perish! Liberty is immortal; our enemies will fall after us, and liberty will survive the whole!" Recriminations subsequently passing amongst them, Clootz exhorted them not to aggravate their calamities by mutual invectives, and he repeated to them the famous apologue—

"Je revais cette nuit que, de mal consumé,
Côte à côte d'un gueux on m'avait inhumé."*

The quotation had its effect, and they ceased to upbraid each other with their common fate. Clootz, still full of his philosophical opinions though so near the scaffold, laboured diligently to eradicate the last remnants of deism which might be still lingering in their minds, and to the last preached the cause of nature and reason with ardent zeal and an inconceivable contempt of death.

They were conducted to the tribunal amidst a prodigious concourse of spectators. The recital of their conduct has shown us in what their conspiracy really consisted. Clubbists of the lowest grade, the dregs of official schemers, thieves and murderers enrolled in the revolutionary army, they had exhibited the usual exaggeration of inferiors, of subordinates intrusted with commissions, who invariably exceed their mandate. Thus they had endeavoured to urge the revolutionary government into a mere military commission, the abolition of a state religion into a proscription of all worship, republican manners into revolting coarseness, liberty of speech into the most disgusting grossness, democratic jealousy and severity with regard to individuals, in fine, into a system of the most atrocious defamation. Abusive expressions against the convention and the ruling committee, wild schemes of government verbally propounded, turbulent motions at the Cordelier Club and in the sections, foul placards and tracts, a visit by Ronsin to the prisons, to ascertain whether any patriots were confined therein as he himself had lately been; lastly, certain vapouring menaces, and an attempt at a movement under favour of the general scarcity—such were their plots. Herein was little more than the vile and stupid effervescence of restless iniquity. A conspiracy profoundly laid and concerted with the foreigner, was far above the capacity of such despicable creatures. That was the perfidious allegation of the committee, which the infamous Fouquier-Tinville was charged to maintain before the tribunal, and which the tribunal had orders to hold irrefragably demonstrated.

The insulting language in which Vincent and Ronsin had indulged towards Legendre, when dining in his company with Pache, and their reiterated propositions for organising the executive power, were adduced as substantiating the project to annihilate the national representation and the committee of public welfare. Their repasts at the house of Kock the banker were alleged as attesting their correspondence with the foreigner. This charge was further supported by testimony of a different character. Certain letters written from Paris to London, and inserted in the English newspapers, had announced that, judging from the prevailing agitation, fresh movements might be anticipated. These letters were held to prove that the foreigner was in the confidence of the accused, since he could so accurately foreshow their purposes. The scarcity, with which they had reproached the government to excite the people, was imputed to them alone; for Fouquier, rendering calumny for calumny, maintained that they were the authors of this very dearth, by causing the waggons bearing vegetables and other produce to be pillaged. The munitions collected at Paris for the revolutionary army were charged upon them as preparations for the conspiracy. The visit of Ronsin to the prisons was given as evidence of a design to arm the suspected and to turn them loose on the Parisians. Lastly, the writings distributed in the markets, and the veil thrown over the declaration of rights, were represented as overt acts of actual sedition. As for Hébert, he was covered with infamy. His political acts and his journal were scarcely alluded to; it was deemed enough to prove against him petty thefts of shirts and handkerchiefs.

But let us turn from the odious discussions between such degraded criminals and the equally degraded accuser, of whom a terrible government made use to accomplish the sacrifices it required. Holding aloof in its elevated sphere, that government marked out the individuals who were obstacles in its way, and left to its attorney-general Fouquier-Tinville the task of satisfying forms by falsehoods. If, in this hideous hecatomb, sacrificed to the exigency of public tranquillity, any particular victims merit a separate notice, they are those unfortunate strangers, Proli and Anacharsis Clootz, arraigned as agents of the coalition. Proli, as we have narrated, being intimately acquainted with Belgium, his native country, had blamed the ignorant violence of the Jacobins in that state; he had, moreover, admired the talents of Dumouriez, and avowed it before the tribunal. His knowledge of foreign courts had on different occasions rendered him useful to Lebrun, and this he also avowed. "Thou hast blamed the revolutionary system in Belgium," said his judges; "thou hast admired Dumouriez, thou hast been the friend of Lebrun; therefore art thou an agent of the foreigner." There was not another fact adduced against him. As to Clootz, his universal republic, his creed of reason, his income of a hundred thousand livres, and certain endeavours on his part to save a female emigrant, sufficed to convict him. Scarcely had the third day of the investigation commenced, than the jury declared itself sufficiently informed, and forthwith condemned at one swoop the whole array of intriguers, agitators, and aliens, to the pains of death. One only was excepted, a person named Laboureau, who had served in the affair as a spy of the committee. On the 4th Germinal (24th March), at four in the afternoon, the condemned were conveyed to the place of execution. The crowd was equally great as on any previous occasion. Places on waggons and on tables disposed around the scaffold were openly let to the highest bidders. Neither Ronsin nor Clootz *quailed*, to use their own terrible expression. Hébert, overwhelmed with disgrace, shame, and scorn, made no effort to surmount his terror; he repeatedly fainted on the way, and the populace, brutal as he himself was vile, followed the fatal cart, repeating the cry of the news-venders, "He is in a furious passion, the Père Duchêne!"

Thus were these worthless characters sacrificed to the indispensable necessity of consolidating a firm and vigorous government: and here the essential need of order and obedience was not one of those sophisms under cover of which governments are wont to immolate their victims. All Europe menaced France, and at the very time, every presumptuous demagogue was endeavouring to arrogate a share of authority, and endangering the public welfare by incessant contests. In such an exigency, it was absolutely requisite that some superior and energetic men should seize and appropriate this disputed authority, hold it to the exclusion of all, and be thereby enabled to direct its whole force in resisting combined Europe. If we ex-

* [This apologue is a short poem of ten lines, the composition of a Caen poet, named Patrix, and written on his deathbed. It contains but a trite moral. The poet dreams that, dying, he is buried by the side of a beggar, and disgusted with such company, he abuses his companion in opprobrious terms, and commands him to begone. The beggar reminds the aristocratic poet that where they have now met there is no distinction of rank. D'Israeli thus translates the concluding lines of the beggar's reply:—

"Here all are equal—now thy lot is mine!—
I on my dunghill, as thou art on thine!"]

perience any regret, it is to witness the employment of falsehood against such despicable persons; to see amongst them a man of great courage, Ronsin; an inoffensive maniac, Clootz; and a foreigner, possibly an intriguer, but no conspirator, and possessing a high degree of merit, the unfortunate Proli.

When the Hébertists had undergone their final doom, the indulgents exhibited infinite joy, and exclaimed every where that they must have been right in denouncing Hébert, Ronsin, and Vincent, since the committee of public welfare and the revolutionary tribunal had consigned them to death. "Of what, therefore, can we be accused?" they said. "Our only offence is having reproached those factious individuals with designing to overthrow the republic, destroy the National Convention, supplant the committee of public welfare, add the danger of religious to that of civil war, and provoke general confusion. This is precisely what Saint-Just and Fouquier-Tinville upbraided them with, when sending them to the scaffold. In what can we be conspirators or enemies of the republic?"

Nothing could be more just than these reflections, and the committee thought exactly as Danton, Camille-Desmoulins, Philippeaux, or Fabre, respecting the danger of that anarchical turbulence. In proof whereof, Robespierre, since the 31st May, had constantly defended Danton and Camille, and as constantly animadverted upon the anarchists. But, as we have already intimated, the committee, in crushing the latter, exposed itself to the stigma of moderatism, and was constrained to display unrelenting rigour in the contrary direction, in order to avoid compromising its revolutionary reputation. Albeit holding identical sentiments with Danton and Camille, the circumstances of the times made it imperative that it should censure their opinions, repudiate them in its public documents, and, in short, appear not to favour them more than the Hébertists themselves. In his report against the two factions, Saint-Just had accused the one equally with the other, and had observed an ominous silence with regard to indulgents. At the Jacobin Club, Collot had stated that all was not concluded, and that a report was preparing against others besides the men actually arrested. To these menaces was joined the apprehension of Herault-Séchelles, the friend of Danton, and one of the most esteemed personages of the epoch. Such indications were far from announcing any intention to relax in severity, and yet it was repeated on all sides that the committee purposed to retrace its steps, to mitigate the revolutionary system, and to take vengeance on destroyers of every description. Those who ardently longed for such return to a more merciful policy—the detained, their families, all the peaceable citizens, in short, harassed under the name of "indifferents"—gave way to those indiscreet hopes, and openly affirmed that the government of blood was at length about to finish. This was soon the general opinion; it circulated rapidly in the departments, especially in those of the Rhone, where some months previously such atrocious vengeance had been wreaked, and through which Ronsin had spread such terror. At Lyons, the inhabitants breathed freely for a moment, ventured to look their oppressors in the face, and seemed to warn them that their cruelties would be brought to a speedy termination. At these rumours, at these anticipations of the middle and peaceable class, the patriots no longer restrained their indignation. The Jacobins of Lyons wrote to those of Paris that aristocracy was again rearing its head; that in a short time they would be unable to hold their ground; and that, if strength and encouragement were not given to them, they would be driven to commit self-murder, like the patriot Gaillard, who had thrust a dagger into his body on the occasion of Ronsin's first arrest.

"I have seen letters," said Robespierre to the Jacobins, "from some of the Lyonese patriots: they all evince the same despair; and if some prompt remedy be not applied to their sores, they will have no solace but in the recipe of Cato and Gaillard. The pernicious faction, which, affecting an extravagant patriotism, was furtively plotting the immolation of the patriots, has been suppressed; but that is of little consequence to the foreigner, so long as another is rampant. If Hébert had been victorious, the convention was scattered, the republic fell into chaos, and tyranny was satisfied; but with the moderates, the convention loses its energy, the crimes of the aristocracy remain unpunished, and the tyrants triumph. The foreigner, therefore, has as much hope from the one as from the other of these factions, and he suborns them all without relying solely on any. What cares he for Hébert dying on the scaffold, if traitors of another kind remain to him, ready to aid in accomplishing his designs? You have then done nothing so long as a faction is still extant and left to be destroyed; the convention is resolute in its purpose to exterminate them all, even to the last fragment."

Thus was it made apparent that the committee had felt the necessity of clearing itself from the reproach of moderation by a new sacrifice. Robespierre had heretofore defended Danton, when a turbulent faction would have struck that most renowned of patriots at his very side. At that time both policy and their common danger counselled him to vindicate his old colleague; but now that audacious faction was no more. By longer defending this now unpopular colleague, he incurred the certain hazard of compromising himself. Besides, the conduct of Danton was calculated to awaken certain misgivings in his jealous breast. What was Danton's position aloof from the committee? In close association with Philippeaux and Camille-Desmoulins, he seemed the instigator and veritable leader of that new opposition which harassed the government with incessant censures and most pungent raillery. Seated in front of the tribune, whence the members of the committee propounded their views, Danton had for many a day borne a scowling and contemptuous expression as he heard and eyed them. His demeanour, his words, eagerly caught up and repeated from mouth to mouth, his intimacies, all tended to demonstrate that, after thus alienating himself from the government, he had resolved into its bitter detractor, and kept himself apart from all contact, as if to set in opposition against it his own great revolutionary name. For, be it remembered, although sunk in popularity, he still enjoyed an extraordinary reputation for hardihood and political genius. Thus, were Danton removed, no commanding influence would remain without the pale of the committee, to eclipse or discredit the secondary men of whom it was composed, such as Saint-Just, Couthon, and Collot-d'Herbois. By consenting to the sacrifice, also, Robespierre would at once get rid of a rival, restore to the government its reputation for energy, and enhance his own fame for virtue by smiting a man so generally accused of unduly relishing money and pleasure. Moreover, he was especially urged thereto by all his colleagues, to whom Danton was more obnoxious than to himself. Couthon and Collot-d'Herbois were conscious that the celebrated tribune held them in supreme contempt. Billaud, envious, cold-blooded, and ruthless in temperament, looked malignantly on a man before whom he felt himself, as it were, insignificant and overawed. Saint-Just, dogmatical, austere, and arrogant, was the very antithesis to a vivacious, free, and open-hearted revolutionist; and he foresaw that, were Danton dead, he would become the second person in the republic. All, in fine, were aware, that in his project for remodelling the committee, Danton held that Robespierre alone ought to be retained. They therefore surrounded their potential colleague, and in truth found no great difficulty in wringing from him a concurrence in what so agreeably flattered his ambition and pride. We cannot recount the precise arguments that influenced

the decision, or assign the day whereon it was taken; but, as by some secret concert, they all suddenly became threatening and mysterious. Amongst those who narrowly watched the lowering portents, no doubt was felt as to their real intentions. At the convention and the Jacobin Club, it is true, they observed an absolute silence; but the sinister rumour travelled in a quick under-current. It was stated that Danton, Camille, Philippeaux, and Lacroix, were marked as sacrifices to the authority of the committee. Some common friends of Danton and Robespierre, alarmed at these intimations, and judging that if such a blow were struck none could henceforward deem himself in security, nay, that Robespierre even could not be altogether tranquil, endeavoured to bring them together and provoke a mutual explanation. Robespierre, shrouding himself in an obstinate silence, refused to reply to these overtures, and maintained a stern and sullen reserve. When they spoke to him of the friendship he had formerly testified for Danton, he answered as an accomplished hypocrite, that he was powerless either for or against his colleague; that justice would always shield innocence; that for himself, his whole life had been a continual sacrifice of his affections for his country; and that if his friend were guilty, he would sacrifice him with regret, but still he must sacrifice him, as any other criminal, to the republic.

The true intent of these evasions was sufficiently obvious; and those anxious peace-makers were convinced that Robespierre purposely avoided contracting any engagement towards Danton, but reserved to himself the liberty of giving him up to his colleagues. Meanwhile, the rumour of the impending arrests acquired greater consistence. The friends of Danton surrounded him, and earnestly besought him to rise from his species of slumber, to shake off his indolence, and to erect once more that revolutionary front which had never been shown in vain during the storm. "I know," said Danton, "they want to arrest me. But," he added, "they will not dare!" And, after all, what could he do? To fly was impossible. What country would have afforded an asylum to this terrible revolutionist? And ought he by flight to have confirmed all the calumnies of his enemies? Moreover, he truly loved his country. "Can a man carry his country at the sole of his foot?" he often exclaimed. On the other hand, if he remained in France, but few means of resistance were available to him. The Cordeliers were devoted to the ultra-revolutionists, and the Jacobins to Robespierre. The convention was paralysed and terror-stricken. Where was the support on which he could rely? This question has not been sufficiently considered by those who, seeing this extraordinary man overturn the throne on the 10th August and arouse the whole population against aggressive foreigners, have expressed such amazement that he fell without a struggle. Revolutionary genius does not consist in regaining a lost popularity, or in creating forces which have no existence, but in directing the affections of a people when fully possessed. The generous sentiments of Danton, and his alienation from affairs, had almost wholly deprived him of the popular favour, or at all events had not left him enough to subvert the reigning authority. Impressed with the conviction of his comparative impotence, he remained quiescent, and repeated—"They will not dare!" He might, in fact, with some reason, believe that before so formidable a name and such great services, his adversaries would hesitate. He thus sunk back into his lethargy, or, more correctly speaking, into that proud indifference of strong minds awaiting expectant danger without using undignified exertions to avert it.

The committee still observed a gloomy silence, whilst sinister rumours continued thickly to circulate. Six days had elapsed since the execution of Hébert, and it was now the 9th of Germinal. The peaceable class of citizens, who had formed indiscreet hopes from the suppression of the furious faction, suddenly originated a report that the community would be speedily freed from the two martyrs, Marat and Chalier; that sufficient had been detected in their lives to transform them, as rapidly as Hébert, from patriots into miscreants. This assertion, founded on the idea of a retrograde movement, was propagated with singular industry; and on all sides men were heard repeating that the busts of Marat and Chalier were about to be broken. Legendre foolishly denounced these inconsiderate words before the convention and the club of Jacobins, as if to protest, in the name of his friends the moderates, against any such design. "Be under no alarm," said Collot to the Jacobins; "these reports will be belied. We have directed the thunderbolt on the infamous men who were deceiving the people—we have torn from them the mask which concealed their deformity; but they are not alone in their iniquity! We will tear away all possible masks. Let not the indulgents imagine that it is for them we have fought—that it is for them we have here held such glorious sittings! We shall soon undeceive them."

In fact, the very next day, 10th Germinal (31st March), the committee of public welfare, to invest its determination with the greater authority, called to its counsels the committee of general safety and the committee of legislation. When all the members were assembled, Saint-Just arose, and, in one of those violent and insidious reports he knew so well how to frame, he denounced Danton, Desmoulins, Philippeaux, and Lacroix, and proposed their apprehension. The members of the two other committees, dismayed and trembling, durst offer no resistance, but hoped rather to keep the danger from themselves by signifying a ready adherence. The strictest silence was enjoined; and during the night of the 10th Germinal, Danton, Lacroix, Philippeaux, and Camille-Desmoulins were surprised, arrested, and lodged in the Luxembourg.

Almost by dawn the intelligence had travelled over Paris, throwing its inhabitants into a species of stupor. The members of the convention assembled in terror and silence. The committee, which was invariably to be waited for, having already assumed all the offensive insolence of power, had not yet arrived. Legendre, who had not been deemed sufficiently important to be arrested with his friends, hastened to occupy the tribune. He said, "Citizens, four members of this assembly have been arrested last night; I know that Danton is one of them—I am ignorant of the names of the others; but whoever they may be, I move that they be heard at the bar. Citizens, I declare that I esteem Danton as pure as myself; and I have yet to learn that any thing can be possibly alleged against me. I will not attack any member of the committees of public welfare and general safety; but I am justified in expressing my apprehension that private antipathy and personal feelings have dragged from liberty men who have rendered the most signal and beneficial services. The man who, in September 1792, saved France by his energy, surely deserves a hearing, and ought to have the privilege of explanation accorded him, when he is accused of having betrayed his country."

To obtain for Danton the power of addressing the convention, was the best expedient for saving him and foiling his adversaries. Several members, in consequence, intimated their opinion in favour of hearing him; but, in the midst of the discussion, Robespierre, preceding the committee, arrived, mounted the tribune, and in an angry and menacing tone spoke in these terms:—"From the unusual excitement pervading this assembly, from the agitation caused by a previous speaker, it is plain that some question of great interest occupies you; that the point at issue is, whether a few individuals shall this day prevail over the country. But how could you forget your principles so far as to entertain a proposition for granting to certain persons what you have formerly refused to Chabot, Delaunay

and Fabre-d'Eglantine? Why this difference in favour of particular individuals? What care I for the eulogiums which men pass on themselves and their friends? Fatal experience has taught us to distrust such eulogies. Our province is to inquire, not whether a man has performed such or such a patriotic act, but what has been his whole course of conduct.

Legendre professes ignorance as to the names of those who are arrested. The whole convention knows them. His friend Lacroix is amongst the number; why does Legendre feign to be ignorant of that? Because he is well aware that none can with decency defend Lacroix. He has spoken of Danton, because he thinks, doubtless, a privilege is attached to that name. No; we will have no privileges—we will have no idols!"

At these last words great applause was manifested; and the cowardly members, then trembling before an idol, hailed with seeming rapture the downfall of one that was no longer to be feared. Robespierre continued: "In what is Danton superior to Lafayette, Dumouriez, Brissot, Fabre, Chabot, or Hébert? What is said of him that may not be said of them? And yet, did you exhibit any delicacy towards them? You are told of the despotism of the committees, as if the confidence the people have reposed in you, and which you have delegated to those committees, was not a sure guarantee of their patriotism. Fears are affected, too; but, I say, whoever trembles at this moment is guilty, for innocence never dreads public vigilance."

Here arose further plaudits from those very poltroons who were then sitting in mortal trepidation, and who would fain prove they had no fear. "And in me also," added Robespierre—"in me also it has been sought to inspire terror. I have been emphatically warned, that after attaining Danton, the danger might reach myself. I have been so admonished in writing. The friends of Danton have loaded me with letters, they have besieged me in person with exhortations; they imagined the remembrance of an old intimacy—a bygone faith in false virtues—would induce me to relax my zeal and passion for liberty. Indeed! I assert that if the dangers of Danton were certain to become mine, such a consideration would not weigh with me for an instant. Now especially it behoves us all to evince some courage and greatness of soul. Vulgar minds or guilty men alone dread to see their prototypes fall, because, having then no longer a barrier of the criminal before them, they stand exposed to the glare of truth; but if such vulgar minds exist, there are in this assembly sufficient of the heroic cast, who will know how to brave all factitious terrors. Moreover, the number of the guilty is not great; crime has found but few partisans amongst us, and the country will be delivered at a trifling sacrifice."

Robespierre had now acquired sufficient confidence and assurance to say whatever suited him, and never perhaps had he exhibited greater ingenuity or greater perfidy. To speak of the sacrifice he made in abandoning Danton, to arrogate merit therefor, to defy such danger as might thence accrue, and to reassure the cowardly by alluding to the small number of the guilty, was assuredly a master-stroke of hypocrisy and address. So all his colleagues in the convention decided, without a dissentient voice, that the four deputies arrested the previous night should not be heard at their bar. At that moment Saint-Just appeared, and proceeded to read his report. On him was generally devolved the task of vilifying victims, because, to the subtlety required for contorting facts and giving them a signification abhorrent to truth and candour, he joined a rare proficiency in the style vituperative and vigorous. Never on any previous occasion had he been more horribly eloquent or more unscrupulous; for all his hatred, howsoever intense it might be, could not have so blinded his judgment as to set down all he advanced in good faith. After reviling Philippeaux, Camille-Desmoulins, and Herault-Séchelles, at great length, and more directly accusing Lacroix, he came eventually to Danton, and invented facts utterly false, or perverted acknowledged facts in an atrocious manner. According to him, Danton, covetous, lazy, mendacious, and dastardly even, had sold himself to Mirabeau, afterwards to Lameth, and, in concert with Brissot, had drawn up the petition which led to the massacre of the Champ-de-Mars, not with the view of subverting royalty, but in order to get the best citizens destroyed; thereafter he had departed with impunity to enjoy himself, and spend the fruit of his perfidies at Arcis-sur-Aube. He had concealed himself on the 10th August, and had reappeared only to make himself minister; he had then allied himself with the Orleans party, and procured the election of Orleans and Fabre to the national deputation. Leagued with Dumouriez, having for the Girondists a mere affected hatred, and holding it always in his power to unite with them, he had been decidedly opposed to the 31st May, and even endeavoured to cause the arrest of Henriot. When Dumouriez, Orleans, and the Girondists were punished, he had negotiated with the party which proposed to put Louis XVII. on the throne. Grasping at money from every quarter—from Orleans, the Bourbons, and the foreigner—dining with bankers and aristocrats, deep in every intrigue, prodigal of promises to all parties, a veritable Catiline in short, rapacious, debauched, idle, a corruptor of public morals, he had gone a second time to bury himself at Arcis-sur-Aube, in order to revel on the ample produce of his cupidity. He had finally returned thence, and recently entered into confederacy with all the enemies of the commonwealth, with Hébert and his gang, by the common link of the foreigner, for the especial purpose of assailing the committee, and the men whom the convention had intrusted with its confidence.

After listening to this iniquitous report, the convention decreed an impeachment against Danton, Camille-Desmoulins, Philippeaux, Herault-Séchelles, and Lacroix.

Those unfortunate deputies had been conducted to the Luxembourg. Lacroix said to Danton, "Arrest us!—us! I could never have imagined it!" "Thou couldst never have imagined it?" remarked Danton; "I knew it—I was forewarned!" "Thou knewest it!" exclaimed Lacroix, "and didst nothing! See the effect of thy usual indolence; it has ruined us!" "I did not think," observed Danton, in reply, "they would have ever dared to execute their design."

All the prisoners had crowded to the gate, eager to see the celebrated Danton, and that interesting Camille, who had illumined their dungeons with a ray of cheerfulness and hope. Danton was, as usual with him, calm, stately, and withal gay; Camille seemed astounded and melancholy; Philippeaux excited and elevated by his danger. Herault-Séchelles, who had preceded them at the Luxembourg by a few days, hastened to meet his friends, and merrily saluted them. "When men commit folly," observed Danton, "they certainly ought to know how to laugh at it." Then perceiving Thomas Paine, he said to him, "What thou hast done for the happiness and liberty of thy country, I have in vain attempted to do for mine; I have been less fortunate, but not more culpable. I am doomed to the scaffold; well, my friends, we must go there cheerfully!"

On the following day, 12th Germinal, the articles of impeachment were sent to the Luxembourg, and the accused ordered to be transferred to the Conciergerie, for the purpose of appearing before the tribunal. Camille was roused to fury as he perused the odious falsehoods wherewith the indictment was surcharged. He soon grew tranquil, however, and exclaimed, with deep affliction, "I go to the scaffold for having shed a few tears over the fate of so many unfortunate victims. My only regret in dying is that I could not serve them!" All the detained, whatever their poli-

tical opinions, testified the most lively interest in his behalf, and offered up ardent vows for his acquittal. Philippeaux spoke a few words about his wife, and then remained calm and serene. Herault-Séchelles retained that gracefulness of mind and manner which distinguished him even amongst men of his own rank; he embraced his faithful servant, who had followed him to the Luxembourg, but was debarred from accompanying him to the Conciergerie, consoling him with words of comfort, and exhorting him to fortitude. Fabre, Chabot, Bazire, and Delaunay, were directed to be removed at the same time, it being determined to try them conjointly with Danton, in order to throw disgrace on his case by an appearance of confederacy with forgers. Fabre was ill, and almost dying. Chabot, who from the recesses of his prison had never ceased writing to Robespierre, imploring his pity in abject terms, and lavishing on him the basest flattery, without, however, moving his obdurate heart, was now convinced that death was inevitable, and for him equally assured infamy; he accordingly resolved upon self-destruction. He swallowed corrosive sublimate; but acute agony having forced him to utter cries, he confessed his attempt, accepted relief, and was carried to the Conciergerie in as wretched a condition as Fabre. A somewhat more noble sentiment seemed to animate him amidst his anguish—it was that of sorrow for having compromised his friend Bazire, who had taken no part in the fraudulent transaction. "Bazire!" he repeatedly exclaimed, "my poor Bazire! what hast thou done?"

At the Conciergerie the accused inspired equal curiosity as at the Luxembourg. They occupied the apartment of the Girondists. Danton conversed with his accustomed energy. "On such a day it was," said he, "that I caused the revolutionary tribunal to be instituted. I ask pardon for the act of God and men. My design was to prevent a fresh September, and not to send a pestilence on humanity." Reverting to his scorn for the colleagues who were assassinating him—"These brother-Cains," he exclaimed, "understand nothing about government. I leave every thing in frightful disorder." Then depicting the impotence of the paralytic Couthon and the cowardly Robespierre, he ridiculed them in gross but original expressions, which still announced a singular vivacity of spirit. For a moment he evinced some slight regret for having taken part in the revolution. "It were better to be a poor fisherman than to govern men," he said. This was the only phrase of the sort he uttered.

Lacroix betokened astonishment on witnessing the number and deplorable state of the prisoners in the cells. "What!" cried a voice, "did not the carts loaded with victims teach you what was passing in Paris?" The surprise of Lacroix was unaffected, and it is a lesson for men who, in ardent pursuit of a political object, give too little heed to the individual sufferings of the unfortunate, and seem as if they believed not in their existence because not actually beheld.

On the following day, the 13th Germinal, the accused were conducted before the tribunal to the number of fifteen. The list was incongruously made up of the five leading moderates, Danton, Herault-Séchelles, Camille, Philippeaux, and Lacroix; of the four charged with forgery, Chabot, Bazire, Delaunay, and Fabre-d'Eglantine; of Chabot's two brothers-in-law, Junius and Emanuel Frey; of the contractor D'Espagnac, and the ill-fated Westermann, accused of having taken part in the corruption and intrigues of Danton; and of two foreigners, friends of the panels, the Spaniard Guzman and the Dane Diederichs. The design of the committee, in this singular amalgamation, was to confound the moderates with the corruptionists and aliens, in order still to maintain the paradox, that moderation was the joint offspring of a falling off from republican virtue and the subornation of the foreigner. The concourse assembled to witness the trial was beyond all precedent immense. Some vestiges of that interest Danton had so long inspired were revived by his appearance at the bar. Fouquier-Tinville, the judges, and the jurymen, all subaltern revolutionists drawn from obscurity by his potent hand, sat abashed in his presence: his confident and haughty demeanour overawed them, and he seemed rather the accuser than the accused. The president, Hermann, and Fouquier-Tinville, instead of selecting the jurymen by lot, as the law enjoined, flagrantly nominated the leet, and fixed upon such exclusively as they called "*the solid.*" They then proceeded to interrogate the prisoners. When Danton was asked the usual questions upon his age and domicile, he answered disdainfully that he was thirty-four, and that his name would be shortly in the Pantheon, himself in nonentity. Camille blasphemously replied, that "he was thirty-three years old, the age of the sans-culotte Jesus Christ when he perished." Bazire was twenty-nine. Herault-Séchelles and Philippeaux were each thirty-four. Thus were talents, courage, patriotism, and youth, found united in this hecatomb, as amid that offered up in the persons of the Girondists.

Danton, Camille, Herault-Séchelles, and others, protested against their cause being confounded with that of forgers. No heed, however, was given to their reclamation. The court first proceeded to investigate the charges against Chabot, Bazire, Delaunay, and Fabre-d'Eglantine. Chabot persisted in his former statement, and boldly maintained that he had taken part in the conspiracy of the stockjobbers solely for the purpose of betraying it. His assertion gained no credence, being devoid of probability on several grounds; if founded in fact, he would have privately intimated his object to some member of the committees, more promptly revealed the machination, and abstained from keeping the funds in his possession. Delaunay was adjudged guilty at once; and Fabre, too, notwithstanding his artful defence, that when he made alterations and erasures in the copy of the decree, he imagined it to be merely the draft of an intended law, was convicted by Cambon, whose frank and unsuspected testimony was conclusive. He proved, in fact, that the projects of laws were never signed; that the copy Fabre had interlined was attested by all the members of the commission of five; and that, consequently, he could not have altered it under the idea that it was a simple draft. Bazire, whose confederacy only amounted to concealment of the fraud, was heard impatiently in his defence, and forthwith assimilated with the rest. The tribunal then passed to D'Espagnac, who was accused of having corrupted Julien of Toulouse, with the view of inducing him to support his contracts, and of being concerned in the intrigue of the East India Company. In this instance, the facts were substantiated by written documents, and all the ingenuity of D'Espagnac failed to invalidate such evidence.

Herault-Séchelles was subsequently interrogated. Bazire had been declared guilty as the friend of Chabot; so against Herault was the like judgment pronounced for having been the friend of Bazire, for having had through him some knowledge of the stockjobbing plot, for having assisted an emigrant, for having been the companion of moderates, and for having furnished grounds of suspicion, by his mildness, his elegance, his fortune, and his ill-disguised regrets, that he was in truth a moderate himself.

After Herault was disposed of, Danton was called upon. A profound silence reigned through the assemblage as he arose to reply. "Danton," said the president, addressing him, "the convention accuses you of having conspired with Mirabeau, with Dumouriez, with Orleans, with the Girondists, with the foreigner, and with the faction striving to restore Louis XVII." "My voice,' answered Danton, in his own sonorous tones, "that voice which has so often made itself heard in the cause of the people, will have no difficulty in repelling calumny. Let the knaves who ac-

cuse me appear, and I will cover them with ignominy. Let the committees come forward—I will answer only before them: I want them both as accusers and witnesses. Let them appear. At the same time, I care little for you and your judgment. I have already told you, nonentity will soon be my asylum. Life is a burden to me; tear it from me. I long to be freed from it!" Whilst uttering these words, Danton was filled with indignation; his feelings revolted at the idea of answering before such men. His demand for the appearance of the committees, and his expressed intention to reply only in their presence, embarrassed the tribunal, and caused a general agitation. Their confronting him in open court would have doubtless proved a cruel exposure to them; they must have been overwhelmed with confusion, and the condemnation might perhaps have become impossible.

"Danton," said the president, after a pause, "audacity is the accompaniment of crime; calmness that of innocence." At this phrase, Danton exclaimed—"Individual audacity is reprehensible, undoubtedly; but that national audacity of which I have so many times given the example, with which I have so often served liberty, is the most meritorious of all the virtues. Such audacity is mine; such it is I here display for the republic against the cowards who accuse me. When I see myself so basely calumniated, can I restrain my indignation? It is not from a revolutionist like me that you must expect a cold studied defence. Men of my order are inestimable in revolutions—on their forehead is the genius of liberty stamped!" As he thus spoke, Danton threw aloft his head, and surveyed the judges in an attitude of defiance. His formidable expression produced a profound sensation. The people, whom a manifestation of power always affects, sent forth an applauding murmur. "I," continued Danton—"I accused of having conspired with Mirabeau, Dumouriez, Orleans—of having crawled at the feet of vile despots! It is I whom you summon to answer to '*inevitable, inflexible justice!*'* And thou, infamous Saint-Just, wilt answer to posterity for thy accusation against the mainstay of liberty! In looking over this list of horrors," added Danton, holding up the articles of impeachment, "I feel my whole being shudder!"

The president again recommended him to be more calm, and cited the example of Marat, who had demeaned himself respectfully before the tribunal. Danton resumed, and said that, since they desired it, he would recount his life. He then proceeded to narrate the difficulties he had encountered in attaining municipal rank, the efforts of the Constituent Assembly to counteract him in his object, the resistance he opposed to the designs of Mirabeau, and, above all, his conduct on that famous day when, surrounding the royal carriage with an immense concourse, he prevented the journey to Saint-Cloud. Thereafter, he recalled the time when he led the people to the Champ-de-Mars to sign a petition against royalty, and the occasion of that celebrated petition; the boldness wherewith he first proposed the overthrow of the throne in 1792; the courage with which he proclaimed the insurrection on the evening of the 9th August, and the firmness he displayed during the twelve hours of conflict. Here, incensed almost to suffocation when he reflected on the charge against him of having concealed himself at the crisis of the 10th August, he broke forth into a strain of passionate invective. "Where," he exclaimed, "are the men who found it necessary to exhort Danton to show himself on that day? Where are the privileged and gifted beings whose energy he borrowed? Let them come forth, my accusers! It rouses all the vigour of my mind when I demand them. I will unmask the three wretched knaves who have encompassed and entrapped Robespierre. Let them but appear, and I will plunge them into the nonentity whence they ought never to have emerged!" The president once more interrupted him by ringing his bell. Danton drowned its sound with his stentorian voice. "Do you not hear me?" asked the president. "It is fitting the voice of a man defending his honour and his life," replied Danton, "should stifle the noise of thy bell." His indignant excitement began, however, to fatigue him; his tone became fainter, and the president considerately besought him to take a little rest, in order to recommence his defence with more calmness and tranquillity.

Danton acceded, and was silent. The public prosecutor next called upon Camille, whose *Old Cordelier* was read over with comments, he vainly repudiating the interpretations given to his writings. Lastly came the turn of Lacroix, whose conduct in Belgium was bitterly assailed, and who, after the example of Danton, claimed the appearance of several members of the convention, and formally insisted on compliance.

This first hearing produced a powerful impression on the public mind. The crowd which surrounded the Palace of Justice, and extended even to the bridges, gave tokens of being greatly agitated. The judges were overawed and terror-stricken. Vadier, Vouland, and Amar, the most detestable members of the committee of general safety, had witnessed the proceedings, concealed in the printing-office contiguous to the hall of the court, and communicating with it by a small window. From that position they had looked on with deep alarm, as they beheld the undaunted hardihood of Danton and the visible emotions of the audience. They began to entertain serious doubts that the condemnation was practicable. Hermann and Fouquier had both repaired, immediately after the tribunal adjourned, to the committee of public welfare, and made known to it the demand of the accused touching the appearance of several members of the convention. The committee seemed unprepared to act in the emergency; Robespierre had retired for the day, and Billaud and Saint-Just alone were present. They instructed Fouquier to refrain from giving any decisive answer; to prolong the discussion so as to consume the three days without affording explanations; and then to make the jurymen declare they were sufficiently informed.

Meanwhile, the excitement caused by the trial in the Palace of Justice, the committee, and all Paris, was fully participated in the prisons, whose inmates took a lively interest in the accused, since they felt that no hope could exist for any if such revolutionists were condemned. In the Luxembourg was at this time immured the unfortunate Dillon, the friend of Desmoulins, by whom he had been defended; he had learnt through Chaumette, who, being exposed to the like danger, now made common cause with the moderates, what had passed before the tribunal. Chaumette obtained the information from his wife. Dillon, whose imagination was easily heated, and who, moreover, sometimes sought, as an old soldier, to drown sorrow in wine, spoke indiscreetly to a person named Laflotte, confined in the same prison, telling him that it was time for good republicans to rise against vile oppressors, that the people had appeared to be moved, that Danton had claimed to answer before the committees, that his condemnation was far from being assured, that the wife of Camille-Desmoulins, by distributing assignats, might arouse the populace, and that, if he himself could contrive to escape, he would muster a body of resolute men sufficient to rescue the republicans about to be sacrificed by the tribunal. These words were but the idle effusions of intoxication and anger. It would appear, however, that some proposal was entertained for transmitting a thousand crowns and a letter to Camille's wife. The treacherous Laflotte, trusting to obtain life and liberty by denouncing a plot, hastened to the governor of the Luxembourg, and made before him a declaration, wherein he represented a conspiracy on the point of breaking out

* A term used in the articles of impeachment.

both within and without the prisons, for the purpose of delivering the accused and assassinating the members of the two committees. We shall soon see to what purposes this infamous deposition was made subservient.

On the following day the confluence was equally great at the Palace of Justice. Danton and his companions, still firm and unyielding, again demanded the appearance of several members of the convention and the two committees. Fouquier, constrained to answer, stated that he did not oppose any necessary witnesses being called. "But it is not sufficient," objected the accused, "that he offers no obstacle, he must himself summon them to attend." Fouquier thereupon remarked that he would summon all those who might be named, excepting members of the convention, because it lay with that assembly to determine whether its members could be cited. The accused again exclaimed that they were denied the means of defending themselves. The whole court was thrown into the utmost confusion. The president proceeded to question certain others of the panels, Westermann, the two Freys, and Guzman, and then hastily broke up the sitting.

Fouquier immediately wrote to the committee, apprising it of what had occurred, and requesting instructions how to meet the reiterated demands of the accused. The position was full of embarrassment, and all hesitated as to the course to be pursued. Robespierre affected indifference, and declined giving any opinion. Saint-Just alone, more resolute and bold than his colleagues, maintained that they ought not to recoil; that all further discussion must be interdicted, and the accused at once sent to execution. At this moment the deposition of the prisoner Laflotte, forwarded to the police by the keeper of the Luxembourg, was placed before the committee. Saint-Just promptly detected in it the proof of a conspiracy laid by the accused, and the pretext for a decree abruptly to terminate their dispute with the tribunal. The next morning, accordingly, he appeared before the convention, and assured it that a great danger threatened the country, but that it was the last, and that, if braved with courage, it would be speedily surmounted. "The accused now before the revolutionary tribunal," he said, "are in open revolt; they menace the tribunal; they carry their insolence so far as to throw balls of crumbs at the heads of the judges; they excite the people, and may even succeed in deluding them. Nor is this indeed all: they have hatched a conspiracy in the prisons; the wife of Camille has received money in order to provoke an insurrection; General Dillon is to break from the Luxembourg, put himself at the head of his confederates, massacre the two committees, and liberate the guilty." At this false and hypocritical relation, the complaisant convention wrung with cries of "Horrible! horrible!" and forthwith unanimously voted the decree proposed by Saint-Just. By virtue of this enactment, the tribunal was to continue, without adjournment, the trial of Danton and his accomplices; and was moreover authorised to order from the bar such of the panels as should fail in respect to the court or endeavour to excite disturbance. A copy of the decree was instantly transcribed. Vouland and Vadier departed to carry it to the tribunal, where the third sitting had commenced, and where the redoubled energy of the accused was throwing Fouquier into the most pitiable perplexity.

On this third day, in fact, the prisoners had determined to persist more strenuously than ever in their reclamations. All of them arose together, and urged Fouquier to summon the witnesses they had demanded. They required furthermore that the convention should nominate a commission to receive the denunciations they were prepared to make against the design of a dictatorship harboured by the committees. Fouquier was completely at a loss what answer to return. In the midst of his embarrassment, an usher advanced to call him out of court. He proceeded into an adjoining chamber, where he found Vouland and Vadier, who, flushed and out of breath, cried to him, "We have the miscreants! Here is what will relieve you from all further trouble!" And they placed in his hands the decree which Saint-Just had just extorted. Fouquier grasped it with rapture, returned to the hall, craved liberty to address the tribunal, and read aloud the fatal document. Danton started passionately to his feet: "I take the audience to witness," he exclaimed, "that we have not insulted the tribunal." "That is true!" shouted several voices in the hall. The whole multitude, indeed, betokened amazement, indignation even, at so glaring a denial of justice to men formally arraigned. The sensation was general and unequivocal: the judges were intimidated.

"One day," added Danton, "the truth will be known. I see great calamities preparing for France. Behold the dictatorship; it shows itself openly and without disguise!" Camille, on hearing the Luxembourg, Dillon, and his wife, spoken of in the decree, exclaimed, in an accent of despair, "The miscreants! not content with taking my life, they would also murder my wife!" Danton perceived at the end of the hall, in the corridor, Vadier and Vouland, who were there lurking to witness the effect of the decree. He pointed to them with his finger: "See," he cried, "those infamous assassins! They hover around us; they will not quit us until we are bereft of life itself!" Vadier and Vouland disappeared in tremor. The tribunal, as the shortest mode of avoiding remonstrances, dissolved the sitting.

The following was the fourth day, and the jury had the power to supersede further discussion by declaring itself sufficiently informed. Accordingly, without affording the accused time to defend themselves, the jury demanded the termination of the process. Camille yielded to an impulse of wrath: he declared to the jurymen that they were assassins, and called upon the people to testify to their iniquity. The officers approached to remove him, with his companions in misfortune, from the hall. He resisted, and they dragged him out by force. Meanwhile, Vadier and Vouland addressed the jurymen in exciting terms, who, however, stood not in need of such instigation. The president Hermann and Fouquier followed them into their retiring-room. There Hermann had the incredible effrontery to tell them that a letter written to foreigners had been intercepted, which placed the connivance of Danton with the coalition beyond doubt. Three or four jurymen alone ventured to vindicate the accused; they were overborne by the majority. The foreman of the jury, one Trinchard, returned to the hall hideous with savage joy, and pronounced, in the tone and manner of a ferocious maniac, the iniquitous verdict.

It was deemed advisable to avoid the hazard of any additional outbreak on the part of the newly condemned, by bringing them into the hall of the tribunal to hear their sentence; wherefore an usher descended to the prison for the purpose of reading it to them. They dismissed him, however, without allowing him to finish the document, exclaiming at the same time that they were ready to be conducted to death. The condemnation being finally pronounced, Danton, upon whom indignation had recently acted as a powerful stimulant, relapsed into calmness, and recovered all his scorn for the beings who persecuted him. Camille, easily pacified, shed a few tears over his wife; and, fortunate in a happy improvidence, he had no idea he was really destined to death, a conviction which would have rendered his last moments insufferable. Herault was gay and lively as usual. The whole of the ill-fated band, in fact, evinced exemplary firmness; and Westermann, in particular, showed himself worthy his renown for courage.

They were executed on the 16th Germinal (5th April). The infamous gang bribed to insult victims followed the carts. Camille, incensed at this atrocious

outrage, attempted to address the multitude, and poured forth the most vehement imprecations against the base and hypocritical Robespierre. The wretches employed thus to vituperate retorted upon him in the foulest language. He, in the violence of his action, had torn his shirt, and stood, the object of their gross derision, with his shoulders bare to the skin. Danton, casting upon the ruffians a calm and scornful look, said to Camille—"Be tranquil, and never mind that vile rabble." Arrived at the foot of the scaffold, Danton was about to embrace Herault-Séchelles, who extended his arms towards him; the executioner interposing to prevent him, he spoke thus terribly to that functionary, but with a smile on his countenance—"Thou canst be then more cruel than death! Away; thou wilt not, a moment hence, prevent our heads embracing in the pannier!"*

Such was the end of that Danton who had played so signal a part in the revolution, and had been so instrumental to its onward course. Daring, ardent, panting for excitement, eager for the gratifications of pleasure, he had rushed into the stormy career with qualities fitting him especially to shine in days of turmoil and terror. Prompt and positive, unaffected by either the difficulty or the novelty of an extraordinary position, none could better judge what means were necessary, or had less fear or scruple in adopting them. He had deemed it imperative to terminate the struggles between the monarchy and the revolution, and he perpetrated the 10th of August. Menaced by the Prussian invasion, he had conceived it indispensable to overawe France and commit it past recall to the system of the revolution; he directed, it is said, the massacres of September, and, even though ordaining them, he saved a multitude of victims. At the commencement of the great year 1793, the convention was astounded at the spectacle of all Europe under arms; he pronounced, comprehending them in all their profundity, those remarkable words—"A nation in a revolution is more likely to conquer its neighbours than to be conquered." He held that twenty-five millions of men, whom a popular government might venture to move, could have nothing to dread from a few hundreds of thousands accoutred by monarchs. He proposed, therefore, to arouse the people, to levy contributions on the rich; in short, he it was who invented all those revolutionary measures which have left so terrible a remembrance, but which nevertheless saved France. This man, so potential in action, relapsed into indolence and the life of pleasure he had always coveted, during the intervals of danger. He delighted even in the most innocent enjoyments—such as the country, a beloved wife, and attached friends, are so calculated to impart. Then he forgot the vanquished, or at least to hate them, and could even render them justice, pity, and defend them. But during those periods of repose, so necessary to his impassioned temperament, his rivals gradually acquired by perseverance that renown and influence he had achieved in a single day of peril. The fanatics reproached him with effeminacy and gentleness, overlooking the fact that, in point of political cruelty, he had rivalled them all in the dismal days of September. Whilst confiding in his fame, procrastinating from indolence, and revolving in his brain noble projects for restoring mild laws, for restricting the reign of violence to the era of danger, for separating the exterminators, irrevocably involved in the ruthless effusion of blood, from the men who had yielded only to the force of circumstances—for organising France, in fine, and reconciling it with Europe—he was surprised by the colleagues to whom he had abandoned the government. These, after striking a blow against the ultra-revolutionists, were constrained, to avoid the appearance of retrograding, to smite with equal rigour the party of the moderates. Thus policy demanded victims, malevolence and envy selected them, and sent to the scaffold the most celebrated and the most dreaded man of his epoch. Danton succumbed, despite his renown and services, before the formidable power he had contributed to establish; but by his undaunted boldness he rendered his fall at least doubtful for a moment.

Danton possessed a mind uncultivated doubtless, but great, capacious, and, above all, simple and solid. He drew upon its resources only when spurred by exigency, and never for the mere purpose of shining; consequently he spoke little, and disdained to write. According to a contemporary, he had no pretension, not even that of comprehending what he was ignorant of, a pretension so common in men of his order. He was accustomed to heed Fabre-d'Eglantine, and to leave the part of oratory to his young and talented friend Camille-Desmoulins, whose lively imagination was to him an inexhaustible source of delight, and whom he had the grief to involve in his fall. He died with his usual fortitude, and communicated it to his friend. Like Mirabeau, he quitted the world, proud of himself, and believing his faults and his life sufficiently expiated by his great services and his ultimate projects.

The leaders of the two parties, then, had been sacrificed. They were speedily followed by their adherents on both sides, men of the most opposite principles being blended and tried together, in order still further to accredit the opinion that they were accomplices in the same plot. Chaumette and Gobel appeared side by side with Arthur Dillon and Simon. The Grammonts, father and son, Lepallu, and other members of the revolutionary army, were classed with General Beysser before the tribunal. Lastly, the wife of Hébert, formerly the inmate of a convent, was placed at the bar with the youthful spouse of Camille-Desmoulins, scarcely in her twenty-third year, redolent of beauty, grace, and innocence. Chaumette, whom we recollect so eminent for submissiveness and docility, was accused of having conspired at the commune against the government, of having starved the people, and sought to inflame them by his extravagant ordinances. Gobel was regarded as the accomplice of Clootz and Chaumette. Arthur Dillon had intended, so it was alleged, to throw open the prisons of Paris, slaughter the convention and the tribunal, and rescue his friends. The members of the revolutionary army were arraigned as agents of Ronsin. General Beysser, who had so powerfully contributed to save Nantes in concert with Canclaux, and who was suspected of an attachment to federalism, was charged as an accomplice of the ultra-revolutionists. The records of the

* ["They proceeded to execution with the assurance usual at that period. A large body of troops had been called to arms, and their escort was very considerable. The crowd, generally boisterous and exulting, was silent. Camille-Desmoulins, even on the fatal cart, was still amazed at his condemnation, and could scarcely credit it. 'This then,' he exclaimed, 'is the recompense awarded to the first apostle of liberty!' Danton carried his head erect, and surveyed the concourse with a tranquil and haughty gaze. At the foot of the scaffold, he was affected for a moment. 'Oh, my well-beloved!' he cried; 'oh, my wife! I will see thee then no more!' But, instantly recovering himself—'Danton, no weakness!'

Thus perished the tardy but last defenders of humanity and moderation; the last who advocated peace amongst the conquerors of the revolution, and mercy towards the vanquished. After them, no voice was heard for a while against the dictatorship of terror; it struck, from one end of France to the other, multiplied and silent blows. The Girondists had endeavoured to prevent this violent system, the Dantonists essayed to counteract it; all perished, and the victors had so many more victims to immolate as they counted more enemies. So sanguinary a career, once entered upon, its limit was to be found only in the destruction of its authors. The Decemvirs, after the definitive fall of the Girondists, had inscribed *terror* as the order of the day; after the fall of the Hébertists, they had made it *justice* and *probity*, because those were impure factionists; after the fall of the Dantonists, they rendered it *terror* and *all the virtues*, because they stigmatised them as the party of indulgents and immoralists."—*Mignet*, vol. ii. pp. 47, 48.]

Vendéan war show how preposterous was the allegation of an understanding between the staff of Nantes and that of Saumur. The woman Hébert was doomed under the character of her husband's coadjutor. Seated on the same bench with the wife of Camille, she said to her, "You are fortunate; no charge is raised against you. You will be saved." In fact, all that could be assigned against that young female, was the crime of having loved her husband too well, and of having continuously wandered with her children around the jail, to see their father and point him out to them. However, both were condemned; and the consorts of Hébert and Camille perished as guilty of an identical conspiracy. The unfortunate Madame Desmoulins died with a courage worthy of her husband and her own virtue. Since the deaths of Charlotte Corday and Madame Roland, no victim had inspired a more tender interest, or excited more unfeigned regret.

CHAPTER XXXII.

CONSEQUENCES OF THE LAST CONDEMNATIONS AGAINST THE PARTIES OPPOSED TO THE GOVERNMENT.—EFFORTS OF THE COMMITTEE OF PUBLIC WELFARE TO CONCENTRATE ALL POWER IN ITSELF.—THE CONVENTION, UPON A REPORT OF ROBESPIERRE, PROCLAIMS, IN THE NAME OF THE FRENCH PEOPLE, THE RECOGNITION OF THE SUPREME BEING, AND THE IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL.

The government, then, stood in the midst, with the ruins of two hostile parties strewed on each side. The first, that of the ultra-revolutionists, was really formidable, or might have become so; the second, that of the new moderates, was, so to speak, innocuous. The destruction of the latter, therefore, was not justified by necessity, but was judged advisable, in order to clear the committee from any imputation of moderate tendencies. The committee had acted in the sacrifice hypocritically, and without conviction; solely moved, indeed, by envy, hatred, and malice. It had been found difficult, however, to plant this final blow; we have seen the whole body hesitate, and Robespierre retreat to his domicile as in the days of imminent peril. But Saint-Just, stimulated by his indomitable courage and his jealous malignity, remained steadfast at his post, reanimated Hermann and Fouquier, the vile instruments of judicial iniquity, alarmed the convention, extorted from it a decree of death, and thereby consummated the work of blood. The final effort required by authority to render itself absolute, is generally the hardest to achieve;* it has need of all its strength to surmount the ultimate obstacle; but that effectually subdued, all yield and bow before it; it has thenceforth only to wield its sovereignty. Then occurs the period of its development, its profligacy, its course to ruin. Whilst every tongue is silenced, and every countenance wears the downcast expression of obsequiousness and submission, hatred rankles in all hearts, and the materials of retribution are prepared even in the hour of overweening triumph.

At present, therefore, the committee of public welfare, after successfully contending with two classes of men, so differently actuated, who had manifested a disposition to control or merely to animadvert on the exercise of its sway, had become irresistible. The winter months were past. The campaign of 1794 (Germinal, year 2) was about to open with the advent of spring. Formidable armies were in motion to deploy on all the frontiers, and to illustrate abroad the terrible power so ruthlessly administered at home. Whosoever had appeared to resist, or to evince any interest in those recently bereaved of life, felt it incumbent to record with all speed his abject acquiescence and contrition. Thus Legendre, who had made an effort on the day Danton, Lacroix, and Camille-Desmoulins were arrested, and who had endeavoured to move the convention in their favour, hastened to repair his imprudence, and to abjure his friendship for the late victims. Several anonymous letters had been sent to him, wherein he was urged to smite the tyrants, who, it was alleged, had now thrown off the mask. Legendre appeared at the Jacobin Club on the 21st Germinal (10th April), denounced these unauthenticated communications, and complained that he should be taken for a Séide, whose hand was always ready to grasp a dagger. "And now," said he, "since I am forced to it, I declare to the people, who have always heard me speak with sincerity, that I consider it demonstrated the conspiracy, of which the leaders have ceased to breathe, really existed, and that I was the dupe of traitors. I have found the proofs in different documents deposited with the committee of public welfare, above all, in the criminal behaviour of the accused before the national justice, and in the machinations of their accomplices, who would fain arm an honest man with the homicidal poniard. I was, before the discovery of the plot, the intimate friend of Danton; I would have answered for his principles and his conduct with my head; but now I am convinced of his guilt—I am persuaded he would have plunged the people into the depths of error. I might perhaps have fallen into the pit myself, if I had not been enlightened in time. I tell the anonymous scribblers who would induce me to poniard Robespierre, and render me the instrument of their evil purposes, that I was born in the bosom of the people, that I make it my glory to remain there, and that I will sooner die than abandon their rights. They will write me no letter I shall not take to the committee of public welfare."

The spirit of submission thus exemplified in Legendre, was general throughout France. A multitude of addresses arrived from all parts of the country, wherein the convention and the committee of public welfare were congratulated on their energy. The number of these addresses was incalculable. In all styles, in forms the most grotesque, one vied with the other in expressing approbation of the acts of the government, and in acknowledging its justice. Rhodez transmitted the following manifesto:—"Worthy representatives of a free people!—It is in vain the sons of Titan have raised their proud heads; the thunderbolt has laid them prostrate! What, citizens! sell liberty for vile riches! The constitution you have given us has shaken all thrones, has struck terror into all kings. Liberty advancing with giant strides—despotism crushed—superstition eradicated—the republic resuming its unity—conspirators discovered and punished—faithless mandatories, base and perfidious functionaries, falling under the axe of the law—the irons of the slaves in the New World broken—such your trophies! If intriguers still exist, let them tremble! Let the death of the conspirators attest your triumph! For yourselves, representatives, live happy under the wise laws you have made for the prosperity of all nations, and receive the tribute of our affection!"*

It was not from any abhorrence of sanguinary measures that the committee smote the ultra-revolutionists, but in order to strengthen authority, and to sweep away the impediments that checked its action. Hence we find it constantly thereafter aiming at a twofold object—to render itself more formidable, and to concentrate all power in its own hands. Collot,

* [The passage, if accurately rendered, should represent the last barrier as *always* the most difficult to break down; but even as it stands in the text, it is open to much objection. The Chinese have a saying, "that in a journey of ten paces, nine are *half* the distance;" but as Madame de Staël observes (*De l'Allemagne*, vol. ii. p. 156), its application is chiefly confined, in Europe at least, to German dramatists, who never know how to finish their pieces.]

* Sitting of the 26th Germinal, No. 208 of the *Moniteur* of the year 2 (April 1794).

who had become an orator of the government at the Jacobin Club, expounded its policy in terms singularly energetic. During a vehement discourse, wherein he intimated to all the constituted authorities the new route they were expected to follow, and the peculiar zeal they were to manifest in the exercise of their functions, he said—"The tyrants have lost their vigour; their armies quail in presence of ours; already some despots are seeking to withdraw from the coalition. In this state, there remains to them but one hope, founded on intestine conspiracies. We must not cease, therefore, to keep a watchful eye on traitors. Like our brethren, conquerors on the frontiers, let us have our weapons at our shoulders and fire all together. Whilst our external enemies fall beneath the blows of our soldiers, let internal enemies fall beneath the blows of the people. Our cause, supported by justice and energy, will be triumphant. Nature herself works this year for the republicans; it promises them a twofold abundance. The blades as they sprout announce the overthrow of tyrants. I repeat to you, citizens, let us be vigilant at home, whilst our warriors fight abroad. Let the functionaries intrusted with the public surveillance redouble their carefulness and zeal; let them be thoroughly impressed with this idea, that there is not perhaps a street or an alley in which a traitor meditating a last plot may not be found. Let that traitor meet death, and death the most prompt! If the administrators, if the public functionaries wish to find a place in history, now is the favourable moment for attempting it. The revolutionary tribunal has already secured an eminent position in its records. Let all the administrations learn to imitate its zeal and its inexorable energy; let the revolutionary committees, above all, redouble their vigilance and activity, and let them beware how they yield to the solicitations with which they are besieged, whereby they are moved to an indulgence most fatal to liberty."

Saint-Just presented to the convention a formidable report on the general police of the republic. He therein repeated the fabulous history of the various conspiracies, representing them as the outbreak of vice against the austere system of the republic. He said that the government, so far from relenting, must smite continually, until it had extirpated all the beings whose corruption formed an obstacle to the establishment of virtue. He passed the accustomed eulogy on severity, and sought to prove, as was usual at the time, by similes of all kinds, that the origin of great institutions was necessarily terrible. "What would an indulging republic become?" he exclaimed. "We have encountered the sword with the sword, and the republic is founded. It has emerged from the bosom of storms: such an origin is in common with the world sprung from chaos, and with man wailing at his birth." In pursuance of these maxims, Saint-Just proposed a general measure against ex-nobles. This was the first of the kind, thus distinctly framed, that had been propounded. Danton, in the preceding year, during a paroxysm of wrath, had caused all aristocrats to be declared beyond the pale of the law. That decree being incapable of execution on account of its comprehensiveness, another had been substituted which condemned all suspected persons to provisional detention. But no specific law against ex-nobles had yet been enacted. Saint-Just exhibited them as the irreconcilable enemies of the revolution. "Whatever you may do," said he, "you will never satisfy the enemies of the people, unless you re-establish the tyranny. They must go, therefore, elsewhere in quest of slavery and kings. They cannot make peace with you; you do not speak the same language; you will never understand each other. Drive them forth, then! The world is not inhospitable, and the public welfare is amongst us the supreme law."

He accordingly submitted a decree banishing all ex-nobles and aliens from Paris, from fortified towns, and from maritime places, and putting out of the pale of the law such as should not have obeyed the decree in the space of ten days. Other articles of the enactment imposed on all authorities the emphatic duty of redoubling their activity and zeal. The convention applauded the proposition, as it never failed to do, and voted it by acclamation. Collot-d'Herbois, the vindicator of the decree before the Jacobins, added his tropes to those wherewith Saint-Just had enlightened the national representatives. "It is necessary," he said, "to expel the unwholesome humours of the aristocracy from the body politic; the more it transpires, the healthier will it become."

Such were the steps taken by the committee to manifest the rigour of its future policy. We now proceed to its acts for the greater concentration of power. In the first place, it resolved upon the disembodiment of the revolutionary army. Organised according to a conception of Danton, that army had originally been serviceable in enforcing the fiats of the convention, whilst there yet survived any relics of federalism; but having become the rallying-point for perturbators and adventurers of the worst grades, and having, moreover, availed the recently suppressed demagogues as a supporting basis, it was deemed necessary to disperse it. Besides, the government, being every where implicitly obeyed, had no further occasion for this horde of satellites to carry its orders into execution. In consequence, it was disbanded by decree. The committee then proposed the abolition of the different ministries. These were felt still to possess too much importance, as respected the members of the supreme committee. Either they left all to be done by the committee, in which case they were useless; or they essayed to act, and then they became obnoxious rivals. The instance of Bouchotte, who, when governed by Vincent, had so often and so greatly embarrassed the committee, was an instructive example. In consequence, the ministries were abrogated. In their stead were instituted the following twelve commissions:—

1. Commission of civil administration, police, and courts of justice.
2. Commission of public instruction.
3. Commission of agriculture and arts.
4. Commission of trade and magazines.
5. Commission of public works.
6. Commission of public aids.
7. Commission of transport, post, and mails.
8. Commission of finance.
9. Commission of organisation and direction for the land forces.
10. Commission of the navy and colonies.
11. Commission of arms, ammunition, and mines.
12. Commission of foreign relations.

These commissions, all dependent on the committee of public welfare, were merely so many boards amongst whom the details of administration were distributed. Hermann, who presided at the revolutionary tribunal during the trial of Danton, was rewarded for his zeal by being nominated chief of one of these commissions. In fact, the most important was confided to him, that "of civil administration, police, and courts of justice."

To promote the centralisation of power, other measures were likewise adopted. According to the law bearing on revolutionary committees, one was enjoined in each commune, or section of a commune. The rural communes being very numerous, and thinly populated, it resulted that the committees were too multifarious, and their duties scattered and trifling. Their composition, moreover, was unsatisfactory. The peasants, although ardent revolutionists for the most part, were uneducated, and the municipal functions had therefore devolved in general on landowners living upon their estates, who were but indifferently disposed to exercise their power in the spirit of the government; in consequence whereof, the surveillance of the country, and, above all, of country seats, was flagrantly

neglected. To remedy this obnoxious state of things, the revolutionary committees of communes were suppressed, and those of districts alone maintained. By this expedient, the police was concentrated, and rendered more effective, being exclusively vested in the burghers of districts, who were nearly all firm Jacobins, and jealous of the old gentry.

The Jacobins formed the principal association or club, and the only one patronised by the government. They had invariably vindicated its principles and interests, and had, like it, pronounced equally against the Hébertists and Dantonists. The committee of public welfare was anxious that this favoured society should absorb the majority of the others, and thus concentrate in itself the influence of opinion, as it, the committee, had already engrossed the whole power of the government. This idea was highly flattering to the ambition of the Jacobins, and they made the greatest efforts to realise it. Since the meetings of sections had been limited to two in the week, in order that the people might attend them, and secure the adoption of revolutionary motions, the sections had resolved into popular societies. The number of such societies was very great in Paris, there being two or three in each section. We have previously mentioned the complaints to which they had given rise. It was asserted that the aristocrats, that is to say, clerks and apprentices discontented with the conscription, old servants of the nobility, all those, in short, who had any motive for resisting the revolutionary system, mustered in these societies, and exhibited the hostility they dared not manifest at the Jacobin Club or in the sections. The vast number of these secondary associations prevented their effectual supervision, and opinions were often promulgated within them which none would have ventured to whisper elsewhere. Their abolition had already been the subject of discussion. The Jacobins had no right to entertain such a topic, and the government could have taken no steps in the matter, without appearing to interfere with the liberty of assembling and deliberating in common, a franchise dearly valued at the time, and held to be of right unlimited. The difficulty was thus obviated. On the proposition of Collot, the Jacobins decided that they would receive no more deputations on the part of societies formed in Paris since the 10th August, and that all correspondence with them should be discontinued. As to those which had been formed in Paris before the 10th August, and which enjoyed the privilege of correspondence, they resolved that a report should be framed on each of them, to ascertain whether they ought to retain that advantage. This measure chiefly concerned the Cordeliers, already assailed in the persons of their leaders, Ronsin, Vincent, Hébert, and since regarded with jealousy and suspicion. Thus, all the sectional societies were branded by this resolution, and the Cordeliers were condemned to undergo the ordeal of an inquiry.

The effect anticipated from this measure was soon realised. All the sectional societies, intimidated or persuaded, appeared in rotation before the convention and the Jacobin Club, to announce their voluntary dissolution. All of them adopted the language of congratulation, equally towards the convention and the Jacobins, and declared that, wholly devoted to the public interest, they were ready to separate of their own accord, since their meetings had been deemed hurtful to the cause they desired to serve. Thenceforth, the parent society of the Jacobins alone remained in Paris, and its affiliated societies in the provinces. It is true, the Cordelier Club still lingered precariously. Originally formed by Danton, towards whom, as its founder, it had been signally ungrateful, and ultimately subservient to Hébert, Ronsin, and Vincent, it had for a while disquieted the government and rivalled even the Jacobins. The outcasts of Vincent's ministry, and of the revolutionary army, continued to assemble in its hall. As a club, it could not be directly dissolved; but the report concerning it was presented, which set forth that, for some time, it had corresponded rarely and negligently with the Jacobin, and that, in consequence, it appeared useless to prolong the privilege of correspondence. On that occasion, certain Jacobins proposed for discussion the question, whether more than one popular society was necessary in Paris. They even ventured openly to maintain, that a single centre of opinion ought to be established, and fixed at the Jacobin Club. The society passed to the order of the day on these propositions, and even refrained from deciding whether the right of correspondence should be preserved to the Cordeliers. But the existence of that celebrated club had virtually terminated: completely discredited, it dwindled into insignificance, and the Jacobins rested, with their train of affiliated societies, the sole masters and regulators of opinion.

After having centralised opinion, if we may so speak, endeavours were directed to regulate its expression, to render it less boisterous and less embarrassing to the government. Hitherto, the main occupation of the Jacobins had consisted in perpetually censuring and denouncing all public functionaries, magistrates, deputies, generals, and administrators. That mania for vituperating and assailing the agents of power had been attended with its inconveniences, but with its advantages, likewise, so long as their zeal and opinions could be reasonably doubted. But now that the committee possessed all authority, watched its agents with unremitting vigilance, and selected them in a truly revolutionary spirit, the Jacobins could no longer be permitted to indulge in their habitual suspicions, or to tantalise functionaries for the most part discreetly chosen and under close supervision. Such a license, indeed, would have involved danger to the state. It was with reference to Generals Charbonnier and Dagobert, who had been both calumniated, whilst the one was gaining advantages over the Austrians and the other laying down his life in Cerdagne stricken with years and wounds, that Collot-d'Herbois took the opportunity of complaining to the Jacobins concerning this reckless propensity to revile generals and functionaries of all grades. Adhering to the custom of charging all on the dead, he attributed this rage for denunciation to the remnants of the Hébert faction, and urged the Jacobins no longer to tolerate these public attacks, which caused the society, as he said, to lose much precious time, and tended to lower in estimation the agents appointed by the government. Thus premising, he concluded by moving the appointment of a committee of the society, with instructions to receive denunciations, and transmit them in secrecy to the committee of public welfare; which proposition was adopted. In this manner, denunciations were deprived of their troublesome and outrageous character, and the demagogical spirit began to settle down into the quietude of formality and routine.

Thus, then, to declare unmitigated hostility towards the enemies of the revolution, and to centralise administration, police, and opinion, were the first cares of the committee, and the immediate results of its victory over the two parties. Doubtless ambition now commenced to instigate its determinations, much more than during the earlier moments of its existence, yet not so greatly as might be inferred from the prodigious extent of power it had grasped. Instituted at the opening of the campaign of 1793, and in the midst of other urgent perils, it was at once the offspring and the resource of dire necessity. Once established, it had gradually assumed a greater share of power, as the exigencies of the state arose, and had so advanced to the dictatorship itself. Its position amid the universal confusion and the dissolution of all authority was such, that it could not reorganise without gaining power, or effect good without the antidote of ambition. Its last measures redounded unquestionably to its own profit, but they were in themselves prudent and bene-

ficial. The major part, indeed, had been suggested to it; for in a society undergoing the process of reconstruction, many things, amidst the latitude of invention, must be forced on the creative authority. But the moment approached when ambition was to be its sole monitor, and when the interest of the state was to become subordinate to that of its own predominance. Such is man; he cannot continue long disinterested, but too soon blends the consideration of self with the mission assigned him.

The last subject that demanded the attention of the committee of public welfare, was one which has at all times seriously occupied the organisers of nations or communities, namely, religion. It had already taken moral sentiments under its protection, by inscribing, "*probity, justice, and all the virtues*, on the order of the day." Religious sentiments remained to challenge its regard.

And here let us digress for an instant, to remark the singular progression of the systems from time to time upheld by these dogmatists of the ruling party. When the Girondists were to be supplanted, they described them as moderates and emasculate republicans, spoke incessantly of patriotic energy and *public salvation*, and sacrificed them to those ideas. When from the conquering ranks two new parties arose, the one furious, brutal, extravagant, ready to rush into anarchy and revolting profanation, the other indulgent, frank, and friendly to mild manners and social enjoyments, they passed from ideas of patriotic energy to those of order and virtue. They decried the fatal moderation which was enervating the vigour of the revolution; they asserted the whole phalanx of the vices to be arrayed against the austerity of the republican spirit; on either side they saw violence repudiating all idea of order, effeminacy and corruption outraging all idea of morality, delirious impiety rejecting all idea of God, and then they deemed the republic, like virtue, assaulted by all the evil passions at once. The word "virtue" forthwith became the predominant motto, and justice and probity were formally installed as "the order of the day." By an easy transition they were moved to maintain the existence of a Supreme Being, the immortality of the soul, the obligation of the moral code; and thus were they led to promulgate a solemn profession of faith, or, in other words, to prescribe the religion of the state. A decree of the convention was all the agency they needed, and that medium they resolved to use. Thus they encountered anarchists with the watchword of order, atheists with the invocation of God, and libertines with the vindication of morality. Their system of virtue had already received a signal development. In addition to other motives, moreover, they were extremely solicitous to remove from the republic the stigma of impiety, which all Europe had agreed in fixing upon it; and they prepared to assert, in the face of the world, what has been often said to intolerant priests, reproaching others with profaneness because they hesitated to accept all their dogmas—We believe in God.

Reasons derived from considerations of a different nature likewise urged them to adopt a decisive measure touching religious faith. The ceremonies appointed for the worship of Reason had been abolished; no particular mode of celebrating the tenth days or decades had been instituted; and, whilst meeting the moral and religious wants of the people, it was likewise of importance to gratify their imagination, and to provide them with occasions of public congregation. The period, besides, was peculiarly favourable: the republic, victorious at the close of the preceding campaign, had opened the present under most flattering auspices. Instead of the deficiency of means which had crippled its efforts during the previous year, it was now, by the foresight of its government, prepared with ample military resources. From the dread of undergoing the horrors of conquest, it had passed to the brilliant anticipation of carrying victory into other lands; whilst on the domestic arena perfect submission had succeeded to formidable insurrections. And if constraint still continued to fetter the operations of internal commerce, owing to the assignats and the maximum, nature seemed beneficently disposed to make amends, and to shower its richest gifts on France, by the promise of an abundant harvest. From all the provinces the reports coincided that the crops would be doubly prolific, and arrive at maturity a month earlier than usual. This, then, was the moment for prostrating the republic, saved, victorious, loaded with benefits, at the footstool of the Eternal. Grand and affecting the occasion to those who believed, opportune to those upon whom political ideas alone operated!

A singular spectacle is here offered to reflection. Dogmatists, in whose eyes no human agreement or prepossession was worthy of regard; who, from their extraordinary contempt for all other nations, and their equally extraordinary self-sufficiency, cared for no opinion, and scrupled not to defy that of the whole world; who, in the matter of government, had superseded all principles for the maxim of stern necessity, and had admitted the authority only of certain citizens temporarily elected; who had rejected all gradation of classes, and had feared not to abolish the most ancient and firmly rooted of creeds—they, these dogmatists, paused before two ideas, morality and the Divine Being! After having repudiated all those from which they conceived mankind might be set free, they remained subject to the influence of these two, and had sacrificed a party to each. If all were not sincere in their belief, all at least felt the absolute need of order amongst men, and, as the essential means of supporting that human order, they perceived the necessity of recognising a general and intelligent Providence in the universe. It is the first time, in the history of the world, that the demolition of every subsisting authority left society a prey to the government of minds purely systematic (for the English, at the era of their commonwealth, put implicit faith in the Christian dispensation); and those very minds, which had so contemptuously spurned all received ideas, yet retained and adopted those which involved the sanctity of morals and the Godhead. This example is solitary in the annals of the world. It is grand and striking. The historian is justified in staying his narrative to ponder on such things.

Robespierre was the reporter on this solemn occasion, and most appropriately so, according to the distribution of parts arranged amongst the members of the committee. Prieur, Robert-Lindet, and Carnot, attended in silence to the details of administration and of war. Barrère compiled the majority of the reports, particularly those which had reference to the operations of the armies, and in general all such as required extempore delivery. Collot-d'Herbois, skilful in the art of declamation, was deputed to the clubs and popular meetings, there to harangue in the interest of the committee. Couthon, despite his paralytic infirmity, also moved to and fro, spoke in the convention, in the Jacobin Club, and in assemblies of the people; and possessed the art of interesting his hearers, not only by his bodily affliction, but also by the kind and gentle tone he assumed even when uttering the most violent doctrines. Billaud, less inclined to personal exertion, devoted his time to the correspondence, and occasionally treated on questions of general policy. Saint-Just, young, bold, and active, passed rapidly between fields of battle and the committee; when he had sufficiently impressed the armies with terror and energy, he returned to frame sanguinary reports against parties marked out for death. Lastly, Robespierre, their universal chief, was consulted on all subjects, but spoke only on great occasions. High moral and political questions were reserved exclusively for him, such eminent themes being alone deemed worthy his talent and ineffable merit. Thus the distinction of reporter upon the topic now appointed for discussion

fell to him of right. None had declared more vehemently against atheism, none was held in such deep respect, none enjoyed so great a reputation for purity and virtue; none, in short, was more fitted, from his ascendancy and dogmatism, to take upon him this species of pontificate.

Never had so fair an opportunity occurred for imitating Rousseau, whose opinions he professed, and of whose style he made a continual study. The talents of Robespierre had been wonderfully developed in the long struggles of the revolution. This cold and unimaginative being had learnt to extemporise with great readiness and fluency; and when he wrote, his productions were distinguished for perspicuity, brilliancy, and strength. In his style something of Rousseau's caustic and sombre humour might be detected; but he could never engraft the noble sentiments or the generous and impassioned soul of the author of *Emile*.

He appeared in the tribune on the 18th Floreal (7th May), with a sedulously wrought discourse. Profound attention was accorded him. "Citizens," so he commenced his address, "it is in the period of prosperity that it behoves nations, equally with individuals, to probe themselves, if I may so speak, in order that they may listen to the voice of wisdom in the stillness of their passions." He then proceeded to unfold his subject at large. The republic, as he represented, was virtue; and all the adversaries it had encountered were only so many varieties of vices contending against it, and fostered by kings. The anarchists, the corruptionists, and the atheists, had all been the agents of Pitt. "The tyrants," he stated, "satisfied with the audacious conduct of their emissaries, had eagerly held up to the odium of their subjects the extravagances they themselves had paid for; and, feigning to believe them committed by the French people, seemed to say to them, 'What will you gain by shaking off our yoke? *You see the republicans are no better than we are!*'" Brissot, Danton, and Hébert, were reviewed by him in succession; but whilst indulging in virulent declamation against those pretended enemies of virtue, tirades which from repetition had become nauseous, he was coldly heard. He speedily abandoned that part of his subject, however, and turned to the inculcation of truly great and moral ideas, most ably expounded. He then obtained universal applause. He observed with reason that it was not as authors of systems that the representatives of the nation ought to reprobate atheism and proclaim deism, but as legislators seeking the most suitable principles for men united in a social compact. "What signify to you, legislators," he exclaimed, "the various hypotheses whereby certain philosophers explain the phenomena of nature? You may safely leave all such points to their interminable disputations; it is neither as metaphysicians nor as theologians you are called upon to view them: in the eyes of the legislator, all that is useful to the world and practically beneficial is truth. The idea of the Supreme Being and of the immortality of the soul is a continual incitement to justice; therefore is it sociable and republican. Who has invested thee," he continued, apostrophising an atheist, "with a mission to teach the people that the divinity has no existence—thou who evincest such zeal for that barren doctrine, but who art ever lukewarm for thy country? What profit dost thou find in persuading man that a blind force rules over his destinies, and smites at hazard both crime and virtue—that his soul is but a volatile essence, absorbed in the dreariness of the tomb? Will the idea of his nonenity inspire him with more pure and elevated sentiments than that of his immortality?—will it inspire him with more respect for his fellow-men and for himself—with more devotedness towards his country—with more heroism to brave tyranny—with more contempt for death or voluptuousness? Ye who regret the loss of a virtuous friend, cherish ye not the thought that his noblest part has escaped the stroke of death? Ye who weep over the shroud of a son or a partner, are you consoled by him who tells you that nothing remains of those beloved beings but vile dust? Ye unfortunates who fall beneath the blow of the assassin, is not your last sigh an appeal to eternal justice? Innocence on the scaffold can make the tyrant quail on his triumphal car. Would it have that power if the grave levelled the oppressor and the oppressed?"

Robespierre, still intent on presenting the question in its political phase, added these remarkable observations: "Let us here take a lesson from history. Remark, I pray you, how the men who have influenced the destinies of states were determined towards the one or the other of the two antagonist systems by their personal character and the nature of their political views. See with what profound art Cæsar, pleading in the Roman senate in favour of Catiline's accomplices, wanders into a digression against the belief in the immortality of the soul, so adapted did he esteem such ideas to extinguish in the hearts of the judges the energy of virtue—so intimately did he deem the cause of crime allied with that of atheism! Cicero, on the contrary, invoked against the traitors both the sword of the law and the vengeance of the gods. Socrates, dying, conversed with his friends on the immortality of the soul. Leonidas, at Thermopylæ, supping with his companions in arms on the eve of executing the most heroic purpose human virtue ever conceived, invited them for the morrow to another banquet in a new world. Cato hesitated not between Epicurus and Zeno. Brutus, and the illustrious band who partook his dangers and his glory, also belonged to that sublime sect of stoics, who maintained such lofty ideas of the dignity of man, who pitched their enthusiasm for virtue so high, and indeed overstrained heroism itself. Stoicism reared emulators of Brutus and Cato even in the dismal ages which followed the loss of Roman liberty; stoicism redeemed the honour of human nature, degraded by the vices of Cæsar's successors, and above all by the patience of the people."

Clinging to the subject of atheism, Robespierre spoke in a singular strain concerning the encyclopedists.* "That sect," he said, "in political views always stopped short of the rights of the people; in moral views it went far beyond the overthrow of religious prejudices. Its coryphœi occasionally declaimed against despotism, and they were pensioned by despots; they sometimes wrote books against the court, and sometimes dedications to kings, speeches for courtiers, and madrigals for ladies-in-waiting; they were arrogant in their works, and cringing in antechambers. That sect propagated with the utmost zeal the doctrine of materialism, which obtained amongst nobles and wits; to it we partly owe that species of practical philosophy, which, reducing selfishness into a system, regards human society as a war of stratagem, success as the measure of justice or injustice, probity as a matter of taste or convenience, the world as the patrimony of adroit knaves.

Amongst those who, at the time of which I speak, distinguished themselves in the career of letters and philosophy, one man, by the elevation of his soul and the grandeur of his character, showed himself worthy to be the preceptor of the human race. He attacked tyranny with all the sincerity of his heart; he spoke with enthusiasm of the Divinity; his vigorous and honest eloquence depicted in glowing colours the charms of virtue, and vindicated those consolatory doctrines which reason gives for support to humanity. The purity of his opinions, founded on nature and a profound hatred of vice, equally with his unalterable contempt for the intriguing sophists who arrogated the title of philosophers, drew upon him the enmity

* [It is perhaps scarcely necessary to remind the reader that this title refers to the French philosophers of the last century, who composed and published an encyclopedia amidst many obstructions from the government, comprising Voltaire, Rousseau, Diderot, D'Alembert, Grimm, &c.]

and persecution of his rivals and false friends. Ah! if he had witnessed this revolution, of which he was the precursor, who can doubt that his generous mind would have embraced with ardour the cause of justice and equality?"*

Robespierre subsequently laboured to dispel the idea that the government, in asserting the dogma of a Supreme Being, was promoting the interests of priests. On this topic he thus expressed himself:—"What is there in common between priests and the Deity? Priests are to ethics what charlatans are to medicine. How infinitely is the God of nature different from the God of priests! I know nothing so much resembling atheism as the religions they have fabricated. By degrading the Supreme Being, they have annihilated him as much as in them lay; they have made him sometimes a ball of fire, sometimes an ox, sometimes a tree, sometimes a man, sometimes a king. Priests have created a God after their own likeness; they have made him jealous, capricious, covetous, cruel, and implacable. They have treated him as in times past the mayors of the palace treated the descendants of Clovis, in order that they might reign in his name and usurp his place; they have chained him in heaven as in a palace, and have called him on earth only to demand for their own profit tithes, lands, honours, luxury, and power. The veritable temple of the Supreme Being is the universe; his creed, virtue; his worship, the gladness of a multitude assembled before him to strengthen the bands of universal brotherhood, and to offer him the homage of pure and sensible hearts."

In conclusion, Robespierre advocated the expediency of festivals in a nation. "Man," said he, "is the noblest object in nature, and the most magnificent of all spectacles is that of an immense congregation." In consequence, he propounded a scheme for holding assemblies on all the tenth days or *decades*.

His report was closed amidst the most deafening applause. He then formally proposed the decree, which was adopted by acclamation. It set forth—

Art. 1st. "The French people recognise the existence of the Supreme Being, and the immortality of the soul."

Art. 2d. "They acknowledge that the worship worthiest of the Supreme Being is the observance of the duties of man."

Subsequent articles enacted the institution of festivals, "with the view of recalling man to a sense of the Divinity and the dignity of his own being." They were to take their names from the events of the revolution, or from the virtues most beneficial to mankind. Besides the festivals of the 14th July, 10th August, 21st January, and 31st May, the republic was henceforth to celebrate the following:—To the Supreme Being; to the human race; to the French people; to the benefactors of mankind; to the martyrs of liberty; to liberty and equality; to the republic; to the liberty of the world; to the love of country; to the hatred of tyrants and traitors; to truth; to justice; to modesty; to glory; to friendship; to frugality; to courage; to good faith; to heroism; to disinterestedness; to stoicism; to love; to conjugal constancy; to paternal love; to paternal tenderness; to filial piety; to infancy; to youth; to manhood; to old age; to misfortune; to agriculture; to industry; to forefathers; to posterity; to happiness.

A solemn festival was ordained for the 20th Prairial, the plan whereof was confided to David. It ought to be added, that in this decree the freedom of religious worship was again confirmed.

Robespierre's report had been ordered to be printed the moment it was concluded. During the same day, the commune and the Jacobin Club called for its public perusal, greeted it with vociferous plaudits, and deliberated upon the propriety of repairing *en masse* to tender their thanks to the convention for the *sublime* decree it had just passed. Remarks had been current upon the fact, that, after the sacrifice of the two factions, the Jacobins had refrained from manifesting their satisfaction, or congratulating the committee and the convention. A member now reminded them of that reproach, and stated that the present occasion was most opportune for proving the union of the Jacobins with a government so worthy of esteem. An address was accordingly voted and presented to the convention by a deputation of Jacobins. Its concluding paragraph was thus couched:—"The Jacobins have come this day to thank you for the solemn decree you have passed; they will come again to unite with you in the celebration of that glorious day when the festival to the Supreme Being will draw together virtuous citizens from all parts of France, to sing the hymn of virtue."

The president replied to the deputation in a somewhat magniloquent strain. "It is worthy," he said, "of a society which fills the world with its renown, which enjoys so vast an influence over public opinion, which has at all times been found in alliance with the most courageous amongst the defenders of the rights of man, to visit the temples of the laws, to render homage to the Supreme Being."

The president continued, and after a long oration on the subject, transferred it for exhaustion to Couthon. He, Couthon, forthwith proceeded to deliver a vehement harangue against atheists and corruptionists, and a pompous eulogy on the society. He then proposed, on this solemn day of gladness and thanksgiving, to render the Jacobins a tribute long and justly due to them, to wit, the acknowledgment, that, since the commencement of the revolution, they had never ceased to merit well of the country. The motion was adopted amidst the most enthusiastic cheering. The assembly broke up in transports of joy, and in a state bordering on delirium.

If the convention had received numerous addresses after the execution of the Hébertists and Dantonists, they were infinitely exceeded by those transmitted to it in consequence of the decree proclaiming belief in the Supreme Being. Ideas and phrases become contagious amongst the French with extraordinary rapidity. Among a people so quick and communicative, the idea which occupies a few minds is speedily the idea which occupies all, and the phrase which is on a few tongues is quickly on all. Addresses poured in from all quarters, congratulating the convention on its sublime decrees, and thanking it for having established virtue, proclaimed the Supreme Being, and restored hope to mankind. All the sections appeared in their order to express the like sentiments. The section of Marat, on presenting itself at the bar, apostrophised the Mountain, saying—"Beneficent Mountain! Sinai-protector! deign to receive our expressions of gratitude and felicitation for all the sublime decrees thou daily emittest for the happiness of the human race. From thy avenging hand hath darted the salutary thunderbolt, which, crushing atheism, imparts to all true republicans the consolatory conviction of living free, under the eye of the Supreme Being, and in the expectancy of an immortality hereafter. Long live the convention! long live the republic! long live the Mountain!" All these addresses besought the convention, as before, to retain power. One, indeed, urged it to sit until the reign of virtue was established in the republic on imperishable bases.

From this time forth, the words "virtue" and "Supreme Being" were in all mouths. Over the portals of temples, where had been written "to Reason," was now displayed in large characters, "To the Supreme Being." The remains of Rousseau were transported to the Pantheon. His widow was presented to the convention, and gratified with a pension.

Thus the committee of public welfare, triumphant over all factions, enfeoffed in al authority, placed at

* [Robespierre here alludes to Rousseau.]

the head of an enthusiastic and victorious nation, proclaiming the reign of virtue and the creed of a Supreme Being, was at the pinnacle of its power and the consummation of its systems.

CHAPTER XXXIII.

STATE OF EUROPE AT THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE YEAR 1794.—POLICY AND PLANS OF THE ALLIES AND OF FRANCE.—OPENING OF THE CAMPAIGN.—VICTORY OF TURCOING.—CLOSE OF THE WAR IN LA VENDEE, AND BEGINNING OF THAT OF THE CHOUANS.—EVENTS IN THE FRENCH COLONIES.—DISASTER OF ST DOMINGO. —LOSS OF MARTINIQUE.—NAVAL BATTLE.

The winter had been employed in Europe and in France to make preparations for the approaching campaign. England was still the soul of the coalition, and continued to incite all the powers of Europe to destroy, on the banks of the Seine, a revolution which alarmed her, and a rival which was hateful to her. The implacable son of Chatham had made prodigious efforts this year to crush France. However, he had not obtained from parliament the means proportioned to his vast projects without encountering obstacles. Lord Stanhope, in the upper house, Fox and Sheridan in the lower house, had always opposed the system of the war. They refused the supplies demanded by the ministers, and were content to grant only so much as was needful for defending the coasts; above all, they protested against the war being described as "just and necessary;" it was, on the contrary, they averred, iniquitous, ruinous, and justly signalised by reverses. They asserted its alleged motives, the opening of the Scheldt, the dangers of Holland, and the necessity of defending the British constitution, to be false and groundless. Holland had not been exposed to peril by the opening of the Scheldt, and the British constitution was not menaced. The aim of the ministers was, they maintained, to subjugate a nation which had presumed to become free, and to augment their own influence and authority under pretence of resisting the machinations of French Jacobins. The war itself had been carried on by disgraceful means. Civil war and domestic massacres had been fomented; but a brave and generous people had foiled the schemes of its adversaries by a courage and efforts without example. Stanhope, Fox, and Sheridan, concluded that such a contest would dishonour and ruin England. They erred in the latter respect. The English opposition may frequently reproach the government with commencing unjust wars, but never disadvantageous ones. If the war waged against France had no just motive, it was supplied with excellent political reasons, as we shall have occasion to show; and the opposition, misled by its generous sentiments, overlooked the advantages which must thence result to England.

Pitt pretended to be alarmed at the threats of descent bellowed from the tribune of the convention. He asseverated that certain Kentish yeomen had been heard to say, "The French are coming to bring us the rights of man." On such expressions (due, it was said, to his own gold) he professed to ground his fears for the constitution. He denounced the constitutional societies of England, which had been stirred into somewhat greater activity by the example of the clubs in France, and maintained that they were striving to establish a convention under the pretext of promoting parliamentary reform. In consequence, he demanded the suspension of the Habeas Corpus Act, the seizure of papers belonging to such societies, and the prosecution of some of their members. He asked, moreover, for permission to enrol volunteers, and support them by means of *benevolences* or subscriptions; and for authority to augment the army and navy, and to take into pay a body of 40,000 aliens, French emigrants, and others. The opposition offered a strenuous resistance. It held that no cause warranted the suspension of the most precious of English liberties; that, as the accused societies deliberated in public, their views openly expressed could involve no conspiracy; that those views were general throughout the country, extending, as they did, only to the enforcement of parliamentary reform; that the immoderate augmentation of the army was dangerous to the English people; that if volunteers might be armed by subscription, it would become feasible for the minister to levy armies without the sanction of parliament; that, to subsidise so great a number of foreigners, was a profligate waste of money, and intended merely to reward French traitors. Notwithstanding the remonstrances of the opposition, which had never displayed greater eloquence or less numerical strength—for it mustered only thirty or forty votes—Pitt obtained all he desired, and carried the whole of the measures he had propounded.

Having thus procured the allowance of his various demands, he doubled the militia, increased the army to 60,000 men and the navy to 80,000, organised additional corps of emigrants, and filed criminal informations against several members of the constitutional societies. The English jury, a more solid guarantee than the parliament, acquitted the defendants; but this was of little moment to Pitt, who had now at his disposal unlimited means of repressing the least political movement, and of deploying a colossal might in Europe.

The moment was opportune for profiting by an universal war, to overwhelm France, to annihilate her navy, and to wrest from her her colonies—results infinitely more sure and desirable in the eyes of Pitt than the suppression of certain political and religious doctrines. He had succeeded the previous year in arming against France the two maritime powers bound by every tie of interest to remain in alliance with her, Spain and Holland; and he strove diligently to keep them steadfast in their political error, and to derive the greatest possible aid therefrom against the French navy. England could send from her ports at least one hundred ships of the line, Spain forty, Holland twenty, without reckoning a multitude of frigates. How was France, with the fifty or sixty vessels remaining to her since the conflagration of Toulon, to resist such forces? Thus, although not a single naval battle had been yet fought, the English flag domineered in the Mediterranean, the Atlantic Ocean, and the Indian seas. In the Mediterranean, the English squadron menaced the Italian states which desired to preserve neutrality, and blockaded Corsica to force it from French possession, whilst, nearer home, they awaited an opportunity for disembarking troops and munitions in La Vendée. In America, they hovered round the Antilles, and sought to profit by the deplorable contentions amongst the whites, mulattoes, and blacks, to secure them for the British crown. In the Indian seas, they accomplished the establishment of British supremacy, and the ruin of Pondicherry. One campaign more, and French commerce was destroyed, whatever might be the fortune of arms on the continent. Thus the war waged by Pitt against France was eminently politic, and the opposition erred in blaming it on the score of utility. It will have judged correctly only in one contingency, and that contingency has not yet happened;—if the national debt, continually on the increase, and now become enormous, be really beyond the resources of the country, and must one day result in bankruptcy, England will have exceeded its means, and acted improvidently in contending for an empire which has exhausted its elements of strength. But this is yet a mystery of the future.

Pitt refrained from no measure, however violent, which promised to facilitate his views, and aggravate the evils of France. The Americans, happy and content under Washington, freely ploughed the seas, and

began to prosecute that vast carrying trade, which proved to them so rich a source of wealth during the long wars in Europe. The English squadrons stopped the American ships, and impressed sailors from their crews. Upwards of five hundred vessels had already undergone that violation, which formed the subject of vehement but hitherto fruitless remonstrances on the part of the American government. Nor was this all: under favour of their neutrality, the Americans, Danes, and Swedes, frequented the French ports, conveying supplies of corn, which the scarcity rendered extremely valuable, together with numerous articles required in navy-yards, and bearing away in return the wines and other products of the French soil. Owing to this intervention of neutrals, commerce was not entirely interrupted, and the most importunate wants of consumption had been satisfied. England, considering France in the light of a besieged fortress to be starved and reduced to despair, regarded with a malevolent eye these rights of neutrals, and had addressed to the northern courts divers notes, replete with sophistry, designed to justify a dereliction of international law.

Whilst employing these various modes of maritime hostility, England still maintained 40,000 men in the Low Countries, under the orders of the Duke of York. Moreover, Lord Moira, who had failed to arrive in time before Granville, was lying at Jersey with his flotilla, and a disembarking force of 10,000 men. In fine, the English exchequer held funds at the disposition of all the belligerent powers.

On the continent, martial ardour had somewhat cooled. The powers, not having the same interest in war as England, and carrying it on, indeed, simply for pretended principles, were far from exhibiting either similar zeal or similar activity. England laboured strenuously to reanimate them all. Holding Holland under thraldom by means of the Prince of Orange, she constrained it to furnish its contingent to the allied army of the north. Thus that unfortunate nation had its ships and its troops in the service of its most formidable enemy, and acting in opposition to its surest ally. Prussia, despite the mysticism of its king, had lost much of the illusion so sedulously propagated amongst its people during the last two years. The retreat of Champagne in 1792, and that of the Vosges in 1793, had certainly not tended to encourage it. Frederick William, who had exhausted his treasure and weakened his army in a war which could have no result advantageous to his kingdom, and which, in the most favourable point of view, could only serve the interests of the house of Austria, would have willingly receded from it. Besides, a subject infinitely more interesting to him called his attention to the north: Poland was in agitation, and its dissevered members aiming at a rejunction. England, plying him in this state of uncertainty, prompted him to continue the war by the all-powerful stimulus of gold. She concluded at the Hague, in her own name and in that of Holland, a treaty whereby Prussia was bound to furnish 62,400 men to the coalition. These forces were to be under the command of a Prussian, and their future conquests to belong in common to the two maritime powers, England and Holland. In return, these two states guaranteed a monthly subsidy of £50,000 sterling to Prussia for the maintenance of its troops, and the reimbursement of its expenditure for bread and forage. They furthermore granted the sum of £300,000 to defray the charges of entering on the campaign, and £100,000 for the return into the Prussian confines. At this price, Prussia continued the impolitic war it had commenced.

The house of Austria had no longer any object of solicitude in France, since the queen-consort of Louis XVI. had expired on the scaffold. Austria must have had less reason than any other country to dread the contagious influence of the revolution, since even thirty years of political discussions have failed to excite her phlegmatic subjects. She made war on France, therefore, from a motive of vengeance, from respect for her engagements, and from the desire of gaining certain fortresses in Flanders; perhaps, also, from the futile hope of grasping a portion of the French provinces. She evinced greater ardour than Prussia, but not much more of real activity, for she did but complete and re-organise her battalions without augmenting their number. A considerable proportion of her troops was in Poland, since she had, like Prussia, potential reasons for looking to the rear, and keeping a steady gaze on the Vistula as well as on the Rhine. The Gallicias bespoke her attention not less, assuredly, than Belgium and Alsace.

Sweden and Denmark adhered to their sage neutrality, and replied to the sophisms of England with befitting spirit. They stated that the public law was immutable; that no reason existed for infringing it with respect to France, or for extending to an entire country the rules of blockade, which were only applicable to a besieged fortress; that the Swedish and Danish vessels were well received in France, not encountering barbarians, as was generally surmised, but a government which acted uprightly towards foreign merchants, and treated them with all the regard due to the subjects of nations with whom it was at peace; and that, consequently, they had no motive for breaking asunder advantageous relations. Accordingly, although Catherine, being favourably inclined towards the projects of England, seemed to pronounce against the rights of neutral nations, Sweden and Denmark persisted in their resolution, observed a firm and prudent neutrality, and concluded a treaty whereby the two countries pledged themselves to maintain the rights of neutrals, and to enforce the clause in the treaty of 1780, which closed the Baltic to the armed vessels of powers which possessed no port in that sea. France, therefore, might still expect to receive corn, and the timber and hemp necessary for her navy, from the north.

Russia, albeit affecting boundless indignation against the French revolution, and amusing the emigrants with many lofty expectations, had in reality her attention concentrated on Poland, and only entered with such apparent warmth into the policy of the English to obtain their concurrence in her own. Herein may be found the explanation of England's silence on so momentous an event as the disappearance of a kingdom from the political stage. At this period of general spoliation, indeed, when England was gathering acquisitions so rapidly in the south of Europe and in every sea, it little became her to speak the language of justice to the co-partitioners of Poland. Thus the coalition, which accused France of having fallen into barbarism, committed in the north the most audacious robbery ever planned by political rascality, contemplated a similar appropriation of the Gallic provinces, and contributed to destroy for ever the liberty of the seas.

The German princes obeyed the impulse of the house of Austria. Switzerland, protected by its mountains and its institutions from being drawn into the crusade for the cause of monarchy, persisted in its system of non-intervention, and thus covered by its neutrality the eastern provinces of France, the least defensible of all. The Swiss acted the same part on the continent as the Americans, Swedes, and Danes, on the seas; they rendered analogous services to French commerce, and reaped a corresponding recompense. They imported horses, of which the French armies stood in great need, and cattle, which had become deficient since the Vosges and La Vendée had been ravaged by war, and they exported the products of French manufactures, thus constituting themselves the intermediate agents of a most profitable traffic. Piedmont continued the war probably with regret, but it could not consent to lay down its arms after having lost two provinces, Savoy and Nice, in the desperate and inconsiderate game. Most of the other

Italian states desired to remain neutral, but in this design they were exposed to much annoyance. The republic of Genoa had suffered the mortification of beholding the English perpetrate within its harbour an unworthy act—a veritable outrage on the law of nations. They had seized on a French frigate, anchored under shelter of Genoese neutrality, and massacred the crew. Tuscany had been obliged to dismiss the French resident. Naples, which had acknowledged the republic when the French squadrons threatened its shores, demonstrated its hostility when the English flag was unfurled in the Mediterranean, and undertook to furnish 18,000 auxiliary troops to Piedmont. Rome, happily impotent, anathematised the French, and allowed their diplomatic agent, Basseville, to be murdered within her walls. Lastly, Venice, although little gratified by the demagogical language of French republicans, was decidedly opposed to embarking in the war, and hoped, under favour of her distant position, to escape its embroilment. Corsica was on the point of falling, since Paoli had declared for the English; Bastia and Calvi were the only possessions left to the French in the whole island.

Spain, the least blameable of all the allies, continued an impolitic war, and participated in the grievous blunder of Holland. The imagined duties of thrones, the victories of Ricardos, and the weight of English influence, determined it to attempt another campaign, despite its great exhaustion and its deficiency in soldiers, and, above all, in funds. The celebrated Alcudia effected the disgrace of D'Aranda for having recommended peace.

The political state of Europe, therefore, had undergone scarcely any modifications since the preceding year. Interests, errors, faults, and crimes, were in 1794 the same as in 1793. England alone had materially augmented its forces. The allies still possessed in the Low Countries one hundred and fifty thousand men, Austrians, Germans, Dutch, and English. Twenty-five thousand or thirty thousand Austrians were at Luxumbourg, and sixty thousand Prussians and Saxons in the vicinity of Mayence. Fifty thousand Austrians, including a proportion of emigrants, lined the Rhine from Manheim to Basle. The Piedmontese army amounted to forty thousand men, with seven thousand or eight thousand Austrian auxiliaries. Spain had levied recruits to recompose its battalions, and had demanded pecuniary aid from the clergy; but its army was not greater than in the preceding campaign, being still restricted to sixty thousand men, distributed between the Eastern and Western Pyrenees.

It was on the north the allies proposed to strike the most decisive blow, basing their operations on Condé, Valenciennes, and Le Quesnoy. The celebrated Mack had arranged a plan at London, from which mighty results were anticipated. On this occasion the German tactician, evincing greater hardihood than heretofore, had included a march on Paris in his scheme of campaign. Unfortunately, he was a little too late in arriving at this degree of boldness, for it was no longer possible to take the French by surprise, and their means of resistance were almost incalculable. His plan consisted in capturing one additional fortress, that of Landrecies, concentrating in force on that point, drawing the Prussians from the Vosges to the Sambre, and marching forward, with the precaution of leaving two corps on the wings, the one in Flanders, the other on the Sambre. At the same time, Lord Moira was to disembark troops in La Vendée, and aggravate the enemy's danger by a double march on Paris.

To take Landrecies, when they possessed Valenciennes, Condé, and Le Quesnoy, was, on the part of the allies, a superfluous caution; to cover their communications towards the Sambre was wisely judged; but to detach a corps to guard Flanders, when it behoved them to form the largest possible invading mass, was highly injudicious; to draw the Prussians on the Sambre was of doubtful policy, as we shall learn hereafter; finally, to effect a diversion in La Vendée, was impracticable by the lapse of many months, for the great Vendéan war had been suppressed. The comparison of the event with the design, however, will more clearly show the futility of the plans transcribed in London.*

The coalition, we have stated, had not called forth its utmost resources. There were, in fact, at this moment, but three powers really active in Europe—England, Russia, and France. And, for sufficient reasons, England was intent on the sovereignty of the seas, Russia on the appropriation of Poland, and France on the preservation of its existence and liberty. These were the only three great interests powerfully excited; that of France alone was noble, and in its vindication she manifested an indomitable energy, of which history records no other example.

The permanent requisition, decreed in the month of August of the preceding year, had already produced considerable reinforcements to the army, and contributed to the successes which terminated the last campaign; but that great measure was not destined to exhibit all its effects until the present year. Under the impetus of that extraordinary movement, twelve hundred thousand men had quitted their homes, and lined the frontiers or crowded the depôts in the interior. The business of embodying these recruits had been diligently prosecuted. A battalion of the line was incorporated with two battalions of the new levy, by which means excellent regiments were formed. Seven hundred thousand men had been already organised on this plan, and dispatched to the frontiers or stationed in fortresses. There were, including garrisons, 250,000 men in the north, 40,000 in the Ardennes, 200,000 men on the Rhine and the Moselle, 100,000 on the Alps, 20,000 on the Pyrenees, and 80,000 between Cherbourg and La Rochelle. The expedients employed to equip these troops had not been less prompt or extraordinary than those to muster and discipline them. The manufactories of arms established in Paris and in the departments had quickly attained the activity sought to be given them, and furnished cannons, muskets, and swords, in amazing quantities. The committee of public welfare, perfectly conversant with the peculiar genius of the French people, had skilfully contrived to render the preparation of saltpetre a subject of emulation. During the previous year, it had ordered cellars to be visited with the view of separating the saline mould. Subsequently, it went a step further: it framed a series of instructions, drawn up with admirable simplicity and perspicuity, to enable the citizens themselves to apply the requisite process to the earth of cellars. It moreover retained some practical chemists to teach the mode of manipulation. A taste for the employment was speedily disseminated; those who had received lessons imparted the information to their neighbours, and in a little while each house supplied several pounds of the precious commodity. Certain of the Parisian quarters congregated to bear in pomp to the convention and the Jacobin Club the saltpetre they had fabricated. The idea of a festival was started, wherein each person should advance and deposit his offering on the altar of the country. The salt was shaped in emblematic forms; all sorts of epithets were lavished on it; the people styled it "the avenging salt," "the liberating salt," &c. Thus it furnished them with a topic of amusement; but they produced considerable quantities of the essential article, and the government had gained its object. Some degree of confusion was naturally attendant on so singular an occupation. The cellars were dug up, and the earth, after being sub-

* Those who are desirous of perusing the best political and military dissertation on this subject, have only to consult the critical memoir written on this campaign by General Jomini, and subjoined to his great History of the Wars of the Revolution.

jected to the process, was thrown into the streets, which it obstructed and injured. An ordinance of the committee of public welfare put a stop to this abuse, and the earthy ore was thenceforth replaced in the cellars. Brine also was deficient; the committee ordained that all the herbs that were not used either in the feeding of animals or for domestic and agricultural purposes, should be forthwith burnt, to serve for the extraction of saltpetre, or to be converted into brine.

The government had the art to instigate another mania equally advantageous. It was found more easy to levy men and manufacture arms than to obtain horses; the artillery and the cavalry were both defective in quadrupeds. The war had rendered them scarce; the demand and the general enhancement in value had greatly increased their price. The grand resource of a requisition was deemed indispensable; that is to say, the taking by force what an imperative necessity required. In each canton one horse out of twenty-five was confiscated, at the rate of nine hundred francs. But, however powerful force may be, good will is always more efficacious. The committee conceived the idea of having a trooper fully equipped presented to it by the Jacobin Club. The example was followed universally. Communes, clubs, and sections, vied in offering to the republic *Jacobin cavaliers*, as they were called, all completely accoutred and mounted.

Soldiers, then, were abundant, but not so officers. The committee met the want with its usual promptitude. "The revolution," said Barrère, "must precipitate in every instance to supply its wants. The revolution is to the human mind what the sun of Africa is to vegetation." The school of Mars was re-established; young men, selected from all the departments, repaired on foot and in military form to Paris. Encamped under tents, in the middle of the plain of Sablons, they were rapidly instructed in all branches of the art of war, and afterwards distributed amongst the armies.

Efforts equally vigorous were made to recompose the navy. In 1789, it consisted of fifty ships, and as many frigates. The disorders of the revolution, and the calamity of Toulon, had reduced it to fifty vessels in all, whereof thirty at the utmost were fit for service. But the chief deficiency was in crews and officers. The navy required experienced men, and all such had long been incompatible with the revolution. The reconstruction enforced on the staffs of the army was consequently even more inevitable with regard to the commanderies of the navy, and necessarily calculated to produce a still greater degree of disorganisation. The two ministers of the admiralty, Monge and D'Albarade, had been found unequal to grapple with the difficulties thence resulting, and been dismissed accordingly. The committee resolved on this point also to employ extraordinary measures. Jean-Bon-Saint-André and Prieur-de-la-Marne were sent to Brest, with the usual powers of commissioners of the convention. The squadron of Brest, after a tedious cruise of four months off the western coasts, to prevent communications between the Vendéans and the English, had mutinied in consequence of its prolonged hardships. Scarcely had it returned into port ere its commander, Admiral Morard de Gales, was arrested by the representatives, and held responsible for the disaffection of the fleet. The crews were broken up, and recomposed after the prompt and violent manner of the Jacobins. Peasants, who had never rowed a boat, were transported to the decks of men-of-war, to manœuvre against the veteran English sailors; simple officers were raised to the highest grades, and Captain Villaret-Joyeuse was promoted to the command of the squadron. In the space of one month, a fleet of thirty line-of-battle ships was in readiness to weigh anchor; it left the port, full of enthusiasm, and amidst the joyful acclamations of the people of Brest, not certainly with the intention of braving the formidable squadrons of England, Holland, and Spain, but of protecting a convoy of 200 sail, then bringing from America a considerable quantity of corn, and of fighting to the death, if the safety of the convoy so required. At the same time, Toulon was the scene of a creative activity not less diligent. The ships that had escaped the conflagration were repaired, and others built; the charges being defrayed by the property of those amongst the Toulonese who had aided in delivering the port into the hands of the enemy. In defect of large fleets, then only in preparation, a multitude of privateers scoured the seas, and made numerous captures. A hardy and valiant people, to whom the means of carrying on a combined system of warfare are denied, can always have recourse to a war of detail, and therein find opportunities of displaying its intelligence and courage; on land it prosecutes a partisan war, on sea a privateering war. According to a statement of Lord Stanhope, the French had, from 1793 to 1794, taken 410 vessels, whilst the English had captured from them but 316. The government, therefore, was far from renouncing the idea of re-establishing French power even on the ocean.

All these prodigious exertions were now destined to have their appropriate consequences; in 1794 was to be reaped the reward of the efforts of 1793.

The campaign first opened on the Pyrenees and the Alps. Almost stagnant on the Western Pyrenees, it shortly became singularly active on the Eastern Pyrenees, where the Spaniards had gained the line of the Tech, and occupied the famous camp of Boulou. Ricardos was dead, and that able general had been replaced by one of his lieutenants, the Count de la Union, an intrepid soldier, but a mediocre commander. Not having yet received the reinforcements he expected, La Union was content to hold fast by his position at Boulou. The French were commanded by the brave Dugommier, the conqueror of Toulon. A part of the ordnance and the troops employed in subjugating that city had been moved before Perpignan, whilst the young recruits were organising in its rear. Dugommier could muster 35,000 men in line, to profit by the defective strength of the Spaniards Dagobert, always impetuous in spite of his age, proposed a plan of invasion by Cerdagne, whereby the French, advancing beyond the Pyrenees and to the rear of the Spanish army, would oblige it to retrograde. The experiment of an attack on the camp of Boulou was preferred; and Dagobert, resting with his division in Cerdagne, had orders to await the result of that assault. The camp of Boulou, placed on the banks of the Tech, and leaning on the Pyrenees, had behind it the Bellegarde road, which forms the highway from France into Spain. Dugommier, instead of taking the enemy's positions in front, which were strongly fortified, determined to penetrate, if possible, between Boulou and the Bellegarde turnpike, with the view of compelling the evacuation of the Spanish camp. His project succeeded beyond expectation. La Union had drawn the bulk of his forces to Ceret, and left the heights of Saint-Christophe, which commanded Boulou, insufficiently guarded. Dugommier passed the Tech, threw a part of his army towards Saint-Christophe, attacked with the residue the front of the Spanish positions, and after a vigorous contest remained master of the heights. From that moment the camp was no longer tenable, and a retreat by the Bellegarde highway became expedient; but Dugommier promptly occupied it, and afforded the Spaniards only the narrow and difficult tract through the defile of Porteuil. Their retreat soon resolved itself into a rout. Charged opportunely with vivacity, they fled in disorder, leaving in the hands of the French 1500 prisoners, 140 pieces of cannon, 800 mules loaded with baggage, and camp materials for 20,000 men. This victory, gained in the middle of Floreal (beginning of May), had the effect of restoring the line of the Tech, and carrying the French beyond the Pyrenees. Dugommier imme-



diately blockaded Collioure, Port-Vendre, and Saint-Elme, to redeem those places from the Spaniards. During this important achievement, the valiant Dagobert, attacked by a fever, closed his long and glorious career. This noble veteran, who had attained the age of seventy-six, was interred amidst the sorrow and the admiration of the whole army.

Thus the first operations of the French on the Eastern Pyrenees were crowned with brilliant success. On the side of the Western Pyrenees, they carried the valley of Bastan, and these triumphs over the Spaniards, whom they had not hitherto defeated, excited universal joy.

On the Alpine frontier, the French had still to establish their line of defence on the great chain. Towards Savoy, they had last year forced the Piedmontese back into the valleys of Piedmont, but they had not succeeded in taking the positions of the Little St Bernard and of Mount Cenis. In the direction of Nice, the army of Italy was, as before, encamped in front of Saorgio, without having been able to carry the formidable camp of Les Fourches (The Forks). General Dugommier had been succeeded by the aged Dumerbion, an intrepid commander, but almost constantly afflicted with gout. Fortunately, he permitted himself to be entirely directed by young Bonaparte, who, as we have seen, had decided the reduction of Toulon by recommending the attack on *Little Gibraltar*. That service had procured Bonaparte the rank of general of brigade, and given him great consideration in the army. After surveying the hostile positions, and perceiving the impossibility of forcing the camp of Les Fourches, he was struck with an idea equally happy with that which recovered Toulon to the republic. Saorgio is situated in the valley of the Roya. Parallel with this valley runs that of Oneille, through which flows the Taggia. Bonaparte conceived the plan of throwing a division of 15,000 men into the valley of Oneille, causing it to ascend to the sources of the Tanaro, then pushing it onwards even to Mount Tanarello, which borders the Upper Roya, and thus intercepting the road to Saorgio, between the camp of Les Fourches and the Col de Tende. By this manœuvre, the camp of Les Fourches, isolated from the Great Alps, would necessarily fall. The project was open to only one objection, namely, that it obliged the army to violate the territory of Genoa. But that republic could take no just offence thereat; for, the year before, 2000 Piedmontese had traversed the Genoese confines, and proceeded to embark at Oneille for Toulon; furthermore, the outrage committed by the English on the frigate *La Modeste*, in the very port of Genoa, was a most flagrant infringement of neutral rights. Great advantages must, moreover, accrue from extending the right of the army to Oneille; it would be thereby enabled to cover part of the Genoese coast, expel the privateers from the little port of Oneille, where they habitually rendezvoused, and thus protect the trade of Genoa with the south of France. That trade, which was carried on in coasting vessels, was greatly interrupted by the English privateers and squadrons, and its security was of considerable importance, as it contributed to supply the southern departments with corn. There could be no hesitation, consequently, in adopting the plan recommended by Bonaparte. The representatives solicited the necessary authority from the committee of public welfare, and the execution of the project was promptly ordained.

On the 17th Germinal (6th April), a division of 14,000 men, divided into five brigades, passed the Roya. General Massena advanced on Mount Tanardo, and Bonaparte, with three brigades, marched on Oneille, drove out an Austrian division, and entered the town. He seized therein twelve pieces of ordnance, and cleared the harbour of all the privateers which infested those shores. Whilst Massena was ascending from Tanardo to Tanarello, Bonaparte continued his operations, and proceeded from Oneille to Ormea in the valley of the Tanaro. He entered that place on the 15th April (26th Germinal), and found in it divers muskets, twenty pieces of cannon, and magazines stored with cloth for soldiers' clothing. So soon as the French brigades had united in the valley of the Tanaro, they moved towards the Upper Roya, to execute the prescribed movement on the left of the Piedmontese. General Dumerbion attacked the positions of the Piedmontese in front, whilst Massena was closing on their flank and rear. After several spirited actions, the Piedmontese abandoned Saorgio, and fell back on the Col de Tende, and finally gave up the Col de Tende itself to take refuge in Limone, beyond the great chain.

Whilst these events were passing in the valley of the Roya, the valleys of the Tinea and the Vesubia were swept by the left of the army of Italy; and shortly afterwards, the army of the Great Alps, incited by the spirit of emulation, carried by main force Saint-Bernard and Mount Cenis. Thus, by the middle of Floreal (beginning of May), the French were victorious along the whole chain of the Alps, and occupied it from the first eminences of the Apennines to Mont-Blanc. Their right, supported on Ormea, reached almost to the gates of Genoa, covered a large portion of the shore of the Ponant, and thus protected trade from the ravages of piracy. They had made 3000 or 4000 prisoners, captured fifty or sixty pieces of ordnance, large stores of accoutring materials, and two fortified places. Their commencement, therefore, was equally fortunate on the Alps as on the Pyrenees, since on both points they obtained a rampart for the frontier, and a portion of the enemies' resources.

The campaign had opened somewhat later on the great theatre of the war, namely, the North. There 500,000 men were arrayed for combat on a line stretching from the Vosges to the sea. The French had still their principal strength concentrated towards Lille, Guise, and Maubeuge. Pichegru had become their general. Commander of the army of the Rhine during the previous year, he had contrived to usurp the honour of raising the blockade of Landau, which belonged rightfully to young Hoche. He had won the confidence of Saint-Just; and, whilst Hoche was thrown into prison, obtained the command-in-chief of the army of the North. Jourdan, esteemed as a prudent general, was not deemed sufficiently enterprising to retain the important command of the North, and he succeeded Hoche in the army of the Moselle. Michaud replaced Pichegru in that of the Rhine. Carnot, be it remembered, always presided over the military operations, and directed them from his cabinet. Saint-Just and Lebas had been dispatched to Guise, for the purpose of invigorating the resolution of the army.

The nature of the country prescribed a plan of operations at once simple and calculated to produce prompt and vast results; which consisted in moving the main mass of the French forces on the Meuse towards Namur, and thus threatening the communications of the Austrians. Therein lay the key of the theatre of war; and it will always be so when hostilities are carried on in the Low Countries against Austrians advancing from the Rhine. Any diversion in Flanders was injudicious; for, if the wing thrown into Flanders were sufficiently strong to make head against the allies, it merely contributed to repulse them in front, without compromising their retreat; and if it were not sufficiently powerful to obtain decisive advantages, the allies had only to let it progress into West Flanders, to be afterwards enabled to hem it in and drive it into the sea. Pichegru, possessing acquirements, intelligence, and considerable firmness, but indifferently gifted with military genius, formed an erroneous estimate of his position; and Carnot, prepossessed by his plan of the preceding year, persisted in enjoining a direct attack on the centre of the enemy and distracting demonstrations on his two

wings. In consequence, the principal mass was appointed to act from Guise upon the centre of the allies, whilst two strong divisions, operating, the one on the Lys and the other on the Sambre, were to make a twofold diversion. Such was the plan opposed to the aggressive project of Mack.

The Prince of Cobourg continued to hold the chief command of the allied forces. The Emperor of Germany had repaired in person to the Low Countries, with the view of encouraging his army, and more especially of terminating, by his presence, the disputes which were perpetually arising amongst the allied generals. Cobourg concentrated a mass of about one hundred thousand men in the plains of Cateau, in order to blockade Landrecies. This was the preliminary operation with which the allies were to open the campaign, whilst awaiting the consent of the Prussians to march from the Moselle on the Sambre.

The movements commenced towards the close of Germinal (April). The allied mass, after driving the scattered French divisions before it, established itself around Landrecies. The Duke of York was stationed in observation towards Cambray; Cobourg towards Guise. By the movement which the allies thus effected, the French divisions of the centre, compelled to retrograde, were separated from the divisions of Maubeuge, which formed the left wing. On the 2d Floreal (21st April), an effort was attempted to renew the communications with those divisions of Maubeuge. A sanguinary conflict ensued on the Helpe. The French columns, still too much divided, were repulsed on all points, and chased into the positions whence they had ventured.

A fresh but general attack was then resolved upon by the French commanders, on the centre and the two wings simultaneously. The division of Desjardins, which was posted towards Maubeuge, had orders to make a movement with the view of uniting with the division of Charbonnier on its way from the Ardennes. In the centre, seven columns were to act at once and concentrically on the whole hostile mass grouped around Landrecies. Finally, on the left, Souham and Moreau, starting from Lille with two divisions, forming in all 50,000 men, were appointed to advance into Flanders, and capture, under the nose of Clairfayt, the fastnesses of Menin and Courtray.

The right of the French army operated its manœuvre without obstacle, for the Prince of Kaunitz was unable, with the division he led on the Sambre, to prevent the junction of Charbonnier and Desjardins. The columns of the centre got in motion on the 7th Floreal (26th April), and marched from seven different points on the Austrian army. This system of simultaneous and unconnected attacks, which had succeeded so ill the year before, met with no better fortune on this occasion. The columns, too far asunder from one another, could afford no mutual support, and failed to obtain a decisive advantage on any individual point. One of them, indeed, that of General Chappuis, was entirely defeated. That commander, moving from Cambray, found himself opposed to the Duke of York, who, we have already stated, covered Landrecies on that side. He scattered his troops on divers points, and came before the intrenched positions of Trois-Villes with insufficient force. Overwhelmed by the English fire, charged in flank by the cavalry, he was put to flight, and his dispersed division re-entered Cambray in the utmost confusion. These checks proceeded much more from the manner of conducting the operations than from any deficiency on the part of the troops. The young French soldiers, astounded occasionally at the terrors of a fire whereof they could have formed no previous idea, were, nevertheless, easily led on and rallied to the attack, and often, indeed, displayed extraordinary ardour and enthusiasm.

Whilst this abortive struggle was going forward in the centre, the diversion essayed in Flanders against Clairfayt completely succeeded. Souham and Moreau had departed from Lille and advanced on Menin and Courtray on the 7th of Floreal (26th April). These two towns are situated, the reader is aware, one below the other, on the Lys. Moreau invested the first, Souham seized on the second. Clairfayt, deceived respecting the march of the French, went in quest of them where they were not to be found. He was speedily apprised, however, of the investment of Menin and the capture of Courtray, and he then determined to make the French retrograde by menacing their communications with Lille. On the 9th Floreal (28th April), accordingly, he moved to Mouscron with 18,000 men, and thus imprudently exposed himself to the onslaught of 50,000 French, who could easily have crushed him by recoiling. Moreau and Souham, immediately recalling a part of their troops towards the threatened communications, marched on Mouscron, and resolved upon giving battle to Clairfayt. He was intrenched on a position which could be reached only through five narrow defiles, defended by a formidable artillery. On the 10th Floreal (29th April) the attack was ordered. The young recruits, of whom the greater part witnessed an enemy's fire for the first time, gave way before it; but the generals and the officers exerted the most heroic efforts to rally them, succeeded, and the positions were carried. Clairfayt lost twelve hundred prisoners, of whom eighty-four were officers, thirty-three pieces of ordnance, four standards, and five hundred muskets. This was the first victory in the north, and it tended greatly to heighten the courage of the French army. Menin was taken immediately after. A division of emigrants, entrapped within the walls, bravely saved itself by cutting an outlet sword in hand.

The success of the left, and the discomfiture of the centre, induced Pichegru and Carnot to abandon the centre altogether, and to act exclusively on the wings. Pichegru detached General Bonnaud with 20,000 men to Sainghien, near Lille, in order to assure the communications with Moreau and Souham. He left at Guise only 20,000 men under the orders of General Ferrand, and dispatched the rest towards Maubeuge, to join the division of Desjardins and Charbonnier. These united forces increased to 56,000 men the right wing destined to act on the Sambre. Carnot, judging more correctly than Pichegru the situation of affairs, issued an order which decided the fate of the campaign. Beginning to perceive that the point on which the allies ought to be assailed was the Sambre and the Meuse, and that, if defeated on that line, they would be separated from their base, he directed Jourdan to draw 15,000 men from the army of the Rhine, to leave on the western slope of the Vosges such force as was necessary to cover that frontier, then to quit the Moselle with 45,000 men, and advance to the Sambre by forced marches. The army under Jourdan, when united with that of Maubeuge, would form a mass of 90,000 or 100,000 men, and ensure the repulse of the allies on the decisive point. This order, the most sagacious of the campaign, and to which all its results must be attributed, was transmitted on the 11th Floreal (30th April) from the cabinet of the committee of public welfare.

Meanwhile, Cobourg had taken Landrecies. Undervaluing the defeat of Clairfayt, he contented himself with detaching the Duke of York to Lamain, between Tournay and Lille.

Clairfayt had moved into West Flanders, between the advanced left of the French and the sea, whereby he was still farther removed than before from the grand army and the succours brought him by the Duke of York. The French, extending from Lille to Menin and Courtray, composed an advanced column in Flanders; Clairfayt, stationed at Thielt, rested between the sea and that column; and the Duke of York, posted at Lamain, before Tournay, was between that column and the grand allied mass. Clairfayt determined to risk an attempt on Courtray, and marched to attack it on the 21st Floreal (10th May).

Souham was at this moment to the rear of Courtray. He promptly completed his arrangements, returned into the town to the aid of Vandamme, and, whilst preparing for a sally, detached Macdonald and Malbranck on Menin, with orders to pass the Lys and turn Clairfayt. The battle was fought on the 22d Floreal (11th May). Clairfayt had made admirable dispositions on the Bruges highway and in the suburbs; but the French conscripts intrepidly braved the fire from the houses and the batteries, and after a fierce encounter, compelled Clairfayt to retire. Four thousand men on both sides covered the field of battle; and if, instead of turning the enemy on the side of Menin, the French had turned him on the opposite quarter, they would unquestionably have cut off his retreat on Flanders.

This was the second defeat Clairfayt had sustained in contest with the left wing of the French. Their right wing on the Sambre was not equally fortunate. Commanded by several generals, who deliberated in councils of war with the representatives, Saint-Just and Lebas, it was not under such efficient direction as the two divisions led by Souham and Moreau. Kléber and Marceau, who had been transferred thither from La Vendée, might have conducted it to victory, but their opinions were little heeded. The movement prescribed for this right wing consisted in passing the Sambre, in order to advance on Mons. A first passage was attempted on the 20th Floreal (9th May), but the necessary dispositions not having been made on the opposite bank, the army was unable to maintain itself, and was obliged to repass the Sambre in disorder. On the 22d, Saint-Just insisted upon making a renewed effort, notwithstanding the failure of the first. It would have been more consistent with prudence to await the arrival of Jourdan, who, with his 45,000 men, promised to render the success of the right wing infallible. But Saint-Just would hear neither of hesitation nor delay, and implicit obedience to the fiats of the terrible pro-consul was imperative. The second endeavour to pass was equally abortive. The army certainly cleared the barrier of the Sambre for the second time; but, being again attacked on the other bank, before it could securely establish itself, it would have been utterly destroyed, had not the intrepidity of Marceau and the firmness of Kléber interposed to save it.

Thus, for a whole month, the hostile armies had contended on a field stretching from Maubeuge to the shores of the ocean, with incredible fury, but without any decisive success. The French had been victorious on the left, discomfited on the right; but in the interim their soldiers were becoming inured to action, and the bold and skilful movement prescribed to Jourdan was preparing the way for great results.

The plan originally formed by Mack could not be carried into execution. The Prussian general, Moellendorf, refused to march on the Sambre, alleging that he had no orders from his court. The English diplomatists had departed to exact explanations from the Prussian cabinet respecting the treaty of the Hague, and, meanwhile, Cobourg, menaced on one of his wings, had been constrained to dissolve his centre after the example of Pichegru. He had reinforced Kaunitz on the Sambre, and moved the bulk of his army towards Flanders to the environs of Tournay. A decisive engagement, therefore, was to be expected on the left, as the moment drew near when large masses must come in contact, and necessarily be embroiled.

At this time a project was propounded at the Austrian head-quarters, designated by its originators as "*the plan of destruction*," the ultimate aim of which was to cut off the French army from Lille, envelope it, and thus annihilate it. Such an operation was doubtless possible, for the allies could bring nearly 100,000 men to bear upon 70,000, but the dispositions they made to effect their purpose were somewhat singular. The French were still distributed in the following manner:—Souham and Moreau at Menin and Courtray, with 50,000 men; and Bonnaud in the vicinity of Lille, with 20,000. The allies were parcelled on the two flanks of this advanced line; Clairfayt's division to the left in West Flanders, the mass of the allies to the right towards Tournay. In this state of things, the allies resolved to make a concentric effort on Turcoing, which interposes between Menin and Courtray and Lille. Cairfayt was to march thither from West Flanders, passing by Werwick and Linselles. The generals, Von Busch, Otto, and the Duke of York, had orders to proceed thither from the opposite quarter, that is to say, from Tournay. Von Busch was directed specifically on Mouscron, Otto on Turcoing itself; and the Duke of York, pushing forward to Roubaix and Mouveaux, was to combine with Clairfayt. By this last junction, Souham and Moreau would be cut off from Lille. General Kinsky and the Archduke Charles were charged, with two strong columns, to drive Bonnaud into Lille. These dispositions, to succeed, required a combination in the movements practically impossible. The majority of these corps, be it observed, had to start from points far asunder, and Clairfayt had to penetrate through the French army.

It was fixed that these operations should be executed on the 28th Floreal (17th May). Pichegru had repaired at this critical moment to the right wing on the Sambre, in order to remedy the disasters that portion of the army had recently encountered. Souham and Moreau commanded the French in his absence. The first signal of the allies' designs was given them by Clairfayt's march on Werwick. They instantly moved in that direction; but, on learning that the mass of the enemy was arriving on the opposite quarter, and threatening their communications, they took a prompt and judicious resolution, namely, to hasten on Turcoing, and secure that important position between Menin and Lille. Moreau remained with Vandamme's division in front of Clairfayt to impede his progress, and Souham marched on Turcoing with 45,000 men. The communications with Lille not being yet interrupted, orders could be transmitted to Bonnaud requiring him likewise to advance upon Turcoing, and to make a strenuous effort to preserve the communication of that position with Lille. The foresight of the French generals was justified by the event. Clairfayt could struggle onwards but slowly; retarded at Werwick, he failed to reach Linselles on the day assigned. General Von Busch had at first possessed himself of Mouscron, but he had afterwards experienced a slight check, and Otto, having weakened himself to succour him, remained in insufficient force at Turcoing. The Duke of York had advanced to Roubaix and Mouveaux without meeting Clairfayt as he expected, and without being able to effect the intended junction. Finally, Kinsky and the Archduke Charles only arrived near Lille late in the evening of the 28th (17th May). The following morning, the 29th, Souham pushed rapidly on Turcoing, overcame all opposition, and secured that important position. On his side, Bonnaud, marching from Lille on the Duke of York, whose province it was to plant himself between that city and Turcoing, found him scattered on an extended line. The English, although taken by surprise, attempted to resist, but the Gallic conscripts, charging with impetuosity, obliged them to recoil, and eventually to fly, throwing away their arms. The rout was so complete, that the Duke of York, scouring the plain at full gallop, owed his safety to the fleetness of his steed alone. From that moment general confusion ensued amongst the allies, and the Emperor of Germany had the mortification to behold, from the heights of Templeuve, his whole army in full retreat. During these events, the Archduke Charles, from defective information, and the difficulties of his position, had remained inactive

below Lille, and Clairfayt, being stopped towards the Lys, had been compelled to retire. Such was the issue of this "*plan of destruction.*" It bestowed on the French several thousands of prisoners, a vast quantity of warlike stores, and the renown of a great victory obtained with seventy thousand men over nearly one hundred thousand.

Pichegru arrived after the battle was won. All the allied divisions fell back on Tournay, and Clairfayt, regaining Flanders, took up his old position at Thielt. Pichegru turned this signal victory to wretched account. The allies had settled round Tournay, having their right supported on the Scheldt. The French general was seized with the whim of capturing certain supplies of forage ascending the Scheldt, and, in the prosecution of this puerile design, he drew the whole army into the hazard of an engagement. Moving towards the river, he pressed on the allies in their semicircular position of Tournay. In a short while all his corps found themselves successively embroiled on this semicircle. A most determined action was fought at Pont-à-Chin, along the banks of the Scheldt. For twelve hours a frightful carnage went on, without any possible result of moment. Seven or eight thousand men perished on both sides. The French army recoiled after having burnt a few boats, and with the partial forfeiture of that ascendancy secured to it by the battle of Turcoing.

However, the French could justly deem themselves victorious in Flanders, and the necessity imposed on Cobourg of detaching reinforcements to other points, afterwards rendered their superiority more decided. On the Sambre, Saint-Just had resolved to attempt a third passage, and to invest Charleroi; but Kaunitz, strongly reinforced, had raised the siege at the moment when, auspiciously enough, Jourdan appeared with the entire army of the Moselle. Thenceforth 90,000 men were to act on this the veritable line of operations, and to terminate the hesitations of fortune.

On the Rhine nothing important had occurred, save only, that General Moellendorf, profiting by the diminution of the French forces in that quarter, had carried the post of Kayserslautern, but had relapsed into inaction after that achievement.

Thus, up to the month of Prairial [end of May], over the wide expanse of the northern frontier, the French had not only resisted the coalition, but triumphed over it in several encounters; they had gained one important victory, and advanced on two wings into Flanders, and to the Sambre. The loss of Landrecies was insignificant when balanced with such advantages, and, above all, with those their present position insured them.

The war of La Vendée had not entirely ceased with the disaster of Savenay. Three chiefs had effected their escape, Larochejacquelein, Stofflet, and Marigny. Besides these three leaders, Charette, who, instead of passing the Loire, had seized upon the isle of Noirmoutiers, still remained in Lower Vendée. But the war had sunk into a mere series of skirmishes, and no longer gave disquietude to the republic. General Turreau had received the command of the west. He had divided the disposable army into moveable columns which scoured the country, concentrically advancing at the same time on one point. These columns hunted down the fugitive bands, and, when they were not to be found, they put in execution the decree of the convention, that is to say, burnt the forests and the villages, and ejected the population to be transported elsewhere. Several engagements had taken place, but without producing any important consequences. Haxo, after recapturing from Charette the isles of Noirmoutiers and Bouin, had, upon various occasions, nearly succeeded in taking him prisoner; but that daring partisan always escaped him, and quickly reappeared on the scene of strife with a determination equal to his address. The war itself was little more than a war of devastation. General Turreau was constrained to adopt a most cruel measure, namely, to publish an order warning the inhabitants of the hamlets to leave the country, under pain of being treated as enemies if they remained. This notification compelled them either to quit the soil whence they drew all their means of existence, or to suffer the horrors of military execution. Such are the peculiar evils of civil wars.

Brittany had become the theatre of a new species of war, that of the Chouans. That province had formerly evinced a disposition to imitate La Vendée, but the tendency to insurrection was not so general, and individuals merely, profiting by the nature of the country, had given way to predatory habits. The wrecks of the Vendéan column which had passed into Brittany subsequently swelled the number of these partisans. Their principal rendezvous was in the forest of Perche, and they traversed the province in troops of forty or fifty, sometimes attacking the gendarmerie, levying contributions on the petty communes, and committing other disorders in the name of the royal and catholic cause. But the veritable war was finished, and the only uneasiness that survived arose from those unfortunate districts being still afflicted with such deplorable calamities.

In the French colonies and at sea, the war raged with not less fury than on the continent of Europe. The rich settlement of St Domingo had been the scene of a more horrible catastrophe than any recorded in history. The white population had embraced with enthusiasm the cause of the revolution, which, as they imagined, would lead to their independence of the mother-country. The mulattoes had embraced it with equal ardour, but they anticipated other results than the independence of the colony, and aspired to the rights of citizenship, from which they had been hitherto excluded. The Constituent Assembly had recognised the rights of the mulattoes; but the whites, who desired the revolution only for themselves, had raised the standard of revolt, and a civil war had commenced between the old race of the privileged and the freedmen. Taking advantage of this contest, the negroes had appeared on the scene in their turn, and announced their rising by fire and blood. They had massacred their masters and burnt their plantations. From that moment the colony became a prey to the most dreadful confusion; each party reproached the other with instigating the new enemies who had appeared, and with giving them arms. The negroes, without yet declaring for any cause, ravaged the country. Shortly, however, incited by the emissaries of the Spanish party, they pretended to serve the royal cause. To augment the disorder, the English had interfered. Part of the whites had invoked their aid in a moment of danger, and yielded to them the important fortress of Saint-Nicholas. The commissioner Santhonax, assisted by the mulattoes and a portion of the whites, resisted the invasion of the English, and ultimately perceived no other mode of repelling it than that of acknowledging the freedom of the negroes who should declare for the republic. The convention had confirmed this measure, and proclaimed by a decree all the negroes free. Thereupon, a portion of them, who advocated the royal cause, went over to the republicans; and the English, intrenched in the fortress of Saint-Nicholas, lost all hope of acquiring the possession of St Domingo, which, after a long course of desolation, was finally destined to fall under its own self-governance. Guadaloupe, after being captured and recaptured, had eventually remained to the French, but Martinique was definitively lost.

Such was the state of the colonies. On the sea, an important event had occurred, namely, the arrival of that convoy from America which had been so long expected in the French ports. The Brest squadron, numbering thirty sail, had left the harbour, as we have stated, with orders to cruise, but to avoid an engagement, unless the safety of the convoy imperiously demanded such a risk. Jean-Bon-Saint-André was on

board the admiral's ship; and, as we have related, Villaret-Joyeuse had been promoted from the rank of captain to the command of the squadron; peasants who had never beheld the sea, had been transformed into mariners, and these officers and sailors of a day had been sent forth to contend with the veteran English navy. Admiral Villaret-Joyeuse weighed anchor on the 1st Prairial (20th May), and made sail towards the islands of Coves and Flores, there to await the convoy. He captured on the way several English commercial vessels, the captains whereof said to him, "You have taken us in detail, but Admiral Howe will take you in the aggregate." In sooth, that admiral was cruising along the coasts of Brittany and Normandy with thirty-three ships of the line and twelve frigates. On the 9th Prairial (28th May) the French squadron descried a fleet. The crews eagerly gazed on the horizon as the dark masses rose to view; and when they recognised the English, they uttered shouts of enthusiasm, and demanded the signal of battle with that patriotic ardour which has always distinguished the inhabitants of the French maritime provinces. Although the instructions given to the admiral authorised him to engage only in case the convoy was in jeopardy, Jean-Bon-Saint-André, himself impelled by the general enthusiasm, consented to offer battle, and allowed the necessary orders for that purpose to be given. Towards evening, a vessel of the rearguard, *Le Revolutionnaire*, which had slackened sail, fell foul of the English, made an obstinate resistance, lost its captain, and was obliged to be towed into Rochefort. The night prevented the action from becoming general.

The following day, the 29th May, the sun displayed the two squadrons drawn up in hostile array. The English admiral manœuvred against the French rearguard. The movement made by the French to protect it, brought on a general engagement. They, failing to manœuvre as well as their opponents, two of their vessels, *L'Indomptable* and *Le Tyrannicide*, were exposed to the attack of a superior force, but fought with the most determined courage. Villaret-Joyeuse gave the signal to succour these ships; but his orders being either misunderstood or badly executed, he advanced alone at the hazard of not being followed. Shortly, however, his example was imitated; the whole French squadron bore down on the enemy, and obliged him to retire. Unluckily, the advantage of the wind was lost; the French kept up a terrible cannonade on the English, but they were unable to pursue them. The two threatened vessels and the field of battle, at all events, remained to cheer them.

On the 30th and 31st May, a thick mist enveloped the two armaments. The French strove to draw the English to the north and west of the course the convoy was likely to take. On the 1st June (13th Prairial) the mist evaporated, and a brilliant sun gleamed upon the two fleets. The French had only twenty-six sail of the line, whereas their enemies had thirty-six. The crews again demanded to be led to combat; and it was judged expedient to gratify their ardour, in order to occupy the English, and to remove them from the course of the convoy, which lay directly over the battle-ground of the 29th May.

The battle, one of the most memorable in naval warfare, began at nine in the morning. Admiral Howe advanced in order to cut the French line. A false manœuvre of the ship *La Montagne* allowed him to pierce it, separate the left wing, and direct upon it his whole force. The French right wing and vanguard remained isolated. The admiral did his utmost to rally them around him to bear down on the English squadron, but he had lost the advantage of the wind, and for the space of five hours was unable to near the field of battle. In the interim, the vessels engaged in the conflict fought with extraordinary heroism. The English, superior in the art of manœuvring, were more on a level with their opponents when matched ship to ship; and they encountered a formidable resistance both to their fire and to their attempts at boarding. In the height of the action, the French vessel *Le Vengeur*, dismasted, half destroyed, and almost ready to founder, refused to haul down its colours, even at the risk of being buried in the waves. The English were the first to cease firing, and they retired with astonishment at so determined a resistance. They carried off six of the French fleet. On the following day, Villaret-Joyeuse, having collected his vanguard and right wing, desired to fall upon them and reconquer their prizes. The English, being greatly damaged, would have perhaps yielded an easy victory. Jean-Bon-Saint-André, however, opposed the renewal of the battle, notwithstanding the ardour of the crews. The English were consequently enabled quietly to regain their ports. They returned home surprised at their victory, and impressed with admiration for the bravery of their inexperienced adversaries. At the same time, the main object of this terrible contest was accomplished. Admiral Venstabel had crossed, during the engagement of the 1st of June, the battle-field of the 29th May (10th Prairial), found it strewed with wrecks, and entered the French harbours in safety.

Thus, victorious on the Pyrenees and the Alps, formidable in the Low Countries, heroic at sea, and sufficiently powerful to dispute a naval victory with the English, the French commenced the campaign of 1794 in the most brilliant and glorious manner.

CHAPTER XXXIV.

DOMESTIC STATE OF FRANCE AT THE BEGINNING OF 1794.—POLITICAL PERSECUTIONS.—ATTEMPT TO ASSASSINATE ROBESPIERRE AND COLLOT D'HERBOIS.—DOMINATION OF ROBESPIERRE.—FESTIVAL TO THE SUPREME BEING.—EXECUTIONS AT PARIS AND ELSEWHERE.—DROWNINGS IN THE LOIRE.—RUPTURE IN THE COMMITTEE OF PUBLIC WELFARE, AND RETIREMENT OF ROBESPIERRE.

Whilst the republic was thus victorious externally, its domestic condition had ceased not to be one of suffering and violence. The evils that afflicted it were unchanged in character; their causes were still the assignats, the maximum, the scarcity of provisions, the law of the suspected, and the revolutionary tribunals.

The difficulties arising from the necessity of regulating all the transactions of commerce, had been constantly accumulating. It had been found indispensable to introduce frequent modifications into the law of the maximum; first, twine and rope had to be excepted from its provisions, and allowed ten per cent. above the scale of prices; then pins, cambrics, lawns, muslins, gauze, thread and silk lace, silk and silken stuffs. And whilst a variety of articles were thus imperatively excepted from the operation of the maximum, it became equally urgent to include others within its stringent purposes. Thus, the price of horses having risen to an excessive height, their value was, in obedience to the presumed exigency, fixed according to their size and breeding. From such expedients the same inconvenience always resulted: trade stagnated, the markets were unfrequented, or rather clandestine sales were effected, and authority was quite powerless against such consequences. If the government had, by means of assignats, been enabled to realise the value of the national domains, and by means of the maximum to convert assignats into a current and corresponding medium of exchange, it could have no mode of preventing the secretion of commodities, or their being withheld from purchasers. Accordingly, we find incessant complaints were raised against dealers for secluding themselves and their goods from the usual marts, or for closing their stores.

Less apprehension was felt this year, however, than

during the last, as to a deficiency of food. The convoys arrived from North America, and an abundant harvest, had provided a sufficient quantity of corn for the consumption of France. The committee, wielding administration in all details with equal vigour, had ordained that an account of the harvest should be taken under charge of the committee for supplies and provisions, and that an adequate portion of the grain should be forthwith threshed to meet the demand in the markets. Fears having been entertained lest the shearers, who were accustomed to migrate into the corn provinces, might exact high wages, the committee declared that all male and female citizens known to seek employment in harvest labour, were in forced requisition, and that their wages should be settled by the local authorities. Shortly thereafter, the journeymen bakers and butchers having struck work, the committee adopted a more general measure, and placed in requisition all operatives of every description engaged in the manipulation, the transport, and the sale of articles deemed of prime necessity.

The supply of meat was a subject attended with infinitely greater difficulty and anxiety. In Paris, especially, an extraordinary scarcity had long prevailed, and, since the time when the Hébertists had attempted to profit by that dearth to excite a commotion, the evil had progressively increased. It was eventually found necessary to place the inhabitants of Paris on rations. The commission for supplies and provisions fixed the daily consumption at 75 oxen, 150 hundredweight of veal and mutton, and 200 pigs. It procured the requisite number of animals, and sent them to the hospital of L'Humanité, which was assigned as the general and only authorised slaughter-house. The butchers nominated by each section repaired thither to obtain the carcasses apportioned to them, the amount whereof was regulated according to the population they had to serve. They were directed to distribute, every fifth day, half a pound of flesh per head to each family. In this arrangement, the tickets issued by the revolutionary committees for the purchase of bread, and which contained the number of individuals composing each family, were likewise to be used. To avoid tumults and long vigils, all resort to the shambles of the butchers before six in the morning was prohibited.

The insufficiency of these regulations was soon made manifest. As we have already stated, clandestine butcher-markets had been previously established, and now they became daily more numerous. Cattle no longer arrived at the markets of Neubourg, Poissy, and Sceaux; the country dealers forestalled them on the way, and even proceeded to the grazing farms in quest of them. Relying on the apathy of the rural communes in the execution of the law, those dealers sold above the maximum, and more plentifully supplied the inhabitants of the large towns, and particularly those of Paris, who were not contented with the half pound distributed every fifth day. In this manner the country butchers entirely engrossed the trade of their city brethren, whose occupation had dwindled into an occasional division of rations. Several of the latter, indeed, demanded a law enabling them to cancel their tenancies. Hence it became necessary to promulgate additional ordinances to prevent cattle from being intercepted in their progress to market, and proprietors of pasturage-lands were subjected to declarations and formalities extremely irksome and vexatious. Still more minute provisions had to be made for wants of a different character: wood and charcoal ceasing to arrive on account of the maximum, suspicions of regrating were engendered, and an inhibition was issued against any individual having in his possession more than four loads of wood and two loads of charcoal.

The new government met all the difficulties which entangled its career with extraordinary activity. Whilst framing these multifarious regulations, it was occupied with projects for reforming agriculture, and altering the law of landlord and tenant as to distraints on land, and for introducing improved modes of mixing soils, preparing artificial meadows, and rearing cattle. It decreed the formation of botanical gardens in all the departmental capitals, in order to naturalise exotic plants, create nurseries for all kinds of trees, and institute agricultural lectureships for the behoof, and adapted to the capacity, of farmers; it enjoined the general draining of marshes, upon a vast and well-conceived plan, determining that the state should make advances for so great an undertaking, and that the proprietors whose lands were drained and fertilised, should pay a tax, or surrender their ownership for a fixed equivalent; it invited all architects to present plans for building villages out of the ruins of lordly mansions; it ordered embellishments in the garden of the Tuileries, to render it more acceptable to the public; and, lastly, it called upon artists to submit a scheme for changing the opera-house into a covered arena, where the people might assemble in winter.

Thus, then, the government executed, or, at all events, essayed, almost every thing at once: so true it is that when much is to be performed, the greater is the capacity for effecting much. The state of the finances was not the least difficult or anxious of its cares. We have stated what methods were adopted in the month of August 1793 to restore the credit of assignats, by withdrawing them in part from circulation. The thousand millions abstracted by the forced loan, and the victories which terminated the campaign of 1793, enhanced them considerably, and, as we have already intimated, they nearly reached to par, from the effect of those terrible enactments which rendered the possession of specie so full of danger. However, that apparent prosperity was not of long continuance; the assignats had a speedy relapse, and the quantity of emissions ensured their accelerated decline. A portion of them certainly returned in the shape of purchase-money for the national domains, but to an amount quite insufficient to balance the issue. Yet these domains were sold above the valuation, which was not at all surprising, for the valuation had been calculated in money, and the payments were made in assignats; whereby it came to pass that the price was in reality far below, although in semblance much beyond, the estimate. Besides, that mode of absorbing assignats could not be otherwise than slow, whereas the emission was necessarily immense and prompt. Twelve hundred thousand men to pay and arm, parks of artillery to found, and a navy to construct, with a depreciated paper, required enormous quantities of the discredited medium, which, having become the sole available resource, and the mass of hypothecated property, moreover, being daily augmented by confiscations, was used resignedly to the full extent exigency demanded. The distinction between the ordinary and extraordinary exchequer was abrogated, the first of which had been set apart for the receipt of taxes, the latter for the creation of assignats. The two kinds of resources were confounded, and whenever the necessity arose, the revenue was eked out by fresh emissions. At the commencement of 1794 (year 2), the sum-total of issues had been doubled. Nearly four thousand millions had been added to the amount previously in existence, raising the whole to about eight thousand millions. Deducting the quantity returned and burned, and the stock not yet disbursed, there remained in actual circulation five thousand five hundred and thirty-six millions (two hundred and thirty millions sterling). In Messidor, year 2 (June 1794), the convention decreed the fabrication of an additional thousand millions (forty-two millions sterling) of assignats, in values varying from 1000 francs (£41, 13s. 4d.) to 15 sous (7½d). The finance committee, furthermore, had again recourse to a forced loan on the rich. The lists of the previous year were

made use of, and on those who were therein enrolled, was levied an extraordinary war contribution to the amount of one-tenth of the former loan, that is to say, one hundred millions. That sum was imposed upon them not as an advance to be reimbursed, but as an impost to be paid by them without return.

To complete the institution of the great book, and the project of rendering the public debt uniform, it remained to *capitalise* the annuities and convert them into an *inscription*. These annuities, of every kind and form, gave rise to the most complicated jobbing; like the old obligations on the state, they had the inconvenience of resting on a royal title, and obtaining a marked preference over the republican engagements; for it was constantly repeated, that if the republic consented to pay the debts of the monarchy, the monarchy would refuse to acknowledge those of the republic. Cambon, therefore, consummated his great work, the regeneration of the debt, by proposing and carrying the law which capitalised the annuities; it provided, also, that the documents of title should be delivered up by the notaries, and afterwards burned, according to the plan adopted with regard to the old obligations. The capital originally advanced by the annuitant was converted into an inscription, and charged with a perpetual interest of five per cent. instead of a life-annuity. At the same time, out of regard for the aged and poorer recipients, who had hoped to double their incomes by purchasing annuities, moderate claims were allowed to their full extent, with reference to the age of the individuals. Thus, persons between forty and fifty years old were left to enjoy annuities ranging from 1500 to 2000 francs; those between fifty and sixty, annuities ranging from 3000 to 4000 francs; and so on to the age of one hundred, and to the amount of 10,500 francs. If the annuitant comprehended in any of these classes were entitled to draw a sum exceeding the prescribed rate, the surplus was capitalised. It was barely possible to have evinced greater consideration for old age and small fortunes than did the legislature in this instance; yet it is a fact that scarcely any law gave rise to more bitter complaints and remonstrances, and the convention encountered, for this measure, so fraught with wisdom and humanity, a higher degree of censure than for all the other measures which daily signalised its terrible dictatorship. The stock-brokers were incensed because the decree required, for the substantiation of claims, certificates of existence. The holders of emigrants' bonds could not easily procure such certificates; hence the brokers, who were affected by this condition, raised a prodigious clamour in the name of the old and the infirm, and exclaimed that neither age nor poverty was respected. They attempted to persuade the annuitants, moreover, that they would not be paid, as the operation and the formalities it enjoined must lead to interminable delays; which, however, was not the case. Cambon introduced certain modifications into the decree, and by dint of unremitting superintendence at the office of the exchequer, hurried the work to completion with the utmost promptitude. The claimants, who were not mere jobbers on the investments of others, but lived on their own legitimate incomes, were immediately satisfied; and, as Barrère stated, instead of awaiting their turn for payment in open courts, exposed to the intemperature of the weather, they attended in the warm and sheltered apartments of the exchequer.

Accompanying these beneficial reforms, the course of cruelty swept on more impetuously than ever. The law expelling ex-nobles from Paris and all fortified and maritime towns, occasioned infinite distress. Now, that nobility was a calamitous appendage, it had become equally difficult to distinguish genuine nobles as in the days when it was an esteemed privilege. Plebeian females married to nobles, and left in widowhood, purchasers of offices who had assumed aristocratic designations, claimed to be exempted from a distinction they had once eagerly coveted. Consequently, that enactment afforded boundless scope for arbitrary treatment and tyrannical vexations.

The representatives on missions exercised their authority with extreme rigour, and some amongst them gave way to extravagant and monstrous cruelties. At Paris, the prisons were daily more crowded with captives. The committee of general safety had instituted a police which carried terror into every quarter. The chief thereof was a man named Héron, who had under his direction a swarm of agents fully worthy of such a leader. They were, as their usual title intimated, *order-bearers* from the committees. Certain of them performed the functions of spies; others, furnished with secret orders, often even with blank orders, prowled around to make arrests both in Paris and in the departments. An allowance was granted them for each such enterprise, and they exacted money from the prisoners besides, thus aggravating cruelty by rapine. All the adventurers disbanded from the revolutionary army, and dismissed from the ministry of Bouchotte, had passed into this new occupation, and become more formidable than before. They crept in every where, into theatres, coffee-houses, and public promenades; the dread of being marked or overheard by one of these inquisitors weighed on every mind. Through their instrumentality the number of the "suspected" had swelled in Paris alone to seven or eight thousand. The prisons no longer presented the same scenes as heretofore; the spectacle was no longer witnessed of the wealthy contributing for the poor, or of men differing widely in opinions and ranks leading a comparatively agreeable life upon an expenditure in common, and mitigating the rigours of captivity by recreations in the arts. That system had been deemed too lenient for those who were stigmatised as aristocrats; malignant assertions had been propagated that luxury and abundance reigned with the suspected, whilst the people were reduced to rations, and that the rich prisoners amused themselves by wasting provisions which might have served to feed the indigent patriots; wherefore it had been determined that the prison discipline should be altered. Accordingly, general refectories and tables were established; at fixed hours, and in large rooms, a detestable and unwholesome regimen was administered to the immured, for which they were, furthermore, dearly charged. The privilege of buying food in lieu of that they were unable to eat, was entirely abrogated. Moreover, their persons were searched, and their assignats abstracted, whereby any possibility of procuring alleviations was debarred. Finally, the liberty of enjoying intercourse amongst themselves was denied, and to the afflictions of solitary confinement were added the terrors of sudden death, for the thirst of blood was hourly becoming more urgent and insatiate. The revolutionary tribunal had begun, since the trial of the Hébertists and Dantonists, to immolate victims in bands of twenty at a time. It had condemned the Malesherbes family and its kinsmen, to the number of fifteen or twenty persons. The venerable head of that house had proceeded to execution with the serenity and cheerfulness of a sage. Making a false step as he walked to the scaffold, he had exclaimed, "That false step is of bad augury; a Roman would have returned home." The Malesherbes had been followed by twenty-two members of the parliament. Almost the entire parliament of Toulouse was exterminated. Lastly, the farmers-general had been recently brought to trial on account of their old contracts with the royal treasury. Proof was adduced that these contracts contained stipulations onerous to the state, and the revolutionary tribunal sent them to the guillotine for by-past exactions on tobacco, salt, &c. Amongst the number was a man illustrious in the annals of science, the chemist Lavoisier, who in vain solicited a few days' reprieve to digest a discovery.

The impulse was given; administering, fighting,

and slaughtering, proceeded in fearful combination. The committees, planted in the centre, distinguished their sway by an uniform uninterrupted vigour. The convention, still awed to silence, granted pensions to the widows and children of soldiers who had died for their country, reviewed judgments pronounced by the tribunals, explained decrees, regulated the exchange of sundry parcels of the domains, and, in short, attended to affairs of a trifling and purely accessory nature. Barrère appeared before it almost daily to recite accounts of victories. He usually styled these reports *carmagnoles*. At the end of each month he intimated, for the sake of form, that the powers of the committees had expired, and that they needed renewal. On such occasions he was answered, with applauding shouts, that the committees had merely to prosecute their patriotic labours. Sometimes, indeed, he omitted the formality, without his negligence affecting the authority of the committees.

It is during such periods, marked by an universal absolute submission, that exacerbated minds revolt, and that despotism has most to dread the stroke of the assassin. There was then at Paris a man employed as an attendant at the national lottery office, who had formerly been in the service of several eminent families, and who was actuated with a deadly hatred against the existing system of things. He was fifty years of age, and called Ladmiral. He had formed the design of assassinating one of the most influential members of the committee of public welfare, Robespierre or Collot-d'Herbois. For some time he had resided in the same house as Collot-d'Herbois, in the street Favart, still hesitating between Collot and Robespierre. On the 3d Prairial (22d May), having then determined to select Robespierre, he repaired to the committee of public welfare, and waited the whole day in the gallery leading to the room in which the committee sat. Failing to encounter his intended victim, he returned home, and stationed himself on the staircase, with the view of smiting Collot-d'Herbois. Towards midnight Collot entered, and, as he was ascending the stairs, Ladmiral snapped a pistol at his head. The pistol missed fire. Ladmiral presented it a second time, and the weapon again defeated his design. A third time he repeated the trial, when at length the charge went off, but merely lodged in the wall. A struggle immediately ensued. Collot-d'Herbois uttered vehement shouts of "murder!" Fortunately for him, a body of patrol was passing in the street, who hastened towards the noise. Ladmiral took to flight, mounted to his apartment, and barricaded the door. The patrol followed him, and attempted to force an entrance. He gave warning that he was armed, and would fire on any who should venture to present themselves. The menace was disregarded by the patrol. The door was broken in; a locksmith, named Geffroy, led the way into the room, and received a musket shot which almost mortally wounded him. Ladmiral was instantly arrested and conducted to prison. Being interrogated by Fouquier-Tinville, he recounted the particulars of his life, and avowed his purpose, detailing the attempts he had made to dispatch Robespierre before assailing Collot-d'Herbois. He was asked who had urged him to commit the crime. He replied with firmness that it was not a crime, but a service he had desired to render his country; that he alone had conceived the project without any foreign suggestion; and that his only regret arose from his failure in the execution.

The report of this attack circulated with rapidity; and, according to custom, it tended to strengthen the power of those against whom it was directed. Barrère hastened to the convention the following day, the 4th Prairial, to render an account of this new machination of Pitt. "The internal factions," he said, "have never ceased to correspond with that government, the trafficker in coalitions, the suborner of assassinations, which pursues liberty as its greatest enemy. Whilst we make justice and virtue the order of the day, the allied tyrants make crime and assassination the order of the day. On all sides you encounter the fatal genius of the Englishman; in our markets, in our purchases, on the seas, on the continent, in the petty courts of Europe, and in our cities. The same head directed the hands which murdered Basseville in Rome, the French sailors in the port of Genoa, the faithful Frenchmen in Corsica; the same head directed the knife against Lepelletier and Marat, the guillotine against Chalier, and the pistol against Collot d'Herbois." Barrère produced letters from London and Holland, which had been intercepted, announcing that the designs of Pitt were levelled at the committees, and particularly at Robespierre. One of these letters stated in substance, "We greatly dread the influence of Robespierre. The more the French republican government is concentrated, the greater will be its force, and the more difficult to subvert."

This manner of presenting the facts was eminently fitted to excite a lively interest in favour of the committees, and especially of Robespierre, and to identify their preservation with that of the republic. Barrère subsequently related the event in all its details, commended the "*affecting zeal*" shown by the constituted authorities in protecting the national representation, and extolled in hyperbolical terms the conduct of citizen Geffroy, who had received a dangerous wound in seizing the assassin. The convention greeted Barrère's report with loud acclamations; it ordered rigorous inquiries to ascertain whether Ladmiral had accomplices or not, passed a vote of thanks to citizen Geffroy, and directed, as a means of compensating him for his sufferings, that the bulletin of his health should be daily read from the tribune. Couthon afterwards delivered a furious harangue in support of a motion that Barrère's report should be translated into all languages, and disseminated in all lands. "Pitt, Cobourg, and all ye base and petty tyrants," he exclaimed, "who regard the world as your heritage, and who, in the last moments of your agony, are struggling with such desperation, whet—whet your daggers; we contemn you too much to fear you, and you know well we are too noble to imitate you!" The hall resounded with plaudits. Couthon subjoined—"But the law, whose reign terrifies you, has its sword suspended over your heads; it will smite you all! The human race has need of such an example, and the heaven whom you outrage has ordained it!"

At this instant Collot-d'Herbois entered, doubtless to enjoy the flattering notice of the assembly. He was hailed with enthusiastic transports, which almost drowned his voice when he essayed to speak. Robespierre, infinitely more astute, abstained at the moment from any public appearance, and seemed to shun the incense awaiting him.

During that same day, a young female, by name Cecile Renault, knocked at Robespierre's door with a packet under her arm. She requested to see him, and urgently insisted upon being introduced to his presence, alleging that a public functionary ought always to receive with alacrity those who demanded an interview, and even heaping reproaches on the Duplaix, in whose house Robespierre dwelt, when they declined to admit her. The girl's earnestness and strange manner created suspicions: she was seized and delivered to the police. Her parcel was opened, and found to contain raiment and two knives. The deduction was instantaneous that she had intended to assassinate Robespierre. She underwent an interrogatory, wherein she displayed equal assurance with Ladmiral. To the inquiry, what she wanted with Robespierre, she replied, her object was to see how a tyrant was made. More closely pressed, questioned as to the packet and its contents, she stated she had entertained no design of using the knives, and had provided herself with the clothes because she expected to be conveyed to prison, and from the prison to the

guillotine. She added, she was a royalist, as she preferred one king to fifty thousand. Being further examined, and harassed with additional questions, she refused to answer, and demanded to be led to the scaffold.

The proofs were held sufficient to establish the conclusion that the girl Renault was one of the assassins employed against Robespierre. The belief was corroborated by another incident. At Choisy-sur-Seine, a citizen seated in a coffee-room chanced to narrate the circumstances of the attempt on Collot-d'Herbois' life, and to express his joy that it had not succeeded. A monk named Saintonax, who listened to the recital, remarked, that it was unfortunate these miscreants in the committee had escaped, but that sooner or later they would be struck, as he hoped. The man was forthwith pinioned, and removed the same night to Paris. No doubt could now exist, had there been any previous sceptics, that the plot had vast ramifications; assertions were confidently made that a band of assassins was already marshalled, intent upon their project; the members of the committee were assiduously surrounded, and entreated to be careful of themselves, to preserve lives so precious to the country. The sections assembled, and once more sent deputations and addresses to the convention. They averred, that amid all the miracles vouchsafed by Providence in favour of the republic, the recent escape of Robespierre and Collot-d'Herbois from the designs of assassins was the most signal. One of them even proposed to furnish a guard of twenty-five men to watch over the safety of the members of the committee.

On the second day afterwards occurred the usual meeting of the Jacobins. Robespierre and Collot-d'Herbois repaired to the club, and were received with a delirium of enthusiasm. When power has succeeded in enforcing universal submission, it has merely to allow abject minds to follow their innate tendencies, for such hasten of their own accord to rivet the chains of thraldom, and prostitute divine honours to the idol of the day. Robespierre and Collot-d'Herbois were viewed with eager curiosity. "Behold these precious men," exclaimed an orator; "the God of freemen has saved them; he has covered them with his shield, and preserved them to the republic! They must be made to partake the honours France has decerned to the martyrs of liberty; she will thus have the satisfaction of honouring them, without having to mourn over their funeral urn." *

Collot first rose to speak, with his accustomed impetuosity, and affirmed that the emotion he felt at the moment proved to him how sweet it was to serve his country, even at the hazard of the direst peril. "I gather this truth," he said, "that he who has incurred some danger for his country derives fresh strength from the fraternal interest he inspires. Those kindly cheers are a new bond of union amongst strong minds. The tyrants, reduced to the last gasp, and perceiving their end approach, strive in vain to employ daggers, poison, snares: the republicans are not to be intimidated. Are these tyrants not aware, that when a patriot expires beneath their blows, it is on his tomb that the patriots who survive him swear vengeance for the crime, and obtest the eternity of liberty?"

Collot concluded amidst vociferous applause. Bentabolle moved that the president give Collot and Robespierre the fraternal embrace in the name of the whole society. Legendre, with the zeal of a man who had been Danton's friend, and was obliged to efface that recollection by odious sycophancy, asserted, "that the hand of crime had been raised to smite virtue, but that the God of nature had interposed to prevent the accomplishment of the enormity." He urged the citizens to form a guard around the members of the committee, and offered himself as the first to watch over their inestimable lives. At this instant, certain sections craved admittance into the hall; an extraordinary eagerness was evinced by them, but the crowd within the precincts was so great, that the favour could not be granted, and they had to content themselves with clustering around the doorways.

Here the committee was offered the insignia of sovereign power at an admirable moment for rejecting them. Sagacious leaders will be satisfied to provoke the tender, and reap the merit of a refusal. The members of the committee present at the sitting combated the proposition of assigning them guards with well-feigned indignation. Couthon hurried to the tribune. "He was astonished," he said, "at the suggestion which had just been propounded to the Jacobin Club, and which had already been submitted to the convention. He was disposed, unquestionably, to attribute it to the purest motives; but it was only despots who surrounded themselves with guards, and the members of the committee had no wish to be assimilated with despots. They had no need of guards to defend them. Virtue, the confidence of the people, and Providence, watched over their days; they wanted no other guarantees for their safety. Moreover, they would always know how to die at their posts and for the cause of liberty."

Legendre essayed to justify his proposition. He asserted that he had not intended precisely to give an organised guard to the members of the committee, but merely to urge all good citizens to watch over their lives; that his motives were pure, but that if he had been misled, he was willing to retract. Robespierre succeeded him in the tribune, his first appearance therein since the recent occurrences. Vehement plaudits broke from the assembly, and long continued to resound: ultimately, silence was restored, and Robespierre permitted to proceed. "I am one of those," he said, "whom the events that have lately passed necessarily interest in a very remote degree, but I cannot prevent myself from making a few reflections. Let the champions of liberty be marks for the poniards of tyranny; it is to be expected! I said long ago, if we discomfit our enemies, if we foil the factions, we shall be assassinated. What I foresaw has happened; the tyrants' soldiers have bitten the dust, the traitors have perished on the scaffold, and daggers have been pointed against us. I know not what impression these events may have made on you, but I will avow what they have produced on me. I have felt that it was more easy to murder us than to subdue our principles and vanquish our armies. I have thought within myself, that the more uncertain and precarious may be the life of the people's defenders, the more zealously should they labour to consume their last days in actions beneficial to liberty. I, who believe not in the necessity of living, but simply in virtue and in Providence, find myself occupying a position in which the assassins unquestionably had no desire to place me; I feel myself more independent than ever of the iniquity of men. The crimes of tyrants and the blades of assassins have rendered me more free to act, more redoubtable against the enemies of the people; my soul is more eager than ever to grapple with traitors, and tear from them the mask they have dared to assume. Frenchmen, friends of equality, trust us to employ the short existence vouchsafed us by Providence in combating the enemies who encompass us!" Redoubled acclamations were elicited by this harangue, and from all parts of the hall effusions of rapture were lavished. After enjoying this enthusiasm for a while, Robespierre again raised his voice to controvert a member of the society who had moved that civic honours be paid to Geffroy. He classed this motion with the one submitted for giving guards to the members of the committees, and maintained that such motions were designed to excite envy and obloquy against the government, by loading it with superfluous honours. In consequence whereof he proposed, and the society ratified, a sentence of expulsion

* See the sitting of the Jacobins on the 6th Prairial.

upon the individual who had advocated civic honours for Geffroy.

From the height of power it had attained, prudence warned the committee to discard all outward symbols of sovereignty. It wielded an absolute dictatorship, but the fact must not be made too palpable; all the trappings and pomp of power could only tend to endanger its stability. An ambitious soldier, raised to supremacy by his sword, and coveting a throne, hastens to invest his authority with an imposing character as early as he dare, and to add the insignia of power to power itself; but the leaders of a party, who govern that party merely by their influence, and who desire to remain masters of it, must still continue to flatter it, constantly attribute to it the sway they enjoy, and, whilst ruling it in all things, seem to obey it only.

The members of the committee of public welfare, the leaders of the Mountain, were debarred by powerful considerations from any obvious isolation as respected that faction or the convention at large, but, on the contrary, felt it incumbent to repudiate all that might appear to elevate them too highly above their colleagues. Already, dissatisfaction was brooding, and the extent of their power generating alarm even in their own party. Already they were viewed as dictators, and Robespierre, above all, from his commanding influence, began to attract odium. It had become usual to say, not "the committee so wills," but "Robespierre so wills." Fouquier-Tinville was wont to tell any individual whom he threatened with the revolutionary tribunal, "*If Robespierre desires it, you will go there.*" The agents of the government invariably named Robespierre in their operations, and seemed to invoke him as the source whence all orders emanated. The sufferers failed not to charge all their calamities on him, and in the prisons one oppressor only was recognised—*Robespierre.* Even foreigners in their proclamations called the French soldiers "*the soldiers of Robespierre.*" That expression occurred in a manifesto of the Duke of York. Deeply sensible how dangerous was this abuse of his name, Robespierre promptly repaired to the convention, and delivered a discourse for the purpose of repelling what he designated perfidious insinuations, the object of which was to ruin him in public estimation. He repeated it at the Jacobin Club, and drew all the applause wherewith his words were sure to be hailed. The *Journal of the Mountain* and the *Moniteur* having the following day copied the speech, with an observation that it was a masterpiece whereof any analysis was impossible, because "*every word told with the force of a sentence, every sentence with the force of a page,*" he was highly incensed, and proceeded forthwith to the Jacobin Club to complain of the journals which, he alleged, insidiously extolled the members of the committee, in order to cover them with obloquy, by investing them with the attributes of omnipotence. The editors were obliged to publish a recantation, and an apology for having praised Robespierre, albeit asseverating that their motives were most pure.

Robespierre had abundant vanity, but a mind not sufficiently great to be ambitious. Fond of flattery and homage, he greedily exacted them, justifying himself at all times by assurances that he had no desire for power. He had around him a species of court composed of sundry men, but more numerously of women, who lavished on him the most delicate attentions. Always besieging his residence, these females testified an earnest and constant solicitude for his person; they never ceased to commend his virtue, his eloquence, and his genius; they styled him a divine man, above humanity. An old marchioness was the chief personage amongst these women, who tended like genuine devotees the sanguinary and arrogant pontiff. The zealotry of women is invariably the surest symptom of public infatuation. Theirs is the province, by exaggerated sedulousness and hyperbolical phrases, to provide an effectual antidote, in the guise of ridicule, as it would seem.

In addition to the creatures who adored Robespierre, there existed an absurd and fantastic sect but recently formed. At the period when religious worship was abolished, sects sprung up in all quarters, because the inherent craving for objects of faith sought to feed itself with new illusions, in lieu of the doctrines which were proscribed. An aged female, whose brain had become disordered in the vaults of the Bastille, and who was known under the name of Catherine Théot, affirmed herself to be the mother of God, and announced the speedy coming of a new Messiah. He was, she taught, to appear amidst universal ruin, and, at the moment of his advent, the elect were to enter upon an eternal life. These elect were enjoined to disseminate their creed by all expedients, and to exterminate the enemies of the true God. The Carthusian, Dom Gerle, who had figured in the Constituent Assembly, and whose weak imagination had been bewildered in mystic reveries, was one of two prophets; Robespierre was the other. His deism had probably secured him that distinction. Catherine Théot delighted to call him her beloved son; the initiated regarded him with reverence, and beheld in his person a supernatural being, appointed to mysterious and sublime destinies. In all likelihood he was acquainted with their folly, and secretly enjoyed their delusion, without committing himself as an associate. It is certain that he had protected Dom Gerle, received frequent visits from him, and given him a certificate of civism, avouched by his own signature, to shield him from the persecutions of a revolutionary committee. This sect counted numerous votaries: it had a peculiar form of worship and ceremonies, which not a little contributed to its propagation. It was accustomed to assemble at the house of Catherine Théot, in a secluded quarter of Paris, near the Pantheon. There proselytes were initiated, in the presence of the mother of God herself, Dom Gerle, and the principal elders. The sect was creeping into notoriety, and a vague rumour prevailed that Robespierre was in its belief a prophet. Thus all things conspired at once to exalt and compromise him.

It was more particularly amongst his immediate colleagues that umbrage began to be taken. Divisions had been already manifested, as was natural; for the power of the committee being established, the period for rivalries had arrived. The committee was separated into several distinct groups. The death of Herault-Séchelles had reduced to eleven the twelve members who originally composed it. Jean-Bon-Saint-André and Prieur-de-la-Marne had been constantly employed on missions. Carnot was exclusively occupied with the war department, Prieur de la Côté-d'Or with the commissariat department, and Robert Lindet with superintending supplies of food. These three were called *examination men.* They took no part either in political matters or in personal contentions. Robespierre, Saint-Just, and Couthon, had formed a close alliance. A certain superiority of mind and manners, the great importance they seemed to arrogate, and the contempt they appeared to entertain for their remaining colleagues, had conduced to isolate them: they were styled the *men of the high hand.* In their eyes, Barrère was a weak and pusillanimous being, endowed with the ready faculty of serving any cause; Collot-d'Herbois a mere club declaimer; and Billaud-Varennes a mediocre, surly, and envious personage. These three latter could not overlook their ill-concealed disdain. Barrère dared give no outward token of his feelings; but Collot-d'Herbois, and especially Billaud, who was of an impetuous character, were unable to dissemble the hatred corroding in their breasts. They sought to derive support from their colleagues, the *men of examination,* and to range them on their side. They might reasonably hope for aid, too, on the part of the committee of general safety, which was

beginning to evince irritation under the supremacy of the committee of public welfare. Specifically limited to matters of police, and frequently superintended or controlled in its operations by the committee of public welfare, the committee of general safety endured its dependence with visible impatience. Amar, Vadier, Vouland, Jagot, and Louis of the Lower Rhine, its most obdurate members, were those most disposed to shake off the humiliating yoke. Two of their colleagues, who were called *the listeners*, watched them on behalf of Robespierre, and they found this system of espionnage insufferable. The malecontents of both committees might therefore coalesce and become dangerous to Robespierre, Couthon, and Saint-Just. Here we may remark, that a strife founded on rivalry in pride and power occasioned the division, and not a difference of political opinion; for Billaud-Varennes, Collot-d'Herbois, Vadier, Vouland, Amar, Jagot, and Louis, were not less uncompromising revolutionists than the three redoubtable adversaries they desired to supplant.

A circumstance tended still more to incense the committee of general safety against the predominant members of the committee of public welfare. Numerous complaints were made concerning the arrests, which daily became more multifarious, and which were frequently marked by injustice, being executed against individuals known as excellent patriots; especially, the exactions and intolerable tyranny of the numberless agents to whom the committee of general safety had delegated its inquisitorial powers, gave rise to piteous remonstrances. Robespierre, Saint-Just, and Couthon, not venturing to attempt the abolition or the reconstruction of that committee, conceived the plan of instituting a police department within the pale of the committee of public welfare. This scheme, without altogether abrogating the committee of general safety, was calculated to intrench upon its functions, and practically absorb them. Saint-Just was intended to have the direction of this department; but being called to the army, he could not undertake the task, and Robespierre assumed the office in his stead. The police department liberated those whom the committee of general safety caused to be arrested, and the latter retorted in a corresponding manner. This usurpation of functions provoked an open rupture. Rumours of the dissension crept abroad; and, despite the secrecy which shrouded the government, the fact that its members were at variance soon became known.

In the convention, likewise, dissatisfaction of an equally serious character prevailed. It was still silent and abject; but certain of its members, who had become alarmed for themselves, were inspirited into hardihood by their danger. These were chiefly former friends of Danton, compromised by their ties with him, and sometimes menaced as relics of the party of corruptionists and indulgents. Sundry of them had transgressed in the execution of official duties, and naturally abhorred the application of the *system of virtue*; others had betokened repugnance to the employment of rigour on so magnified a scale. The most compromised amongst them was Tallien. It was affirmed that he had been guilty of malversations at the commune when a member thereof, and at Bordeaux when there on a mission. It was hinted, moreover, that in the last-named town he had allowed himself to be mollified and seduced by a young and beautiful female, who had accompanied him to Paris, and been recently cast into prison. Next to Tallien stood Bourdon-de-l'Oise, committed by his contest with the party of Saumur, and expelled from the Jacobin society conjunctly with Fabre, Camille, and Philippeaux. Then came Thuriot, likewise excluded from the club of Jacobins; Legendre, who, notwithstanding his obsequious deportment, could not obtain forgiveness for his old relations with Danton; finally, Fréron, Barras, Lecointre, Rovère, Monestier, Panis, &c.—all either associates of Danton or reprobators of the system pursued by the government. These personal anxieties were communicated, and the number of the malecontents was daily augmented. Thus, in the convention were many prepared to unite with such of the members of either committee as should cultivate their alliance.

The 20th Prairial (8th June) approached: it was the day fixed for the festival to the Supreme Being. On the 16th, the election of a president occurred: the convention with one accord nominated Robespierre as the occupant of the chair, whereby the principal part in the ceremony of the 20th was secured to him. His colleagues, we perceive, still sought to flatter and conciliate him by a show of deference and honour. Vast preparations for the occasion had been made, conformably to the plan conceived by David. The festival was to be on a magnificent scale. The sun broke forth, on the morning of the 20th, in all his splendour. The multitude, ever prompt to attend the spectacles vouchsafed by authority, thronged early to the scene. Robespierre kept the assembly waiting a considerable period. At length he appeared amidst the convention. He was elaborately attired; on his head he wore a plume of feathers, and in his hand he held, like the other representatives, a bouquet of flowers, fruits, and wheaten ears. On his countenance, usually so sombre, sparkled a joy of most unwonted character. An amphitheatre had been erected in the middle of the garden of the Tuileries. The convention occupied it; on the right and the left were clustered several groups of children, youths, old men, and women. The infantine were crowned with violet, the adolescent with myrtle, the virile with oak, the veteran with vine and olive. The women held their daughters by the hand, and carried baskets of flowers. In front of the amphitheatre were displayed figures representing Atheism, Discord, and Selfishness. They were destined to be consumed by fire. The moment the convention had taken its place, a strain of music opened the ceremony. The president delivered a preliminary discourse on the object of the festival. "Republican Frenchmen," he said, "the ever fortunate day, consecrated by the French people to the Supreme Being, has at length arrived. Never did the world he created offer him a spectacle so worthy his contemplation. He has beheld tyranny, crime, and imposture, reigning on the earth: at the present moment he beholds an entire nation, contending against all the oppressors of the human race, suspend the course of its heroic labours, to elevate its voice and mind towards the Great Being who has given it the mission to undertake and the courage to execute them!"

After an harangue of sundry minutes, the president stepped from the amphitheatre, and, snatching a torch, applied its flame to the monstrous effigies of Atheism, Discord, and Selfishness. From out their ashes emerged a statue of Wisdom; but it was remarked that it had been blackened by the smoke amidst which it was revealed. Robespierre returned to his station, and pronounced a second oration on the extirpation of the vices leagued against the republic. This first ceremony concluded, the procession was formed to proceed to the Champ-de-Mars. The pride of Robespierre seemed doubly inflated, and he affected to march considerably in advance of his colleagues. But some, more froward and indignant, quickened their steps, closed upon him, and derided his arrogance with biting sarcasms. One party sneered at the new pontiff, and told him, with an allusion to the statue of Wisdom, which had come forth begrimed, that his wisdom was darkened. Others made the word "tyrant" tingle in his ears, and whispered that the race of Brutus was not extinct. Bourdon-de-l'Oise saluted him with the words, "*The Tarpeian Rock stands near the Capitol.*"

The procession at length reached the Champ-de-Mars. On the plain stood, in lieu of the old altar of the country, a lofty mountain. On the pinnacle of

this eminence a tree was planted; beneath its branches the convention reposed. The various groups of children, old men, and women, arranged themselves on each side of the mountain. A symphony played; then the groups chanted stanzas with alternate responses; eventually, at a preconcerted signal, the young men drew their swords, and swore, on the hands of the old, to defend the country; the mothers elevated their infants in their arms; all present raised their hands towards heaven, and the oaths to conquer blended exultingly with the homage rendered to the Supreme Being. The procession afterwards returned to the garden of the Tuileries, and the festival terminated with public games.

Such was the famous festival celebrated in honour of the Supreme Being. Robespierre, that day, had attained the height of grandeur; but he had climbed to the summit only to be thence precipitated. His pride had offended all beholders. Even at the moment of his triumph, raillery had mortified his spirit, and he had encountered in some of his colleagues a hardihood ominous and unprecedented. On the morrow, he repaired to the committee of public welfare, and vented his wrath against the deputies who had insulted him the preceding day. He denounced especially "those friends of Danton, those impure relics of the indulgent and corrupt faction," and demanded their punishment. Billaud-Varennes and Collot-d'Herbois, who were not less irritated than the others at the deportment of Robespierre during the ceremony, heard his reproaches with infinite coolness, and manifested little inclination to avenge him. They did not defend the deputies of whom Robespierre complained, but they animadverted on the festival itself, and expressed apprehensions as to its effects. It had indisposed numerous minds, they alleged. Besides, those ideas of a Supreme Being and the immortality of the soul, such pomp and ceremony, they maintained, seemed the harbingers of a return to the superstitions of former times, and might cause the revolution to retrograde. Robespierre was incensed at these remarks: he asseverated that he had never designed to make the revolution retrograde; that, on the contrary, he had laboured incessantly to accelerate its march. In corroboration, he adduced a project of law which he had recently digested in concert with Couthon, framed with the view of rendering the revolutionary tribunal more murderous.

This project thus originated. For the last two months, the subject of introducing modifications into the organisation of the revolutionary tribunal had been canvassed. The defence made by Danton, Camille, Fabre, and Lacroix, had demonstrated the inconvenience of even such formalities as were allowed to remain. And still the annoyance was of daily repetition; witnesses and advocates had to be heard; and, however brief the process of evidence, however curtailed the arguments of counsel, a great loss of time resulted, and a certain sensation was produced. The chiefs of the government, who were anxious that all should be done promptly and silently, desired to abrogate these obnoxious formalities. Having inured themselves to the conviction that the revolution had a right to destroy its enemies, who were to be identified by mere inspection, they held that the revolutionary procedure could not be too expeditious. Robespierre, in whose province the tribunal more particularly lay, had prepared the law with Couthon alone, for Saint-Just was absent. He had not deigned to consult the other members of the committee, but contented himself with reading to them the project before presenting it to the convention. Although Barrère and Collot-d'Herbois were as strongly in favour of its sanguinary purpose as himself, they felt bound to receive it coldly, because it had been planned and drawn up without their participation. Nevertheless, it was agreed that it should be proposed the following day, under the auspices of Couthon as reporter. But no satisfaction was awarded to Robespierre for the contumely he had experienced on the preceding evening.

The committee of general safety had been left equally in ignorance touching this intended law as the committee of public welfare. It knew, certainly, that a measure was in agitation; but it received no invitation to consult or concur. It craved the privilege of nominating twenty out of fifty jurymen who were to be appointed; but Robespierre rejected its leet, and inserted his own creatures only. The proposition was submitted on the 22d Prairial, by Couthon the reporter. After the usual declamation concerning the inflexibility and promptitude which ought to characterise revolutionary justice, he read the project, which was conceived in a fearful spirit. The tribunal was to be divided into four sections, constituted by a president, three judges, and nine jurymen. Twelve judges were nominated, and fifty jurymen, who were to succeed each other in the exercise of their functions, in order that the tribunal might sit daily. The sole punishment the court could inflict was death. The tribunal, so the law spoke, was instituted to chastise the enemies of the people—a definition of the vaguest and yet most comprehensive character. In the list were enumerated dishonest contractors, and alarmists who propagated false intelligence. The power of consigning citizens to the revolutionary tribunal was vested in the two committees, the convention, the representatives on missions, and the public prosecutor, Fouquier-Tinville. If proofs existed, *either physical or moral*, the hearing of testimony was to be dispensed with. Finally, a clause was thus couched—"*The law gives, as defenders to calumniated patriots, patriot juries; it grants none to conspirators.*"

A law which suppressed all guarantees, which limited criminal process to a mere arraignment, and which, investing the two committees with the power of sending citizens before the revolutionary tribunal, conferred upon them in fact the prerogative of life and death—such a law was indeed calculated to startle and terrify especially those members of the convention already uneasy about their safety. It was not expressed in the project whether the committees were to have the faculty of consigning representatives to the tribunal without obtaining a preliminary decree of impeachment; in the absence of all inhibition, the committees, therefore, might dispatch their colleagues to death, with the trouble of a nod to Fouquier-Tinville. Consequently, the remnants of the pretended faction of the indulgents combined; and, for the first time during a long interval, an opposition was arrayed on the benches of the assembly. Ruamps moved that the project be printed and the debate adjourned, saying, that if such a law were adopted without consideration, the only course left them was to dash out their brains. Lecointre of Versailles supported the motion of adjournment. Robespierre immediately rose to crush this unexpected resistance. "There are two opinions," he said, "as old as our revolution—the one tending to punish conspirators in a prompt and inevitable manner, the other tending to absolve the guilty. This last has never failed to reappear upon all occasions. It is displaying itself again to-day, and I am here to repel it. For two months the tribunal has complained of the impediments which have clogged its progress; it has complained of wanting jurymen; therefore a law is necessary. Amidst the victories of the republic, the conspirators are more active and zealous than ever; to smite them is urgent. The unexpected opposition now manifested is not natural. It is intended to divide the convention—to alarm it"—"No, no," exclaimed several voices; "they will not divide us." "We," added Robespierre, "have always defended the convention; we are not the parties it has to fear. For the rest, we are arrived at a crisis when we may be slain probably, but we will not be prevented from saving the country."

Robespierre never failed to talk of daggers and

assassins, as if he were perpetually threatened by them. Bourdon-de-l'Oise replied to him, and stated that if the tribunal needed jurymen, the proposed list ought to be forthwith adopted, as none could wish to impede the course of justice; but that the remainder of the project might be innocuously deferred. Robespierre remounted the tribune, and argued that the law was not more complicated or obscure than divers others which had been passed without discussion; and that, at a moment when the defenders of liberty were menaced with the dagger, to delay the repression of conspiracies was fraught with danger. In conclusion, he proposed to discuss the whole measure, clause by clause, and to sit until midnight, in order that it might be decreed the same day. The influence and pertinacity of Robespierre prevailed: the law was read and adopted in a few minutes.

Bourdon, Tallien, and other members who laboured under personal apprehensions, were justly alarmed at this enactment. The committees being thereby empowered to send all citizens indiscriminately before the revolutionary tribunal, without any exception in favour of the members of the national representation, they dreaded lest they might be captured in a single night, and delivered over to the mercies of Fouquier-Tinville, without any previous intimation to the convention. Accordingly, on the following day, the 23d Prairial, Bourdon appeared in the tribune. "When investing the committees of public welfare and general safety," he said, "with power to commit citizens to the revolutionary tribunal, the convention had no intention, assuredly, that the privilege should embrace its members without a preliminary decree." "No, no," was exclaimed from all sides. "I expected those responses," he cried; "they prove to me that liberty is imperishable." This remark occasioned a profound sensation. Bourdon moved a resolution that the members of the convention could not be carried before the revolutionary tribunal unless by virtue of a decree of impeachment. The committees were not present, and Bourdon's proposition was hailed with satisfaction. Merlin moved the previous question; murmurs arose against him; he explained, and amended his motion for the previous question with a declaration to the effect that the convention had never been competent to divest itself of the sole right to impeach its members. The declaration was adopted amidst general applause.

An occurrence which happened during the same evening gave additional zest to this unwonted opposition. Tallien and Bourdon chanced to be strolling in the garden of the Tuileries, when they were closely followed by certain spies of the committee of public welfare. Tallien, irritated at the insufferable nuisance, turned and confronted them, upbraiding them as vile spies of the committee, and enjoining them to hasten with a report to their employers of what they had seen and heard. This scene caused extraordinary excitement. Couthon and Robespierre were highly incensed. On the morrow they repaired to the convention, determined to remonstrate authoritatively against the resistance they encountered. Delacroix and Mallarmé offered them an opportunity. Delacroix moved that a more precise definition should be inserted of those whom the law designated as "depravers of manners." Mallarmé demanded the meaning of the words—"the law gives to calumniated patriots only the consciences of patriotic jurymen as their defenders." Couthon thereupon mounted the tribune, and inveighed against the amendments then and formerly propounded. "You have calumniated the committee of public welfare," he said, "by appearing to suppose that it coveted the privilege of sending members of the convention to the scaffold. That tyrants calumniate the committee is natural; but that the convention should seem to sanction the calumny, is an insupportable injustice, and it cannot avoid complaining of such conduct. Yesterday a chance clamour was extolled as proving that liberty was imperishable—as if, forsooth, liberty had been threatened! To make that attack, the moment was chosen when the members of the committee were absent. Such a proceeding was unfair; and I move that the amendments adopted yesterday be rescinded, and those proposed to-day rejected."

Bourdon replied, that to ask explanations on a law was not a crime; that if he had expressed satisfaction at an exclamation, it was because he felt gratified at being in harmony with the convention; and that, if equal asperity were exhibited on both sides, all discussion would be impracticable. "I am accused," he said, "of speaking like Pitt and Cobourg; if I retorted in a similar strain, what would be the consequence? I esteem Couthon, I esteem the committees, and I esteem the Mountain which has saved liberty." Bourdon's explanations were applauded, but they were in truth excuses, for the authority of the dictators was as yet too strong to be openly defied. Robespierre then presented himself, and delivered a verbose discourse, replete with arrogance and acrimony. "Mountaineers," he said, "you will always be the bulwark of public liberty, but you have nothing in common with the intriguing and the perverse, whomsoever they may be. If they attempt to rank themselves amongst you, they are not the less strangers to your principles. Do not suffer certain intriguers, more despicable than the others, because they are more hypocritical, to sway some of your number, and render themselves the leaders of a party"—— Bourdon-de-l'Oise interrupted Robespierre with a disclaimer of his having ever purposed to render himself the leader of a party. Robespierre resumed, without noticing the observation. "It would be the height of disgrace," he continued, "if calumniators, misleading our colleagues"—— Bourdon again interrupted him. "I demand," he exclaimed, "that proof be given of what is advanced; the allusion is sufficiently clear that I am viewed as a villain." "I have not named Bourdon," replied Robespierre; "wo to him who names himself! Yes, the Mountain is pure, it is sublime; intriguers are not of the Mountain!" He subsequently expatiated on the efforts making to alarm the members of the convention, and to persuade them they were in danger; he averred that the guilty alone had reason to be terrified, and that they wickedly endeavoured to communicate their own apprehensions. Eventually he referred to the encounter of the preceding evening between Tallien and the spies, whom he described as "messengers of the committee." His account of the incident led to vehement explanations on the part of Tallien, which only drew upon him, in return, virulent vituperation. At length this angry discussion was terminated by the adoption of the motions emanating from Couthon and Robespierre. The amendments of the previous day were rescinded, those of the present were negatived, and the terrible law of the 22d remained such as it had been originally presented.

Once more, therefore, the overbearing chiefs of the committee were triumphant, and their opponents struck with dismay. Tallien, Bourdon, Ruamps, Delacroix, Mallarmé, all, in short, who had offered objections to the law, gave themselves up for lost, and expected every moment to be arrested. Even though the preliminary decree of the convention were necessary to an impeachment, that assembly was so effectually intimidated, that any concession might be readily wrung from it. Against the puissant Danton it had passed the required ordinance; much more might it sanction proceedings against such of his friends as survived. A rumour prevailed that the list of proscription was actually framed; the number of victims was assigned as twelve, subsequently eighteen. They were all designated by the public voice. Nevertheless, the terror became general, and upwards of sixty members of the convention no longer slept under their own roofs.

However, an obstacle interposed to prevent their

lives being so easily taken as they apprehended. The chiefs of the government were divided. We have already seen that Billaud-Varennes, Collot, and Barrère, had listened to Robespierre's first complaints against many of his colleagues with studied indifference. The members of the committee of general safety were more decidedly aroused against him, for they warmly resented the recent affront of submitting the law of the 22d Prairial without their concurrence, and it would even seem that some amongst them were menaced. Robespierre and Couthon, too, were insatiable in their exactions; their thirst of vengeance could be assuaged only by the immolation of numerous deputies; they particularised Tallien, Bourdon-de-l'Oise, Thuriot, Rovère, Lecointre, Panis, Monestier, Legendre, Fréron, and Barras; they even demanded Cambon, whose financial renown mortified them, and who had betokened disapprobation of their merciless cruelties; finally, they would have scaled the summit of the Mountain, and struck several of its most zealous members, such as Duval, Audouin, Léonard, and Bourdon.* The three members of the committee of public welfare, Billaud, Collot, and Barrère, and all those of the committee of general safety, refused their consent. The danger, spreading over so wide a surface, might eventually involve themselves.

Such were the hostile dispositions in the two committees, such the slender prospect of unanimity touching a new and miscellaneous sacrifice, when a last circumstance provoked a definitive rupture. The committee of general safety had discovered the meetings held at the house of Catherine Théot. It had learned that her extravagant sect deemed Robespierre a prophet, and that the latter had given Dom Gerle a certificate of civism. Vadier, Vouland, Jagot, and Amar, eagerly resolved to avenge themselves by representing this sect as a band of dangerous conspirators, denouncing it in that light to the convention, and thus covering Robespierre himself with some of the odium and ridicule attached to it. They employed an agent, Sénart, who, under pretext of soliciting initiation, gained admittance to one of the conclaves. In the middle of the ceremony, he crept to a window, gave the signal to the armed force, and succeeded in capturing almost the entire sect. Amongst the rest, Dom Gerle and Catherine Théot were apprehended. The certificate of civism given by Robespierre to Dom Gerle was found upon him; and in the bed of the mother of God was discovered a letter addressed by her to her well-beloved son, to the first prophet, to Robespierre, in short. When Robespierre knew it was intended to prosecute the sect, he determined to oppose the design, and commenced a discussion on the subject in the committee of public welfare. We have previously intimated that Billaud and Collot were but lukewarm in the cause of deism, and that they viewed with umbrage the political purposes to which Robespierre strove to bend that belief. They declared in favour of the prosecution. Robespierre persisting in controverting it, the discussion became extremely animated; acrimonious expressions were interchanged, Robespierre failed to carry his point, and retired from the committee foaming with rage. The dispute had been so warm, that, to avoid being heard by those who traversed the galleries, the members of the committee resolved to transfer their place of meeting to the upper floor. The report against the sect of Catherine Théot was presented to the convention. Barrère, to gratify his animosity against Robespierre, had exercised his peculiar talent, and secretly framed the report to be delivered by Vouland. The sect was held up equally to ridicule and detestation. The convention, alternately moved to abhorrence and mirth by Barrère's exposition, at once decreed impeachment against the principal leaders of the sect, and consigned them to the revolutionary tribunal.

* Consult the list furnished by Villate in his Memoirs.

Robespierre, indignant both at the resistance he had encountered and at the injurious terms used towards him, resolved to abstain from appearing in the committee, or taking part for the future in any of its deliberations. He withdrew towards the conclusion of Prairial (the middle of June). This retirement proves the nature of his ambition. The man of lofty and aspiring spirit never yields to chagrin; he is irritated by obstacles, seizes daringly on power, and uses it to crush the enemies who have maltreated him. A weak and vainglorious declaimer frets and recedes when he no longer meets with flattery and deference. Danton retired from indolence and disgust, Robespierre from wounded vanity. To each his retreat was equally fatal. Couthon henceforth remained alone against Billaud-Varennes, Collot-d'Herbois, and Barrère, who prepared to monopolise the direction of all affairs.

These divisions were not yet notorious. It was merely known that a misunderstanding existed between the two committees, and their discord occasioned infinite joy, for it seemed to warrant the hope that fresh proscriptions would be prevented. Those who felt themselves in jeopardy clung to the committee of general safety, exhorting, cajoling, imploring it. They had actually received from certain members the most cheering promises: Elie-Lacoste, Moyse-Bayle, Lavicomterie, and Dubarran, the worthiest men on the committee of general safety, had undertaken to withhold their signatures from any new list of proscription.

Meanwhile, the Jacobins were still devoted to Robespierre. They had hitherto made no distinction between the different members of the committee—between Couthon, Robespierre, and Saint-Just, on the one part, and Billaud-Varennes, Collot-d'Herbois, and Barrère, on the other. On the contrary, they saw only the revolutionary government on the one hand, and on the other sundry relics of the faction of indulgents—certain friends of Danton, who, with reference to the law of the 22d Prairial, had unexpectedly started into opposition against that salutary government. Robespierre, who had defended that government when advocating the law, was always in their eyes the first and greatest citizen in the republic; his opponents were despicable intriguers, whose destruction it behoved them to promote. Accordingly, they readily excluded Tallien from their committee of correspondence, on the ground that he had failed to answer the accusations directed against him in the sitting of the 24th. From that moment, Collot and Billaud-Varennes, perceiving the all-commanding influence of Robespierre, refrained from frequenting the Jacobin Club. It was the wisest course they could adopt. By attending, they would surely have exposed their personal quarrel, and made matter of public question whether they or Robespierre surpassed in pride and malice. It merely remained for them, therefore, to observe silence and await events. Robespierre and Couthon consequently had the field to themselves. The rumour of an impending proscription having produced an unfavourable effect, Couthon hastened to disclaim before the society the designs they were alleged to entertain against the safety of twenty-four and even sixty members of the convention. "The shades of Danton, Hébert, and Chaumette," he said, "still walk amongst us; they seek to perpetuate trouble and dissension. What passed in the sitting of the 24th is a signal confirmation of it: men strive to divide the government and to discredit its members, by representing them as Syllas and Neros; they deliberate in secret, congregate in hidden corners, form pretended lists of proscription, and alarm the citizens with the insidious view of rendering them enemies of the public authority. They spread, a few days ago, a report that the committees intended to arrest eighteen members of the convention, and even mentioned their names. Reject these perfidious insinuations: those who circulate such rumours are accomplices of Hébert and Danton; they dread the punishment of their guilty

conduct; they endeavour to associate with them pure patriots, in the hope that, concealed behind them, they may more easily escape the eye of justice. But dismiss your fears; the number of the guilty is trifling; it is only four, or six, perhaps, and those will be certainly attacked, for the time has arrived to deliver the republic from the last foes conspiring against it. Confide in the energy and justice of the committees for its preservation."

It was politic thus to depress the number of victims whom Robespierre wished to smite. The Jacobins applauded, according to usage, Couthon's speech; but it failed to reassure any of the threatened members, and those who deemed themselves in peril continued to sleep apart from their households. Never had greater terror prevailed during the revolution, not alone in the convention, but in the prisons and throughout all France.

The merciless agents of Robespierre, the public accuser Fouquier-Tinville and the president Dumas, had joyfully grasped the law of the 22d Prairial, and armed themselves therewith to devastate the prisons. "Shortly," said Fouquier, "a board will be exposed above the gates, bearing the notice—*A house to let.*" The design was to get rid of the greater part of the suspected. These were, by the inveterate prejudices of the time, considered irreconcilable enemies, whom, for the safety of the republic, it was imperative to destroy. To slay thousands of individuals guilty of no delinquency but that of thinking in a certain manner, and who frequently did not differ in opinions with their persecutors, seemed quite natural, from the force of the habit so long indulged of shedding the blood of adversaries. The indifference with which death was administered and met had become truly marvellous. On fields of battle and on scaffolds thousands of human beings daily perished, without harrowing the sensibilities, or, in fact, without exciting any peculiar observation. The first murders committed in 1793 proceeded from a real exasperation, grounded on a sense of imminent danger. At present the danger had ceased, the republic was victorious, and the system of slaughter was continued, not from high-wrought indignation, but from the horrible usage too firmly and fatally engrafted on the revolution. That formidable machinery, heretofore found indispensable effectually to resist so many varieties of enemies, began to be no longer necessary; but once put in motion, it could not be easily stayed. Every government seems destined to have its period of excess, and to perish only when it attains that period. The revolutionary government was not to finish the very day all the enemies of the republic were sufficiently intimidated; it was to go far beyond that limit, and exercise its sway until it had earned universal execration by its deplorable atrocity. Human affairs are not otherwise ruled. Why had fearful circumstances rendered it incumbent to create a government of death, which could reign and vanquish only by so desperate an engine?

The most lamentable consequence of all appears, that when the impetus is imparted, when the idea is established that lives must be sacrificed, and that by sacrificing them the state will be saved, all concur in carrying out the frightful dogma with extraordinary facility. Every one acts without remorse, without repugnance—less importuned by scruples, in sooth, than the judge when consigning criminals to execution, the anatomist with creatures writhing under his knife, or the general ordering the sacrifice of twenty thousand soldiers. A hideous language, too, is forged for the new career—even a sportive, derisive language; quaint phrases are invented to express sanguinary ideas. Impelled, maddened by the prevailing mania, none can resist its influence; and men are seen, who an instant earlier were tranquilly engaged in arts or commerce, devoting themselves with equal assiduity to the repulsive work of death and destruction.

The committee had given the signal, by the law of the 22d Prairial; Dumas and Fouquier had only too well comprehended its import. Nevertheless, pretexts were requisite for effecting so indiscriminate an immolation. What crime could be imputed to unfortunate captives, of whom the greater part were peaceable, obscure citizens, who had never harassed the state by any overt act? An evil imagination discovered that, immured in jails, they must long for their deliverance; that their numbers must inspire them with a feeling of strength, and suggest to them the resolution of using it to break from bondage. The pretended conspiracy of Dillon was the germ of this idea, which was developed in an atrocious manner. Certain wretches amongst the detained, who consented to perform the infamous part of informers, were suborned. These designated one hundred and sixty prisoners in the Luxembourg, who, they alleged, had taken part in Dillon's plot. In all the other places of detention such fabricators of lists were found; and in each, from one to two hundred individuals were denounced as accomplices in the conspiracy of the prisons. An attempt at escape made at La Force only served to accredit the iniquitous fable; and, without further delay, hundreds of unfortunates were hurried before the revolutionary tribunal. They were transferred from the different prisons to the Conciergerie, thence to proceed before the tribunal, and to the scaffold. During the night of the 18th-19th Messidor (6th June), the one hundred and sixty designated at the Luxembourg were removed. They trembled upon hearing the roll called; they knew not what crime was imputed to them, but they had a presentiment of the probable issue—the death in store for them. The ferocious Fouquier, since he was armed with the law of the 22d, had effected great alterations in the hall of the tribunal. In lieu of the seats reserved to advocates and the bench for the accused, which contained but eighteen or twenty places, he had caused an amphitheatre to be constructed, capable of holding one hundred or one hundred and fifty prisoners at a time. He called this erection "his little tiers." Carrying his ardour to a pitch of extravagance, he had reared a scaffold in the very hall of the court, and congratulated himself upon the prospect of having the one hundred and sixty captives from the Luxembourg sentenced at the same sitting.

The committee of public welfare, on learning the species of delirium that had seized upon its public prosecutor, summoned him before it, ordered him to remove the scaffold from the hall in which it was raised, and prohibited him from arraigning more than sixty individuals at once. "Wouldst thou demoralise punishment, then?" said Collot-d'Herbois to him, in a transport of anger. We must observe, however, that Fouquier has asserted the contrary to be the fact, and maintained that it was he who urged the trial of the one hundred and sixty in three detachments. It is sufficiently proved, nevertheless, that the committee was less extravagant than its minister, and that it controlled his frenzy. A second imperative injunction to Fouquier to remove the scaffold from the hall of the tribunal was necessary.

The one hundred and sixty were divided into three bands, and tried and executed in three days. The process had become as expeditious and horrible as that employed at the wicket of the Abbaye during the nights of the 2d and 3d September. The carts, put in daily requisition, waited from dawn in the court of the Palace of Justice, and the accused could perceive them as they ascended to the tribunal. The president Dumas, with the demeanour of one infuriated, had a brace of pistols on the table before him. He interrogated the prisoners simply as to their names, and occasionally added some general question. In the examination of the one hundred and sixty, the president, addressing one of them called Dorival, said, "Are you acquainted with the conspiracy?" "No." "I expected you would give such an answer but it

will not succeed. Pass to another!" To an individual named Champigny, he said—"Are you not an ex-noble?' "Yes." "To another!" To Guedreville —"Are you a priest?" "Yes, but I have taken the oath." "Hold your tongue. Another!" To Menil —"Were you not a servant of the ex-constituent Menou?" "Yes." "Another!" To Vely—"Were you not architect to Madame?"* "Yes, but I was disgraced in 1788." "Another!" To Goudrecourt —"Have you not your father-in-law at the Luxembourg?" "Yes." "Another!" To Durfort—"Were you not a body-guardsman?" "Yes; but I was disbanded in 1789." "Another!"

It was thus that the trial of these unfortunate men proceeded. The law bore that the hearing of witnesses should be dispensed with only when there subsisted physical or moral proofs; none were ever called, however, it being always pretended that proofs of that description existed. The jurymen did not even trouble themselves to retire into the consulting-room. They declared their opinions in open court, and the sentence was immediately pronounced. The accused had scarcely time to rise and enunciate their names. One day an individual happened to be brought up whose name was not on the list of the accused; and he said to the tribunal, "I am not accused; my name is not in your list." "Eh! what signifies?" cried Fouquier; "give it immediately." He gave his name, and was sent to death with the rest. The greatest negligence signalised this barbarous species of administration. It frequently occurred, as the result of the outrageous precipitancy, that the articles of accusation were not intimated; and in such cases they were conveyed to the accused when at the bar. The strangest errors, too, were committed. A respectable old man, Loizerolles, heard his surname called out, coupled with the Christian names of his son; he abstained from reclaiming, and was sent to the scaffold. Some time after, the son was placed before the tribunal in his turn, when it was discovered that he ought to be no longer in existence, as an individual bearing all his names had been executed: the substitute was his father. He perished notwithstanding. On sundry occasions, prisoners were called who had been already executed a long while previously. Hundreds of indictments were kept in readiness, to which merely the designations of prisoners required to be added. The like method was pursued with regard to the sentences. A printing-office adjoined the hall of the tribunal; the types were already up, the offences and the judgment were in composition; the names only had to be inserted, and they were handed to the compositor through a grated window. Thousands of copies were forthwith struck off and distributed, spreading grief amongst families, and consternation amongst captives. Urchin-hawkers vended the bulletin of the tribunal under the windows of the prisons, crying out, "*Here's a list of those who have won in the lottery of the holy guillotine!*" The accused were executed upon leaving the court, or at the latest on the morrow, if the day were too far advanced.

Since the law of the 22d Prairial, heads fell at the rate of fifty and sixty each day. "All right!" said Fouquier; "heads fall like hailstones." He added—"It must go still better next decade; I must have four hundred and fifty at least."† For that fell purpose, "bespeaks," as the phrase went, were made to the "lambs," meaning thereby the spies on the detained. Those miscreants had become the terror of the prisons. Immured amongst the rest as suspected persons, it was not exactly known who had undertaken to designate victims; but they were generally betrayed by their insolent demeanour, the favours they obtained from the jailers, and the orgies they held in the guardrooms with the agents of the police. Frequently they allowed their importance to transpire, with the view of turning it to pecuniary account. They were caressed and entreated with abject sedulousness by their trembling fellow-captives; sums of money were given them to withhold names from their list. They made their selections at hazard: they said of one that he had held aristocratic language, of another that he had drank one day when a defeat of the armies was announced; and their mere denunciation was equivalent to a judgment of death. The names furnished by them were introduced into the analogous number of indictments; and officers appeared in the evening to serve those indictments on the prisoners, and conduct them to the Conciergerie. This proceeding was styled, in the phraseology of the jailers, "the evening journal." When the miserable captives heard the rumbling of the carts brought to remove them, they were thrown into an anxiety as dreadful as death itself; they hurried to the wickets, pressed against the bars to hear the list, and shook with tremor lest their names might fall from the lips of the messengers. When they had been nominated, they embraced their companions in misfortune, and took their farewells as dying men. The most afflicting separations were often witnessed—a father tearing himself from his children, a husband from his wife. Those who remained were equally unhappy with those conveyed to the caverns of Fouquier-Tinville; they returned to their cells with the gloomy anticipation of speedily following their comrades. After the fatal roll was finished, the survivors breathed more freely, perhaps, but only until the morrow. Then their agony recommenced, and the horrible rumbling of the carts again struck all with dismal dread.

Public commiseration was beginning, however, to be manifested in a manner somewhat disquieting to the exterminators. The tradesmen in the street Saint-Honoré, through which the carts daily passed, closed their shops. To prevent the victims witnessing these evidences of sympathy, the scaffold was transported to the Barrier du Trône; and in that quarter of operatives, not less pity was evinced than in the most richly inhabited thoroughfares of Paris. The people, in a moment of delirium, may unmercifully exult over victims immolated by themselves; but when the spectacle is daily presented to them of fifty or sixty fellow-beings expiring on a scaffold, against whom they are aroused by no extraordinary fury, they are speedily melted into compassion. In the present instance, however, such emotion was as yet silent and timorous. All the more distinguished inmates of the prisons had fallen; the wretched sister of Louis XVI. had been decapitated in her turn; and now, from the elevated ranks of society, the destroyer was descending to the lowest. On the lists of the revolutionary tribunal at this period we perceive tailors, shoemakers, barbers, butchers, husbandmen, lemonade-venders, and even working men, condemned for sentiments and expressions reputed counter-revolutionary. The multitudinous executions at this epoch may be demonstrated by the simple statement, that from the month of March 1793, when the tribunal entered on its functions, to the month of June 1794 (22d Prairial, year 2), it had condemned 577 persons; whilst, from the 10th June (22d Prairial) to the 27th July (9th Thermidor), it condemned 1285; whereby it appears that the total number of victims, up to the 9th Thermidor, was 1862.

The shedders of all this blood, meanwhile, enjoyed little tranquillity. Dumas was troubled in conscience, and Fouquier dared not venture out after dusk—he saw the relatives of his victims always ready to smite him. Crossing the courts of the Louvre one day with Sénart, he took alarm at a slight noise: it was merely a man passing very near him. "If I had been alone," he exclaimed, "something might have happened to me."

* [Wife of Monsieur, afterwards Louis XVIII.]

† For all these details, consult the long trial of Fouquier-Tinville.

In the principal towns of France, terror prevailed equally as in Paris. Carrier had been sent to Nantes, commissioned to chastise La Vendée. Carrier, still young in years, was one of those mediocre and violent beings, who, in the excitement of civil broils, become monsters of cruelty and extravagance. He commenced his career, on arriving at Nantes, by declaring his opinion that an indiscriminate slaughter must be made; and that, notwithstanding the promise of pardon held out to such Vendéans as laid down their arms, mercy should be extended to none. The constituted authorities having ventured to speak of holding faith with the rebels—"You are ——," said Carrier to them; "you don't know your trade: I will have you all guillotined;" and he proceeded to fulfil his mission, by causing the unfortunate men who had surrendered to be mowed down by ball and grape-shot, in bands of one and two hundred. He appeared before the popular society with a drawn sword in his hand, scattering abusive epithets, and threatening all with the guillotine. The society speedily displeased him, and he forthwith dissolved it. He intimidated the authorities to such an extent, that they durst no longer assemble in his presence. One day some of the members presumed to mention the subject of provisions to him: he replied to the municipal officers "that the affair was none of his; that the first —— who spoke to him about provisions should have his head struck off; and that he had no time to attend to their nonsense." The madman thought his only mission was to slay.

He resolved upon punishing not only the rebellious Vendéans, but also the federalist Nantese, who had attempted a movement in favour of the Girondists after the siege of their city. Fugitives, who had escaped the massacres of Mans and Savenay, daily arrived in crowds, chased by the armies which encompassed them on all sides. Carrier caused them to be immured in the prisons of Nantes, and thus accumulated of those unhappy creatures nearly ten thousand. He afterwards formed a company of assassins, who spread themselves over the adjoining country, arrested the Nantese families, and plundered at will in addition to their other enormities. Carrier had originally instituted a revolutionary commission, to pass the Vendéans and Nantese through a form of trial. Under his direction the Vendéans were shot, and the Nantese accused of federalism or royalism were guillotined. In a little while, however, he found the formality too tedious, and the mode of execution by grape-shot attended with inconveniences. The destruction was somewhat lingering, and it was troublesome to inter the bodies. They frequently remained on the field of slaughter, and so infected the air, that an epidemic prevailed in the town. The Loire, which traverses Nantes, suggested a horrible idea to Carrier—namely, to get rid of his prisoners by throwing them into the river. He made a preliminary experiment, by loading a barge with ninety priests, under pretence of transporting them elsewhere, and causing it to be scuttled at a distance from the city. The expedient being found to answer, he decided upon adopting it more extensively. He no longer employed the derisory formality of arraigning the victims before a commission; he had them taken from the prisons during the night, in bands of one and two hundred, and conducted into lighters. From these lighters they were transferred into small vessels prepared for the execrable purpose. The doomed were stowed into the hold of the craft, the port-holes nailed up, and the apertures of the deck covered with planks; then the executioners retired into the barges, whilst carpenters stationed in boats stove in the sides of the vessel with hatchets, and sent it to the bottom. Such was the process whereby four or five thousand individuals perished. Carrier congratulated himself on having discovered this more expeditious and salubrious method of delivering the republic from its enemies. Not only men, but a great number of women and children likewise, were drowned in this fashion. Upon the dispersion of the Vendéan families after the catastrophe of Savenay, several inhabitants of Nantes had received children into their houses with the view of rearing them. "They are wolves' whelps," said Carrier; and he ordered they should be surrendered to the republic. These orphan children were nearly all drowned.

The Loire was choked with corpses; ships, in casting anchor, sometimes raised vessels filled with dead. Birds of prey hovered on the shores of the river and devoured the human relics.* The fish were tainted with a diet which rendered their use dangerous, and the municipality issued a prohibition against drawing them. These horrors were aggravated by a contagious malady and a famine. Amidst all the calamity, Carrier, always frantic and wrathful, denounced the slightest expression of pity; seized by the collar and threatened with his sword any who ventured to address him; and caused a notice to be affixed, that whoever should pester him with solicitations for a prisoner, would be himself thrown into prison. Fortunately, the committee of public welfare superseded him; for, however much it approved of extermination, it was called upon to discourage extravagance. The number of victims sacrificed by Carrier is estimated at four or five thousand. The greater part were Vendéans.

Bordeaux, Marseilles, and Toulon, had also dearly to expiate their federalism. At Toulon, the representatives Fréron and Barras had dispatched 200 inhabitants with grape-shot, visiting upon them a crime whose veritable authors had escaped on board the foreign squadrons. Maignet exercised in the department of Vaucluse a dictatorship equally formidable with the other envoys of the convention. He had reduced the small town of Bedouin to ashes, on the ground of rebellion; and, at his instance, the committee of public welfare had established at Orange a revolutionary tribunal, with a jurisdiction comprehending all the southern departments. This tribunal was organised according to the precedent of that at Paris, differing from its model only in the absence of juries; five judges condemned, upon what they called *moral proofs*, the unhappy beings whom Maignet collected in his circuits. At Lyons, the barbarous executions ordered by Collot-d'Herbois had ceased. The revolutionary commission had recently rendered an account of its labours, and furnished an enumeration of the acquitted and the condemned. One thousand six hundred and eighty-four individuals had been put to death by the guillotine, or by discharges of musketry and grape-shot. One thousand six hundred and eighty-two had been set at liberty, "*by the justice of the commission.*"

The north likewise had its proconsul impersonated in Joseph Lebon. This individual had been a priest, and often avowed that in his youth religious fanaticism would have impelled him to slay his father and mother, if the sacrifice had been enjoined him. He was a veritable maniac, less ferocious perhaps than Carrier, but even more outrageous in his insanity. His words and his conduct clearly proved that his brain was deranged. He fixed his principal residence at Arras. He instituted a tribunal with the sanction of the committee of public welfare, and traversed the departments of the north followed by his judges and a guillotine. He visited Saint-Pol, Saint-Omer, Bethune, Bapaume, Aire, &c., and every where left bloody traces behind him. The Austrians having approached Cambray, and Saint-Just deeming he detected a secret intercourse between the aristocrats of that town and the enemy, he called Lebon thither, who in a few days sent to the scaffold a multitude of pretended criminals, and boasted he had saved Cam-

* Deposition of a ship captain on Carrier's trial.

bray by his firmness. When Lebon had finished his circuits, he always returned to Arras. There he abandoned himself to the most disgusting orgies with his judges and certain members of the clubs. The executioner was admitted to his table, and treated with the greatest consideration. Lebon himself attended all the executions, seated on a balcony; thence he harangued the people, and ordered the *Ca ira* to be played whilst the guillotine was at work. One day, intelligence of a victory arrived at the critical moment; he hastened to his balcony and caused the execution to be suspended, in order that the wretched creatures awaiting death might learn the success of the republic.

Lebon had displayed such evident lunacy in his conduct, that even before the committee of public welfare he was assailable. Certain inhabitants of Arras had fled to Paris, where they used every exertion to gain an audience of Robespierre, their fellow-citizen, in order to lay their grievances before him. Some of them had known and even obliged him in his youth; but they were unsuccessful in their endeavours to see him. The deputy Guffroy, who was a native of Arras, and endowed with a manly courage, devoted himself with infinite ardour to prevail on the committees to review the proceedings of Lebon. He had even the noble hardihood to make an express denunciation before the convention. The committee of public welfare felt it incumbent to take cognisance of this open exposition, and summon Lebon to Paris. However, as the committee was determined not to disavow its agents, or seem to allow that too much severity was possible against aristocrats, it remanded Lebon to Arras, and employed in its instructions to him the following expressions:—"Continue to effect good, and do it with such discretion and dignity as may defy the calumnies of aristocracy."

The complaints submitted to the convention by Guffroy against Lebon, called forth a special report from the committee. Barrère was charged with its composition. "All remonstrances against representatives," he said, "ought to be judged by the committee, in order to avoid debates which may trouble the government and the convention. Thus have we acted in this instance touching Lebon; we have investigated the motives of his conduct. Are these motives pure? Is the result beneficial to the revolution? Does it profit liberty? Are not the complaints mere recriminatory aspersions, or are they not in truth the vindictive outcries of aristocracy? So the committee has concluded in this business. Forms somewhat sharp have been employed; but those forms have destroyed the snares of aristocracy. The committee, doubtless, may have disapproved of them; but Lebon has completely crushed the aristocrats, and saved Cambray. Besides, what is not permitted to the hatred of a republican against aristocracy! How many are the generous sentiments felt by a patriot, leading him to overlook what may be severe in the pursuit of the enemies of the people! The revolution ought to be spoken of only with reverence, revolutionary measures with circumspection. *Liberty is a virgin whose veil it is criminal to lift.*"

The meaning of these ambiguous phrases was, that Lebon had been continued in his authority, and that Guffroy was ranked amongst the obnoxious censurers of the government, and exposed to all their perils. It was obvious that the entire committee upheld the reign of terror. Robespierre, Couthon, Billaud, Collot-d'Herbois, Vadier, Vouland, Amar, might be divided amongst themselves as to their individual preponderance, or as to the number and selection of their colleagues doomed for sacrifice; but they were in perfect harmony with regard to the system of exterminating all who stood in the way of the revolution. They had no wish, indeed, that this system should be applied with the extravagance of such men as Lebon and Carrier; but they verily intended that, after the example of the operations at Paris, the persons whom they deemed conspirators against the republic should be disposed of in a prompt, sure, and, as far as possible, noiseless manner. Even when blaming, therefore, certain outrageous and revolting cruelties, they had all the jealous pride of power, which never disavows its agents; they condemned the proceedings at Nantes and Arras, but in outward semblance they approved them, scorning to acknowledge a fault in their administration. Thus irretrievably committed to this ruthless career, they advanced blindly and recklessly, knowing no longer into what catastrophe it was to gather. Such is the sad condition of men engaged in evil, that they cannot halt in their course. When doubts begin to arise in their minds touching the nature of their actions, when they are brought to discern that they have erred, instead of retrograding, they rush more madly forward, as if to whirl their senses into dizziness, and stifle the voice which upbraids them. Calm reflection and rigid self-examination, so difficult amid the turmoil of passion, may make men pause and retrace their steps; but they must thereby pass a judgment on themselves almost too stern for human frailty.

In the present posture of affairs, only a general outbreak could restrain the authors of this horrible system. Into such a demonstration might enter sundry members of the committees, jealous of the predominant influence, the threatened Mountaineers, the convention, indignant under its yoke, and all, in fine, who abhorred the unmerciful effusion of blood. But before this alliance of jealousy, fear, and indignation, could be formed, it was requisite that the jealousy should be aggravated in the committees, the fear become extreme in the Mountain, and the indignation inspire courage in the convention and the community. An occasion was needed to force all these feelings into simultaneous explosion; it was necessary that the oppressors should aim the first blow, to stimulate the spirit of retribution.

Opinion thus disposed, the moment was approaching when a movement in the name of humanity against revolutionary violence was possible. The republic being victorious and its enemies prostrated, apprehension and fury were subsiding, and confidence and lenity arising in their stead. For the first time during the revolution such a reaction might become general. When the Girondists, when the Dantonists perished, the time had not arrived for invoking humanity. The revolutionary government had not yet lost either its utility or its credit.

Meanwhile, until events produced the crisis, a lull of mutual observance prevailed, and resentments were left to accumulate and canker in the heart. Robespierre had entirely ceased to attend the committee of public welfare. He hoped to disparage the administration of his colleagues by withholding his countenance and participation. He appeared only in the Jacobin Club, into which Billaud and Collot no longer ventured, and where he was every day more adored. He now began to make allusions before the Jacobins to the intestine divisions in the committees. "Formerly," he said, addressing them on the 13th Messidor, "the furtive faction, composed of the relics of Camille-Desmoulins and Danton, attacked the committees in the aggregate; at present it prefers to attack certain members in particular, to promote its constant design of rupturing unity. Formerly, it dared not attack the national justice; at present it deems itself sufficiently strong to calumniate the revolutionary tribunal, and the decree amending its organisation; it attributes what concerns the whole government to a single individual; it presumes to assert that the revolutionary tribunal has been instituted to slaughter the national convention, and unfortunately it has obtained only too much credence. Its calumnies have been believed, and assiduously propagated; a dictator has been spoken of, ay, named; it is I who

have been designated, and you would shudder *if I told you in what place!* Truth is my only refuge against guilt. Such calumnies will undoubtedly not discourage me, but they leave me undecided as to the conduct I ought to pursue. Until I can divulge more, I invoke for the safety of the republic the virtues of the convention, the virtues of the committees, the virtues of all good citizens—yours, in fine, which have been so often beneficial to the country."

We see by what perfidious insinuations Robespierre sought to excite odium against the committees, and to attach the Jacobins exclusively to himself. They repaid him these marks of confidence with a boundless adulation. The revolutionary system being attributed to him alone, it was natural that all the revolutionary institutions should be favourably disposed towards him, and embrace his cause with zeal. Hence, to the Jacobins were necessarily joined the commune, always united in principles and conduct with their club, and all the judges and jurymen of the revolutionary tribunal. This coalition could deploy considerable strength, and, with greater resolution and energy, Robespierre might have become extremely formidable. In the Jacobins, he possessed a turbulent mass, which had hitherto represented and controlled opinion; in the commune, he commanded the local authority, which had taken the initiative in every preceding insurrection; and, above all, the armed force of Paris. The mayor Pache, and the commandant Henriot, who had been saved by him when threatened to be involved in the fate of Chaumette, were entirely devoted to him. Billaud and Collot had, it is true, profited by his absence from the committee to imprison Pache; but the new mayor Fleuriot, and the national agent Payan, were equally prepared to become his instruments. Add to these individuals the president of the tribunal Dumas, the vice-president Coffinhal, and the other judges and jurymen, and an idea may be formed of the means wielded by Robespierre within the city of Paris. Should the committees and the convention discard his influence, he had only to complain and excite a movement at the Jacobin Club, impart that movement to the commune, procure a declaration by the municipal body that the people resumed their sovereign powers, draw out the sections, and send Henriot to demand from the convention fifty or sixty deputies. Dumas and Coffinhal, with the entire tribunal, were afterwards ready to dispatch the deputies whom Henriot had obtained by violence. All the means, in short, of another 31st of May, more prompt and sure than the former, were in his hands. Accordingly, his partisans and sycophants collected around him, and earnestly besought him to assume the offensive. Henriot offered the services of his columns, and promised to be more energetic than on the 2d of June. Robespierre, who preferred to use oratory as his most effective agent, and still deemed that favourite resource equal to the exigency, resolved to wait. He relied upon discrediting the committees by his retirement and by his speeches at the Jacobin Club, and proposed eventually to seize a fitting moment for openly attacking them in the convention. He continued, notwithstanding his species of abdication, to direct the tribunal, and to exercise an active police system by means of the peculiar department he had instituted. He thereby subjected his opponents to a vigilant scrutiny, and gained intimation of all their proceedings. He allowed himself at the present juncture somewhat more relaxation than had ever been usual with him. He visited an agreeable country residence, situated at Maisons-Alfort, three leagues from Paris, which was occupied by a family attached to his fortunes. Thither many of his partisans accompanied him—Dumas, Coffinhal, Payan, and Fleuriot. Henriot, likewise, often repaired to the villa with all his aides-de-camps, scouring the roads five abreast and at full gallop, prostrating any wayfarers who chanced to encounter them, and spreading terror through the district by their presence. The hosts and friends of Robespierre caused him, by their indiscretion, to be suspected of more dangerous projects than he meditated, or had indeed the courage to form. When in Paris, he was always surrounded by the same individuals, and moreover followed at intervals by sundry Jacobins, or jurymen of the tribunal, his zealous adherents, who carried clubs and concealed arms, and were ready to fly to his aid on the first signal of danger. They were called his body-guards.

On their side, Billaud-Varennes, Collot-d'Herbois, and Barrère, monopolised the administration of affairs, and, in the absence of their rival, secured the co-operation of Carnot, Robert Lindet, and Prieur-de-la-Côte-d'Or. A common interest attracted to them the committee of general safety; but, at the same time, they deemed it expedient to proceed with profound reserve. Their endeavours were directed to gradually diminish the power of their adversary by reducing the armed force of Paris. There existed forty-eight companies of artillerymen, belonging to the forty-eight sections, perfectly organised, and having at all periods evinced the most revolutionary spirit. They had always declared for the cause of insurrection, from the 10th of August to the 31st May. A decree ordained that, provided one-half at least of this force were left in Paris, the remainder might be moved elsewhere. Billaud and Collot enjoined the president of the commission for army movements to march the permitted number successively towards the frontiers. In all their operations they veiled as much as possible from Couthon, who, not having retired like Robespierre, observed them sedulously, and greatly incommoded them. In this posture of affairs, Billaud, ever morose and melancholy, seldom quitted Paris; but the gay and voluptuous Barrère resorted to Passy with the principal members of the committee of general safety, the elder Vadier, Vouland, and Amar. They met under the roof of Dupin, an old farmer-general, celebrated under the royalty for his table, and in the revolution for the report which consigned the farmers-general to death. There they abandoned themselves to pleasure and indulgence with beautiful females, and Barrère exercised his wit against the "pontiff of the Supreme Being, the first prophet, the beloved son of the mother of God." After thus revelling in enjoyment, they left the arms of their courtezans to return to Paris, swimming with blood and torn with intestine rivalries.

On their part, the veteran members of the Mountain, who felt themselves in jeopardy, kept up a secret intercourse with each other, and endeavoured to arrange a general confederacy. The generous woman who had attached herself to Tallien at Bordeaux, and had wrested from him numberless victims, urged him from the recesses of her prison to smite the tyrant. With Tallien, Lecointre, Bourdon-de-l'Oise, Thuriot, Panis, Barras, Freron, and Monestier, had united Guffroy, the denouncer of Lebon, Dubois-Crancé, compromised at the siege of Lyons and detested by Couthon, and Fouché of Nantes, who had quarrelled with Robespierre, and drawn upon himself the reproach of not having acted in a sufficiently patriotic manner at Lyons. Tallien and Lecointre were the boldest and most impatient. Fouché was especially dreaded for his skill in weaving and managing an intrigue, and against him the wrath of the triumvirs was most violently excited.

On occasion of an address from the Jacobins of Lyons to those of Paris, in which they grievously complained of their existing condition, the recent history of that unfortunate city was reviewed. Couthon denounced Dubois-Crancé, as he had done some months previously, accused him of having allowed Précy to escape, and caused him to be erased from the list of Jacobins. Robespierre assailed Fouché, and imputed to him the devices which had induced the patriot Gaillard to commit suicide. He procured a resolution

that Fouché should be summoned before the society to justify his conduct. It was less the intrigues of Fouché at Lyons than at Paris that Robespierre feared and wished to punish. Fouché, sensible of his peril, addressed an evasive letter to the Jacobins, and entreated them to suspend their judgment, until the committee, to which he had submitted his conduct and all vindicatory documents, had delivered its sentence. "It is astonishing," exclaimed Robespierre, "that Fouché now invokes the aid of the convention against the Jacobins. Does he dread the eyes and ears of the people? Is he apprehensive lest his discomfited countenance proclaims his guilt? Or is he fearful lest the scrutinising glances of six thousand patriots, fixed on him, detect his soul in his eyes, and in spite of nature, which has shrouded them, therein read his thoughts? The conduct of Fouché is that of a conscious criminal; you cannot longer retain him in your society; he ought to be excluded." Fouché was forthwith expelled, as had happened to Dubois-Crancé. Thus the storm was gathering more loweringly over the menaced Mountaineers, and on all sides the horizon was darkened with clouds.

Amidst this portentous gloom, the members of the committees, who feared Robespierre, would willingly have preferred a mutual explanation and compromise, rather than incur the hazard of a dangerous conflict. Robespierre had summoned his young colleague Saint-Just, who had immediately returned from the army. After his arrival, a meeting was proposed with the view of effecting a reconciliation. Robespierre took much entreaty ere he consented to an interview: at length he yielded, and the two committees assembled. Reciprocal complaints were urged with infinite rancour. Robespierre spoke of himself with his accustomed arrogance, inveighed against secret conclaves, descanted on the condign punishment merited by conspiring deputies, censured all the operations of the government, and found every department delinquent —civil administration, war, and finance. Saint-Just supported Robespierre, pronounced on him a magniloquent eulogium, and concluded by declaring that the last hope of the foreigner rested on dividing the government. In corroboration of this averment, he cited the testimony of an officer taken prisoner before Maubeuge. According to this officer, the enemy was waiting until a more moderate party overthrew the revolutionary government and gave predominance to other principles. Saint-Just relied upon this fact to demonstrate more incontestibly the necessity of mutual forbearance, and of proceeding henceforth in concord. The adversaries of Robespierre willingly acquiesced in the soundness of this doctrine, but would consent to act upon it only so far as consisted with their own pre-eminence in the government; whilst, to attain the object in view, all the demands of Robespierre must be conceded, and such preliminaries were utterly incompatible with their views. The members of the committee of general safety complained bitterly that their functions had been wrested from them; Elie-Lacoste was hardy enough to affirm that Couthon, Saint-Just, and Robespierre, formed a committee within the committees, and even ventured to mention the word "triumvirate." Nevertheless, certain concessions were yielded on both sides. Robespierre agreed to confine his department of general police to a superintendence over the agents of the committee of public welfare; and, in return, his opponents consented to intrust Saint-Just with the preparation of a report to the convention upon the interview that had taken place. In this report, as may be surmised, any avowal of the divisions that had existed in the committees was to be avoided: its topics were to be the commotion into which public opinion had been thrown in recent times, and the course the government proposed to follow for the future. Billaud and Collot maliciously intimated that any undue amplification concerning the Supreme Being would be objectionable, as Robespierre's pontificate was for ever recurring to their recollection. At the same time, Billaud, with his gloomy and misgiving demeanour, assured Robespierre that he had never been his enemy; and the committees separated, appearing somewhat less divided than formerly, but far from establishing a sincere union. Such a reconciliation, in truth, could have nothing real in its elements, for the same ambition remained to actuate either party; it was one of those efforts at negotiation made by all parties before coming to a final rupture. It recalled the famous *Lamourette kiss*, and the various reconciliations attempted between the Constitutionalists and the Girondists, between the Girondists and the Jacobins, between Danton and Robespierre.

If, however, it failed to restore harmony amongst the members of the committees, it greatly alarmed the Mountaineers. They feared their destruction would be the pledge of peace, and strove anxiously to ascertain the actual conditions of the treaty. Elie-Lacoste, Dubarran, and Moyse-Bayle, the most estimable members of the committee of general safety, hastened to remove their apprehensions, tranquillising them with the assurance that no sacrifice had been arranged. The fact was true, and formed one of the reasons which prevented the possibility of a perfect adjustment of differences. Nevertheless, Barrère, who laboured to inculcate the belief that concord prevailed, asserted in his daily reports that the members of the government were cordially united, that they had been unjustly accused of not being so, and that they were directing their common efforts to render the republic universally victorious. He pretended to assume the reproaches levelled at the triumvirs as aimed against all, and he repelled such imputations as criminal slanders equally injurious to both committees. "Amidst the shouts of victory," he said, "dull murmurs are heard, dark calumnies are propagated, subtle poisons are infused into the journals, disastrous plots are devised, factitious discontents are fanned, and the government is perpetually harassed, fettered in its operations, perplexed in its movements, calumniated in its motives, and menaced in its component members. What, notwithstanding, has it accomplished?" And Barrère proceeded to repeat the usual enumeration of the labours and services of the government.

CHAPTER XXXV

OPERATIONS OF THE ARMY OF THE NORTH TOWARDS THE MIDDLE OF 1794.—CAPTURE OF YPRES.—BATTLE OF FLEURUS.—OCCUPATION OF BRUSSELS.—LAST DAYS OF THE REIGN OF TERROR.—8TH AND 9TH THERMIDOR; ARREST AND EXECUTION OF ROBESPIERRE AND HIS CONFEDERATES.—PROGRESS OF THE REVOLUTION FROM 1789 TO THE 9TH THERMIDOR.

Whilst Barrère was thus diligently employed in throwing a veil over the dissension in the committees, Saint-Just, despite the report he had been charged to frame, returned to the army, where important events were passing. The movements commenced on both wings had been arduously prosecuted. Pichegru had continued his operations on the Lys and the Scheldt, and Jourdan had opened his on the Sambre. Profiting by the defensive attitude which Cobourg had assumed at Tournay, since the engagements of Turcoing and Pont-à-Chin, Pichegru projected an attack on Clairfayt separately. But not venturing to advance so far as Thielt, he resolved to commence the siege of Ypres, in the double hope of drawing Clairfayt upon him and of taking that fortress, which would consolidate the establishment of the French in West Flanders. Clairfayt was awaiting reinforcements, and made no movement in advance. Pichegru accordingly pushed the siege with such vigour, that Cobourg and Clairfayt felt it incumbent to quit their respective positions,

with the view of relieving the besieged place. To prevent Cobourg from pursuing this intention, Pichegru directed a sortie of troops from Lille, and so threatening a demonstration to be made on Orchies, that Cobourg was detained at Tournay. In the interim, he himself moved forward and bore rapidly on Clairfayt, who was advancing towards Rousselaer and Hooglede. His prompt and well-conceived movements again provided him with an opportunity of defeating Clairfayt apart from his allies. By an unlucky chance, a division mistook the route, and Clairfayt had time to retrograde to his camp at Thielt, after suffering a trifling loss. But three days subsequently, on the 25th Prairial (13th June), having received the reinforcement he expected, he suddenly deployed in front of the French columns with 30,000 men. The French soldiers ran eagerly to arms, but the right division, being attacked with great impetuosity, disbanded, leaving the left division uncovered on the plateau of Hooglede. Macdonald commanded this left division. He contrived to uphold it against the repeated attacks in front and flank to which it was long exposed, and by this courageous resistance he afforded time to the brigade of Devinthier to rejoin him, and then obliged Clairfayt to retire with considerable loss. This was the fifth occasion on which Clairfayt, badly supported, had sustained a defeat from the army of the North. The action, so honourable to Macdonald's division, decided the fate of the besieged fortress. Four days afterwards, 29th Prairial (17th June), Ypres opened its gates, and a garrison of 7000 men laid down its arms. Cobourg was on the point of proceeding to the aid of Ypres and Clairfayt, when he learnt it was too late. The events occurring on the Sambre then constrained him to diverge towards the opposite extremity of the theatre of war. He left the Duke of York on the Scheldt, Clairfayt at Thielt, and marched with all the Austrian troops on Charleroi. This was a complete separation between the principal powers, England and Austria, who stood upon indifferent terms, and whose very distinct interests were now illustrated in a most striking manner. The English remained in Flanders, towards the maritime provinces, and the Austrians hastened towards their threatened communications. Their separation tended to augment their misunderstanding. The Emperor of Germany had retired to Vienna, disgusted with so unsuccessful a war; and Mack, perceiving his plans subverted, once more quitted the imperial staff.

We narrated the arrival of Jourdan from the Moselle at Charleroi, precisely as the French, repulsed for the third time, were repassing the Sambre in disorder. After allowing a few days' respite to the troops, of whom one portion was dejected at its discomfitures and the other wearied by its rapid march, an alteration was made in their organisation. The divisions of Desjardins and Charbonnier were incorporated with those arrived from the Moselle into a single army, called the army of the Sambre and Meuse, which amounted to about 66,000 men, and was placed under the orders of Jourdan. A division of 15,000 men, commanded by Schérer, was left to guard the Sambre, from Thuin to Maubeuge.

Jourdan resolved immediately to cross the Sambre and invest Charleroi. The division of Hatry was appointed to attack the place, whilst the bulk of the army should encompass it to protect the siege. Charleroi is situated on the Sambre. Beyond its circuit sweeps a range of positions in the form of a semicircle, the extremities whereof rest on the Sambre. These positions are by no means advantageous, because the semicircle they describe is ten leagues in extent, and because, moreover, they are unconnected with one another, and have a stream in the rear. Kléber, with the left, stretched from the Sambre to Orchies and Traségnies, and guarded the rivulet of the Piéton, which traversed the debatable ground, and flowed into the Sambre. In the centre, Morlot occupied Gosselies; Championnet pushed forward between Hépignies and Wagné; Lefebvre held Wagné, Fleurus, and Lambusart. Lastly, on the right, Marceau extended in front of the wood of Campinaire, and carried the line to the Sambre. Jourdan, sensible of the disadvantages attending these positions, determined to vacate them; and in order to accomplish that object, proposed to take the initiative in an attack on the morning of the 28th Prairial (16th June). Cobourg had not yet moved on this point; he was still at Tournay, contemplating the defeat of Clairfayt and the capture of Ypres. The Prince of Orange, detached towards Charleroi, commanded the army of the allies. He resolved on his part to anticipate the attack wherewith he was menaced; and, at dawn on the 28th, his troops, distributed in order of battle, compelled the French to sustain the conflict on the ground they occupied. Four columns, arrayed against the right and centre, had already penetrated into the wood of Campinaire, where Marceau was stationed, wrested Fleurus from Lefebvre and Hépignies from Championnet, and were proceeding to drive Morlot from Pont-à-Migneloup on Gosselies, when Jourdan, hastening opportunely with a reserve of cavalry, stopped the fourth column by a fortunate charge, rallied Morlot's troops into their positions, and restored the battle in the centre. On the left, Wartensleben had made similar progress towards Traségnies. But Kléber, by the most skilful and prompt dispositions, retook Traségnies, and then, séizing the critical moment, turned Wartensleben, repulsed him beyond the Piéton, and prepared to pursue him on his two columns. So far the battle was maintained with advantage, and even victory was about to declare for the French, when the Prince of Orange, concentrating his two first columns towards Lambusart, on the point connecting the extreme right of the French with the Sambre, threatened their communications. Thereupon the right and the centre were constrained to retrograde. Kléber, abandoning his victorious march, protected the retreat with his division. It was effected in good order. Such was the affair of the 28th (16th June). This was the fourth time the French had been obliged to repass the Sambre; but on this occasion it happened in a manner more honourable to their arms. Jourdan gave way to no dejection. He again cleared the Sambre a few days subsequently, resumed his positions of the 28th, re-invested Charleroi, and caused it to be bombarded with extreme vigour.

Cobourg, apprised of these new operations on the part of Jourdan, at length approached the Sambre. It behoved the French to take Charleroi before the reinforcements expected by the imperialists came up. The engineer Marescot pushed on the works so briskly, that in eight days the fire from the town was silenced, and all prepared for an assault. On the 7th Messidor (26th June), the commandant dispatched an officer with a letter proposing a parley. Saint-Just, who still exercised supremacy in the French camp, refused to open the letter, and dismissed the messenger with these words—"*It is not a rag of paper, but the town we want!*" The garrison marched out of the place the same evening, at the very moment Cobourg arrived in sight of the French lines. The surrender of Charleroi remained unknown to the enemy. The possession of the fastness materially strengthened the French position, and rendered the battle about to be fought, with a river in the rear, infinitely less dangerous. The division of Hatry, now left at liberty, was moved to Ransart, to reinforce the centre; and all was made ready for a decisive action the following day, the 8th Messidor (27th June).

The French positions were the same as on the 28th Prairial (16th June). Kléber commanded on the left, ranging from the Sambre to Traségnies. Morlot, Championnet, Lefebvre, and Marceau, formed the centre and the right, and extended from Gosselies to the Sambre. Intrenchments had been thrown up at Hépignies, to

protect the centre. Cobourg directed his attack on the whole of this semicircle, instead of making a concentric effort on one of the extremities, on the right for example, and seizing the passages of the Sambre.

The battle began on the morning of the 8th Messidor. The Prince of Orange and General Latour, who confronted Kléber on the left, repulsed the French columns, and drove them through the wood of Monceaux, even to the banks of the Sambre, to Marchienne-au-Pont. Kléber, who had been fortunately stationed on the left to direct all the divisions in that wing, immediately hastened to the threatened point, planted batteries on the heights, enveloped the Austrians in the wood of Monceaux, and caused them to be assailed on all sides. They having ascertained, on approaching the Sambre, that Charleroi was in possession of the French, began to evince hesitation; Kléber quickly profited thereby, charged them vigorously, and expelled them from the vicinity of Marchienne-au-Pont. Whilst Kléber thus extricated one of the wings, Jourdan acted as efficiently for the safety of the centre and right. Morlot, who was in advance of Gosselies, had maintained a lengthened contest with General Kwasdanovich, and attempted several times to turn him, but had been ultimately out-manœuvred and turned himself. He fell back on Gosselies, after efforts highly honourable to his courage and capacity. Championnet resisted with equal pertinacity, supported by the redoubt of Hépignies; but the corps of Kaunitz having advanced to turn the redoubt, at the moment a false report announced the retreat of Lefebvre on the right, Championnet, deceived by the intelligence, retrograded, and had already evacuated the redoubt, when Jourdan, spying the danger, detached a part of Hatry's division placed in reserve, enabled Hépignies to be recovered, and ordered his cavalry to charge into the plain upon the Austrian troops. Whilst on either side repeated onslaughts were making with unusual fury in this quarter, a still more violent conflict raged near the Sambre, at Wagné and Lambusart. Beaulieu, ascending simultaneously the two banks of the Sambre to assail the French extreme right, had repulsed Marceau's division. This division fled in all haste through the woods which skirt the Sambre, and even crossed the river in disorder. Thereupon Marceau gathered certain battalions around him, and, without heeding the remainder of his fugitive division, threw himself into Lambusart, determined to die rather than abandon that post, contiguous to the Sambre, and indispensable as a base to the extreme right. Lefebvre, who was stationed at Wagné, Hépignies, and Lambusart, recalled his advanced posts from Fleurus to Wagné, and detached some troops on Lambusart to support Marceau. That place then became the decisive point of the battle. Beaulieu perceived its critical importance, and directed thither a third column. Jourdan, attentive to the danger, also dispatched to the scene the remainder of his reserve. The opposing forces contended around the village of Lambusart with extraordinary fierceness. The fire was so continuous that the volleys were no longer distinguishable. The forage and casks in the camp ignited, and the battle proceeded amidst the blaze of a conflagration. Eventually the republicans remained masters of Lambusart.

At this moment, the French, repulsed in the early part of the day, had succeeded in restoring the combat on all points: Kléber had covered the Sambre on the left; Morlot, driven back to Gosselies, had there stood his ground; Championnet had retaken Hépignies, and a furious encounter at Lambusart had ended in securing that position. The close of day drew nigh. Beaulieu had learned on the Sambre the fact already known to the Prince of Orange—the occupation of Charleroi by the French. Thereupon Cobourg, not venturing to persist, ordered a general retreat.

Such was this decisive battle, one of the most vigorously contested in the campaign, and fought on a semicircular range of ten leagues, between two armies of about eighty thousand men each. It was called the battle of Fleurus, although that village had borne a very secondary part in the affray, because the Duke of Luxumbourg had already illustrated the name under Louis XIV. Although its results in immediate acquisition were inconsiderable, and the victory itself only amounted to a defeated attack, it determined the retreat of the Austrians, and thereby led to vast consequences.* The Austrians were incapacitated from hazarding another engagement. They must at all events have effected a preliminary junction with the Duke of York or with Clairfayt, and both those generals were occupied in the north by Pichegru. Moreover, threatened on the Meuse, it became essential for them to retrograde, to avoid compromising their communications. From that instant the retreat of the allies was general, and they resolved to concentrate their strength on Brussels, in order to cover that city.

The campaign was manifestly decided; but a delusion of the committee of public welfare prevented such prompt and considerable advantages being derived as might have been reasonably hoped. Pichegru had formed a plan, unquestionably the best of all his military conceptions. The Duke of York was on the Scheldt parallel with Tournay, and Clairfayt, far removed, at Thielt in Flanders. Pichegru, intent on his design of destroying Clairfayt separately, proposed to pass the Scheldt at Oudenarde, thus isolate Clairfayt from the Duke of York, and once more engage him apart from his allies. Afterwards he purposed, whilst the Duke of York, finding himself alone, should be pondering on a junction with Cobourg, to overwhelm him in his turn, and eventually take Cobourg in the rear, or unite with Jourdan. This plan, which, besides the advantage of exposing the Duke of York and Clairfayt to isolated attacks, possessed the merit of attracting all the French forces towards the Meuse, was counteracted by a remarkably stupid conceit of the committee of public welfare. Carnot had been persuaded to send Admiral Venstabel with troops for disembarkation in the isle of Walcheren, with the view of exciting insurrectionary movements in Holland. In order to favour this scheme, Carnot enjoined Pichegru to meander with his army along the shore of the ocean, and seize upon all the ports in West Flanders; he moreover directed Jourdan to detach 16,000 men from his army for the purpose of assisting in this maritime demonstration. This last order was especially irrational and dangerous. The generals demonstrated its absurdity to Saint-Just, and it was not executed; but Pichegru found himself under the necessity of moving towards the sea, under a mandate to capture Bruges and Ostend, whilst Moreau should take possession of Nieuport.

The operations were prosecuted on both wings simultaneously. Pichegru left Moreau, with a portion of the army, to besiege Nieuport and Sluys, and with the residue forcibly occupied Bruges, Ostend and Ghent. He subsequently advanced towards Brussels, whither Jourdan was progressing on his side. The only resistance offered to the French consisted in conflicts with the allies' rearguards; and at length, on the 22d Messidor (10th July), their vanguard entered the capital of the Low Countries. A few days afterwards, the two armies of the North and the Sambre and Meuse accomplished their junction. The event was one of paramount importance: one hundred and fifty thousand French troops concentrated in the capital of the Low Countries, might from that point

* It is an error to attribute the great effect produced on public opinion in France by the battle of Fleurus to the interest of a faction. The Robespierrian faction had, on the contrary, excellent reasons for disparaging at the moment the effect of victories, as will be shortly made apparent. The battle of Fleurus opened Belgium and Brussels to the French, and this it was which caused its reputation.

fall with terrific effect on the discomfited armies of Europe, which, repulsed on all sides, were flying to regain the sea or the Rhine, as their homes pointed. The fastnesses of Condé, Landrecies, Valenciennes, and Le Quesnoy, which the allies had previously taken, were forthwith invested; and the convention, pretending that the deliverance of the territory superseded all laws, decreed that if the garrisons did not immediately surrender, they should be put to the edge of the sword. It had already passed a decree, enacting that no more English prisoners should be made, in order thereby to avenge all the wrongs of Pitt towards France. The French soldiers abstained from executing the decree. A sergeant having taken some English soldiers, conducted them to an officer. "Why hast thou taken them?" said the officer to him. "Because they make so many shots the less to receive," replied the sergeant. "True," responded the officer; "but the representatives will compel you to shoot them." "It will not be we who will shoot them," retorted the sergeant; "send them to the representatives, and, if they are barbarians, let them kill and eat them too if they please."

Thus the French armies, at the beginning, had directed their efforts against the enemy's centre, and, finding it too strong, subsequently divided into two wings, and diverged, the one upon the Lys and the other upon the Sambre. Pichegru had first defeated Clairfayt at Moucroën and Courtray, then Cobourg and the Duke of York at Turcoing, and finally Clairfayt again at Hooglede. After several abortive passages over the Sambre, Jourdan had marched to that locality, in pursuance of a brilliant conception of Carnot, and decided the success of the right wing at Fleurus. From that moment, overpowered on the two wings, the allies had abandoned the Low Countries to the French. Such was the campaign. Its astonishing success was the theme of universal congratulation. The victory of Fleurus, the occupation of Charleroi, Ypres, Tournay, Oudenarde, Ostend, Bruges, Ghent, and Brussels, and the junction of the armies in that capital, were extolled as veritable prodigies. Such achievements, however, were by no means grateful to Robespierre, who saw, with secret mortification, the reputation of the committee increase, and especially that of Carnot, who, it must be allowed, was too inordinately lauded for the results of the campaign. All the good effected, all the glory reaped by the committees in Robespierre's absence, arose upbraidingly against him, and redounded to his discredit. A defeat, on the contrary, would have rekindled revolutionary fury, permitted him to accuse the committees of inertness or treachery, justified his retirement during the last four decades, conveyed a high idea of his foresight, and carried his power to the extreme verge. He had therefore placed himself in the most mournful of positions, that in which his country's reverses were desirable; and there can be no doubt he did anxiously desire them. It was not fitting he should either proclaim or allow to be detected this his disposition; but, despite himself, it was perceptible in his speeches. He laboured, when haranguing the Jacobins, to damp the enthusiasm which the successes of the republic inspired; he insinuated that the allies retreated now, as they had formerly done before Dumouriez, only to return the sooner and the stronger; and he held that, in momentarily removing from the frontiers, their design was merely to leave the nation a prey to the passions evolved by prosperity. He added, at the same time, "that victory over foreign armies was not such as should be most craved. The true victory," as he inferred, "was that which the friends of liberty gain over factions; such is the victory which recalls amongst nations peace, justice, and happiness. A nation is not rendered illustrious because it prostrates tyrants or enchains populations. This was the manner of the Romans and sundry other nations. Our destiny, incomparably more sublime, is to found on earth the empire of wisdom, justice, and virtue."*

Robespierre had absented himself from the committee since the latter days of Prairial. The first of Thermidor were now entered upon. For nearly forty days he had stood aloof from his colleagues; the time was come for taking a decided part. His confidants openly affirmed that another 31st of May was necessary; Dumas, Henriot, Payan, and their associates, urged him unceasingly to give the signal. But he neither partook their predilection for violent methods, nor shared their brutal impatience. Accustomed to effect his purposes by oratory, and shrinking from a violation of legality, he preferred the experiment of a discourse, wherein he should denounce the committees and demand their reconstruction. If by this peaceful course he succeeded, he became absolute master, without danger or commotion. If he failed, his trial of the gentle mode did not preclude recourse to violent expedients, nay, on the contrary, it would stimulate their adoption. The 31st of May had been preceded by multitudinous harangues and respectful addresses, and it was only after solicitation proved fruitless that coercion had been applied. He resolved, therefore, to follow the precedent of that celebrated occasion: in the first place to instigate the presentation of a petition by the Jacobins, then to pronounce a studied oration, and lastly, to introduce Saint-Just with a report. If this demonstration were insufficient, he had all his resources intact—the Jacobins, the commune, and the armed force of Paris. But he really hoped to avoid the necessity of renewing the scene of the 2d of June. He lacked the requisite audacity, and still entertained too much respect for the convention to desire so desperate a proceeding.

For some time he had been assiduously preparing a voluminous harangue, in which he taxed his ingenuity to unfold the abuses of the government, and to fasten upon his colleagues all the calamities attributed to it. He wrote to Saint-Just, urging his return from the army; he detained his brother, who ought to have departed for the Italian frontier; he appeared every day at the Jacobins', and made every disposition for the attack. As always happens in critical conjunctures, various incidents tended to augment the general excitement. A man, by name Magenthies, presented an absurd petition, craving the penalty of death against all who should indulge in imprecations which profaned the name of God. Moreover, a revolutionary committee imprisoned as suspected persons certain operatives who had contrived to get intoxicated. These two circumstances occasioned various rumours to the prejudice of Robespierre. Amongst other things, it was sneeringly observed that his Supreme Being promised to become more oppressive than the religion of Christ, and that the inquisition would be shortly seen revived for behoof of deism. Alive to the danger of such accusations, he hastened to denounce Magenthies before the Jacobins as an aristocrat suborned by the foreigner to disparage the creed promulgated by the convention; he even procured his consignment to the revolutionary tribunal. Furthermore, availing himself of his board of police, he caused all the members of the offending revolutionary committee to be lodged in prison.

The approach of the catastrophe was felt, and it would seem that the members of the committee of public welfare, Barrère in particular, desired to make peace with their redoubtable colleague; but he had become so exorbitant, that any compromise was absolutely impossible. Barrère, returning home one evening with a friend, said to him, as he threw himself on a sofa, "This Robespierre is insatiable! Let him demand Tallien, Bourdon-de-l'Oise, Thuriot, Guffroy, Rovère, Lecointre, Panis, Barras, Fréron, Legendre, Monestier, Dubois-Crancé, Fouché, Cam-

* Sitting of the Jacobins, 21st Messidor (9th July).

bon, and all the *Danton squad*—so be it; but Duval, Audouin, Léonard-Bourdon, Vadier, Vouland—it is impossible to consent!" We see, then, that Robespierre required the sacrifice of sundry members of the committee of general safety, whereby all prospect of accommodation was precluded; to break and run the chances of the struggle was henceforth unavoidable. However, not one of Robespierre's adversaries had sufficient daring to take the initiative. The members of the committees waited to be denounced, and the proscribed Mountaineers until their heads were actually demanded; all, in short, resolved to let the attack be made on them before taking measures of defence; and they acted reasonably. It was politic to allow Robespierre to commence the engagement, and compromise himself in the opinion of the convention by a demand for additional proscriptions. Then they would be in the position of men defending not only their own lives but those of others; for if another sacrifice were to be offered up, no limit could be assigned to the execrable system.

All was arranged, and the first movements began on the 3d Thermidor at the Jacobin Club. Amongst the confidants of Robespierre was a person named Sijas, an adjunct to the commission for army movements. This commission was obnoxious for having ordered the successive departure of several companies of artillerymen, and thus reduced the armed force of Paris. A direct accusation for so doing was not yet to be ventured upon; but Sijas assailed the president of the commission, Pyle, for the secrecy in which he enveloped his proceedings, and discharged upon him the vituperation he dared not utter against Carnot or the committee of public welfare. Sijas maintained that only one resource was available, namely, to address the convention, and submit a formal charge against Pyle. Another Jacobin denounced an agent of the committee of general safety. Thereupon Couthon ascended the tribune, and said it was necessary to strike higher, and present an address to the National Convention on all the machinations which were once more threatening liberty. "I invite you," he proceeded, "to submit your reflections to it. It is pure; it will not allow itself to be subjugated by four or five miscreants. As to myself, I affirm they will never subjugate me." Couthon's proposition was forthwith adopted. The petition was framed, approved on the 5th, and presented to the convention on the 7th Thermidor.

The style of this petition was, as usual, respectful in form but imperious in substance. It stated that the Jacobins "*came to repose in the bosom of the convention the solicitudes of the people.*" It repeated the customary declamations against the foreigner and his accomplices, against the system of indulgence, against the alarms disseminated for the purpose of dividing the national representation, against the efforts made to render the worship of God ridiculous, &c. It contained no specific conclusions, but ended in general terms—"You will make traitors, knaves, and intriguers, tremble; you will reassure the honest; you will maintain that union which constitutes your strength; you will preserve in all its purity that sublime creed whereof every citizen is a minister, whose only practice is virtue; and the people, confiding in you, will place their duty and glory in respecting and defending their representatives to the death." This was intimating sufficiently explicitly—"You will do what Robespierre shall dictate, or you will be neither respected nor defended." The perusal of this petition was heard in sullen silence. No reply was given. Immediately after its presentation, Dubois-Crancé appeared in the tribune, and, without alluding to the petition or to the Jacobins, complained of the rancour with which he had been assailed during the last six months, and of the injustice rendered to his services, concluding with a motion that the committee of public welfare should be charged to draw up a report on his conduct, although in that committee, as he said, were two of his accusers. He further moved that such report be presented within three days. His demands were acceded to, without eliciting a single remark, amidst a continued silence. Barrère succeeded him in the tribune. He brought up a grand report on the comparative state of France in July 1793 and July 1794. It is certain a prodigious difference existed; and that if the France, convulsed at once by royalists, federalists, and foreigners, were compared with the France victorious on all the frontiers and mistress of the Low Countries, a tribute of approbation to the government which had effected such a change in one year could scarcely be withheld The only manner in which Barrère ventured indirectly to attack Robespierre, was by extolling the committee; he even expressly commended him in his report. Referring to the insidious agitation notoriously prevailing, and to the reprehensible clamour of certain perturbators who upheld the necessity of a second 31st of May, he said, "That a representative who enjoyed a well-merited reputation for patriotism, founded on a service of five years, and on steadfast principles of independence and liberty, had controverted with energy those counter-revolutionary doctrines." The convention, after hearing this report, separated under the foreboding impression of some imminent catastrophe. The members observed each other in silent distrustfulness, daring neither to offer nor to seek explanations.

On the following day, the 8th Thermidor, Robespierre determined to pronounce his famous discourse. All his agents were apprized and on the alert, and Saint-Just arrived in the course of the day. The convention, on beholding Robespierre appear in that tribune he so rarely mounted, prepared for a decisive scene. He was received in gloomy stillness. "Citizens," he said, "let others sketch flattering pictures for you; I come to tell you useful truths. I am not come to realise the absurd alarms circulated by perfidy; but I wish to extinguish, if possible, the flames of discord by the mere force of truth. I am about to defend before you your own outraged authority and violated liberty. I am about to defend myself: you will not be surprised thereat. You bear no similitude to the tyrants whom you combat. The cries of oppressed innocence importune not your ears; and this cause, you are aware, is not foreign to yourselves." Robespierre subsequently alluded to the agitation that had existed for some time, to the fears sedulously propagated, and to the projects attributed to the committee and himself against the convention. "We," he exclaimed, "attack the convention! And what are we without it? Who has vindicated it at the peril of his life? Who has devoted himself to rescue it from the thraldom of factions?" Robespierre answered that it was he who had done these things; in corroboration whereof he adduced his defence of the convention against sundry factions, and his tearing from its pale Brissot, Vergniaud, Gensonné, Pétion, Barbaroux, Danton, Camille-Desmoulins, &c. After the proofs of zealous devotion he had given, he was amazed at sinister reports having crept into circulation. "Is it then true," he said, "that detestable lists have been hawked about, wherein several members of the convention were marked for victims, and that the work was asserted to be the committee's, and ultimately mine? Is it true that sittings of the committee, rigorous ordinances which never existed, and arrests not less chimerical, have been audaciously invented? Is it true that attempts have been made to persuade irreproachable representatives that their destruction was resolved upon?—to persuade all those, in short, who, acted upon by any terror, had yielded an involuntary tribute to human frailty, that they were to undergo the fate of conspirators? Is it true that the imposture has been maintained with such art and effrontery, that a number of

members no longer slept at home? Yes, these facts are certain, and their proofs are with the committee of public welfare!"

He proceeded to complain that accusations, first directed against the committees in the aggregate, had eventually settled on him alone. He averred that his name was connected with whatever of evil was perpetrated in the government. If patriots were imprisoned instead of aristocrats, it was said—"It is Robespierre who so resolves:" if any patriots had fallen victims, it was said—"It is Robespierre who has so ordained:" if the numerous agents of the committee of general safety extended the sphere of their vexations and rapine, it was stated—"It is Robespierre who sends them:" if a new law harassed annuitants, it was said—"It is Robespierre who ruins them." He affirmed that he had been represented as the author of all calamities, with the view of injuring him in public estimation; that he had been called a tyrant; and that, on the day of the festival to the Supreme Being—"that day whereon the convention smote at one blow atheism and priestly despotism, and attached to the revolution all generous hearts—that day, in short, of felicity and holy rapture"—the president of the National Convention, speaking to the assembled population, had been insulted by guilty men; and that those men were deputies. He had been called a tyrant!—and wherefore? Because he had acquired some influence by holding the language of truth. "And what do you seek," he exclaimed, "you who desire that truth should be without force in the mouths of the representatives of the French people? Truth, doubtless, has its power, its wrath, its despotism; it has its touching and terrible accents, which vibrate in hearts pure and spotless, as in consciences the most guilty, and falsehood can no more imitate it than Salmoneus the thunders of Heaven. But do you accuse the people, the nation therefore, who feels and loves it? Who am I that am thus accused? A slave of liberty—a living martyr of the republic—the victim as well as the enemy of crime? All knaves rail at me; the most indifferent and legitimate actions on the part of others, are crimes in me. A man is reviled the moment he forms an acquaintance with me: the delinquencies of others are pardoned; my zeal is converted into guilt. Take away my conscience, I am the most unfortunate of men; I do not even enjoy the rights of a citizen; nay, I am not permitted to fulfil the duties of a representative of the people!"

It was by such vague and artful declamations that Robespierre sought to defend himself, and, for the first time, he found the convention sullen, silent, and, as it were, impatient under the infliction of his verbosity. He came at length to the more stirring part of his theme—accusation. Assailing all parts of the government, he first censured the financial system with diabolical perfidy. Himself the author of the law of the 22d Prairial, he descanted in a strain of deep commiseration on the law of annuities; indeed, against every measure, even to the maximum, he seemed to declare, by his assertion, that intriguers had entrapped the convention into violent expedients. "In whose hands," he asked, "are your finances? In the hands of Feuillants, of known rogues—Cambon, Mallarmé, Ramel." He subsequently adverted to the war department, and spoke with disdain of those victories "which had been described with *academic levity*, as if they had cost neither blood nor toil." "Be vigilant on victory," he exclaimed; "keep an eye on Belgium. Your enemies retire, and leave you to your intestine dissensions: beware the end of the campaign. Divisions have been sown amongst the generals; military aristocracy is protected; faithful generals are persecuted; the military administration surrounds itself with a suspicious authority. These truths countervail many epigrams." He said no more against Carnot and Barrère, leaving to Saint-Just the task of vituperating Carnot's plans. The crafty misanthrope, as we see, tinged every topic with the envious malignity rankling within him. He next proceeded to reprobate the committee of general safety, expatiating on the multitude of its agents, on their cruelties and on their exactions; he denounced Amar and Jagot for having monopolised the police, and for doing their utmost to discredit the revolutionary government. He complained of the sarcasms uttered in the tribune with respect to Catherine Théot, and affirmed that pretended conspiracies were imagined, in order to conceal real ones. He represented the two committees as abandoned to intrigues, and, to a certain extent, engaged in the schemes of the anti-national faction. In the entire existing state of things, he found nothing praiseworthy but the *revolutionary government*, and of that only the principle, not the execution. The principle was his; he it was who had instituted that government, whereas it was his adversaries who had corrupted it.

Such the purport and essence of Robespierre's voluminous harangue. He concluded with the following words in the nature of a summary:—"Let us acknowledge that a conspiracy exists against public liberty; that it owes its strength to a criminal coalition intriguing in the very heart of the convention; that this coalition has accomplices within the committee of general safety, and in the offices of that committee which they control; that the enemies of the republic have opposed this committee to the committee of public welfare, and thus constituted two governments; that certain members of the committee of public welfare participate in this plot; that the coalition thus formed seeks to ruin patriots and the country. What is the remedy for these evils? To punish the traitors, remodel the offices of the committee of general safety, purify that committee itself, and render it subordinate to the committee of public welfare; to purify the committee of public welfare as well, establish the government under the supreme authority of the National Convention, which is the centre and the judge, and thus crush all the factions by the weight of the national authority, in order to rear upon their ruins the sway of justice and liberty. Such are the essential principles. If it be impossible to uphold them without being esteemed ambitious, I will conclude that principles are proscribed, and that tyranny reigns amongst us, but not that I ought to conceal the fact; for what can be objected to a man who adheres to truth, and who knows how to die for his country? I was made to combat crime, not to govern it. The time is not yet arrived when honest men can serve the country with impunity!"

Robespierre had commenced his speech amid silence, and so concluded it. From every part of the hall all eyes were fixed on him, but not a sound escaped. Those deputies, formerly so eager and animated in their homage, had become suddenly congealed; they withheld all expression of their feelings, having seemingly found courage at least to remain cold and quiescent, since the tyrants, divided amongst themselves, had taken them as arbiters. An impenetrable reserve sat on every countenance. An indistinct murmur gradually arose in the assembly, but no member ventured for a while to address it. Lecointre of Versailles, one of the most energetic of Robespierre's antagonists, was the first to present himself, but merely in order to move the printing of the discourse, so egregiously did the boldest hesitate to enter upon the conflict. Bourdon-de-l'Oise presumed to oppose the motion, on the ground that the speech involved questions of too much gravity; and he moved its reference to the two committees. Barrère, always prudential, supported the original motion, maintaining that in a free country every thing ought to be printed. Couthon sprang to the tribune, indignant at the idea of a debate instead of an outburst of enthusiasm, and demanded not only the printing but the transmission to all the communes and all the armies. "He required to ease his afflicted heart," he said; "for during past days the deputies

most faithful to the cause of the people had been steeped in odium; they were accused of shedding blood, of wishing to shed more; and yet, if he thought he had contributed to the destruction of one innocent person, he would sacrifice himself for grief." The vehemence of Couthon resuscitated the spirit of submission in the assembly; it voted the printing of the speech and its transmission to all the municipalities.

The adversaries of Robespierre seemed on the point of sustaining a signal discomfiture; but Vadier, Cambon, Billaud-Varennes, Panis, and Amar, hastily demanded leave to answer his invectives. The danger reanimated their drooping courage, and the decisive contest began. The greatest eagerness was evinced by them to occupy the tribune; insomuch, that it was found necessary to determine the order of their precedence. Vadier was first admitted to the privilege of explanation. He vindicated the committee of general safety, and upheld that the report on Catherine Théot had been framed for the purpose of unfolding a deep and veritable conspiracy, subjoining, in a significant tone, that he possessed documents sufficient to prove its importance and danger. Cambon, speaking with his natural impetuosity, warmly defended his financial measures, and likewise his probity, which was universally known and admired in a situation open to so many and great temptations. He showed that stock-jobbers alone could have been injured by his financial laws; and ultimately breaking through the reserve hitherto maintained—"It is time," he exclaimed, "to tell the whole truth. Is it I who ought to be accused of having rendered myself master in any thing? The man who has rendered himself master in all things, the man who paralyses your will, is he who has but recently spoken—Robespierre!" This energetic frankness disconcerted Robespierre: as if he had been charged with playing the tyrant in matters of finance, he remarked that he had never interfered in financial questions, and could not, therefore, have constrained the convention on such points; he moreover averred that, although assailing Cambon's plans, he had no intention to impeach his motives. He had, however, designated him a rogue. Billaud-Varennes, an equally formidable antagonist, maintained that the time was come for placing all truths on record; expatiated on Robespierre's retirement from the committees and on the removal of the companies of artillerymen, whereof but fifteen had been draughted from Paris, whilst the law sanctioned the displacement of twenty-four; and added that he would shortly tear away all masks, much preferring that his corpse should serve as a footstool to an ambitious character, rather than by his silence seem to authorise his projects. He moved the repeal of the decree which directed Robespierre's speech to be printed. Panis complained of the continual calumnies accredited by Robespierre, who, he alleged, had laboured to represent him as the author of the days of September; and he called upon Robespierre and Couthon to explain themselves as to the five or six deputies whose sacrifice they had for the last month been so incessantly demanding at the Jacobin Club. Instantly the same cry was repeated from all parts of the hall. Robespierre replied with hesitation, that he had come to unmask abuses, but had never undertaken to justify or accuse any particular individual. "Name, name the persons!" exclaimed the deputies. Robespierre again attempted to equivocate, and stated that "Whenever he had presumed to impress upon the convention counsels which he deemed advantageous, he gave no heed"—— He was interrupted. Charlier shouted to him, "You who pretend to have the courage of virtue, show you have that of truth. Name, name the individuals!" Great confusion ensued. Eventually the question of the printing was reconsidered. Amar insisted upon a remit of the speech to the committees. Barrère, perceiving the advantage of supporting those who advocated the reference to the committees, rose to excuse himself in some degree for having previously repudiated that proposition. At length the convention revoked its decision, and ordained that Robespierre's discourse, instead of being printed, should be referred to the examination of the two committees.

This sitting of the convention was at once a memorable and extraordinary event. The deputies had shaken off their habitual submission and resumed their pristine courage. Robespierre, who had always been devoid of true hardihood, and gifted only with an arrogant effrontery, was amazed, chagrined, and prostrated. He felt the necessity of encouragement, and hastened amongst his faithful Jacobins in quest of friends and to borrow assurance from their sympathy. They were already apprised of the result, and impatiently awaited his arrival. His appearance was the signal for vociferous plaudits. Couthon followed him, and received similar acclamations. The recitation of the speech was enthusiastically demanded. Robespierre gratified them by repeating it, an occupation in which he again consumed two mortal hours. At every paragraph he was interrupted by frantic exclamations and cheers. When he had concluded, he added a few words expressive of emotion and dejection. "This discourse you have just heard," he said to the Jacobins, "is my dying testament. I have ascertained it to-day; the league of the wicked is so strong that I cannot hope to escape it. I succumb without regret; I bequeath you my memory; it will be dear to you, and you will defend it." At these words they exclaimed there was no cause for fear or despair; that on the contrary they would avenge the father of the country on all the iniquitous united. Henriot, Dumas, Coffinhal, and Payan, surrounded him and declared themselves ready to act. Henriot stated that he still knew the road to the convention. "Separate the wicked from the weak," responded Robespierre; "deliver the convention from the miscreants who oppress it; render it the service it expects from you, as on the 31st May and 2d June. March—again save liberty! If, notwithstanding all such efforts, we must yield, so be it: my friends, you will see me drink the hemlock with composure." "Robespierre," shouted a deputy, "I will drink it with thee!" Couthon proposed to the society a new purifying scrutiny, and maintained that the deputies who had voted against Robespierre should be expelled on the instant: he had with him a list of their names, which he immediately submitted. His proposition was adopted amidst a deafening tumult. Collot-d'Herbois attempted to offer certain observations; he was overborne with outcries: he adverted to his services, his dangers, the two shots of Ladmiral; he was jeered, hooted, and driven from the tribune. All the deputies present and designated by Couthon were forced out, some by the agency of blows. Collot saved himself amid an array of daggers suspended over him. The club was that day swelled by all the men of action, who, in periods of commotion, gained admittance with spurious tickets or without having any. These united violence with clamour, and were even ready to add assassination. The national agent Payan, who was a man of execution, proposed a bold scheme. He urged that all the conspirators should be forthwith seized, which might have been accomplished, for those he so stigmatised were at that very moment gathered together in the committees of which they were members. The struggle would have been thus terminated without a conflict, by a sudden movement. Robespierre opposed the project: he was hostile to such prompt proceedings; he thought that all the precedents of the 31st May ought to be followed. A solemn petition had already been presented; he himself had delivered an oration; Saint-Just, who had but now arrived from the army, would make a report the following morning; he, Robespierre, would again speak, and, if all were unsuccessful, the magistrates of the people, assembled in the interim at the commune, and supported by the

armed force of the sections, should proclaim that the people resumed their sovereignty, and advance to deliver the convention from the wretches who misled it. The plan was thus traced by precedents, as he demonstrated. The Jacobins separated with mutual pledges that, on the morrow, Robespierre should be in the convention, the Jacobins in their hall, the municipal magistrates at the commune, and Henriot at the head of the sections. They relied, moreover, on the youths in the school of Mars, whose commandant, Labretèche, was devoted to the cause of the commune.

Such was the day of the 8th Thermidor, the last of the sanguinary tyranny which had brooded so heavily on France. Still, on that day even, the horrible revolutionary system was in full activity. The tribunal sat, and victims were conducted to the scaffold. Among the number were two celebrated poets, Roucher, author of *Les Mois*, and young André Chenier, who left many admirable though unfinished pieces, and whom France has cause to regret, in association with all those young men of genius—orators, writers, and generals—prematurely cut off by the guillotine or the sword. Those two votaries of the Muses consoled each other in the fatal cart by repeating verses from Racine. Young André, on mounting the scaffold, uttered the complaint of genius arrested in its course: "*To die so young!*" he exclaimed, striking his forehead; "*there was something here!*"*

During the night which ensued, every quarter of Paris was the scene of agitation, and each party strove to collect its strength. The two committees were assembled, in deliberation on the events of the day, and on the prospects of the morrow. From what had occurred at the Jacobin Club, it was manifest that the mayor and Henriot would support the triumvirs, and that all the forces of the commune would have to be encountered in the hour of peril. The most prudent course in the option of the committees was to have ordered the arrest of those two leaders; but they still hesitated; they were swayed to and fro in pitiable vacillation; in sooth, they felt a species of regret at having commenced the contest. They reflected that, if the convention were sufficiently powerful to vanquish Robespierre, it would resume all its authority; and that, though they might be rescued from the fangs of their rival, they would be denuded of the dictatorship. It had been better, doubtless, to have negotiated a compact; but the opportunity was gone. Robespierre took especial care not to intrust himself amongst his colleagues after the meeting of the Jacobins. Saint-Just, however, who had arrived from the army a few hours ago, sat observing them in gloomy silence. He was asked for the report, the preparation whereof had been confided to him at the last interview, and a desire was expressed to hear it read; he answered that he could not communicate it, having previously given it to one of his colleagues to peruse. He was solicited to impart the substance, at least, but he declined. At this moment, Collot entered, furious at the outrage he had just experienced at the Jacobin Club. "What is passing at the Jacobins?" inquired Saint-Just. "Thou askest!" replied Collot, wrathfully; "art thou not the accomplice of Robespierre? Have you not together arranged all your schemes? I see it: you have formed an infamous triumvirate, and you purpose to assassinate us; but if we fall, you will not long enjoy the fruit of your crimes!" Then stepping up to Saint-Just with enraged vehemence—"Thou designest to denounce us to-morrow morning," he said; "thou hast thy pockets full of notes against us: show them!" Saint-Just emptied his pockets, and pledged his word he had no such documents. Collot-d'Herbois was pacified. The committees exacted from Saint-Just an engagement to attend at eleven in the morning, to communicate his report before reading it to the convention. Ere they finally separated, they agreed to demand from the convention the dismissal of Henriot, and the summons to the bar of the mayor and the national agent.

Saint-Just hurried away to compose his report, which was not yet drawn up; and therein arraigned, with more brevity and force than had distinguished Robespierre's effort, the conduct of the committees towards their colleagues, the assumption of all affairs, the superciliousness of Billaud-Varennes, and the false manœuvres of Carnot, who had transferred Pichegru's army to the coasts of Flanders, and endeavoured to wrest 16,000 men from Jourdan. This report betrayed a spirit equally perfidious as the speech of Robespierre; but in other respects it was characterised by great ability. Saint-Just resolved to read it to the convention without any previous intimation of its contents to the committees.

Whilst the conspirators were occcupied in concerting their measures, the Mountaineers, who had hitherto confined themselves to intercommunications of their apprehensions, and had formed no specific design, hastened from house to house, and exchanged pledges to attack Robespierre in a more formal manner on the following day, and to obtain his impeachment if possible. To achieve this latter object, the concurrence of the deputies of the Plain was requisite, whom they, the Mountaineers, had frequently menaced, and Robespierre, affecting the part of moderator, had formerly defended. They had, consequently, but indifferent claims to their support. They proceeded, however, to visit Boissy-d'Anglas, Durand-Maillane, and Palasne-Champeaux, all three ex-constituents, whose example was likely to influence the others. They warned them they would be responsible for all the blood hereafter shed by Robespierre, unless they consented to vote against him. Repulsed at first, three times they returned to the charge, and ultimately procured the desired promise. They continued their cir-

* [André Chenier was born at Constantinople, where his father was consul-general for France. The mother of André was a Greek lady, celebrated for her beauty and wit. Returning to his native country about the year 1753, the consul Chenier placed his son at the college of Navarre, where he remained until of age to enter the army. But a garrison life did not accord with his tastes, and we find him pursuing a literary career in Paris at the commencement of the revolutionary struggle. A partisan, at first, of the popular cause, Chenier published a number of poems full of ardent notions respecting liberty, and calculated to encourage his countrymen in their tumultuary efforts. The excesses into which they ran, however, shocked his ingenuous spirit, and he exerted himself so much in defence of the king, as to compromise his own safety. After a short imprisonment, during which he produced some affecting and appropriate poetical compositions, he ended his career on the scaffold, at the age of thirty-three. The following fragmentary verses are said to have been composed and repeated by him, while waiting his turn to be called to the guillotine:—

"As the summer day pours its parting ray,
Or the breeze its farewell sigh,
At the scaffold's foot do I wake the lute,
As I wait my time to die.

Perchance ere this hour, in its circling tour,
O'er the dial-front hath run,
And his sixtieth pace hath told that the race
By his wakeful steps is won;

The sleep of the tomb o'er my lids in gloom
Shall fall, ere the verse I pen
Be made complete in cadence meet;
And the walls of this scared den

Shall haply ring with the tones that bring
The decree of fate to me—
Borne on the breath of the herald of death,
Who recruits for the shades" * * *

The lines *were* left incomplete. In alluding to this subject, D'Israeli mentions only two (four-line) stanzas as having been composed by Chenier; but M. Tissot, from whose collection of French literature we translate the piece, gives the additional lines here presented in an English form.

M. Thiers's mother is understood to have belonged to the family whence André Chenier sprung.]

cuits during the whole morning of the 9th. Tallien undertook to lead the attack, and requested only from others the boldness to uphold him.

Every one early flew to his post. The mayor Fleuriot and the national agent Payan were at the commune. Henriot was on horseback with his aides-de-camp, traversing the streets of Paris. The Jacobins had commenced a permanent sitting. The deputies, on the alert since dawn, had repaired to the convention before the accustomed hour. They congregated tumultuously in the corridors, and the Mountaineers besieged them with assiduity to incline them in their favour. It was within half an hour of noon. Tallien was talking at one of the doors of the hall to some of his colleagues, when he saw Saint-Just enter and take possession of the tribune. "Now is the moment," he exclaimed; "let us enter." They followed him, the benches gradually filled, and all awaited in silence the opening of that scene, destined to be one of the most striking in the stormy annals of the republic.

Saint-Just, who had broken faith with his colleagues regarding the report, which he had promised to preliminarily submit to them, was in the tribune. The two Robespierres, Lebas, and Couthon, were seated side by side. Collot-d'Herbois occupied the chair. Saint-Just stated that he had been charged by the committees to present a report, and he accordingly obtained liberty to speak. He commenced by asseverating that he was of no faction, but belonged solely to truth; and averred that the tribune might be, to him as to many others, the Tarpeian Rock, but that he would not the less utter his unreserved opinion on the divisions which had arisen. Tallien scarcely allowed him to finish these first passages, ere he arose and claimed to speak on a point of order. Leave was accorded him. "The republic," said he, "is in the most melancholy state, and no good citizen can avoid shedding tears over its calamities. Yesterday a member of the government isolated himself and denounced his colleagues; another comes to do the same to-day. It is sufficient to aggravate our misfortunes: I demand that the veil be at length entirely torn away." No sooner were these words pronounced than plaudits broke forth, which were caught up and long sustained, again commenced, and even for a third time resounded in deafening echoes. It was the precursor signal of the fall of the triumvirs. Billaud-Varennes, who had struggled into the tribune after Tallien, announced that the Jacobins had held a seditious meeting the previous evening, in which suborned assassins were present, who had avowed the design of slaughtering the convention. General abhorrence was manifested. "I see in the galleries," added Billaud-Varennes, "one of the men who yesterday threatened the faithful deputies. Let him be seized!" The man was immediately pinioned, and delivered over to the gendarmes. Billaud subsequently maintained that Saint-Just had no right to speak in the name of the committees, inasmuch as he had not communicated to them his report; and he further insisted that the moment was one in which the assembly ought to repudiate indulgence, for it would perish if it were weak. "No, no!" shouted the deputies, waving their hats in the air; "it will not be weak, and it will not perish!" Lebas claimed the tribune, which Billaud had not yet vacated. He gesticulated violently, and otherwise created great disturbance in his eagerness to obtain it. At the instance of the entire assembly, he was called to order. Unmindful of the rebuke, he still persisted. "To the Abbey with the malignant!" growled sundry voices from the Mountain.

Billaud resumed, and, casting aside all further reserve, boldly affirmed that Robespierre had always sought to domineer in the committees; that he had withdrawn when resistance was offered to his law of the 22d Prairial, and to the purposes which he intended to make it subserve; that he had insisted upon retaining the noble, Lavalette, a conspirator in the national guard at Lille; that he had prevented the arrest of Henriot, the accomplice of Hébert, in order to mould him as his creature; that he had, moreover, opposed the apprehension of a secretary of the committee, who had misappropriated 114,000 francs; that he had caused to be incarcerated, by means of his board of police, the best revolutionary committee in Paris; that he had invariably followed his own will in all things, and assiduously aimed at absolute supremacy. Billaud subjoined, that he could cite a multitude of additional facts, but it sufficed to state that yesterday Robespierre's agents, the Dumas' and Coffinhals, had pledged themselves at the Jacobin Club to decimate the National Convention. Whilst Billaud enumerated these enormities, the assembly expressed at intervals unequivocal symptoms of indignation. Robespierre, livid with rage, had quitted his seat and mounted the steps of the tribune. Standing behind Billaud, he demanded from the president liberty to speak, with extreme vehemence. He seized the moment when Billaud paused, to claim it with redoubled violence. "Down with the tyrant! down with the tyrant!" reverberated from all parts of the hall. Twice this accusing cry arose, and announced that the deputies at length ventured to give him the name he merited. While passionately insisting on his right, Tallien, who had again rushed to the tribune, likewise craved the ear of the president, and obtained attention in preference. "But a few minutes ago," he said, "I demanded that the veil should be wholly rent; I perceive it has now been so. The conspirators are unmasked. I knew that my life was menaced, and hitherto I had kept silence; but yesterday I was present at the meeting of the Jacobins, I saw the army of the new Cromwell formed, I trembled for the country, and I armed myself with a poniard to pierce his heart, if the convention should lack the courage to decree him under impeachment." As he uttered these words, Tallien displayed his dagger, and the assembly covered him with applause. He then moved the arrest of the leader of the conspirators, Henriot. Billaud proposed to add the names of the president Dumas and of one Boulanger, who had distinguished himself on the eve as one of the most furious agitators amongst the Jacobins. The convention forthwith decreed the arrest of those three criminals.

At this moment Barrère entered, to submit to the assembly the propositions which the committees had agreed upon during the night before separating. Robespierre, who had not quitted the tribune, availed himself of the occasion again to urge his claim to be heard. His adversaries were determined to reject his appeals, lest his voice might awaken a remnant of the dastardly and servile spirit so recently predominating. All planted on the summit of the Mountain, they vociferated with renewed energy; and whilst Robespierre turned alternately to the president and to the assembly, "Down! down with the tyrant!" they exclaimed in stentorian accents. Barrère likewise was adjudged to take precedence of Robespierre. It is affirmed that this man, whom vanity had incited to play a prominent part, and whom weakness now filled with dread at his own success, had two reports in his pocket, one in behalf of Robespierre, the other in behalf of the committees. He proceeded to develop the project resulting from the night's deliberation; it included the abolition of the grade of commander-in-chief, the re-establishment of the old law passed by the Legislative Assembly, whereby each legionary leader commanded the armed force of Paris in rotation; and the summons to the bar of the mayor and national agent, to answer for the tranquillity of the capital. The articles were adopted and decreed on the instant, and an usher departed to communicate them to the commune, amidst great personal hazard.

When the decree proposed by Barrère had been passed, the enumeration of Robespierre's delinquencies was resumed: the deputies were emulous to charge



him with crimes. Vadier, who professed to have discovered an important conspiracy on the seizure of Catherine Théot, imparted, what he had not specified the previous day, that Dom Gerle possessed a certificate of civism signed by Robespierre; and that, in a mattress belonging to Catherine Théot, a letter had been found, wherein she styled Robespierre her beloved son. He subsequently expatiated on the spy-system maintained by the committees, with the diffuseness of old age, and a deliberation altogether unsuitable to the excitation of the moment. Tallien impatiently remounted the tribune, and once more addressed the assembly, stating, that the true point of the question had been departed from and must be restored. It was true that Henriot, Dumas, and Boulanger, had been impeached, and Robespierre called a tyrant; but no decisive resolution had been taken. He observed that it was not merely certain details in the life of the man, stigmatised as a tyrant, which were to be reprobated, but that his entire career ought to be dragged into light. He thereupon commenced a ruthless survey of the conduct pursued from early times by that cowardly, supercilious, and sanguinary demagogue. Robespierre, half suffocated with rage, interrupted him with howls of fury. Louchet exclaimed, "It is time to finish: the arrest of Robespierre!" Loseau added, "Impeachment against the denouncer!" "Impeachment! Impeachment!" shouted numerous deputies. Louchet arose; and, looking around him, asked if he would be supported. "Yes! yes!" responded a hundred voices. Robespierre the younger said from his place—"I partake the crimes of my brother; join me with him!" This expression of devotedness was scarcely heeded. "The arrest! the arrest!" again echoed wildly. At this moment, Robespierre, who had been continually moving to and fro between his seat and the table, once more approached the president, and demanded to be heard. But Thuriot, who had succeeded Collot-d'Herbois in the chair, answered him only by ringing his bell. Then Robespierre turned his eyes upon the Mountain, but met the gaze simply of cold friends or infuriated enemies. He averted them towards the Plain. "It is to you," he said, "pure and virtuous men—it is to you I address myself, and not to brigands!" Some moved aside, others used menacing gestures. Hopeless, he retreated to the president, and thus invoked him:—"For the last time, president of assassins, I demand leave to speak!" These words he uttered in stifled and almost inarticulate accents. "The blood of Danton chokes you!" cried Garnier-de-l'Aube. Duval, irritated at the hesitation, rose and exclaimed—"President, is this man to be still the master of the convention?" "Ah! how hard it is to beat down a tyrant!" added Fréron. "To the vote! to the vote!" vociferated Loseau. The arrest so often urged was at length put to the vote, and decreed amidst an extraordinary ferment. Scarcely was the decree passed ere the whole assemblage rose throughout the spacious hall, and with one impulse proclaimed—"Long live liberty! Long live the republic! The tyrants are no more!"

When the excitement had subsided, various members sprang up, and asserted that they had understood the vote of arrest included the accomplices of Robespierre, Couthon and Saint-Just. Their names were forthwith appended to the decree. Lebas asked to be inserted therein; his request was granted, as likewise Robespierre the younger's. These men still inspired such dread, that the ushers of the assembly had not ventured to approach in order to lead them to the bar. Perceiving that they remained on their seats, several deputies inquired why they did not descend to the place assigned for those under accusation; the president replied that the ushers had been unable to execute the command. The shout—"To the bar! to the bar!" then became general. The five accused proceeded thither, Robespierre bewildered with wrath, Saint-Just calm and scornful, the others in deep dejection at their novel and unexpected humiliation. At last they too stood in that dock whither they had sent Vergniaud, Brissot, Pétion, Camille-Desmoulins, Danton, and so many others of their colleagues, illustrious for their virtue, their genius, or their courage.

It was five afternoon. The assembly had declared the sitting permanent; but at this period, overcome with fatigue, it took the hazardous resolution of suspending the sitting until seven, to allow an interval of repose. The deputies thereupon separated, and thus left to the commune, if it possessed any hardihood, the opportunity of closing the place of their meetings, and seizing upon all dominion in Paris. The five under impeachment were conducted to the committee of general safety, and subjected to an interrogatory before their colleagues, preparatory to their incarceration.

Whilst these important events were passing in the convention, the commune had remained in observance. The usher, Courvol, had appeared before it, to intimate the decree placing Henriot under arrest, and summoning the mayor and national agent to the bar. The reception accorded him had been by no means gracious. Having requested an acknowledgment of the execution of his mission, the mayor had replied to him—"*On a day like this, we give no acknowledgments. Go to the convention, inform it we shall know how to keep the day; and tell Robespierre he may be under no apprehension, for we are here.*" The mayor had subsequently expressed himself in a vague and mysterious manner to the council-general regarding the objects of the meeting; he adverted merely to the decree ordaining the commune to watch over the tranquillity of Paris, and to the epochs when that same commune had displayed heroic courage, alluding with sufficient explicitness to the 31st of May. The national agent, Payan, speaking after the mayor, had proposed to send two members of the council to harangue the people, congregated in a vast multitude on the square in front of the town-hall, and invite them "*to unite with their magistrates to save the country.*" Eventually an address had been framed, wherein it was alleged that miscreants were oppressing Robespierre, "that virtuous citizen, who caused to be proclaimed the consolatory dogmas of the Supreme Being and the immortality of the soul; Saint-Just, that apostle of virtue, who uprooted the treason on the Rhine and in the north; Couthon, that virtuous citizen, who has but the trunk and head of mortals, but possesses them glowing with patriotism."* Thereafter, a resolution had been passed, that the sections should be convoked, and their presidents and the commanders of the armed force called before the commune to receive its directions. A deputation had been sent to the Jacobins, soliciting them to come and fraternise with the commune, and to detach to the council-general their most energetic members, and an adequate supply of "*male and female citizens for the galleries.*" Without yet proclaiming an insurrection, the commune took all the measures requisite to maintain one, and obviously progressed towards that conclusion. The arrest of the five deputies was unknown to it, which accounts for any species of reserve being still manifested by the turbulent body.

Meanwhile, Henriot was scouring the streets of Paris with a troop of horse. In his progress, he learnt that the five deputies had been put under arrest; whereupon he attempted to excite the populace, exclaiming that miscreants were oppressing the faithful deputies, and that they had already arrested Couthon, Saint-Just, and Robespierre. The wretch was half-intoxicated; he rose upon his saddle, and brandished his sword like one demented. He repaired, in the first place, to the Faubourg Saint-Antoine, with the intention of arousing the operatives, who

* [In explanation of this singular eulogy, the reader may be reminded that Couthon had almost lost the use of his limbs.]

scarcely comprehended what he laboured to impress upon them, and who, moreover, began to be touched with pity at the daily spectacle of victims passing to death. By a hazard fatal to his projects, Henriot encountered the carts proceeding to the scaffold. On hearing of Robespierre's arrest, the people had surrounded them, imagining that, as Robespierre was understood to be the author of all the murders, his downfall implied a cessation of the executions. They consequently desired to turn back the gloomy cavalcade. Henriot, rushing up at the moment, opposed their design, and caused that last immolation to be consummated. He then returned, still at full speed, to the Luxembourg, and ordered the gendarmes to muster on the square of the town-hall. He took a detachment with him, and started off along the quays towards the Place du Carrousel, in order to rescue the prisoners under detention with the committee of general safety. As he galloped down the quays with his aides-de-camp, he overthrew sundry individuals. One man thus treated, who had his wife on his arm, appealed to the gendarmes, crying out—"Gendarmes, apprehend that brigand; he is no longer your general!" An aide-de-camp silenced him by a cut of his sabre. Henriot continued his route, and plunged into the Street St Honoré. Arrived on the Place du Palais-Egalité (Palais-Royal), he descried Merlin de Thionville, and charged upon him, shouting, "Arrest this knave! he is one of those who persecute the faithful representatives!" Merlin was immediately grasped, brutally ill used, and conveyed to the nearest guard-house. In the courts of the National Palace, Henriot caused his followers to dismount, and attempted to enter the palace. The grenadiers refused him admittance, and presented their bayonets. At this moment, an usher advanced, and said, "Gendarmes, arrest that rebel; a decree of the convention commands you!" Henriot was forthwith surrounded, himself and several of his aides-de-camp disarmed, pinioned, and conducted into the room of the committee of general safety, beside the Robespierres, Couthon, Saint-Just, and Lebas.

Hitherto all had gone favourably for the convention. Its decrees, boldly passed, were happily executed. But the commune and the Jacobins, who had not yet openly proclaimed an insurrection, were now about to enter upon a more determined course of action, and realise, if they could, their project of another 2d of June. Fortunately, whilst the convention imprudently suspended its sitting, the commune had done the same, and the decisive opportunity was lost to both.

The commune did not again assemble until six o'clock. Upon this resumption of the sitting, the arrest of the five deputies and of Henriot was known. The council no longer restrained its fury, but at once declared that it rebelled against the oppressors of the people, who were intent on destroying their defenders. It ordered the tocsin to be sounded at the town-hall and in all the sections. It detached one of its members into each of the sections, to incite those bodies into insurrection, and induce them to send their battalions to the commune. It dispatched gendarmes to close the barriers, and enjoined all the keepers of the prisons to refuse any captives who might be brought to their gates. Lastly, it nominated an executive committee of twelve members, in which Payan and Coffinhal were included, to direct the insurrection, and wield all the sovereign powers of the people. By this time, a few sectional battalions, several companies of artillery, and a large proportion of the gendarmerie, were already gathered on the square of the commune. The municipality began to administer an oath to the commandants of the battalions actually under arms. Subsequently, it directed Coffinhal to proceed with a few hundred men to the convention, and deliver the prisoners.

Robespierre had been already dismissed to the Luxembourg, his brother to the House of Lazarus, Couthon to Port-Libre, Saint-Just to the Ecossais, and Lebas to the court-house of the department. The order given to the jailers was obeyed, and they refused to receive the prisoners. The administrators of police then seized upon their persons, and conducted them in carriages to the municipality. When Robespierre appeared, he was embraced, loaded with testimonies of affection, and stunned with oaths to die in his defence, and in that of all the faithful deputies. Meanwhile, Henriot had alone remained at the committee of general safety. Coffinhal, vice-president of the Jacobins, appeared there sword in hand, with some companies of the sections, forced his way into the saloon of the committee, drove out the members, and delivered Henriot and his aides-de-camp. Henriot, thus rescued, flew to the Place du Carrousel, regained his horse, vaulted into the saddle, and, with great presence of mind, assured the companies and artillerymen around him that the committee had just pronounced him innocent, and reinstated him in the command. Thereupon they encompassed him, forming a sufficiently formidable array; and he commenced to issue orders against the convention, and to make preparations for besieging its hall.

It was now seven in the evening, the hour to which the convention stood adjourned. In the interval, the commune had acquired important advantages. It had, as we have narrated, proclaimed an insurrection, deputed commissioners to the sections, already gathered around it several companies of artillery and gendarmes, and rescued the prisoners. It was in a position, if possessing the requisite hardihood, to march promptly on the convention, and compel it to revoke its decrees. It had cause to rely, moreover, on the School of Mars, the commandant whereof, Labretèche, was its devoted instrument.

The deputies congregated in tumult, and imparted to each other the disastrous tidings of the evening with countenances of dismay. The members of the committees, in deep alarm and incertitude, were assembled in a small chamber contiguous to the bench of the president. They there deliberated, unconscious of the course it behoved them to pursue under the emergency. In the interim, several deputies successively mounted the tribune, and recounted the events that had passed in Paris. They bore testimony that the prisoners were liberated, that the commune had coalesced with the Jacobins, that it already disposed of a considerable force, and that the convention was speedily to be environed. Bourdon proposed to issue forth in a body, and reclaim the people by so affecting a spectacle. Legendre strove to encourage the assembly with assurances that it would every where encounter none but pure and faithful Mountaineers ready to defend it, and evinced at this moment a fortitude he had never manifested before Robespierre. Billaud now appeared in the tribune, and announced that Henriot was on the Place du Carrousel, and that, having debauched the artillerymen, he had caused the cannons to be turned against the hall of the convention, and was on the point of beginning the attack. Collot-d'Herbois seated himself in the chair, which, from the disposition of the hall, must receive the first ball that was fired, and said, as he assumed that post of danger, "Representatives, this is the moment to die at our posts. Miscreants have invaded the National Palace." At these words, all the deputies, some of whom were standing, others pacing the floor, took their places, and awaited the issue in majestic silence. All the occupants of the galleries fled in a tumultuous uproar, and left nothing behind them but a cloud of dust. The convention remained in solitude, and with the conviction of its impending massacre, but resolved to perish rather than endure a Cromwell. Here let us admire the wondrous influence of a crisis on courage. Those same men, so long abashed before the mere declaimer, now brave his bristling cannon with sublime heroism!

Certain members of the assembly were appointed to bring intelligence of occurrences on the Carrousel. They reported that Henriot was still giving orders. "Outlawry! outlawry against the brigand!" resounded through the hall. The decree declaring him without the pale of the law was instantly passed, and several deputies quitted their seats to publish it in front of the National Palace. At that moment, Henriot, having succeeded in deluding the artillerymen and inducing them to plant their pieces against the hall, was urging them to fire. The deputies exclaimed, "Artillerymen, will you dishonour yourselves? That brigand is without the law!" Those sturdy republicans responded to the appeal, and refused to obey Henriot. Abandoned by his adherents, his only resource was to turn and flee to the commune.

This first danger averted, the convention put the deputies who had evaded its decrees, and all the members of the commune participating in the revolt, under the ban of outlawry. But this measure, however bold, was in itself inoperative. If Henriot had disappeared from the Place du Carrousel, the insurgents were still in great force at the commune, and able even to attempt a sudden onslaught. Against this latter hazard especially it was incumbent to take precaution. But much time was wasted in fruitless deliberation. Eventually, in the small chamber behind the president's chair, where the members of the committees and several representatives were assembled, it was proposed to appoint a commander of the armed force, selected from the convention itself. "Who?" inquired divers of the interlocutors. "Barras," replied a voice, "and he will have the courage to accept!" On the instant, Vouland hastened to the tribune, and moved the nomination of the representative Barras as director of the armed force. The convention acquiesced in the suggestion, nominated Barras general-in-chief, and added seven other deputies to command under him, to wit, Fréron, Ferrand, Rovère, Delmas, Bolleti, Leonard-Bourdon, and Bourdon-de-l'Oise. Moreover, at the instance of a member of the assembly, a proposition not less important than the preceding was adopted, namely, the delegation of chosen representatives to the sections, for the purpose of enlightening them as to the true character of the contest, and soliciting from them the aid of their battalions. This resolution, in fact, was one of paramount necessity, as to decide the wavering and reclaim the deceived sections had become of extreme urgency.

Barras proceeded, immediately after his appointment, to the battalions already under arms, to intimate his authority and distribute them around the convention. The deputies commissioned to the sections repaired to their several destinations with the utmost promptitude. Even yet the majority of those bodies were undecided; at the same time, very few inclined towards the commune and Robespierre. Abhorrence at the atrocious system imputed to Robespierre, and aspirations for some event to deliver France therefrom, were almost universal. But terror still paralysed the citizens, insomuch that they dared not venture to declare themselves. The commune, which the sections were accustomed to obey, had summoned them, and several, shrinking from an open resistance, had sent delegates, not to coincide in the project of insurrection, but to take note of circumstances. Thus was Paris in a state of uncertainty and anxiety. The relatives and friends of prisoners, all who suffered from the existing state of things, issued from their domiciles, crept from street to street towards the places where noise prevailed, and eagerly sought to gather tidings. The unfortunate captives themselves, perceiving from their grated apertures an unusual commotion, and hearing the varied din, concluded some crisis was at hand, although they dreaded the result might but aggravate their calamitous lot. However, the growing uneasiness of the jailers, their whispers in the ears of the fabricators of lists, and the visible consternation following such revelations, were deemed of good omen, and partially dissipated their doubts. Ultimately they became aware, from divers involuntary expressions, that Robespierre was in danger; kinsmen came and planted themselves underneath the windows of the prisons, indicating by signs what was passing; then the captives, hurrying together, gave way to all the delirium of unbounded joy. The infamous delators, now trembling in their turn, took some of the suspected apart, and strove to justify themselves, by specious arguments, that they were not the authors of the lists of proscription. Others, avowing their guilt, sought to extenuate it by assurances that they had suppressed many names; one had furnished but forty out of two hundred demanded from him, another had erased entire catalogues. In their terror, these wretches commenced to recriminate, and to throw the burden of opprobrium from one to the other.

The deputies who visited the sections experienced little difficulty in prevailing against the obscure missionaries of the commune. Those of the sections which had detached their battalions to the town-hall remanded them, the remainder directed theirs towards the National Palace. That edifice was already surrounded by a sufficient force. Barras appeared before the convention to certify the fact, and then hastened to the plain of Les Sablons, in order to replace Labretèche, who was superseded, and bring the School of Mars to the succour of the convention.

The national representation now found itself secure against attack. In fact, the reverse contingency had arisen, and to march upon the commune, to assume the offensive it shrunk from adventuring, was feasible. A resolution to advance upon the town-hall was accordingly taken. Leonard-Bourdon, being at the head of numerous battalions, prepared to lead them onward. Appearing to announce his design of moving upon the rebels—"Go," said Tallien, who occupied the chair, "and may the sun on rising alight not on living conspirators!" Bourdon debouched by the quays, and thus reached the square in front of the town-hall.* An imposing array of gendarmes, artillery, and armed citizens from the sections, still occupied its spacious area. An agent of the committee of public welfare, named Dulac, had the courage to penetrate the hostile ranks and read the decree of the convention declaring the commune without the pale of the law. The habitual respect entertained for that assembly, in whose name the government had been conducted for two years, the reverence which the words law and republic inspired, operated magically. The battalions separated, some returning whence they came, others uniting with Leonard-Bourdon. The square of the commune remained vacant; those who guarded it and they who had just arrived to assault it, drew up in the surrounding streets so as to occupy all the avenues.

So impressive an idea of the determination of the conspirators prevailed, and so greatly did their apparent stillness in the town-hall amaze their assailants, that they hesitated to approach. Leonard-Bourdon apprehended they had planted a mine beneath the building. It was not so, however; they were deliberating in extreme confusion, proposing to write to the armies and the provinces, ignorant in whose name they ought to write, and completely intimidated from adopting any decisive part. If Robespierre had ventured, like a man of nerve and action, to show himself and march upon the convention, it had perchance been placed in jeopardy. But he was a mere rhetorician, and he felt, moreover, and all his partisans participated in the feeling, that public opinion had forsaken him. The end of the reign of terror had in truth arrived; the convention was universally obeyed, and

* [The names of several of the principal squares in Paris were frequently changed in the course of the revolution. The square now referred to was the celebrated Place de Grève, the scene of many a bloody tragedy from the earliest times of the old monarchy. A permanent gibbet stood in its centre during the middle ages.]

the proclamations of outlawry produced a miraculous effect. Had he been really endowed with greater energy, he must have been discouraged under such circumstances, so predominant above all individual force. When from the square in front the decree of outlawry reached the town-hall, all within it were struck as if by sudden stupor. Payan, who first obtained it, read it in a loud voice, and, with great presence of mind, added to the list of those placed without the pale of the law *the people of the galleries*, an addendum certainly not in the decree. Contrary to his expectation, however, the populace in the galleries stole terrified away, not caring to partake the anathema launched by the convention. Terrible presentiments then came across the conspirators. Henriot descended to harangue the artillerymen, but he looked in vain for a single defender. He exclaimed with an oath, "How! those wretches of gunners, who saved me a few hours ago, now abandon me!" Furious, he rescaled the flight of steps and apprised the council of this crowning disaster. The conspirators were plunged in despair; they saw themselves forsaken by their troops and encompassed on all sides by those of the convention. Mutual accusations began: each reproached the other with the common calamity. Coffinhal, an energetic man, and who had been badly seconded, assailed Henriot, saying to him—"Villain, it is thy cowardice that has ruined us!" With these words he rushed upon him, and, seizing him round the waist, hurled him out of a window. The miserable Henriot alighted on a heap of refuse, which, softening the fall, prevented its being mortal. Lebas fired a pistol at himself; Robespierre the younger threw himself out of a window; Saint-Just stood calm and motionless, a weapon in his hand, but without seeking to kill himself; Robespierre, too, eventually determined to close his career, and found in this extremity courage to attempt his own life. He drew a pistol upon himself, but the ball, striking beneath the lip, only pierced the cheek, and inflicted a severe though not dangerous wound.

At this moment, certain intrepid men—the agent Dulac, the gendarme Méda, and some others—leaving Bourdon with his battalions on the square, mounted the staircase, armed with swords and pistols, and entered the hall of the council precisely as the report of two shots came echoing from within. The municipal officers were preparing to throw aside their scarfs; but Dulac threatened to cut down the first who should attempt so to divest himself. None ventured to stir: the municipal officers, Payan, Fleuriot, Dumas, Coffinhal, &c., were seized, the wounded placed on shutters, and all carried in triumph to the convention. It was three in the morning. Shouts of victory rent the air, sending the gladdening sounds to reverberate even beneath the arches of the hall. The deputies instantly arose and vociferated, "Live liberty! Live the convention! Down with tyrants!" The president addressed them in these words: "Representatives, Robespierre and his accomplices are at the door of your hall: is it your pleasure that they be brought before you?" "No, no!" they responded from all sides; "to execution with the conspirators!"

Robespierre was transported, together with his companions, into the room of the committee of public welfare. He was stretched on a table, and a bundle of paper was placed under his head. He preserved his presence of mind, and betokened no emotion. He wore a blue coat, the same that he appeared in at the festival to the Supreme Being, nankeen trousers, and white stockings, which amidst the tumult he had allowed to fall over his shoes. The blood spouted from his wound, and he staunched it with the holster of a pistol. Those around presented him from time to time with pieces of paper, which he used to dry his face. He thus remained several hours, exposed to the curiosity and the insults of a multitude of people. When the surgeon arrived to dress his wound, he rose of himself, descended from the table, and moved into a chair. He underwent the painful operation of dressing without uttering the least complaint. He evinced the insensibility and sullenness of pride humiliated. He replied to no inquiries. He was subsequently removed, with Saint-Just, Couthon, and the others, to the Conciergerie. His brother and Henriot had been taken up half dead in the streets adjoining the town-hall.

The previous declaration of outlawry obviated the necessity of a trial: it was sufficient to prove identity The following morning, 10th Thermidor (28th July), the criminals appeared, to the number of twenty-one, before that tribunal to which they had consigned so many victims. Fouquier-Tinville produced evidence of identity, and at four in the afternoon obtained their condemnation to immediate death. The populace, who had long abstained from attending executions, thronged to the spectacle on this occasion with the utmost eagerness. The scaffold had been erected on the Place de la Revolution. An immense crowd filled the Street Saint Honoré, the Tuileries, and the large square itself. Numerous relatives of former victims followed the carts, vomiting imprecations: several approached, demanding to see Robespierre; the gendarmes pointed him out to them with the points of their swords. When the cavalcade had reached the scaffold, the executioners showed Robespierre to all the people; they tore away the bandage which bound his cheek, and drew from him the first exclamation he had yet uttered. He died with the impassibility he had manifested for the preceding hours. Saint-Just met death with the courage whereof he had always given proof. Couthon appeared in extreme trepidation. Henriot and Robespierre the younger were almost dead from the consequences of their fall. At every stroke of the fatal axe, loud cheers broke forth, and the crowd betokened extravagant joy. The rapture was general, indeed, throughout Paris. In the prisons hymns of thanksgiving were chanted; the captives embraced with a species of delirium, and paid even thirty francs for the newspapers containing a report of the late events. Although the convention had made no declaration of its purpose to abolish the system of terror, although the conquerors themselves were either the authors or the upholders of that very system, still it was universally deemed to be finished with Robespierre, so peculiarly had he drawn upon himself all its fearful odium.

Such was the fortunate catastrophe which checked the onward march of the revolution, and made it begin to retrograde. The revolution had, on the 14th July 1789, prostrated the old feudal constitution; on the 5th and 6th October, it had wrested the king from the court, in order to make sure of his person; subsequently, it had framed for itself a constitution, and intrusted its guardianship to the monarch, as upon trial. Soon regretting that confidence, and despairing to reconcile the court with liberty, it had invaded the Tuileries on the 10th August, and consigned Louis XVI. to a prison. Austria and Prussia advancing to destroy it, it threw—to use its own terrible language—it threw down, as the gage of combat, the heads of a king and six thousand captives: thus irrevocably committed in the contest, it engaged and repulsed the allies by a first effort. Its wrath doubled its enemies; the increase of foes and danger redoubled its wrath and lashed it into fury. It tore by violence, from the temple of the laws, men who were sincere republicans, but who, not comprehending its inexorable necessities, wished to moderate it. Then it had to contend with one-half of France, La Vendée, and Europe. As the consequence of this continual struggle between it and obstacles, with all the vicissitudes thereof acting and reacting, as well upon its opponents as upon its own wild rage, it reached the extreme point of danger and passion; it reared scaffolds in every city, and sent a million of men to the frontiers. Then, at once sub-

lime and atrocious, it administered affairs with a miraculous promptitude and a profound sagacity, whilst it destroyed with a blind fury. Converted, by the exigency of a concentrated action, from a turbulent democracy into an absolute dictatorship, it became regular, silent, and formidable. During the latter months of 1793 and the commencement of 1794, it proceeded with unanimity, the result of imminent peril. But victory having crowned its efforts at the close of 1793, occasion of discord arose, for then generous and manly hearts, calmed by success, raised and responded to the cry of "Mercy to the vanquished!" But all hearts were not yet mollified; the safety of the revolution was not manifest to all minds; the commiseration of some stimulated the fury of others, and an extravagant party appeared, which would have resolved all government into a tribunal of death. The dictatorship smote the two new parties which embarrassed its course. Hébert, Ronsin, and Vincent, perished with Danton and Camille-Desmoulins. The revolution thus continued its career, achieved a glorious renown in the beginning of 1794, defeated combined Europe, and struck it with dismay. This was the moment when pity ought finally to have superseded wrath. But it happened according to all precedent: on the incident of a day it was determined to graft a system of endurance. The chiefs of the government had systematised violence and cruelty; and even when the dangers were past and passions had subsided, they insisted still upon continued slaughter; but general abhorrence was unequivocally expressed. Opposition they prepared to stifle by the habitual mode—death! Then a cry of indignation sprung simultaneously from their rivals in power and from their threatened colleagues, and that cry was the signal for an universal outbreak. It took an interval to shake off the deadening influence of fear; but finally courage was inspired, and the reign of terror was subverted.

It may be asked, what would have resulted had Robespierre been victorious? The state of abandonment in which he found himself proves that it was impossible. But, supposing him successful, he must have either yielded to the general feeling or succumbed somewhat later. Like all usurpers, he would have been impelled to substitute a mild and tranquil government for the horrors of incessant strife. But, in truth, the part of an usurper was for him impracticable. The French revolution was on too vast a scale to permit the same man, a deputy in the Constituent Assembly of 1789, to be proclaimed emperor or protector in the cathedral of Notre Dame in 1804. In a country less advanced and of smaller confines, such as England was, where the same individual might be both delegate and general, and actually unite those two characters, a Cromwell was able to enact the parts of a factionist at the commencement, and of an usurping soldier at the end. But in a revolution extending over so wide a surface as the French, where war was so terrible and predominant, and where the same individual could not occupy both the tribune and the camp, the factionists first destroyed each other; and after them came soldiers, one of whom remained the ultimate master.

It was not reserved for Robespierre, therefore, to act the usurper in France. Still, how came it to pass that he survived all those famous revolutionists, who were so superior in genius and might to himself—Danton, for example? Robespierre possessed undeniable integrity; and to captivate the masses, an unsullied reputation is essential. He was devoid of pity—a quality which, in revolutions, ruins those who hearken to its impulses. He had, moreover, in a supreme degree, that stubborn and indomitable self-sufficiency and assumption which weighs so influentially with mankind. These qualifications were sufficient to ensure his survival beyond all his contemporary rivals. But he was of the worst order of men. A zealot without passions, lacking the vices, doubtless, to which they expose, but equally so the courage, the magnanimity, and the sensibility which usually accompany them, exclusively wrapped up in his pride and dogma, hiding in the hour of danger, and reappearing to gather homage after the victory was secured by others, he presents himself to our contemplation as one of the most odious beings who have ever domineered over men, and we should say also one of the most vile, did we not acknowledge his strong conviction and his undeviating rectitude.

CHAPTER XXXVI.

CONSEQUENCES OF THE 9TH THERMIDOR.—MODIFICATIONS OF THE REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT.—SUSPENSION OF THE REVOLUTIONARY TRIBUNAL AND LIBERATION OF THE SUSPECTED.—THE CONVENTION DIVIDED INTO TWO PARTIES—THE MOUNTAINEERS AND THE THERMIDORIANS.—STATE OF THE FINANCES, OF TRADE, AND OF AGRICULTURE, AFTER THE REIGN OF TERROR.—NUMEROUS DECREES REGULATING THE ADMINISTRATION.—THE REMAINS OF MARAT TRANSPORTED TO THE PANTHEON AND DEPOSITED IN THE PLACE OCCUPIED BY MIRABEAU'S.

The events of the 9th and 10th Thermidor produced a paroxysm of joy, which several days were insufficient to moderate. Not only in Paris, but throughout all France, the gladness was supreme. A number of persons, who had quitted the provinces to seek concealment in the metropolis, threw themselves into the public conveyances, to regain their abodes and carry tidings of the common deliverance. On the way they were stopped at every interval by eager crowds clamorous to learn the details. Every where, as the happy intelligence transpired, citizens, who had for many months forsaken their domiciles, re-entered them in confidence, and others, long secluded in subterranean darkness, ventured into the light of day. The captives who peopled the countless prisons of France, began to indulge hopes of liberty, or at least to dismiss fears of death.

The precise nature of the revolution just effected was not investigated; how far the surviving members of the committee of public welfare were disposed to persist in the revolutionary system, or to what extent the convention might participate in their views, were considerations not heeded: the one great event, the death of Robespierre, was alone beheld and comprehended. It was he who had been the head of the government; to him were imputed the incarcerations, the executions, all the enormities, in short, of the late tyranny. Robespierre dead, it seemed as if all must change and assume a new aspect.

At all times, public expectation, consequent upon the occurrence of some great event, becomes an irresistible influence, to which rulers must more or less defer. Thus, after two days devoted to receiving congratulations, hearing addresses, all echoing the same cry, "Catiline is no more—the republic is saved!" recompensing individual acts of courage, and voting memorials to render the day of the 9th for ever famous, the convention directed attention to the measures its new situation demanded.

The popular commissions instituted to select individuals for detention, the revolutionary tribunal compounded by Robespierre, and the public accuser Fouquier-Tinville, still remained in authority, and needed but a signal of encouragement to continue their ruthless proceedings. In the sitting even of the 11th Thermidor (29th July), a motion was made and passed for subjecting the popular commissions to a process of purgation. Elie-Lacoste solicited attention to the revolutionary tribunal, and proposed its suspension until it were reorganised upon different principles and composed of other individuals. The proposal of Elie-Lacoste was adopted; and, at the same time, in order

to avoid delay in trying Robespierre's accomplices, it was agreed to nominate a provisional commission to supersede the revolutionary tribunal. In the evening sitting, Barrère, in his habitual character of reporter, appeared to announce a further achievement—the entry of the French into Liege; and afterwards digressed to the existing condition of the committees, which had been reduced at various times, by executions and missions, in the number of members. Robespierre, Saint-Just, and Couthon, had expired on the scaffold the previous day. Herault-Séchelles had died with Danton. Jean-Bon-Saint-André and Prieur [de-la-Marne] were on missions. The acting members on the committee of public welfare consisted only of Carnot, who attended exclusively to the war department; Prieur [de-la-Côte-d'Or], charged with the care of arsenals and magazines; Robert Lindet, with the superintendence of supplies and of trade; Billaud-Varennes and Collot-d'Herbois, with the management of correspondence with the administrative bodies; and, lastly, Barrère, with the preparation of reports. Out of twelve, therefore, but six remained. The committee of general safety was more complete, and pronounced fully adequate to its duties. Barrère proposed to replace the three members recently executed by three new members, for the interval occurring until the general renewal of the committees, which was fixed for the 20th of each month—a form that had ceased to be observed since the ascendancy of the dictatorship. Hereby important considerations were suggested:—Ought all the men who had formed part of the late government to be cashiered? Ought not only the men but the principles and constitution of the committees to be changed, precautions taken against their undue influence, their powers curtailed; in a word, a complete revolution effected in the administration of the government?

Such were the questions started by Barrère's proposition. First, exception was taken to the form of proceeding, whereby the convention was suddenly and dictatorially asked to nominate members for the committee the same day they were proposed. It was thereupon moved that the list of names submitted be printed, and the appointment adjourned. Dubois-Crancé went further, and complained of the prolonged absence of members of the committees. "If Herault-Séchelles," he said, "had been replaced, if Prieur-de-la-Marne and Jean-Bon-Saint-André had not been left constantly on missions, a majority would have been more certain, and less hesitation manifested in attacking the triumvirs." He subsequently maintained that men grew indolent in power, and otherwise contracted dangerous habits. In consequence, he recommended a decree, providing that, for the future, no member of the committees should be competent to accept missions; and that a fourth part of each committee should be renewed every month. Cambon, urging the discussion still further, alleged that the entire government required a fresh organisation. The committee of public welfare, he represented, had monopolised all affairs, whence it resulted that the members, albeit toiling day and night, were unequal to the burden imposed upon them, whilst the committees of finance, legislation, and general safety, were reduced to complete nullity. A new distribution of functions, therefore, was essential, in order to prevent the committee of public welfare being overwhelmed with business and the other committees practically annihilated.

The discussion being thus provoked, an assault was threatened on all portions of the revolutionary government. But Bourdon-de-l'Oise, whose opposition to Robespierre's system was well known, inasmuch as he had been marked for one of his first victims, checked this premature movement. He said that France had long possessed an able and vigorous government, to which the safety of the country and many signal victories were owing; that great peril might ensue from imprudently interfering with its organisation; that all the hopes of the aristocrats would be thereby resuscitated; and that, whilst guarding against a new tyranny, still infinite caution should be observed in modifying an institution productive of so many great results. However, Tallien, the hero of the 9th, argued that at least certain questions might be now entertained, and that their immediate decision could be attended with no danger. Why, for example, not decree on the instant that a fourth of the members of the committees should go out in rotation every month? This proposition of Dubois-Crancé, thus reproduced by Tallien, was hailed with enthusiasm, and adopted amid cries of "Long live the republic!" To this measure the deputy Delmas advocated an addition. Addressing the assembly, he said, "You have now stifled ambition at its source; to complete your decree, I move you to decide that no member shall be eligible to re-enter a committee within a month after leaving it." This resolution, greeted like the preceding, was instantly passed. These principles being thus sanctioned, it was eventually agreed that to a commission should be delegated the task of presenting a new project for the organisation of the governing committees.

On the following day, six members were chosen, to replace those dead or absent, on the committee of public welfare. On this occasion, the nominations submitted by Barrère were not confirmed. The choice of the convention fell on Tallien, in remembrance of his courage; on Bréard, Thuriot, and Treilhard, members of the first committee of public welfare; and on the two deputies Laloi and Eschasseriaux the elder, the latter of whom was conversant in matters of finance and political economy. The committee of general safety was likewise remodelled. Three of its mem bers were objects of general odium—David, obnoxious as a reputed adherent of Robespierre, and Jagot and Lavicomterie, accused of having exercised their inquisitorial powers in a revolting manner. Numerous voices demanded their displacement, and it was decreed. The assembly appointed, to succeed them and complete the committee of general safety, several of the champions who had distinguished themselves on the 9th Thermidor—Legendre, Merlin de Thionville, Goupilleau de Fontenay, André Dumont, Jean Debry, and Bernard de Saintes. It subsequently rescinded the law of the 22d Prairial by an unanimous vote. Complaints were then vehemently urged against the decree which permitted the incarceration of a deputy without a preliminary hearing before the convention—that fatal decree, which had consigned to death many eminent victims yet cherished in recollection, Danton, Camille-Desmoulins, Herault-Séchelles, &c. The decree was abrogated. All these measures, however, only affected the substance of things, and there were men against whom the public resentment was fierce and inexorable. "All Paris," exclaimed Legendre, "invokes you for the justly merited punishment of Fouquier-Tinville!" The suggestion was immediately acted upon, and Fouquier decreed under impeachment. "We can no longer sit by the side of Lebon!" cried another voice; and all eyes were turned on the proconsul who had deluged the town of Arras with blood, and whose excesses had provoked remonstrance even in the time of Robespierre. Lebon was forthwith declared in a state of arrest. The storm next fell on David, who had been at first merely excluded from the committee of general safety, and he was placed under arrest. The like proceeding was adopted against Héron, the principal agent of the police instituted by Robespierre; against General Rossignol, heretofore well known; and against Hermann, president of the revolutionary tribunal previous to Dumas, afterwards appointed, through the influence of Robespierre, head of the commission of police and courts of justice.

Thus the revolutionary tribunal was suspended, the law of the 22d Prairial repealed, the committees of

public welfare and general safety partially recomposed, and the principal agents of the late dictatorship arrested and criminated. The character of the last revolution was fixed, and the impulse given to hopes and appeals of every kind. The detained who filled the prisons, and their families, now congratulated themselves on the prospect of enjoying the fruits of the 9th Thermidor. Anterior to this happy moment, the relatives of the suspected dared not reclaim, even to substantiate the most legitimate reasons, under the apprehension either of awakening the attention of Fouquier-Tinville or of being themselves immured for soliciting in favour of aristocrats. The dreary interval of terror had, however, at length elapsed. The sections, which had been long abandoned to the sans-culottes, who received forty sous a-day, began again to be frequented, and were speedily filled with individuals now emerging from the deepest seclusion, relatives of prisoners, and fathers, brothers, or sons of victims immolated by the revolutionary tribunal. The desire of delivering their kinsmen animated several, the thirst of vengeance incited others. In all the sections the liberation of the detained was advocated, and deputations were sent to the convention craving a decree in conformity. These petitions were referred to the committee of general safety, whose duty it was to superintend the application of the law of the suspected. Although it still contained the greater number of those who had signed the warrants of arrest, the bias of circumstances and the infusion of new members necessarily inclined it to lenity. It commenced, in fact, to issue orders of discharge in great profusion. Certain of its members—Legendre, Merlin, and others—visited the prisons to gather complaints, and inspired infinite gladness by their words and presence; their colleagues, sitting day and night, entertained the pleas of relatives, who attended in crowds to obtain adjudications of release. The committee was instructed to examine whether the alleged suspected had been incarcerated on grounds set forth in the law of the 17th September, and whether such grounds were specified in the warrants of arrest. This was merely reverting to the law of the 17th September in its more strict interpretation and execution; but it in truth sufficed to empty the prisons almost entirely. The precipitation of the revolutionary agents had been so great, that they were accustomed to apprehend without particularising the assigned motives, or giving the prisoners intimation thereof. Accordingly, liberations proceeded as multitudinously as the previous detentions. The joy, if less boisterous, became then more heartfelt; it communicated to families who recovered a father, a son, or a brother, of whom they had been long deprived, and whom they had given up as doomed to the scaffold. Men now poured forth from the prisons whom their reserve or their connexions had rendered obnoxious to a suspicious authority, and many, also, in whom even an accredited patriotism had not availed to pardon opposition. That young general, who, concentrating the two armies of the Moselle and the Rhine on a single flank of the Vosges, had raised the blockade of Landau by a movement worthy of the greatest captains, Hoche, immured for his resistance to the committee of public welfare, was released, and restored to his family and the armies which he was again to lead on to victory. Kilmaine, too, who saved the army of the North by evacuating Cæsar's Camp in August 1793, and imprisoned for that admirable retreat, likewise recovered his liberty. That young and beautiful female, who had gained so beneficial a sway over Tallien, and had never ceased to stimulate his courage from the recesses of her prison, was delivered by him and made his wife. The liberations, in fact, increased after a geometrical ratio, although the solicitations with which the committee was besieged seemed still numerous as ever. "Victory," said Barrère, "has produced an epoch in which the country may be indulgent without danger, and deem incivic errors effaced by an interval of confinement. The committees labour continuously to decide on claims of freedom, and to repair individual mistakes or injustice. Shortly the trace of personal vengeance will disappear from the soil of the republic; but the concourse of suitors of both sexes at the doors of the committee of general safety only tend to retard exertions so advantageous to the public. We grant the impatience of families to be natural under the circumstances; but why delay, by solicitations irksome to legislators, and by assemblages inconveniently tumultuous, the rapid course that national justice ought to take at this period?"

The committee of general safety was in truth assailed by importunities of every kind. Females especially exerted their influence to procure acts of clemency, even in behalf of known enemies of the revolution. More than one deception was practised on the committee: the Dukes d'Aumont and De Valentinois were released under supposititious names, and a great number of others obtained enlargement by similar devices. But little positive danger could thence accrue; for, as Barrère had truly stated, victory had introduced an epoch in which the republic might securely become lenient and benign. At the same time, the report that many undoubted aristocrats were being liberated, was calculated to revive revolutionary distrust, and rupture the unanimity wherewith the measures of mildness and concord were at present greeted.

The sections, meanwhile, had become scenes of agitation and tumult. The relatives of prisoners or of victims, the suspected recently liberated, and all, indeed, to whom freedom of speech was restored, as might have been anticipated, clamoured not only for reparation of past injuries, but also for vengeance on the wrong-doers. An inveterate feeling more particularly prevailed against the revolutionary committees, and they were bitterly assailed. It was proposed to remodel, even to abolish them; and these angry discussions provoked sundry disturbances in Paris. The section of Montreuil appeared before the convention to denounce the arbitrary acts of its revolutionary committee; that of the French Pantheon declared its committee had forfeited its confidence; and that of the Social Contract likewise adopted severe resolutions touching the conduct of its revolutionary committee, and appointed a commission to investigate its records.

These movements were indicative of a natural reaction on the part of the moderate class, long awed into silence and fear by the inquisitors of the revolutionary committees, and could scarcely fail to attract the attention of the Mountain.

That redoubtable Mountain had not perished with Robespierre, but yet survived to play a part. Certain of its members were steadfastly convinced of the integrity and loyalty of Robespierre's intentions, and refused to believe he contemplated usurpation. They regarded him as the victim of Danton's friends and of the corrupt party, the remains whereof he had been unable to destroy; but a very trifling minority held that opinion. The majority of the Mountaineers, sincere and enthusiastic republicans, viewing with abhorrence every project of exclusive dominion, had aided in accomplishing the 9th Thermidor, less to subvert a sanguinary government than to smite a rising Cromwell. Doubtless, revolutionary justice, such as it had become under the auspices of Robespierre, Saint-Just, Couthon, Fouquier-Tinville, and Dumas, was revolting to their feelings; but they intended in no degree to relax the energy of the government or to spare what was called aristocracy. The greater part were upright and rigid men, strangers to the dictatorship and to its acts, and by no means interested in vindicating it; but they were likewise jealous revolutionists, averse to the 9th Thermidor resulting in a reaction and turning to the advantage of a party. Amongst

the members of the convention who had coalesced to overthrow the dictatorship, they beheld with secret aversion men who passed for knaves and extortioners, friends of Chabot and Fabre-d'Eglantine, members, in short, of the so-much-decried venal, jobbing, and debauched party. They had seconded them against Robespierre, but they were prepared to oppose them if they perceived any tendency towards checking revolutionary energy, or converting the late events into a means of exalting any faction whatsoever. Danton had been accused of corruption, federalism, Orleanism, royalism; therefore it is not surprising that suspicions of a like nature arose against his now triumphant friends. At the same time, no attack was yet made; but the numerous liberations and the general demonstration against the revolutionary system began to awaken solicitude.

The veritable authors of the 9th Thermidor, numbering fifteen or twenty, of whom the principal were Legendre, Fréron, Tallien, Merlin-de-Thionville, Barras, Thuriot, Bourdon [de-l'Oise], Dubois-Crancé, and Lecointre of Versailles, were not more disposed than their colleagues towards royalism and a counter-revolution; but, excited by the danger they had incurred and the arduous struggle so recently maintained, they pronounced more decidedly against the revolutionary laws. Moreover, they partook in a much greater degree that feeling of commiseration which had ruined their friends Danton and Desmoulins. Encompassed, extolled, importuned, they became more committed than their colleagues of the Mountain to the system of clemency. It is possible, indeed, that some amongst them were drawn into involuntary beneficence by their new position. To render services to disconsolate families, to receive testimonies of overflowing gratitude, to soothe the bitterness of past affliction, had charms to tempt more obdurate men than they. Be that as it may, already those who distrusted their complaisant mood, and likewise those who placed future hopes in the dawning change, gave them a peculiar appellation—they called them *Thermidorians*.

Contentions frequently occurred on the subject of liberations. Thus, for example, on the recommendation of a deputy in behalf of an individual from his department, the committee ordered his release; shortly a deputy of the same department appeared to complain of this order, affirming that the committee had enlarged a pure aristocrat. Such disputes often recurring, and the confluence of numerous undoubted enemies of the revolution, who came forth beaming with joyful anticipations, led to a measure which was adopted without much importance being attached to it at the moment. This was a resolution that the list of all the individuals discharged by orders from the committee of general safety should be printed, and that opposite the name of each such person should be specified the names of those who had pleaded for him and who had answered for his principles.

This measure produced a most painful impression. Still mindful of the tyranny they had so recently endured, many citizens were alarmed to perceive their names commemorated on a list which might hereafter serve as a foundation for fresh severities, if the system of terror were ever re-established. Several of those who had solicited and obtained liberations deeply regretted their interference, whilst others shrunk from advocating any further claims. In the sections, numerous speakers inveighed against a measure so calculated to throw gloom over the public joy and confidence, and strenuously insisted it ought to be revoked.

On the 26th Thermidor (13th August), an incidental discussion arose in the convention, touching the agitation prevailing in the sections of Paris. The section of Montreuil had attended to denounce its revolutionary committee, and received for answer that it should address its complaints to the committee of general safety. Duhem, deputy for Lille, a personage unconnected with the acts of the late dictatorship, but a friend of Billaud-Varennes, partaking all his opinions, and firmly convinced that the revolutionary authority ought not to be relaxed in rigour, rose and expressed himself with peculiar vehemence against aristocracy and moderatism, which, he averred, "were already rearing their audacious heads, and concluding that the 9th Thermidor had been effected for their benefit." Baudot and Taillefer, who had manifested a courageous resistance under the supremacy of Robespierre, but were equally uncompromising Mountaineers as Duhem, together with Vadier, famous as a member of the old committee of general safety, likewise maintained that aristocracy was in activity, and that, whilst the government showed itself just, it ought also to remain inflexible. Granet of Marseilles, who sat upon the Mountain, submitted a motion which tended to augment the excitement of the assembly. He moved that the prisoners already liberated, whose sureties failed to furnish their names within a given period, should be again incarcerated. This proposition caused a general commotion. Bourdon, Lecointre, and Merlin de Thionville, opposed it with their utmost strength. The discussion, as generally happens on such occasions, travelled from the immediate subject to the political position, and much acrimony was displayed in assailing the views respectively attributed on the hostile sides. "It is time," exclaimed Merlin de Thionville, "that all the factions be debarred from using the steps of Robespierre's throne. Nothing ought to be done by halves, and yet it must be granted, the convention, in the day of the 9th Thermidor, did many things incompletely. But if it left tyrants here, they ought at least to keep silence." Much applause greeted Merlin's words, which were addressed chiefly to Vadier, one of those who had most strongly inveighed against the movements in the sections. Legendre occupied the tribune after Merlin. "The committee is well aware," he said, "that it has been trepanned into the release of certain aristocrats; but the number is not great, and they will soon be reimprisoned. Why perpetually accuse each other? Why regard one another as enemies, when our intentions link us together? Let us moderate our passions, if we would assure and accelerate the success of the revolution. Citizens, I move you to repeal the law of the 23d, which commands the publication of the lists of released citizens. That law has dissipated public joy and frozen all hearts."

Tallien succeeded Legendre. He was heard with profound attention as the principal of the Thermidorians. "For several days," he said, "all good citizens have perceived with grief that endeavours are making to divide you, and to rekindle those animosities which were thought to be buried in the tomb of Robespierre. On entering here, a note was handed me, intimating that several members were to be attacked in this sitting. Doubtless they are enemies of the republic who give currency to such reports: let us beware how we promote their designs by our dissensions." Plaudits interrupted Tallien: he resumed. "Imitators of Robespierre," he exclaimed, "expect no success! The convention is determined to perish rather than suffer a new tyranny. The convention desires an inflexible but also a just government. It is possible that some patriots have been deceived regarding certain prisoners; we do not hold the infallibility of men. But let the individuals improperly liberated be denounced, and they will be recommitted. For myself, I here declare, in all sincerity, that I prefer seeing twenty aristocrats at large to-day, who can be retaken to-morrow, rather than endure the consciousness that one patriot remained in durance. What! the republic with its twelve hundred thousand armed citizens, afraid of a few aristocrats! No—it is too great; it can at all times discover and put its enemies to confusion."

The cheers which had often interrupted Tallien in his speech resounded still more vociferously on its conclusion. After much general recrimination, the

discussion reverted to the law of the 23d, and to the additional clause which Granet proposed for insertion therein. The advocates of the law maintained, that none could fear publicity in the performance of a patriotic act, such as appealing in behalf of a citizen unjustly confined. Its opponents replied, that nothing was more dangerous than such lists; that those of the twenty thousand and of the eight thousand had been the occasion of continual uneasiness; that all whose names were thereon inscribed had lived in terror; and that, were no other tyranny to be apprehended, the individuals recorded in the new lists would never enjoy tranquillity. Eventually a compromise was offered. Bourdon submitted a motion to the effect that the names of the enfranchised prisoners should be printed, without the addition of those who had solicited the liberations. This suggestion was accepted, and a resolution passed that the names of the discharged alone should be published. Tallien, who was not satisfied with this surrender, immediately presented himself in the tribune. "Since you have determined," he said, "to publish the list of the citizens restored to liberty, you cannot consistently withhold that of the citizens who caused their incarceration. It is equally fitting that we know those who denounced and immured good patriots." The assembly, somewhat taken by surprise, found the proposition just, and forthwith adopted it. Scarcely had the vote been taken, however, ere several members protested. "This is a list," said they, "which will stand in opposition to the former: *it involves civil war!*" The phrase was repeated in the hall, and numerous voices exclaimed, "It involves civil war!" "Yes," resumed Tallien, who again mounted the tribune—"yes, *it is civil war!* I think with you. Your two decrees will set in distinct array two classes of men who can never forgive each other. But I wished, in proposing the second decree, to make you sensible of the inconvenience of the first. Now, I move you to rescind both." From all quarters the exclamation arose, "Yes, yes! the repeal of both decrees!" Amar himself coincided, and the two decrees were recalled. All publication of lists was thus averted, the result of Tallien's bold and adroit surprise on the assembly.

This sitting restored confidence to many in whom alarm was again becoming predominant; but it at the same time proved that all animosities were not reconciled nor all struggles terminated. Every party had now been struck in its turn, and shorn of its most eminent members: the royalists at several eras; the Girondists on the 31st May; the Dantonists in Germinal; the ultra-Mountaineers on the 9th Thermidor. But if the more distinguished leaders had perished, the parties themselves survived; for such confederacies are rarely crushed by a single mischance, but even in their crippled state continue a more cautious agitation. These parties, then, were henceforth to contend for the direction of the revolution, and to recommence an arduous and merciless career. It seems, in sooth, that when the minds of men have been urged by the stimulus of danger to the acmé of excitement, it is only by slow degrees they can subside into pristine calmness; whilst, in the interim, power is grasped alternately by the struggling factions, and one remorseless combat of passions, systems, and ambition, waged.

After devoting its earliest attention to the mitigation of unnecessary severity, the convention turned to the organisation of the committees and of the provisional government, intended, as has been often mentioned, to rule France until the era of a general peace. A preliminary discussion had occurred, as we remember, respecting the committee of public welfare; and the whole question had been referred to a commission, with special instructions to digest and present a new project. The subject was one of imperative urgency, and the assembly entered upon it with the commencement of Thermidor. The difficulty of the position lay in steering between two opposite systems and dangers—between the fear, on the one hand, of weakening the authority intrusted with the safety of the revolution, and the dread, on the other, of restoring the tyranny. The tendency of men is to feel undue alarm at perils that are past, and to adopt precautions against what cannot recur. The tyranny of the late committee of public welfare had sprung from the necessity of fulfilling an extraordinary task amidst obstacles the most harassing and various. Certain men had taken upon themselves to perform what a large assembly could or dared not attempt with any hope of success; and, engrossed by unprecedented labours for a period of fifteen months, it had been impossible for them either to assign the grounds of their proceedings, or to render an account of them to the convention, save in a general manner: they had not had time even to deliberate amongst themselves, and each governed in the department committed to him as absolute master. They had thus become so many involuntary dictators, whom circumstances rather than ambition invested with uncontrolled power. Now that the task was almost accomplished, and the season of extreme peril past, no occasion remained to warrant or render feasible any similar authority. It partook of the puerile to guard so anxiously against a danger practically impossible; nay, this very wariness might be productive of serious evil, by relaxing authority and depriving it of energy. Twelve hundred thousand men had been raised, provisioned, armed, and conducted to the frontiers; but their further maintenance and direction were essential as heretofore, and required continued vigilance, joined to great capacity and extensive powers.

The principle of partially renewing the committees every month had been already adopted; and, at the same time, a resolution had been passed, that the retiring members should be ineligible for re-election during a month. These two conditions, framed to prevent a new dictatorship, likewise prevented all effective administration. In a ministry constantly fluctuating, coherency, continuous application, or secrecy, was impracticable. Scarcely was a member initiated in affairs, ere he was compelled to forego their management; and though a peculiar aptitude were manifested, as by Carnot for war, Prieur [de-la-Côte-d'Or] and Robert Lindet for civil administration, and Cambon for finance, still such superior talent was lost to the state at the term fixed; for the mere absence during a month, required by the law, rendered almost nugatory the advantages of a subsequent re-election.

But the spirit of reaction was irresistible. An extreme concentration of power was to be succeeded by an equally extreme dissemination, hazardous in the opposite tendency. The former committee of public welfare, being intrusted with the exercise of sovereign control over all that concerned the well-being of the state, had enjoyed the prerogative of summoning the other committees before it, and constraining them to render an account of their operations; whereby it had contrived to appropriate every important function in the department of each. To prevent such encroachments for the future, the new system of organisation separated and specified the jurisdictions of the committees, and constituted them mutually independent. Sixteen were established:—

1. The committee of public welfare.
2. The committee of general safety.
3. The committee of finance.
4. The committee of legislation.
5. The committee of public instruction.
6. The committee of agriculture and arts.
7. The committee of trade and supplies.
8. The committee of public works.
9. The committee of post-conveyances.
10. The military committee.
11. The committee of the navy and colonies.

12. The committee of public aids.
13. The committee of division.
14. The committee of minutes and records.
15. The committee of petitions, correspondence, and dispatches.
16. The committee of curators of the national palace.

The committee of public welfare was composed of twelve members. It retained the direction of military and diplomatic operations; it was charged with the levy and equipment of armies, the choice of generals, the plans of campaigns, &c.; but its powers were confined within those limits. The committee of general safety, composed of sixteen members, had the police assigned it; that of finance, composed of forty-eight members, had the management of the revenue, the exchequer, the coinage, assignats, &c. The committees were empowered to unite for objects of common concernment. Thus, the absolute authority of the former committee of public welfare was superseded by a number of rival boards, liable to embarrass and interfere with each other in their action. Such was the new organisation of the government.

Other reforms, deemed equally exigible, were effected at the same time. The revolutionary committees, established in the smallest towns, and authorised to execute inquisitorial functions therein, were the most vexatious and abhorred of all the institutions attributed to the Robespierre faction. With the view of restraining their obnoxious activity, their number was reduced to one in each district; provided, however, that one must be maintained in every borough containing eight thousand inhabitants, whether it were the district capital or not. In Paris, the number was curtailed from forty-eight to twelve. These committees were henceforth to be composed of twelve members; the signature of three members at least was declared essential to the validity of a writ, and of seven to substantiate a warrant of arrest. Like the superior committees, they were subjected to a monthly renewal of one-fourth part. These regulations were accompanied by another not less important in its operation, namely, a decree prohibiting the sectional assemblies from being held more than once in a decade, appointing the *decadis* or tenth days for such meetings, and disallowing the further payment of forty sous to the citizens attending them. This measure had the effect of confining democracy within narrower limits, by rendering popular assemblages more rare, and especially by depriving the lower classes of the remuneration previously granted for their presence. A practice was thus abolished which had degenerated into a monstrous abuse in Paris. It had been usual to pay in each section twelve hundred members as present, whilst scarcely three hundred were actually in attendance. Those present had been accustomed to answer for the absent —a service alternately performed and returned. Now, that operative militia, so long devoted to Robespierre, found itself discarded and constrained to labour.

One of the most important determinations taken by the convention was aimed at the individuals composing the local authorities, revolutionary committees, municipalities, &c., who were appointed to undergo a process of purgation. In those bodies, as we have previously intimated, the most ardent revolutionists were comprised—men who in each locality had played the part of Robespierre, Saint-Just, and Couthon at Paris, and exercised their sway with all the brutality of inferior demagogues. The decree of the revolutionary government, suspending the constitution until the return of peace, had postponed elections of every description, in order to avoid disturbance and to maintain authority in approved hands. The convention, for reasons perfectly similar, that is to say, in order to prevent collisions between the Jacobins and the aristocrats, confirmed the dispositions of that decree, and merely empowered the representatives on missions to purge the administrations throughout France. By this expedient it secured to itself the selection and control of the local authorities, and averted the ebullition of faction against faction.

Lastly, the revolutionary tribunal, recently suspended, was restored to activity. The judges and jurymen not being yet all nominated, those actually appointed were to assume their functions *ad interim*, and try prisoners according to the laws in force prior to the decree of the 22d Prairial. Those laws were of a sufficiently formidable character; but the men who had been chosen to apply them, and the aptitude of extraordinary tribunals to obey the spirit of the government that calls them into existence, were guarantees against fresh cruelties.

All these measures were adopted between the 1st and the 15th of Fructidor (end of August). Still one invaluable privilege remained to be adjusted—the liberty of the press. No law prescribed restrictions upon it; in the declaration of rights it was even recognised in an unlimited sense; but it had been practically interdicted under the reign of terror. A single indiscreet word sufficing to compromise the life of a citizen, it would have argued reckless temerity to essay authorship. The fate of the lamented Camille-Desmoulins had significantly proved the real thraldom of the press in recent times. Durand-Maillane, an ex-constituent, and one of those timid characters who had shrunk into complete nullity during the storms of the revolutionary era, was the first to demand that the liberty of the press should be again formally asserted. "We have never been able," said that exemplary personage to his colleagues, "to utter our sentiments within these walls, without being exposed to insults and menaces. If you wish our opinions in the discussions hereafter to arise, if you wish that we may contribute our information to the common stock, you must give fresh securities to those who are disposed either to speak or to write."

A few days thereafter, Fréron, the friend and associate of Barras in his mission to Toulon, the intimate of Danton and of Camille-Desmoulins, and since their death a determined enemy of the committee of public welfare, raised his voice in support of Durand-Maillane, and moved the grant of unlimited freedom to the press. Opinions were divided. Those who had lived in constraint under the late dictatorship, and longed to express their ideas upon all subjects without hazard, those who were inclined to react energetically against the revolution, argued in favour of a formal declaration guaranteeing the liberty of thought, written or spoken. The Mountaineers, foreboding the use to which this license might be converted, seeing in embryo the tirades contemplated against all the individuals who had exercised any functions during the terror; and many others also, who, without having personal fears, duly appreciated the dangerous weapon proposed to be conferred on the counter-revolutionists, already swarming in all quarters—all these opposed an express declaration. They alleged as their reasons, that the declaration of rights consecrated the liberty of the press; that to acknowledge it anew was useless, since it was proclaiming a recognised right; and that, if it were intended to render the license unfettered, such a purpose was imprudent and impolitic. "Would you then permit royalism to spring up again," asked Bourdon-de-l'Oise and Cambon, "and publish whatsoever it may please against the institution of the republic?" The proposition was referred to the competent committees, to consider the expediency of a fresh declaration.

Thus the provisional government, framed to direct the revolution until the advent of peace, was integrally modified in accordance with the lenient and generous principles manifested since the 9th Thermidor. The governing committees, the revolutionary tribunal, the local administrations, were reorganised or purged; the liberty of the press was vindicated, and all announced a new era.

The effect these reforms were calculated to produce

was not long in becoming apparent. Hitherto, the party of ultra-revolutionists had occupied the seats of government itself; it monopolised the committees and swayed the convention; it reigned supreme at the Jacobin Clubs, and filled the municipal administrations and the revolutionary committees wherewith all France was ramified. Now dispossessed, it began to find itself utterly excluded from the government, and to form a hostile faction against it.

The Jacobin Club had been suspended during the night of the 9th-10th Thermidor. Legendre had closed their hall, and deposited the keys on the table of the convention. The keys were restored, and the society was permitted to be reconstituted, on condition of undergoing purification. Fifteen of the oldest members were appointed to investigate the conduct of the whole fraternity on the night of the 9th Thermidor. They were enjoined to admit those only who, during that famous night, had been at their posts as citizens, instead of attending at the commune to conspire against the convention. Pending this purgation, the former members were allowed to occupy the hall as provisional members. The scrutiny being commenced, it was found that a strict inquiry touching each of them would involve great delay and difficulty; wherefore the censors were content to pass them through an interrogatory, and adjudicate on their replies. In how indulgent a spirit such an examination was likely to be conducted may be surmised, when it is remembered that Jacobins were sitting in judgment on Jacobins. In the course of a few days, upwards of six hundred members were reinstalled, upon their simple assurance that, during the night in question, they had been at the posts prescribed by their duty. The club was speedily recomposed in its previous condition, filled with individuals the zealous adherents of Robespierre, Saint-Just, and Couthon, and mourners of them as martyrs to liberty and victims of the counter-revolution. In connexion with the parent society, that famous electoral club still existed, into which those retired who had propositions to make inconsistent with the caution expedient on the public arena of the Jacobins themselves, and wherein some of the signal events of the revolution had been concocted. It still met at the Evêché, and was composed of old Cordeliers, of the most determined Jacobins, and of men the most compromised during the reign of terror. The Jacobin Club and it were the natural asylums of those functionaries whom the recent purgations had expelled from office. Thus the judges and jurymen of the revolutionary tribunal, the members of the forty-eight committees to the number of four hundred or thereabouts, the agents of the secret police under Robespierre and Saint-Just, the order-bearers of the committees, who formed the band of the notorious Héron, the clerks in different departments, the officials, in short, of every order, excluded from the places they had filled, congregated at the Jacobin and Electoral Clubs, whether they chanced to be already members or now obtained admission for the first time. There they gave free vent to their complaints and resentments. They were uneasy as to their personal safety, dreading the vengeance of those they had persecuted; and furthermore, they regretted the loss of lucrative appointments, especially those who, being members of the revolutionary committees, had enjoyed opportunities of adding plunder and extortion to their fixed emoluments. The union of these men produced a violent and vindictive party, the natural ardour of their opinions being now inflamed with the exasperation of wounded self-interest. The precedent of Paris served for example to the rest of France. The discarded members of the municipalities, the revolutionary committees, and the district directories, gathered together in the affiliated societies, and gave utterance in concert to their grievances and their animosities. They commanded the sympathy of the populace, who had likewise been despoiled of agreeable functions since the payment of the forty sous was discontinued as the reward of attendance in the sections.

In abhorrence of this party and in antagonism to it, there grew up another, which was, however, little more than a revival. It comprehended all who had suffered or been reduced to silence during the system of terror, and who now deemed the moment arrived for springing into activity, and directing in their turn the course of the revolution. We have already seen, when on the topic of the liberations, the relatives of captives and victims reappear in the sections, and there busily agitate to accelerate the opening of the prisons, or stimulate the denunciation and arraignment of the revolutionary committees. The new tendencies of the convention, the reforms effected, increased the hopes and the courage of these first reclaimers. They belonged to all the classes that had endured oppression, various in grade and calling, but chiefly to the commercial and burgher class—to that industrious, opulent, and moderate community, which, monarchical and constitutional with the Constituent Assembly and republican with the Girondists, was vanquished on the 31st May, and had been since exposed to unrelenting persecution. In its ranks were now concealed the small remnants of nobility, who dared not yet complain of their depression, but who invoked the rights of humanity in their own behalf, and sundry partisans of royalty, creatures or agents of the old court, who had never ceased to foster obstacles in the way of the revolution, by joining in every opposition, whatever might be its principle or character. The young men of these different classes were they who, as usual, declared themselves with the greatest vivacity and energy, for the impetuosity of youth is always the first to assail an oppressive system. These filled the sections, the Palais-Royal, and the public places, and vented their opinions against those who were called the terrorists, in the most resolute strain. They alleged the most exalted motives. Some had witnessed the desolation of their families; others foreboded their tyrannical treatment, should the reign of terror be restored; and all obtested they would resist its revival to the last drop of their blood. But the secret of the vehemence on the part of many amongst them lay in the conscription: some had avoided it by secreting themselves, others had quitted the armies on hearing of the 9th Thermidor. To them were joined the authors and writers, so enthralled in recent times—an order of men prone as youth itself to swell the cry of opposition; these already inundated the journals, and stocked pamphlets with furious diatribes against the reign of terror and its abettors.

The two parties expressed themselves in the most strenuous but contradictory terms on the modifications introduced by the convention into the revolutionary system. The Jacobins and the clubbists exclaimed against aristocracy; they complained of the committee of general safety, for liberating counter-revolutionists, and of the press, as being already made the vehicle of ruthless calumny against those who had saved France. The measure which chiefly roused their ire, however, was the sweeping process of purgation applied to the various authorities. Not venturing precisely to remonstrate against the dismissal of individuals, since that would have implied personal motives, they declaimed against the mode of nomination, maintaining that the right of electing their magistrates ought to be restored to the people, and that to delegate the appointment of members of municipalities, district directories, and revolutionary committees, to representatives on missions, was a flagrant usurpation. They likewise asserted that the limitation of the sections to one meeting in each decade was a violation of the inherent right possessed by the citizens of assembling to deliberate on public affairs. Most of such complaints were in direct contradiction to the principles of the revolutionary government, which

had prohibited all élections until the restoration of peace; but parties are regardless of inconsistencies when their interests are affected, and the revolutionists were aware that a popular election would have reseated them in their places.

On the other hand, the burghers in the sections, the young men at the Palais-Royal and in the public places, and the writers in the journals, demanded with vehemence the unlimited freedom of the press, and inveighed against the retention of numerous agents of the late dictatorship in the existing committees and authorities. They even ventured to frame petitions against representatives who had been engaged on certain missions. In truth, they derided all services hitherto rendered, and began to revile the convention itself.

Tallien, who, in his capacity of the Thermidorian leader, considered himself peculiarly responsible for the new impulse imparted to affairs, was desirous that such impulse should be sustained with firmness, bending neither to the one side nor to the other. In a discourse replete with subtle distinctions between the system of terror and the revolutionary government, the general purport whereof was, that, without putting in vogue systematic cruelty, an adequate degree of energy must yet be observed, Tallien moved the convention to declare that the revolutionary government was still in force, and that consequently the primary assemblies ought not to be convoked for the purpose of elections; but he proposed to declare at the same time, that all the courses of terror were proscribed, and that proceedings instituted against writers for freely delivering their opinions, should be deemed modes of terror.

These propositions, which embodied no specific measure, and merely intimated the views of the Thermidorians, who wished to plant themselves between the two parties without favouring either, were referred to the three committees of public welfare, general safety, and legislation, to whom every thing bearing on these questions was remitted.

The rancour of the two parties, however, was not to be assuaged by such impartial indications. They continued their mutual invectives with unabated virulence; and what greatly contributed to augment the general uneasiness and to multiply topics of complaint and accusation, was the economical situation of France, more deplorable at this moment, perhaps, than it had ever been, even in the most calamitous epochs of the revolution.

The assignats, notwithstanding the victories of the republic, had experienced a rapid depreciation, and represented in trade only the sixth or the eighth fraction of their nominal value, which caused a lamentable derangement in traffic, and rendered the maximum more impracticable and vexatious than ever. Want of confidence was obviously no longer the reason of this depreciation, since no fears could now be entertained for the existence of the republic; it was owing to the excessive and always increasing issues commensurate with the decline. The taxes, gathered with difficulty and paid in paper, scarcely supplied a fourth or a fifth of the sums monthly dispensed by the government for the extraordinary expenses of the war, and the deficiency was to be made good by fresh emissions. Thus, since the previous year, the quantity of assignats in circulation, which it had been expected to reduce by various combinations to two thousand millions, had risen, on the contrary, to four thousand six hundred millions.

To this enormous accumulation of paper-money, and to the depreciation consequent thereon, were added all the calamities resulting both from the war itself and the arbitrary measures it had superinduced. We recollect that, in order to establish a forced relation between the nominal value of assignats and articles of merchandise, the law of the maximum had been devised, which regulated the price of all commodities, and interdicted dealers from enhancing it in proportion to the decline of paper; and that this measure was aggravated by *requisitions*, in the enforcement whereof the representatives or agents of the administration were invested with power to purvey all supplies necessary for the armies and the larger boroughs, paying for them in assignats, and at the rates of the maximum. These expedients had saved France, but with the evil of throwing trade and the circulation into irremediable confusion.

The principal inconveniences of the maximum have been already detailed, but may be recapitulated. The general establishment of two markets, the one public, in which the dealers exposed only their worst articles, and in the smallest possible quantity, and the other clandestine, in which they sold their best commodities for specie, and at unfettered prices; the universal secretion of produce, which the cultivators contrived to shield from the vigilant scrutiny of the agents charged to make requisitions; lastly, disorder and intermission in manufacturing, because the manufacturers could not realise, from the prices allowed on their goods, the cost even of production. All these evils of a two-sided traffic, the concealment of agricultural produce, and the stagnation of manufacturing industry, had only increased with the course of time. Throughout all the ramifications of trade, two exchanges had been established—the one public and deficient, the other furtive and extortionate. There were two qualities of bread, two qualities of meat, two qualities of every thing; the one for the rich, who could pay in specie or exceed the maximum, the other for the poor, the artisan, the annuitant, who could only offer the nominal value of the assignat. The farmers had become daily more ingenious in hoarding their stocks; they made false declarations, and abstained, under pretext of lacking labour, from threshing their corn—an allegation sufficiently plausible, for the war had absorbed fifteen hundred thousand men; they urged, likewise, the bad harvest, which had certainly not turned out so favourably as had been anticipated in the early part of the year, when, at the festival to the Supreme Being, thanksgivings were chanted to Heaven for victories and abundant crops. As to the manufacturers, they had entirely suspended their operations. We recollect that, in order to avoid injustice towards the retailers, it had been found necessary during the preceding year to extend the law to the manufacturers, and to fix the price of fabrics at the place of production, adding thereto the cost of carriage; but the law then became unjust towards these new objects of its attention. Raw materials and handicraft labour having shared in the general enhancement, the manufacturers had been unable to redeem their outlay, and had accordingly ceased to produce. The commercial community were in the same predicament. For example, the freight on merchandise from the Indies had risen from 150 francs to 400 francs per ton, and the rates of insurance from 5 and 6 to 50 and 60 per cent. Importers, therefore, could no longer afford to dispose of foreign cargoes at the prices of the maximum, and they consequently ceased their traffic. As we have elsewhere remarked, if the price be forced on one article, it must be equally so through all the ramifications of industry; which is altogether impracticable.

Time had unfolded other mischievous consequences resulting from the maximum. The price of corn had been fixed upon an uniform scale throughout France. But the production of corn being unequal in cost and quantity in the different provinces, the legal rate proved inappropriate to the various local peculiarities. Again, the power vested in the municipalities of determining the prices of all commodities, led to another species of derangement. When a deficiency existed in any town, the authorities raised the standard of prices, which had the effect of attracting supplies to the prejudice of adjacent districts; so that in one

place a glut, in another a dearth, prevailed, at the will of those who regulated the tariff, and the operations of trade, instead of flowing in a regular and natural channel, were subjected to capricious, partial, and convulsive vicissitudes.

The consequences of the requisitions were even more disastrous. This oppressive system was enforced for the purposes of supplying the armies, providing the great arm-manufactories and arsenals with all that they needed, provisioning the large towns, and sometimes obtaining for manufacturers the materials required in their business. Those to whom the power of making requisitions was delegated, were the representatives on missions, the commissaries in the armies, and the agents of the commission for trade and supplies. During the urgency of the danger, requisitions had been made with precipitation and disorder, frequently encountering on the same articles, whereby the owners were perplexed which to obey. They were generally on an unlimited scale, embracing an entire commodity in a town or a department. In such cases, the traders or farmers were debarred from selling to any but the purveyors of the republic; and all dealings being interdicted, the article under requisition remained for a long period without being removed or paid for, and the interchanges of trade were effectually checked. In the confusion of the emergency, distances had been scarcely calculated, and departments were often laid under requisition the most remote from the town or army intended to be supplied, whereby transports were inconveniently augmented. Several rivers and canals being devoid of water on account of an unusual drought, land-carriage alone was feasible, and the horses engaged in agriculture were absorbed for the purpose. This extraordinary employment, combined with a forced levy of 44,000 horses, rendered them so scarce, that the means of conveyance were absolutely exhausted. The effect of these ill-designed and often useless removals, was to accumulate enormous quantities of goods and provisions in the public magazines, heaped promiscuously together, and exposed to infinite damage and loss. The cattle collected for the republic were insufficiently fed; they reached the shambles in lean and poor condition, and a calamitous deficiency in greasy products, lard, tallow, &c., resulted. To all this were added woful waste, and abuses of the most disgraceful description. Dishonest agents secretly resold at the highest currency the commodities they had obtained at the maximum by means of requisitions. Such frauds were likewise practised by traders and manufacturers, who, having previously procured orders of requisition under pretence of supplying their own wants, subsequently disposed at enhanced prices of what they had purchased at the rates of the maximum.

These various causes co-operating with the evils of a continental and naval war, had reduced commercial industry to the most melancholy condition. All intercourse with the colonies was at an end, the English cruisers rendering access almost impracticable, and nearly the whole of them being ravaged by war. The most important, Saint-Domingo, was laid waste with fire and sword by the hostile parties contending for its possession. By this concourse of untoward accidents, external communication had become rare and precarious—a state of isolation further augmented by the revolutionary measure subjecting to sequestration the property of aliens at war with France. The object of the convention, in ordaining that sequestration, was to suppress the negotiation of foreign paper, and prevent capitalists from disparaging assignats by purchases of bills of exchange on Frankfort, Amsterdam, London, and other emporiums. The confiscation of credits held by Spaniards, Germans, Dutch, and English, on France, provoked a similar proceeding on their part, and all circulation of exchangeable values between France and the principal states of Europe ceased. Commercial relations existed only with the neutral countries, Switzerland, Denmark, Sweden, the United States, and the Levant; but the commission for trade and supplies had engrossed the whole of such intercourse in procuring grain, iron, and different articles requisite for the navy. For those purposes it had placed all the bills drawn on those countries under requisition, giving the French bankers assignats in return, and using them to pay for the various products purchased in Switzerland, Sweden, Denmark, or America.

The whole commerce of France, therefore, was reduced to the operations of government in drawing supplies from foreign countries by means of the bills forcibly extorted from the French bankers. If any cargoes chanced to arrive on private account, they were summarily attached by requisitions, whereby, as we have already intimated, the merchants were effectually discouraged, since freight and insurance cost them a prodigious outlay, and they were remunerated at the rates of the maximum alone. The only merchandise at all abundant in the French ports proceeded from captures made by corsairs; but it was stopped *in transitu* by the requisitions, and also by the prohibitions issued against the produce of hostile nations. Nantes and Bordeaux, previously devastated by the civil war, had fallen into decay and extreme distress through this stagnation of commerce. Marseilles, which formerly flourished by its trade with the Levant, saw its harbours blockaded by the English, its principal merchants dispersed by the reign of terror, its soap-manufactories destroyed or transported into Italy, and a meagre, disadvantageous intercourse with Genoa its sole field of activity. The cities in the interior were stricken with a ruin equally complete. Nismes had ceased to produce its silks, which it formerly exported to the value of twenty millions. The opulent town of Lyons, destroyed by bombs and mines, was in a state of demolition, and no longer fabricated the rich tissues it was wont to vend annually for an amount exceeding sixty millions. A decree directing the stoppage of all articles destined for towns in rebellion, had been the means of accumulating around Lyons immense stores, part whereof had been intended for Lyons itself, and the remainder for conveyance through it to the numerous points studding the great route to the south. The towns of Châlons, Mâçon, and Valence, had taken advantage of this decree to arrest the commodities proceeding along that usually crowded thoroughfare. The manufacturers of Sedan had been obliged to intermit the weaving of fine fabrics, and apply themselves to the production of cloth suitable for troops; whilst, at the same time, the principal amongst them were imprisoned as accomplices of the movement projected by Lafayette after the 10th August. The departments of the North, the Pays-de-Calais, the Somme, and the Aisne, so rich from the cultivation of flax and hemp, had been completely devastated by the war. Towards the west, in the unfortunate La Vendée, upwards of six hundred square leagues were lying almost an entire waste. The country was in part an unpeopled desert, and the flocks roamed at hazard, without pasturage or covering. In fine, even where peculiar calamities were not superadded to the general disasters, the war had fatally thinned the labouring population, whilst terror on the one hand, and political preoccupation on the other, had driven from or disgusted with toil a vast number of industrious citizens. In every locality the workshops and fields were abandoned by multitudes for the charms of the clubs, the municipal councils, and the sections, where they received forty sous for indulging in excitement and agitation.

Thus, disorder in the markets, scarcity of provisions, and stagnation of manufacturing industry in consequence of the maximum; inconsiderate removals, useless accumulations, waste and damage of goods, and exhaustion of the means of transport under the system of requisitions; interruption of intercourse with

neighbouring nations on account of the war, naval blockade and sequestrations; devastation of manufacturing towns and agricultural districts in civil strife; loss of population by the conscription; idleness resulting from the passion for political excitation—such is the picture of France rescued from foreign conquest, but shattered for a moment by the stupendous efforts imposed upon her.

Under these circumstances it is that we perceive two parties at issue after the 9th Thermidor—the one upholding the revolutionary measures as indispensable, and striving to prolong indefinitely a state of things essentially transient; the other, exasperated at the inevitable calamities of an extraordinary organisation, forgetting the services rendered by that organisation, and labouring to abolish it as atrocious; and, in the existing condition of France, we may conceive how profusely two such parties would be supplied with topics of recrimination. The Jacobins exclaimed against the relaxation of the laws; against the violation of the maximum by the farmers, dealers, and rich merchants; against the impunity allowed to stockjobbing, and against the depreciation of assignats; thus reviving the outcries of the Hébertists against the rich and against forestallers and stockjobbers. Their opponents, on the contrary, now venturing for the first time to assail revolutionary expedients, inveighed against the excessive emission of assignats, the tyranny of requisitions, the injuries inflicted on Lyons, Sedan, Nantes, and Bordeaux, and the various prohibitions and fetters which paralysed and ruined commerce. These were, with the liberty of the press and the mode of nominating public functionaries, the standard themes dilated upon in the counter-petitions from the clubs and sections. All such documents were meanwhile referred to the committees of public welfare, finance, and trade, with instructions to frame reports and propound their views thereon.

Thus, in all that had been done and in all that was yet doing, two parties in hostile array were bent on seeking and finding continual subjects of accusation and reproach. Every thing hitherto performed, good or evil, was imputed to the members of the old committees, against whom the authors of the reaction now began to vent their smothered wrath. Although they had contributed to overthrow Robespierre, it was alleged that their quarrel with him was instigated solely by ambition and the desire of more largely participating in the tyranny; that at bottom they thought alike, held identical principles, and purposed to continue the same odious system in their own persons. Amongst the Thermidorians ranked prominently Lecointre of Versailles, who, being of an ardent and wayward temperament, expressed himself with an imprudent warmth disapproved by his colleagues. He had formed the design of denouncing Billaud-Varennes, Collot-d'Herbois, and Barrère, of the old committee of public welfare, and David, Vadier, Amar, and Vouland, of the committee of general safety, as accomplices and *continuators* of Robespierre. He neither could nor dared make the same accusation against Carnot, Prieur [de-la-Côte-d'Or], and Robert Lindet, whom opinion entirely separated from their colleagues, and who were esteemed as exclusively occupied by the labours to which the safety of France was owing. Neither did he venture to attack all the members of the committee of general safety, because in public estimation they were not all equally criminal. He communicated his project to Tallien and Legendre, who endeavoured to dissuade him from its execution; but, deaf to their entreaties and arguments, in the sitting of the 12th Fructidor (29th August), he presented twenty-six heads of accusation against the members of the old committees. These twenty-six articles were compounded of vague charges, that the accused had been accomplices in the system of terror which Robespierre had perfected to oppress the convention and all France; had joined in the arbitrary acts of the two committees; had signed orders of proscription; had disregarded the appeals made on behalf of citizens unjustly imprisoned; had powerfully contributed to the death of Danton; had upheld the law of the 22d Prairial; had left the convention in ignorance that law was not the work of the whole committee; had failed to denounce Robespierre when he seceded from the committee of public welfare; and, lastly, had taken no precautions during the 8th, 9th, and 10th Thermidor, to shield the convention from the designs of the conspirators.

When Lecointre had finished the perusal of these twenty-six articles, Goujon, deputy of the Ain—a young, sincere, fervent republican, and a disinterested Mountaineer, for he was free from the reproaches to which the late government was obnoxious—arose and mounted the tribune, with all the appearances of profound sorrow. "I am painfully affected," he said, "when I behold the cool tranquillity wherewith endeavours are made to sow new seeds of discord and accelerate the ruin of the country. Sometimes you are urged to anathematise, under the name of the system of terror, all that has been done during the last year; at other times you are asked to impeach men who have rendered signal services to the revolution. They may be culpable; I know not. I was with the armies, and I am unable to judge; but if I had documents criminating members of the convention, I would not produce them, or only bring them under grievous necessity. On the contrary, with what matchless unconcern do others attempt to plunge a dagger in the breasts of men dear to the country for their important services! But mark, the charges alleged against them bear on the convention itself. Yes, it is the convention that is accused—the French people who are put upon their trial—since both the one and the other have endured the tyranny of the infamous Robespierre. As Jean Debry told you shortly ago, they are aristocrats who submit or instigate all these propositions"— "And embezzlers," interrupted sundry voices. "I move," resumed Goujon, "that the discussion instantly cease." Several deputies opposed this summary dismissal of the subject. Billaud-Varennes started to the tribune, and vehemently insisted that the debate be continued.

"There is no doubt," he stated, "that if the facts alleged be true, we are great criminals, and our heads ought to be forfeited. But we defy Lecointre to prove them. Since the fall of the tyrant, we have been exposed to the attacks of the whole body of intriguers, and we declare that life has no value in our eyes if they are to prevail." Thus proceeding, Billaud averred that he and his colleagues had long meditated the 9th Thermidor; that if they had deferred it, circumstances had rendered the delay imperative; that they had been the first to denounce Robespierre and tear away the mask he had assumed; that if the death of Danton were charged on them as a crime, he would be the promptest to accuse himself; that Danton was the accomplice of Robespierre, the rallying point for all counter-revolutionists, and that, if he had lived, liberty must have perished. "For some time," exclaimed Billaud, "we have seen in agitation, intriguers, embezzlers"—— At this last word, Bourdon interrupted him by saying, "The word is uttered; it must be proved." "I undertake to prove it, for one," retorted Duhem. "We will prove it, for others," echoed several voices from the Mountain. This was an old reproach the Mountaineers were always ready to revive against the friends of Danton, now for the most part ranked as Thermidorians. Billaud, who, amidst the tumult and interruption, had still clung to the tribune, persisted, and finally moved for an investigation, in order that the guilty might be ascertained. Cambon succeeded him, and warned the convention to avoid the snare set to entrap it; he affirmed that the aristocrats were seeking to induce it to dishonour itself by disgracing certain of its members, and that, if the

committees were culpable, it was equally so. "And all the nation with it," added Bourdon [de-l'Oise]. At this instant of commotion, Vadier suddenly appeared in the tribune with a pistol in his hand, vociferating that he would not survive the calumny, if he were not permitted to justify himself. Divers members rushed to seize and drag him from the tribune. The president Thuriot declared that he would adjourn the assembly if the tumult were not abated. Duhem and Amar insisted upon the continuation of the debate, as an act of justice to the inculpated parties incumbent on the convention. Thuriot, who was a zealous Thermidorian but nevertheless a staunch Mountaineer, had listened with pain to the agitation of such angry topics. He now addressed the assembly from the chair in these words: "On the one hand, the public interest is concerned that such a discussion as the present be immediately closed; on the other, the interest of those accused is concerned that it be proceeded with: let us reconcile both by passing to the order of the day on the proposition of Lecointre, and declaring that the assembly has heard that proposition with the deepest indignation." The convention adopted the suggestion of Thuriot with eager alacrity, and passed to the order of the day, branding, as proposed, the denunciation of Lecointre.

This discussion gave rise to anxious reflections on the part of all sincerely attached to their country. What advantage, they asked, could be gained by reverting to the past, winnowing the evil from the good, and deciding to whom really belonged the tyranny so recently subverted? Or how, in fact, assign the respective parts—of Robespierre and of the committees who had divided the power, of the convention which had supported them, of the nation, in short, which had suffered the convention, the committees, and Robespierre? And how, moreover, could this tyranny be truly judged? Did it proceed from criminal ambition, or from the energetic and irreflective action of men determined to attain their aim at all hazards, and reckless of the means they employed? How, in such multifarious action, could be discriminated the share of cruelty, ambition, mistaken zeal, sincere and fervid patriotism? To unravel so many mysteries, to penetrate the thoughts and hearts of so many men, partook of the impracticable. On the contrary, it behoved the predominant party to forget the past, receive from the hands of those now excluded from power the France they had saved, control anarchical tendencies, mitigate the ruthless severity of the laws, and remember that in political affairs evils may be redressed, never avenged.

Such were the conclusions of prudent moderate men. But the enemies of the revolution were overjoyed at Lecointre's rash proceeding; and seeing that the discussion had been abruptly closed, they proclaimed the convention under the influence of fear, and asserted that it dared not entertain questions so embarrassing and dangerous to itself. The Jacobins, likewise, and the Mountaineers, still the enthusiasts and fanatics of earlier times, and prepared in extremity to vindicate the reign of terror, were eager for the discussion and furious at its interruption. On the following day, accordingly, the 13th Fructidor, several Mountaineers protested, alleging that the president had yesterday taken the assembly by surprise when he closed the debate; that he had delivered his opinion without quitting the chair; that, as president, he was incompetent to express his sentiments; that the termination was an act of injustice; and that it was due to the members inculpated, the convention itself, and the revolution, to enter frankly upon a discussion which patriots assuredly had no reason to dread. In vain did the Thermidorians, Legendre, Tallien, and others, who were accused of having instigated Lecointre, but who, on the contrary, had sought to dissuade him from his project, maintain the expediency of allowing the subject to drop. The assembly, which had not altogether thrown off its habitual deference for the Mountain, agreed to revoke its decision of the eve and reopen the debate. Lecointre was called into the tribune, to read his twenty-six articles and substantiate them by authentic documents.

Lecointre had found it impossible to procure documentary evidence for this singular process, since he would have required proofs of what had occurred in the interior of the committees, to show how far the accused members had participated in the so-called tyranny of Robespierre. He could merely adduce, in corroboration of each article, public notoriety, speeches delivered at the Jacobin Club or in the convention, and a few original warrants of arrest, which of themselves proved nothing. At each new charge, the incensed Mountaineers vociferated, "The documents! the documents!" and protested against his proceeding unless he produced the written proofs. Lecointre, generally in the predicament of being unable to furnish them, appealed to the recollection of the assembly, and demanded whether it had not always considered Billaud-Varennes, Collot-d'Herbois, and Barrère, as in concert with Robespierre. But a reliance on this fact, the only material one citable under the circumstances, demonstrated the absurdity of his accusation. By analogous assumptions, it might have been maintained that the convention was the accomplice of the committee, and all France of the convention. The Mountaineers would not permit Lecointre to continue such remarks: they cried to him, "Thou art a calumniator!" and obliged him to pass to another count. No sooner had he read the succeeding one, than they again assailed him with shouts of "The documents! the documents!" and Lecointre not supplying them—"To the next!" they exclaimed, more boisterously than before. Amidst this continual tumult, Lecointre arrived at his last count, without having been able to authenticate any charge he had advanced. The only reason he could allege consisted in the averment that the accusation was political, and did not admit the usual mode of procedure; to which a ready answer might have been given, that it was improper to institute one of such a character. After a prolonged and stormy debate, the convention declared the charges of Lecointre false and calumnious, and thus assoilzied the old committees.

The result of this proceeding tended to re-invigorate the Mountain, and partially to revive in the convention its ancient dread of that redoubtable faction. Nevertheless, Billaud-Varennes and Collot-d'Herbois tendered their resignation as members of the committee of public welfare. Barrère was ejected by the hazard of the ballot. Tallien also, on his part, voluntarily retired; and all four were replaced by Delmas, Merlin of Douay, Cochon, and Fourcroy. Thus, of the members of the famous committee of public welfare, Carnot, Prieur [de-la-Côte-d'Or], and Robert Lindet, alone remained. The committee of general safety likewise underwent the prescribed renewal of one-fourth its members. Elie-Lacoste, Vouland, Vadier, and Moyse-Bayle, had to withdraw. David, Jagot, and Lavicomterie, had been previously excluded by a decision of the assembly. These seven members were succeeded by Bourdon [de-l'Oise], Colombelle, Méaulle, Clauzel, Mathieu, Mon-Mayau, and Lesage-Senault.

The prevailing ferment was unexpectedly increased by an unfortunate and entirely fortuitous event. The powder-magazine of Grenelle ignited and exploded. The sudden and tremendous concussion threw Paris into the utmost consternation, and seemed to the affrighted population ominous of some new and dire conspiracy. The calamity was at once charged upon the aristocrats, and by the aristocrats upon the Jacobins. The convention again became the arena of fierce recrimination between the two parties, without leading to any definite result. Amidst the excitement of this first accident, another happened to inflame the

discord. On the evening of the 23d Fructidor (9th September), Tallien was returning to his residence. A man, enveloped in a large cloak, fell upon him, exclaiming, "I have been awaiting thee!—thou shalt not escape me!" At the same moment he discharged a pistol at his person, which fractured his shoulder. The following day Paris was in a state of commotion. Moderate citizens lamented that all hope of repose seemed extinguished; that two parties, infuriated against each other, had apparently sworn to keep the republic in perpetual turmoil. On one side, the attempt on Tallien was attributed to the Jacobins; on the other, to the aristocrats. Many, again, ventured to intimate that Tallien, following the example of Grangeneuve previous to the 10th August, had purposely caused himself to be wounded, in order to upbraid the Jacobins with the crime, and to introduce an occasion for urging their dissolution. Legendre, Merlin [de Thionville], and other friends of Tallien, hurried to the tribune, and asserted with vehemence that the Jacobins were the instigators of the atrocity. Thus they argued: Tallien had not forsaken the cause of the revolution, yet miscreants alleged that he had passed over to the aristocrats and moderates. These latter, therefore, could not have formed the design of murdering him; the idea could have originated only with the furious men who accused him, that is to say, the Jacobins. Subsequently, Merlin specifically denounced their last meeting, and quoted an expression of Duhem—"*The toads of the marsh are raising their heads; so much the better, they will be the more easy to chop off.*" Thus inveighing against the Jacobins, Merlin eventually moved, with his accustomed hardihood, the dissolution of that celebrated club, which had rendered, he admitted, most eminent services, and had powerfully contributed to prostrate the throne; but which, having no longer a throne to subvert, was now aiming at the overthrow of the convention itself. The conclusions of Merlin and his friends were not adopted; but, as usual, the whole subject was referred to the appropriate committees, with instructions to digest a report thereon. Remits of this description had been already made with regard to all the material questions at issue between the two parties. Reports had been ordered on the liberty of the press, on assignats, on the maximum, on the system of requisitions, on the impediments affecting commerce; in short, on all that had become the object of dissension and controversy. A desire was now manifested that all these reports should be comprised in one; and, accordingly, the committee of public welfare was charged to present a general report on the actual condition of the republic. The task was delegated to Robert Lindet, as the member most conversant with the state of affairs, since he had belonged to the old committees, and most to be relied on for impartiality, inasmuch as he had been exclusively occupied in serving his country by indefatigable attention to the arduous department of supplies and transports. The day fixed for receiving this report was the 4th Sans-culottide of the year 2 (20th September 1794).

In the interim, whilst all awaited with anxious impatience the presentation of this report as the precursor of most important decrees, Paris continued a prey to agitation. The young men confederated against the Jacobins were accustomed to assemble in the garden of the Palais-Royal. There they read aloud the newspapers and pamphlets, which appeared in great numbers, against the late revolutionary system, and were sold by the booksellers of the arcades. They frequently formed bands, and departed to disturb the meetings of the Jacobins. On the day of the 2d Sans-culottide, several of these bands were formed, composed of those zealous youths who, to distinguish themselves from the Jacobins, affected great propriety of attire, and wore high cravats, which procured them the cognomen of *muscadins*. A person in one of these groups chanced to exclaim, that, if any evil betided, the rallying cry must be "the convention," and that the Jacobins were intriguers and miscreants. A Jacobin came forward to answer him. Thereupon a tumult arose; on one side was vociferated, "The convention for ever! Down with the Jacobins! Down with Robespierre's tail!" On the other, "Down with the aristocrats and the muscadins! The convention and the Jacobins for ever!" The tumult speedily grew into a conflict. The Jacobin who had attempted to speak, and the few bystanders disposed to abet him, were maltreated. The guard hastened to the spot, dispersed the crowd already beginning to accumulate, and prevented a general engagement.

At length, on the second day thereafter, being the one fixed for receiving the joint and comprehensive report of the three committees of public welfare, general safety, and legislation, Robert Lindet appeared in the tribune. The picture he drew of the state of France was sufficiently gloomy. After tracing the course of successive factions, and the progress of Robespierre's power to its decline and fall, he exhibited two parties as existing, the one composed of ardent patriots, fearful for the revolution and for themselves, the other of disconsolate families, whose near kinsmen had been immolated or were still groaning in fetters. "Restless men conceive," said Lindet, "that the government gives symptoms of lacking energy; and they avail themselves of all possible expedients to propagate their opinion and their apprehensions. They send deputations and addresses to the convention. These apprehensions are chimerical: in your hands the government will preserve all its force. And can patriots or public functionaries fear that their services will be effaced from recollection? How great the courage they needed to accept and perform their dangerous functions! But now France recalls them to their occupations and professions, from which they have been too long estranged. They know that their functions were temporary, and that power too long continued in the same hands becomes a subject of uneasiness; they ought to have no dread that France will abandon them to resentment and vengeance."

Then adverting to the position of the other party, composed of those who had suffered, Lindet proceeded in these words: "Restore freedom to those whose animosities, passions, the error of public functionaries, and the fury of the last conspirators, have caused to be thrown multitudinously into jails; restore it to the artisans, the traders, and the relatives of the young heroes who are defending the country. The arts have been persecuted; and yet it is from them you have learned to forge the thunderbolt; it is through their instrumentality the invention of Mongolfier has served to ascertain the movements of armies;* it is by them metals are purified and prepared, leather tanned, dressed, and fashioned for use within the week. Protect them, succour them. Many useful men still languish in dungeons."

The reporter subsequently drew a sketch of the agricultural and commercial condition of France. He showed the calamities resulting from the over issues of assignats, from the maximum, the system of requisitions, and the interruption of external intercourse. "Industry," he said, "has lost much of its activity, as well because fifteen hundred thousand men have been transferred to the frontiers, and multitudes, besides, have been engaged in civil strifes, as because the minds of men, distracted by political passions, have been diverted from their habitual occupations. There are many new tracts drained or cleared, but infinitely more neglected. The corn remains unthreshed, the wool uncarded; the cultivators neither steep their hemp nor peel their flax. Let us endeavour to repair evils so numerous and various; let us restore tranquillity to the great maritime and manufacturing cities. Let the demolitions at Lyons be terminated. With peace, pru-

* [Alluding to the invention of balloons.]

dence, and oblivion, the citizens of Nantes, Bordeaux, Marseilles, and Lyons, will resume their callings. Let us revoke the laws so destructive of commerce, give to commodities their natural and beneficial circulation, and encourage exportation, in order that what we want may be brought us in return. Let the cities and departments cease to exclaim against the government, which, they allege, has exhausted their resources, failed to observe just proportions in its demands, and caused the burden of requisitions to weigh unequally. Let those who thus complain but cast their eyes on the accounts, the declarations, and the addresses, of their fellow-citizens in other districts! They will there behold the same complaints, the same remonstrances, the same energy, inspired by the sense of identical sufferings. Let us recall tranquillity of mind and industry to the country; the artisans to their workshops, the husbandmen to their fields. Above all, let us strive to cultivate union and confidence amongst ourselves. Let us cease to reproach each other with our misfortunes and errors. Have we ever been, have we had it in our power to be, what we would always wish in fact to be? We have all been hurled into the same career: some have combated with courage and calm reflection; others have rushed headlong, in their exuberant ardour, against all the obstacles they desired to surmount and overthrow. Who will interrogate us, and demand an account of those movements it was impossible to foresee and control? The revolution is accomplished: it is the work of all. What generals, what soldiers have never overstepped the limits of rigid necessity, or have been able to pause exactly where cold and unimpassioned reason would have warned them to stop? Were we not in a state of war with countless and redoubtable adversaries? Have not reverses inflamed our courage, kindled our wrath? What has happened to us that happens not to all men thrown an incalculable space from the ordinary course of human existence?"

This report, so appropriate, impartial, and complete, was received with plaudits. All approved the sentiments it embodied, and it was unfortunate all could not cordially embrace them. Lindet eventually proposed a series of decrees, which commanded the same favourable reception as his report, and were forthwith adopted.

By the first decree, the committee of general safety and the representatives on missions were directed to investigate the reclamations of traders, agriculturists, artists, and parents of citizens absent with the armies, who were themselves or had relatives in prison. By the second, the municipalities and committees of sections were bound to assign their reasons when they refused to grant certificates of civism. These were intended as concessions to those who incessantly complained of the system of terror, and were haunted with the dread of its revival. A third decree ordained the preparation of moral institutes, designed to inculcate the value of industry and respect for the laws, and to instruct the citizens in the principal circumstances of the revolution, which were appointed to be read to the people on the decadal festivals. A fourth decree established a plan of normal schools, for training young teachers, and thus disseminating education and knowledge throughout France.

These decrees were accompanied by others, enjoining the committees of finance and commerce to consider with due promptitude,

1st, The advantages of allowing a free exportation of articles of luxury, on condition of their value being returned to France in miscellaneous merchandise.

2d, The advantages or disadvantages of allowing a free exportation of the surplus of articles of primary necessity, on condition of a similar return, and the observance of certain formalities.

3d, The most advisable means of putting into circulation the commodities seized on the way to cities in rebellion and retained under seal.

And, 4th, The appeals of merchants, who were bound, by virtue of the law of sequestration, to deposit in the district treasuries the sums they stood indebted to foreigners with whom France was at war.

Hence, we perceive, these decrees afforded securities to those who exclaimed against persecution, and accelerated the adoption of measures calculated to ameliorate the depressed state of commerce. The Jacobin party alone was benefited by no decree; but it in truth needed none. It had undergone neither molestation nor imprisonment; of power alone it had been deprived; and no reparation, therefore, was exigible in its behalf. To reassure it as to the future course of the government was all that could be attempted, and the report presented by Lindet was conceived and expressed in such spirit. Consequently, the effect of that report, and of the decrees accompanying it, was in the highest degree favourable on all parties.

A partial lull ensued. On the morrow, the last day and 5th Sans-culottide of the year 2 (21st September 1794), was performed the long-decreed ceremony of placing Marat in the Pantheon and ejecting Mirabeau therefrom. This proceeding was now no longer in harmony with the spirit and feelings of the moment. Marat was no longer the saint, nor Mirabeau the culprit, in public estimation, sufficient to warrant such honour to the sanguinary apostle of terror, or such opprobrium to the mightiest orator of the revolution. But, lest the Mountain might take umbrage, and the symptoms of reaction become too rapid and prominent, the previous ordinance was not disturbed. On the appointed day, the remains of Marat were borne in pomp to the Pantheon, and those of Mirabeau ignominiously cast out by a lateral postern.

Thus, pre-eminence in power, perilously wrested from the Jacobins and Mountaineers, was now possessed by the partisans of Danton and Camille-Desmoulins—by the much vilified indulgents, in short, who had become known as Thermidorians. These latter, however, whilst intent on repairing the evils produced by the revolution, whilst liberating the suspected, and striving to confer freedom and security on commerce, still evinced a prudent deference towards the Mountain they had superseded, and even consented to enshrine Marat in the temple whence they repudiated Mirabeau.

CHAPTER XXXVII.

RESUMPTION OF MILITARY OPERATIONS.—SURRENDER OF CONDE, VALENCIENNES, &C.—DEJECTION OF THE ALLIES.—PASSAGE OF THE MEUSE.—OCCUPATION OF THE RHINE ALONG ITS WHOLE COURSE.—SITUATION OF THE ARMIES ON THE ALPS AND PYRENEES.—THE SUCCESS OF THE FRENCH ON ALL POINTS.—LA VENDEE AND BRITTANY; WAR OF THE CHOUANS.—ROYALIST INTRIGUES IN FRANCE.

THE activity of military operations had somewhat abated toward the middle of the season. The two grand armies of the North and of the Sambre and Meuse, after entering Brussels in Thermidor (July), and subsequently marching, the one on Antwerp, the other on the Meuse, had sunk into a long repose, awaiting the reduction of Landrecies, Le Quesnoy, Valenciennes, and Condé, fortresses lost during the preceding campaign. On the Rhine, General Michaud was occupied in recomposing his army, to retrieve the check of Kayserlautern, and expecting a reinforcement of 15,000 men drawn from La Vendée. The armies of the Alps and of Italy, now in possession of the great chain, were encamped on the heights of the Alps, awaiting the approval of a plan of invasion, generally attributed to the young officer who had decided the capture of Toulon and the lines of Saorgio. On the Eastern Pyrenees, Dugommier, after his previous success at Boulou, had been delayed in taking

Collioure, and was now blockading Bellegarde. The army of the Western Pyrenees was still organising. This prolonged inertness in the midst of the campaign, which must be imputed to the critical events occurring in the interior, and to defective combinations, might have frustrated the success of the French, if their enemies had known how to turn time to account. But so great was the disorder and despondency prevailing amongst the allies, that they sought no advantage from the fault, and it merely tended to retard for an interval the extraordinary progress of the French arms.

Nothing could be worse judged than the inaction of the French in Belgium, encamped around Antwerp and on the banks of the Meuse. Their most certain plan, for accelerating the surrender of the four fortresses, consisted in always increasing the distance between them and the great armies, which could alone afford them succour. If due advantage had been taken of the confusion into which the defeat of Fleurus and the retreat consequent thereon had thrown the allies, they might, with comparative ease, have speedily reached the margin of the Rhine. Unfortunately, the grand art of profiting by victory was yet unknown—an art most rare in military commanders; for it infers that success is not the mere accident of a fortunate attack, but the foreseen result of profound and vast combinations. In order to hasten the reduction of the four strongholds, the convention had passed a ruthless decree, similar in spirit to all those that marked the era from Prairial to Thermidor. Premising that the allies held four French possessions, and that every means are justifiable to expel an enemy from invaded territory, it had decreed that if, twenty-four hours after being summoned, the garrisons failed to surrender, they should be put to the sword. The garrison of Landrecies alone yielded before this terrible menace. The commandant of Condé returned the dignified answer, "*that one nation had no right to ordain the dishonour of another.*" Le Quesnoy and Valenciennes also manifested a determined spirit of resistance. The committee, sensible of the injustice of such a decree, contrived to avoid its enforcement by a subtle device, without subjecting the convention to the necessity of repealing it. The committee drew the presumption that the decree had not been formally notified to the commandants of the three places, and therefore was to them unknown. Before intimating it in express terms, it directed General Schérer to carry on the works with sufficient activity to render the summons imposing, and to justify a capitulation on the part of the garrisons. In consequence, Valenciennes was ceded on the 12th Fructidor (29th August); Condé and Valenciennes were delivered on the following days. Those fortresses, therefore, which had cost the allies such efforts to reduce during the preceding campaign, were recovered by the French with trifling exertion; and the French territory in Flanders no longer contained a single point in hostile occupation. On the contrary, the French were masters of all Belgium from Antwerp to the Meuse.

Moreau had just taken Sluys and returned into line; Schérer had detached Osten's brigade to Pichegru, and rejoined Jourdan with his own division. By these junctions, the army of the North, under Pichegru, was raised to upwards of 70,000 men under arms, and that of the Meuse, under Jourdan, to 116,000. The government, exhausted by the efforts it had made to expedite the equipment of these armies, attended but imperfectly to their maintenance, and it was found necessary to make amends by moderate requisitions and the exercise of much military virtue. The soldiers accustomed themselves to dispense with the most necessary articles; without tents to encamp beneath, they contentedly bivouacked under the foliage of trees or the open canopy of heaven. The officers, without appointments, or paid in assignats, lived as the common soldiers, subsisted on the same coarse food, and marched on foot like them, with knapsacks on their backs. Republican enthusiasm and the confidence of victory supported those armies in their hardships, composed as they were of the most docile and heroic troops ever possessed by France.

The allies were in a state of lamentable disorder. The Dutch, ill supported by their confederates the English, and doubtful of their good faith, were in the utmost consternation. They formed a cordon before their strongholds, with the view of gaining time to put them in a state of defence, which ought to have been effected long before. The Duke of York, equally incompetent and presumptuous, knew not how to make use of his English forces, and took no decisive part. He retired towards the Lower Meuse and the Rhine, stretching his wings alternately towards the Dutch and towards the imperialists. But, by uniting with the Dutch, he might have disposed of 50,000 men, and attempted, on the flanks of either of the two armies of the North and of the Meuse, one of those enterprising movements which General Clairfayt, in the following year, and the Archduke Charles, in 1796, executed with such effect and credit, and whereof a great commander has since given so many memorable examples. The Austrians, intrenched along the Meuse, from the mouth of the Roer to that of the Ourthe, were discouraged by their reverses and lacked supplies. The Prince of Cobourg, whose incapacity had been strikingly exemplified in the last campaign, had yielded the command to Clairfayt, the most worthy to hold it amongst all the Austrian generals. It was not yet too late to have joined the Duke of York, and operated *en masse* against one of the two French armies; but all thought was centred on guarding the Meuse. The cabinet of Saint-James, alarmed at the course of events, had sent envoy after envoy to rekindle the zeal of Prussia, to claim on its part the execution of the treaty of the Hague, and to engage Austria, by promises of aid, to defend with vigour the line still occupied by its troops. A congress of English, Dutch, and Austrian ministers and generals was held at Maestricht, and a firm resolution taken to dispute the country beyond the Meuse.

The French armies at length shook off their lethargy in the middle of Fructidor (beginning of September). Pichegru advanced from Antwerp towards the mouths of the rivers. The Dutch thereupon committed the mistake of separating from the English. To the number of 20,000 men, they took up positions parallel with Bergen-op-Zoom, Breda, and Gertruydenberg, resting on the sea, and so injudiciously ranged, that they were incapable of acting in defence of the places they wished to cover. The Duke of York, with his British and Hanoverians, retreated on Bois-le-Duc, keeping up a communication with the Dutch by a chain of posts, which the French army could force the moment it appeared. At Boxtel, on the edge of the Dommel, Pichegru came up with the Duke of York's rearguard, surrounded two battalions, and compelled them to lay down their arms. The following day, he encountered General Abercromby on the banks of the Aa, again took several prisoners, and continued to push the Duke of York, who hastily repassed the Meuse at Grave, under protection of the guns of that fastness. In this march Pichegru had taken 1500 prisoners. He reached the banks of the Meuse on the anniversary of the 2d Sans-culottide (18th September).

At the same time, Jourdan advanced on his side, and prepared to cross the Meuse. The Meuse has two main tributaries—the Ourthe, which joins it towards Liege, and the Roer, which flows into it towards Ruremonde. These two confluents form two lines, dividing the country between the Meuse and the Rhine, which must be successively carried in order to reach the Rhine. The French, masters of Liege, cleared the Meuse, and immediately took up a position in front of the Ourthe; they skirted the Meuse from Liege

to Maestricht, and the Ourthe from Liege to Comblaine-au-Pont, thus forming an angle whereof Liege was the apex. Clairfayt had drawn up his left wing behind the Ourthe, on the heights of Sprimont. These heights are flanked on one side by the Ourthe, and on the other by the Ayvaille, which falls into the Ourthe. General Latour commanded the Austrians on this point. Jourdan ordered Schérer to attack the position of Sprimont on the side defended by the Ayvaille, whilst General Bonnet was to assail it by passing the Ourthe. On the anniversary of the 2d Sans-culottide (18th September), Schérer divided his troops into three columns, commanded by Generals Marceau, Mayer, and Hacquin, and moved on the line of the Ayvaille, which flows in a deep bed between two steep banks. The generals themselves gave the example, plunged into the water, and led their soldiers to the opposite shore, despite the play of a formidable artillery. Latour had remained immoveable on the heights of Sprimont, intending to fall on the French columns when they had passed the stream. But the moment these had scaled the precipitous barrier, they rushed on his position, without giving him time to anticipate the aggression. They attacked him with the utmost energy; and at the same time General Hacquin deployed on his left flank, and General Bonnet, having passed the Ourthe, advanced on his rear. Latour was thereupon constrained to decamp, and fall back on the imperial army.

This enterprise, well designed and admirably executed, reflected equal credit on the commander-in-chief and the army. Thirty-six pieces of ordnance and one hundred ammunition waggons fell into the hands of the French; and the Austrians lost 1500 men, killed and wounded. This reverse determined Clairfayt to quit the line of the Ourthe, being apprehensive, now that his left was defeated, lest his retreat might be cut off from Cologne. Accordingly, he abandoned the banks of the Meuse and the Ourthe, and retired upon Aix-la-Chapelle.

The barrier of the Roer now alone remained to the Austrians. They occupied that river from Dueren and Juliers to its junction with the Meuse, that is to say, to Ruremonde. They had yielded all the course of the Meuse extending from the Ourthe to the Roer, between Liege and Ruremonde; they only occupied the space from Ruremonde to Grave, the point by which they held communication with the Duke of York.

It behoved the imperialists to defend vigorously the line of the Roer, to prevent the loss of the left bank of the Rhine. Clairfayt concentrated all his forces on its banks, between Dueren, Juliers, and Linnich. Some time previously he had ordered the erection of considerable works to strengthen the line, and had stationed advanced corps in front of the Roer, on the plateau* of Aldenhoven, fortified with intrenchments. He himself encamped behind the steep declivities of the river, with the bulk of his army and a numerous artillery.

On the 10th Vendémiaire year 3 (1st October 1794), Jourdan came in presence of the enemy with all his forces. He ordered General Schérer, commanding the right wing, to move on Dueren, passing the Roer at every fordable point; General Hatry to cross towards the centre of the position, at Altorp; Championnet and Morlot, with their divisions, supported by cavalry, to carry the plateau of Aldenhoven rising in advance of the Roer, then to sweep the plain, traverse the stream, and mask Juliers, to prevent the Austrians debouching from it; General Lefebvre to seize upon Linnich and cross by all the fords abounding in its vicinity; and, lastly, Kléber, who was stationed towards the mouth of the river, to ascend it as far as Ratem, and pass it at that weakly defended point, so as to cover the battle on the side towards Ruremonde.

The next day, the 11th Vendémiaire, the French commenced their movement along the whole line. One hundred thousand young republicans marched simultaneously, with an order and precision worthy of veteran troops. They had not hitherto appeared in such numbers upon the same field of battle. They advanced resolutely towards the Roer, the prize to be contested. They were unfortunately a considerable distance from that river, and failed to reach it until nearly mid-day. The general-in-chief, in the judgment of military men, had committed but one fault, which consisted in having taken a point of departure too remote from the point of attack, and not having devoted a day to approaching nearer the hostile line. General Schérer, commanding the right, moved his brigades on different points of the Roer, and directed General Hacquin to proceed to the ford of Winden, far up the river, and there pass, in order to turn the left flank of the enemy. It was eleven o'clock when he issued this order. Hacquin occupied a long interval in traversing the circuit assigned him. Schérer paused until Hacquin should reach the prescribed point, ere throwing his divisions into the Roer, and thus allowed Clairfayt time to prepare all his means of resistance along the heights of the opposite bank. At three in the afternoon Schérer determined to wait no longer, and forthwith put his troops in motion. Marceau plunged into the water with his division, and crossed at the ford of Mirveiller; Lorges did the same, advanced on Dueren, and drove out the enemy after a sanguinary conflict. The Austrians evacuated Dueren but for a moment: retiring to the rear, they speedily returned in augmented force. Marceau immediately threw himself into Dueren, to support the brigade of Lorges. Mayer, who had passed the Roer a little above, at Niedereau, and sustained a murderous fire of artillery, likewise fell back on Dueren. On that point, therefore, all efforts were now concentrated. The enemy, who had hitherto acted only with his vanguards, was drawn up in the background, on heights planted with sixty pieces of ordnance. He now brought these into play, and mowed down the French with a continuous shower of grape-shot and balls. The young soldiers, encouraged by their generals, stood firm to their position. Unfortunately, Hacquin had not yet made his appearance on the left flank of the enemy, a manœuvre on which the success of the battle mainly depended.

Meanwhile the battle was raging in the centre, on the advanced plateau of Aldenhoven. The French had scaled it at the point of the bayonet. Their cavalry had then deployed, and made and received several charges. The Austrians, perceiving the Roer carried above and below Aldenhoven, ultimately abandoned the plateau, and fell back on Juliers beyond the river. Championnet, who pursued them even to the glacis, opened a fire on the fortress, and a vigorous cannonade was maintained on both sides. At Linnich, Lefebvre had repulsed the Austrians and gained the Roer; but, having found the bridge burnt, he was compelled to lose time in restoring it. At Ratem, Kléber had encountered masked batteries, and was engaged in answering them by all his disposable artillery.

The decisive conflict, therefore, lay on the right at Dueren, where Marceau, Lorges, and Mayer were concentrated, awaiting the movement of Hacquin. Jourdan had ordered Hatry to move on Dueren, instead of effecting the passage at Altorp; but the distance was too great for that column to become available on the decisive point. At length, at five in the afternoon, Hacquin appeared on the left flank of Latour. Thereupon the Austrians, seeing themselves threatened on the left by Hacquin and confronted by Lorges, Marceau, and Mayer, determined to retreat, and drew in their left wing, the same which had fought at Sprimont. On their extreme right, Kléber

* [Although the word *plateau* is almost naturalised, we may here explain, that it means an elevated plain or table-land. In military description it is of necessary use.]

menaced them with a bold movement. The bridge he had attempted to throw across proving too short, his soldiers demanded leave to breast the stream. Kléber, to encourage and cover their hazardous undertaking, concentred all his artillery, and poured tremendous volleys on the enemy occupying the opposite bank. From that point, likewise, the imperialists were then obliged to retire, and in a short while they withdrew from all the others. Thus they abandoned the Roer, leaving 800 prisoners, and 3000 men on the field of battle.

On the following day, the French found Juliers evacuated, and were enabled to pass the Roer on all points. Such was the important action which secured them the definitive conquest of the left bank of the Rhine—one of those achievements which have especially recommended General Jourdan to the gratitude of his country and the applause of military men. Nevertheless, critics have reproached him with not taking a point of departure nearer the point of attack, and not directing the bulk of his army on Mirveiller and Dueren.

Clairfayt took the high road to Cologne. Jourdan followed him, and occupied that city on the 15th Vendémiaire (6th October). On the 29th (20th October) he entered Bonn. Kléber proceeded, in conjunction with Marescot, to beleaguer Maestricht.

Whilst Jourdan thus brilliantly executed his task, and took possession of the important line of the Rhine, Pichegru was busied in preparing to pass the Meuse, with the view of subsequently advancing on the Wahl, the principal branch of the Rhine towards its embouchure. As we have shortly ago narrated, the Duke of York had traversed the Meuse at Grave, leaving Bois-le-Duc to its own resources. Before attempting the passage of the Meuse, it was necessary for Pichegru to possess himself of Bois-le-Duc; but a siege at that advanced season, and with insufficient *materiel* for the purpose, was attended with difficulty and hazard. However, the daring enterprise of the French, and the despondency of their antagonists, rendered nothing impossible. The fort of Crevecœur, near the Meuse, being suddenly menaced by a battery bearing on a point it had been deemed impracticable to attain, surrendered. The munitions found therein became available in pressing the siege of Bois-le-Duc. Five consecutive attacks astounded the governor, who yielded the place on the 19th Vendémiaire (10th October). This unhoped-for acquisition secured to the French a solid basis and considerable munitions, to aid their further operations beyond the Meuse to the banks of the Wahl.

Moreau, who formed the right, had advanced to Venloo, since the victories of the Ourthe and the Roer. The Duke of York, alarmed at that movement, had withdrawn all his troops beyond the Wahl, and abandoned the ground intervening between the Meuse and the Wahl or Rhine. Subsequently, however, reflecting that Grave (on the Meuse) would be left without communications or support, he repassed the Wahl, and undertook to defend the space comprised between the two streams. The ground, as always happens near the mouths of large rivers, was lower than the bed of the water, presenting vast meadow-lands intersected by dykes and canals, and inundated in sundry places. General Hammerstein, stationed intermediately between the Meuse and the Wahl, had added to the difficulty of the approach by occupying the roads, planting the dykes with artillery, and throwing bridges over the canals, which his soldiers were to destroy as they retired. The Duke of York, whose vanguard he formed, remained in the rear, on the banks of the Wahl, in the camp of Nimeguen.

In the course of the 27th and 28th Vendémiaire (18th and 19th October), Pichegru passed two of his divisions across the Meuse upon a bridge of boats. The English, intrenched under the cannon of Nimeguen, and Hammerstein's vanguard, disposed along the canals and dykes, were much too distant materially to impede the operation. The rest of the army reached the opposite shore under protection of those two divisions. On the 28th, Pichegru determined upon an attack of all the works covering the intermediate space between the Meuse and the Wahl. He threw four columns, composing a mass superior to the enemy, into those inundated and intersected meadows. The French braved the fire of the artillery with admirable fortitude, and plunged into the canals, having the water to their necks, through which they steadily advanced, whilst the riflemen, distributed along the elevations of the ground, fired over their heads. The enemy retrograded in dismay, thinking only of saving his artillery. He took refuge in the camp of Nimeguen, on the banks of the Wahl, whither the French speedily followed, to taunt him with daily insults.

Thus, towards Holland as towards Luxumbourg, the French had at length succeeded in attaining that formidable barrier of the Rhine, which nature seems to have assigned as a boundary to their country, and which they have always felt ambitious to render one of its frontiers. Pichegru, it is true, checked by Nimeguen, was not yet master of the course of the Wahl; and, if he entertained any thoughts of conquering Holland, he had before his eyes numerous streams of water, divers fortified places, extensive inundations, and an inclement season; but, nevertheless, he touched upon the long-desired point, and with one more act of intrepidity, he might force his way into Nimeguen or the Isle of Bommel, and firmly establish himself on the Wahl. Moreau, styled the general of sieges, had just carried Venloo by a display of extraordinary gallantry. Jourdan was triumphantly consolidated on the banks of the Rhine. To complete the occupation of that majestic stream, the French armies had also reached its course from the Moselle and Alsace.

Since the check at Kayserlautern, the armies of the Moselle and of the Upper Rhine, commanded by Michaud, had been awaiting reinforcements in detachments drawn from the Alps and La Vendée. At length, on the 14th Messidor (2d July), an attack was adventured along the whole line, from the Moselle to the Rhine, upon both slopes of the Vosges. This attack, too scattered and divided, was repulsed. A second attempt, conducted upon better principles, was made on the 25th Messidor (13th July). The principal effort was directed upon the centre of the Vosges, with the design of conquering the defiles; and it induced, as in other places, the general retreat of the allied armies beyond Frankenthal. The committee then ordered a diversion on Trèves, which was occupied as a just chastisement on the elector. By this movement, a large division found itself exposed between the imperial armies on the Lower Rhine and the Prussian army on the Vosges, without the latter heeding the opportunity to inflict a grievous injury on their opponents. The Prussians, however, eventually taking advantage of the diminution of the French forces towards Kayserlautern, made a sudden onslaught, and repelled them beyond that town. At this moment intelligence arrived of Jourdan's victory on the Roer and of Clairfayt's passage of the Rhine at Cologne. The allies no longer ventured to remain in the Vosges; they forthwith retrograded, abandoning the whole Palatinate to the French, and throwing a strong garrison into Mayence. Their sole possessions on the left bank, consequently, were limited to the two towns of Luxumbourg and Mayence. The committee issued immediate orders for their investment. Kléber was called from Belgium to Mayence, in order to direct the siege of that place, which he had so gallantly contributed to defend in 1793, and where he had first gained his renown. Thus the tide of victory flowed on all points, and the barrier of the Rhine fell throughout into possession of the French.

In the Alps, the state of inactivity had been continued, and the great chain confirmed definitively to the French. The plan of invasion ably devised by General Bonaparte, and communicated to the committee by Robespierre the younger, who was commissioned to the army of Italy, had been originally adopted. It consisted in uniting the two armies of the Alps and of Italy in the valley of Sturia, and thus overrunning Piedmont. The orders to march were already given, when the catastrophe of the 9th Thermidor happened: the execution was then suspended. The commandants of places who had been obliged to detach part of their garrisons, the representatives on missions, the municipalities, and all the partisans of reaction, alleged that the plan was designed to destroy the army by entangling it in Piedmont, re-open Toulon to the English, and aid the sinister views of Robespierre. Jean-Bon-Saint-André especially, who had been dispatched to Toulon to reorganise the navy, and who revolved peculiar schemes of action in the Mediterranean, appeared as one of the bitterest opponents of the plan. Bonaparte was even accused of being an accomplice of the Robespierres, an insinuation founded on the confidence his talents and views had inspired in the youngest of the two brothers. The army consequently retrograded in disorder upon the great chain, where it resumed its positions. The campaign closed, however, with a brilliant affair. The Austrians, in concert with the English, resolved to make an attempt on Savona, in order to intercept the communication with Genoa, which by its neutrality rendered important services with regard to supplies. General Colloredo, accordingly, advanced with a body of eight to ten thousand men; but using little celerity in his march, he gave the French time to prepare for him. Surprised amidst the mountains by the French troops, whose movements General Bonaparte directed, he lost 800 men and retired ingloriously, charging the English with his disaster, which they retorted on him. The communication with Genoa was maintained, and the army consolidated in all its positions.

On the Pyrenees the French had recommenced a successful career. Dugommier had been long engaged on the siege of Bellegarde, being anxious to reduce that place before descending into Catalonia. La Union had endeavoured, by a general attack on the French line, to succour the besieged; but, repulsed at all points, he had moved off in disorder; whereupon the garrison, effectually discouraged by this rout of the Spanish army, surrendered on the 6th Vendémiaire (27th September). Dugommier, now secure in his rear, prepared to advance into Catalonia. On the Western Pyrenees, the French, at length emerging from their inertness, had overrun the valley of Bastan, carried the strongholds of Fontarabia and Saint-Sebastian, and, under the genial climate of that region, made dispositions, as on the Eastern Pyrenees, to push their successes notwithstanding the approach of winter.

In La Vendée the war continued: not an active or dangerous, but a slow and devastating war. Stofflet, Sapinaud, and Charette, had of late divided the command in the insurgent districts. Since the death of Larochejacquelein, Stofflet had succeeded him in Anjou and Upper Poitou. Sapinaud had long preserved the small circuit of the centre. Charette, renowned for his campaign during the previous winter, when, with forces almost destroyed, he had invariably contrived to baffle the pursuit of the republicans, commanded in Lower Vendée, but aspired to the commandership-in-chief. A meeting had been held at Jallais, where a convention was adopted under the influence of the Abbé Bernier, incumbent of Saint-Laud, the monitor and friend of Stofflet, and governing the country in his name. This abbé was equally ambitious with Charette, and desired such a combination as would enable him to exercise over all the chiefs the sway he already held over Stofflet. It was agreed to form a superior council, under whose orders every thing should be conducted for the future. Stofflet, Sapinaud, and Charette, mutually confirmed their several commands in Anjou, the centre, and Lower Vendée. M. de Marigny, who had survived the great Vendéan expedition against Granville, having infringed an order issued by the newly appointed council, was arrested and cruelly shot by Stofflet on a report of Charette. This act of rigour, which produced a mournful impression on all the royalists, has been generally attributed to jealousy.

The war, in the absence of any possible result, had become little more than one of plunder and extermination. The republicans had established fourteen intrenched camps around the insurgent country, whence issued devastating columns, which, under the superior command of General Turreau, executed the terrible decree of the convention. They burnt the woods, hedges, and heaths, frequently even the villages, carried off the crops and cattle, and, alleging the decree which enjoined every inhabitant not engaged in the revolt to withdraw twenty leagues from the insurgent districts, treated as enemies all whom they met. The Vendéans, on the other hand, obliged to find means of existence, still continued to cultivate their fields amidst these horrible scenes, and revenged the aggressions in a manner calculated to render the warfare perpetual. At a signal from their chiefs, they formed sudden assemblages, fell upon the camps from the rear, and swept all before them; or, allowing the columns to penetrate, they assailed them when entangled in the country, and if they succeeded in breaking their ranks, they massacred them to the last man. On such occasions they seized upon the arms and munitions with extraordinary avidity; and, without having at all weakened an enemy so far superior to themselves, indulged in congratulations upon obtaining the means of continuing this atrocious warfare.

Such was the state of things on the left bank of the Loire. On the right bank, in that part of Brittany comprised between the Loire and the Vilaine, a new insurrectionary assemblage had been formed, composed in a great measure of the remnants of the Vendéan column dispersed at Savenay, and of the peasants dwelling on those plains. M. de Scépeaux was the leader of this band; it contained a force nearly equal to that of M. de Sapineau, and served to connect La Vendée with Brittany.

Brittany had become the theatre of a war altogether different from that of La Vendée, and not less deplorable. The Chouans, of whom we have already spoken, were smugglers whom the abolition of provincial duties had left without employment, young men who had contrived to elude the conscription, and a few Vendéans, escaped, like those under M. de Scépeaux, from the disaster of Savenay. They secreted themselves as banditti among the rocks and vast woods of Brittany, particularly in the great forest of Pertre. They did not form, as the Vendéans, numerous bodies, capable of keeping the field; they roamed in bands of thirty and fifty, stopping couriers and public conveyances, and assassinating justices of the peace, mayors, all republican functionaries, in fact, and especially the purchasers of national domains. As to those who were not owners, but simply the cultivators of any such domains, they visited their farmsteads and levied the amount of rent payable. They generally adopted the plan of destroying bridges, breaking up roads, and disabling wains, in order to prevent the transport of provisions into the towns. They issued terrible menaces against those who carried their produce to market, and made good their threats by pillaging and burning their property. Incapable of occupying the country in a military point of view, their aim manifestly was to throw it into a state of anarchy, by scaring the citizens from accepting any functions under the republic, by avenging the acquisition of national domains, and by famishing the towns. Less united and

numerous than the Vendéans, they were even more formidable, and truly merited the appellation of brigands.

They had a secret leader, whose name has already occurred in our annals, M. de Puisaye, formerly a member of the Constituent Assembly. After the 10th August he had retired into Normandy, joined in the federalist insurrection, and, after the defeat at Vernon, concealed himself in Brittany, where he laboured to collect the remains of the conspiracy of La Rouarie. With great intelligence and a rare capacity for uniting the elements of a party, he combined extreme activity of mind and body, and boundless ambition. Struck with the peninsular position of Brittany, the vast extent of its coasts, the peculiar nature of its surface, covered by forests, mountains, and impenetrable retreats, and, above all, with the ignorance of its inhabitants, speaking a strange language, whereby they were isolated from communication with the other inhabitants of France, entirely subject to the influence of priests, and three or four times more numerous than the Vendéans, Puisaye deemed it possible to organise an insurrection in Brittany much more formidable than that under the guidance of such chiefs as Cathelineau, D'Elbée, Bonchamps, and Lescure. The vicinity of England, and the happy juxtaposition of the islands of Guernsey and Jersey, had suggested to him, moreover, the idea of inducing the cabinet of London to concur in his projects. He was consequently desirous that the energy of the country should not be wasted in useless ruffianism, but strove to bring it under regulation, and mould it in furtherance of his own extended views. Aided by the priests, he had caused all the men capable of bearing arms to be enrolled on registers opened in the various parishes. Each parish was to furnish a company, and each canton a division; the united divisions were to form four principal divisions, those of Morbihan, Finisterre, Côtes-du-Nord, and Ille-et-Vilaine, all dependent on a central committee representing the supreme authority of the country. Puisaye presided over the central committee in the character of generalissimo; and, by means of these ramifications, he ensured the distribution of his orders over the whole district. Until entering upon the execution of his ultimate designs, he recommended as few acts of hostility to be committed as possible, in order to avoid drawing too many troops into Brittany; he enjoined his partisans to content themselves with collecting munitions and intercepting the conveyance of provisions to the towns. Nevertheless, the Chouans, little fitted for the kind of general war he meditated, continued to indulge in individual lawlessness, which they found more profitable and more to their taste. Puisaye used indefatigable exertions to complete his arrangements, and proposed, so soon as he had achieved the organisation of his party, to visit London for the purpose of opening a negotiation with the English cabinet and the French princes.

As already mentioned in the account of the preceding war, the Vendéans had held no intercourse with foreign powers. M. de Tinténiac had been, however, sent amongst them, to ascertain their character, principles, and numbers, and to offer them arms and aid if they could possess themselves of a port on the coast. This was the inducement that led them to Granville, an expedition which ended in the disastrous issue we have recorded. Lord Moira's squadron, after a fruitless cruise off the coasts, had conveyed to Holland the succours intended for La Vendée. Puisaye hoped to prevail on the English cabinet to dispatch a second flotilla, and to form arrangements with the French princes, who had hitherto neither testified gratitude nor given encouragement to the royalists under arms in the interior.

On their part, the princes, despairing of effective support from the allies, began to cast their eyes on their partisans in France. But they were not surrounded by counsellors fitted to take advantage of the zeal manifested by the brave men prepared to sacrifice themselves in their cause. A few old lords and friends had followed the fortunes of Monsieur, who had been declared regent, and taken up his abode at Verona, since the district of the Rhine had become unsafe for peaceful residents. The Prince of Condé, a brave but incompetent leader, continued on the Upper Rhine, drawing to him all who were willing to use their swords. A party of young nobles accompanied the Count d'Artois in his travels, and had followed in his train to St Petersburg. Catherine had given the prince a brilliant reception, and presented him with a frigate, a million of money, a sword, and the gallant Count de Vauban to admonish and stimulate him in the use of those precious gifts. She had furthermore held out magnificent promises of future aid, if the prince should succeed in making a descent on La Vendée. That operation, however, was not effected; and the Count d'Artois had sailed to Holland, and repaired to the head-quarters of the Duke of York.

The situation of the three emigrant princes was far from enviable. Austria, Prussia, and England, had refused to recognise Monsieur as regent; for the acknowledgment of a sovereign of France other than the sovereign *de facto*, would have implied an interference in its domestic concerns which no power desired ostensibly to arrogate. Now, especially, when they were defeated, all affected to maintain that they had taken up arms solely with a view to their own security. The recognition of the regent would have entailed a still further inconvenience, in the pledge it involved to make peace dependent on the destruction of the republic—a consummation, under present prognostics, of rather hopeless achievement. At the same time, the powers received the agents of the princes, but allowed them no public character. The Duke d'Harcourt at London, the Duke d'Havré at Madrid, and the Duke de Polignac at Vienna, delivered notes, seldom read and more rarely heeded; they were rather the intermediate recipients of the pecuniary aid occasionally doled out to the emigrants than the organs of an acknowledged authority. Thus the utmost discontent prevailed in the three emigrant courts towards the great powers. They began to perceive that the boasted zeal of the coalition in favour of royalty concealed the most violent hatred against France. Austria, by planting her flag on Valenciennes and Condé, had, according to the emigrants, chiefly occasioned the outburst of French patriotism. Prussia, whose pacific tendencies they already detected, had failed, they asserted, in all her engagements. Pitt, who of all the allies evinced the greatest sternness and disdain towards them, was especially odious in their eyes. The only appellation he obtained amongst them was "the perfidious Englishman;" and they held it justifiable to accept his largesses and afterwards deceive him if the opportunity offered. They maintained that Spain only could be relied upon: Spain alone was a faithful relative, a sincere ally; upon it solely were any hopes to be founded.

The three petty fugitive courts, so slenderly connected with the belligerent powers, possessed no bond of union even amongst themselves. The court of Verona, stagnant and remote, transmitting orders to the emigrants which they disregarded, and making communications through unaccredited agents to the cabinets, which they treated with contumely, distrusted the two others, viewed with jealousy the active conduct of the Prince of Condé on the Rhine, and the partial consideration his useless but energetic courage availed him with the cabinets, and even murmured enviously at the travels of the Count d'Artois through Europe. The Prince of Condé, on his part, equally deficient in talent as full of bravery, refused to enter into any consistent plan, and manifested but little deference for the two courts which held aloof from warfare. Lastly, the diminutive court located at Arn-

heim, abjured as well the dangers to be encountered on the Rhine as the authority to be obeyed in Verona, and clung to the English head-quarters, under pretext of divers momentous projects on the coasts of France.

Bitter experience having taught the French princes that they could not rely on the enemies of their country to restore their throne, they fondly turned to their partisans in the interior and to La Vendée, and alleged that upon them alone all hope thenceforth rested. When terror ceased its reign in France, malignants unfortunately recovered confidence equally with honest men. The communications of the emigrants with the interior then recommenced. The court of Verona, through the medium of the Count d'Entraigues, corresponded with one Lemaitre, an intriguer who had been successively an advocate, secretary of the council, a pamphleteer, a prisoner in the Bastille, and now finally an agent of the princes. To him were joined a certain Laville-Heurnois, formerly a master of requests and a creature of Calonne, and an Abbé Brothier, tutor of the Abbé Maury's nephews. From these intriguers were demanded details on the state of France, and on the situation and views of parties, and digested plans of conspiracy. They replied by statements for the most part false: they boasted of pretended relations with the chiefs of the government, and laboured with all their power to persuade the princes that every thing was to be expected from a movement in the interior. They had been specifically instructed to open a communication with La Vendée, and particularly with Charette, who by his long resistance had become the hero of the royalists, but with whom no negotiation had been yet attempted.

Such, then, was the position of the royalist party within and without France. In La Vendée it prosecuted a war, little alarming from its dangers, but afflictive by its ravages. In Brittany it formed extensive projects, but remote as yet, and dependent on a doubtful contingency—union and concert amongst a multitude of lawless individuals. Out of France it was divided, contemned, unsupported; but, finally disabused touching the efficaciousness of foreign aid, it had reverted to the royalists of the interior, and opened with them an insignificant intercourse.

The republic, therefore, had little to dread from the efforts of Europe or of royalism. Apart from the regret occasioned by the unsuppressed ravages in La Vendée, it had abundant themes of congratulation in its brilliant triumphs. Saved the preceding year from invasion, it had this year wreaked revenge by conquests: it had acquired Belgium, Dutch Brabant, the districts of Luxumbourg, Liege, and Juliers, the electorate of Trèves, the Palatinate, Savoy, Nice, a fortress in Catalonia, the valley of Bastan; and thus menaced at once Holland, Piedmont, and Spain. Such were the results of the extraordinary efforts of the celebrated committee of public welfare.

CHAPTER XXXVIII.

ADMINISTRATIVE REFORMS. — ALTERATION OF MANNERS. — SALOONS OF PARIS. — CONFLICTS BETWEEN THE TWO PARTIES.—MODIFICATIONS IN THE MAXIMUM AND THE SYSTEM OF REQUISITIONS.—ATTACK ON THE HALL OF THE JACOBIN CLUB, AND CLOSING THEREOF.—RETURN OF THE SEVENTY-THREE DEPUTIES IMPRISONED AFTER THE 31ST MAY.—CONDEMNATION OF CARRIER. — PROCEEDINGS COMMENCED AGAINST BILLAUD-VARENNES, COLLOT-D'HERBOIS, AND BARRERE.

WHILST the events we have recounted were passing on the frontiers, the convention prosecuted its remedial measures. The representatives appointed to remodel the authorities, traversed France, every where reducing the number of revolutionary committees, composing them of other individuals, arresting, as accomplices of Robespierre's system, those whose excesses were too flagrant to be allowed to pass unpunished, changing the municipal functionaries, reorganising the popular societies, and purging them of the most dangerous men. These operations were not always effected without opposition. At Dijon, for example, the revolutionary organisation had been more compactly knitted than at almost any other place. The same individuals, members at once of the revolutionary committee, the municipality, and the popular society, had kept the inhabitants in constant dread and trepidation. They were accustomed to immure travellers and residents in the most arbitrary manner, to inscribe on the list of emigrants the names of all whom it suited them to include under that category, and to intimidate the sections from granting such persons certificates of residence. They had enrolled themselves under the form and name of a revolutionary army, and compelled the commune to allow them pay. They followed no industrious profession, attended the sittings of the club as a pastime, accompanied by their wives, and dissipated in orgies, where it was permitted to drink only from large and flowing goblets, the twofold product of their appointments and their rapine. They corresponded with the Jacobins of Lyons and Marseilles, and served as their medium of communication with the brethren of Paris. The representative Cales experienced infinite difficulty in breaking up this confederacy; he superseded all the revolutionary authorities, and selected twenty or thirty moderate members of the club, and charged them to institute a process of purgation as to the remainder.

When the ultra-revolutionists were expelled from the various municipalities in the departments, they followed the example of those at Paris, and usually retired into the Jacobin Club. If the club had been purged, they forcibly invaded it after the departure of the representatives, or formed another. There they indulged in language even more violent than heretofore, and gave way to all the frenzy of combined rage and fear, for they saw retribution and vengeance menacing them from every quarter. The Jacobins of Dijon transmitted an inflammatory address to those of Paris, breathing the most implacable sentiments. At Lyons they presented an equally determined aspect; and as the city still lay under the ban of the convention's ruthless decrees, the representatives were greatly fettered in their endeavours to repress their fury. At Marseilles they were yet more audacious; joining the heated passions characteristic of the locality to those of their universal party, they gathered into a tumultuous crowd, surrounded a room in which the deputies Auguis and Serres were dining, and sent in envoys, who, with swords and pistols in their hands, demanded the liberation of the imprisoned patriots. The two representatives displayed the utmost firmness; but, ill supported by the gendarmerie, which had constantly assisted in the perpetration of the recent cruelties, and deemed itself in a great measure responsible for them, they narrowly escaped being strangled or stabbed. Several Parisian battalions, however, happening to be in Marseilles at the moment, came to the rescue of the representatives, and dispersed the multitude. At Toulouse, also, the Jacobins provoked riots. In that city were four individuals who had rendered themselves the leaders of the revolutionary party—a director of the post-office, a secretary of the district, and two comedians. These had formed a committee of surveillance for an extensive district, and stretched their tyranny far beyond Toulouse. They opposed the reforms and imprisonments ordered by the deputies D'Artigoyte and Chaudron-Rousseau, aroused the popular society, and had the hardihood to induce it to publish a declaration that those representatives had forfeited the confidence of the people. Ultimately overpowered, however, they were incarcerated, with their principal accomplices.

Such scenes occurred throughout all France, with more or less violence, according to the character of the provincial population. Nevertheless, the Jacobins were repressed in every locality. Those of Paris, the ruling elders of the confederacy, were in the greatest alarm. They beheld the capital obviously repugnant to their doctrines, and it now became equally apparent that in the departments, opinion, less prompt in its manifestations than at Paris, had also emphatically pronounced against them. They knew they were every where stigmatised as cannibals, as partisans, accomplices, and continuators of Robespierre. True, they felt themselves supported by the horde of dismissed functionaries, by the Electoral Club, by a zealous and often victorious minority in the sections, and even by a portion of the members of the convention, some of whom still frequented their society; but they were not the less dismayed at the unequivocal tendency of the public mind, and they loudly proclaimed there was a plot formed to dissolve all the popular societies, and after them the republic itself.

They drew up an address to the affiliated societies, with the view of refuting the charges alleged against them. "Endeavours are making," so their manifesto ran, "to destroy our fraternal union, to break a compact formidable to the enemies of liberty and equality: we are denounced and assailed with the blackest calumnies. Aristocracy and moderatism are raising their audacious fronts. The disastrous reaction caused by the fall of the triumvirs is perpetuated; and, from amidst the storms brewed by the enemies of the people, has started a new faction, which aims at the dissolution of all the popular societies. It exacerbates and labours to infuriate public opinion; it pushes effrontery so far as to represent us a rival power to the national representation—we who have fought and coalesced with it in all the dangers of the country. It accuses us of being the successors of Robespierre, whilst we have on our registers the names of those only who, during the night of the 9th and 10th Thermidor, occupied the posts which the danger of the country assigned to them. But we will answer these vile calumniators by assiduously combating them; we will answer them by the purity of our principles and actions, and by an unshaken devotion to the cause of the people which they have betrayed, to the national representation which they would dishonour, and to the equality which they so much abhor."

They affected great respect, it will be observed, for the national representation. At one of their meetings they had even delivered up to the committee of general safety a member for having stated that the chief conspirators against liberty were in the bosom of the convention itself. They caused their address to be circulated through all the departments, and particularly through the sections of Paris.

The party opposed to them became every day more emboldened. It had already assumed peculiar emblems and manners, and agreed upon places and cries for rallying together. It was composed, especially in the beginning, as we have previously mentioned, of young men belonging to the persecuted families, or who had eluded the conscription. These had found ready allies in the female sex, who had passed the last winter in terror, and aspired to pass the present in festivities and pleasure. Frimaire (November) was approaching: the women were eager to throw off the semblance of indigence, simplicity, squalor even, they had been long condemned to affect during the reign of terror, and to substitute for such obnoxious constraint indulgence in elegant apparel, in the forms and enjoyments of refined intercourse. They made common cause with the youthful reprobators of a savage democracy, stimulated their zeal, and bound them, by their encomiums and exhortations, to observe the graces of politeness and studied costume. Thus fashion recommenced its sway. It imposed, as one of its laws, that the hair should be bound in tresses, and confined at the back of the head by a comb. This was a usage borrowed from the military, who thus disposed their hair to parry the strokes of swords. It originated in the idea of thereby intimating that those thus adorned had taken part in the success of the French armies. It was likewise essential to wear large cravats, black or green collars, according to a practice of the Chouans; and, above all, crape round the arm, as if mourning some victim of the revolutionary tribunal. Hence we see what a singular medley of ideas, recollections, and opinions, gave rise to the peculiarities of the *gilded youth*, for such was the name given to that class. At night, in the saloons, which were resuming their ancient brilliancy, the women rewarded with smiles and praises the young men who had displayed their courage in the sections, at the Palais-Royal, or in the garden of the Tuileries, and the writers also, who, in the thousand pamphlets and prints of the day, assailed with sarcasms *the revolutionary rabble*. Fréron had become the chief of journalists; he edited the *Orator of the People*, which speedily acquired renown. It was the journal read by the "gilded youth," and the monitor they consulted for their daily instructions.

The theatres were not yet open. The actors of the Comedie-Française were still in prison. In default of that place of resort, concerts were frequented, given at the Feydeau Theatre, and illustrated by a melodious voice which now first asserted its charms over the Parisians—the voice of Garat. There congregated all that might be called the aristocracy of the time, represented by a few nobles who had not quitted France, by persons of wealth who now ventured to show themselves in public, and by contractors who no longer dreaded the severity of the committee of public welfare. The women appeared in a costume modelled on the antique, according to the mania of the epoch, and copied from designs by David. They had long ago abandoned powder and hoops; they wore fillets around their hair; the form of their garments approached as nearly as possible the simple tunic of the Grecian women; and, instead of high-heeled shoes, they assumed that covering we see on ancient statues —a slight sandal attached to the ankle by ribands. The young men, with braided hair and black capes, filled the pit of the theatre, and occasionally arose to greet with acclamations the elegant and capriciously attired females who embellished those assemblies by their presence.

Madame Tallien was the most beautiful and admired of those women who introduced the new tastes: her saloon was the most brilliant and crowded. Daughter of the Spanish banker Cabarus, widow of a president at Bordeaux, and recently married to Tallien, she was linked both to the men of the old and of the new order of things. She had viewed with abhorrence the reign of terror, as well from indignation as from amiability; she had warmly interested herself in the misfortunes of others, and both at Bordeaux and at Paris had never ceased to act the part of a petitioner, which she performed, it is said, with irresistible fascination. It was she who had contrived to soften the proconsular severity which her husband manifested in the Gironde, and recall him to more humane sentiments. She aspired to make him the pacificator, the redresser of the wrongs of the revolution. She invited to her house all those who had contributed with him to consummate the 9th Thermidor, and strove to gain them over to the cause of mercy by gentle flattery, and by firing their minds with dazzling hopes of public gratitude, of oblivion of the past, which many assuredly needed, and of power, which now inclined rather to the opponents than to the partisans of terror. She drew around her fair associates, who aided in this scheme of pardonable seduction. Amongst them shone pre-eminent the widow of the unfortunate General Alexander Beauharnais, a young creole, attractive not so much from her beauty as her

inimitable grace.* Into this polished circle were attracted the rough and enthusiastic men who had been wont to lead so austere and harassing a life. They were there caressed, sometimes even rallied on their garb, their manners, or their rigorous principles. They were brought to sit at table with men whom they would have formerly persecuted under the character of aristocrats, enriched stockjobbers, or peculators of the public moneys, and thus made to feel their inferiority with regard to the ancient models of good taste and conversation. Many amongst them, deficient in acquirements, lost their self-possession with their rudeness, and were unable to sustain the energy of their character; others again, who, by their superior resources, knew how to vindicate their rank and speedily to acquire those advantages of mien and expression required in society, so frivolous and so easily caught after all, were nevertheless not always proof against alluring blandishments. The member of a committee, adroitly besought during an entertainment, often granted a favour or allowed his vote to be influenced.

Thus, a woman, born of a financier, married to a magistrate, and fallen, like any other spoil of the olden time, into the arms of an ardent revolutionist, took upon herself to reconcile simple men, sometimes uncouth and almost uniformly fanaticised, with elegance, taste, pleasure, freedom of social intercourse, and indifference as to opinions. The revolution redeemed (and that was, doubtless, a blessing) from the extreme limit of fanaticism and coarseness, was, notwithstanding, advancing too rapidly towards an utter disregard of republican manners, principles, and, we may almost say, antipathies. The Thermidorians were reproached with the change; they were accused of having commenced it, of eagerly embracing it, and of accelerating its predominance. The charge was true, and could not be gainsaid.

The revolutionists shunned these concerts and saloons. Rarely some amongst them ventured to enter such uncongenial scenes, and then hastened from them to their own tribunes, there to inveigh against "La Cabarus,"† and all the aristocrats, intriguers, and contractors she drew in her wake. They, the ultra-revolutionists, had no other places of resort than their clubs and sectional assemblies, which they frequented, not in quest of pleasure properly so called, but to give their passions vent. Their wives, who were styled "*the Furies of the Guillotine*," because they had often formed a circle around the scaffold during executions, appeared in the galleries of the clubs, attired in the popular costume, to bestow their applause on the most violent motions. Several members of the convention still continued to attend the meetings of the Jacobins, some bearing the halo of celebrity with them, but silent and gloomy, as Collot-d'Herbois, Billaud-Varennes, and Carrier. Others, such as Duhem, Crassous, Lanot, &c., gave their presence from attachment to the cause, and without having any peculiar reason for defending their revolutionary conduct.

The two parties repeatedly came into collision at the Palais-Royal, around the convention, in the galleries, and in the sections. In the sections, especially, where they had to deliberate and discuss, the tumults were characterised by extreme violence. It had become usual for certain unruly spirits to carry the address of the Jacobins to the affiliated societies from one to the other of the sectional meetings, and insist upon having it read. On the other hand, a special decree had directed the report of Robert Lindet on the state of France to be read on such occasions—a report which presented so truthful a picture, and expressed in so appropriate a manner the sentiments wherewith the majority of the convention and all honest men were animated. The reading of these two diverse documents became every decade the subject of lively contention. The revolutionists demanded with loud shouts the address of the Jacobins; their adversaries clamoured for Lindet's report. An indescribable uproar generally ensued. The members of the old revolutionary committees took down the names of all who mounted the tribune from the opposing ranks, and as they wrote them they exclaimed, "We will exterminate them!" Their habitual pursuits during the reign of terror had familiarised on their tongues the vocabulary of ruffianism and slaughter, and they could scarcely speak in any other language. By their present proceeding they gave occasion to a reproach that they were drawing up fresh lists of proscription, and making ready to recommence the system of Robespierre. These scenes usually terminated in actual conflicts; sometimes the victory remained uncertain, and ten o'clock arrived without any thing having been read. At such times the revolutionists, who never scrupled to overstep the legal hour, waited until their antagonists, who professed unlimited submission to the law, had retired, when they read whatever they pleased, and entertained all such topics of deliberation as their fancies suggested.

Every day scenes of this nature were reported to the convention, and bitter complaints lodged against the members of the old revolutionary committees, who were, it was generally asserted, the originators of all these disturbances. The Electoral Club, a more outrageous and turbulent arena than even any of the sections, contrived at length to provoke the patience of the assembly by an address conceived in the most dangerous spirit. That club was the resort, as we have before mentioned, of all the men most irretrievably compromised, and the place where the most daring schemes were concocted. A deputation from this club appeared, to demand that the election of municipal magistrates should be restored to the people; that the municipality of Paris, which had not been re-established since the 9th Thermidor, should be reconstituted; and, lastly, that instead of one sectional meeting each decade, two should be again allowed. On this audacious petition being read, sundry deputies arose, enforced the prevailing topics of complaint, and moved that proceedings be commenced against the members of the old revolutionary committees, to whom all the disorders were attributable. Legendre, although he had disapproved the previous attack of Lecointre upon Billaud-Varennes, Collot-d'Herbois, and Barrère, affirmed that the evil was to be traced to a higher source; that it was to be found in the members of the old government committees, who abused the indulgence of the assembly, and that the time had at last arrived when it was imperative to punish their former tyranny in order to avert its recurrence. This declaration occasioned a renewed and acrimonious outburst. After long and deplorable recriminations had been exchanged, the assembly, feeling the questions either insoluble or dangerous, for the second time passed to the order of the day.

Divers measures were then successively propounded, designed to repress ebullitions in the popular societies and abuses in the right of petition. It was proposed to subjoin to Lindet's report an address to the French nation, expressing in more clear and energetic terms the sentiments of the assembly, and the new course it purposed to follow. This suggestion was adopted. The deputy Richard, who had just returned from the army, maintained that the expedient was inadequate; that a vigorous government was the required panacea; that addresses were of no avail, because the framers of petitions would take care to neutralise their effect by counter-appeals; and that words ought no longer to be allowed utterance at the bar, which, pronounced in the streets, would lead to the arrest of those using such license. Bourdon [de-l'Oise] rose to speak. "It is time," he said, "to tell

* [This lady, it is perhaps scarcely necessary to state, subsequently became Empress of the French, as the wife of Napoleon Bonaparte.]

† [This was the natal name of Madame Tallien.]

you some useful truths. Do you know why your armies are constantly victorious? It is because they observe an exact discipline. Establish in the state a good police, and you will have a good government. Do you know whence spring the perpetual attacks directed against your rule?—from the mischievous purposes to which your enemies convert whatever is democratic in your institutions. They delight in repeating that you will never have a government—that you will be eternally torn by anarchy. Can it then be possible that a nation uniformly victorious should be ignorant how to govern itself; and that the convention, aware that the defect alone prevents the consummation of the revolution, should not remove it? No, no; let us deceive our enemies. It is by the abuse of popular societies and of the right of petitioning that they think to destroy us: it is that abuse which must be suppressed."

Various modes of rendering the popular societies innocuous without annihilating them, were then suggested. Pelet, with the view of depriving the Jacobins of the support they derived from several Mountaineer deputies sitting in their club, and more especially of tearing from them Billaud-Varennes, Collot-d'Herbois, and other dangerous leaders, proposed that all the members of the convention be prohibited to enrol themselves members of a popular society. His motion was adopted. But vehement remonstrances were urged by the Mountain: it was alleged that the right of meeting to discuss public interests was a privilege inherent in all the citizens, which a deputy could be no more debarred from exercising than any other member of the community, and that consequently the decree just passed was a violation of an absolute and unassailable right. The decree was rescinded. Dubois-Crancé thereupon submitted another motion. Reciting the manner in which the Jacobins had executed the process of purification, he showed that the club still retained within its pale the very individuals who had misled it under Robespierre. He maintained that the convention had an undoubted right to purge it in the same effective manner it had pursued, through its commissioners, with regard to the popular societies in the departments. He eventually moved that the subject be referred to the competent committees, with instructions to devise a suitable method of purification and a plan for rendering the popular societies beneficial. This amended proposition was finally adopted.

The Jacobins were thrown into an extraordinary ferment by the decision of the convention. They protested that Dubois-Crancé had deceived the deputies; that the purification ordained after the 9th Thermidor had been rigorously executed; that no authority could warrant another revisal; that they were all equally worthy to sit in that illustrious society, which had rendered such eminent services to the country; but that, at the same time, they shrunk from no scrutiny howsoever severe, and that they were ready to undergo the examination required. In consequence, they resolved that the list of all the members should be printed, and borne to the bar of the convention by a deputation. On the following day, the 13th Vendémiaire (4th October), however, they evinced a less docile spirit. They affirmed that their resolution of the eve was inconsiderate; that to deliver the list of the society to the national assembly, was tantamount to a recognition of the right to institute a purification, which they held was possessed by no earthly power; that all the citizens enjoying the privilege of meeting, without arms, to confer on questions of public import, no individual could be declared unfit to be enrolled in a society; and that, consequently, the purification was contrary to all right, and the list should not be rendered. "The popular societies," exclaimed a certain Giot, an outrageous Jacobin, and one of the delegates to the armies—"the popular societies are independent of all but themselves. If it were otherwise, the infamous court would have purged that of the Jacobins, and you would have seen these benches, which ought to be filled by virtue alone, polluted by the presence of the Jaucours and the Feuillants. Well! the court itself, which respected nothing, dared not interfere with you; and what the court dared not do, is to be attempted at a moment when the Jacobins have sworn to prostrate all tyrants, whoever they may be, and to yield invariable submission to the convention! I have just arrived from the departments; I can assure you the existence of the popular societies is seriously jeopardised; I have been treated as a miscreant, because the title of Jacobin was in my commission. I was told that I belonged to a society which was composed only of brigands. There are furtive schemes hatching to alienate from you the other societies in the republic; I have been fortunate enough to check the schism, and to knit more firmly the bands of fraternity between you and the society of Bayonne, which Robespierre had calumniated in your hall. What I have stated of one is common to all: be prudent; always adhere to your principles and to the convention; and, above all, acknowledge in no power the right to purify you." The Jacobins applauded this discourse, and determined they would not furnish their list to the convention, but would await its decrees.

The Electoral Club was still more unruly. Since its last petition, it had been excluded from the Evêché, and taken refuge in a room of the Museum, in the immediate vicinity of the convention. There, in a sitting held during the night, amidst furious cries from the assembled horde, and clattering peals from the feet of the women located in the galleries, it declared that the convention had overstepped the duration of its powers; that it had been deputed to try the last king and frame a constitution; and that, having accomplished those two objects, its task was performed and its authority extinct.

These scenes in the Jacobin and Electoral Clubs were quickly denounced before the convention, which referred the additional facts to the committees charged to present a report touching the abuses of the popular societies. It had adopted an address to the French nation, as previously resolved, and transmitted it to the sections and all the communes in the republic. This address, couched in firm and moderate language, inculcated in a manner more positive and precise the sentiments expressed in the report of Robert Lindet. It became the subject of fresh contests in the sections. The revolutionists strove to prevent its being read, and opposed addresses of adhesion being voted in reply; on the contrary, they moved and carried the adoption of addresses to the Jacobins, expressive of the interest felt in their cause. Frequently, after having thus decided a vote, auxiliaries reinforced their adversaries, who proceeded to expel them; and the section, thus remodelled, arrived at an opposite conclusion. It consequently happened that several amongst them proffered two contradictory addresses—the one to the Jacobins, the other to the convention. In the first, the services of the popular societies were extolled, and vows offered up for their preservation; in the latter, the convention was assured that the section, freed from the thraldom of anarchists and terrorists, came to express its true feelings, to place at its disposal the arms and lives of its members, to combat both the successors of Robespierre and the agents of royalism. The convention calmly surveyed these dissensions, whilst awaiting the forthcoming project on the regulation of the popular societies.

It was presented on the 25th Vendémiaire (16th October). Its principal aim was to break up the coalition formed throughout France by the various Jacobin societies. Affiliated to the parent society, regularly corresponding with it, and obeying its orders, these composed a vast party, skilfully organised, under a supreme and central direction—the feature most obnoxious to a ruling power. The proposed decree interdicted "*all affiliations and federations, as likewise all*

correspondence, in a collective capacity, between popular societies." It provided, moreover, that no petitions or addresses should be framed in a collective capacity, in order to avoid those imperious manifestoes which the delegates of the Jacobin and Electoral Clubs were wont to read at the bar, and which had often become mandates to the assembly. Every address or petition was to be individually signed. This stipulation assured the means of ascertaining and prosecuting the authors of inflammatory motions; and hopes were entertained that the necessity of appending their signatures would induce them to pause. The list of members belonging to each society was to be immediately drawn out and affixed in the place of meeting.

Scarcely was the project submitted to the assembly, ere a hundred voices broke forth in condemnation. "The design of destroying the popular societies is manifest," said the Mountaineers; "but you forget that they have saved the revolution and liberty; you forget that they offer the most potent engine for uniting the citizens, and preserving in them energy and patriotism; you infringe, by prohibiting them from holding correspondence, the essential right appertaining to all citizens of corresponding together—a right equally sacred as that of congregating peaceably to confer on questions of public interest." The deputies Lejeune, Duhem, and Crassous, all Jacobins, all strongly interested in discarding such a decree, were not the only members who thus expressed themselves. The deputy Thibaudeau, a sincere republican, unconnected with either Mountaineers or Thermidorians, betokened alarm at the possible consequences of the decree, and urged its postponement, signifying himself apprehensive that it would endanger the very existence of the popular societies. "No intention exists of destroying them," replied the Thermidorians, the authors of the decree; "it is merely wished to place them under necessary restrictions."

Amidst the contention, Merlin de Thionville suddenly exclaimed—"President, call the previous speakers to order. They pretend that we desire to abolish the popular societies, whereas the question solely relates to the regulation of their external position." Rewbel, Bentabolle, and Thuriot, likewise maintained that their suppression was not contemplated. "Are they prevented," they argued, "from meeting peaceably and unarmed to confer on public affairs? Certainly not; that right remains unimpeached. They are prevented from affiliating or confederating, and they are thereby treated only as the departmental authorities have previously been. These latter were interdicted, by the decree of the 14th Frimaire, instituting the revolutionary government, from corresponding or concerting together. Is it intended that the popular societies should be allowed a license withheld from the departmental authorities? They are prohibited from corresponding in a collective capacity, and in that restriction no right is violated: every citizen, doubtless, is entitled to correspond from one extremity of France to another; but do citizens correspond through presidents and secretaries? It is this official correspondence between powerful and organised bodies that the decree purposes, and most reasonably purposes, to prevent, in order to destroy a federalism more monstrous and dangerous than that of the departments. It is by means of these affiliations and correspondences that the Jacobins have succeeded in attaining so formidable an influence over the government, and assuming a part in the direction of affairs which rightfully belongs to the national representation alone."

Bourdon [de-l'Oise], one of the most influential members of the committee of general safety, and, as we recollect, not always in perfect concord with his friends, although a Thermidorian, thus spoke:—"The popular societies are not the people; I see the people only in the primary assemblies: the popular societies are collections of men self-elected, self-nominated, like monks, who have concluded by forming an exclusive and permanent aristocracy, entitling itself the people, and planting itself alongside the national representation, to dictate, modify, or oppose its resolutions. I say, by the side of the convention I perceive another representation in full activity, and that representation is located at the Jacobin Club." Loud plaudits interrupted Bourdon: he continued in these terms:—"I bring so little passion to the discussion, that to have peace and union I would willingly say to the people, 'Determine between the men you have appointed to represent you and those who have reared themselves by their side; it matters little, so that you have a single representation.'" Fresh cheers again compelled Bourdon to pause. He resumed: "Yes," he passionately exclaimed, "let the people choose between you and the men who would have proscribed representatives possessing the national confidence—between you and the men who, leagued with the municipality of Paris, laboured so strenuously, but a few months ago, to strangle liberty. Citizens, would you conclude a glorious peace?—would you grasp the boundaries of ancient Gaul? Then offer to the Belgians, to the people bordering on the Rhine, a peaceable revolution—a republic without a double representation—a republic without revolutionary committees imbrued with the blood of citizens. Say to the Belgians and the people of the Rhine, 'You aspired to a demi-liberty, we give it you whole, only sparing you the cruel calamities which precede its establishment—sparing you the bloody trials through which we have ourselves passed.' Remember, citizens, that in order to deter the neighbouring populations from uniting with you, they are told that you have no government; that in treating with you it is difficult to ascertain whether the convention or the Jacobin Club ought to be addressed. Give, on the contrary, unity and concentration to your government, and you will find that no population will display aversion towards you and your principles—you will find that no population hates liberty."

Duhem, Crassous, and Clausel, pressed for at least the postponement of the decree, alleging that it was too important a measure to be passed thus abruptly; all anxious to address the assembly, they contended for priority. Merlin de Thionville demanded it in preference to them all, with that ardour he could manifest in the tribune as well as on the field of battle. The president ended the strife by calling upon them successively. Dubarran, Levasseur, Romme, were likewise heard against the decree; Thuriot in its favour. Finally, Merlin once more spoke. "Citizens," he exclaimed, "when the establishment of the republic was discussed, you decreed it without delay or report; today its establishment for the second time is in some sort the question, since it has to be rescued from the popular societies coalesced against it. Citizens, there is no reason to recoil from an attack on that cavern, notwithstanding the blood and corpses that obstruct its entrance; penetrate boldly into it, drive out the knaves and assassins, and leave none but good citizens therein, to ponder tranquilly on the great interests of the country. I move you to pass this decree, which saves the republic, as you did that which created it, that is to say, without delay or report."

Merlin was greatly applauded, and the decree forthwith voted, clause by clause. It was the first blow levelled at that celebrated society, which had hitherto held the convention in trembling thraldom, and constantly imparted to it the revolutionary impulse. The importance of the decree was not to be estimated merely by its provisions, which might be easily evaded, but by the courage manifested in its adoption, for the spirit was portentous to the Jacobins of their approaching fall. Congregating that same evening in their hall, they commented on the measure and the manner in which it had been passed. The deputy Lejeune, who had strenuously opposed it in the convention, complained of not having been adequately

supported; he asserted that few members of the assembly had spoken in defence of the society to which they belonged. "There are certain members of the convention," he said, "renowned for their revolutionary and patriotic energy, who maintained this day a reprehensible silence. Either those members are guilty of tyranny, as alleged against them, or they have laboured for the public welfare. In the first supposition, they are culprits, and ought to be punished; in the second, their task is not yet accomplished. After having facilitated by their vigils the successes of the country's defenders, they ought to vindicate their principles and the endangered rights of the people. But two months ago, you, Collot and Billaud, were incessantly descanting on the rights of the people from this tribune; how comes it that you have ceased to uphold them? Why are you silent now, when so many appeals are still made upon your courage and talents?"

In truth, since the formal accusation lodged against them in the convention, Billaud and Collot had observed a sullen silence. But thus invoked by their colleague Lejeune, and upbraided with not having defended the society, they appeared in the tribune, and declared, "that if they had preserved silence it was from motives of prudence, not from weakness; that they had been apprehensive their support might injure rather than benefit the cause advocated by patriots; that this dread of prejudicing discussions had long been the sole reason of their reserve; that, moreover, being accused of having domineered over the convention, they had sought to answer their accusers by abstaining from all prominent participation in affairs; but that they responded with delight to the call made upon them by their colleagues, to emerge from that voluntary retirement, and would again feel authorised to devote their energies to the cause of liberty and the republic."

Satisfied with this explanation, the Jacobins greeted them with applause, and reverted to the law enacted that morning. They found consolation in the idea that they would still communicate with all France by means of their orations in the tribune. Goujon urged them to respect the decree just passed, and prevailed in extorting a promise from them to that effect; but a Jacobin, by name Terrasson, propounded a scheme for continuing the correspondence without directly infringing the law. This consisted in framing a circular letter, not written in the name of the Jacobin Club and addressed to other Jacobins, but *signed by all the free men assembled in the hall of the Jacobins, and addressed to all the free men of France assembled in popular societies.* The suggestion was hailed with rapture, and the plan of transmitting such circulars definitively adopted.

Thus we see how lightly the Jacobins treated the menaces of the convention, and how little disposed they showed themselves to profit by the warning it had given them. Meanwhile, until fresh provocations should render additional measures respecting them indispensable, the convention applied itself to the task traced out in Robert Lindet's report, and entered upon the discussion of the various questions treated by him in that document. The objects in view were to remedy the effects of a violent system of government on agriculture, trade, and currency, and to revive confidence, security, and the spirit of order and industry, in all classes of the community. But here, again, the contending parties were equally at variance, equally certain to be engaged in altercation, as on all other matters of polity.

The requisitions, the maximum, the assignats, and the sequestration on the property of foreigners, were topics of as virulent invective against the late government as the imprisonments and executions. The Thermidorians, supremely ignorant on subjects of political economy, were moved, by the mere force of reaction, to censure all that had been done in that branch of administration in bitter and outrageous terms; and yet, if in the general government of the state, during the preceding year, any thing had been really irreproachable and completely justified by necessity, it was the conduct of the financial and victualling departments. Cambon, the most influential member in the committee of finance, had brought the exchequer into admirable order: he had caused large issues of assignats, it is true, but that was the sole resource; and he had quarrelled with Robespierre, Saint-Just, and Couthon, because he refused to concur in an increased revolutionary expenditure. And Lindet, charged with the superintendence of transports and requisitions, had laboured with the most exemplary zeal in obtaining from abroad, amassing in France, and conveying both to the armies and to the great towns, the supplies that were necessary. The mode of requisitions was undoubtedly a violent one; but on all hands it was acknowledged to be the only possible expedient, and Lindet had sedulously endeavoured to use it with the utmost moderation. At the same time, he could not be held responsible either for the fidelity of all his agents or for the conduct of those who exercised the privilege of making requisitions, such as municipal functionaries, representatives on missions, or commissioners to the armies.

The Thermidorians, and especially Tallien, directed the most frivolous and unjust attacks upon the general system of these revolutionary expedients, and upon the manner in which they had been carried into effect. The primary cause of all the evils was, according to them, the excessive issue of assignats, whereby they had been depreciated, and rendered utterly disproportionate in value to articles of food and merchandise. It was thus the maximum had become so disastrous and oppressive, because it compelled all venders or creditors to receive in payment a nominal and purely illusory acquittance. There was nothing very novel or profound in these objections; no indication of any remedy, or of any discovery unknown to all the world; but it was the object of Tallien and his friends to attribute the inordinate issue of assignats to Cambon, and thus apparently to charge upon him all the calamities of the state. They likewise reproached him with the sequestration of foreign property—a measure which, having provoked reprisals against the French, had interrupted the circulation of bills of exchange, destroyed every species of credit, and annihilated commerce. As to the commission for supplies and provisions, the same censors accused it of having harassed France with requisitions, expended enormous sums abroad in procuring corn, and left Paris in scarcity at the commencement of a rigorous winter. They maintained the expediency of subjecting it to a severe inquiry.

Cambon possessed a reputation for integrity unimpugned by any party. He was actuated with an ardent zeal for the best practicable administration of the finances, but combined therewith an impetuous temperament, which an unjust reproach excited beyond the limits of control. He had intimated to Tallien and his friends that he would not assail them, but that, at the first whisper of calumny, he would approve himself a merciless antagonist. Tallien had the imprudence to aggravate his attacks from the tribune of the convention by vituperative articles in the journals. Cambon was incensed to fury, and during one of the numerous sessions devoted to the discussion of those matters, he hurried to the tribune, and thus apostrophised Tallien: "Ah! thou attackest me!—thou wouldst throw doubts upon my honesty! So be it! I will prove that thou art an embezzler and an assassin. Thou hast not rendered thy accounts as secretary of the commune, and I have the proof thereof at the committee of finance; thou hast ordered an outlay of fifteen hundred thousand francs for an object which will cover thee with infamy. Thou hast not rendered the accounts of thy mission to Bordeaux, and I have likewise proofs of this at the committee. Thou

wilt remain for ever suspected of confederacy in the crimes of September, and I shall proceed to prove, by thy own words, that confederacy against thee, which ought to condemn thee to silence for the rest of thy life." Here Cambon was interrupted; he was told that such personalities were trespasses on the order of debate, that no person impugned his honesty, and that the discussion had reference merely to the financial system. Tallien muttered a few incoherent sentences, to the effect that he did not answer personal charges, but simply such as related to public questions. Cambon subsequently proceeded to demonstrate that assignats had been the sole resource of the revolution, as the expenditure had amounted to three hundred millions per month; that the income, amidst the prevailing disorder, had scarcely furnished the fourth of that sum, and the deficiency was to be made good every month by assignats; that the quantity in circulation was no mystery, and amounted to six thousand four hundred millions; and that at the same time the national domains represented twelve thousand millions, and supplied adequate means for redeeming the republic from debt. He averred that he had, at the peril of his life, saved five hundred millions, which Robespierre, Saint-Just, and Couthon proposed to apply to certain purposes; that he had long opposed the maximum and sequestration; and that, with regard to the commission for commerce, being obliged to pay twenty-one francs the quintal abroad for corn, and to resell it in France for fourteen, there could be little ground for wonder that its transactions had entailed heavy losses.

These controversies, so indiscreet on the part of the Thermidorians, who, whether right or wrong in their views, had assuredly a somewhat tarnished reputation, and should have paused ere they ventured to assail a man at once upright, able, and violent, caused to the assembly the loss of much valuable time. Although the attacks ceased on the side of the Thermidorians, Cambon's wrath was not appeased, and every day he repeated in the tribune: "To accuse me! the vile rabble! I challenge you to examine my accounts, and investigate my conduct!" "Be tranquil," exclaimed the members around him; "no one doubts your integrity." But he reverted to the subject almost daily. Amidst this hot contention and personal recrimination, the assembly adopted, to the extent of its capability, such measures as were most calculated to repair or mitigate existing evils.

It ordered a general statement of the finances, detailing the receipts and payments, and a report on the means of withdrawing a part of the assignats from circulation, without depriving them of their current character, so as to avoid discrediting them. On the motion of Cambon, it renounced a miserable financial expedient, which gave rise to infinite peculation, and outraged the prejudices of sundry provinces, to wit, the melting of church plate. This resource had been originally estimated at a thousand millions; in reality, it produced only thirty millions. A resolution was passed that the plate in question should not be touched for the future, but remain in deposit with the communes. The more serious inconveniences of the maximum next occupied the attention of the assembly. Some members already advocated the entire abolition of that measure; but the apprehension of a disproportionate enhancement of prices prevented acquiescence in so sweeping a reaction. The modification of the law was alone aimed at. The maximum had contributed to destroy commerce, because the merchants obtained, in the rates of the tariff, no allowance for the charges of freight or insurance. In consequence, all colonial produce, all articles of primary necessity, and all raw materials brought from abroad into the French ports, were freed from the maximum and the burden of requisitions, and might be sold in open competition. The same privilege was granted with regard to merchandise captured in prizes, which had hitherto lain unproductive in the warehouses. The uniform maximum on corn had been attended with manifold inconveniences. The production of grain being more costly and less copious in certain departments, the prices received by the farmers in those departments had not repaid even their outlay. It was decided that the prices of grain should vary in each department, according to the scale of 1790, and be raised two-thirds upon that basis. When thus increasing the value of the commodities of life, it was proposed to augment appointments, salaries, and the incomes of small annuitants; but this suggestion, considerately submitted by Cambon, was repudiated as interested by Tallien, and deferred for after consideration.

The subject of requisitions was subsequently discussed. The principal evils attending them were the general, unlimited, and confused manner in which they were levied, and the exhaustion of the means of transport; to avert which for the future, it was determined that the commission for supplies should alone possess the right of making requisitions; that it should be debarred from exacting an entire commodity, or all the produce of a department; but that it should specify the article needed, both as to its nature and quantity, and the period for its delivery and payment; and that it should regulate its demands according to the actual necessity, and select the district contiguous to the locality requiring supplies. The representatives with the armies were solely authorised, in urgent cases of destitution or of rapid movements, to make prompt and indispensable requisitions.

The question touching the sequestration of foreign property was warmly debated. One party argued that the war ought not to be extended from governments to subjects; that it was fitting the latter should be allowed peaceably to continue their relations and interchanges, and armies only be attacked; that the French had confiscated but twenty-five millions, whereas they had lost by seizures in foreign countries at least one hundred millions; that policy dictated the restitution of the twenty-five in order to recover the one hundred millions; that the sequestration was ruinous to the French bankers, inasmuch as they were obliged to deposit in the public treasury the sums they owed to aliens, whilst they were debarred from receiving what aliens were indebted to them, as the foreign governments appropriated all such balances by way of reprisal; that this measure, thus prolonged, rendered commercial intercourse with France distasteful and suspicious even to neutrals; and that, lastly, the circulation of bills having ceased, it was found necessary to pay for a considerable portion of the produce imported from adjacent countries in specie. The other party replied that, since a distinction was taken between subjects and governments in time of warfare, the rule must be applied to balls and bullets as well as commerce, and those missiles be directed at the heads of kings alone, not at those of their soldiers; that the English trading vessels taken by French privateers ought to be restored, upon the same principle, and only ships of war retained; that if the twenty-five millions sequestrated were reimbursed, the example would not be imitated by the hostile governments, and the one hundred millions belonging to Frenchmen be still withheld; and, finally, that to re-establish the circulation of bills of exchange would merely serve to provide the emigrants with a medium for drawing funds out of France.

The convention shrunk from deciding the point, and simply resolved that the sequestration should be raised so far as regarded the Belgians, whom conquest had in a certain sense placed at peace with France, and the merchants of Hamburg, who were guiltless of the war declared by the empire, and whose credits represented grain furnished to France.

To all these retrieving measures adopted in behalf of agriculture and commerce, the convention super-

added others calculated to revive confidence and reinstate the trading community in its wonted activity. A former decree placed beyond the pale of the law all who should elude a sentence, or evade the provisions of an enactment; it was abolished, and those condemned by revolutionary commissions, or included in the lists of suspected, who had concealed themselves, were formally authorised to re-enter their abodes in safety. The suspected still under detention were allowed the right of administering their property. Lyons was declared to be no longer in a state of rebellion; its name was restored; the demolitions ceased; the goods stopped by the surrounding communes were given up to it; its merchants no longer needed certificates of civism to receive or transmit merchandise, and the benefits of trade recommenced for that unfortunate city. The members of the popular commission of Bordeaux and their adherents, that is to say, nearly all the Bordeaux merchants, were under the ban of outlawry; the decree fulminated against them was cancelled. An invidious column had been ordered for erection at Caen, in execration of federalism; the order was countermanded, and a resolution passed that no such column should be reared. Sedan was pronounced free to manufacture all descriptions of cloth. The departments of the North, the Pays de Calais, the Aisne, and the Somme, were relieved from the land-tax for four years, on condition they resumed the cultivation of flax and hemp. Lastly, a commiserating glance was cast at the ill-fated La Vendée. The representatives Hentz and Francastel, General Turreau, and several others, who had executed the ruthless decrees promulgated under the reign of terror, were recalled. It was alleged, naturally enough, that they were accomplices of Robespierre and the committee of public welfare, who had purposed, by the employment of cruelty, to render the war of La Vendée perpetual. Why the committee should have harboured such an intention, was not stated; but parties are not scrupulous in branding adversaries. Vimeux was appointed to command in La Vendée, young Hoche in Brittany; and into both districts new representatives were dispatched, with commissions to examine whether any probability existed that an amnesty would be accepted, and thereby a pacification happily accomplished.

It now becomes obvious how rapid and general was the reaction towards other ideas. And whilst alleviating all manner of woes, reintegrating all classes of proscribed, it was natural that the sympathy of the convention should be likewise awakened on behalf of its own members. For more than a year, seventy-three deputies had languished in detention at Port Libre, for having signed a protest against the outrage of the 31st May. They had written a letter demanding a trial. All that yet remained of the right side, and a portion of the section stigmatised as *the Belly*, started from their long slumber on a question which involved the freedom and security of debate, and strenuously advocated the reinstalment of their colleagues. Then ensued one of those stormy and interminable discussions which invariably arose when the past came under review. "You would then condemn the thirty-first of May!" the Mountaineers exclaimed; "you would anathematise a day which up to this hour you have asserted glorious and salutary; you would resuscitate a faction which, by its baneful opposition, almost ruined the republic; you would reorganise federalism!" The Thermidorians, themselves the authors or approvers of the 31st May, were embarrassed; and, in order to delay the decision, the convention ordered a report on the suspended deputies.

It is in the nature of reactions not only to seek redress for ills inflicted, but also to exact vengeance. At this time the convention was besieged with exhortations to hasten the trial of Lebon and Fouquier-Tinville. We are aware that proceedings against Billaud, Collot, Barrère, Vadier, Amar, Vouland, and David, members of the old committees, had been previously and repeatedly urged. Circumstances daily led to further propositions of the like nature. The drownings at Nantes, atrocities long unknown, had at length been revealed. One hundred and thirty-three Nantese, transferred to Paris for trial before the revolutionary tribunal, had not arrived until after the 9th Thermidor. They had been acquitted, and heard with favour whilst recounting the calamities visited on their city. The public indignation was so vividly excited, that it had been found expedient to summon the members of the revolutionary committee of Nantes to Paris. The evidence adduced on their trial furnished a melancholy picture of the enormities usual in civil strife. At Paris and elsewhere, remote from the theatre of warfare, no conception was formed of the excess to which ferocity had been carried. The accused could allege but two facts in their exculpation, and they pleaded them to all the charges—La Vendée raging around them, and the orders of the representative Carrier. As the proceedings drew towards a close, they inveighed more bitterly against Carrier, and demanded that he be made to partake their fate, and to answer in his own person for the acts he had enjoined. The entire population was aroused, and clamoured for the arrest of Carrier, and for his arraignment before the revolutionary tribunal. It became necessary for the convention to adopt some resolution upon the topic thus agitating the public mind. The Mountaineers were struck with dismal apprehensions; they asked whether, after having already immured Lebon and David, and several times accused Billaud, Collot, and Barrère, their adversaries intended to finish by calling to account all the deputies who had been engaged on missions. To allay their fears, the expedient of a decree was devised, for the purpose of placing under the safeguard of strict formalities prosecutions against members of the national representation. The introduction of this decree gave rise to lengthened debates, characterised by great asperity on both sides. The Mountaineers desired, with the view of averting a fresh proscription, to render the formalities slow and complicated. Those they called "the reactors," on the contrary, desired to simplify them, in order to ensure more promptly and certainly the chastisement of those obnoxious deputies classed under the title of "proconsuls." Eventually the measure was so framed that all denunciations were to be referred to the three committees of public welfare, general safety, and legislation, who should decide whether there were grounds for investigation; that, in case of an affirmative decision, a committee of twenty-one members should be chosen by ballot to draw up a report; and that, with such report and the vindication of the inculpated deputy before it, the convention should determine in the last resort whether there were grounds for impeachment, and, in the unfavourable alternative, send the deputy before the competent tribunal.

So soon as the decree was passed, the three committees declared there were grounds for investigation against Carrier. A committee of twenty-one members was thereupon impanelled, to which all the documents in the pending trial were referred: it summoned Carrier to give appearance before it, and forthwith entered upon the examination. After the circumstances that had transpired at the revolutionary tribunal, and the notoriety of his revolting acts, the fate of Carrier could not be doubtful. The Mountaineers, albeit reprobating the crimes of Carrier, professed to believe that, if he were prosecuted, it was not so much to punish his transgressions, as to prepare the way for a long series of avenging sacrifices against the men whose energy had saved France. Their opponents, on the other hand, comparing the urgent demands, pressed by the members of the revolutionary committee on trial, for the arraignment of Carrier, with the singular tardiness of the committee of twenty-one, concluded there was a project formed for sparing

him. The committee of general safety, fearing that he might take flight, surrounded him with police agents, who kept constant vigils on his movements. Carrier does not seem, however, to have meditated flight. Certain ultra-revolutionists had secretly urged him to escape; but their exhortations were lost on him—he appeared overwhelmed and paralysed by the public abhorrence. One day, perceiving he was followed, he turned upon one of the agents, asked furiously why he was dogging him, and, showing a pistol, threatened to blow out his brains. A crowd collected, and symptoms of a commotion were manifested; the armed force hastened to the spot, seized Carrier, and conducted him to his dwelling. This occurrence gave rise to considerable excitement in the assembly, and to vehement outcries in the Jacobin Club. It was maintained that the national representation had been outraged in the person of Carrier, and explanations were demanded from the committee of general safety. The committee frankly avowed its share in the matter; and, though subjected to severe animadversion, it gained the credit of being determined to prevent Carrier's escape. At length, the committee of twenty-one made its report, concluding for impeachment before the revolutionary tribunal. Carrier essayed despondingly to defend himself; he traced all his cruelties to the exasperation provoked by the civil war, to the necessity of terrifying La Vendée, still in a menacing condition, and to the impulse imparted from the committee of public welfare, on which he dared not directly charge the drownings, but to which he explicitly imputed that inspiration to ferocious energy which had hurried into extravagance divers commissioners of the convention. Here, as had often previously happened, dangerous questions were revived; the more hazardous, that the share of each in the violences of the revolution must become, when brought under discussion, the fertile theme of recrimination. The commissioners might attribute to the committees, the committees to the convention, the convention to all France, that inspiration which had led to such frightful and to such great results, which was common to the whole country, and which above all sprung from a situation without example. "Every one," exclaimed Carrier, in a moment of despair—"every one is guilty here, even to the president's bell!" Nevertheless, the narrative of the abominations perpetrated at Nantes had aroused so deep a feeling of indignation, that not a single member ventured to vindicate Carrier, or attempted to shield him even upon general considerations. He was decreed under impeachment by an unanimous vote, and consigned to the revolutionary tribunal.

The reaction was thus proved to be making rapid strides. The blow, which the convention had heretofore shrunk from aiming at the members of the old committees of government, was now levelled at Carrier. All the deputies who had filled missions, all the individuals who had officiated on revolutionary committees—all those, in short, who had exercised rigorous powers—began to tremble for their safety.

The Jacobins, already struck at by a decree which interdicted them from maintaining affiliations and correspondence in a collective capacity, had need of prudence; but, since the late measures of the assembly, so contrary to their views and doctrines, it was scarcely to be anticipated they would subside into acquiescence, and thus avert a rupture with the convention and the Thermidorians. The resolution taken with regard to Carrier, in fact, evoked all their latent animosity, and led to a violent outburst in their club. Crassous, a deputy and Jacobin, described it as one of the means employed by aristocracy to ruin the patriots. "The trial now proceeding before the revolutionary tribunal," he said, "is the chief reliance of aristocracy, and that on which it grounds its hopes. The accused are scarcely allowed the privilege of being heard before the tribunal; nearly all the witnesses are men interested in making a great uproar about this affair—some of them have passports signed by Chouans; the journalists and pamphleteers have conspired to exaggerate the most trifling facts, bewilder public opinion, and keep out of view the cruel circumstances which produced and which explain the calamities that occurred, not only at Nantes but throughout France. Unless the convention be on its guard, it will find itself disgraced by these aristocrats, who make so much noise about this trial only to throw upon it all the odium. It is not the Jacobins who are to be accused of seeking to dissolve the convention, but these men, confederated to compromise and degrade it in the eyes of France. Let all good patriots, therefore, be vigilant; the attack upon them is commenced; let them hold together and be prepared to defend themselves with energy."

Several Jacobins spoke after Crassous, and harangued in the same strain. "The reactors descant," they said, "on drownings and shootings; but they omit to mention that the individuals whom they profess to commiserate had furnished aid to the brigands; they forget the cruelties inflicted on our volunteers, who were hanged on trees and shot in files. If the brigands are to have vengeance, let the families of two hundred thousand republicans, mercilessly massacred, also come forward and demand vengeance." The minds of the assembled Jacobins became furiously excited; the meeting was converted into a raging tumult. At length, Billaud-Varennes, whose long silence had been a subject of reproach, appeared in the tribune. "The tactics of the counter-revolutionists are well known," he said: "when they endeavoured, under the Constituent Assembly, to assail the revolution, they called the Jacobins disorganisers, and massacred them on the Champ de Mars. After the 2d September, when they strove to prevent the establishment of the republic, they called them drinkers of blood, and loaded them with atrocious calumnies. Now they are recommencing the same machinations. but let them not delude themselves with hopes of triumph; the patriots have thought fit to observe silence for a moment, but the lion is not dead when he sleeps, and on his awakening he annihilates all his enemies. The trenches are opened, and the patriots are about to shake off their slumber and resume all their energy. We have already a thousand times exposed our lives; if the scaffold still await us, let us remember that it is the scaffold which secured the glory of the immortal Sidney!"

These words electrified the assemblage. The Jacobins gathered around Billaud-Varennes, and rapturously applauded him; they pledged themselves to make common cause with all the threatened patriots, and to combat in their defence whilst life held.

In the present position of parties, this scene necessarily attracted attention. The speech of Billaud-Varennes, who had hitherto abstained from occupying either of the two tribunes, was a veritable declaration of war. The Thermidorians, at all events, so construed it. On the following day, Bentabolle produced the journal of the Mountain, which contained an account of the meeting at the Jacobin Club, and denounced that expression of Billaud-Varennes—"*The lion is not dead when he sleeps, and on his awakening he annihilates all his enemies.*" Scarcely had Bentabolle time to repeat this phrase, ere the Mountaineers arose in a body, assailed him with abusive epithets, and exclaimed that he too was one of those who had liberated aristocrats. Duhem, in particular, pronounced him a villain. Tallien vehemently insisted upon Bentabolle's right to be heard, that deputy, scared at the tumult, being about to leave the tribune. He was induced to remain, however, and proceeded to demand an explanation from Billaud-Varennes as to the words "*on the awakening of the lion.*" Billaud rose to reply in his place. "To the tribune!" was shouted from all sides. He resisted; but was finally obliged to mount

the rostrum, and speak from that conspicuous station. "I do not disavow," he said, "the opinion I uttered at the Jacobin Club. So long as I deemed personal quarrels the only matters at issue, I remained silent: but I could no longer be silent when I saw aristocracy arising more formidably than ever." At these words a laugh broke forth in one of the galleries, and a noise in another. "Turn out the Chouans!" vociferated the Mountaineers. Billaud continued, amidst antagonist cheers and murmurs. He affirmed, in an embarrassed tone, that known royalists had been liberated and the purest patriots immured; in corroboration, he cited the instance of Madame de Tourzel, the governess of the children of France, "who had recently been set at large, and who might of herself form a nucleus of contra-revolution." Much laughter was elicited by this remark. He added, that the secret conduct of the committees belied the public language of the convention in its addresses; and that in such a state of things he was justified in speaking of "an awakening" as necessary to patriots, for it is the slumber of men on their rights that leads them to slavery.

Partial applause from the Mountain accompanied Billaud as he descended the steps of the tribune, but the great body of the audience and the assembly indulged in obstreperous laughter, or evinced that insulting pity engendered at the sight of fallen tyranny, struggling dismally and vainly to plead its justification. Tallien hastened to succeed Billaud, and retort his reproaches. "It is time," he said, "to answer the men who are striving to incite the people against the convention." "No person is doing so," cried sundry voices in the hall. "Yes, yes!" responded others; "men are striving to incite the people against the convention!" "They are those men who tremble for themselves," continued Tallien, "on beholding the sword of justice suspended over guilty heads, light piercing into all parts of the administration, and the vengeance of the law ready to fall upon assassins; they are the men now agitating, who pretend that the people ought to awaken, who seek to mislead patriots by assuring them that they are all compromised, and who fondly hope, in short, under favour of a general commotion, to prevent the prosecution of Carrier's accomplices and upholders." Universal plaudits interrupted Tallien. Billaud, who repudiated any connivance with Carrier, exclaimed from his seat, "I assert that I have not upheld the conduct of Carrier." No attention was given to this disclaimer of Billaud. The cheering continued, and it was not for some moments Tallien could resume. "It is impossible," he subjoined, "that two rival authorities can be longer suffered to exist—that members who are silent here should be permitted to denounce elsewhere what you have done." "No, no!" echoed several voices; "no rival authorities to the convention!" "It must not be," pursued Tallien, "that men go, I care not where, to throw ignominy upon the convention, and on such of its members as it has intrusted with the government. I will not submit any resolution at this moment," he added. "It is sufficient that this tribune has replied to what has been said in another; it is sufficient that the unanimity of the convention against the men of blood is strikingly manifested."

Renewed acclamations proved to Tallien that the assembly was in a mood to sanction whatever might be proposed against the Jacobins. Bourdon [de-l'Oise] supported the views of the preceding speaker, although on several questions he differed from his friends the Thermidorians. Legendre, also, made his sonorous voice be heard. "Who are those," he asked, "who censure our operations? It is a handful of men of prey. Look them in the face: you will see on their visage a varnish compounded of the gall of tyrants." This expression, which was levelled at the sombre and livid countenance of Billaud-Varennes, elicited great applause. "Of what do you complain," Legendre continued—"you who so unceasingly accuse us? Is it because citizens are no longer incarcerated by hundreds? Is it because fifty, sixty, eighty persons are no longer guillotined each revolving day? Ah! I confess, in that our gratification is different from yours, and our manner of emptying the prisons is not the same. We have visited them; we have drawn, as well as we were able, the distinction between aristocrats and patriots: if we have been deceived, our heads are here to answer for the error. But whilst we redress wrongs—whilst we seek to make you forget that those wrongs are yours—why repair to a famous club, to denounce us and mislead the people, fortunately few in number, who frequent it?" In conclusion, Legendre added, "I move that the convention take measures to prevent its members attending and preaching revolt at the Jacobin Club." The convention adopted the proposition of Legendre, and instructed the committees to devise and propound those measures.

The convention and the Jacobins were thus in hostile array, and under circumstances where, words being exhausted, the final appeal must be to coercion. That the convention was well disposed to abrogate that celebrated club, could not be doubted; it only remained for the committees to muster courage formally to submit the proposition. The Jacobins felt their precarious tenure, and complained in all their sessions of the manifest intention to dissolve them: they compared the existing government to Leopold, Brunswick, and Cobourg, who had also demanded their dissolution. Moreover, a phrase dropped in the tribune had furnished them with a fertile text whereon to descant, in proof that they were calumniated and menaced. It had been unguardedly stated, that in certain intercepted letters evidence was discovered that the committee of emigrants in Switzerland coincided with the Jacobins of Paris. If it were merely intended by this statement that the emigrants viewed with satisfaction any excitement or agitation calculated to embarrass the government, nothing could be more true. A letter seized on an emigrant was found, in fact, to maintain that the hope of subduing the revolution by arms was pure folly, and that its annihilation was to be sought through its own disorders. But if, on the contrary, it were meant to be inferred that the Jacobins and emigrants corresponded and concerted together in order to attain an identical object, the charge was equally preposterous and ludicrous; and nothing could be more agreeable to the Jacobins than to be criminated and assailed after such a fashion. Accordingly, we find that for several days they ceased not to proclaim themselves injured and calumniated men; and Duhem insisted, at repeated intervals, that these pretended letters should be produced and read in the tribune of the assembly.

Meanwhile an extraordinary ferment prevailed in Paris. Large crowds, issuing on the one hand from the Palais-Royal, and composed of the young men with braided hair and black collars, and on the other from the Faubourg Saint-Antoine, the streets Saint-Denis and Saint-Martin—from all the quarters, in short, commanded by the Jacobins—encountered on the Carrousel, in the garden of the Tuileries, and on the Place de la Revolution. The first raised shouts of "The convention for ever! Down with the terrorists and the tail of Robespierre!" The second retorted with cries of "The convention for ever! The Jacobins for ever! Down with the aristocrats!" They had also distinct songs. The "gilded youth" had adopted an air which was called *Le Reveil du Peuple;* the partisans of the Jacobins struck up that old air of the revolution, immortalised by so many victories—"*Allons! enfans de la patrie!*" When these hostile crowds came in contact, they roared their respective airs, chorus against chorus; then they yelled forth their several rallying whoops, and charged with volleys of stones and flourishes of bludgeons; blood soon flowed, and on both sides prisoners were made and taken to the com-

mittee of general safety. The Jacobins asserted that this committee, entirely composed of Thermidorians, released the young men thus delivered into its hands, and detained only the patriots.

These scenes recurred several days consecutively, and ultimately became sufficiently alarming to induce the committees of government to take measures of precaution, and to double the guards at all the posts. On the 19th Brumaire (9th November), the assemblages were more multifarious and considerable than on any preceding occasion. One crowd, pouring out of the Palais-Royal and advancing along the Rue Saint-Honoré, stopped before the hall of the Jacobins and surrounded it. The multitude swelling every moment, all the avenues were obstructed; and the Jacobins, who chanced to be in session at the time, had reason to believe themselves besieged. Some groups, favourable to them, gave utterance to the accustomed shouts—"The convention for ever! The Jacobins for ever!" which provoked the adverse cries; a conflict ensued, and, as the youths were the strongest, they speedily succeeded in putting the hostile groups to flight. They then completely encompassed the hall of the club, and broke the windows with showers of stones. Large fragments of flint fell amidst the congregated Jacobins. They, incensed and furious, exclaimed they were about to be murdered; and, on the ground that members of the convention were in the meeting, they affirmed that it was intended to assassinate the national representation. The women who filled their galleries, known under the cognomen of "furies of the guillotine," endeavoured to leave the hall in order to escape the danger; but the young men outside, seizing upon those who sought to fly, subjected them to the grossest indecencies, and even cruelly maltreated many of them. Several retreated into the hall, their dresses in shreds, their hair dishevelled, echoing shrieks of "murder!" Still the stones continued to shower into the assembly. The Jacobins then resolved to make sallies and charge the assailants. The energetic Duhem, armed with a club, headed one of these sorties, and a frightful encounter in the Street Saint-Honoré resulted. If the weapons of the two parties had been deadly, a prodigious massacre must have attended the collision. The Jacobins re-entered, carrying with them sundry prisoners. The young men, remaining without, threatened, if their comrades were not released, to storm the hall and wreak upon their adversaries remorseless vengeance.

This commotion had continued several hours before the governing committees assembled or could issue orders. Emissaries, on the part of the Jacobins, had appeared before the committee of general safety, to announce that the deputies sitting in the society were exposed to assassination. The four committees of public welfare, general safety, legislation, and war, consulted jointly, and determined to dispatch patrols forthwith to rescue their colleagues engaged in this scandalous rather than sanguinary scene.

The patrols departed, accompanied by a member of each committee, towards the place of combat. The members of the committees restrained the gensdarmes from attacking the assailants, contrary to the instigations of the Jacobins; they likewise refused to enter the hall, although strongly urged by their colleagues present at the meeting. They remained without the building, exhorting the young men to disperse, and promising to secure the freedom of their comrades. Eventually, they succeeded in gradually dissipating the assemblage, and afterwards caused the hall of the Jacobins to be evacuated, dismissing every one to his abode.

Tranquillity being re-established, they returned to their colleagues, and the four committees passed the night in discussions upon the course to be adopted. Some argued in favour of suspending the Jacobin Club, others dissented. Thuriot especially, albeit a strenuous opponent of Robespierre on the 9th Thermidor, began to be alarmed at the sweeping rapidity of the revulsion, and betokened a leaning towards the Jacobins. The committees separated without arriving at any conclusion.

On the following morning, 20th Brumaire, the convention met under the excitement of the night's occurrence. Duhem was foremost, as may be imagined, to maintain that a conspiracy had been laid to exterminate the patriots, and that the committee of general safety had failed in its duty. The galleries, taking part in the discussion, made a terrific noise, manifesting on one side approval, on the other denial, of the facts alleged. The disturbers were ordered to be removed, and immediately afterwards a number of members demanded simultaneously to be heard—Bourdon [de-l'Oise], Rewbel, and Clausel, to defend the committee; Duhem, Duroy, and Bentabolle, to censure it. Each spoke in his turn, and represented the circumstances according to his peculiar view, interrupted at intervals by the contradictions of those who had viewed them in a different light. Some had chanced merely to perceive crowds in which patriots were maltreated; others had happened only to encounter groups in which the youths were ill-used, and the convention and the committees denounced. Duhem, who could with difficulty restrain his violent temper in discussions of this nature, exclaimed that the attack had been planned by the aristocrats who dined with La Cabarus and pursued the chase at Raincy. He was ordered out of the tribune, and debarred from addressing the assembly. From amidst this chaos of conflicting assertions, it remained obvious that the committees, notwithstanding their alacrity in meeting and summoning the armed force, had been unable to send it until late to the scene of commotion; that when the patrols were at length directed to the Rue Saint-Honoré, they had not allowed them to extricate the Jacobins by force, but contented themselves with gradually dispersing the multitude; that, in short, they had exhibited a very natural forbearance towards men who used as their motto, "The convention for ever!" and who were not accustomed perpetually to vociferate that the government was delivered over to counter-revolutionists. More, in fact, could scarcely have been expected from them. To prevent assaults on their enemies was distinctly their duty; but it was too much to insist that they should charge sword in hand their own friends, or in other words, young men who daily mustered in numerous bands, ready to support them against the ultra-revolutionists. They declared to the convention that they had consumed the night in deliberation upon the question whether it were fitting or not to suspend the Jacobin Club. They were asked if they had passed a resolution, and on their intimation that they had not yet settled the point, the whole subject was remitted to their consideration, with instructions to frame a report and submit it to the assembly.

The Jacobins not meeting this day (the 20th), it elapsed in comparative quietude. But on the morrow (the 21st), being one of the usual club days, crowds congregated as before. On both sides, the parties seemed prepared for a determined struggle, and it was evident they would come into collision during the evening. The four committees hastily assembled, suspended by an ordinance the sittings of the Jacobins, and directed that the key of the hall should be immediately brought to the office of the secretary to the committee of general safety.

The order was executed, the hall closed, and the key lodged in the secretary's office. This measure prevented the tumult justly apprehended: the crowds dispersed, and the night passed in perfect calmness. On the following day, Laignelot appeared in the name of the four committees, to communicate to the convention the resolution they had taken. "We never entertained the idea of attacking popular societies," he said; "but we have the right to close the doors

of buildings where factions are reared and civil war preached." The assembly showered upon him repeated plaudits. The call of the roll was demanded, and the resolution sanctioned almost unanimously, amidst acclamations and cries of "The republic for ever! The convention for ever!"

Thus finished that society whose name has remained so celebrated and so odious, and which, similar to all the assemblies, to all the men who successively figured on the scene, similar to the revolution itself, possessed the merit, together with the vices, of extreme energy. Occupying a position inferior to the convention, and open to all new aspirants, it was the arena whereon the young revolutionists, who had not yet distinguished themselves, and were impatient to emerge from obscurity, made trial of their powers, and sought to propel the slower movement of revolutionists already seated in power. So long as the demand existed for fresh champions, fresh talents, fresh lives ready to offer themselves for sacrifice, the society of the Jacobins was useful, and furnished men of whom the revolution had need in its sanguinary and terrible struggles. When the revolution had reached its final term, and began to retrograde, the ardent men who had been formed amongst the Jacobins, and had survived the convulsion, were driven for sanctuary, as it were, into the bosom of their club. Soon it became obnoxious from its anxieties and ebullitions, dangerous from its very terrors. It was then sacrificed by the men who were striving to heave back the revolution from the extreme point it had reached, and to substitute a medium system, with reason, equity, and liberty for its principles—men who, blinded by hope, as are all who innovate, fondly believed they could fix it in that desired medium. They had reason, doubtless, in wishing to return to moderation, and the Jacobins, too, had reason in warning them they were advancing to counter-revolution. Revolutions sweeping like a pendulum violently agitated from one extreme to another, we may always surely prognosticate they will have excesses; but, fortunately, political societies, after oscillating fitfully in contrary directions, conclude by settling into an equable and justly-poised movement. But what an interval was yet to occur—what calamities, what bloodshed—before arriving at that happy epoch! The English, also, the forerunners in revolutions, had to pass through the ordeal of a Cromwell and two Stuarts.

The dispersed Jacobins were not men to retire at once into private life and renounce political agitation. Part repaired to the Electoral Club, which, expelled from the Evêché by the committees, had since mustered in a room of the Museum; others betook themselves to the Faubourg Saint-Antoine, to the popular society of the section of the Quinze-Vingts, the resort of the most prominent and decided men in that faubourg. The Jacobins appeared there in a cluster, on the 24th Brumaire, saying—"Brave citizens of the Faubourg Antoine, you who are the sole supporters of the people, you see before you unfortunate persecuted Jacobins. We ask to be received into your society. We have said to each other, 'Let us go to the Faubourg Antoine, we shall be there unassailable; united, we shall strike surer blows to guarantee the people and the convention from slavery!'" They were all admitted without scruple. They gave utterance to the most inflammatory and dangerous doctrines, and several times read that clause in the declaration of rights which ran: "*When the government violates the rights of the people, insurrection becomes for the people the most sacred of rights and the most indispensable of duties.*"

The committees, having made trial of their power and found themselves capable of acting decisively, did not deem it necessary to pursue the Jacobins into their asylums, but permitted them to indulge in idle vapourings; prepared, at the same time, to interfere on the first symptom of turbulence, if deeds should happen to follow words.

The majority of the sections in Paris, emboldened by the aspect of affairs, altogether expelled from their purlieus those known as terrorists, who retreated into the quarters of the Temple and the Faubourgs Saint-Antoine and Saint-Marceau. Thus freed from opposition, they adopted addresses of congratulation to the convention on the energy it had just displayed against the "accomplices of Robespierre." Similar addresses emanated from nearly all the towns in France; and the convention, already committed to the line of conduct recently exemplified, was hurried forward still more rapidly. The seventy-three suspended deputies, whose restoration had been previously advocated, now became the objects of still more assiduous reclamations from members of the centre and the right side, whose zeal was kindled by the desire not only of vindicating the freedom of debate, compromised in the persons of their colleagues, but also of securing the valuable reinforcement of seventy-three votes. They were at length liberated and reinstated; the convention, without passing any judgment on the 31st May, declared that it was possible to have thought differently from the majority touching that event without thereby incurring guilt. They entered the assembly in a body, the aged Dusaulx at their head. He spoke in behalf of all on the occasion, and gave assurance that, in seating themselves again by the side of their colleagues, they buried all resentment, and would be actuated solely by anxiety to promote the public weal. This boon granted, it seemed as if concession were to become illimitable. Louvet, Lanjuinais, Henri-Larivière, Doulcel, Isnard, all the Girondists escaped from proscription, and for the most part concealed in caverns, wrote and claimed to be reinstalled. A violent debate ensued upon this subject. The Thermidorians, aroused to a sense of the extraordinary progress of the reaction, resisted the demand, and overawed the right side, which, deeming itself in need of their further assistance, presumed not to irritate them, and desisted from enforcing the point. It was, however, decreed that the deputies under the ban of outlawry should be no longer molested, but not allowed to resume their functions as members of the national representation.

The same spirit which led to the absolution of some, instigated the condemnation of others. A venerable deputy, named Raffron, scaled the tribune, and obtested that the time was come for punishing all who were culpable, and for proving to France that the convention was not the confederate of assassins. He urged that Lebon and David, both under arrest, should be forthwith brought to trial. The enormities committed in the south, and especially at Bedouin (Vaucluse), having been made known, a report and a decree of impeachment against Maignet were demanded. Sundry voices also claimed an immediate judgment upon Fouquier-Tinville,* and a prosecution against the for-

* [Now that Fouquier-Tinville disappears from the scene, a few particulars of that revolting character may not prove unacceptable. We quote from the author of the *Graphic History of the French National Convention*, vol. ii. pp. 216, 217.

"Fouquier-Tinville, a Picard by birth, born in 1747, and procureur in the court of the Châtelet, exhibited one of those extraordinary characters, in which there is such a mixture of bad and strange qualities as to be almost inconceivable. Gloomy, cruel, atrabilious, the unsparing enemy of every species of merit or virtue, jealous, artful, vindictive, ever ready to suspect, to aggravate the already overwhelming dangers of innocence, he appeared impervious to every feeling of compassion or equity: justice in his estimation consisted in condemnation; an acquittal caused him the most severe mortification; he was never happy but when he had sent all the accused to the scaffold; he prosecuted them with an extreme *acharnement*, made it a point of honour to repel their defences: if they were firm or calm in presence of the judges of the tribunal, his rage knew no bounds. But with all this hatred to what generally secures admiration and esteem, he showed himself alike insensible to the allurements of fortune and the endearments of domestic life: he was a stranger to every species of recreation—women, the pleasures of the table, the theatres, had for him no attractions. Sober in his habits of life, if he ever be-

mer minister of war, Bouchotte, the same who had delivered up the offices of that department to the Jacobins. A similar measure was advocated against the ex-mayor Pache, who was alleged to have been the accomplice of the Hébertists, and saved by the influence of Robespierre. Amidst this torrent of accusation against revolutionary leaders, the three principal chiefs, so long spared, were at length doomed to fall. Billaud-Varennes, Collot-d'Herbois, and Barrère, once more formally denounced by Legendre, could not escape the common lot. The committees were constrained to receive the denunciation and pronounce an opinion on its merits. Lecointre, declared a calumniator in his previous accusation, announced that he had caused the documents to be printed which he had formerly lacked, and they were accordingly referred to the committees. They, impelled by the current of opinion, dared no longer resist, and speedily resolved that there were grounds for investigation as against Billaud, Collot, and Barrère, but not in the case of Vadier, Vouland, Amar, and David.

The trial of Carrier, tardily prosecuted in presence of a public which ill disguised the spirit of reaction wherewith it was animated, finally closed on the 26th Frimaire (16th December). Carrier and two members of the revolutionary committee of Nantes, Pinel and Grand-Maison, were condemned to undergo the pains of death, as agents and accomplices of the system of terror. The others were acquitted, as exonerated from their participation in the drownings by obedience to their superiors. Carrier, still persisting that the entire revolution—those who had caused, suffered, or directed it—were equally culpable with himself, was dragged to the scaffold: at the fatal moment he evinced resignation, and received death with calmness and courage. In proof of the unnatural passions engendered by civil war, traits of character were adduced of Carrier before his mission to Nantes, which showed him to have possessed a temperament the reverse of sanguinary. The revolutionists, even whilst condemning his conduct, were dismayed at his fate; they could not dissemble from themselves that his execution was the commencement of those ruthless reprisals the counter-revolution was preparing for them. Besides the proceedings threatened against representatives, members of the old committees, or envoys on missions, recent enactments warned them that vengeance was about to take a lower range, and that inferiority of function would be no safeguard. A decree made it imperative on all who had exercised any powers whatsoever, or disbursed the public funds, to render an account of their transactions. Now, as all the members of revolutionary committees had formed treasuries with the proceeds of the taxes, with the plate of churches, and with extraordinary revolutionary imposts, in order to organise the first battalions of volunteers, to subsidise revolutionary armies, to pay for transports, to establish police, to meet multifarious expenses of the like nature, it was obvious that every individual functionary during the reign of terror, however low his grade, would be liable to all the hazards of retribution.

These well-founded apprehensions were aggravated by divers alarming rumours. Peace was spoken of with Holland, Prussia, Spain, the Empire, La Vendée even, and it was alleged that the conditions of such pacification would be fatal to the revolutionary party.

came intoxicated, it was with the commonest kind of wine. The orgies in which he participated had all a political view, as, for example, to procure a *feu de file;* on such occasions he was the first to bring together the judges and juries, and to provoke Bacchanalian orgies. What he required, above every thing, was human blood.

A *feu de file*, in the Jacobin vocabulary, was the condemnation to death of all the accused. When it took place, the countenance of Fouquier-Tinville became radiant; no one could doubt that he was completely happy; and to attain such a result he spared no pains. He was, to be sure, incessantly at work: he went into no society, hardly ever showed himself at the clubs: it was not there, he said, that his post lay. The only recreation which he allowed himself was to go to the place of execution, to witness the pangs of his victims: on such occasions his gratification was extreme.

Fouquier-Tinville might have amassed a large fortune: he was, on the contrary, poor, and his wife, it is said, actually died of starvation. He lived without any comforts: his whole furniture, sold after his decease, only produced the sum of five hundred francs. He was distinguished by the appearance of poverty and a real contempt of money. No species of seduction could reach him: he was a rock, a mass of steel, insensible to every thing which usually touches men—to beauty and riches; he became animated only at the prospect of a murder which might be committed, and on such occasions he was almost handsome, so radiant was the expression of his visage.

The friend of Robespierre, who fully appreciated his valuable qualities, he was the depository of his inmost thoughts. The dictator asked him one day what he could offer him most attractive, when supreme power was fully concentrated in his hands, 'Repose,' replied Fouquier-Tinville, 'but not till it is proved that not another head remains to fall: incessant labour till then.'"

CHAPTER XXXIX.

CONTINUATION OF THE WAR ON THE RHINE.—CAPTURE OF NIMEGUEN BY THE FRENCH.—CONQUEST OF HOLLAND BY PICHEGRU.—CAPTURE OF UTRECHT, AMSTERDAM, AND THE PRINCIPAL TOWNS.—NEW POLITICAL ORGANISATION OF HOLLAND.—VICTORIES ON THE PYRENEES.—CLOSE OF THE CAMPAIGN OF 1794.—NEGOTIATIONS FOR PEACE.—STATE OF LA VENDEE AND BRITTANY.—NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE VENDEAN CHIEFS.

The French armies, consolidated on the left bank of the Rhine, and with no formidable impediment to obstruct their passage to the right shore, menaced Holland and Germany. Was it prudent to move them onwards, or ought they to be withdrawn into cantonments? Such was the question to be solved.

Notwithstanding their triumphs and long sojourn in fertile and teeming Belgium, they were in the utmost destitution. The country they occupied, overrun for three years by innumerable legions, was entirely exhausted. With the evils of war were combined those of the French administration, which had introduced in its wake assignats, requisitions, and the maximum. Provisional municipalities, eight intermediate authorities, and a central administration established at Brussels, governed the country pending its definitive fate. Eighty millions had been imposed on the clergy, the abbeys, the nobles, and the corporations. The assignats had been put into forced circulation, and the prices at Lille had served to determine the rates of the maximum throughout all Belgium. Articles of food and commodities of essential usefulness were subjected to requisition. These regulations had failed to obviate the scarcity. The traders and farmers concealed all they possessed, and both officer and soldier were exposed to the greatest privations.

Levied *en masse* the preceding year, accoutred on the spur of the moment, and hastily transported to Hondtschoote, Watignies, Landau, the army had since received nothing from the government but powder and projectiles. Long ago it had ceased to encamp under tents; it bivouacked under the foliage of trees, despite the commencement of a winter already inclement. Many soldiers, in defect of shoes, enveloped their feet in wisps of straw, and covered their bodies with mats in place of mantles. The officers, paid in assignats, often found their appointments depreciated to eight or ten actual francs per month; those who received supplies from their friends were seldom allowed to appropriate them, for every thing was absorbed by the requisitions of the French adminis

tration. They were reduced to the condition of the private soldier, marching on foot, carrying knapsacks on their backs, feeding on the coarse ration-bread, and trusting for existence to the precarious chances of war.

The war administration seemed exhausted by the extraordinary efforts it had made to levy and equip twelve hundred thousand men. Nor was the new organisation of the government, weak and disjointed, calculated to impart to it the requisite vigour and activity. Thus all conspired to counsel the withdrawal of the army into winter quarters, and the boon of permission for it to reap the recompense of its victories and military virtues in the enjoyment of repose and abundance.

At the same time, it was to be considered that the army was already before the fortress of Nimeguen, which, situated on the Wahl (such is the name of the Rhine near its mouth), commanded both its banks, and might serve the enemy as a means for debouching in the following campaign on the left bank. It was, therefore, important to occupy this place before wintering; but the attack presented almost insuperable difficulties. The English army, drawn up on the right shore, counted at least 38,000 men; a bridge of boats furnished it with the means of communicating with the town and throwing in supplies. Besides its own fortifications, Nimeguen was defended by an intrenched camp in advance, filled with troops. Consequently, to render an investment complete, it would have been necessary to detach a strong force over the river, exposed to all the hazards of the passage and of an engagement, and in case of defeat to almost certain destruction, as retreat would have been impracticable. The French, under these circumstances, could operate on the left bank alone, and were in the dilemma of having no alternative but to attack the intrenched camp, with very slender hopes of success.

The French generals, however, were determined to attempt one of those sudden and bold attacks, which had recently opened to them, in so short a time, the strongholds of Maestricht and Venloo. The allied generals, feeling the importance of Nimeguen, had assembled at Arnheim to deliberate on the best mode of defending it. They had arranged that an Austrian corps, under the orders of General Werneck, should pass into the English service, and form the left of the Duke of York, for the defence of Holland. Whilst the Duke of York, with his English and Hanoverians, remained on the right bank, before the bridge of Nimeguen, and reinforced the defenders of the place, General Werneck was to execute, towards Wesel, considerably above Nimeguen, a singular movement, which experienced military men have deemed one of the most absurd imagined by the allies in the course of their luckless campaigns. This corps, profiting by an islet which the Rhine forms towards Buderich, was to pass on the left bank, and attempt a point between the army of the Sambre-and-Meuse and that of the North. Thus 20,000 men were to be thrown, beyond a large river, between two victorious armies of 80,000 to 100,000 men each, to see what effect they would produce on the latter: they were to be reinforced according to the event. We can conceive that such a movement, effected by the united armies of the coalition, might have become grand and decisive; but, essayed with a force of 20,000 men, it was a project essentially puerile, and probably disastrous, so far as the troops charged therewith were concerned.

Nevertheless, trusting to save Nimeguen by these means, the allies caused, on the one hand, the corps of Werneck to advance, and on the other, the garrison of Nimeguen to prosecute harassing sallies. The French repelled these sorties, and, as at Maestricht and Venloo, opened the trenches at a proximity to the place as yet unusual in war. A fortunate accident facilitated their labours. The two extremities of the arc they described around Nimeguen rested on the Wahl; from these extremities they attempted to bombard the bridge. Some of their projectiles alighted on the pontoons, and jeopardised the communications of the garrison with the English army. The English in the fortress, surprised by this unexpected occurrence, re-established the pontoons, and hastened to rejoin the bulk of their army on the opposite shore, abandoning to its own resources the garrison, composed of 3000 Dutchmen. When the republicans perceived this evacuation, they redoubled their fire. The governor, struck with dismay, sent to apprise the Prince of Orange of his critical position, and obtained permission to retire so soon as he judged the danger sufficiently great. Scarcely had he received this authority, ere he repassed the Wahl in his own person. The garrison was thrown into the utmost disorder: one part grounded arms; the residue, attempting to escape on a floating bridge, were checked by the French cutting the cables, and eventually foundered on an island, where they were made prisoners.

On the 18th Brumaire (8th November), the French entered Nimeguen, and found themselves undisputed masters of that important station—an achievement due to their temerity and the terror inspired by their arms. Meanwhile, the Austrians, under the command of Werneck, had endeavoured to debouch by Wesel; but the impetuous Vandamme, falling on them the moment they set foot on the left bank of the Rhine, had forced them to recross the stream, fortunate that they had been thus stopped at the outset, for they would have surely incurred the risk of utter destruction had they advanced farther.

The time was now at length arrived for entering into cantonments, since the French were in possession of all the important points on the Rhine. Doubtless, to conquer Holland, and thus secure the navigation of the three great rivers, the Scheldt, the Meuse, and the Rhine, deprive England of its most powerful maritime alliance, menace Germany on its flanks, interrupt the communications of the continental enemies of France with the insular, or at least oblige them to make the long circuit of Hamburg; in short, open up the richest country in the world, and the most desirable for France in its present commercial prostration, was an object, with such inordinate advantages, apt to tempt the ambition of the government and armies of France. But how many considerations prompted them to avoid hazarding an invasion of Holland—an enterprise almost impracticable at all times, but especially so in the season usually marked by deluges of rain! Planted at the mouths of several rivers, Holland is formed by mere fragments of soil, accumulated between the waters of such rivers and those of the ocean. Its surface, every where depressed below the bed of the waters, is incessantly menaced by the sea, the Rhine, the Meuse, the Scheldt, and intersected, moreover, by small detached branches of those rivers, and by a multitude of artificial canals. These low lands, thus perpetually threatened, are covered with gardens, manufacturing towns, and dockyards. At every step an army might adventure, it has to encounter either large rivers, whose margins are lofty dykes planted with cannon, or arms of rivers and canals, all defended by the art of the engineer, or, finally, fortresses which are the strongest in Europe. Those grand manœuvres, which often disconcert a methodical resistance by rendering sieges unnecessary, are therefore impossible upon a superficies intersected and defended by innumerable lines. Should an army succeed, however, in surmounting so many obstacles, and advancing into Holland, its inhabitants, by an act of heroism such as signalised them on the invasion of Louis XIV., have only to pierce their dykes, inundate the country, and with it engulf the enemy sufficiently rash to penetrate its confines. Their vessels remain to them; and they can, like the Athenians of old, fly with their moveable

wealth, and await better times; or depart for India, and found a new empire in the vast territories there belonging to them. All the difficulties we have enumerated become still greater in the season of floods, and a naval alliance, such as that of England, renders them insurmountable.

It is true, that the spirit of independence which animated the Dutch at this period, their hatred of the stadtholderate, their aversion to England and Prussia, the knowledge they possessed of their true interests, the resentments still rankling for the violent suppression of the revolution in 1787—all gave assurance that the French armies would be welcomed by the great body of the people. It might be rationally concluded that the Dutch would oppose the cutting of the dykes, and the consequent ruin of the country, for a cause they detested. But the army of the Prince of Orange and that of the Duke of York still overawed them; and they united would amply suffice to prevent the passage of the multitudinous lines to be carried before their eyes. Upon the whole, therefore, if a surprise were rashness in the time of Dumouriez, it was almost madness at the end of 1794.

Nevertheless, the committee of public welfare, stimulated by the Dutch refugees, seriously discussed the expediency of pushing for a point beyond the Wahl. Pichegru, in a plight deplorable as that of his soldiers, who were covered with itch and vermin, had repaired to Brussels for relief from a cutaneous disorder. Moreau and Regnier had succeeded him in the command: both counselled repose and winter quarters. The Dutch general Daendels, a refugee and an intrepid soldier, earnestly recommended a preliminary attack on the Isle of Bommel, with the condition that, if it failed of success, the scheme should be prosecuted no farther. The Meuse and the Wahl, flowing parallel towards the sea, mingle their waters for a moment considerably below Nimeguen, again diverge asunder, and ultimately reunite at Wondrichem, a little above Gorcum. The ground enclosed between their two streams forms what is called the Isle of Bommel. Notwithstanding the dissent of Moreau and Regnier, an attack was adventured on this island, at three different points. It was unsuccessful, and the plan forthwith abandoned, in good faith and candour, especially on the part of Daendels, who promptly acknowledged its impossibility the instant it became apparent to his mind.

Thereupon, that is to say towards the middle of Frimaire (commencement of December), the army was allowed to take up winter quarters, whereof it stood in such need; and part of the cantonments were established around Breda, so as to form a species of blockade. This fortress and that of Grave had not yet surrendered; but, from the want of communications during all the period of winter, they were inevitably doomed to fall.

In this state of repose the army confidently expected to pass the season; and assuredly it had achieved enough to be proud of its glory and services. But a hazard, partaking of the miraculous, opened for it a new career, to close in yet more brilliant destinies. The cold, already intense, soon increased to such a point as to foster hopes that the great rivers might be probably frozen. Pichegru quitted Brussels, without waiting for his effectual cure, eager to be on the spot to take advantage of the season if it offered the opportunity of fresh conquests. In effect, the winter speedily became more severe, and gave tokens of proving the most rigorous that had occurred during the century. Already the Meuse and the Wahl were filled with floating masses of ice, and their margins congealed. On the 3d Nivose (23d December), the Meuse was firmly frozen, so as to bear the weight of cannon. General Walmoden, to whom the Duke of York had devolved the command upon his own departure for England, and whom he had thereby condemned to a series of humiliating disasters, found himself in a precarious position. The Meuse being frozen over, his front was exposed; and the Wahl being filled with ice, threatening to carry away the bridges, his retreat was endangered. He speedily learned that the bridge of Arnheim had been actually swept away, and he thereupon hastened to transfer his baggage and heavy cavalry to the rear, and in person directed a retreat on Deventer, on the banks of the Yssel. Pichegru, profiting by the opportunity which fortune presented to him of surmounting obstacles usually invincible, prepared to cross the Meuse on the ice. He proposed to pass it on three points, and to seize on the Isle of Bommel, whilst the division blockading Breda should attack the lines encompassing that place.

The French soldiers, braving the hardest winter of the century almost in a state of nudity, marching in shoes whereof the upper leather was all that remained, left their quarters with alacrity, and cheerfully renounced the repose they had scarcely begun to enjoy. On the 8th Nivose (28th December), in a cold of seventeen degrees, they pressed forward on three points—Crevecœur, Empel, and Fort Saint-André—traversed the ice with their artillery, surprised the Dutch, nearly benumbed by the cold, and completely routed them. Whilst they took possession of the Isle of Bommel, the division besieging Breda attacked and stormed the lines. The Dutch, assailed on all points, retrograded in disorder, one part towards the headquarters of the Prince of Orange, who had always continued at Gorcum, the residue to Thiel. Such was the confusion of their retreat, that they even omitted to take measures for defending the passage of the Wahl, which was not entirely frozen over. Pichegru, master of the Isle of Bommel, which he had reached by passing the stream of the Meuse, now crossed the Wahl at sundry points, but refrained from adventuring beyond that river, as the ice was not sufficiently strong to bear cannon. In this state of affairs, the fate of Holland hung on the contingency of a thaw, whilst every thing announced the long duration of the frost. The Prince of Orange with his dispirited forces at Gorcum, and Walmoden with his English in full retreat on Deventer, could offer but a slender resistance to the progress of a formidable victor, who was much superior to them in strength, and had already succeeded in breaking the centre of their line.

The political situation of Holland was not less alarming than the military. The Dutch, full of joyful anticipations as they viewed the approach of the French, began to evince symptoms of disaffection. The Orange party was too weak to keep the republicans in check. Every where the enemies of the stadtholderate upbraided the reigning power with having abolished the liberties of the country, imprisoned or banished the best and most enlightened patriots, and, above all, sacrificed Holland to the English, by entangling her in an alliance opposed to all her commercial and maritime interests. They congregated secretly in revolutionary committees, ready to rise on the first signal, supersede the authorities, and nominate others of more popular tendencies. The province of Friesland, whose states were assembled at the time, ventured openly to declare an intention of separating from the stadtholder; and the citizens of Amsterdam presented an address to the authorities of the province, wherein they announced their determination to oppose all preparations for defence, and especially their fixed purpose not to suffer the dykes to be breached. In this threatening posture of affairs the stadtholder resolved to negotiate, and dispatched envoys to the headquarters of Pichegru, in order to solicit a truce, and offer, as conditions of peace, neutrality and an indemnity for the expenses of the war. The French general and the representatives refused to grant a truce; and as to the offers of peace, they undertook to refer them to the committee of public welfare.

Spain, likewise, menaced by Dugommier, whom we

left descending from the Pyrenees, and by Moncey, who, master of Guipuscoa, was advancing on Pampeluna, had made propositions of peace. The representatives sent into La Vendée to ascertain whether a pacification were possible, had reported in the affirmative, and urged a decree of amnesty. However guarded a government may be, negotiations of this nature invariably transpire; they transpire even under absolute and permanent ministers; how then could they remain secret under committees partially renewed every month? It was publicly known that Holland and Spain had submitted proposals; it was alleged, moreover, that Prussia, awakened from her delusion, and recognising the error she had committed in allying herself with the house of Austria, had intimated a desire to treat; and it was matter of notoriety, as published in all the journals of Europe, that at the diet of Ratisbon several states of the empire, wearied of a war which but slightly interested them, had demanded the opening of negotiations. All tended, therefore, to inspire ideas of peace; and as the violent principles of revolutionary terrorism had formerly yielded to sentiments of lenity, so in like manner did the passion for war now give way to an inclination for a general reconcilement with Europe. The most trifling circumstances, in this disposition of the public mind, were made the foundations of ingenious conjecture. The unfortunate children of Louis XVI., still surviving in the prison of the Temple, cut off from all their relatives, and separated from each other, had experienced some alleviation in their lot since the 9th Thermidor. The cordwainer Simon, the keeper of the young prince, had perished as an accomplice of Robespierre. In his place three guardians had been nominated, one of whom attended throughout each day, and these treated the prince with more consideration and humanity. Mighty consequences were held to be involved in these changes at the Temple. The inquiry instituted as to the means of withdrawing assignats from circulation, also gave rise to sundry inferences. The royalists, who already appeared avowedly, and whose numbers were swelled by the cohesion of those waverers who always desert a party when it begins to totter, propagated with malicious industry the rumour of approaching peace. No longer able to taunt the republicans as before with the cry, "Your armies will be beaten!" which had been repeated too often without success, and had become, in truth, too ridiculous to avail any longer, they wheeled into an entirely different strain, and addressed them in such language as the following:—"You are to be stopped in your course of victory; peace is signed; you will not get the Rhine for a frontier; the conditions of the peace will be the establishment of Louis XVII. on the throne, the return of the emigrants, the abolition of assignats, and the restitution of the national domains." Such assertions, it may be well conceived, were eminently adapted to exasperate the patriots. Already alarmed at the proceedings threatened against them, they were driven to absolute despair by the conviction, that the objects for which they had struggled so long and painfully were about to be sacrificed by the government. "For what do you destine the young Capet?" they asked. "What is your intention respecting the assignats? Have our armies shed so much blood only to be stopped in the midst of their victories? Are they not to enjoy the satisfaction of giving their country the barriers of the Rhine and the Alps? Europe proposed to dismember France: the just retribution of victorious France upon Europe is to conquer the provinces which complete her surface. What is projected for La Vendée? Are rebels to be pardoned when patriots are immolated?" "It were better," exclaimed a member of the Mountain, in a transport of indignation, "to be Charette than a deputy in the convention!"

Such subjects of discord, added to those arising from the domestic policy of the government, necessarily caused a great and increasing ferment in the public mind. The committee of public welfare, finding itself pressed between the two parties, deemed it incumbent to explain the views of the government. On two different occasions, once through the medium of Carnot, a second time through Merlin of Douay, it declared that the armies had received orders to pursue their triumphs, and to heed no propositions of peace until within the walls of the enemies' capitals.

The overtures of Holland, in fact, had seemed to it somewhat too tardy, nor did it deem France bound to listen to negotiations when on the very point of subduing the country. Moreover, the overthrow of the stadtholderate and the restoration of the republic in Holland, appeared to it objects signally worthy the ambition of the French republic. True, the Dutch colonies, and even navy, would be exposed to the risk of falling into the power of the English, who would profess to seize them in the name of the stadtholder; but immediate political considerations outweighed those yet distant contingencies. France was irresistibly impelled to subvert the stadtholderate; besides, the conquest of Holland would add to the marvels of her late career in arms, tend still more to intimidate Europe, uncover the flanks of Prussia, compel that power to treat without further delay, and, above all, reassure the French patriots. Accordingly, Pichegru was ordered to tarry not an instant.

Neither Prussia nor the empire had as yet submitted any proposals, so that no reply was called for in either case. As to Spain, which promised to recognise the republic, and pay it indemnities, on condition that it assigned a small principality to Louis XVII. near the Pyrenees, her offers were heard with indignation and scorn, and orders forthwith given to the two French generals to advance with augmented celerity. With regard to Vendée, a decree of amnesty was passed, which imported that all the rebels, without distinction of rank, who should lay down their arms in the space of a month, would be free from molestation on account of their insurrection. General Canclaux, formerly superseded on the ground of moderatism, was replaced at the head of the army called of the West, which comprehended La Vendée. Young Hoche, already in command of the army on the coast of Brest, was intrusted in addition with that of the army on the coast of Cherbourg. No persons could have been selected more capable than these two generals of tranquillising the country by a happy combination of prudence and energy.

Pichegru, who had received positive injunctions to prosecute his victorious march, waited until the surface of the Wahl was firmly congealed. Meanwhile, his army skirted its banks, distributed towards Millingen and Nimeguen, and along the shore of the Isle of Bommel, whereof it held complete possession. Walmoden, observing that Pichegru had merely stationed a few advanced posts on the right bank opposite Bommel, drove them back, and commenced an offensive movement. He urged the Prince of Orange to join him, in order to form, with their united armies, an imposing mass, capable of contesting a battle with an enemy whom it was no longer possible to restrain by the barrier of rivers. The Prince of Orange, however, resolute in his purpose of not uncovering the route to Amsterdam, refused to quit Gorcum. Walmoden then determined to plant himself on his line of retreat, which he had traced in anticipation from the Wahl to the Linge, from the Linge to the Leck, from the Leck to the Yssel, by Thiel, Arnheim, and Deventer.

Whilst the republicans awaited the operation of the frost with the utmost impatience, the fortress of Grave, heroically defended by the commandant Debons, surrendered, almost in a heap of ruins. It was the principal of the strongholds possessed by the Dutch beyond the Meuse, and the only one which had not yielded to the ascendancy of the French arms. The French

entered it on the 9th Nivose (29th December). At length, on the 19th Nivose (8th January 1795), the Wahl was solidly frozen. The division of Souham passed over from Bommel; the brigade of Dewinther, detached from the corps under Macdonald, traversed it near Thiel. At Nimeguen and above, the passage was not equally easy, because the Wahl was not wholly firm. Nevertheless, on the 21st (10th January), the right of the French crossed it above Nimeguen; and Macdonald, supported by that wing, effected the passage at Nimeguen in boats. On beholding this general movement, Walmoden and his army retrograded. A battle alone could have saved him the ignominy of retreat; but in the state of division and discouragement paralysing the allies, an engagement would have probably led to a more dismal disaster. Walmoden wheeled his front to the rear, and posted onwards to the line of the Yssel, in order to gain Hanover by the upper provinces. Thus, conformably to the plan of retreat he had marked out for himself, he abandoned the provinces of Utrecht and Guelderland to the French. The Prince of Orange remained towards the sea, that is to say, at Gorcum. Giving up the case as desperate, he deserted his army, presented himself before the states assembled at the Hague, announced to them he had attempted all in his power for the defence of the country, and declared that nothing more could be done. He urged the representatives to offer no further resistance to the conqueror, in order to avert still greater calamities, and with this exhortation set sail for England.

From that moment, the advance of the invading army became the rush of a torrent. On the 28th Nivose (17th January), Salon's brigade entered Utrecht, and General Vandamme, Arnheim. The states of Holland resolved that all resistance to the French should cease, and commissioners be dispatched to open to them the fortresses they might deem requisite for their security. In every town, the secret committees previously formed manifested their organisation, annulled the established authorities, and spontaneously appointed others in their stead. The French were received with open arms, and as liberators; the food and raiment they so woefully lacked were brought to them with alacrity. At Amsterdam, where their arrival was impatiently expected, an extraordinary ferment reigned. The citizens, incensed against the Orangists, insisted that the garrison should evacuate the town, the regency lay down its authority, and the people be provided with arms. Pichegru, who was rapidly approaching, detached an aide-de-camp to exhort the municipal authorities to maintain tranquillity and prevent disturbances. At length, on the 1st of Pluviose (20th January), Pichegru, accompanied by the representatives Lacoste, Bellegarde, and Joubert, made his entry into Amsterdam. The inhabitants flocked to greet his advent, bearing in triumph the persecuted patriots, and rending the air with cries of "The French republic for ever! Long live Pichegru! Liberty for ever!" They could not sufficiently admire those intrepid men, who, half-naked, had defied the rigour of so unparalleled a winter, and achieved such brilliant actions. The French soldiers gave, on this occasion, an admirable example of order and discipline. Hungry, and scantily clad, exposed to a pitiless storm of snow and hail, in the heart of one of the richest capitals of Europe, they waited patiently for several hours, around their arms, piled in pyramids, until the magistrates had provided for their nourishment and distribution. Whilst the republicans had marched into the city on one side, the Orangists and French emigrants had disappeared by the opposite extremity. The sea was covered with vessels bearing from the shore fugitives and property of every description.

On the same day, 1st Pluviose, Bonnaud's division, which had on the eve captured Gertruydenberg, traversed the frozen Biesbos and entered the town of Dordrecht, where it found six hundred pieces of ordnance, ten thousand muskets, and magazines of provisions and ammunition for an army of 30,000 men. This division subsequently passed through Rotterdam on its way to occupy the Hague, where the states were in session. Thus, the right towards the Yssel, the centre towards Amsterdam, and the left towards the Hague, were successively advancing to the conquest of all the Netherland provinces. Already extraordinary as an operation of war, it was invested with the character of marvellous by a final stroke. A portion of the Dutch fleet lay at anchor near the Texel. Pichegru, unwilling to allow it time to break through the ice and make sail for England, detached some divisions of cavalry and several batteries of light artillery towards Nord-Holland. The Zuyder-Zee was frozen, and the French squadrons scoured at a gallop its icy plain, when the singular spectacle was exhibited of hussars and horse-artillerymen summoning ships of war, embedded in the frozen mass, like a fortified town. The Dutch vessels promptly struck their flags to these novel assailants.

On the left, the only province yet unoccupied was that of Zealand, which is composed of islands placed at the mouths of the Scheldt and the Meuse; and on the right there remained to subjugate the provinces of Over-Yssel, Drenthe, Friesland, and Gröningen, which join Holland to Hanover. The province of Zealand, strong in its inaccessible position, proposed a somewhat haughty capitulation, by which it stipulated that garrisons should not be placed in its principal towns; that it should not be subjected to contributions, or be compelled to receive assignats; that its vessels and public and private property should be guaranteed; in a word, that it should undergo none of the inconveniences of war. It likewise demanded, on behalf of the French emigrants, license to depart in peace and safety. The representatives acceded to some of the articles of the capitulation, and abstained from contracting any engagement as to the others, saying they must refer them to the committee of public welfare; and without further explanations they entered the province, happy to avert the dangers of a hostile attack, and to secure the fleet, which might otherwise have been delivered to England. Whilst affairs were thus progressing on the left, the right, crossing the Yssel, drove the English before it and chased them beyond the Ems. The provinces of Friesland, Drenthe, and Gröningen, were thus subdued, and the seven United Provinces lay at the mercy of the victorious republic.

This conquest, due to the season, the indefatigable courage of the French soldiers, and their capacity to withstand accumulated sufferings, much more than to the ability of the generals, excited in Europe an astonishment mingled with dread, and in France a boundless exultation. Carnot, having directed the operations of the armies during the campaign in the Low Countries, was the principal and veritable author of the successes. Pichegru, and especially Jourdan, had admirably seconded his views throughout that series of sanguinary conflicts. But after the army had proceeded from Belgium into Holland, all was owing to the soldiers and the frost. Nevertheless, Pichegru, generalissimo of the forces, monopolised the glory of this miraculous conquest, and his name, borne on the wings of fame, circulated through all Europe as that of the greatest French captain.

It was not sufficient, however, to have conquered Holland; the equally difficult task remained to exhibit prudence and policy in its treatment. The first great point was to protect the country from excesses, in order not to indispose the population. Next in importance was the political direction to be impressed on Holland; and here two contrary opinions were to be considered. One party maintained that the conquest should be rendered advantageous to the cause of liberty, by revolutionising Holland; another held that too marked a spirit of proselytism should not be

manifested, in order to avoid giving fresh umbrage to Europe, now ready to seal a reconciliation with France.

The earliest care of the representatives was to publish a proclamation, wherein they declared that all private property should be held sacred, excepting that of the stadtholder; that he, the said stadtholder, being the only enemy of the French Republic, his possessions were confiscated to the victors, in satisfaction of the expenses of the war; and that the French had come, as the friends of the Batavian nation, not to impose upon it any creed or form of government whatsoever, but to free it from oppressors, and restore to it the means of expressing its wishes. This proclamation, accompanied by corresponding acts, produced a most favourable impression. The authorities were every where renewed in the French interest. In the states-general, certain members were excluded who owed their introduction solely to the stadtholder's influence; and Peter Paulus, minister of the marine before the overthrow of the republican party in 1787, a man of distinguished talents and strongly attached to his country, was elected president. That assembly likewise abolished the stadtholderate for ever, and proclaimed the sovereignty of the people. These resolutions were formally communicated to the representatives by a deputation of the states, as an acceptable homage to their principles. The assembly subsequently proceeded to frame a constitution, and meanwhile confided the administration of the country to a provisional government. Of the eighty or ninety vessels composing the naval force of Holland, fifty were found to have remained in the harbours, and were saved to the Batavian republic; the residue had been seized by the English. The Dutch army, dispersed since the departure of the Prince of Orange, was appointed to be reorganised upon a different principle, under the orders of General Daendels. Amongst other subjects of interest demanding immediate notice, the affairs of the famous Bank of Amsterdam were investigated, and the mystery in which they had been long enveloped finally dispelled. Whether it had continued solely as a bank of deposit, or had become a bank of discount by affording loans to the East India Company, to the government, and to the provinces, were questions which had long occupied attention, and materially affected the credit of the institution. It was ascertained that it had lent, to the extent of eight or ten millions of florins, on obligations of the East India Company, the Chamber of Debits, the province of Friesland, and the city of Amsterdam. This involved a violation of its charter. At the same time, it was alleged that no real deficit existed, because those obligations represented assured funds. But that the engagements incurred by the bank could be all redeemed in full, depended of course on the solvency of the company, the Chamber of Debits, and the government.

In the interim, whilst the Dutch were engaged in regulating the state of their country, the wants of the destitute French army demanded relief. The representatives addressed a requisition to the provisional government, for cloth, shoes, raiment of all kind, provisions, and munitions, which it undertook to satisfy. This requisition, without being excessive, was sufficient to equip and victual the army. The Dutch government invited the different towns to furnish their respective proportions of this requisition, saying to them with reason that a cheerful acquiescence was due to a generous conqueror, who asked instead of taking, and whose demands were confined within the strict limits of his exigencies. The towns evinced a cordial alacrity in responding to this appeal, and the objects included in the requisition were punctually provided. An arrangement was subsequently concluded touching the circulation of assignats. As the soldiers received their pay in paper alone, it was necessary to make that paper current as money to enable them to discharge such liabilities as they might incur. The Dutch government framed an ordinance on the subject. The shopkeepers and petty dealers were enjoined to accept assignats from the French soldiers, at the rate of nine sous per franc, and to refrain from selling to any one soldier goods to the value of more than ten francs. At the close of each week they were to appear before the municipal authorities, who would retire the assignats at the rate they had taken them in exchange. Owing to these arrangements, the army, which had undergone such lengthened privations, at last found itself amidst abundance, and began to taste the fruit of its victories.

The triumph of France, so complete and astonishing in Holland, was not less signal in Spain. There, the climate, from its mildness, had not obstructed the operations of the army. Dugommier, quitting the Upper Pyrenees, had moved in presence of the hostile lines, and attacked on three points the long chain of positions occupied by General La Union. The gallant leader of the French, Dugommier, was killed by a cannon-ball in the central onslaught. The left wing failed to make any impression; but the right, thanks to the bravery and energy of Augereau, obtained a complete victory, The command-in-chief was conferred on Perignon, who resumed the attack on the 30th Brumaire (20th November), and gained a decisive advantage. The enemy fled in disorder, and abandoned to the French the intrenched camp of Figueras. Consternation seized on the Spaniards; the commandant of Figueras threw open the gates of that town on the 9th Frimaire, and the French entered into possession of one of the finest fortifications in Europe. Such was their position in Catalonia. Towards the Western Pyrenees, they had taken Fontarabia, Saint-Sebastian, and Tolosa, and occupied the whole province of Guipuscoa. Moncey, who succeeded General Muller, had cleared the mountains and advanced even to the gates of Pampeluna. However, deeming his situation too hazardous, he had retraced his steps, and, resting on more secure positions, awaited the return of spring to penetrate into the Castilles.

The winter, therefore, had not been allowed to retard the progress of this immortal campaign, and it only now finally closed amidst the stormy and inclement weather of Pluviose. If the auspicious campaign of 1793 had saved France from the horrors of invasion by the deblockades of Dunkirk, Maubeuge, and Landau, that of 1794 crowned her with the laurel of a conqueror, by subjugating to her sway Belgium, Holland, the districts comprised between the Meuse and the Rhine, the Palatinate, the great barrier of the Alps, the line of the Pyrenees, and several places in Catalonia and Biscay. Hereafter, doubtless, we shall witness still greater marvels; but these two campaigns will hold their place in history as the most decidedly national, legitimate, and honourable, ever undertaken by France.

The coalition could not bear up against such rude and numerous shocks. The English cabinet alone, which, by the aid of the incompetent Duke of York, had merely lost the territories of its allies, and, under pretext of recovering those of the stadtholder, had acquired forty or fifty ships of war, and projected the appropriation, under the like pretence, of the Dutch colonies, could have no urgent reasons for terminating the war; on the contrary, it trembled at the prospect of its conclusion by the rupture of the coalition. But Prussia, which beheld the French on the banks of the Rhine and the Ems, and saw the torrent ready to sweep into her own confines, no longer hesitated. She forthwith dispatched an envoy to Pichegru's headquarters, empowered to conclude a truce and undertake to open immediate negotiations for peace. The place selected for the conference was Basle, where the French republic maintained an agent who had gained the esteem and consideration of the Swiss by his talents and moderation. The reason alleged for choos-

ing this locality was, that the negotiations might be there conducted with greater secrecy and tranquillity than at Paris, where too many passions still fermented, and foreign intrigues were in dangerous activity: but this was not the real motive. Even whilst making overtures of peace to that republic which she had vowed to annihilate by a single march, Prussia wished to dissemble the confession of her defeat, and preferred seeking peace in a neutral land rather than visit Paris in the character of a suppliant. The committee of public welfare, less arrogant than its predecessor, and feeling withal the importance of detaching Prussia from the coalition, consented to invest its agent at Basle with the requisite powers to treat. Prussia accredited the Baron von Goltz, and the powers were exchanged at Basle on the 3d of Pluviose, year 3 (22d January 1795).

The empire was equally desirous of withdrawing from the coalition as Prussia. The majority of its members, incapable of furnishing the quintuple contingent, and the subsidies voted under the influence of Austria, had been fruitlessly urged, during the whole campaign, to fulfil their engagements. Excepting those who had possessions compromised beyond the Rhine, and who were well aware that France would not restore them unless wrung by force, all wished for peace. Bavaria, Sweden for the duchy of Holstein,* the Elector of Mayence, and several other states of the empire, had maintained in the diet that it was time to put an end, *by an acceptable peace, to a ruinous war;* that the German empire had engaged in hostilities solely to maintain the stipulations of 1648, and to defend such of the states as adjoined Alsace and Lorraine; that it contemplated its integrity, not its aggrandisement; that *its purpose never had been or could be to interfere in the internal government of France;* that this conciliatory declaration ought to be published with all promptitude, in order to terminate the evils which afflicted humanity; and that Sweden, as the guarantee of the treaty of Westphalia in 1648, and fortunately a neutral power amidst the universal warfare, might undertake the office of mediator. The majority of the votes had acquiesced in these views. The Elector of Treves, denuded of his territories, and the imperial envoy for Bohemia and Austria, had alone upheld the doctrine that, however desirable peace might be, it was not possible with a country devoid of a government. Eventually, on the 25th December, the diet had promulgated a provisional *conclusum* favourable to peace, reserving the question of from whom the proposition should emanate. The *conclusum* in substance set forth that, although making preparations for a fresh campaign, overtures of peace ought, notwithstanding, to be encouraged; and that no doubt France, touched with the evils of humanity, and convinced that no idea of interfering in our internal affairs was entertained, would consent to conditions honourable to both parties.

Thus, many who had committed egregious errors sought to repair them, if there were yet time. But Austria, however exhausted by her efforts, had lost too much in losing the Low Countries to think of laying down her arms. Spain would have willingly receded, but, entangled in the meshes of English intrigue, and moved by a false pride to uphold the cause of the French emigrants, she could not yet summon resolution to solicit peace.

The despondency into which the foreign enemies of the republic had fallen, crept also upon its domestic foes. The Vendéans, distracted and exhausted, were not far distant from peace; to fix their determination, it only needed to be adroitly offered them, and with such evidences as might convince them it was sincerely intended. The forces of Stofflet, Sapinaud, and Charette, were greatly reduced. By constraint alone were they able to make their peasants march; wearied of carnage, and ruined by the devastations, they would gladly have abandoned so horrible a warfare. Entirely devoted to the chiefs there only remained the men of a purely enterprising character—smugglers, deserters, poachers—to whom conflicts and pillage had become habitual cravings, and the labours of agriculture tiresome and distasteful: but these were few in number. They composed the chosen troop, which was constantly under arms, but altogether insufficient to make head against the republicans. It was with the utmost difficulty the more industrious peasants could be dragged from their fields on days set apart for expeditions. Thus the three Vendéan chiefs were almost devoid of forces. To increase their forlorn condition, discord fell amongst them. We remember that Stofflet, Sapinaud, and Charette, had concluded a compact at Jalais, which proved a mere postponement of their rivalry and dissension. Stofflet, instigated by the ambitious Abbé Bernier, had speedily manifested an intention of organising his army separately, and of establishing finances, an administration—all, in short, that constitutes a regular authority; and, in furtherance of his object, he commenced to fabricate a paper currency. Charette, who viewed Stofflet with a jealous eye, strongly opposed his designs. Seconded by Sapinaud, whom he swayed, he required Stofflet to renounce his scheme, and to appear before the general council instituted by the convention of Jalais. Stofflet declined to answer, whereupon Charette declared the convention of Jalais annulled. This was tantamount to a repudiation of his title to exercise command, for at Jalais they had mutually acknowledged their respective claims. The rupture, consequently, was complete, and all hope of redeeming their cause by union and concord at an end. It seems strange that, notwithstanding the royalist agents in Paris had instructions to open a correspondence with Charette, and forward to him letters from the regent, no communication had yet reached that chief.

The division of Scépeaux, between the Loire and the Vilaine, presented a like desolate spectacle. In Brittany, however, energy was less relaxed: a prolonged, interminable war had not occurred to depress and wear out the inhabitants. The Chouans pursued a lucrative occupation as banditti, and one by no means severe or fatiguing to those engaged in it; besides, a single chief, of almost unequalled perseverance, was always at hand to rekindle ardour when ready to droop. But this chief, who, as we have mentioned, was only tarrying until he had completed the organisation of Brittany, had recently proceeded to London, for the purpose of holding direct communication with the English cabinet and the French princes. Puisaye had appointed one Sieur Desotteux, calling himself Baron de Cormatin, to succeed him in the central committee, under the designation of major-general. Emigrants, so abundant in the courts of Europe, were very scarce in La Vendée, Brittany, and wherever civil war raged with its dangers and horrors. They affected great disdain for this species of service, and called it *Chouannising.* On this account the selection was limited, and Puisaye had pitched upon this adventurer, who had lately assumed the title of Baron de Cormatin, because his wife had inherited a small lordship in Burgundy of that name. He had in his chequered life figured alternately as a hot-brained revolutionist, an officer of Bouillé, a knight of the dagger, and, finally, an emigrant, and in every capacity striving to play a part. He was an arrant blusterer,* speaking and gesticulating with extraordinary vivacity, and capable of the most sudden transformations. Such was the man whom Puisaye, without sufficiently fathoming, left behind him in Brittany.

Puisaye had taken care to arrange a correspondence through the island of Jersey; but his absence was

* [This is an error in the text. For Sweden, Denmark should be substituted.]

* [The term used by M. Thiers is *energumene*, a reproachful epithet. In his sketch of Cormatin's character, it may be observed, he has been neither very happy nor very consistent.]

protracted, his letters frequently miscarried; Cormatin was utterly incapable of supplying his place and sustaining partisan courage; the chiefs grew impatient or disheartened, and they found rancour and animosity, calmed by the clemency of the convention, vanishing amongst their followers, and the elements of civil war dissolving. The approach of such a general as Hoche was little calculated to encourage them. From all these causes, it resulted that Brittany, though less exhausted than La Vendée, was equally disposed to accept a peace dexterously propounded.

Canclaux and Hoche were both eminently adapted to promote that desirable end. Canclaux, as recorded at the time, had been engaged in the first Vendéan war, and had left in the country a high reputation for moderation and ability. The army now placed under his command was considerably weakened by the reinforcements continually drafted for the Pyrenees and the Rhine, and moreover deplorably disorganised by so long a sojourn in the same locality. As an invariable sequence in civil wars, insubordination had gained ground, and thence had ensued pillage, debauchery, drunkenness, disease. It was the second relapse of that army since the commencement of this fatal war. Of 46,000 men composing it, 15,000 or 18,000 were in hospital; the 30,000 remaining were badly armed, and the moiety garrisoned the towns: consequently, 15,000 were at the utmost disposable. Canclaux procured an augmentation of 20,000 men—14,000 drawn from the army of Brest and 6000 from that of Cherbourg. By the aid of this reinforcement, he doubled all the posts, retook the camp of Sorinières near Nantes, recently stormed by Charette, and moved in force on the Layon, which formed the defensive line of Stofflet in Upper Anjou. After having taken this imposing attitude, he disseminated in profusion copies of the decrees and the proclamation of the convention, and dispatched emissaries over all the land.

Hoche, accustomed to war on a grand scale, and endowed with superior qualifications to conduct it, saw himself, with an emotion of despair, condemned to a civil war, inspiring no generous impulses, presenting no grand combinations, offering no glory. He had at first solicited to be relieved; but he had soon resigned himself to serve his country in a post at once repugnant to his feelings and too obscure for his talents. He was to be rewarded for this resignation by finding, on the very theatre he desired to quit, an opportunity of displaying the qualities of a statesman as well as those of a general. His army was extremely enfeebled by the reinforcements sent to Canclaux; he had scarcely forty thousand men, in defective organisation, to guard a broken, mountainous, and woody country, with more than three hundred and fifty leagues of coast from Cherbourg to Brest. He was promised twelve thousand auxiliaries drawn from the department of the North. He entreated, above all things, the assistance of soldiers inured to discipline; and forthwith applied himself to redeem his own from habits contracted in the infectious atmosphere of civil war. "We must," said he, "put at the head of our columns only disciplined men, who can show themselves moderate as valiant, and be mediators as well as soldiers." He distributed his troops into a multitude of small camps, and exhorted them to range abroad in bands of forty and fifty, seek to obtain a knowledge of localities, habituate themselves to a war of surprises, and contend in artifice with the Chouans; converse with the peasants, associate with them, encourage and cheer them, and gain their good will, if possible their co-operation. "Let us never forget," he wrote to his officers, "that policy must have a great share in this war. Let us employ alternately humanity, probity, virtue, force, guile; and always the dignity befitting republicans." In a short time he had imparted to that army an entirely different aspect and attitude; the order indispensable to his views of pacification was re-established amongst its hitherto disorderly members. Blending towards his soldiers indulgence with severity, he wrote to one of his lieutenants, who complained too virulently of certain bacchanalian excesses, in the following happy strain:—"Ha! my friend, if soldiers were philosophers, they would take care not to fight! Let us correct drunkards, however, if intoxication causes them to neglect their duty." He had formed most just ideas on the country and the mode of pacifying it. "Priests are a necessary want to these peasants," he indited; "then let them have them, since they wish it. Many have undergone much hardship, and sigh for a return to peaceful husbandry; let them have assistance to put their farms in order. As to those who have become fit for nothing but war, it would be inconsiderate to return them to the country; they would disturb it by their idle and restless habits. These ought to be formed into legions, and enrolled in the armies of the republic. They will make excellent soldiers for advanced guards; and their hatred of the coalition, for affording them no succour, assures us of their fidelity. Besides, what does cause signify to them? War is what they want. Remember," he added, "the bands of Du Guesclin marching to dethrone Peter the Cruel, and the regiment levied by Villars in the Cevennes." Such was the young general selected to tranquillise those unfortunate districts.

The decrees of the convention abundantly circulated in La Vendée and Brittany, the liberation of the suspected both at Nantes and at Rennes, the pardon granted to Madame de Bonchamps, who was saved by a decree after sentence of death had been passed upon her, the revocation of all condemnations not executed, the freedom allowed to the exercise of religious worship, the injunctions against injuring churches, the enlargement of the priests, the punishment of Carrier and his accomplices—all these causes, operating conjointly, began to produce the effects in the two provinces which were expected from them, and to dispose the minds of all to embrace the benefits of the general amnesty extended to both chiefs and followers. The intense hatred so long fomented gradually subsided, and with it the courage to bear up against the accumulated evils desolating the land. The representatives on mission at Nantes held interviews with the sister of Charette, and through her agency succeeded in forwarding him a copy of the decree of the convention. He was at this moment reduced to extremity. Albeit gifted with unparalleled obstinacy, some hope was necessary to lure him onwards, and not a ray gleamed from any quarter to cheer his path. The court of Verona, where his name was mentioned in such terms of admiration, as we have heretofore intimated, abstained, nevertheless, from taking any active steps in his behalf. The regent indeed had written him a letter, wherein he nominated him lieutenant-general, and styled him the second founder of the monarchy. But, intrusted to the agents at Paris, this letter, which would have served at all events to gratify his vanity, had never reached him. He had for the first time craved succours from England, and dispatched his young aide-de-camp, La Roberie, to London; but he had heard no tidings of him since his departure. Thus, not a word of recompense or encouragement was vouchsafed him, either from the princes in whose cause he had been so long battling or from the powers whose views he had assisted. He accordingly consented to an interview with Canclaux and the representatives of the people.

At Rennes the desired reconciliation was likewise promoted by a sister of one of the chiefs. Botidoux, one of the principal Chouans of Morbihan, having learnt that his sister, who was at Rennes, had been thrown into prison on his account, was induced to repair thither with the view of obtaining her liberation. The representative Boursault restored him his sister, and otherwise treated him with marked consideration: he succeeded in dispelling the jealous chieftain's doubts

as to the intention of the government, and in convincing him of the sincerity wherewith the decree of amnesty had been promulgated. Botidoux undertook to write to Bois-Hardi, a young intrepid Chouan, who commanded the division on the Côtes-du-Nord, and enjoyed the reputation of being the most formidable of the rebels. He consequently addressed him in these terms:—"What are your anticipations? The republican armies are in possession of the Rhine. Prussia solicits peace. You cannot rely on the word of England; you cannot rely on chiefs who merely send you letters from beyond sea, or who have deserted you under pretext of going in quest of succours: for the future you can only carry on a war of assassinations." Bois-Hardi, startled by this letter, and unable to quit the coasts of the North, where active hostilities still required his presence, besought the central committee to visit his quarters, for the purpose of agreeing upon an answer to Botidoux. The committee, with Cormatin as major-general at its head, consented, and accordingly removed to the vicinity of Bois-Hardi.

There was at this time a young general in the republican army, bold, hardy, full of natural readiness, and, above all, of that finesse which is said to be peculiar to the profession he had formerly followed, that of a *pimp*, by name General Humbert. "He was of the number of those," says Puisaye, "who have only too well proved that one year's practice in war is more than equivalent to all the trainings of the esplanade." He composed a letter, the style and orthography whereof were reprobated before the committee of public welfare, but which was well suited to captivate such men as Bois-Hardi and Cormatin. These parties had a conference. Bois-Hardi displayed the frank acquiescence of a young warrior, devoid of malice or animosity, and inspirited to arms by natural temperament rather than fanaticism; nevertheless, he came under no distinct pledges, and allowed Cormatin to bear the principal part in the interview. The latter, with his habitual instability, flattered at being called to treat with the generals of the puissant French republic, acceded to all the overtures of Humbert, and demanded to be put in communication with the generalissimos Hoche and Canclaux, and with the representatives. Interviews were arranged, the days and places fixed. The central committee reproached Cormatin with evincing over-eagerness. He, joining duplicity to unsteadiness, assured the committee he would not betray its cause; that in holding a conference, he was actuated solely by a desire to observe their common enemies more narrowly, and to judge of their strength and dispositions. He moreover alleged two reasons of great importance, as he represented them. In the first place, they in Brittany had never seen Charette, or been enabled to concert measures with him; in obtaining a meeting with him, under pretext of rendering the negotiation common to La Vendée and Brittany, he would have an opportunity of apprising him of Puisaye's projects, and inducing him to concur in them. Secondly, Puisaye, the companion in boyhood of Canclaux, had written him a letter calculated to have considerable effect upon his mind, and containing the most brilliant offers to gain him over to the cause of the monarchy; this letter Cormatin, under pretence of seeking an interview, would forward to Canclaux, and thus promote the views of Puisaye. In this manner, affecting the part of a skilful diplomatist with his colleagues, Cormatin obtained authority to open a feigned negotiation with the republicans, in order to concert with Charette and seduce Canclaux. He wrote to Puisaye in this vein, and departed upon his mission, full of the most conflicting cogitations; now buoyed with the conceit of deceiving the republicans, intriguing before their eyes, and robbing them of a general; anon inflated with the idea of becoming the mediator between the insurgents and the representatives of the republic; and fitted, amidst this mental bewilderment, to be himself the dupe endeavouring to dupe others. He saw Hoche, and first of all demanded from him a temporary truce, and subsequently permission to visit all the Chouan chiefs in succession, with the view of diffusing pacific sentiments amongst them; and to confer with Canclaux, and especially Charette, in order that he and the latter might act together, as the Bretons would not separate from the Vendéans. Hoche and the representatives granted all his requests; but they gave him Humbert as an associate, to be present at his various interviews. Cormatin, at the summit of his hopes, wrote to the central committee and to Puisaye that his artifices were succeeding; that the republicans were his dupes; that he was starting to confirm the Chouans in their fidelity, explain affairs to Charette, urge him merely to temporise until the grand expedition was prepared, and finally debauch Canclaux. He then set out upon his journey through Brittany, visiting the chiefs in all directions, and astonishing them by exhortations to peace, and by the intimation of this unexpected truce. Unable to comprehend the nicety of his subterfuge, the majority were discouraged and perplexed. The cessation of hostilities that ensued, introduced a love of repose and peace; and, without his intending it, Cormatin materially advanced the pacification. He himself began to incline towards that consummation; and, whilst intent on deceiving the republicans, it chanced that the republicans unconsciously entrapped him.

Meanwhile, a day and place had been fixed for an interview, by Charette. It was to take place near Nantes. Cormatin agreed to repair thither and commence the negotiations. He, becoming daily more entangled in engagements with the republicans, favoured the central committee more rarely with his communications, and the committee, seeing the turn affairs were about to take, wrote a pressing letter to Puisaye, in Nivose, thus couched:—"Return with all speed. Courage is shaken; the republicans are seducing the chiefs. You must come, were it only with twelve thousand men, together with a supply of money, priests, and emigrants. Be here before the end of January (Pluviose)." Thus, whilst the emigrants and foreign powers were building such sanguine hopes on Charette and on Brittany, a negotiation was on the point of tranquillising the two disturbed districts. In Pluviose (January-February), therefore, the republic had opened conferences at Basle with one of the principal members of the coalition, and at Nantes with the royalists who had hitherto denied and combated it.

CHAPTER XL.

REOPENING OF THE THEATRES AND LEARNED SOCIETIES.—ESTABLISHMENT OF SCHOOLS.—DECREES RELATIVE TO COMMERCE, &C.—SCARCITY OF PROVISIONS.—ABOLITION OF THE MAXIMUM AND REQUISITIONS.—REINSTATEMENT OF THE GIRONDIST DEPUTIES.—TUMULTS OCCASIONED BY THE DEARTH.—INSURRECTION OF THE 12TH GERMINAL.—BANISHMENT OF BARRÈRE, COLLOT-D'HERBOIS, AND BILLAUD-VARENNES.—ARREST OF SEVERAL MOUNTAINEER DEPUTIES.—DISARMING OF THE PATRIOTS.

The Jacobins were dispersed, the principal agents or leaders of the revolutionary government impeached, Carrier put to death, and several other deputies assailed on account of their missions; moreover, Billaud-Varennes, Collot-d'Herbois, Barrère, and Vadier, were placed under detention, and destined to be speedily arraigned before the tribunal of their colleagues. But whilst France thus sought vengeance upon the men who had exacted from her many painful efforts and condemned her to pass through so terrible an ordeal, she returned with ecstasy to the arts, pursuits, and recreations of civilisation, from which those men had

for a time debarred her. We have already seen with what zest preparations were made to enjoy the winter, with what singular and novel taste the women had arrayed themselves, with what eagerness they crowded to the concerts in the Rue Feydeau. Now all the theatres were reopened. The performers of the Comédie Française had been released from prison; Larive, Saint-Pris, Dazincourt, Saint-Phal, Mesdemoiselles Contat and Devienne, had reappeared on the stage. The population flocked to the theatres as if impelled by a mania. All the passages bearing the remotest allusion to terror were vociferously applauded; the air of the *Reveil du Peuple* was chanted at intervals, and the *Marseillais* altogether proscribed. In the boxes appeared the beauties of the hour—the wives or friends of the Thermidorians; in the pit "the gilded youth" seemed by their mirth, their attire, and their appreciation, to shame by contrast those sanguinary and uncouth terrorists, who, they alleged, had designed to destroy all civilisation. Balls were attended with the same ardour. One was held where none gained admittance who had not lost a relative in the revolution: it was called the *ball of the victims*. The public buildings consecrated to the arts were likewise reopened. The convention, actuated by great ideas as well as passions, had ordained the formation of a museum, in which were collected not only the pictures already possessed by France, but those also gained by conquest. The masterpieces of the Flemish school, acquired in Belgium, had been transferred to its walls. The Lyceum, in which La Harpe had but recently extolled philosophy and liberty in the red cap—the Lyceum, closed during the reign of terror, was restored to the public through the liberality of the convention, which had voted a contribution to the charges of the establishment, and distributed some hundreds of tickets amongst the young people of each section. There La Harpe was now heard declaiming against anarchy, terror, the degradation of the French language, *philosophism*, and all that he had formerly vaunted, before the liberty, which he had celebrated without understanding, had terrified his petty mind. The convention also granted pensions to most of the literary and scientific men of the day, without distinction of political principles. It had already decreed the institution of primary schools, wherein the people were to be taught the elements of language spoken and written, the rules of arithmetic, the rudiments of mensuration, and practical ideas upon the principal phenomena of nature; likewise of central schools, intended for higher classes, where youths were to be instructed in mathematics, natural philosophy, chemistry, natural history, botany, mechanics, the art of design, polite literature, the ancient languages, the living tongues most appropriate to the position of localities, general grammar, logic and analysis, history, political economy, the principles of legislation, all in the order best adapted to develop the minds of the pupils; also of a normal school, wherein young professors were to be trained, under the most celebrated literary and scientific characters, and subsequently distributed through France, to diffuse the knowledge acquired in this focus of intelligence; and, lastly, of special schools for medicine, law, and veterinary science.

Besides this vast system of education, destined to disseminate that civilisation which the revolution was so unjustly accused of having banished, the convention offered encouragements to works of all kinds. The establishment of various manufactures was decreed. National domains at Besançon were conferred upon certain Swiss, expatriated by domestic broils, with the view of forming there a clock and watch manufactory. The convention furthermore instructed its committees to digest plans for canals and banks, and a system of advances to certain provinces devastated by the war. It modified sundry laws injurious to agriculture and commerce. A great number of cultivators and artisans had quitted Alsace, when it was evacuated by Wurmser, Lyons during its siege, and the whole south, at the time of the crusade against federalism. These the convention distinguished from emigrants, and passed a decree whereby the peasants and artisans, who had left France since the 1st of May 1793, and were disposed to return before the 1st of Germinal, should not be considered as emigrants. The law of the suspected, the repeal of which had been often urged, was maintained; but it was no longer formidable except to the patriots, who had become the suspected of the era. The revolutionary tribunal was entirely reconstructed, and placed on the footing of the ordinary criminal courts, having judges, jurymen, and advocates. It was not permitted to decide upon written documents and without hearing witnesses. The law allowing silence to be imposed on prisoners, which had been enacted against Danton, was rescinded. The district administrations were henceforth to cease being permanent, excepting in towns of above fifty thousand souls. Finally, the important subject of religion was regulated by a new law. This ordinance recited that, by virtue of the declaration of rights, all creeds were free; but it announced at the same time that the state subsidised none, and forbade all public celebration of rites. Each sect was at liberty to build or hire edifices, and solemnise the services of its religion in the interior of such edifices. As a substitute for the ancient ceremonies of the Catholic faith and for those of *Reason*, a plan of decadal festivals was devised. It combined music, dancing, and moral exhortations, so as to render the amusements of the people profitable, and leave impressions upon their minds at once beneficial and agreeable. Thus relieved from the absorbing care of defending itself, the revolution discarded the violent forms it had assumed under the pressure of danger, and reverted to its veritable mission, that of encouraging arts, industry, enlightenment, and civilisation.

But whilst the convention was busied in abrogating harsh and cruel laws, and the upper classes were again taking consistence and eagerly treading the paths of pleasure, the lower classes were suffering from a dreadful scarcity, and from an intense cold almost unknown in these latitudes. The winter of the year 3, which had permitted the French to traverse as on dry land the rivers and seas of Holland, revenged that conquest, as it were, by subjecting both the town and rural population to terrible hardships. It was, without doubt, the most rigorous that had occurred during the century, far exceeding that which preceded the opening of the states-general in 1789. Provisions were deficient from various causes. The principal was the insufficiency of the harvest. Although the crops had promised to yield abundantly, a long drought and subsequent dampness had blighted expectation. The thrashing had also been neglected, as in previous years, both from a want of hands and from the unwillingness of the farmers. The assignats falling almost continually, and having at this period sunk to the tenth of their nominal value, the maximum had become proportionably more oppressive, and the repugnance to obey it, the efforts to evade it, grew daily greater. The farmers universally delivered false declarations, and were supported in their prevarications by the municipalities, which, as we are aware, had been all recently renewed. Being now generally composed of moderate men, they complacently winked at infractions of the revolutionary laws; whereby, the springs of authority being relaxed, and the government ceasing to inspire terror, the requisitions for the supply of armies and large towns were no longer heeded. Accordingly, that extraordinary system of drawing supplies, devised as a substitute for the natural operations of trade, was effectually disorganised before trade had resumed its usual channels. The scarcity thence resulting was most sensibly felt in the larger towns, which are at such times difficult to provision. Paris, in particular, was threatened with a famine more in-

veterate than any that had excited apprehensions during the course of the revolution. With general causes were combined others purely local. By the suppression of the commune, attainted of conspiracy on the 9th Thermidor, the care of alimenting Paris had devolved on the commission for trade and supplies; which change was productive of interruption in the services. Orders had been issued tardily, and then precipitately and without circumspection. The means of carriage lacked deplorably; the horses had all been absorbed; and thus, besides the difficulty of collecting sufficient quantities of corn, there was the equally arduous undertaking of conveying them to Paris. Delays, pillages on the routes, all the unavoidable contingencies of scarcities, foiled the exertions of the commission. Nor was the dearth of food the only evil; the want of fuel entailed equal misery. The canal of Briare had been dry during the whole summer. No coals had arrived, and the charcoal had been all consumed in domestic purposes. The orders to fell timber had been given late in the season, and the contractors for floating wood, molested and harassed by the local authorities, were completely discouraged. Coals and wood, therefore, were deficient; and in this rugged winter, a scarcity of fuel was scarcely less calamitous than one of food.

Thus, fearful distress amongst the lower classes contrasted unhappily with the enjoyments to which the upper classes abandoned themselves. The revolutionists, exasperated against the government, followed the example of all beaten parties, and used the public misfortunes as so many grounds of invective against the actual leaders of the state. They even contributed to aggravate those calamities by thwarting the orders of the administration. "Avoid sending your corn to Paris," they said to the farmers; "the government is counter-revolutionary; it is bringing back the emigrants; it refuses to put the constitution in force; it leaves the grain to moulder in the magazines of the commission for trade; it wishes to starve the people, so as to compel them to throw themselves into the arms of royalty." By such exhortations they induced the holders of grain to keep it back. They quitted the towns in which they had usually resided for the larger cities, where they were unknown and beyond the reach of those they had persecuted, and there instigated commotions. At Marseilles, they had recently subjected the representatives to outrages, and obliged them to suspend the proceedings instituted against the alleged accomplices of the system of terror. It had even been found necessary to declare the city in a state of siege. At Paris, especially, they congregated in great numbers, and manifested the utmost turbulence. They inveighed perpetually on the same topic—the distress of the people, and drew comparisons between it and the luxury of the new leaders of the convention. Madame Tallien was the female of the day whom they chiefly assailed, for at all periods one had been the object of popular odium; upon this perfidious enchantress it was they charged, as formerly upon Madame Roland, and earlier upon Marie-Antoinette, all the sufferings of the people. Her name, frequently mentioned reproachfully in the convention, had not appeared to move Tallien. One day, however, he ascended the tribune to vindicate her from this series of aspersions. He depicted her as a model of constancy and courage, and as one of the victims destined by Robespierre for the scaffold; declaring, moreover, that she had become his wife. Barras, Legendre, and Fréron, supported him; they affirmed, that the time was at length arrived for a definitive explanation, and proceeded to exchange calumnious expressions with members of the Mountain. The convention found it incumbent, as usual, to put an end to the discussion by passing to the order of the day. On another occasion, Duhem told the deputy Clausel, a member of the committee of general safety, that he would assassinate him. A horrible tumult ensued, and the order of the day was again interposed to terminate the disgraceful scene.

The violent and indefatigable Duhem chanced to alight on a publication entitled *The Spectator of the Revolution*, in which appeared a dialogue on the two governments, republican and monarchical. In this production a decided preference was given to the monarchical government, and it even urged, in terms sufficiently unequivocal, the French people to return to that system. Duhem indignantly denounced the work as one of the symptoms of the royalist conspiracy. The convention, acquiescing in the propriety of this denunciation, sent the author before the revolutionary tribunal; but Duhem, having taken upon himself to assert that royalism and aristocracy were in the ascendant, was committed to the Abbey for three days, as having insulted the assembly.

These scenes agitated all Paris. In the sections addresses were proposed respecting them, which gave rise to fierce contentions as to the terms in which they should be embodied, each party striving to carry them in accordance with its own views. Never had the revolution presented so stormy a spectacle. Formerly, the Jacobins, all powerful over opinion, had encountered no resistance capable of producing a veritable struggle. They had driven all before them, and remained undisputed conquerors; conquerors obstreperous and wrathful, it is true, but sole and supreme. Now, a mighty party had arisen, and, although it was less outrageous, it supplied by numbers what it lacked in violence, and could contend upon equal terms. Addresses were thus framed in opposite senses. Several Jacobins, congregated in the coffee-houses, in the populous quarters of Saint-Denis, the Temple, and Saint-Antoine, held language such as they had used in the worst times. They threatened to attack the new conspirators at the Palais-Royal, the theatres, and even in the convention. On their side, the young men indulged in boisterous clamour in the pits of the theatres. They vowed to perpetrate a galling outrage on the Jacobins. The bust of Marat was planted in all public places, and prominently in those of public amusement. At the theatre Feydeau, some young men sprang up the balcony, and, clambering on each other's shoulders, they pulled down the bust of the saint, broke it to atoms, and replaced it by one of Rousseau. The police used fruitless efforts to prevent this exploit. Universal acclamations greeted the action of these daring youths. Garlands were thrown on the stage wherewith to crown the bust of Rousseau; verses, written for the occasion, were delivered, and the building re-echoed with shouts of "Down with the terrorists! Down with Marat! Down with that bloodthirsty monster who demanded three hundred thousand heads! Long live the author of Emile, the Social Contract, and the New Heloise!" Similar scenes were enacted on the following day in all the theatres and public places. Bands rushed into the market-places, bedaubed the busts of Marat with blood, and then hurled them into the mud. Even boys formed a procession in the quarter of Montmartre, and, after bearing the bust of Marat to the brink of a sewer, cast it amongst the filth. The public detestation was expressed with extreme virulence; disgust and abhorrence of Marat were in all hearts, even amongst the majority of the Mountaineers, for none of them had been able to follow in his aberrations the conceptions of that audacious maniac. But the name of Marat being hallowed—the dagger of Charlotte Corday having exalted him into a species of idol—a dread of touching his shrines had been felt equal to that of desecrating those of liberty itself. We have seen that, during the last Sans-culottides, only four months ago, he had been placed in the Pantheon in lieu of Mirabeau. The committees hastened to profit by this explosion of opinion, and proposed to the convention a decree whereby no individual could be deposited in the Pantheon before a lapse of twenty years, and no bust or portrait of any citizen be exposed in

public places. It was adopted, with the addition that every contrary decree was cancelled. In consequence, Marat was ejected from the Pantheon, after an occupation of but four months. Such is the instability of revolutions! Immortality to-day decerned, to-morrow abrogated; and popular odium pursues party leaders even beyond the gates of death! From that moment commenced the long infamy to which Marat has been consigned, and which he has partaken with Robespierre. Both, recently deified by fanaticism, now judged by acerbity, were devoted to permanent execration.

The Jacobins, incensed at this outrage on the memory of one of the most renowned revolutionists, assembled in the Faubourg Saint-Antoine, and swore to avenge the fame of Marat. They took his bust, carried it in triumph through all the quarters they swayed, and, armed to the teeth, menaced with death any who should disturb their sinister celebration. The young men debated whether they should assault the procession; they encouraged each other to make the attack, and a battle must have inevitably ensued, if the committees had not caused the club of the Quinze-Vingts to be closed, prohibited processions of this description, and dispersed the crowds. At the sitting of the 20th Nivose (9th January), the busts of Marat and Lepelletier were removed from the convention, as likewise the two fine pictures in which David had represented them dying. The galleries, filled by the opposing partisans, uttered antagonist cries; some raised applauding cheers, others howled in dismal yells. Amongst the latter were those females usually styled "furies of the guillotine:" they were expelled from the building. The majority of the assembly joined in the acclamations, whilst the Mountain, sullen and silent, appeared to behold, in the removal of those celebrated pictures, the portent of the approaching ruin of the revolution and the republic.

The convention, through its committees, had interfered to prevent the two parties from coming to actual conflict on the recent occasion; but the collision was only delayed for a time. Animosities were so deep and bitter, the sufferings of the people so great, that the recurrence of one of those desperate commotions, so common in the annals of the revolution, might be hourly expected. Meanwhile, in all the uncertainty of coming events and issues, the convention discussed the questions forced on its attention by the commercial and financial condition of the country—painful and unhappy questions, which were ever and anon perforce revived, for treatment and solution in the varying modes called for by the fluctuations ideas underwent from time to time.

Two months earlier it had modified the maximum, by rendering the prices of grain variable with reference to local circumstances; it had modified the system of requisitions, by rendering them special, limited, and regular; and it had postponed the inquiry relative to the foreign sequestration, to currency, and to assignats. At the present moment, all respect for revolutionary creations was gone. It was no longer a simple modification that men demanded, but the abolition of the whole coercive system instituted during the terror. The opponents of that system advanced excellent reasons in support of their views. "All values not being assigned," they argued, "the maximum was absurd and iniquitous. The farmer, paying 30 francs for a ploughshare he formerly bought for 50 sous, 700 francs to a servant whom he could have engaged heretofore for 100 francs, and 10 francs to a day-labourer instead of 50 sous, could not sell his produce at the same price as in times past. Raw materials imported from abroad having been recently excepted from the maximum, with the view of restoring some activity to commerce, it was preposterous to subject them, when manufactured, to its operation; for thereby they would bring eight or ten times less than in the raw state. These instances were not the only ones that might be adduced: a thousand others of the same kind could be cited. The maximum thus exposing the merchant, the manufacturer, and the agriculturist, to inevitable losses, they naturally shunned it; the first abandoned his warehouse or his manufactory, the last hoarded his grain or had it consumed in the farm-yard, because he found it more advantageous to sell fatted poultry and pigs. Hence, if it were wished that the market should be supplied, prices must be rendered free, for no one would labour in order to incur certain loss. For the rest," added the adversaries of the revolutionary system, "the maximum had never been practically executed; those who stood in need of articles were actually compelled to pay a remunerative price, and not the legal price. The whole question, therefore, had resolved itself into this alternative—pay dear or want. Vain was the hope of supplying the spontaneous activity of industry and trade by requisitions, that is to say, by the action of the government. A government embarking in commerce was a monstrous absurdity. That commission of supplies, which had boasted so much of its operations, were people aware what quantity of foreign corn it had brought into France? Just enough to feed France for five days. It was indispensable, therefore, to revert to individual activity, that is to say, to free trade, and trust to it alone. When the maximum was abrogated, and the merchant could reimburse himself the charges of freight and insurance, interest upon his capital, and a fair profit, he would bring commodities from all quarters of the globe. The large cities, especially, which were not, like Paris, provisioned at the expense of the state, had trade alone to rely upon, and would be absolutely starved unless the fetters impeding its operations were removed."

In principle, these arguments were sound and just; but it was not the less true that the transition from the coercive system to free trade, at so critical a period as the present, was necessarily hazardous and dangerous. Until the inducement of unfettered prices had revived individual industry and stocked the markets, all articles must undergo an extraordinary enhancement. This might be but a slight inconvenience as to commodities not of primary necessity, producing at the worst a temporary interruption, until, in the ordinary course of things, competition brought down prices; but as it affected articles of subsistence, which would allow of no interruption, the subject was fraught with difficulty. Whilst waiting until the faculty of selling corn at free prices had caused vessels to be dispatched to the Crimea, Poland, Africa, and America, and constrained farmers, by the natural spirit of competition, to bring forward their produce, how were the people in large cities and towns to live, without the maximum and without requisitions? After all, bad bread, scantily obtained by the arduous efforts of the administration, and amidst incredible obstacles, was better than absolute famine. Doubtless it was expedient to get rid of this forced system as soon as possible, but with caution and not impetuous precipitancy.

The reproaches of M. Boissy-d'Anglas against the commission of supplies were equally unjust as preposterous. Its importations, he said, would not have fed France for more than five days. Granting the calculation correct, which was controverted, his objection is valueless. It is only a little a country ever needs in the case of domestic deficiency, otherwise it could not be supplied; but was it not a signal service to have produced that little? Can the desperate condition of a whole country deprived of bread for even five days be imagined? Were such a destitution, indeed, equally borne and distributed, it might prove less mortal; but whilst the rural districts would have had corn in superfluity, the great towns, and especially the metropolis, would have been devoid thereof, not for five days only, but for ten, twenty, fifty, and

complete anarchy must have resulted. Besides, the commission for trade and supplies, directed by Lindet, had not simply limited its labours to the importation of produce from abroad, but had likewise superintended the transport of grain, provender, and other agricultural produce in France itself, from the country to the frontiers and to the large towns; and trade would assuredly not have performed those services if left to itself, amidst the terrors of war and political fury. It had been found indispensable to substitute the will of the government for the action of commerce, and the energetic marvellous realisation of that will deserved the gratitude and admiration of France, despite the sneers of those insignificant personages who, during the dangers of the country, had employed their faculties only in concealing themselves from observation.

The question was carried by assault, if it may be so expressed. The convention abolished the maximum and system of requisitions by overruling impulse, in like manner as it had recalled the seventy-three deputies, and passed a decree against Billaud-Varennes, Collot-d'Herbois, and Barrère. Certain remnants of the system of requisitions were, however, allowed to subsist. Such as had been issued for the purpose of alimenting large towns were to remain in force for one month longer. The government likewise retained the privilege of pre-emption, that is to say, the power of taking commodities by authority at the market value. The famous commission was partly curtailed in its title; it was to be no longer called the commission for trade and supplies, but simply the commission of supplies. Its five directors were reduced to three, and its ten thousand agents to a few hundreds. The system of private enterprise was substituted for that of administrative action, and sundry passing invectives were uttered against Pache for his institution of the committee of contracts. The wainage was surrendered to purveyors. The manufacture of arms at Paris, which had rendered costly but immense services, was discontinued, which could now be done without inconvenience, and the fabrication of arms abandoned to private enterprise. The workmen, aware they would henceforth receive less wages, murmured; instigated by the Jacobins, they even threatened a movement; but they were curbed, and dismissed to their several districts.

The question of sequestration, previously adjourned because fears were entertained that, by restoring the circulation of bills of exchange, remittances would be forwarded to the emigrants and stockjobbing in foreign paper revived, was finally considered, and decided to the advantage of commercial freedom. The sequestration was raised, and the convention thereby surrendered to foreign merchants their confiscated balances, at the hazard of not obtaining a similar restitution in favour of the French. Lastly, the free circulation of specie was re-established, after a warm discussion. It had been heretofore interdicted, with the view of preventing the emigrants from drawing bullion out of France; it was now permitted, on the ground that, the means of exchange being defective, Lyons being no longer able to furnish sixty millions' worth of manufactures, Nismes twenty, and Sedan ten, commercial intercourse would be impracticable, unless license were given to pay in gold or silver for purchases made abroad. Moreover, it was judged that specie being now hoarded and kept back on account of the paper-money, the privilege of reimbursing foreigners for articles imported would have the effect of drawing it forth, and re-introducing it into the currency. At the same time, useless precautions were taken to prevent it being exported for the benefit of emigrants. Whoever transmitted any of the precious metals abroad, was bound to import merchandise of corresponding value.

Finally, the difficult question of assignats came to be solved. There were nearly seven thousand and five or six hundred millions in actual circulation; five or six hundred millions remained in the coffers of the state; consequently the amount fabricated reached eight thousand millions. The hypothec in property of first and second origin, such as forests, lands, palaces, mansions, houses, and moveables, amounted to upwards of fifteen thousand millions, according to the actual valuation in assignats. The pledge, therefore, was amply sufficient. Nevertheless, the assignat was depreciated to nine-tenths or eleven-twelfths of its value, according to the nature of the objects for which it was exchanged. Thus the state, which received the taxes in assignats, the fund-holder, the public functionary, the proprietor of land or houses, the creditor of outstanding capital—all those, in short, who received their appointments, dividends, salaries, or payments, in paper—suffered losses in a perpetually increasing ratio, and the distress thence resulting became daily more afflictive. Cambon had proposed to augment the salaries of public functionaries and the dividends of stockholders. After opposing his suggestion, it had been found necessary to adopt it in behalf of public functionaries, who could no longer exist upon their pittances. But this was a feeble palliative for an evil so immense; it merely relieved one class out of a hundred. To make the relief effectual and general, it was requisite to establish the just proportion between values of all kinds: but how was this to be effected?

The notions in vogue during the preceding year were again fondly indulged; still the cause of the depreciation of assignats, and the means of raising them in value, were the themes of discussion. In the first place, albeit granting that their inordinate quantity was one reason for the discredit into which they had fallen, it was maintained that it was by no means the greatest; and this to vindicate their profuse emission. In corroboration of this statement, it was alleged that, at the period of Dumouriez's defection, the insurrection of La Vendée, and the capture of Valenciennes, the assignats, circulating in far less abundance than subsequent to the deblockades of Dunkirk, Maubeuge, and Landau, nevertheless declined more; which, indeed, was true, and proved unquestionably that defeats and victories materially influenced the standard of the paper-money—an incontestible axiom. But now, in Ventose, year 3 (March 1795), the triumph of the republic was complete on all points, confidence in the sales of national domains was established, those domains had even become the objects of a species of jobbing, numerous speculators purchasing them to profit by their resale or subdivision; and yet the depreciation of assignats was four or five times greater than in the previous year. The huge emission was therefore the veritable cause of the discredit, and its reduction the only mode of enchancing the value.

The sole legitimate means of lessening the amount of assignats in circulation consisted in redeeming them by sales of national property. But how were these sales to be effected?—an eternal question, canvassed every year. The causes which had retarded the purchases of domains in preceding years were repugnance, prejudices, and, above all, want of confidence in the stability of the acquisitions. Now the case was altogether different. Let us consider for a moment how acquisitions of immoveable property are made in the ordinary course of things. The merchant, manufacturer, agriculturist, or capitalist, buys, with the accumulations of his industry, or income, the land of an individual who has become impoverished, or who disposes of his estate to exchange it for another. Lands are thus constantly changing hands, either for others, or for floating capital accumulated by enterprise or thrift. The new purchaser retires to his estate, and the vender seeks to turn the money he has received in payment to account, and succeeds to the industrial occupation of the previous realiser. Such is the insensible operation proceeding with regard to immoveable property. But, on the other hand, let us imagine

the third of a vast territory, comprising immense estates unbroken by divisions, parks, palaces, and sumptuous mansions, exposed to sale all at once, and at the very moment that landed proprietors and merchants, all the richest capitalists, were dispersed, and we shall understand why dispositions were impracticable. It was not a few citizens or agriculturists, escaped from the proscription, who could attempt such acquisitions or pay for them. It may be objected, doubtless, that the mass of assignats in circulation was sufficient to absorb the domains; but this mass was illusory, when it is remembered that each holder of assignats was obliged to use them in an eight or ten fold proportion beyond their value, to procure such objects as were essential to his comfort or existence.

The difficulty consisted, then, in imparting, not the inclination to purchase, but the ability to pay. Thus, all the measures proposed proceeded on a false basis, for they all presupposed this ability. The measures themselves were either of a coercive or voluntary nature. The first contemplated demonetisation, or a forced loan. Demonetisation converted the paper from current money into a mere obligation on the domains. It was tyrannical; for, when it struck the assignat in the hands of the operative, or of the individual who had only wherewithal to live, it transformed his crust of bread into clay, and reduced the unfortunate holder to famine. The mere rumour, in fact, of such a project being entertained with regard to a portion of the assignats, had caused them to decline rapidly, and the convention was constrained to promulgate a decree that it would not demonetise. A forced loan was not less tyrannical; it likewise consisted in changing the assignat from money into a charge upon the national property. The only difference was, that the forced loan bore upon the higher and wealthy classes, and operated the conversion as to them alone; but they had already suffered so much, that it was scarcely possible to make them purchase land without subjecting them to severe embarrassment. Besides, since the reaction, they had begun to defend themselves from any recurrence to revolutionary expedients.

Measures of a voluntary nature, therefore, alone remained feasible. Divers were propounded. Cambon conceived the idea of a lottery, to be composed of four millions of lots, of one thousand francs each; which supposed a contribution of four thousand millions on the part of the public. The state was to add three hundred and ninety-one millions to make up prizes, so that there might be four prizes of 500,000 francs, thirty-six of 250,000, and three hundred and sixty of 100,000. The least fortunate would recover their pristine disbursement of one thousand francs; but all, instead of receiving assignats, would be furnished with bonds on the national domains, bearing three per cent. interest. Thus, it was imagined that the allurement of a considerable prize would tempt the public to compete for this mortgage on the national property, and that four thousand millions of assignats would quit the character of currency to assume that of obligations on land, by means of this premium of three hundred and ninety-one millions. This scheme was still founded on the supposition that the investment could in fact be made. Thirion recommended another mode, that of a tontine. But this plan, well adapted for rendering a small capital productive to a few survivors, was infinitely too slow, and utterly inadequate for an operation affecting so enormous a mass of floating paper. Johannot proposed a species of territorial bank, in which assignats should be deposited for bonds bearing three per cent. interest—bonds convertible at will into assignats. This was only another modification of the project for changing the paper-money into obligations on land, with the difference, that the power of reconverting them into a current form was here secured. It is obvious that none of these schemes overcame the real, substantial obstacle; and that all the plans propounded for withdrawing the paper and enhancing it in value were purely illusory. Nothing was left, therefore, but to pursue indefinitely the same course, emitting assignats *ad libitum*, until they should reach their lowest point of depression, and the term arrive for a forced solution of all difficulties. It is unfortunate that nations never can discern the necessary sacrifices, and diminish their weight and extent by anticipating the period when they become unavoidable. This foresight and courage have always failed nations in financial crises.

To these abortive projects for redeeming assignats were added others, happily more practical, but lamentably insufficient to meet the evil. The moveables belonging to emigrants, which might be easily realised, amounted in value to two hundred millions. Amicable arrangements for the shares of emigrants in commercial companies might produce one hundred millions; their portion of hereditaments five hundred millions. But, with regard to the first, capital would be withdrawn from commerce; and, with regard to the second, part of the produce must be received in real estate. It was resolved to offer a premium to those who should complete their payments for lands already purchased, whereby it was expected eight hundred millions would be gained. Finally, the large mansions situated in Paris, and not let, were to be disposed of by lottery, which would bring in a thousand millions more. In the event of all anticipations being fulfilled, the expedients just enumerated might return into the exchequer two thousand six hundred millions; but if, from the whole, fifteen hundred millions accrued, the result might be deemed auspicious; and this sum was already destined for immediate outlay. The necessity for this disbursement arose from a considerate and humane measure which had been recently decreed; to wit, the liquidation of the debts of emigrants. It had been originally determined to institute an individual liquidation for each emigrant. As several of them were insolvent, the republic would thus have satisfied claims only so far as the assets permitted on each estate. But this separate investigation threatened interminable delays; an account must have been opened for every individual emigrant, and the produce of his lands and moveables balanced with his liabilities, in the course of which operation, the unfortunate creditors, almost all domestics, artisans, and tradesmen, might have waited twenty or thirty years for payment. Cambon was instrumental in procuring a decree that the creditors of emigrants should be considered creditors of the state, and forthwith paid, excepting those whose debtors were notoriously bankrupt. The republic might thus lose sundry millions; but it alleviated many severe pangs, and conferred a signal boon on the objects of its bounty. The arch-revolutionist Cambon was the author of this beneficent and humane proceeding.

But whilst the convention was engaged in anxious discussion upon these grave and difficult questions, it was perpetually recalled to cares still more emergent, arising from the absolute dearth menacing Paris. Ventose was just elapsing.* The abolition of the maximum had as yet failed to revive trade, and supplies of grain ceased to arrive. Numerous deputies, disseminated around Paris, issued requisitions which were not heeded. Although these were still authorised for the purpose of alimenting large towns, and were to be reimbursed at the market value, the farmers asserted they were abolished, and refused obedience. Nor was this the only or the greatest obstacle. The rivers and canals were completely frozen, and all traffic upon them at an end. The roads, covered with ice, were impracticable; to render wainage possible, it was necessary to strew them with sand for a circuit of twenty leagues. On the way the waggons were plundered by the starving population, whose rage the

* The middle of March.

Jacobins stimulated by inculcating the belief that the government was counter-revolutionary, that it allowed the corn to rot in Paris, and was labouring to re-establish royalty. Whilst supplies diminished, consumption increased, as always happens in similar cases. The apprehension of scarcity induced all who were able to lay in stores for several days. Following the precedent of former times, bread was distributed on the presentation of tickets, but every one exaggerated his necessities. On the entreaties of their laundry and dairy-women, or of the country people who brought them vegetables and fowls, the inhabitants of Paris gave them bread, which they preferred to money, as the famine raged in the environs as cruelly as in Paris. The bakers even sold the unbaked dough to persons from the country; and from fifteen hundred sacks of flour, the consumption had increased to nineteen hundred. The abolition of the maximum had caused the price of all edibles to reach an extraordinary height; to induce a decline, the government had consigned divers articles of primary use to the sausage-venders, grocers, and other shopkeepers, in order that they might retail them at low prices, and thus reduce the general dearness. But the consignees abused their trust, and sold at higher rates than they had undertaken to observe.

The committees were daily harassed with alarm and solicitude lest the nineteen hundred sacks of flour, indispensable for the diurnal consumption, should not be forthcoming. Boissy-d'Anglas, upon whom the burden chiefly lay, presented repeated reports, with the view of tranquillising the public, and inspiring it with a confidence and security not enjoyed by the government itself. In this situation, a constant war of recrimination was waged between the antagonist parties. "Behold," said the Mountain, "the precious consequence of your abolition of the maximum!" "Behold," retorted the right side, "the inevitable effect of your revolutionary measures!" Each urged as the required panacea the accomplishment of its party views, and often demanded measures the most alien to the dolorous subject that stirred the strife. "Punish all the guilty," cried the right side, "redress all injuries, revise all the tyrannical laws, and rescind the law of the suspected." "No," answered the Mountaineers; "remodel your committees of government, reinfuse revolutionary energy into them, and cease to persecute the purest patriots and to resuscitate aristocracy." Such were the ideas propounded by the respective factions for the alleviation of the public calamity.

It is always such moments parties select to press hostilities the most fiercely, and to secure the triumph of their peculiar tenets or desires. The report so long expected on Billaud-Varennes, Collot-d'Herbois, Barrère, and Vadier, was now presented to the assembly. The committee of twenty-one concluded for impeachment, and recommended provisional detention. The arrest was at once voted by an overwhelming majority. With regard to the impeachment, it was decided that the four inculpated deputies should be heard by the assembly, and a solemn deliberation be subsequently held on the merits of their case. Scarcely had this resolution been passed ere a motion was submitted for reinstalling the proscribed deputies, who, two months ago, had been relieved from molestation, but not permitted to resume their seats amidst their former colleagues. Sieyes, who had studied silence for five years—who, since the early months of the Constituent Assembly, had sought to bury in oblivion his reputation and his genius, by crouching amongst the centre, and whom the dictatorship had pardoned as an unsocial idealist, incapable of conspiring, and ceasing to be dangerous when he ceased to write—Sieyes emerged from his long inanition, and observed, that since the reign of the laws appeared to be returning, he would resume the faculty of speech. So long as the outrage perpetrated on the national representation was not redressed, the reign of the laws, in his opinion, was not established. "Your whole history," he said to the convention, "is divided into two epochs: from the 21st September, the day of your inauguration, until the 31st May, oppression of the convention by the deluded people; since the 31st May until the present moment, oppression of the people by the tyrannised convention. From this day forth you will prove you have become free, by recalling your colleagues. Such a measure cannot even be discussed; it is of clear right." The Mountaineers vehemently controverted this manner of presenting the subject. "All that you have done, then, is null!" exclaimed Cambon. "Those vast labours, that multitude of laws, all those decrees which constitute the actual government, are then null! and the salvation of France, worked out by your courage and efforts—all is null!" Sieyes explained that he had been misunderstood. The assembly, despite the protestations of the Mountain, ordained the reinstatement of the deputies who had escaped the scaffold. Those famous outlaws, Isnard, Henri-Larivière, Louvet, Larevellière-Lépaux, Doulcet of Pontécouland, entered amidst acclamations. "Alas that a cavern was not found sufficiently deep," exclaimed Chénier, "to save from the executioners the eloquence of Vergniaud and the genius of Condorcet!"

The Mountaineers were extremely wroth. Several Thermidorians even, alarmed at the reintegration into the assembly of the leaders of a faction which had opposed so dangerous a resistance to the revolutionary system, returned to the Mountain. Thuriot, that bitter opponent of Robespierre, who had been saved by a miracle from the fate of Philippeaux; Lesage-Sénault, a man of prudent sagacity, but a decided enemy to all counter-revolution; Lecointre, in fine, the determined adversary of Billaud, Collot, and Barrère, who had been pronounced a calumniator five months previously, for having denounced the seven surviving members of the old committees—all resumed their seats on the left side. "You know not what you are doing," said Thuriot to his colleagues; "those men will never forgive you." Lecointre proposed to draw a distinction. "Recall," he said, "the proscribed deputies, but inquire who amongst them have borne arms against their country by inciting the departments, and such admit not into your bosom." All, in fact, had taken up arms. Louvet hesitated not to avow the fact, and even moved a resolution that the departments which had risen in June 1793 had deserved well of the country. Here Tallien started to the tribune, amazed at the audacity of the Girondists, and repelled both propositions—Lecointre's and Louvet's. They were severally negatived. Whilst thus restoring the proscribed Girondists, the convention consigned to examination before the committee of general safety, Pache, Bouchotte, and Garat.

Such indications were not calculated to allay agitation. The scarcity still increasing, at length rendered it imperative to adopt a step which had been deferred for some time, in the hope it might be averted, for it was one certain to inflame exasperation to the highest pitch. This reluctant measure was putting the inhabitants of Paris on rations. Boissy-d'Anglas appeared before the convention on the 25th Ventôse (16th March), and proposed, in order to prevent waste and secure to every one a sufficiency of food, that each individual should be limited to a certain allowance of bread. The number of individuals composing each family, he suggested, should be indicated on the tickets, and no more than one pound of bread delivered per head daily. Under this restriction, he undertook to promise that the city would not lack subsistence. The Mountaineer Romme moved as an amendment that the ration of labouring men should be extended to a pound and a half. The higher classes, he urged, had means of procuring meat, rice, and vegetables; but the populace, being able to purchase bread alone, ought to have an additional quantity. This amendment of Romme was adopted, and the Thermi-

dorians regretted they had not themselves originated it, in order thereby to gain the support of the people and withdraw it from the Mountain.

No sooner was the decree passed, than it excited a prodigious ferment in the populous quarters of Paris. The revolutionists applied themselves to exaggerate its consequences, and stigmatised Boissy-d'Anglas with the epithet of *Famine-Boissy*. On the second day thereafter, 27th Ventôse, when the decree was for the first time put in execution, violent commotions occurred in the Faubourgs Saint-Antoine and Saint-Marceau. For the 636,000 inhabitants of the capital had been distributed 1897 sacks of flour: 324,000 citizens received the additional half-loaf assigned to operatives engaged in manual labour. Nevertheless, it appeared so novel to the people of the faubourgs to be placed upon rations, that they murmured discontentedly. Sundry females, the habitual frequenters of clubs, and always ready to raise their discordant voices, broke into flagrant mutiny in the section of L'Observatoire. The ordinary agitators of the section hastened to join them. The united malecontents proposed to march with a petition to the convention; but in order to frame a petition a meeting of the whole section was requisite, and it was only allowed to assemble on specific days—the *decades*. Notwithstanding, they surrounded the civil committee, and demanded with menaces the keys of the building in which the section held its sessions; and, on the refusal of that body to surrender them, they insisted that one of its members should be delegated to accompany them to the convention. The committee acceded, and deputed one of its members to regulate the movement and prevent disorders. A similar disturbance was proceeding at the same moment in the section of Le Finistère. A crowd was there gathered, which eventually blended with the muster of L'Observatoire. The two conjoined marched towards the convention. One of the ringleaders undertook the part of orator, and was introduced with several companions to the bar. The residue of the multitude remained at the door, making a fearful clamour. "We are in want of bread," said the orator of the deputation; "we are ready to regret all the sacrifices we have made for the revolution." At these words, the assembly, stirred with indignation, interrupted him, and a number of members arose to rebuke such unseemly language. "Bread! bread!" vociferated the petitioners, striking furiously on the bar. At this insolent demeanour, the assembly prepared to order them from the hall. But the tumult abating, the orator was permitted to finish his harangue: he stated that, until the wants of the people were satisfied, they would never cease the shout of "The republic for ever!" The president replied with firmness to this seditious discourse; and, without inviting the petitioners to the honours of the sitting, dismissed them to their avocations. The committee of general safety, which had meanwhile collected several battalions of the sections, caused the avenues of the convention to be cleared, and dispersed the assemblage.

This occurrence produced a vivid impression on the members of the national representation. The continual threats of the Jacobins scattered amongst the sections of the faubourgs; their inflammatory placards, wherein they announced an insurrection within eight days, unless the patriots were relieved from further prosecution and the constitution of 1793 was put in force; their almost overt conspiracies, hatched in the coffee-houses of the faubourgs; and, lastly, this late attempt to foment a commotion, revealed to the convention the design of another 31st of May. The right side, the restored Girondists, the Thermidorians, all equally menaced, bethought themselves of measures to avert the calamity of a fresh attack upon the national representation. Sieyes, who now appeared prominently on the scene, and had been nominated on the committee of public welfare, submitted to the united committees a species of martial law, framed to prevent new outrages against the convention. This project of law declared seditious every assemblage in which propositions were entertained for assailing public or private property, for re-establishing royalty, for subverting the republic and the constitution of 1793, for resorting to the Temple or to the convention, or for other analogous purposes. Every individual forming part of such an assemblage was liable to transportation. If, after three summonses by the magistrates, the assemblage failed to disperse, force was to be employed; all the adjacent sections, pending the muster of the public force, were to forward their several battalions. An insult committed on a representative of the people was punished with banishment; an outrage, accompanied by violence, with the penalty of death. One bell only was to remain suspended in Paris, and be placed on the tower of L'Unité. If a crowd marched on the convention, this bell was immediately to sound the tocsin. At this signal, all the sections were bound to assemble, and move to the succour of the national representation. If the convention were dissolved or fettered in its liberty, all the members who could escape were enjoined to depart forthwith from Paris, and repair to Châlons-sur-Marne. All those elected as substitutes, and all the deputies on missions or furloughs, were directed to join them. The generals were with all speed to send them troops from the frontier; and this new convention formed at Châlons, concentrating all legitimate authority, was to march on Paris, deliver the oppressed portion of the national representation, and punish the authors of the treason.

The committees hailed this project with rapture. Sieyes was charged to digest the report thereon, and present it without delay to the assembly. On their part, the revolutionists, emboldened by the late demonstration, deriving in the scarcity an opportunity most favourable to their views, perceiving the danger of their party on the increase, and the fatal moment approaching for Billaud, Collot, Barrère, and Vadier, manifested a most resolute spirit, and seriously revolved the expedient of a sedition. The Electoral Club and the popular society of the Quinze-Vingts had been dissolved. Thus deprived of those places of resort, the revolutionists had of late overspread the sections, and filled the assemblies held every decade: they chiefly occupied the Faubourgs Saint-Antoine and Saint-Marceau, the quarters of the Temple, and the City. They met in certain coffee-houses situated in the heart of these localities, and deliberated on a movement, without having, however, any distinct plan or well-defined leaders. Amongst them were several men compromised by former deeds, either in the revolutionary committees or in different employments, who had considerable influence over the multitude, but none of them enjoyed a decided pre-eminence. Being thus poised amongst themselves, their agreement was not altogether harmonious: they held, beyond doubt, no communication with the deputies of the Mountain.

The old popular leaders, always in alliance with Danton, Robespierre, and the chiefs of the government, had heretofore been instrumental in giving the word of command to the populace. But they had perished with their superiors. The new leaders were strangers to the new chiefs of the Mountain: they had in common with them only their dangers and their attachment to the same cause. Moreover, the Mountaineer deputies, forming the minority in the assembly, and incessantly taunted with conspiring to recover their lost power, the general fate of supplanted parties, were reduced to the necessity of daily justifying themselves, and protesting that they were not conspiring. The ordinary effect of such a position is to create a desire that others may rebel, but a repugnance to take the initiative in any preparatory measures. Thus the Mountaineers constantly re-

peated—"*The people will rise—the people must rise;*" but they did not venture to concert with them to provoke the outbreak. Certain unguarded expressions of Duhem and Maribon-Montaud in a café were indeed adduced; both were sufficiently devoid of prudence and self-control to have uttered them. Declamatory harangues of Leonard-Bourdon at the sectional society of the Rue du Vert-Bois, were also cited; they were such as might have probably fallen from him. But it was not the less true that not one of them held correspondence with the patriots. As to Billaud-Varennes, Collot-d'Herbois, and Barrère, who were more interested than any others in the result of a movement, they dreaded lest, by taking part therein, they might aggravate the perils of their position, already too precarious.

The patriots, therefore, proceeded alone, devoid of effective combination, as invariably occurs when influential leaders are wanting. They hurried to and fro, passed mottos or tokens from street to street, from ward to ward, and circulated tidings of intended petitions or movements on the part of such and such sections: such their desultory manœuvres. At the commencement of a revolution, when a party is full of pristine vigour, with all its chiefs unscathed, when success and novelty draw the masses in its wake, and it disconcerts its adversaries by the unexpected boldness of its attacks, it supplies the lack of combination and order by enthusiasm: on the other hand, when it is reduced to defend itself, is deprived of all inspiring impulse, and is thoroughly known to its adversaries, then must all its hopes rest upon perfect union and discipline. But this discipline, always extremely difficult, becomes impossible when the commanding spirits have disappeared. This was the position of the patriot party in Ventose, year 3 (end of March): it was no longer the torrent of the 14th July, the 5th and 6th October, the 10th August, the 31st May; simply an amalgamation of men hardened in a long course of civil discord, seriously compromised, full of energy and determination, but less fitted to vanquish than to combat with the obstinacy of despair.

In accordance with the established custom of preceding every movement by an imperious and yet guarded petition, the sections of Montreuil and the Quinze-Vingts, comprised within the Faubourg St Antoine, composed an address, in strict analogy with all those that had heralded the great insurrections. It was fixed for presentation on the 1st Germinal (21st March). This chanced to be the day on which the committees had resolved to propound the law of high police, the produce of Sieyes' fertile brain. It was arranged amongst the patriots that the deputation appointed to present the petition should be accompanied to the Tuileries by a large concourse: accordingly, on the day prescribed, they repaired thither in vast numbers, and as usual formed into multitudinous groups, crying ever and anon, "The convention for ever! The Jacobins for ever! Down with the aristocrats!" The young men of braided locks and sable collars likewise poured from the Palais-Royal towards the Tuileries, and fell into antagonist bands, shouting "The convention for ever! Down with the terrorists!" The petitioners were introduced to the bar: the language of their address was extremely temperate. They adverted to the sufferings of the people, without any peculiar bitterness; they controverted the charges alleged against the patriots, without recriminating on their adversaries. They merely remarked that in these accusations both the past services of the patriots, and the position in which they had been placed, had been overlooked; at the same time, they confessed that excesses had been committed, but added, that parties, of whatever complexion they might be, were composed of men and not of gods. "The sections of the Quinze-Vingts and Montreuil," they said, "are not here to ask of you, as general measures, either exile or effusion of blood against such or such party —measures which confound simple error with crime; in Frenchmen they behold only brethren, differently organised, it is true, but all members of the same family. They are here to solicit you to employ a resource which is in your own hands, and which can alone be efficacious in terminating our political tempests: it is the constitution of 1793. From this day forth, organise that popular constitution which the French people have accepted and sworn to defend. It will reconcile all interests, tranquillise all anxieties, and conduct you to the goal of your labours."

This artful requisition embodied all the revolutionists contemplated at the moment. They dreamed, in fact, that the constitution, leading to a dissolution of the assembly, would restore themselves and their leaders to preponderance in the legislature, the executive power, and the municipal administrations. In this expectation they erred exceedingly; but such was their hope; and they imagined that, without advancing obnoxious demands, such as the liberation of the patriots under detention, the suspension of all procedures, and the incorporation of a new commune at Paris, they would amply realise it by obtaining the enforcement of the constitution. If the convention refused their request, or evaded it by vague protestations, and failed to fix an early period for its accomplishment, it would thereby evince its repugnance to the constitution of 1793: so they argued. The president Thibaudeau answered them in a firm tone, concluding in these severe and reproachful terms: "The convention has never attributed the insidious petitions which have been brought before it to the hardy and sincere defenders of liberty furnished by the Faubourg St Antoine." When the president had ceased, the deputy Chales hastened to the tribune, and moved that the declaration of rights be exposed in the hall of the convention, as directed by one of the articles of the constitution. Tallien succeeded him in the tribune. "I beg to ask those men," he said, "who now approve themselves such ardent supporters of the constitution, who seem to have borrowed the rallying-cry of a sect which appeared at the close of the Constituent Assembly—'*The constitution, nothing but the constitution,*' whether they are not the very parties who have shut it up in a box?" Plaudits on one side, murmurs and shouts on the other, interrupted Tallien: he resumed amidst the turmoil. "Nothing," he continued, "will prevent me from expressing my opinion when I am amongst the representatives of the people. We all desire the constitution, with a firm government—with the government it prescribes; and it is to be reprobated that certain members should encourage the people to believe there are members in this assembly who repudiate the constitution. It has now even become imperative to prevent them, by the adoption of distinct measures, from calumniating the pure and estimable majority of the convention." "Yes! yes!" resounded from all quarters. "That constitution," proceeded Tallien, "which they followed up, not by laws fitted to fulfil it and render its execution feasible, but by the revolutionary government; that constitution, I repeat, must be brought into play, and vitality imparted to it. But we will not be so imprudent as to attempt putting it into execution without organic laws, and thereby deliver it up, incomplete and without safeguards, to all the enemies of the republic. Wherefore I move that a report be, with all convenient dispatch, digested on the means of executing the constitution, and that it be decreed, at this present moment, that between the existing and definitive government none other shall intervene."

Tallien descended from the tribune amidst general expressions of approbation, for his reply had tended to relieve the assembly from embarrassment. The necessity of organic laws was a happy device for postponing the promulgation of the constitution, and likewise for modifying it. An opportunity was thereby afforded of instituting a revision, such as that operated

on the old constitution of 1791. The deputy Miaulle, a moderate Mountaineer, acquiesced in the opinion of Tallien, and admitted with him that the execution of the constitution ought not to be unduly hurried; but he maintained there could be no inconvenience in giving it publicity, and he proposed that it be engraved on tables of marble, and exposed in all public places. Thibaudeau, alarmed at the consequences of such notoriety to a constitution drawn up in a moment of popular delirium, yielded the chair to Clauzel, and mounted the tribune. "Legislators," he exclaimed, "we ought not to imitate those priests of antiquity who had two modes of expressing themselves, the one secret the other open. It behoves us to avow with courage what we think of this constitution; and should I be doomed to death, as were those who last year ventured to offer observations against it, I will still speak." After protracted interruption, caused by a series of acclamations, Thibaudeau boldly asserted there would be danger in publishing a constitution which was certainly unknown to those who so highly extolled it. "A democratic constitution," he said, "is not that under which the people themselves exercise all powers." "No! no!" responded numerous voices. "It is," resumed Thibaudeau, "one wherein, by a wise distribution of powers, the people enjoy liberty, equality, and repose. Now, I do not perceive these results in a constitution which would rear, by the side of the national representation, an usurping commune or a factious club of Jacobins; which would refuse to the national representation the direction of the armed force in the city where it sits, and thus deprive it of the means of defending itself and vindicating its dignity; which would grant to a fraction of the people the right of partial insurrection, and the privilege of subverting the state. It is idle to tell us an organic law will correct all these inconveniences. A mere law may be changed by the legislature, but dispositions so important as those to be introduced into such organic laws ought to be immutable as the constitution itself. Moreover, organic laws are not made in a fortnight, nor in a month; and, in the interim, I suggest that no publicity be given to the constitution, that fresh vigour be imparted to the government, and that, if need be, additional prerogatives be conferred on the committee of public welfare." Thibaudeau left the tribune amid vehement applause elicited by the hardy frankness of his declaration. It was immediately proposed to close the discussion; the president put the question to the vote, and almost the whole assembly rose to affirm it. The discomfited Mountaineers alleged that time had not been allowed to comprehend the import of the president's words, that they were ignorant of the proposition submitted: they were not heeded, and the subject was disposed of. Legendre then advocated the formation of a committee of eleven members to undertake the task of framing with all speed the organic laws wherewith the constitution was to be accompanied. This suggestion was instantly adopted. At that moment the committees announced that they had an important report to present, and Sieyes ascended the tribune to propound his law of high police.

Whilst these circumstances were proceeding in the interior of the convention, tumult reigned paramount without. The patriots of the faubourg, who had been unable to gain admittance into the hall, had overspread the Carrousel and the garden of the Palais-Royal; they awaited with impatience, uttering their accustomed whoops, tidings of the effect produced by the petition on the convention. Some of their number, descending from the galleries, came to report what was passing to their associates, and, giving a false account, stated that the petitioners had been maltreated. Thereupon they were excited to fury; some hastened to the faubourgs, to proclaim that their delegates were abused at the convention; others overran the garden, driving before them the young men whom they encountered: they even seized three, and threw them into the large reservoir of the Tuileries. The committee of general safety, on learning these disturbances, ordered the call to arms to be beaten in the adjacent sections. The danger, however, was imminent, and before the sections could be convoked and marshalled, much time must necessarily elapse. The committee was surrounded by a multitude of youths, gathered to the number of a thousand or twelve hundred, armed with bamboos, and eager to fall upon the groups of patriots, who had hitherto met with no resistance. It accepted their aid, and authorised them to assume the police of the garden. They immediately rushed upon the groups, vociferating "The Jacobins for ever!" dispersed them after a long struggle, and even chased a portion to the hall of the convention. Several of the fugitive patriots broke into the galleries, and caused by their precipitate arrival considerable confusion. Sieyes had at that identical moment concluded his report upon the law of high police. The Mountain demanded an adjournment, exclaiming, "It is a law of blood! it is a martial law! It purposes the removal of the convention from Paris!" With these shouts was blended the noise of the patriots pouring into the galleries. A scene of hideous commotion ensued. "The royalists are assassinating the patriots!" roared sundry stentorian voices. Tumult was heard at the doors; the president put on his hat. The majority of the assembly arose, and stated that the exigency preconceived by the law of Sieyes had arrived, and that it ought to be instantly voted. "To the vote! to the vote!" echoed through the chamber. The law was accordingly put to the vote, and adopted by an immense majority, amidst the din of uproarious cheering. The members of the left extremity refused to take part in the deliberation. By degrees comparative tranquillity was re-established, and individual voices began to be heard above the clamour. "The convention has been deceived!" exclaimed Duhem. Clauzel, entering the hall, came, so he asserted, to reassure the assembly. "We have no occasion to be reassured," angrily retorted divers members. Clauzel, however, continued, and affirmed that virtuous citizens had congregated to form a rampart with their bodies round the national representation. His intimation was received with applause. "Thou art the man," cried Ruamps, addressing him, "who has instigated these assemblages to get an atrocious law passed." Clauzel essayed to reply, but his intonation was too feeble to rise above the storm. At length energetic remonstrances were advanced against the law which had been voted with such precipitancy. "The law is passed," said the president; "it cannot be reverted to." "There are men here conspiring with those outside," observed Tallien; "no matter, let us re-open the discussion upon the project, and show that the convention can deliberate calmly even amidst the howls of murderers." The suggestion of Tallien was acceded to, and Sieyes' project resubmitted to consideration. The debate was prosecuted with more calmness. Whilst the convention was thus engaged in deliberation, the turmoil beyond its walls subsided. The youths, victorious over the Jacobins, craved permission to appear before the assembly; they were introduced by deputation, and gave assurance of their patriotic intentions, and of their zeal in the cause of the national representation. They then withdrew, rewarded by the applauding acclamations of the deputies. The convention, persisting to discuss the law of police without adjournment, voted it clause by clause, and finally separated at ten in the evening.

This day left upon both parties the conviction that a decisive crisis was at hand. The patriots, contemned by the convention abruptly closing the discussion upon their petition, and soundly beaten by bamboos in the garden of the Tuileries, carried their wrath into the faubourgs, and laboured assiduously to incite the

populace to a movement. The assembly saw clearly that it was about to be attacked, and resolved upon calling into requisition the tutelary law it had just enacted.

The following day had been assigned for a proceeding equally grave in character with that of its predecessor in the calendar. Billaud-Varennes, Collot-d'Herbois, Barrère, and Vadier, were to be heard for the first time before the convention. A host of patriots and women had early hurried from their homes in order to fill the galleries. The youths, more prompt, had anticipated them on the scene, and prevented the females from entering. They had even rudely dismissed them, and thence had resulted divers conflicts around the hall. However, numerous patrols, distributed in the environs, had maintained public tranquillity; the galleries were occupied without much disturbance, and from eight in the morning to midday the time had been employed in chanting patriotic airs. By one party was sung *Le Reveil du Peuple*, by the other *La Marseillaise*, pending the moment for the deputies to assume their seats. At length the president took the chair, amidst cries of "The convention for ever! The republic for ever!" The defendants were introduced to the bar, and profound stillness reigned through the expectant assemblage.

Robert Lindet first demanded to be heard on a point of order. It was immediately apprehended that he, himself above reproach, and not at all implicated in the accusations directed against the other members of the old committee of public welfare, purposed to defend his former colleagues. It was noble in him to do so, for he had participated even less than Carnot and Prieur [de-la-Côte-d'Or] in the political measures of that committee. He had accepted the department of supplies and transports only on condition of remaining a stranger to all the operations of his colleagues, of never deliberating with them, and even of occupying a different locality with his offices. He had declined responsibility before any danger threatened; the danger come, he generously claimed it. It was deemed probable that Carnot and Prieur [de-la-Côte-d'Or] would follow his example; consequently several members on the right side simultaneously protested against Robert Lindet being allowed to address the assembly. "It is for the defendants to speak," urged sundry deputies; "they must be heard before their accusers or defenders." "Yesterday," cried Bourdon [de-l'Oise], "a plot was hatched to save the accused; good citizens foiled it. To-day recourse is had to other means; scruples are suggested to honest men, whom accusation has severed from their colleagues, and influences are used leading them to make common cause with the guilty, in order to retard the course of justice by fresh obstacles." Robert Lindet replied, that it was the entire government now under arraignment; that he had been a member thereof; that, in consequence, he could not consent to be separated from his colleagues; and that he demanded his share of the responsibility. It is hard to withstand a resplendent manifestation of courage and magnanimity. Robert Lindet obtained the leave he sought, and proceeded to retrace with lengthened minuteness the vast labours of the committee of public welfare; he proved its activity, its foresight, its eminent services; he inculcated the persuasion that the excitation of zeal evoked by the prolonged struggle had alone caused the excesses wherewith certain members of that government were reproached.

This discourse, of six hours' duration, was not heard without frequent interruptions. Ingrates, forgetting the services of the men under accusation, found this vindication inordinately tedious; some had even the effrontery to declare that the oration should be printed at the expense of Lindet, as it would be too costly a publication to be undertaken by the republic. The Girondists growled when they heard the federalist insurrection and the evils it had caused averted to. Every one, in fact, found matter of complaint. An adjournment took place until the morrow, all vowing to suffer no more such voluminous depositions in favour of the accused. However, Carnot and Prieur [de-la-Côte-d'Or] claimed to be heard in their turn; they, too, wished to afford timely and generous aid to their colleagues, and, at the same time, to justify themselves from a variety of charges which could not press upon Billaud, Collot, and Barrère, without implicating them likewise. The signatures of Carnot and Prieur [de-la-Côte-d'Or] were, in truth, attached to orders the most strenuously objected against the accused. Carnot, with his great reputation, the man of whom it was said in France and in all Europe that *he organised victory*, and whose courageous contests with Saint-Just and Robespierre were topics of notoriety—Carnot must necessarily command attention if not respect. The tribune was accorded him. "It belongs to me," he said, "to vindicate the committee of public welfare—to me, who first ventured to confront Robespierre and Saint-Just;" and he might have added, "who ventured to attack them when you obeyed their slightest wishes, and decreed at their pleasure all the mandates of death they sought from you." He prefaced his remarks by an explanation of the manner in which his own, and the signatures of his colleagues, non-participant in the political acts of the committee, came to be affixed, notwithstanding, to the most atrocious orders. "Overwhelmed," he said, "by multitudinous toils, having three and four hundred affairs to regulate every day, and often unable to spare time for necessary refreshment, we had agreed to lend each other signatures. We signed a multitude of documents without perusing them. I signed warrants of accusation, and my colleagues signed orders for movements, plans of attack, without either the one or the other having time to seek explanations. The necessities of this prodigious labour had called for such individual dictatorship, and it was reciprocally conceded. Never otherwise could the work have been accomplished. An order to arrest one of my most efficient clerks in the war department—an order on account of which I assailed Robespierre and Saint-Just, and denounced them as usurpers—that order I had myself signed without being aware of it. Thus our signatures prove nothing, and cannot be made evidence of our participation in the acts objected to the late government." Carnot then proceeded to exculpate his accused colleagues. Assuming, without expressly avowing, that they had been of the ruthless and violent in the committee, he asseverated they had first arisen against the triumvirate, and that the indomitable character of Billaud-Varennes, in particular, had been the greatest obstacle Robespierre encountered in his progress. Prieur [de-la-Côte-d'Or], who, by presiding over the fabrication of arms and munitions, had rendered services equally signal with those of Carnot himself, and who had granted signatures in the same manner, reiterated Carnot's declaration, and demanded, like him and Lindet, to share the responsibility weighing upon the defendants at the bar.

Here the convention again found itself entangled in the embarrassments of a question already several times incidentally started, and which had invariably led to dismal confusion. This example, given by three men enjoying universal consideration, and coming forward to proclaim themselves co-obligants of the old government, was it not a warning, an intimation to it? Did it not import that every one had been more or less the accomplice of the former committees, and that it, the convention, ought itself to solicit arraignment, as Lindet, Carnot, and Prieur? In sooth, it had not attacked the tyranny until after the three men it now sought to punish as the accomplices thereof; and as to their remorseless passions, it had partaken them all; it was even more culpable than they, if it had not been actuated by such passions, for it had sanctioned all the excesses into which they had hurried others.

Thus the discussion became, during the days of the 4th, 5th, and 6th Germinal (24th, 25th, and 26th March), a continued storm. Every moment the name of a member became implicated; he claimed the right of justifying himself; he recriminated in his turn; and protracted and acrimonious digressions ensued, evolving topics most dangerous to handle. It was accordingly ordained that the accused, and the members of the commission of twenty-one, should alone be permitted to discuss the facts, article by article, and that each deputy should be prohibited from endeavouring to exculpate himself if his name were mentioned. It was in vain this order had been pronounced; the discussion became general again almost every instant, and not an act was adduced which was not the immediate occasion of charges and retorts exchanged with frantic violence. The excitement prevailing since the preceding outbreaks was only fanned into greater fury; the faubourgs rang with but one shout—"We must to the convention, to demand bread, the constitution of '93, and the liberty of the patriots!" Unfortunately, the quantity of flour requisite to furnish the eighteen hundred sacks not having arrived at Paris on the 6th, in the morning of the 7th only half-rations were distributed, with promises of the remaining moiety in the after part of the day. The women dwelling in the section of Les Gravilliers, quarter of the Temple, refused the demi-rations offered them, and assembled tumultuously in the Street du Vert-Bois. Some amongst them, alive to the movement in view, strove to form a multitude, and, dragging with them all the females they met, marched towards the convention. Whilst they advanced in that direction, the agitators hastened to the president of the section, violently possessed themselves of his bell and the keys of the public building, and proceeded to constitute an illegal meeting. They appointed a president and secretaries, and read several successive times the clause in the declaration of rights which declared insurrection a right and a duty. The women, meanwhile, had continued their progress to the convention, and created a deafening clamour at the doors. They insisted upon being introduced in a body; twenty only were permitted to enter. One of the number boldly addressed the assembly, and complained of having received only half-a-pound of bread. The president essaying to reply, they drowned his voice with shouts of "Bread! bread!" They interrupted, by similar exclamations, Boissy-d'Anglas, when he attempted to explain the circumstances attending the distribution of the morning. They were eventually ejected, and the discussion touching the accused deputies was resumed. The committee of general safety caused these women to be conveyed back to their settlements by the patrols, and dispatched one of its members to dissolve the meeting illegally convened in the section of Les Gravilliers. Those who composed it declined at first to heed the exhortations of the representative deputed to them; but, seeing the armed force, they ultimately dispersed. During the night, the principal instigators were arrested and lodged in prison.

This was the third attempt at a movement: on the 27th Ventôse, the commotion had originated on account of the system of rations; on the 1st Germinal, from the petition of the Quinze-Vingts; and on the 7th, from an insufficient distribution of bread. A general outbreak was apprehended on the decade, a day of idleness and meeting in the sections. To obviate the dangers of nocturnal congregations, it was decided that the meetings should be held from one to four o'clock. This was but an insignificant precaution, and one utterly inefficient to prevent outrage. The feeling meanwhile gained ground that the chief causes of these disturbances were the impeachment directed against the members of the former committee of public welfare and the incarceration of the patriots. Several deputies proposed to abandon these proceedings, which, however just they might be, were unquestionably dangerous. Rouzet suggested an expedient whereby a judgment upon the accused might be dispensed with, and their lives at the same time spared: namely, an ostracism. He maintained, that when a citizen had rendered his name a subject of discord, he should be banished for a time. His idea was promptly discarded. Merlin [de Thionville] himself, all zealous Thermidorian and intrepid of mind as he was, began to surmise that it would be better perhaps to avoid the struggle. He proposed, therefore, to convoke the primary assemblies, put the constitution forthwith in force, and refer the judgment upon the accused to the subsequent legislature. Merlin of Douay strongly supported this opinion. Guiton-Morveau intimated one of a firmer character. "The process we have instituted," he said, "is a scandal: where are we to stop, if we pursue all those who have made more sanguinary motions than those charged against the accused? It is difficult to say, in truth, whether we are terminating or recommencing the revolution." The convention was justly alarmed at the idea of resigning authority, at such a moment, to a new assembly; neither had it any inclination to give France a constitution so singularly preposterous as that of 1793; it consequently resolved that there was no grounds for deliberating on the proposition of the two Merlins. As to the impeachment already commenced, too many revengeful feelings were enlisted in its prosecution to allow of its cessation. It was merely determined that the assembly, in order to meet other calls upon its attention, should devote alternate days only to the trial of the accused deputies.

This decision was, as may be imagined, far from satisfying the views of the patriots. The whole of the decade (10th Germinal) was spent by them in mutual instigations. The sectional assemblies were extremely tumultuous; but the day elapsed without the dreaded movement occurring. In the section of the Quinze-Vingts, a new petition was framed, bolder in its terms than the last, which it was agreed to present on the morrow. It was read, in fact, at the bar of the convention. "Why," it ran, "is Paris without a municipality? Why are the popular societies closed? What has become of our harvests? Why are assignats daily depressed? Why may the young men of the Palais-Royal alone assemble? Why are patriots alone found in the prisons? The people are at length determined to be free. They know that, when they are oppressed, insurrection is the first of their duties." The petition was heard amidst the murmurs of a majority of the convention, and the acclamations of the Mountain. The president Pelet [de-la-Lozère] sternly rebuked the petitioners, and dismissed them from the bar. The only satisfaction accorded them was the transmission of the list of patriots under detention to the sections, in order that they might judge whether there were any who merited favourable consideration.

The remainder of the 11th was passed in exciting the population of the faubourgs. Men canvassed the various districts, repeating that on the following day the convention must be visited, to again demand from it what had been hitherto withheld. This phrase was circulated from mouth to mouth through all the quarters occupied by the patriots. The ringleaders of each section, without having any definite object, laboured to produce a general rising, and to propel on the convention the entire mass of the people. So successful were their efforts, that in the next morning, 12th Germinal (1st April), the women and boys mustered in the section of the City, and besieged the doors of the bakers, preventing all applicants from receiving their rations, and striving to draw them towards the convention. The chief malecontents meanwhile gave vent to all sorts of rumours: they asserted that the convention was about to depart for Châlons, and abandon the population of Paris to its misery; that the section of the Gravilliers had been disarmed during the night; that the young men were gathered, to

the number of thirty thousand, on the Champ de Mars, and that with their assistance it was intended to disarm the patriot sections. They forced the authorities of the section of the City to surrender the drums, which seizing, they carried through all the streets, beating the call to arms. The contagion spread with rapidity; the populace of the Temple and the Faubourg St Antoine arose, and, following the quays and the boulevards, moved towards the Tuileries. This formidable assemblage was composed of women, striplings, and intoxicated men; the latter were armed with clubs, and bore on their hats the words—"*Bread and the constitution of* '93."

The convention was at this moment listening to a report of Boissy-d'Anglas on the various systems adopted to procure supplies of food. It had merely its ordinary guard around it; the rioters had already reached the doors; they inundated the Carrousel and the Tuileries, and choked all the avenues, insomuch that it was impossible for the numerous patrols scattered through Paris to approach in order to defend the national representation. The crowd pressed into the Saloon of Liberty, the vestibule preceding the hall, and attempted to penetrate into the midst of the assembly. The ushers and guard endeavoured to stop it; several men, armed with clubs, rushed forward, dispersed all who offered resistance, charged precipitately upon the doors, broke them in, and at length all poured like a torrent into the middle of the convention, uttering deafening shouts, waving their hats, and enveloped in a cloud of dust. "Bread! bread! The constitution of '93!" such were the cries vociferated by this blind mob. The deputies retained their seats, and manifested an imposing calmness. Suddenly one of them arose and exclaimed—"The republic for ever!" All imitated him; and the crowd likewise responded to the cry, but added, "Bread! The constitution of '93!" The members of the left side alone deemed it fitting to cheer; and they otherwise betokened that the presence of the populace, in the national sanctuary, occasioned them no feelings of regret or indignation. The multitude, which had started without any specific plan, whose leaders merely purposed by its means to intimidate the convention, spread amongst the deputies and sat down by their side, but without venturing to commit any violence towards them. Legendre mounted the tribune. "If ever malevolence," he commenced —— He was not allowed to continue. "Down! down!" roared the multitude; "we have no bread!" Merlin de Thionville, always prompt to signalise the courage he had displayed at Mayence and in La Vendée, quitted his seat, descended amidst the populace, spoke to several of the men, embraced them, received embraces in return, and urged them to respect the convention. "To thy place!" cried some of those on the Mountain. "My place," retorted Merlin, "is in the midst of the people. These men have just assured me they have no evil intentions; that they have no wish to overawe the convention by their numbers; that, on the contrary, they will defend it, and that they are here only to make known the urgency of their wants." "Yes! yes!" exclaimed voices in the crowd; "we want bread!"

At this moment shouts were heard in the vestibule of Liberty: it was a fresh popular flood surging over the first—a second irruption of men, women, and children, vociferating in chorus—"Bread! bread!" Legendre recommenced the speech he had been waiting impatiently to deliver; he was again interrupted by a volley of "Down! down!"

The Mountaineers perceived that, in the present state of affairs, the convention, invaded, outraged, and overborne, could not enter upon deliberation, since it was impossible for any voice to be heard; and that the only object of the insurrection must fail, as the desired decrees could not be passed. Gaston and Duroi, both members of the left side, arose and complained of the condition to which the assembly had been reduced. Gaston approached the people. "My friends," said he, "you want bread, the liberation of the patriots, and the constitution; but for those purposes we must deliberate, and we cannot do so if you remain here." The noise prevented Gaston from being understood. André Dumont, who had superseded the president on the bench, strove in vain to impress the same reasons on the mob: he was not heeded. The Mountaineer Huguet alone succeeded in making a few words be heard. "The people who are here," he said, pitching his voice to its highest key, "are not in insurrection; they have come to press a just demand—the enlargement of the patriots. People, maintain your rights!" At this instant a man mounted on the bar, forcing his way through the crowd which opened before him: it proved to be Vanec, who commanded the section of the City at the epoch of the 31st May. "Representatives," he said, "you see before you the men of the 14th July, the 10th August, and also *of the 31st May.*" Here the galleries, the populace, and the Mountain, applauded most vociferously. "These men," Vanec continued, "have sworn to live free or die. Your divisions distract the country; it must no longer suffer from your animosities. Restore liberty to the patriots and bread to the people. Give us justice on the army of Fréron—those gentry with canes. And thou, holy Mountain," added the declaimer, turning to the benches on the left—"thou who hast so often combated for the republic—the men of the 14th July, the 10th August, and the 31st May, claim thee in this moment of crisis; thou wilt always find them ready to sustain thee, always ready to shed their blood for the country!" Shouts and cheers accompanied the concluding words of Vanec. One voice in the assembly was thought to be detected in condemnation, but too indistinctly to be traced. An immediate call was made for any one who had a charge to advance against Vanec to come forward and give it utterance. "Yes," cried Duhem, exultingly, "let him speak it aloud!"

The orators of several sections appeared successively at the bar, and in somewhat more measured terms urged the same demands as the leader of the City. The president Dumont replied, with firmness, that the convention would attend to the wishes and wants of the people when it was enabled to resume its labours. "Let it do so at once," cried several voices; "we have no bread!" Thus the tumult continued for several hours. The president was exposed to appeals and reproaches of all kinds. "Royalism is in the chair," said Choudieu addressing him. "Our enemies are exciting the storm," replied Dumont; "they are little aware that the thunder is about to fall on their own heads." "Yes," retorted Ruamps, "the thunder of your Palais-Royal youths." "Bread! bread!" interrupted the women, furiously.

At length the tocsin on the tower of L'Unité was heard tolling. The committees, in fact, putting into execution the law of high police, were engaged in summoning the sections. Several of those bodies had already taken up arms, and were marching to the convention. The Mountaineers became more than ever sensible of the importance of summarily converting into decrees the wishes of the patriots; but for that purpose it was necessary to disengage the assembly to a certain extent, and permit it to breathe more freely. "President," exclaimed Duhem, "invite the good citizens to retire, in order that we may deliberate!" He likewise addressed the people. "The tocsin has sounded," he said to them, "the drum has beaten in the sections; if you do not permit us to deliberate, the country is lost." Choudieu took a female by the arm, beseeching her to withdraw. "We are in our own house," she replied, petulantly. Choudieu turned to the president, and told him that if he did not know how to perform his duty, and cause the hall to be evacuated, he ought to yield his place to another. He again spoke to the mob: "Snares are

laid to entrap you," he said; "withdraw, in order that we may accomplish your views." The people, perceiving the signs of impatience manifested by the whole Mountain, prepared to retire. The example once given, it was gradually followed; the concourse diminished in the interior of the convention, and began to decrease outside also. The bands of young men could this day have done nothing against so immense a multitude; but the numerous battalions of the sections faithful to the convention were already arriving from all quarters, and the crowd retreated before them. Towards evening, the hall was entirely freed both within and without, and tranquillity re-established in the convention.

So soon as the assembly found itself delivered from the mob, it ordered Boissy-d'Anglas to resume the perusal of his report, in which task he had been interrupted by the inroad of the populace. The members were not yet restored to confidence, and they desired to show that the first subject they entered upon, after becoming free, related to the subsistence of the people. At the close of his report, Boissy-d'Anglas proposed to draw an armed force from the sections of Paris to protect in the environs the convoys of corn. The decree for the purpose was passed. Prieur-de-la-Marne proposed to commence the distribution of bread with the working-classes, which motion was likewise adopted. The evening was now far advanced; a considerable force was mustered around the convention. A few malecontents, who still resisted, had congregated in the section of the Quinze-Vingts; others, again, in the section of the City. These latter had seized upon the cathedral of Notre-Dame, and there, as it were, intrenched themselves. However, all apprehensions were at an end, and the assembly was in a position to avenge the outrages of the day.

Isabeau presented himself in the name of the committees, and narrated the events of the day, the manner in which the assemblages had been formed, the direction they had received, and the measures taken by the committees to disperse them, conformably to the law of the 1st Germinal. He related that the deputy Auguis, being commissioned to visit different quarters of Paris, had been stopped by the factious, and wounded; and that Pénière, detached to extricate him, had been fired at and struck. At this recital, cries of indignation burst forth, and vengeance was demanded. Isabeau proposed, first, to declare that on this day the liberty of the convention in its sessions had been violated; and, secondly, to charge the committees to take measures against the authors of the enormity. The Mountaineers, seeing how promptly it was intended to turn the abortive attempt to their prejudice, received this proposition with murmurs. Three-fourths of the assembly immediately arose, and demanded that it be put to the vote. Several members exclaimed that it was a 20th of June against the national representation; that to-day the hall of the assembly had been invaded as was the palace of the king on the 20th June; and that, unless the convention took signal vengeance on the perpetrators, a 10th of August would be shortly prepared for it. Sergent, a deputy of the Mountain, maintained that the movement was attributable to the Feuillants, the Lameths, and Duports, who intrigued in London to urge the patriots of Paris into imprudent excesses. He was told in rejoinder that his wits were wandering. Thibaudeau, who, during the late disturbance in the assembly, had withdrawn, indignant at the violence offered to its independence, now sprang to the tribune. "The conspiring minority is there," he said, pointing to the left side. "I protest I have absented myself for four hours, because I no longer beheld the national representation here. I now return and support the proposed decree. The time for weakness is past; it is the weakness of the national representation that has always compromised it, and encouraged a criminal faction. The safety of the country is this day in your hands; you will ruin it if you evince imbecility!" The decree was voted amidst protracted plaudits; and those outbreaks of wrath and vindictiveness, stimulated by the remembrance of indignities and dangers incurred, began fastly to multiply. André Dumont, who had occupied the chair amidst the tempestuous scene, ascended the tribune, and complained of the menaces and insults to which he had been exposed: he affirmed that Chales and Choudieu had exclaimed, directing the attention of the people to him, that royalism was in the chair, and that Foussedoire had recommended, only the evening before, amidst a group of persons, the disarming of the national guard. Foussedoire gave him the lie; but sundry deputies asseverated they had heard him. "For the rest," resumed Dumont, "I contemn all those enemies who would have directed daggers against me; it is the chiefs who must be struck. The attempt made to-day was to save Billaud, Collot, and Barrère; I will not propose to you to send them to death, for they are not tried, and the period for assassinations is past, but to banish them from the territory they infect and agitate by seditions. I move the transportation, this very night, of the four defendants whose case you have been canvassing for several days." This motion was hailed with enthusiastic acclamations. The members of the Mountain demanded a call of the assembly, and several of them proceeded to the table to sign the demand. "It is the last effort," said Bourdon, "of a minority whose schemes are confounded. I move, besides, the arrest of Choudieu, Chales, and Foussedoire." Both propositions were decreed. Thus was terminated, by a sentence of exile, the long process of Billaud, Collot, Barrère, and Vadier. Choudieu, Chales, and Foussedoire, were punished with arrest. The course of retribution did not stop here. It was recalled to memory that Huguet had spoken during the invasion of the hall, and had exclamed, "People, maintain your rights!"—that Leonard-Bourdon had presided at the popular society of the Rue du Vert-Bois, and that by his incessant declamations he had tended to foment insurrection; that Duhem had openly encouraged the insurgents during the irruption, and that on the previous days he had been seen at the Payen Café, in the section of the Invalides, carousing with the principal leaders amongst the terrorists, and inciting them to insurrection: in consequence, Huguet, Leonard, and Duhem, were decreed under arrest. Divers others were likewise denounced; in the number was Amar, the most abhorred member of the old committee of general safety, and deemed the most dangerous of the Mountaineers. The convention doomed him also to detention. With the view of removing these alleged leaders of the conspiracy to a distance from Paris, it was suggested they should be confined in the castle of Ham. The idea was adopted, and it was moreover decided they should be conveyed thither forthwith. It was subsequently determined to proclaim the capital in a state of siege, until the danger should have entirely subsided. General Pichegru was at that moment in Paris, and in the height of his renown. He was nominated commander of the armed force during all the time the peril should continue; with him were conjoined the deputies Barras and Merlin de Thionville. It was now six in the morning, 13th Germinal (2d April); the assembly, exhausted with fatigue, adjourned, confiding in the efficacy of the measures it had taken.

The committees proceeded without delay to put in execution the decrees which had just been passed. That very morning, the four exiles were placed in carriages, although one of them, Barrère, was extremely ill, and dispatched towards Orleans on the route to Brest. The like promptitude was shown in removing the seven deputies condemned to detention in the castle of Ham. The vehicles had to traverse the Champs-Elysées; the patriots were aware of the

fact, and a crowd of them congregated on the way with the view of stopping them. When the carriages arrived, preceded by the gendarmerie, they surrounded them in great numbers. Some vociferated it was the convention retiring to Châlons, bearing away the funds of the treasury; others shouted, on the contrary, it was patriot deputies unjustly torn from the sanctuary of the convention, and that to deprive them of their functions was against the law. They dispersed the gendarmerie, and conducted the vehicles to the civil committee of the section of the Champs-Elysées. At the same moment, a mob attacked the post on guard at the barrier of L'Etoile, seized the cannons, and pointed them down the avenue. The commander of the gendarmerie vainly attempted to parley with the insurgents; he was assailed and obliged to fly. He hastened to the Gros-Caillou to demand aid; but the artillerymen of the section threatened to fire on him unless he immediately withdrew. Meanwhile, several battalions of the sections, and a few hundreds of young men, arrived, under the command of Pichegru, elated at the idea of marching under the orders of so celebrated a general. The insurgents discharged two cannon-balls and a volley of musketry. Raffet, who that day commanded the sections, received a shot fired close to his person; Pichegru himself incurred the greatest danger, and was twice aimed at. However, his presence, and the confidence he communicated to those he led, decided the conflict. The insurgents were put to flight, and the carriages departed without further obstacle.

It remained to dissipate the assemblage in the section of the Quinze-Vingts, with which had united the muster previously formed in the cathedral of Notre-Dame. There the malecontents had constituted themselves a permanent assembly, and were engaged in deliberating upon a fresh insurrection. Pichegru proceeded to the spot, cleared the hall of the section, and finally succeeded in restoring public tranquillity.

On the following day he appeared before the convention, and announced that its decrees were executed. Unanimous applause greeted the conqueror of Holland, who had, by his opportune presence at Paris, thus rendered an additional service to the state. "The vanquisher of tyrants," the president replied to him, "could not fail to triumph over factionists." He received the fraternal embrace and the honours of the sitting, and remained for several hours exposed to the gaze of the assembly and the public, who fixed all observation on him alone. The cause of his conquests was not investigated, the part due to fortunate accidents was not weighed; the results were great and striking, and so brilliant a career was viewed with universal admiration.

This audacious outrage of the Jacobins, which cannot be better characterised than by calling it another 20th of June, aroused against them redoubled acrimony, and provoked new repressive measures. A searching inquiry was instituted to discover all the ramifications of the conspiracy, which was erroneously imputed to the members of the Mountain. They had held no communications with the popular agitators, and their relations with them were limited to a few meetings in coffee-houses and to vague verbal encouragements; nevertheless, the committee of general safety was instructed to draw up a report.

The conspiracy was supposed the more extensive from the circumstance of commotions having likewise occurred in all the districts bordering on the Rhone and the Mediterranean, at Lyons, Avignon, Marseilles, and Toulon. Previous denunciations had been levelled at the patriots for quitting the communes, where they had signalised themselves by excesses, and gathering in arms in the principal cities, both to avoid the notice of their fellow-citizens and to coalesce with their prototypes in those larger communities, and form with them a combined and formidable mass. They were stated to be traversing the banks of the Rhone, hovering in numerous bands around the environs of Avignon, Nismes, and Arles, and in the plains of La Crau, and committing robberies on the inhabitants reputed to be royalists. They were charged with the murder of a wealthy proprietor, a magistrate of Avignon, who had been plundered and assassinated. At Marseilles, they were with difficulty repressed by the activity of the representatives present on the spot, and by the measures adopted consequent upon declaring the city in a state of siege. At Toulon they had mustered in great force, and composed a multitude of several thousand persons, almost after the manner of the federalists on the arrival of General Cartaux in 1793. They commanded the town by their junction with the individuals employed in the navy-yards, who had nearly all been chosen by Robespierre the younger after the capture of the place. They had many partisans amongst the workmen of the arsenal, whose number exceeded twelve thousand; and all these men, when united, were capable of perpetrating any imaginable atrocities. At this moment the squadron, in a complete state of equipment, was ready to weigh anchor; the representative Letourneur was on board the admiral's vessel; troops for disembarkation had been shipped, and the expedition was understood to be destined for Corsica. The revolutionists, taking advantage of the opportunity when merely a weak and uncertain garrison remained in the place, and wherein they counted several partisans, broke into open insurgency, and in the very arms of the three representatives, Mariette, Ritter, and Chambon, slew seven prisoners accused of emigration. In the latter days of Ventôse (March), they repeated similar acts of violence. Twenty prisoners, taken in a foreign frigate, were in one of the forts; these, they asserted, were emigrants whom it was intended to pardon. They roused the twelve thousand workmen of the arsenal, surrounded the representatives, who narrowly escaped with their lives, and were only arrested in their career by a battalion which was fortunately landed from the fleet.

These events, happening concurrently with those at Paris, added to the apprehensions of the government, and urged it to increased severity. Injunctions had been already issued to all the members of municipal administrations, revolutionary committees, and popular or military commissions, in short to all functionaries superseded since the 9th Thermidor, to leave the towns in which they had assembled and return to their several communes. A still more rigorous decree was now fulminated against them. They having possessed themselves of arms distributed in moments of danger, it was ordained that all those who were known throughout France to have participated in the vast tyranny abolished on the 9th Thermidor should be disarmed. Upon each municipal or sectional assembly was devolved the task of designating the accomplices of that tyranny in the various communes, and taking measures to disarm them. We may well conceive to what harassing persecutions such a decree must have exposed them, at a time when they had drawn upon themselves so inveterate a hatred.

Nor was this sufficient to satisfy the ruling party in the convention: it determined, moreover, to deprive them of the assumed leaders they had on the benches of the Mountain. Although the three principal had been condemned to exile, and seven more, to wit, Choudieu, Chales, Foussedoire, Léonard-Bourdon, Huguet, Duhem, and Amar, consigned to the fortress of Ham, it held that others yet remained who might prove formidable. Cambon, the financial dictator, and the inexorable adversary of the Thermidorians, whose insinuations on his probity he had never pardoned, appeared an encumbrance certainly, and might even be dangerous. It was alleged that, on the morning of the 12th, he had stated to the clerks at the treasury—"There are three hundred of you here, and in case of accidents you will be able to resist;" words he might have probably spoken, and which evidenced

his unison of sentiment, but not his confederacy, with the Jacobins. Thuriot, formerly a Thermidorian, but again become a Mountaineer since the restoration of the seventy-three and the twenty-two proscribed deputies, and a very influential member undoubtedly, was likewise marked down as a leader of the faction. In the same category were ranked Crassous, who had been one of the most energetic supporters of the Jacobin Club; Lesage-Sénault, who had concurred in closing that club, but had since taken alarm at the rapidity of the reaction; Lecointre of Versailles, an avowed opponent of Billaud, Collot, and Barrère, and a receder to the Mountain since the return of the Girondists; Maignet, the incendiary of the South; Hentz, the terrible proconsul of La Vendée; Levasseur [de-la-Sarthe], one of those who had contributed to the death of Philippeaux; and Granet of Marseilles, accused as an instigator of the revolutionists in the South. Tallien undertook the office of denunciator: after nominating them from the tribune of the assembly, he moved they should be arrested, and sent to Ham after their seven colleagues. The selections of Tallien were ratified, and the denounced representatives condemned to suffer incarceration accordingly.

Thus, this movement of the patriots resulted in drawing upon them additional severity; they were disarmed throughout France, and remanded to their communes; and in their fate they involved nearly twenty Mountaineers, of whom some were exiled and others immured. Every movement of a party not sufficiently strong to conquer, only tends to hasten its ruin.

After smiting individuals, the Thermidorians turned with zest to the substance of things. The committee of seven, charged to frame a report on the organic laws of the constitution, declared, without reservation, that the constitution was so vague it must be re-formed. A committee of eleven members was thereupon appointed to present a new plan. Unfortunately, the victory of their adversaries, instead of reducing the revolutionists to order, only infuriated them the more, and provoked, on their part, new and perilous efforts.

CHAPTER XLI.

CONTINUATION OF THE NEGOTIATIONS AT BASLE. — TREATY OF PEACE WITH HOLLAND; ALSO WITH PRUSSIA.—POLICY OF AUSTRIA AND THE EMPIRE.—PEACE WITH TUSCANY.—SUBMISSION OF CHARETTE AND OTHER VENDEAN CHIEFS.—FEIGNED PEACE OF THE BRETON CHIEFS. — STATE OF AUSTRIA AND ENGLAND. — DISCUSSIONS IN THE BRITISH PARLIAMENT. — PREPARATIONS OF THE COALITION FOR A NEW CAMPAIGN.

During these melancholy internal dissensions, the negotiations commenced at Basle had been suspended for an interval by the sudden demise of Baron von Goltz. The most untoward rumours were forthwith circulated. One day it was said, "The Powers will never treat with a republic incessantly torn by factions; they will leave it to perish in the convulsions of anarchy, without either attacking or recognising it." Another day, the direct contrary was alleged: "Peace is made with Spain; the French armies will advance no farther; negotiations are opened with England and with Russia, but to the prejudice of Sweden and Denmark, who are to be sacrificed to the ambition of Pitt and Catherine, and thus rewarded for their friendship towards France." Here malevolence, careless of contradictions, prompted apprehensions of what chanced to be most injurious at the moment to France: were peace desirable, it proclaimed ruptures; if victories were needful, it deplored the calamity of peace. Once, even, it strove to disseminate the belief, that all peace was for ever impossible and that a protestation on the subject had been lodged with the committee of public welfare by a majority of the members of the convention. An impetuous sally of Duhem was the groundwork of this report. That deputy had maintained that it was preposterous to treat with a single power, and that peace ought to be granted to none until they all solicited it together. This doctrine he had embodied in a note which he deposited with the committee of public welfare, and thus arose the unfounded clamour concerning a protestation.

The patriots, on their part, were equally busy in propagating sinister statements. They said that Prussia was purposely protracting the negotiations, in order to include Holland in a common treaty, and thereby to maintain her influence in that country, and save the stadtholderate. They complained that the fate of the Dutch republic remained so long undecided; that the French enjoyed there none of the advantages of conquest; that the assignats were received only at half value, and exclusively from soldiers; that the Dutch merchants had written to their Belgian and French correspondents that they were ready to transact business with them again, but only on condition of being paid in advance, and in the precious metals; and, finally, that the Dutch had permitted the stadtholder to depart, carrying with him whatever he chose, and had themselves sent to London, or transported on board the vessels of the East India Company, a considerable proportion of their wealth. Undoubtedly, many difficulties had accrued in Holland, both with regard to the conditions of peace and on account of the extreme views of the patriot party. The committee of public welfare had dispatched thither two of its members, fitted by their commanding influence to adjust all differences. The committee had craved from the convention, with reference to the delicacy and success of the negotiation, the privilege of withholding their names or the object of their mission. The assembly had acceded to the request, and the members appointed had forthwith taken their departure.

It was natural that such important events, that such high interests as were involved in their issue, should excite contrary hopes, fears, and allegations. But, despite all these rumours, the conferences continued auspiciously; the Count von Hardemberg had succeeded the Baron von Goltz at Basle, and appearances promised a speedy settlement of the conditions.

Scarcely had these negotiations been commenced, ere it became obvious that circumstances imperiously demanded a modification of the powers vested in the committee of public welfare. It was manifest that a government so completely open, unable to conceal any thing, to decide upon or to perform any act, without a public deliberation, would be incapable of negotiating a treaty with any power, howsoever frank. In order to arrange preliminaries even, it is necessary to sign suspensions of hostilities, and to neutralise certain territories; secrecy, above all, is indispensable, for a power often negotiates long before it thinks fit to avow the design. Moreover, there are frequently articles which, upon every principle of policy, should remain unknown. For example, if one power undertake to unite its forces with those of another—if it stipulate the junction of an army or of a squadron—in short, any concurrence of measures, the importance of such combinations depends on their secrecy. But how was the committee of public welfare, renewed by one-fourth every month, obliged to render an account of all operations, and altogether devoid of that vigour and hardihood possessed by the old committee, which scrupled not to act upon its own responsibility—how, we ask, was it to negotiate, especially with powers chagrined at their own faults, reluctantly submitting to allow their discomfiture, and all insisting, either upon leaving certain conditions secret, or upon not having the fact of their treating at all made

known until after peace was signed? The necessity it had felt of sending two of its members into Holland, without imparting their names or their mission, was the first distinct proof that secrecy had been ascertained to be indispensable in diplomatic operations. Acting upon this knowledge, the committee submitted a decree conferring upon it the powers requisite for treating with foreign states, a step which occasioned fresh rumours.

Regarding simply the theory of governments, it is curious to behold a democracy foregoing indiscreet curiosity, surmounting its jealousy of power, and, impelled by necessity, granting to a few individuals the extraordinary privilege of stipulating secret conditions. Such was the course of the convention at the present moment. It conferred on the committee of public welfare power to conclude armistices, to neutralise territories, to negotiate treaties, and to settle, frame, and even sign their conditions, reserving only what veritably appertained to itself—the ratification. It did more: it authorised the committee to adopt secret articles, under the sole condition that those articles contained nothing inconsistent with the patent stipulations, and that they should be published so soon as the occasion for secrecy was over. Provided with these powers, the committee prosecuted, and conducted to a happy termination, the negotiations commenced with different powers.

Peace with Holland was eventually concluded under the auspices of Rewbell, and, above all, of Sieyes, who were the two members of the government recently accredited to Holland. The Dutch patriots accorded distinguished honours to the celebrated author of the first Declaration of Rights, and evinced a deference towards him which smoothed sundry difficulties. The conditions of peace, signed at the Hague on the 27th Floreal, year 3 (16th May 1795), were as follow:—The French republic acknowledged the republic of the United Provinces as a free and independent power, and guaranteed its independence and the abolition of the stadtholderate. An offensive and defensive alliance was declared between the two republics during the continuance of the existing war. This offensive and defensive alliance was to be perpetual between the two republics in all cases of war against England. The United Provinces placed forthwith at the disposition of France twelve ships of the line and eighteen frigates, which were to be employed principally in the North and Baltic seas. They gave, moreover, as an auxiliary force to France, the moiety of their army, which, in truth, was reduced to almost nothing, and required a total reorganisation. The demarcations of territory were fixed in the following manner:—France retained all Dutch Flanders, thereby completing its territories towards the ocean, and extending them to the mouths of the rivers; towards the Meuse and the Rhine, it obtained the possession of Venloo and Maestricht, and all the country to the south of Venloo, stretching on both sides of the Meuse. Thus the republic abstained from pressing its extension to the Rhine on this point, as was but reasonable. In fact, in that direction, the Rhine, the Meuse, and the Scheldt are so mingled together, that there is no clear boundary. Which of those streams was to be considered as the Rhine? It is impossible to decide, and the question resolves itself into one purely conventional. Besides, in that quarter, no hostilities could threaten France except those of Holland, which were not much to be dreaded, and therefore did not need the protection of a strong barrier. In short, the territory assigned by nature to Holland consisting of alluvial soil accumulated at the mouths of the rivers, France, in order to include one of the principal streams, must have appropriated three-fourths at least of that residuum, and thus pretty nearly annihilated the republic it had just enfranchised. The Rhine becomes the limit of France, with respect to Germany, only in the vicinity of Wesel, and the possession of both banks of the Meuse, to the south of Venloo, left that question untouched. Furthermore, the French republic reserved to itself the privilege, in case of war towards the Rhine or Zealand, of placing garrisons in the fortresses of Grave, Bois-le-Duc, and Bergen-op-Zoom. The port of Flushing remained in common. Thus all necessary precautions were taken. The navigation of the Rhine, the Meuse, the Scheldt, the Hondt, and their several branches, was declared for ever free. In addition to these advantages, an indemnity amounting to one hundred millions of florins was paid by Holland. To compensate the latter for its sacrifices, France promised it, on the event of a general peace, territorial indemnities wrested from the conquered countries, and most suitably located for the due definement of the respective boundaries.

This treaty was founded on the most reasonable bases; the conqueror exhibited in its terms equal generosity and acumen. The allegation is futile, that by fixing Holland in its alliance, France exposed her to the risk of losing one-half of her navy detained in the English ports, and, above all, her colonies, abandoned without defence to the ambition of Pitt. Holland, left in neutrality, would have neither recovered her ships nor preserved her colonies: Pitt would have still found a pretext for seizing on them in the name of the stadtholder. The retention of the stadtholderate alone, without certainly saving either the Dutch ships or colonies, would have deprived English cupidity of all pretence; but this maintenance of the stadtholderate, with the political principles of France, with the promises made to the Batavian patriots, with the spirit which animated them, with the hopes they had conceived when throwing themselves into the arms of the French—was it possible, was it even just?

The conditions with Prussia were more easy to settle. Bischofwerder had been consigned to prison; and the King of Prussia, delivered from mysticism, had formed new ideas of ambition. He no longer talked of upholding the principles of general order; he now panted to render himself the mediator of a general pacification. The treaty with him was signed at Basle on the 16th Germinal (5th April 1795). It set forth, in the first place, that there should be peace, friendship, and good intelligence, between his majesty the King of Prussia and the French republic; that the troops of the latter should evacuate that portion of the Prussian dominions which they occupied on the right bank of the Rhine; that they should continue to occupy the Prussian provinces on the left bank, and that the definitive allocation of those provinces should not be decided until the period of general concord. From this last condition, it was obvious that the republic, without yet distinctly explaining its views, had conceived the design of giving itself the limit of the Rhine; but that, pending fresh victories over the armies of the empire and over Austria, it deferred the solution of the difficulties necessarily attendant on the advancement of that lofty pretension. Then only could it evict or grant indemnities, when its predominance was firmly established. The French republic, moreover, engaged to accept the mediation of the King of Prussia, in effecting a reconciliation with the princes and states of the German empire; it even pledged itself to refrain, during three months, from treating as enemies such of the princes on the right bank in behalf of whom his Prussian majesty should manifest an interest. This was an assured method of inducing the whole empire to seek peace through the intervention of Prussia.

Immediately after the treaty was signed, the cabinet of Berlin solemnly announced its conclusion to the empire, and detailed the motives which had influenced the conduct of Prussia. It declared to the diet that its good offices were at the disposal of the empire, if it desired peace; and, should the majority of the states reject an accommodation, of those amongst them who

should feel constrained to negotiate separately for their individual safety. On her part, Austria addressed sundry bitter reflections to the diet: she stated that she wished for peace as much as any other power, but that she deemed it impossible; that she would choose the suitable moment for treating, and that the states of the empire would find greater advantages in relying upon Austrian fidelity, than upon perjured powers which had failed in all their engagements. The diet, to appear prepared for war even whilst soliciting peace, decreed for the ensuing campaign the quintuple contingent, and resolved that the states which were unable to furnish soldiers, should have the privilege of avoiding the obligation by paying two hundred and forty florins in lieu of each man. At the same time, it decided that Austria, having become bound with England to continue the war, could not act as the mediatrix of peace, and that such mediation must be confided to Prussia. It only remained, therefore, to settle the form and composition of the delegation.

Notwithstanding this strong inclination to treat for peace, the empire could scarcely do so in its collective capacity; for it must demand, in behalf of its members who had lost their territories, restitutions which France could not have made without renouncing the barrier of the Rhine. But it was manifest that, under this impossibility of negotiating collectively, the several princes would throw themselves into the arms of Prussia, and conclude, through her friendly agency, individual accommodations.

Thus the republic began to disarm its enemies, and coerce them to adopt pacific views. Those only were resolutely bent on war who had suffered severe reverses, and who entertained no hopes of recovering by negotiations what they had lost by arms. Such were naturally the dispositions of the princes on the left bank of the Rhine, driven from their possessions, of Austria, deprived of the Low Countries, and of Piedmont, despoiled of Nice and Savoy. Those, on the contrary, who had had the good sense to observe neutrality, daily congratulated themselves on their sagacity, and the advantages it had ensured them. Sweden and Denmark were about to send ambassadors accredited to the convention. Switzerland, which had become the entrepôt of continental commerce, adhered to its prudent intentions, and addressed, through the medium of M. Ochs, to the French envoy Barthélemy, these admirable words—"A Switzerland is necessary to France, and a France to Switzerland. It is, in truth, reasonable to suppose that, without the Helvetic confederation, the relics of the old kingdoms of Lorraine, Burgundy, and Arles, would not have been united to the French dominions; and it is difficult to believe that, without the powerful diversion and determined interference of France, Helvetic liberty must not have been eventually stifled at its birth." The neutrality of Switzerland had been unquestionably of eminent service to France, and had contributed to save it from foreign conquest. To these reflections M. Ochs added others not less elevated. "Men will perhaps one day admire," he said, "that sentiment of natural justice which, leading us to repudiate all external influence in the choice of our forms of government, forbids us likewise to constitute ourselves judges of the mode of administration adopted by our neighbours. Our fathers censured neither the great feudatories of the German empire for vieing with the imperial power, nor the royal authority of France for repressing its great vassals. They successively beheld the states-general representing the French nation; the Richelieus and Mazarines seizing upon absolute power; Louis XIV. concentrating in his own person the entire power of the nation; and the parliaments claiming to share public authority in the name of the people; but never were they heard in rash tones arrogating a right to remonstrate with France, at any period of her history. The prosperity of France was their prayer, her unity their hope, the integrity of her territories their reliance."

These principles, so enlightened and so just, conveyed a severe censure on the conduct of Europe; and the results which Switzerland derived from their observance were a striking demonstration of their utility. Austria, jealous of her commercial activity, desired to fetter it by establishing a cordon; but Switzerland reclaimed to Wurtemburg and the adjacent states, and obtained justice.

The Italian powers longed for peace, or those at least whom their imprudence might one day expose to untoward consequences. Piedmont, although greatly exhausted, had lost too much to forego all further appeal to arms. But Tuscany, constrained against her inclination to break her neutrality by the English ambassador, who, threatening her with a squadron, had only allowed her twelve hours to decide, was impatient to resume her former position, especially since the French had penetrated to the gates of Genoa. In consequence, the grand-duke had opened a negotiation, which terminated in a treaty, the most easily adjusted of all. Good intelligence and friendship were re-established between the two states, and the grand-duke restored to the republic the corn belonging to Frenchmen in his ports, upon which an embargo had been laid at the period of the declaration of war. Indeed, before the negotiation, he had made that restitution of his own accord. This treaty, advantageous to France by facilitating the trade of the southern departments, especially in grain, had been concluded on the 21st Pluviose (9th February).

Venice, who had recalled her envoy from France, announced her intention of appointing another, and sending him forthwith to Paris. The Pope, too, on his part, intimated regret at the outrages that had been committed on the French.

The court of Naples, blinded by the passions of a foolish queen, and instigated by the intrigues of England, scorned all idea of negotiating, and made ridiculous promises of aid to the coalition.

To Spain peace was still most needful: she seemed as if waiting to be driven into it by additional reverses.

A negotiation not less important, perhaps, when the moral effect it was calculated to produce is considered, was that opened at Nantes with the insurgent provinces. We have narrated how it came to pass that the chiefs of La Vendée, divided amongst themselves, almost deserted by their peasants, followed only by a few determined partisans, pressed on all sides by the republican generals, reduced to the alternative of accepting an amnesty or undergoing extermination, had been brought to treat of peace. We have mentioned that Charette had agreed to an interview near Nantes, and that the pretended Baron de Cormatin, Puisaye's major-general, had presented himself as the mediator for Brittany, after having made a long tour with Humbert, hesitating the while between the credit of deceiving the republicans, completing an arrangement with Charette and seducing Canclaux, and the renown of being the pacificator of those celebrated districts. The general rendezvous was at Nantes; the interviews were to commence at the castle of La Jaunaye, a league from that city, on the 24th Pluviose (12th February).

Upon his arrival at Nantes, Cormatin attempted to place Puisaye's letter in the hands of Canclaux; but the man, so intent on beguiling the republicans, lacked wit even to keep from them a knowledge of this dangerous communication. It was discovered and published, and Cormatin constrained to asseverate that the letter was supposititious, that he had not been the bearer of any such document, and that he had come with the sincere desire of concluding a peace. He thus became more than ever committed; his part of a cunning diplomatist, deluding the republicans, concerting with Charette, and winning over Canclaux.

entirely failed him; he was curtailed to that of a pacificator. He saw Charette, and found him reduced by his position to the necessity of at least temporarily treating with the enemy; whereupon he no longer hesitated in deciding for the accomplishment of a peace. Still it was agreed between them that this peace should be merely feigned; that, pending the execution of her promises by England, they should pretend submission to the republic, and strive to obtain, meanwhile, the best conditions possible. So soon as the conferences were opened, accordingly, Cormatin and Charette delivered a note, in which they demanded freedom of religious worship, alimentary provision for all the ecclesiastics of La Vendée, exemption from military service and taxes for ten years, in order to repair the calamities of war, indemnities for all the devastations, the liquidation of the engagements contracted by the chiefs for the supply of their armies, the re-establishment of the old territorial subdivisions of the country and of its old mode of administration, the formation of rural guards under the command of the present chiefs, the removal of all the republican armies, the exclusion of all the inhabitants of La Vendée who had left the country as patriots, and whose property had been seized by the royalists, and, lastly, an amnesty common to the emigrants as well as to the Vendéans. Such demands were preposterous and altogether inadmissible. The representatives granted freedom of worship, indemnities for those whose cottages had been destroyed, exemption from service for the young men liable to the present requisition, for the purpose of repeopling the country, the formation of rural guards, to be under the orders of the administrations, to the number of two thousand men only, and the payment of the obligations signed by the leaders to the extent of two millions. But they refused the restoration of the old territorial subdivisions and the old civil administrations, exemption from taxes for ten years, the removal of the republican armies, and the amnesty for the emigrants; and they insisted upon the restitution of their property to the Vendéan patriots. They stipulated, moreover, that these concessions should be embodied, not in a formal treaty, but in ordinances to be issued by the representatives on mission; and that, on their side, the Vendéan generals should subscribe a declaration acknowledging the republic, and promising to give obedience to its laws. A final conference was fixed for the 29th Pluviose (17th February), as the truce expired on the 30th.

A request was urged that, before concluding peace, Stofflet should be invited to these conferences. Several royalist officers desired it, because they held that he ought to participate in the negotiations; the representatives were also anxious for his presence, as they wished to comprehend all La Vendée in one treaty. Stofflet was at this period swayed by the ambitious Abbé Bernier, who was hostile to a peace which would deprive him of all his influence; and besides, Stofflet himself felt indignant at the idea of playing a second part, and at negotiations being commenced and carried on without his concurrence. However, he consented to attend the conferences, and he appeared at La Jaunaye, accompanied by a numerous retinue of officers.

Great was the tumult consequent upon this gathering. The advocates of peace and the partisans of war evinced much mutual exasperation. The former clustered around Charette: they alleged that those who wished to continue the war were precisely the parties who never engaged in action; that the country was ruined, and reduced to the last gasp; that the powers had done nothing, and would in all probability never do any thing for them; and in whispers they added too, that at any rate it behoved them to temporise, to gain time by means of a simulated peace, and that if England ever kept her promises, they would be always ready to rise. The partisans of war maintained, on the other hand, that they were offered peace merely with the intention of disarming them, subsequently violating all the conditions, and immolating them at leisure; that to lay down their arms, even for an instant, would tend to slacken courage, and to render all future insurrections impracticable; that inasmuch as the republic negotiated, they had good proof she herself was reduced to deplorable extremities; that they only needed the exercise of a little more patience and constancy to see the moment arrive when they might attempt great things by the assistance of foreign powers; that it was unworthy French chivalry to sign a treaty with the secret resolution to break it; and that, for the rest, they had no power to recognise the republic, for they should thereby abjure the rights of the princes for whom they had so long contended. Several consultations were held by the two parties, in which much asperity of feeling was manifested, and even fierce passions engendered. On one occasion, so violent were the reproaches and menaces levelled by the partisans of Charette against those of Stofflet, that a general combat was with difficulty averted. Cormatin was one of the most zealous advocates of peace; his fluency, his vehemence of action and opinion, and his quality of representative of the Breton army, secured him attention and consideration. Unluckily for him, he was accompanied by a certain Solilhac, whom the central committee of Brittany had given him as an attendant. Solilhac, amazed at perceiving Cormatin enact a part so different from that he had been appointed to perform, remarked to him that he was departing from his instructions, and that he had not been deputed to conclude a pacification. Cormatin was thrown into the utmost perplexity; Stofflet and the upholders of war exulted over their opponents, on learning that Brittany purposed rather to gain delay and to concert with La Vendée than to submit, and declared they would never lay down their arms, since Brittany was determined to support them.

On the morning of the 29th Pluviose (17th February), the council of the army of Anjou met in a separate room of the castle of La Jaunaye, to adopt a definitive resolution. The officers of Stofflet's division drew their swords, and swore to *cut the throat* of the first who spoke of peace; and they forthwith passed a resolution to continue the war. In another room, Charette, Sapinaud, and their followers, decided for peace. At noon a meeting was to be held, under a tent pitched on the lawn, with the representatives of the people. Stofflet, not venturing to confront them with the declaration of his intentions, sent to inform them that he declined their propositions. The representatives left at the prescribed distance the detachment which attended them, and entered the tent. Charette left his Vendéans at the same interval, and repaired to the rendezvous, accompanied only by his principal officers. Meanwhile, Stofflet was seen to mount his horse, with the infuriated partisans who followed him, and depart at full gallop, waving his hat, and shouting "Long live the king!" There was little to discuss under the tent where Sapinaud and Charette had met the representatives, for the ultimatum of the latter had been previously accepted. The stipulations were respectively subscribed. Charette, Sapinaud, Cormatin, and the other officers, signed an act of submission to the laws of the republic; the representatives delivered the ordinances containing the conditions granted to the Vendéan chiefs. A mutual suavity and politeness illustrated the conference, and all things seemed to betoken a sincere reconciliation.

The representatives, desirous of throwing a lustre upon the submission of Charette, made preparations for giving him a magnificent reception in Nantes. The most exuberant joy reigned in that patriotic city. The inhabitants rejoiced in the belief that at length the calamity of civil war was about to terminate; they hailed with rapture the return of so distinguished a man as Charette into the bosom of the republic.

and dwelt complacently on the probability of his sword being henceforth devoted to its service. On the day appointed for his solemn entry, the national guard and the army of the West were drawn up under arms. The whole population flocked, full of gladness and curiosity, to behold and honour the celebrated chief. He was received with shouts of "The republic for ever! Charette for ever!" He wore the costume of a Vendéan general, relieved by the tricoloured cockade. In character, Charette was stern, distrustful, cunning, and intrepid; and these qualities were depicted on his countenance and in his deportment. Of medium stature, his small and sparkling eye, nose of Tartar form, and ample mouth, gave him a strange and peculiar expression, but one singularly appropriate to his character withal. Whilst thus congregated to greet him, all sought to penetrate the sentiments passing in his mind. The royalists were fain to detect perplexity and remorse in his features. The republicans found him delighted, almost intoxicated with his triumph. He might have reasonably been so, despite the embarrassment of his position; for his enemies accorded him the first grateful recompense he had yet received for his exploits.

Immediately after the conclusion of the peace, the representatives determined upon renewed efforts to win over Stofflet, and to induce the Chouans to accept the conditions granted to Charette. The latter appeared cordial in his manifestations; he circulated proclamations through the country, urging all to return to their duty. The inhabitants were in general overjoyed at the pacification. The men completely addicted to war were organised into rural guards, and their command was intrusted to Charette, with authority to form the police of the country. This was in accordance with a suggestion of Hoche, perverted to satisfy the Vendéan chiefs, who, entertaining both ulterior views and present doubts, desired to retain under their orders the men most inured to martial life. Charette even promised his assistance against Stofflet, if he, hard pressed in Upper Vendée, should fall back on the Marais.

General Canclaux was sent without delay in pursuit of Stofflet. Merely leaving a corps of observation around Charette's district, he moved the greater part of his troops on the Layon. Stofflet, anxious to magnify his importance by a brilliant achievement, made an attempt on Chalonne, which was vigorously repulsed, and he recoiled on Saint-Florent. He declared Charette a traitor to the cause of royalty, and caused sentence of death to be pronounced against him. The representatives, aware that such a war was to be terminated, not only by force of arms, but by giving a counter interest to the motives of the ambitious leaders, by bestowing pecuniary aids on men impoverished and without resources, likewise employed the agency of money. The committee of public welfare had opened them a credit on its secret funds. They distributed 60,000 francs in specie, and 365,000 in assignats, amongst sundry officers of Stofflet. His major-general, Trotouin, received 100,000 francs, half in money and half in assignats, and deserted him. He addressed a letter to the officers of the army of Anjou, exhorting them to peace, adducing such reasons as were best adapted to shake their constancy.

Whilst these measures were in progress touching the army of Anjou, the representatives, pacificators of La Vendée, repaired to Brittany, with the view of bringing the Chouans into a similar accommodation. Cormatin accompanied them; he was now altogether committed to the system of peace, and indulged hopes of repeating at Rennes the triumphal entry of Charette at Nantes. Notwithstanding the truce, several acts of rapine had been perpetrated by the Chouans. They being for the most part mere bandits, without attachment to any cause, and concerning themselves but little about the political views which induced their chiefs to sign a suspension of arms, took no heed as to its observance, and thought only of pillage and booty. Some of the representatives, viewing this conduct of the Bretons in a serious light, began to doubt their intentions, and to apprehend that all expectation of peace must be abandoned. Boursault was the most disposed to encourage these misgivings. The representative Bollet, on the contrary, a zealous advocate of peace, held that, despite certain acts of hostility, an accommodation was practicable, and that mildness would be eventually efficacious in quelling the disturbances. Hoche, meanwhile, flying from cantonment to cantonment, at distances of eighty leagues, never enjoying a moment of repose—placed between the representatives who advocated war and those who advocated peace—between the Jacobins of the towns, who accused him of weakness and treachery, and the royalists, who denounced him for barbarity—Hoche was sickened with disgust, though his ardour remained unabated. "You wish me another campaign of the Vosges," he wrote to one of his friends; "how would you make such a campaign against Chouans, and almost without an army?" This young hero saw his talents wasted in an ungrateful war, whilst generals greatly inferior to himself were reaping immortal honour in Holland and on the Rhine, at the head of the finest armies of the republic. Still he prosecuted his mission with zeal, and with a profound appreciation of men and of his own position. We have seen that he had already proffered the most prudent counsels—as, for example, to indemnify those insurgents who had continued the avocation of peasants, and to enrol those whom war had converted into soldiers. Further acquaintance with the country had unfolded to him the veritable means of appeasing the inhabitants and attaching them to the republic.

"We must continue to treat with the chiefs of the Chouans," he said; "their good faith is doubtless problematical, but we must display it towards them. We shall thus, by infusing confidence, gain over those who ask only to have their doubts removed. Such as are ambitious should be tempted by military rank—such as are poor and needy by money; thus they will be divided amongst themselves, and those who may be surely relied on can be intrusted with the rural police, having territorial guards assigned to them, the institution whereof has been already sanctioned. At the same time, twenty-five thousand men ought to be distributed in several camps, to watch over the whole country; a service of gunboats placed along the coasts, to be in perpetual activity; and the arsenals, arms, and munitions, transferred from open towns to fortified places and forts. As to the inhabitants, the priests should be employed to influence them, and assistance judiciously administered to the indigent. If we succeed in reviving confidence by means of the priests, *Chouannerie* will subside at once."

"Circulate," he wrote to his general officers on the 27th Ventôse—"circulate the beneficial law just passed by the convention on the freedom of worship, and vindicate religious tolerance in your own persons. The priests, convinced that they will not be disturbed for the future in the exercise of their ministry, will become your friends, were it only to secure tranquillity. Their profession disposes them to peace: see them, and urge upon them that the continuation of the war will expose them to the risk of being harassed and molested, not by the republicans, who respect religious opinions, but by the Chouans, who acknowledge neither God nor law, and are solely intent on keeping the country in a state of alarm, and on plundering. Amongst them are many extremely poor, and in general they are very covetous; be careful to offer them assistance, but not ostentatiously; on the contrary, with all the delicacy of which you are capable. Through them you will learn all the manœuvres of the party, and obtain their influence to keep the peasants in their fields and prevent them from going to fight. You perceive that, to attain this ob-

ject, mildness, amenity, and candour are requisite. Engage some officers and soldiers to attend with decorum some of their ceremonies, but with strong injunctions never to disturb them. The country expects from you the greatest zeal; all means are lawful in its service, when they are consistent with the laws and with republican honour and dignity." Hoche appended to these exhortations a recommendation not to draw any thing for the subsistence of the army from the country, at least for a time. With regard to the designs of the English, he advised, in order to balk them, that Jersey and Guernsey should be seized upon, and a *Chouannerie* introduced into England, to give them occupation at home. He cast his eyes also on Ireland; but on this topic he wrote that he would personally explain his views to the committee of public welfare.

This policy, dictated by sound discretion, and employed in various localities with exemplary address, had already been attended with marked success. Brittany was completely divided; all the Chouans who appeared at Rennes were caressed, subsidised, inspired with confidence, and prevailed on to lay down their arms. Others, more obstinate, and relying on Stofflet and Puisaye, determined to persevere in carrying on the war. Cormatin continued to traverse the country, urging all to treat, and endeavouring to draw them to La Prévalaye. Notwithstanding the ardour this adventurer manifested in pacifying the country, Hoche, who had penetrated his character, and duly estimated his instability and vainglory, distrusted him, and doubted he would break faith with the republicans as previously with the royalists. He observed him with close attention, to satisfy himself whether he were labouring sincerely, and without ulterior views, in the great work of pacification.

Singular intrigues were brought to bear on these efforts of the republicans to promote a general pacification. We have seen that Puisaye had proceeded to London with the view of gaining the concurrence of the English cabinet in prosecution of his projects; and we have seen the three French princes scattered over the continent, one awaiting the course of events at Arnheim, another fighting on the Rhine, and the third, in his character of regent, corresponding from Verona with all the European cabinets, and maintaining a secret agency at Paris. Puisaye had conducted his negotiations with equal skill and activity. Disregarding the old Duke of Harcourt, the regent's useless ambassador at London, he addressed himself directly to the English ministry. Pitt, usually inaccessible to the emigrants who abounded in the streets of London, and besieged him with projects and demands, promptly received the organiser of Brittany, and introduced him to the minister of war, Mr Windham, who was an ardent friend of monarchy, and advocated its maintenance or re-establishment throughout the globe. Puisaye's designs, after undergoing a rigid examination, were cordially adopted. England promised an army, a fleet, money, arms, and munitions, for a descent on the coasts of France, but imposed secrecy on Puisaye with regard to his countrymen, and especially as to the Duke of Harcourt, the envoy of the regent. This accorded with Puisaye's own views, who was ambitious of acting entirely by himself: he remained impenetrable to the Duke of Harcourt, to all the other agents of the princes in London, and in particular to the agents at Paris, who corresponded with the secretary of the Duke of Harcourt. He merely wrote to the Count d'Artois requesting from him extraordinary powers, and urging him to come over and put himself at the head of the expedition. The prince forwarded the powers, and intimated his intention of assuming the command in person. In a short time the projects of Puisaye were suspected, despite his efforts to conceal them. All the emigrants, repulsed by Pitt and amused by Puisaye, were unanimous in their denunciations. According to them, Puisaye was a base intriguer, sold to the perfidious Pitt, and meditating most suspicious schemes. This opinion, diligently inculcated at London, soon travelled to the counsellors of the regent at Verona. Already, in that petty court, great distrust of England prevailed—in fact ever since the affair of Toulon; and now that she proposed to make use of one of the princes, the utmost anxiety was engendered. On this occasion, it demanded with extraordinary solicitude what she intended to make of the Count d'Artois; why the name of Monsieur was excluded from her designs; whether she thought he could be dispensed with, &c. The agents at Paris, who held their mission from the regent, and participated in his ideas respecting England, being unable to obtain any communication from Puisaye, repeated the same objections to the enterprise preparing in London. Another motive induced them still more to discountenance it. The regent entertained thoughts of recurring to Spain, and proposed to remove into that country, in order to be nearer La Vendée and Charette, whom he especially idolised as a hero. The agents at Paris, on their part, had opened a communication with an emissary of Spain, who had strongly urged them to avail themselves of that power, and promised it would effect for Monsieur and Charette what England was projecting for the Count d'Artois and Puisaye. But it would be requisite to wait until Monsieur could be transported from the Alps to the Pyrenees by the Mediterranean, and a considerable expedition be prepared. The Parisian intriguers, therefore, were strenuous in extolling Spain. They pretended she would exasperate the French less than England, because her interests were less directly opposed to France; moreover, that she had already gained Tallien through his wife, the daughter of the Spanish banker Cabarus; and they scrupled not to affirm that they were sure of Hoche, so little did imposture cost them, to give importance to their projects. But after all, Spain, with her fleets and armies, was of little moment, as they represented, in comparison with the grand schemes they were concocting in the interior. From their central position in the heart of the capital, they professed to discern a decided feeling of indignation harboured against the revolutionary system. This sentiment, they alleged, must be fostered, and adroitly turned to the advantage of royalty; but, for that purpose, the royalists ought to show themselves as little formidable as possible, for the Mountain was strengthened by all the apprehensions which the idea of a counter-revolution inspired. A victory by Charette, a descent of emigrants in Brittany, would suffice to restore the revolutionary party to the influence it had forfeited, and deprive the Thermidorians, from whom so much was to be expected, of all their popularity. Charette had certainly made peace, but it was with the intention of being ready to resume hostilities: in the same manner, Anjou and Brittany must appear to submit for a time; during the interval the leaders of the government and the generals would be seduced, and the armies allowed to pass the Rhine and become entangled in Germany; then, suddenly, the slumbering convention would be surprised, and royalty proclaimed in La Vendée, Brittany, Paris itself. An expedition from Spain, including the regent, and concurring with these simultaneous movements, would then decide the success of royalty. As to England, all that should be asked from her was money (for these personages were acutely alive to its charms), and afterwards she might be laughed at. Thus, each of the numerous agents employed in behalf of the counter-revolution indulged his own conceits, formed views according to his individual position, and aspired to be the principal restorer of the monarchy. Falsehood and intrigue were their sole instruments for the most part, and money the chief object of their desires.

Holding and inculcating such ideas, the agency at

Paris, similar in character to that which Puisaye was labouring to establish at London, naturally sought to prevent any enterprise for the moment, to tranquillise the insurgent provinces, and to promote the conclusion of a feigned peace. Under favour of the truce granted to the Chouans, Lemaitre, Brottier, and La-ville-Heurnois had recently succeeded in opening a direct communication with the insurgent provinces. The regent had instructed them to deliver letters into the hands of Charette: they intrusted them to an old officer of the navy, Duverne de Presle, who had been deprived of his commission, and was ready for any employment. They charged him, at the same time, to aid the pacification, by advising the insurgents to temporise, and to wait for succours from Spain and a movement in the interior. This emissary repaired to Rennes, whence he contrived to forward the letters of the regent to Charette, and afterwards recommended a momentary submission to all the chiefs. Others were likewise dispatched on the same mission by the agents at Paris; and speedily ideas of peace, already prevailing in Brittany, became still more predominant. The opinion rapidly propagated that hostilities ought to cease; that England was deceiving the royalists; that every thing was to be expected from the convention; that it was about to re-establish monarchy of its own accord; and that, in the treaty signed with Charette, were included secret articles conditioned for the recognition, as King Louis XVII., of the young orphan in the Temple. Cormatin, whose position had become highly embarrassing, from his having so flagrantly belied the confidence of Puisaye and the central committee, found in the system of the agents at Paris an excuse and encouragement for his conduct. It appears, even, that he was flattered with hopes of having the command of Brittany confided to him in lieu of Puisaye. By dint of great exertions, he succeeded in mustering the principal Chouans at La Prévalaye, and the conferences were eventually opened.

In the mean time, Messieurs de Tinténiac and de la Roberie had been sent from London by Puisaye—the first to convey to the Chouans ammunition, money, and intelligence of an approaching expedition; the latter to apprise his uncle, Charette, of the intended descent on Brittany, and invite him to hold himself in readiness to second it; and both conjointly to insist upon the rupture of the negotiations. They had attempted to disembark with some emigrants on the coast of Brittany; the Chouans, informed of their intention, had hastened to receive them, become embroiled with the republicans, and suffered a defeat. Messieurs de Tinténiac and de la Roberie had escaped by a miracle; but the truce was compromised, and Hoche, who began to be diffident of the Chouans, and strongly suspected the honesty of Cormatin, proposed his immediate arrest. Cormatin protested his good faith to the representatives, and prevailed on them to refrain from declaring the truce broken. The conferences proceeded at La Prévalaye. An agent of Stofflet appeared to take part in them. Stofflet, repulsed, pursued, reduced to extremity, deprived of all his resources by the discovery of the small arsenal he possessed in a forest, now at length begged to be admitted to treat, and accordingly sent an envoy to La Prévalaye in the person of General Beauvais. The conferences were extremely animated, as they had been at La Jaunaye. General Beauvais still advocated the continuance of the war, notwithstanding the sorrowful condition of the chief he represented, and maintained that Cormatin, having signed the peace of La Jaunaye, and acknowledged the republic, had forfeited the command wherewith he had been invested by Puisaye, and was incapacitated from participating in the deliberations. M. de Tinténiac, having penetrated, in spite of all dangers, to the place of conference, essayed to foreclose the negotiation upon the authority of Puisaye, and announced his intention of immediately returning to London; but Cormatin and the partisans of peace prevented him from carrying his object into effect. Eventually Cormatin decided the majority to accept a compromise, on the arguments that time would be gained by agreeing to an apparent submission, and the vigilance of the republicans lulled. The conditions were identical with those conceded to Charette: freedom of religious observances, indemnities to those whose property had been laid waste, exemption from the conscription, and the institution of rural guards. The present treaty was illustrated by one condition the more, to wit, the payment of a million and a half to the principal chiefs, a sum whereof Cormatin was to have his share. Not to forego an instant his career of turpitude, says General Beauvais, Cormatin, at the moment of appending his signature, took his sword in his hand, and swore to resume arms upon the first opportunity; and recommended every one to observe, until fresh orders, the organisation hitherto maintained, and the respect due to all the superiors thereof.

The royalist chiefs subsequently removed to La Mabilaye, a league from Rennes, to sign the treaty at a solemn meeting with the representatives. Several of them expressed repugnance to proceed thither, but Cormatin overruled their objections. The meeting took place with the same formalities as at La Jaunaye. The Chouans had requested that Hoche might not be present, on account of the extreme distrust he manifested: their demand was complied with. On the 1st Floreal (20th April), the representatives delivered similar ordinances to those given at La Jaunaye, and the Chouans subscribed a declaration, wherein they acknowledged the republic and submitted to its laws.

On the following day, Cormatin made his entry into Rennes as Charette into Nantes. The activity he had displayed, and the importance he had arrogated, caused him to be considered as the leader of the Breton royalists. All was attributed to him—as well the exploits of that host of unknown Chouans who had mysteriously overrun Brittany, as the peace which had been so long and ardently desired. He received a species of triumph. Applauded by the inhabitants, admired and flattered by the women, endowed with an ample fund of assignats, he reaped all the honours and advantages of the war, as if he had long been its prop and mainstay. Yet he had disembarked in Brittany only to perform the singular part we have recorded. Henceforward, however, he presumed not to address Puisaye: he dared not venture his person out of Rennes, lest, if he advanced into the country, he might be shot by the malecontents. The principal chiefs, after the formality was over, returned into their several districts, first writing to Puisaye that they had been deceived, that he had only to come amongst them, and that at the first signal they would rally and fly to meet him. A few days afterwards, Stofflet, seeing himself completely deserted, signed the peace at Saint-Florent, on the same conditions as the other chiefs.

Whilst the two divisions of La Vendée and Brittany were thus succumbing, Charette had at length received a letter from the regent, the first token of the interest he had inspired. It was dated on the 1st of February. The prince saluted him as the second founder of the monarchy, expressed to him his gratitude, his admiration, his desire to join him, and nominated him lieutenant-general. These testimonies of regard came somewhat tardily. Charette, greatly moved, forthwith replied to the regent, "that the letter with which he had been honoured transported his soul with joy; that his zeal and fidelity would always remain the same; that necessity alone had constrained him to yield, but that his submission was only feigned; that, *when parties were better united*, he would again take arms, and be ready to die under the eyes of his prince, and for the most glorious of causes."

Such was the first pacification of the insurgent provinces. As Hoche had divined, it was only apparent; but as he had also judged, it might be rendered fatal to the Vendéan chiefs, by accustoming the country to tranquillity and to the laws of the republic, and by extinguishing or diverting to more beneficial purposes that passion for war which animated numbers of men. Notwithstanding the assurances of Charette to the regent, and of the Chouans to Puisaye, that ferocious spirit must necessarily subside after a few months of calmness and repose. Such subterfuges were neither more nor less than acts of bad faith, excusable, doubtless, in the frenzy of civil war, but which take from those who fall into their commission all right to complain of the severities of their adversaries. The republican representatives and generals exhibited the most scrupulous honour in fulfilling the conditions stipulated. It is surely superfluous to demonstrate the absurdity of the report then circulated, and even since repeated, that the treaties now signed contained secret articles, involving a pledge to place Louis XVII. on the throne. As if any representatives could have been sufficiently mad to contract such an obligation! As if it were credible that a republic would be sacrificed to a few partisans, which was resolutely maintained against all Europe! For the rest, none of the chiefs, when writing to the princes or the various royalist agents, ever ventured to advance so palpable an anomaly. Charette, arraigned at a later date for having violated the conditions of the treaty concluded with him, never attempted to urge so irrefragable a plea as the non-execution of a secret article. Puisaye, in his memoirs, has treated the assertion as equally preposterous and false; and it would not have been here alluded to, had it not been revived in a multitude of memoirs.

The result of this pacification was not simply that it led to a disarming of the disturbed districts; happening concurrently with the treaties of peace signed with Prussia, Holland, and Tuscany, and with the manifestation of pacific intentions by several other states, it had the further advantage of producing a striking moral effect. Europe beheld the republic recognised at once by its internal and external enemies—by the coalition and by the royalist party itself.

Amongst the decided enemies of France, England and Austria stood alone. Russia was too remote to be dangerous; the empire was ready to fall in pieces, and at all events incapable of sustaining the war; Piedmont was exhausted; Spain, little participating the chimerical hopes of the royalist intriguers, sighed for peace; and the anger of the court of Naples was as impotent as ridiculous. Pitt, notwithstanding the unprecedented triumphs of the French republic, despite a campaign without example in the annals of war, was not shaken in resolution; his powerful intellect had comprehended that so many victories, however disastrous to the continent, were not at all hurtful to England. That the stadtholder had lost all, the princes of Germany, Austria, Piedmont, and Spain, a portion of their dominions, was most true; but England had acquired an incontestible superiority upon the seas; she swept the Mediterranean and the ocean; she had confiscated a moiety of the Dutch navy; she was impelling Spain to weaken her marine in conflicts with that of France; she was proceeding to conquer the French colonies, to occupy all those of Holland, and to consolidate for ever her empire in India. An additional period of war and political aberration on the part of the continental powers, was still requisite for her purposes. It behoved her, therefore, to stimulate hostilities by giving subsidies to Austria, rekindling the zeal of Spain, and fomenting fresh disorders in the southern provinces of France. Mournful, doubtless, for the belligerent powers, if they were beaten in a new campaign: but England had nothing to apprehend; she would continue her progress on the ocean, in India, and in America. If, on the other hand, the powers were victorious, she gained an important point, by replacing under the dominion of Austria the Low Countries, which she dreaded above all things to see in the hands of France. Such were the ruthless but profound calculations of the English minister.

Notwithstanding the losses that England had sustained by captures at sea, the defeats of the Duke of York, and the enormous outlay she had incurred in subsidies to Prussia and Piedmont, she still possessed resources much greater even than the English or Pitt himself had conceived. It is true, she complained bitterly of the numerous captures; of the scarcity and enhanced prices of all articles of consumption. English merchant vessels, having alone continued to navigate the seas, were of course more exposed to the hazards of capture by privateers than those of other nations. Policies of insurance, which had become the occasion of boundless speculation, rendered their owners more reckless; and they often refused to wait for convoys, whereby the French cruisers were richly benefited. As to the famine, it was general throughout Europe. On the Rhine, around Frankfort, the bushel of rye cost fifteen florins. The vast consumption of the armies, the multitude of labourers torn from agriculture, and the calamities of ill-fated Poland, which had scarcely furnished any corn last year, had produced this extraordinary dearth. Besides, the navigation from the Baltic to England had become extremely perilous since the French took possession of Holland. Europe had been obliged to visit the New World in quest of food; and at this moment she was subsisting on the surplus produce of those virgin soils which the North Americans had so recently subjected to agriculture. But the rates of freight were excessive, and the price of bread had progressively risen in England to an exorbitant height. The price of meat, also, had kept pace with that of bread. The wools of Spain no longer arrived since the French occupied the ports of Biscay, and the manufacture of cloth was threatened with interruption. Thus, while in the throes of labour with her future greatness, England was oppressed by many grievous afflictions. The working classes mutinied in all the manufacturing towns; the people clamoured for bread in menacing accents; and the houses of Parliament were harassed with petitions, bearing thousands of signatures, imploring a termination to this disastrous war. Ireland, agitated on account of boons denied and withdrawn, was preparing additional embarrassments to those already burdening the government.


Yet, through these sinister appearances, did Pitt discern both the means and motives for prosecuting the war. In the first place, it flattered the passions of his court, it flattered even those of the English people, who had a leaven of hatred against France, always to be stirred even amidst the most cruel suffering. Moreover, despite the losses of commerce, losses which proved that the English alone continued to traverse the seas, Pitt beheld this commerce augmented during the last two years by the monopoly of all the marts of India and America. It was known to him that the export trade had singularly increased since the commencement of the war; and already the future superiority of his nation must have gleamed prophetically as he pondered in his cabinet. In the system of loans he found a resource, the teeming fertility whereof astonished himself. The government stocks maintained their value; the conquest of Holland had affected them but slightly, because, the event being foreseen, a prodigious amount of capital had been remitted from Amsterdam to London. The Dutch merchants, albeit firm patriots, looked nevertheless somewhat gloomily on affairs, and sought to place their wealth in security, by transporting it to England. Pitt had but spoken of a new loan, and, despite the war and all other calamities, offers showered thickly upon him. Experience has since proved that war

cramping commercial enterprise, and concentrating speculation on the public funds, facilitates rather than impedes loans. This result was still more naturally to be anticipated in a country which, having no assailable frontiers, never finds in war a question of existence, but simply one of trade and commercial aggrandisement. Pitt accordingly resolved, by means of the rich capitalists of his nation, to furnish subsidies to Austria, augment his navy, reorganise his army for transport to India and America, and afford considerable succours to the French insurgents. He concluded a subsidiary treaty with Austria, similar to that he had made the year before with Prussia. That power had abundance of soldiers, and she undertook to keep at least two hundred thousand effective men on foot; but she lacked the essential sinew, money, and was unable to obtain further loans in Switzerland, Frankfort, or Holland. England engaged, not actually to provide her with funds, but to guarantee a loan she proposed to open in London. To guarantee the debts of a power like Austria, was almost tantamount to an engagement to pay them; but the operation, under this form, was more easy of justification before parliament. This loan was for 4,600,000 pounds sterling (115 millions of francs), with interest at five per cent. Pitt opened at the same time a loan for eighteen millions, on account of England, at four per cent. The capitalists evinced extreme eagerness for the investment; and as the Austrian loan was guaranteed by England, and bore a higher interest, they demanded that, for two-thirds subscribed to the English loan, one-third should be apportioned them in the Austrian. Pitt, having thus assured himself of Austria, attempted to arouse the animation of Spain; but he found it drooping dolefully. He took in his pay the emigrant regiments under Condé, and intimated to Puisaye that, as the pacification of La Vendée tended to lessen confidence in the insurgent provinces, he would give him a squadron, *materiel* for an army, and the emigrant regiments, but no English soldiers; and that, if, as they wrote from Brittany, the dispositions of the royalists were really unchanged, and the expedition should prove successful, he would endeavour to render it decisive, by dispatching an army to the scene of action. He moreover resolved to increase his navy from eighty thousand to one hundred thousand seamen. To effect this object, he devised a species of conscription. Every merchant vessel was bound to furnish one sailor from a crew of seven—a contribution due from commerce for the protection it received from the military marine. Agricultural and manufacturing industry likewise owed succour to the navy, which secured them marts; consequently, each parish was also obliged to furnish a sailor. Pitt thus procured the means of giving to the English navy an extraordinary development. The English ships of war were much inferior in construction to the French; but the vast superiority in numerical force, the excellence of the crews, and the ability of the naval officers, precluded all idea of competition.

With all these combined preparations, Pitt met parliament. The opposition had this year received an accession of nearly twenty members. The advocates of peace and of the French revolution were invigorated beyond precedent, for they had portentous facts to oppose to the minister. The language which Pitt prompted to the crown, and which he himself held during this session—one of the most memorable in the British annals for the momentous questions discussed, and the eloquence of Fox and Sheridan—was signally adroit. He granted that France had obtained unparalleled triumphs; but those triumphs, far from discouraging its enemies, ought, on the contrary, he alleged, to inspire them with greater determination and perseverance. It was still England, he represented, that France aimed to injure; it was her constitution and prosperity it sought to annihilate; and to yield before such an inveterate, redoubtable animosity, would be equally imprudent and pusillanimous. At the present moment, especially, a cessation of hostilities on the part of England would, he affirmed, betray a fatal imbecility. France, having only Austria and the empire to combat, would overwhelm them; then, faithful to her hatred, she would return, freed from her enemies on the continent, and fall on England, which, standing alone in the struggle, must be exposed to a terrible encounter. Therefore, the moment when several powers were still contending, was to be seized, to attack in concert the common enemy, to restrict France to her limits, to wrest from her Holland and Belgium, and to repel within her own confines alike her armies, her commerce, and her pernicious principles. Furthermore, one other effort only was required—a single effort—to prostrate her. She had vanquished, doubtless, but at the expense of exhaustion, by employing barbarous expedients, which had become null by their very violence. The maximum, requisitions, assignats, terror, had been used by the rulers of France, until they were of no further avail in their hands. Those rulers had fallen a sacrifice to the very system they pursued for achieving their victories. Thus, he added, one more campaign, and Europe and England were avenged, and preserved from a sanguinary revolution. But, even should these reasons of honour, security, and policy be repudiated, and peace desired, such peace was impossible. The French demagogues would reject it with that ferocious arrogance they had exhibited even before their recent triumphs. And to treat with them, where were they to be found? Where was the government to be sought for amidst those bloodthirsty factions, heaved alternately into power, and disappearing as quickly as they reached it? How could a solid peace be concluded with those ephemeral depositaries of an authority perpetually disputed? It was consequently dishonourable, imprudent, and impossible to negotiate. England had still immense resources; her exports were greatly increased; her trade endured captures which demonstrated its hardihood and its activity; her navy was growing in might, and her wealth was spontaneously offered in profusion to the government, in order to prosecute this "*just and necessary* war."

This was the appellation wherewith Pitt had gilded the war at its commencement, and which he affected still to retain. We see that, amidst these his senatorial arguments, he dared not allege the true motives; he shrunk from avowing through what machiavellian routes he purposed to conduct England to the pinnacle of greatness. Such ambition is rarely proclaimed in the face of the world.

Accordingly, the opposition replied with overpowering effect. We were asked, said Fox and Sheridan, for but one campaign last session; already sundry fortifications were held by the allies; they were to start therefrom in spring to subjugate France. Yet behold the results! The French have conquered Flanders, Holland, all the left bank of the Rhine save Mayence, a part of Piedmont, the greater portion of Catalonia, and all Navarre. Adduce a similar campaign in the annals of Europe! It is allowed they have taken a few fortresses; show us a war in which so many places have been captured in a single campaign! If the French, contending against the whole of Europe, have gained such triumphs, what advantages will they not have against Austria and England when almost alone?—for the other powers either can no longer assist us or have actually concluded peace. We are told they are exhausted; that the assignats, their sole resource, have lost their value; and that their government has now ceased to manifest its former energy. But the Americans saw their paper-money fall ninety per cent., and they did not succumb. And this government, when it was energetic, we were told was barbarous; now that it has become humane and moderate, it is discovered to be without strength. Our resources, our disposable wealth, are exultingly re-



ferred to; but the people are perishing with want, they are unable to purchase either bread or meat, and they demand peace with loud outcries. This marvellous wealth, which seems created as by enchantment, is it real? Are treasures created by paper? All these systems of finance conceal some deadly fallacy—some yawning chasm, which must open appallingly upon us at no distant day. We proceed lavishing our treasure on the powers of Europe: already we have disbursed large sums to Piedmont and to Prussia; and the same extravagance is to be continued towards Austria. Who assures us that this power will be more faithful to her engagements than Prussia? Who guarantees us that she will not prove false to her promises, and negotiate after receiving our gold? We are exciting an infamous civil war; we are arming Frenchmen against their country; and yet, to our disgrace, those Frenchmen, recognising their error and the prudence of their new government, have laid down their arms. Are we to rekindle the extinguished embers of discord in La Vendée, to light up there a devastating conflagration? We are reminded of the barbarous principles of France: can those principles be more antisocial than our conduct with regard to her insurgent provinces? All the means for continuing the war, therefore, are either doubtful or criminal. Peace, we are told, is impossible; France hates England: but when did the wrath of the French manifest itself against us? Was it not when we showed the reprehensible intention of wresting from them their liberty, of interfering in their choice of a government, of exciting civil war amongst them? Peace, it is alleged, would spread the contagion of their principles. But Switzerland, Sweden, Denmark, the United States, are at peace with them: are their constitutions destroyed? Peace, it is added, is impossible with a tottering and ever-changing government. But Prussia and Tuscany have found parties to treat with; Switzerland, Denmark, Sweden, and the United States, know with whom to confer in their relations with France; and yet we cannot negotiate with her! We ought to have been forewarned on commencing the war that we were not to make peace until a certain form of government was re-established amongst our enemies—until the republic was abolished—until they had adopted the institutions it pleased us to give them.

Pitt, resolute in his purpose, unaffected by this encounter of reason and eloquence, still shrouding his veritable motives, obtained all he sought—loans, maritime impressment, suspension of the *habeas-corpus* act. Aided by his treasures, his navy, the two hundred thousand men of Austria, and the desperate courage of the French emigrants, he determined to wage another campaign, sure at least of domineering on water, even though victory on land remained with the enthusiastic nation he assailed.

To resume: these negotiations, these conflicts of opinion in Europe, these preparations for war, prove how important a station France then held in the world. At this period arrived contemporaneously ambassadors from Sweden, Denmark, Holland, Prussia, Tuscany, Venice, and America. Upon their arrival at Paris, they proceeded to visit the president of the convention, whom they sometimes found dwelling on a third or fourth storey, and whose simple, unaffected welcome had superseded the pompous receptions of the old court. They were afterwards introduced into that famous hall, where sat, on naked benches and in homely costume, the assembly which, by its power and the greatness of its passions, no longer appeared ridiculous, but terrible and imposing in the eyes of men. They were conducted to chairs opposite that of the president; they spoke in a sitting posture; the president replied to them in the same manner, addressing them by the titles expressed in their credentials. He subsequently gave them the fraternal embrace, and proclaimed them representatives of the states from which they came accredited. A gallery was reserved for them to attend the convention when they thought fit, and witness those tempestuous debates which inspired foreigners with mingled curiosity and terror. Such was the ceremonial employed with regard to the ambassadors of the powers at peace with France. Simplicity became a republic, receiving without ostentation, but with propriety and respect, the envoys of the kings it had vanquished. The name of Frenchman was honourable at this epoch: it was ennobled by the most brilliant victories, and the most unsullied of all—those which a nation had won in defending its existence and its liberty.

CHAPTER XLII.

NEW CONSPIRACY OF THE PATRIOTS.—MASSACRE IN THE PRISONS OF LYONS.—ADMINISTRATIVE AND FINANCIAL MODIFICATIONS.—INSURRECTION OF THE 1ST PRAIRIAL; EVENTS OF THAT DAY AND THE FOLLOWING.—ARREST AND EXECUTION OF SEVERAL REPRESENTATIVES.—DISARMING OF THE PATRIOTS.—MEASURES FOR THE RETIREMENT OF ASSIGNATS.

The events of Germinal had wrought on the two parties which now divided France the invariable consequence of an indecisive collision: those two parties had become more violent—each more furiously intent on extirpating the other. Over the whole south, and particularly at Avignon, Marseilles, and Toulon, the revolutionists, more menacing and audacious than ever, defying all the efforts that were made to disarm or remand them to their communes, persisted in clamouring for the liberation of patriots, the death of returned emigrants, and the constitution of 1793. They corresponded with their partisans in other provinces; they urged them to join them and to concentrate on two principal points—Toulon for the south, Paris for the north. When they should be in sufficient force at Toulon, they intended, so they alleged, to arouse the departments and march to unite with their brethren of the north. This was precisely the scheme of the federalists in 1793.

Their adversaries, whether royalists or Girondists, had also grown more emboldened since the government, attacked in Germinal, had given the signal for persecutions. Masters of the local administrations, they turned to terrible account the decrees enacted against the patriots. They immured them as accomplices of Robespierre or as intromitters with the public funds unannealed by acquittances: they disarmed them as participators in the tyranny abolished on the 9th Thermidor, or chased them from place to place as men who had quitted their communes. It was in the south, more especially, that the severities against the unfortunate patriots were the most actively pursued, for violence necessarily engenders violence. In the department of the Rhone, the reaction was assuming an aspect of most fearful malignity. The royalists, who had been obliged to fly before the remorseless energy of 1793, returned through Switzerland, crossed the frontiers, entered Lyons with false passports, discoursed largely concerning the king, concerning religion, concerning former prosperity, and dwelt pertinaciously on the massacres and enormities consequent upon the siege, with the insidious view of converting that republican city to the tenets of monarchy. Thus, the royalists established themselves at Lyons as the patriots at Toulon. Précy even was stated to be concealed in the city, the calamities of which he had so greatly aggravated by his courageous defence. Numbers of emigrants, accumulated at Basle, Berne, and Lausanne, indulged in more presumptuous language than had ever distinguished them. They spoke confidently of their approaching return, affirming that their friends were now in power; they boasted that the son of Louis XVI. would be shortly replaced on the throne, themselves honourably recalled, and their

property restored to them; they said that, with the exception of certain military chiefs whom it would be necessary to punish, every one would promote this restoration with eagerness and zeal. At Lausanne, where the youthful generation was enthusiastic in favour of the French revolution, they were rudely assailed, and compelled to observe silence. In other places they were allowed to chatter as they listed; their vauntings were derided, for they had become stale and trite in a rehearsal of six years; but umbrage was taken at several amongst them, who were pensioned by the Austrian police as spies upon the words of travellers in inns and hostelries. It was in this quarter, that is to say, towards Lyons, that companies had again been formed, under the titles of *Companies of the Sun* and *Companies of Jesus*, for the specific objects of scouring the country, penetrating into towns, and slaughtering the patriots living in retirement on their lands or detained in the prisons. The banished priests likewise re-entered France by this frontier, and had already overspread the eastern provinces, where they declared null and void all the ecclesiastical ordinances the conforming priests had administered; they rebaptised the children, remarried those joined in wedlock, and inspired the people with hatred and contempt of the government. They took the precaution, however, of hovering near the frontiers, in order to retreat at the first signal. Those who had not been sentenced to exile, and who enjoyed an alimentary provision in France, and permission to exercise their religious duties, equally abused with their banished brethren the toleration of the government. Not content with celebrating mass in buildings hired or lent for the purpose, they stirred up the people and headed them in forcibly appropriating the churches which had devolved in possession upon the communes. Numerous scandalous scenes of this description had occurred, and the employment of force had been found necessary to compel observance of the laws. At Paris, the venal journalists of royalism, directed by Lemaître, wrote with more hardihood than ever against the revolution, and almost openly advocated a return to monarchy. Lacroix, the editor of the *Spectator*, had been acquitted upon the prosecution commenced against him, since which event the tribe of libellists no longer stood in awe of the revolutionary tribunal.

Thus the two parties were in array, prepared for a decisive conflict. The revolutionists, resolved to strike a blow of which the 12th Germinal had been but the portent, openly conspired. They planned schemes in every quarter, since they had lost the principal leaders, who alone revolved designs for the entire party. A meeting was organised at the house of one Lagrelet, in the Rue de Bretagne, wherein they canvassed a project for instigating several simultaneous risings, at the head whereof Cambon, Maribon-Montaut, and Thuriot, were to be placed, some to attack the prisons and deliver the patriots, others to abduct the committees, and others, again, to besiege the convention and wring from it the requisite decrees. Once masters of the convention, the conspirators purposed to coerce it into reintegrating the imprisoned deputies, annulling the condemnation pronounced against Billaud-Varennes, Collot-d'Herbois, and Barrère, excluding the seventy-three, and proclaiming *instanter* the constitution of 1793. All the arrangements were complete, even to the crowbars for forcing the prisons, to the tickets for ascertaining the initiated, to a piece of cloth for hanging at the window of the house whence orders were to issue. A letter was intercepted, concealed in a loaf, and addressed to a prisoner, in which these words occurred: "On the day you receive eggs half-white and half-red, you will hold yourselves in readiness." The day fixed was the 1st of Prairial. One of the conspirators betrayed the secret, and revealed to the committee of general safety the details of the project. That committee immediately caused all the leaders specified to be arrested, which unfortunately failed to derange the plans of the patriots, for every one was now a leader amongst them, and they plotted in a thousand places at once. Rovère, worthy to be stigmatised in times past with the name of terrorist under the old committee of public welfare, but at present a furious reactionist, presented a report to the convention upon this plot, and inculpated sundry deputies as appointed to take the lead of the various assemblages. Those deputies were strangers to the scheme, and their names had been used without their knowledge, as men who were needful in the emergency, and whose dispositions could be relied on. Already condemned to detention at Ham, they had not obeyed the sentence, and still contrived to elude its execution. Rovère prevailed on the assembly to decide that, unless they forthwith surrendered themselves prisoners, they should be deemed banished by the mere fact of contumacy. This abortive project sufficiently indicated a coming storm.

When this new machination of the patriots was made public by the press, an extraordinary ferment manifested itself in Lyons, and the previous animosity harboured against them was redoubled in intensity. At the moment a prominent terrorist denunciator chanced to be undergoing trial, prosecuted under the decree passed against the accomplices of Robespierre. The Parisian journals subsequently arrived, containing the report presented by Rovère to the convention upon the conspiracy of the 29th Germinal. The Lyonnese began to exhibit symptoms of turbulence; the majority of them, be it remembered, had to deplore either the ruin of their fortunes or the death of their kinsmen. They gathered tumultuously around the hall of the tribunal. The representative Boisset appeared in the midst, on a charger; they closed upon him, vociferously enumerating their several wrongs against the man on trial. The promoters of disorder, the members of the companies of Jesus and the Sun, hastened to profit by this commotion, fomented the excitement, moved towards the prisons, stormed them, and massacred seventy or eighty prisoners, reputed terrorists, and cast their bodies into the Rhone. The national guards made efforts to prevent this slaughter, but perhaps failed to evince the zeal they would have displayed had less resentment animated them against the victims of the day.

Thus, scarcely had the Jacobin plot of the 29th Germinal transpired, ere the counter-revolutionists had answered it by the massacre of the 5th Floreal (24th April) at Lyons. The sincere republicans, albeit holding in abhorrence the projects of the terrorists, were now struck with alarm at those of the counter-revolutionists. Hitherto their views had been chiefly directed to the prevention of a new reign of terror, and royalism had not entered within the scope of their apprehensions; royalism, in sooth, appeared so inconceivable, after the executions of the revolutionary tribunal and the victories of the republic. But when they saw it, hunted as it were from La Vendée, returning through Lyons, forming companies of assassins, pushing turbulent priests into the heart of France, and dictating at Paris itself writings teeming with the diatribes of emigration, they took counsel upon such facts, and concluded, that to the rigorous measures adopted against the abettors of terror must be added others against the partisans of royalty. In the first place, to leave without pretexts those who had suffered from former excesses, and who demanded retribution on the perpetrators, they moved the convention to enjoin upon the tribunals a greater degree of activity in judging the individuals accused of malversations, abuses of authority, and oppressive acts. Thereafter they deliberated on the measures best calculated to repress the royalists. Chénier, known for his literary talents and his stanch republican principles, was charged with a report upon this subject. In his exposition he drew a forcible picture of France, of the two parties disputing its empire, and especially of the insidious practices of the emigration and the clergy. He pro

posed that every returned emigrant should be forthwith brought before the tribunals, to undergo the application of the law; that every banished person should be considered an emigrant, who, having revisited France, was found therein at the expiration of a month; that whoever violated the law on religious worship, and attempted to take forcible possession of churches, should be visited with six months' imprisonment; that every writer who tended to bring the national representation into contempt, or to promote the return of royalty, should be condemned to banishment; and, lastly, that all the authorities charged with the disarming of the patriots should be obliged to assign motives for each deprivation of arms. All these measures were received with universal approbation, except two, which gave rise to observations. Thibaudeau held it imprudent to punish with six months' imprisonment infractions of the law on religious worship. He argued with reason that the churches were adapted only for one purpose, that of religious ceremonies; that the people, sufficiently devout to attend mass in private conventicles, would always view with indignant regret their exclusion from the edifices in which it was formerly celebrated; and that, whilst declaring the government for ever unconnected with the cost of any worship, the churches might be restored to the Catholics, in order to avert complaints, disturbances, and perhaps a general La Vendée. Thibaudeau's remarks made but a slight impression, for the convention was apprehensive lest, by restoring the churches to the Catholics, even on condition of their upholding them at their own charge, the clergy might revive the imposing pomp of their ritual, which had heretofore materially contributed to exalt their influence. Tallien, who had become a journalist with Fréron, and who, either on that account or from an affectation of justice, desired to protect the independence of the press, controverted the proposal for exiling writers. He maintained that the provision was arbitrary, and allowed too inordinate a latitude for severities against the press. His argument was just; but, in this state of open war with royalism, it perhaps behoved the convention to adopt a strong resolution against those libellists, who laboured so earnestly to reclaim France thus prematurely to monarchical ideas. Louvet, that impetuous Girondist, whose suspicions had wrought such mischief for his party, but who was, undoubtedly, one of the most sincere men in the assembly, hastened to answer Tallien, and conjured all the friends of the republic to forget their mutual differences and grievances, and unite against the oldest, the only veritable enemy they all had, namely royalty. The testimony of Louvet in favour of violent measures could scarcely be impugned; for he had braved a most ruthless proscription in combating the system of revolutionary government. The whole assembly applauded his noble and frank declaration, voted the printing and transmission of his discourse to all the towns of France, and adopted the proposed article, to the sad confusion of Tallien, who had chosen so injudicious a moment to vindicate a maxim inherently just and true.

Thus the convention, having previously ordained prosecutions against the patriots, their deprivation of arms, and their return to their communes, had found it necessary likewise to renew the laws against emigrants and exiled priests, and to prescribe penalties against the opening of churches and against royalist publications. But penal laws are feeble guarantees against parties actuated by an inextinguishable and rancorous feud. The deputy Thibaudeau propounded an opinion that the organisation of the governing committees, since the 9th Thermidor, was too weak and subdivided. This organisation, instituted at the moment when the dictatorship was subverted, had been prompted solely by the dread of a new tyranny. Consequently, to an exceeding tension on all the springs of government had succeeded an extreme relaxation. Each committee had been reinvested with its peculiar authority, in order to destroy the too predominant influence of the committee of public welfare; whence had resulted intricacies, delays, and a complete paralysis of the government. For example, if troubles occurred in a particular department, the administrative gradation in observance assigned the intimation to the committee of general safety; this committed summoned to its assistance that of public welfare, and in certain cases that of legislation; before these committees could unite in conference, each required to be complete; and besides the time thus lost, was added the interval consumed in deliberation. Thus, such meetings were attended with many impediments; and, when formed, were too numerous to decide and act with befitting promptitude. Were it merely requisite to dispatch twenty men on guard, the committee of general safety, charged with the police, was obliged to make application to the military committee. It now became obvious how erroneous was the excessive alarm at the tyranny of the old committee of public welfare, and the precaution against a danger thenceforward chimerical.

A government thus constituted could offer but a very feeble resistance to virulent factions, or curb them by a display of concentrated energy. The deputy Thibaudeau accordingly proposed a simplification of the government. He recommended that the committees should be restricted to the simple function of originating laws, and that executive measures should belong exclusively to the committee of public welfare; that the latter should unite the police to its other attributes, and, in consequence, the committee of general safety be abolished; and, lastly, that the committee of public welfare, thus burdened with the whole weight of government, should be increased to twenty-four members, in order to meet the vast extension of its duties. Those timid personages in the assembly, who were ever ready to take alarm at impossible dangers, exclaimed against this project, and maintained that it would revive the former dictatorship. The question being thus introduced, and scope given to imagination, numerous were the suggestions tendered to the wisdom of the convention. Those who cherished the phantasy of returning to constitutional forms, to the division of prerogatives, proposed to create an executive power apart from the convention, in order that administrative and legislative functions might be kept asunder; others, again, proposed to take the members of this power from the ranks of the convention, but to interdict them, during the continuance of their authority, from exercising the legislative vote. After long and discursive debates, the assembly arrived at the conclusion, that, inasmuch as its existence would not be prolonged beyond the span of two or three months, that is to say, for the interval necessary to complete the constitution, it would be folly to waste its latter moments in framing a provisional constitution, and, above all, to discard the dictatorship at a period so fraught with peril, when strength was more than ever needful. Consequently, it rejected all the propositions tending to promote a division of powers; but the project of Thibaudeau excited too much dread of an opposite character to be adopted, and the convention contented itself with rendering the action of the committees less fettered. It decided that they should be reduced to the mere faculty of submitting laws; that the committee of public welfare should alone possess the direction of executive measures, but that the police should remain with the committee of general safety; that the joint conferences of committees should for the future be managed by delegates; and, finally, to guard still more against that redoubtable committee of public welfare, which caused so much apprehension, that it, this last-named committee, should be deprived of the initiative in laws, and be for ever debarred from taking any steps tending to the impeachment of a deputy.

After these measures had been adopted, with the

view of imparting additional energy to the government, the convention resumed consideration of those financial questions, the discussion whereof had been abruptly ruptured by the events of the month Germinal. The abolition of the maximum, of requisitions, of the sequestration—in short, of the entire system of forced expedients—by restoring all things to their natural channel, had rendered still more rapid the decline of assignats. Sales being no longer forced, and prices having become free, commodities had been enhanced in an extraordinary manner, and assignats of course proportionably depreciated. The communications with other countries being re-established, the assignat had again entered into competition with foreign bills, and its inferiority had been speedily manifested by the continual fall of its exchangeable value. Thus the degradation of the paper-money was complete in all respects; and, according to the ordinary law of gravitation, the rapidity of the descent was accelerated according to the depth of the fall. All sudden fluctuations in money-values lead to hazardous speculations, that is to say, to stockjobbing; and as these fluctuations never occur except as the consequence of either financial or political disorder, when production languishes, when industry and trade are discouraged, this species of enterprise is almost the only occupation left; wherefore, instead of fabricating or transporting additional commodities, capitalists are content to speculate on the variations of price in those already on the spot. In lieu of producing, ingenuity and sagacity are diverted to wagering on what is already produced. Stockjobbing, therefore, which had gained such a height in the months of April, May, and June, 1793, when the defection of Dumouriez, the insurrection of La Vendée, and the federalist confederacy, provoked so considerable a depreciation of assignats, reappeared more actively than before in the months of Germinal, Floreal, and Prairial, year 3 (April and May 1795). Thus to the horrors of famine were added the scandal of reckless gambling, which materially aided to enhance the price of commodities and to precipitate the downfall of the paper. The course of the speculators was the same as in 1793—the same, indeed, as ever. They purchased articles of merchandise, which, rising in relation to the assignat with great rapidity, grew in value in their hands, and procured them in short periods large profits. All hopes and all exertions were thus directed to promote the degradation of the paper. Many articles were sold and resold thousands of times without being removed. Nay, bargains were made on imaginary investments. An article was bought of a seller who had it not, but who was to deliver it at a fixed term: the term elapsed, the vender did not deliver it, but paid the difference between the rate of contract and the price of the day if the article had risen, or received the difference if the article had fallen in value. The Palais-Royal, already so odious in the eyes of the people as the resort of "the gilded youth," was the place where the gamblers assembled. A citizen could not traverse that locality without being assailed by traffickers, who carried in their hands stuffs, gold snuff-boxes, silver vases, or rich bronzes: it was veritably a den of thieves. At the Café de Chartres all the speculators in the precious metals chiefly gathered. Although gold and silver were no longer considered merchandise, and since 1793 it was forbidden, under severe penalties, to exchange them against assignats, the traffic in them proceeded almost openly. The louis-d'or was sold for 160 livres in paper; and in the space of an hour it was made to vary from 160 to 200 and even 210 livres.

Thus a deplorable scarcity of bread, an absolute deficiency of fuel, amid a cold still rigorous in the heart of spring, an excessive enhancement in the price of all commodities, the impossibility of obtaining them with a paper which fell every day in value; and amidst all these calamities a loathsome jobbing, accelerating the depreciation of assignats by its operations, and presenting the spectacle of scandalous gambling—of sudden fortunes mocking the general misery—such were the exhaustless topics of invective afforded to the patriots for inflaming the wrath of the people. To alleviate the public distress, and to prevent a general outbreak, it was essential to remove these causes of complaint; but therein lay the ever-recurring and insurmountable difficulty.

The measure deemed indispensable, as we have mentioned, was to enhance the assignats by withdrawing them; but to withdraw them it was necessary to sell domains, and here the real obstacle occurred, which was either not comprehended or wilfully overlooked—the difficulty of obtaining purchasers with the ability to pay for a third of the French territory. Violent means had been rejected, to wit, arresting the currency altogether or levying a forced loan; the choice vibrated between the two voluntary expedients, that is to say, between a lottery and a bank. The proscription of Cambon decided the preference in favour of Johannot's scheme, which contemplated the formation of a bank. But, pending the interval requisite to realise this chimerical idea, which, even though it succeeded, could never restore assignats to the standard of specie, the grand evîl, that of a difference between the nominal and the real value of the paper, still remained. Thus the creditor of the state or of individuals received the assignat at par, and could reinvest it only at a loss of nine-tenths at the least. Proprietors who had leased their lands received but the tenth fraction of their rents. Tenants had been seen to discharge the amount of their rents with the produce of a sack of corn, a fatted hog, or a horse. The public exchequer, especially, suffered a loss which contributed to ruin the finances of the state, and, as a necessary consequence, the credit of the paper-money. It received in satisfaction of taxes the assignat at its nominal value, and collected monthly fifty millions, which were equivalent to five at the utmost. To supply the deficit thus accruing, and to meet the extraordinary expenses of the war, it was obliged to issue assignats to the extent of eight hundred millions per month, on account of their great depreciation. The first remedial measure indispensable, therefore, whilst awaiting the effect of the fallacious projects devised for withdrawing and enhancing them, was to establish the relation between their real value and their nominal value, so that the republic, the creditors of the state, the owners of lands, the capitalists, all the individuals, in short, paid in paper, might not be involved in utter bankruptcy and destitution. Johannot proposed to declare the precious metals the standard of value. According to his plan, the current price of assignats, with reference to gold or silver, was to be daily ascertained, and all engagements acquitted on that basis. Thus, he to whom 1000 francs were due would receive 10,000 francs in assignats, if they were only worth the tenth in specie. The taxes, rents, incomes of all kinds, payments for national domains, would all be rendered in money or in assignats at the current rate. This selection of specie, as the common regulator of all values, was opposed, first, from a lingering antipathy against the precious metals, which were accused of having ruined the paper; and, secondly, because the English, having a profusion thereof, would be enabled, so it was gravely argued, to make them fluctuate at their pleasure, and thus control the course of the assignats. Such reasons were truly miserable, but they weighed with the convention to reject metals as the measure of value. Thereupon Jean-Bon-Saint-André suggested the adoption of corn, which formed amongst all nations the essential basis whereby prices of other articles were necessarily regulated. By this method, taking the instance of a man discharging a liability, the quantity of corn which the sum due could command would be calculated, as at the period when the transaction had been concluded, and so many assignats paid in

liquidation as would purchase the same quantity at the time of settlement. Thus, he who owed interest, rent, or taxes, to the amount of 1000 francs, at a period when 1000 francs represented 100 quintals of wheat, would give the current value of 100 quintals of wheat in assignats. But here a fatal objection was started. The exigencies of the war and the depression of agriculture had tended to raise considerably the price of corn in relation to all other produce or commodities, even in the proportion of four to one. Wheat ought, according to the present rate of assignats, to have cost only ten times the price of 1790, that is to say, 100 francs the quintal; but it cost nevertheless 400. He who owed 1000 francs in 1790 would now owe 10,000 francs assignats, accounting after the standard of specie, and 40,000 francs, reckoning upon the basis of wheat; he would thus be mulcted in three times his real debt. Calculation was therefore completely baffled as to the adoption of a standard of value. The deputy Raffron proposed to reduce the assignats one per cent. per diem, dating from the 30th of the month. An immediate outcry arose that this was a bankruptcy, as if it were not one to place assignats on a metallic or corn basis, or in other words, reduce them at one blow ninety per cent. Bourdon, who discoursed incessantly on finances without understanding them, caused a decree to be passed that no proposition tending to bankruptcy would be entertained by the legislature.

Moreover, the allocation of the assignat to a rate of exchange had an inconvenience of the gravest nature. If in all payments, whether for taxes or national domains, the assignat should be taken for the future only at the ratio to which it daily sunk, no limit could be assigned to its decline, for then there would be no countervailing agency. In the present state of matters, the assignat being still available for its nominal value in the discharge of taxes, rents, and all sums overdue, it fulfilled a service which gave a certain reality to its value; but if it were received henceforth universally only at the standard of the day, it must fall indefinitely and without measure. The assignat emitted to-day for 1000 francs might to-morrow be worth but 100 francs, one franc, or one centime: true, this depreciation would injure no one, either individuals or the state, for all would take it only for what it was worth; but its value, being forced in no direction, would forthwith decline to the lowest ebb. There was no positive reason why a nominal thousand millions should not dwindle to one substantial franc; and in such case the resource of paper-money, still indispensable to the government, would fail it altogether.

Dubois-Crancé, finding all these projects fraught with danger, opposed the reduction of assignats to a basis, and disregarding the sufferings of those who were impoverished by payments in paper, advocated simply the exaction of the land-tax in kind. The state would thus be enabled to ensure the supply of the armies and the large towns, and to dispense with an emission of from three to four thousand millions of paper, which it must disburse in order to satisfy inevitable demands. This scheme, which seemed plausible at the first blush, was discarded after more mature examination. Some other was to be sought for.

Meanwhile, the evil increased daily: disturbances occurred in all quarters on account of the scarcity of provisions and of wood for fuel; at the Palais-Royal bread was seen exposed to sale at twenty-two francs the pound; boatmen at one of the passages of the Seine had demanded 40,000 francs for a service formerly performed in consideration of 100. A species of despair seized on the minds of men; exclamations broke forth that the country must be extricated from this horrible condition—that measures must be found at all hazards. In this cruel perplexity, Bourdon [de-l'Oise], ignorant as a financier, who treated all these questions in a very declamatory style, discovered, assuredly by accident, the only feasible method of escaping from the embarrassment. To bring the assignats under the regulation of a standard was difficult, as we have shown, both on account of the dilemma touching the selection of specie or corn as the basis, and because it would immediately rob them of all value and expose them to an interminable depreciation. To enhance them by withdrawal was equally difficult, for the national domains must be sold, and the disposition of so prodigious a quantity of immoveable property was almost impossible.

Nevertheless, one mode of selling the domains was practicable, and that consisted in placing them within the reach of purchasers by exacting from them merely a value commensurate with the state of the public fortunes. The domains were at present sold by auction; whence it resulted that offers were based on the depreciation of the paper, and five or six times the price of 1790 was now to be given in assignats. This, it is true, was still only the half of the value the lands bore at that period, but it was too high for the present times, since the land, in reality, was not worth the half, not the fourth of what it had been worth in 1790. There is nothing absolute in value. In America, on vast continents, lands are worth little, because their mass is infinitely superior to the amount of capital. It was the same, so to speak, with France in 1795. The valuation of 1790 had become fictitious, and it was therefore requisite to forego it and adopt one suitable to the era of 1795, for the true value of a thing must depend upon the capability of buying it.

In consequence, Bourdon-de-l'Oise proposed to adjudge lands, without auctions and by mere minutes of agreement, to all who should offer in assignats three times the estimation of 1790—between two competitors, the preference to be accorded to him who had first made the application. Thus, a property valued at 100,000 francs in 1790 would now be bought for 300,000 in assignats. The assignats having fallen to a fifteenth of their value, 300,000 francs represented in reality only 20,000 sterling francs; therefore an estate was to be purchased for 20,000 francs which in 1790 was worth 100,000 francs. This by no means involved an absolute loss of four-fifths, because, in sooth, it was impossible to obtain more. Besides, had the sacrifice been real, still it ought to have been made, for immense advantages attended the scheme.

In the first place, it obviated the inconveniences of establishing a standard of value which would destroy the paper altogether. We have already explained, in fact, that the assignat, levelled to a current rate of exchange for all purposes, even for the payment of national domains, would be entirely deprived of any fixed value, and must sink into nullity. But by preserving to it the faculty of paying for domains, a fixed value was secured to it, for it represented a certain quantity of land; this land being at all times procurable, it would always retain such value as the land itself possessed, and utterly perish only with its substantial representative: consequently the plan averted the annihilation of the paper. But it had other good properties. It is certain, and what occurred two months afterwards proved it, that all the domains might have been forthwith disposed of, on condition of their being paid for at the rate of three times the valuation of 1790. All, or nearly all, the assignats might thus have been retired; those which remained in circulation would have recovered their value; the state might have ventured on a fresh emission, and rendered this resource again available. Doubtless, by requiring only thrice the estimation of 1790, it became obliged to give much more land in order to retire the floating mass of paper: but still sufficient would remain to it for the purpose of meeting extraordinary exigencies. Moreover, the taxes, at present almost unproductive since they were paid in worthless assignats, would be restored in value if the assignats were either absorbed or enhanced. The domains, surrendered to private enterprise and industry, would immediately become productive both to

individuals and the state, and the most afflictive calamity would be obviated by the just relation of values being re-established.

The project of Bourdon-de l'Oise was adopted, and preliminary steps taken for putting it into prompt execution. But the storm which had been long gathering, and whereof the 12th Germinal had been but the precursor, was becoming more portentous than ever; it had settled on the horizon, and was on the point of bursting. The two antagonist parties had continued to agitate in their respective spheres of action. The counter-revolutionists, predominating in certain sections, prepared petitions against the measures introduced by Chénier in his report, and particularly against the provision punishing with banishment the abuses of the press by the royalists. On their side, the patriots, reduced to extremity, meditated designs prompted by despair. The execution of Fouquier-Tinville, condemned with several jurymen of the revolutionary tribunal for the manner in which he had exercised his functions, had urged their exasperation to the highest pitch. Although detected in their scheme of the 29th Germinal, and more recently foiled in a second attempt to constitute all the sections permanent, under pretence of the famine, they conspired with unabated activity in different populous quarters. They had now so far matured their plans, as to form a central committee of insurrection, located between the quarters of Saint-Denis and Montmartre, in the Rue Mauconseil. It was composed of members of the old revolutionary committees, and of sundry individuals of similar character, almost all unknown beyond the precincts of their wards. The plan of insurrection was modelled on preceding outbreaks of the like nature: the women to be put in the van, followed by an immense concourse; the convention to be surrounded by such a multitude that no succours could reach it, and then compelled to discard the seventy-three, recall Billaud, Collot, and Barrère, liberate the deputies detained at Ham and all the incarcerated patriots, declare the constitution of 1793 in force, give a new commune to Paris, and revert to the revolutionary expedients of the maximum, requisitions, &c.—such was the plan of the patriots. They digested it into a manifesto, comprising eleven articles, and published "*in the name of the sovereign people re-entered upon their rights.*" They caused it to be printed on the evening of the 30th Floreal (19th May), and circulated through Paris. The inhabitants of the capital were exhorted to repair, *en masse*, to the convention, bearing on their hats these words: "*Bread and the Constitution of* '93." The entire night of the 30th Floreal to the 1st Prairial, was passed in commotion, in clamour, in furious menaces. Women scoured the streets, vociferating that on the morrow the convention must be visited; that it had murdered Robespierre only to assume his place; that it starved the people, protected the dealers who sucked the blood of the poor, and consigned to death all the patriots. They encouraged each other to march in the van, because, they said, the armed force would not venture to fire on women.

In the morning,* in fact, at the break of day, the tumult was general in the Faubourgs Saint-Antoine and Saint-Marceau, in the quarter of the Temple, in the Streets Saint-Denis and Saint-Martin, and, above all, in the City. The patriots rang all the bells they could command, beat the tattoo, and discharged pieces of ordnance. At the same instant, the tocsin pealed from the tower of L'Unité, by direction of the committee of general safety, and the sections began to muster; but those which were involved in the plot, had formed at early dawn, and were already under arms, long before the others had received any intimation to hold themselves in readiness. The multitude, constantly swelling, advanced gradually towards the Tuileries. A gang of women, interspersed with drunken men, and yelling "Bread and the constitution of '93!" troops of bandits, armed with pikes, swords, and every variety of weapon, throngs of the lowest populace, and several battalions of the sections regularly armed, composed this heterogeneous assemblage, and marched without order towards the point assigned for all—the convention. About ten o'clock they had reached the Tuileries; they forthwith beleaguered the hall of the assembly, and blocked all the avenues.

The deputies, summoned in all haste, were at their post. The members of the Mountain, having held no communication with the obscure committee of insurrection, had not been apprised of the intended movement, and, like their colleagues, were warned of it only by the cries of the populace and the knell of the tocsin. They were even moved with distrust, fearing that the committee of general safety had laid a snare for the patriots, and incited them to tumult in order to gain an opportunity of treating them with additional severity. The assembly was no sooner constituted, than Isabeau rose to read the manifesto of insurrection. The galleries, early occupied by the patriots, immediately resounded with deafening acclamations. Seeing the convention thus environed, a member exclaimed, it would know how to die at its post. Instantly all the deputies sprang to their feet, and repeated emphatically, "*Yes! yes!*" A gallery, filled more favourably than the others, applauded this declaration. Meanwhile, the pervading din grew more distinct, the roar of the great popular wave reverberated in louder echoes: deputies appeared successively in the tribune, and offered divers suggestions. Suddenly, a swarm of women was seen pouring into the galleries; they rushed precipitately forward, treading under foot those who occupied them, and vociferating, "Bread! bread!" The president Vernier covered, and commanded them to be silent; but they not the less continued to cry, "Bread! bread!" Some clenched their fists at the assembly, others mocked its distress. Numerous members arose to speak, but their efforts to obtain a hearing were ineffectual. They called upon the president to enforce the respect due to the convention; the president was powerless. André Dumont, who had presided with firmness on the 12th Germinal, succeeded Vernier, and seated himself on the bench. The disturbance continued, the shouts of "Bread! bread!" were reiterated by the women who had stormed the galleries. André Dumont declared he would order their removal: howls on one side, plaudits on the other, greeted the announcement. At this moment, violent blows were heard on the door to the left of the bench, and the noise of a multitude endeavouring to force it. The stanchions of the door creaked, and the plaster began to fall. In this perilous situation, the president addressed a general, who had presented himself at the bar with a company of young men, to deliver on the part of the section of Bon-Conseil a judicious petition, in these words: "General, I summon you to watch over the national representation; and I appoint you provisional commandant of the armed force." The assembly confirmed this nomination by its applause. The general affirmed he would die at his post, and departed for the scene of combat. Presently, the noise at one of the doors ceased, and a degree of calmness ensued. André Dumont, addressing himself to the galleries, enjoined all good citizens present in them to withdraw, and announced he was about to employ force in compelling their evacuation. Many citizens retired, but the women remained, still echoing the same shouts. In a few minutes, the general, charged by the president to watch over the convention, returned with an escort of fusiliers, and several young men who had provided themselves with postilions' whips. They scaled the galleries, and expelled the women, chasing them away with sonorous chastisement. The females fled, uttering lamentable cries, relieved by

* 1st Prairial year 3 (Wednesday, 20th May).



the acclamations of the major part of the spectators.

Scarcely were the galleries cleared, ere the noise at the door on the left recurred. The crowd had returned to the charge; it was again assailing the door, which at length yielded to the pressure, started, and fell in fragments. The members of the convention retreated to the upper benches; the gendarmerie formed a barrier around to protect them. Divers armed citizens of the sections hastened into the hall, by the door on the right, to repulse the populace. They at first succeeded, and captured some women; but they were speedily obliged to recoil in their turn before the victorious horde. Fortunately the section of Grenelle, the first to fly to the succour of the convention, arrived at this critical moment, and furnished an important reinforcement. The deputy Auguis was at its head, sword in hand. "Forward!" he cried. The battalion closed, advanced, crossed bayonets, and repelled without wounding the multitude of assailants, who shrunk back as the glittering phalanx approached. One of the insurgents was grasped by the collar, dragged to the foot of the bench, rifled, and his pockets found full of bread. It was now two o'clock. Comparative tranquillity revived in the assembly: a resolution was passed that the section of Grenelle had deserved well of the country. All the foreign ambassadors had repaired to the gallery set apart for their use, and remained spectators of this scene, as if to partake in some sort the perils of the convention. It was decreed that especial mention of their courageous sympathy should be recorded in the votes.

Meanwhile the crowd gradually increased around the hall. Two or three sections only had been sufficiently alert to gain and penetrate the National Palace, and they were incapable of resisting the continually augmenting mass of assailants. Others had subsequently arrived, but strove in vain to reach the interior; they were debarred from communicating with the committees, they had no specific orders, and thus they halted in ignorance whether to make use of their arms. In a few moments the crowd made a fresh inroad through the Saloon of Liberty, and pushed onward to the prostrated door. The shouts "to arms!" were renewed; the armed force in the interior of the hall hurried to the threatened inlet. The president covered his head, and the assembly sat in calm solicitude. The two parties were speedily in collision; before the portal itself the struggle commenced: the defenders of the convention crossed their bayonets; the assailants on their side fired sundry shots; the bullets whistled through the hall and lodged in the walls. The deputies arose and cried with one accord, "The republic for ever!" Additional detachments poured in, traversed the hall from right to left, and reinforced those already sustaining the assault. The discharge of musketry was redoubled: the battalions charged and pierced the crowd amid the clash of sabres. But the vast mass behind the assailants urged them forward, drove them in their own despite upon the bayonets, overthrew all opposing obstacles, and swept like a torrent into the assembly. A deputy, named Féraud, recently arrived from the army of the Rhine, and who for the last fortnight had been scouring the environs of Paris to hasten the arrival of provisions, an ingenuous young man, glowing with courage and ardour, flew in front of the invading multitude, and conjured them to advance no farther. "Take my life," he exclaimed, laying bare his bosom; "you will enter only after passing over my body!" In fact, he extended himself on the ground, hoping to check them; but the infuriated mob derided his appeal, passed over his body, and pressed on towards the bench. Three o'clock had just struck. Intoxicated women, and men armed with swords, pikes, and muskets, bearing on their hats the words, "Bread and the constitution of '93," filled the hall; some occupied the lower seats abandoned by the deputies; others crowded the space below the bar; and others again planted themselves before the bench, or clustered on the steps leading to the chair of the president. A young officer of the sections, named Mally, stationed on the steps of the bench, tore from one of these men the motto on his hat. He was immediately fired upon, and he fell covered with wounds. At this moment, all the bayonets and pikes were directed upon the president; his head was enveloped in a forest of steel. The occupant of the chair was Boissy-d'Anglas, who had succeeded André Dumont; he remained immovable and calm. Féraud, who had raised himself from the floor, appeared at the foot of the tribune, tore his hair and smote his breast, with the aspect of a man in the deepest affliction; then, perceiving the danger of the president, he sprang forward to cover him with his body. One of the men with pikes endeavoured to restrain him by grasping his coat; an officer, with the view of disengaging Féraud, struck the man who detained him with his fist; the wretch retorted the blow with a pistol-bullet, which pierced Féraud in the shoulder. The unfortunate young man fell; he was borne along in the moving mass, trampled under foot, ultimately dragged out of the hall, and his corpse thrown to the populace.

Boissy-d'Anglas continued in the chair, amidst this frightful commotion, calm and imperturbable: the bayonets and the pikes still bristled as a halo around his head. Now commenced a scene of confusion no pen can adequately describe. Every one essayed to speak, and taxed his lungs in vain to make himself heard. The drums beat to restore silence; but the crowd, feeling delight in the chaos, roared the louder, kicked with their feet, clattering and hallooing with frantic joy at the spectacle of the condition to which the supreme council of the nation was reduced. It was not thus the 31st May had been accomplished, when the revolutionary party, having at its head the commune, the staff of the sections, and a considerable number of deputies, to receive and give the necessary injunctions, surrounded the convention with a silent and armed concourse, and, blockading without invading it, made it pass, with some semblance of dignity, the decrees required at the moment. In the present instance, all was clamour and tumult; no one could be heard, no means were ensured for even extorting an apparent concurrence in the desires of the patriots. An artilleryman, surrounded with fusileers, mounted the tribune to read the plan of insurrection. He was interrupted every instant by shouts, execrations, and the rolling of the drum. One man obtained a momentary lull, and began to address the multitude. "My friends," he said, "we are all here for the same cause. Danger presses, decrees are needed: allow your representatives to pass them." "Down! down!" they shouted to him for answer. The deputy Rhul, an old man of venerable aspect, and a zealous Mountaineer, endeavoured to utter a few words from his place, exhorting to silence; but he was stopped by a renewed storm of vociferations. Romme, a man of austere character, unconnected with the insurrection, as was all the Mountain, but desirous that the measures demanded by the people should be adopted, and perceiving with regret that this deplorable confusion would terminate in no result, like the movement of the 12th Germinal—he, Romme, earnestly begged to be heard. Duroi also urged a similar entreaty with an identical object: neither the one nor the other could obtain attention. The tumult recommenced, more terrible than ever, after these various essays, and continued thus for upwards of an hour longer. Whilst at its height, a head suddenly appeared, borne aloft on the point of a bayonet: it was beheld with a thrill of horror: the features could not be recognised. Some asserted it was the head of Fréron, others that of Féraud. It was Féraud's, too truly: the brigands had decapitated his corpse, and placed the head on the edge of a bayonet. They paraded it through the hall amid the

howls of the multitude. The fury against Boissy-d'Anglas was revived; he was again exposed to imminent peril; his head was enclosed in a circuit of bayonets, muskets were levelled at him on all sides, death menaced him from a thousand arms.

Thus the time elapsed until seven in the evening. A new terror was suggested to the minds of the representatives: they feared that the mob, which included many determined miscreants, would proceed to the last extremities, and massacre the national representation under the obscurity of night. Several members of the centre besought certain Mountaineers to exhort the populace to disperse. Vernier endeavoured to inculcate upon the insurgents that it was already late, that they ought now to retire, that they would expose the people to the danger of wanting bread by disarranging the operations for obtaining supplies. "That is the manœuvre," rejoined the crowd; "you have told us that for the last three months." Thereupon sundry cries broke from the multitude: one voice demanded the liberty of the patriots and of the arrested deputies; another the constitution of '93; a third the arrest of all emigrants; numerous others the permanence of the sections, the re-establishment of the commune, the appointment of a commander of the Parisian armed force, domiciliary visits in quest of concealed provisions, the assignats at par, &c. &c. One man, who contrived to gain a hearing for a few moments, insisted that the convention should immediately nominate a commander of the Parisian armed force, and select Soubrany for the post. Another, at a loss what to demand, exclaimed, "The arrest of knaves and cowards!" and for the space of thirty minutes, he repeated at intervals, in sonorous accents, "The arrest of knaves and cowards!"

One of the ringleaders, sensible at length of the necessity of gaining decisions from the convention, proposed that the deputies should descend from the upper benches to which they had retreated, collect in the middle of the hall, and there enter on deliberation. The idea was forthwith acted upon; the people forced the deputies from their seats, compelled them to descend, and drove them, like a flock of sheep, into the space intervening between the tribune and the lowest benches. Men encompassed them with pikes, forming a ring or pen around them with those weapons. Vernier superseded in the presidency Boissy-d'Anglas, who was exhausted with the fatigues of so arduous and perilous a post as he had occupied for the last six hours. It was nearly nine o'clock. A species of deliberation was organised: it was arranged that the people should remain covered, and the deputies alone raise their hats in sign of approbation or disapproval. The Mountaineers began to entertain hopes that the desired decrees might really be passed, and they proceeded accordingly to submit motions. Romme, who had already rendered himself conspicuous, moved that the enlargement of the patriots be ordained by decree. Duroi stated that, since the 9th Thermidor, the enemies of the country had promoted a fatal reaction; that the deputies arrested on the 12th Germinal had been so illegally, and that their recall must be forthwith pronounced. The president was obliged to put these different propositions to the vote; hats were raised, and cries of "Adopted! adopted!" uttered, amidst tremendous uproar, without the possibility of distinguishing whether the deputies had actually affirmed or negatived. Goujon followed Romme and Duroi, and maintained that means must be taken to ensure the execution of the decrees. He said that the commitees had not appeared; that it was of importance to know what they were doing; that they ought to be called upon to render an account of their proceedings, and be replaced by an extraordinary commission. Herein lay the great peril of the day to the Mountaineers. If the commitees remained free to act, they might advance to deliver the convention from its oppressors. Albitte the elder suggested that sufficient order was not manifested in the form of deliberation; that the bureau was not constituted, and that one ought immediately to be formed. It was composed forthwith. Bourbotte moved the arrest of newspaper editors. An unknown voice arose, crying that, to prove the patriots were not cannibals, the penalty of death should be abolished. "Yes, yes!" responded on all sides; "except for emigrants and the forgers of assignats." This proposition was adopted in the same manner as the preceding. Duquesnoi reverted to the subject introduced by Goujon, and moved the suspension of the committees and the nomination of an extraordinary commission of four members. On the instant, Bourbotte, Prieur [de-la-Marne], Duroi, and Duquesnoi himself, were appointed. Those four deputies accepted the functions confided to them. However hazardous they might be, they would know, so they asseverated, how to fulfil them and to die at their post. They prepared to depart, with the intention of repairing to the committees and seizing upon all authority. Here was the difficulty; and the success of the insurrection depended altogether upon the result of that enterprise.

It was nine o'clock: neither the committee of insurrection nor the committees of government had appeared to act during this long and terrible day. All that the committee of insurrection had been able to do, was to propel the people on the convention: as we have previously mentioned, it was composed of obscure leaders, such as remain in the latter days of a party, having no commune, no staff of the sections, no commander of the armed force, no deputies, at their disposition, and consequently incompetent to direct the insurrection with the combination and vigour requisite to ensure it success. They had sent forward a horde of furious wretches, who had committed horrible excesses, but who had done nothing they ought to have done. No detachment had been sent to suspend and neutralise the committees, or to open the prisons and deliver the energetic men whose aid would have been so valuable. The arsenal alone had been seized, which the gendarmerie of the tribunal, comprising the militia organised by Fouquier-Tinville, delivered to the first applicants. On the contrary, the governing committees, surrounded and defended by the "gilded youth," had employed the interval in strenuous efforts to muster the sections. The task was arduous amid the tumult which reigned, the terror wherewith many of them were struck, and the hostile feeling even, displayed by some. The commitees had early succeeded in assembling two or three, whose assistance, as we have seen, had been rendered nugatory by the force of the assailants. At a later period they had contrived to collect a greater number, owing chiefly to the zeal of the section Lepelletier, formerly known as that of the Filles St-Thomas; and towards night they were prepared to seize the moment when the multitude, wearied with fatigue, would begin to dwindle, in order to fall upon the insurrectionists and deliver the convention. Foreseeing that, during its prolonged invasion, the convention would be coerced into decrees repugnant to its wishes, they had passed a resolution, branding as spurious all decrees which might be adopted on that day. Their arrangements thus completed, Legendre, Auguis, Chénier, Delecloi, Bergoeng, and Kervélégan, had proceeded, at the head of strong detachments, towards the convention. Arrived there, they had agreed to leave the doors open, in order that the populace, pressed on one side, might retreat by the other. Legendre and Delecloi had then undertaken to penetrate into the hall, ascend the tribune despite all dangers, and summon the insurgents to withdraw. "If they refuse," they said to their colleagues, "do you charge, and fear nothing for us. Though we must perish in the tumult, still advance."

Legendre and Delecloi, in fact, penetrated into the hall at the very moment the four deputies nominated to compose the extraordinary commission were on the

point of departing. Legendre scaled the tribune, amidst insults and blows, and essayed to speak under a roar of howls. "I invite the assembly," he cried, "to remain firm, and the citizens who are present to retire." "Down! down!" shouted the mob. Legendre and Delecloi were compelled to withdraw. Duquesnoi then addressed his colleagues of the extraordinary commission, and urged them to follow him, so that they might at once suspend the committees, which it was obvious, he said, were in contravention to the resolutions of the assembly. Soubrany also engaged them to be prompt. Thereupon all four moved out of the hall; but they speedily encountered the detachment at the head of which marched the representatives Legendre, Kervélégan, and Auguis, and the commander of the national guard, Raffet. Prieur-de-la-Marne demanded of Raffet whether he had received from the president orders to enter. "I have nothing to do with you," replied Raffet, and he proceeded onwards. The multitude was again summoned to withdraw: the president repeated the invitation in the name of the law: it answered by yells. The detachments immediately lowered their bayonets and entered; the unarmed crowd yielded, but the men holding weapons stood and resisted; they were quickly repulsed, and fled, vociferating, "To us, Sans-culottes!" Part of the patriots returned at this cry, and charged with impetuosity the detachment which had penetrated. For a moment they had the advantage: the deputy Kervélégan was wounded in the hand; the Mountaineers, Bourbotte, Peyssard, and Gaston, exulted in shouts of victory. But the noise of the charge had resounded to the outer hall; a considerable reinforcement poured in, made a fresh onslaught upon the insurgents, drove them back, and pursued them at the point of the bayonet. They fled with precipitation, crowding through the doorways, clambering up the galleries, or leaping out of the windows. The hall of representatives was finally cleared, just on the stroke of midnight.

The convention, delivered from the assailants who had outraged by violence and death its hallowed precincts, took a few seconds to recover itself. Tranquillity gradually revived. "It is then too true," exclaimed a member, "that this assembly, the cradle of the republic, has once more narrowly escaped becoming its tomb! Fortunately, the criminal designs of the conspirators have again been foiled. But, representatives, you will not be worthy of the nation, unless you exact for it a signal vengeance." He was applauded from all sides; and, as on the 12th Germinal, the night was devoted to punishing the enormities of the day. But much graver delinquencies now demanded proportionably severer measures. The first care was to rescind the decrees proposed and passed by the insurgents. "Rescind is not the word," said a deputy to Legendre, who had submitted this motion. "The convention did not, could not vote, whilst ruffians were murdering one of its members. All that has been done is not the act of the convention, but of the brigands who oppressed it, and of some culpable representatives who rendered themselves their accomplices." The assembly accordingly declared all that had been done null and void. The secretaries burnt the minutes of the decrees carried by the rebels. All eyes were then turned in quest of the deputies who had taken part in the late tempestuous scene: they were eagerly pointed out, their names vehemently pronounced. "No longer," exclaimed Thibaudeau—"no longer any hope exists of reconciliation between us and a factious minority. Since the sword is drawn, we must combat it with the greater resolution, and profit by existing circumstances to restore peace and security in the heart of this assembly for ever. I move that you instantly decree the arrest of those deputies who, betraying all their duties, endeavoured to realise the views of the insurrection, and embodied them in laws. I move that the committees forthwith propound measures of severity against those mandatories, recreant at once to their country and their oaths." The contumacious deputies were thereupon designated, to wit, Rhul, Romme, and Duroi, who had enjoined silence in order to open the deliberation; Albitte, who had caused the constitution of a bureau; Goujon and Duquesnoi, who had urged the suspension of the committees and the formation of an extraordinary commission of four members; Bourbotte and Prieur-de-la-Marne, who had accepted, with Duroi and Duquesnoi, the appointment of members of that commission; Soubrany, whom the rebels had nominated for commander of the Parisian army; and, lastly, Peyssard, who had shouted "victory" during the action. Duroi and Goujon desired to speak: they were not permitted; they were execrated as assassins, and instantly decreed under arrest. A suggestion was offered, that means should be taken to prevent them escaping, as the majority of those who had been condemned on the 12th Germinal. The president directed the gendarmerie to surround them and convey them to the bar. Search was made for Romme, who shrunk from observation: Bourdon stretched out his hand, detecting him; he was dragged to the bar with his colleagues. The spirit of vengeance, thus aroused, demanded more ample gratification: all the Mountaineers who had signalised themselves on extraordinary missions in the departments, long obnoxious objects, now likewise fell under anathema. "I move," exclaimed a member, "the arrest of Lecarpentier, the executioner of La Manche." "Of Pinet the elder," cried another voice, "the executioner of the people of Biscay." "Of Borie," added a third, "the devastator of the South, and of Fayau, one of the exterminators of La Vendée." These propositions were adopted amid shouts of "The convention for ever! The republic for ever!" "We must have no more half measures," said Tallien. "The object of the movement to-day was the re-establishment of the Jacobins, and especially of the commune; we must destroy what yet remains of it—both Pache and Bouchotte must be arrested. This is only the prelude of the measures the committee will submit to you. Vengeance, citizens—vengeance against the assassins of their colleagues and of the national representation! Let us profit by the blunders of these men, who deem themselves the equals of those who prostrated the throne, and would fain emulate them—of those men who would make revolutions, and can only foment revolts. Let us profit by their incapacity, let us hasten to smite them, and thus put an end to the revolution." The assembly applauded, and at once adopted the proposition of Tallien. In this paroxysm of wrath, sundry voices denounced Robert Lindet, whom his virtues and his services had hitherto shielded from the fury of the reaction. Lehardi moved the arrest of "*that monster*;" but so many deprecatory voices were raised in praise of Lindet's suavity, in testimony that he had saved from famine entire cities and departments, that the order of the day was adopted on the motion. After these resolutions, the convention renewed its decree for the disarming of the terrorists; it ordained that, on the approaching quintidi (Sunday, 24th May), the sections should assemble, and proceed forthwith "*to disarm the assassins—the drinkers of blood—the robbers and agents of the tyranny which preceded the 9th Thermidor*;" it even authorised them to arrest those they considered ought to be arraigned before the revolutionary tribunal. It determined at the same time that, until further orders, women should be no longer admitted into the galleries. It was now three in the morning. The committees announcing that all was tranquil in Paris, the convention suspended its session until ten o'clock.

Such was the revolt of the 1st Prairial. On no day during the revolution had so terrible a spectacle been presented. If on the 31st May and 9th Thermidor, cannon were pointed on the convention, the place o its sessions, nevertheless, had not been invaded, ren-

dered the arena of a sanguinary conflict, traversed by bullets, and stained by the murder of a representative of the people. The revolutionists, on this occasion, had exhibited the inefficiency and violence of a party long subdued, devoid of confederates in the government from which it had been excluded, deprived of its leaders, and directed by men at once obscure, compromised, and desperate. Without knowing how to avail themselves of the Mountain, without even apprising it of the movement, they had inculpated and exposed to the scaffold honest deputies, unsullied by the excesses of the subverted tyranny, attached to the patriots from alarm at the reaction, and who had taken part in the events of the day only to avert greater calamities, and to hasten the accomplishment of certain views they held in common with the insurgents.

Nevertheless, the malecontents, seeing the fate impending over them all, and habituated so inveterately as they were to revolutionary struggles, were not men to succumb all at once. They collected on the following day at the hall of the commune, proclaimed themselves in permanent insurrection, and laboured to muster around them the sections devoted to their cause. Feeling, however, that the commune was not a good post, although located between the quarter of the Temple and the City, they deemed it preferable to establish the nucleus of insurrection in the Faubourg Saint-Antoine. They proceeded thither accordingly in the middle of the day, and took measures for renewing the enterprise of the eve. They now endeavoured to act with a greater degree of order and prudence. They dispatched three battalions completely armed and organised, being those of the sections Quinze-Vingts, Montreuil, and Popincourt, all three composed of stalwart operatives, and directed by intrepid leaders. These battalions advanced alone, without the disorderly rabble which had yesterday accompanied them, encountered sections faithful to the convention, but not in sufficient force to check them, and finally, after mid-day, planted themselves with their artillery in front of the National Palace. At the same time, the sections Lepelletier, Butte-des-Moulins, and others, took up a position confronting them, to protect the convention. But should a regular engagement ensue, in the present state of affairs, it was extremely dubious that the victory would remain with the defenders of the national representation. To render the chance more precarious, the artillerymen, who in all the sections were operatives and ardent revolutionists, abandoned the sections drawn up before the palace, and proceeded with their pieces to join the artillerymen of Popincourt, Montreuil, and the Quinze-Vingts. The cry "To arms!" passed along the lines, muskets were loaded on both sides, and all seemed prepared for a sanguinary action. The dull rolling of the ordnance was heard echoing under the arches of the convention. Divers members sprang up to give utterance to their feelings. "Representatives," exclaimed Legendre, "be calm, and remain at your post. Nature has doomed us all to die: a little sooner or a little later is of small moment! Good citizens are ready to defend you. Meanwhile, the dignified course is to observe silence." The entire assembly immediately sat down, and displayed that imposing calmness which it had evinced on the 9th Thermidor, and on so many other occasions in the course of its stormy career. In the interim, the two opposing forces, already in battle array, had assumed the most menacing attitude. Before actually coming into collision, several individuals cried out that it was horrible for good citizens to slaughter one another; that at least some explanation, some effort at an understanding, should be attempted. Many stepped from the antagonist ranks and parleyed on alleged grievances. Certain members of the committees, who chanced to be present, glided into the battalions of the hostile sections, and addressed them in soothing language; when, finding that much might be gained by the ways of conciliation, they sent to request from the assembly a deputation of twelve members, for the purpose of fraternising with the relenting rebels. The convention, considering this step an act of unbecoming weakness, manifested repugnance to adopt it; but being assured that its committees deemed it advisable and calculated to prevent the effusion of blood, it acquiesced: the twelve members were delegated, and they presented themselves to the three sections. Speedily the ranks were broken on both sides, and the troops mingled indiscriminately. The man of uncultivated mind and inferior grade is always sensible to the amicable demonstrations of the person whom costume, language, and manners, place above him. The soldiers of the three malecontent battalions were affected; they declared that they had no wish either to shed the blood of their fellow-citizens, or to fail in the respect due to the National Convention. However, the ringleaders insisted upon their petition being heard. General Dubois, who commanded the cavalry of the sections, and the twelve representatives commissioned to fraternise, consented to introduce a deputation from the three battalions to the bar of the National Convention.

They accordingly introduced the deputation, and craved leave for the petitioners to speak. Some deputies protested against the permission; but it was eventually accorded. "We are instructed to ask from you the constitution of 1793 and the liberty of the patriots," commenced the orator of the delegates. At these words the occupants of the galleries manifested impatience, and uttered cries of "Down with the Jacobins!" The president imposed silence on the brawlers. The orator continued, and stated that the citizens assembled before the convention were ready to withdraw into the bosom of their families, but that they would rather die than abandon their post, if the remonstrances of the people were not heeded. The president replied with firmness to the petitioners, that the convention had just passed a decree on the subject of provisions, which he would read to them. This promise he proceeded to fulfil, and subsequently added that the convention would examine their propositions, and decide in its wisdom what was fitting in the case. He then invited them to the honours of the sitting.

During this interval, the three malecontent sections had remained intermingled with the others. They were told that their petitioners had been graciously received, that their demands would be considered, and that they must await the decision of the convention. It was now eleven o'clock; the three battalions saw themselves surrounded by a large majority of the inhabitants of Paris; the hour was moreover late, especially for working men, and they adopted the resolution of retiring into their faubourgs.

This second attempt, therefore, equally ended in the discomfiture of the patriots. They nevertheless continued congregated in the faubourgs, preserving their hostile attitude, and persevering in the demands they had so often urged. The convention, during the morning of the 3d, passed several decrees warranted by the exigency. With the view of infusing greater unity and vigour into the execution of its measures, it conferred the direction of the armed force on three representatives, Gilet, Aubry, and Delmas, and authorised them to employ the agency of arms in the maintenance of public tranquillity. It prescribed six months' imprisonment on whomsoever should beat the tattoo without orders, and the penalty of death on whomsoever should beat the general call to arms without the sanction of the representatives of the people. It ordained the formation of a military commission, to try and send to immediate execution all the prisoners taken from the rebels in the insurrection of the 1st Prairial. It converted into a decree of impeachment the decree of arrest pronounced against Duquesnoi, Duroi, Bourbotte, Prieur-de-la-Marne, Romme, Soubrany, Goujon, Albitte the elder, Peyssard, Lecarpentier of La Manche, Pinet the elder, Borie, and

Fayau. It adopted a similar proceeding with regard to the deputies arrested on the 12th and 16th Germinal, and enjoined its committees to present a report on the tribunal to be appointed for the trial of both classes of offenders.

The three representatives hastened to recall the troops distributed over the environs of Paris to protect the arrival of corn; they retained under arms the sections favourable to the convention, and called around them companies of the young men, who had never quitted the committees during the whole insurrection. The military commission entered on its functions that very day. The first individual it tried was the assassin of Féraud, who had been apprehended the previous evening; it condemned him to death, and ordered his execution the same afternoon. The convict was accordingly carried to the scaffold; but the patriots were cognisant of the intention; some of the most determined had gathered around the place of punishment; they rushed upon the scaffold, dispersed the gendarmerie, rescued the criminal, and convoyed him into the insurgent faubourg. During the night, they summoned to their aid all the patriots scattered through Paris, and prepared to intrench themselves in the Faubourg Saint-Antoine. They placed themselves under arms, pointed their cannon on the square of the Bastille, and thus awaited the consequences of their audacious outrage.

So soon as this event was communicated to the convention, it decreed that the Faubourg Saint-Antoine should be summoned to deliver up the convict, to surrender its arms and artillery, and, in case of refusal, be immediately bombarded. At this moment, in fact, the forces at its disposal permitted the convention to assume a more imperious tone. The three representatives had succeeded in assembling three or four thousand troops of the line; they had besides upwards of twenty thousand men of the armed sections, whom the dread of witnessing the revival of the terror inspired with courage and zeal; and, finally, the devoted companies of the "gilded youth." They intrusted the command of these united forces to General Menou, and prepared to march on the faubourg. That same day, 4th Prairial (23d May), whilst the representatives were advancing, the "gilded youth" had been moved by a spirit of bravado to repair alone to the Faubourg Saint-Antoine. This daring troop was composed of ten or twelve hundred individuals. The patriots allowed them to penetrate, without offering any resistance, and then enveloped them on all sides. The young men speedily perceived the redoubtable battalions of the faubourg in their rear; at the windows they descried a multitude of infuriated women, ready to shower upon their heads a storm of missiles; and they began to conclude their reckless enterprise must terminate in a disastrous catastrophe. Luckily for them, however, the armed force was approaching, and, moreover, the inhabitants of the faubourg had not an insatiable thirst for their blood; they permitted them to retreat from the quarter, after inflicting chastisement upon sundry of their number. At this moment General Menou appeared with 20,000 men; he caused all the avenues of the faubourg to be occupied, especially those which communicated with the patriot sections. He planted his artillery, and formally summoned the rioters. A deputation came forward and received his ultimatum, which contained a demand for the surrender of all arms and of Féraud's assassin. The manufacturers, together with all the more wealthy and peaceable citizens of the faubourg, alarmed at the threat of a bombardment, hastened to use their influence over the population, and prevailed upon the three sections to lay down their arms. Accordingly, the insurgent sections of Popincourt, Montreuil, and the Quinze-Vingts delivered up their artillery, and undertook to search for the convict, who had been removed. General Menou returned in triumph with the cannon of the faubourg; and from that instant the convention had nothing more to dread from the patriot party. Utterly prostrated, its only part in future annals is undergoing the exactions of vengeance.

The military commission forthwith commenced to try all the prisoners captured during the late events: it condemned to death gendarmes who had taken part with the rebels, and operatives, shopkeepers, and members of the revolutionary committees, seized *in flagrante delicto* on the 1st Prairial. In all the sections, the disarming of the patriots, and the apprehension of the most conspicuous malecontents, proceeded on the day appointed; and, as the interval was too short for such an operation to be completed within the prescribed hours, the sections were authorised to declare themselves permanent for that special occupation.

But it was not at Paris alone that the despair of the patriots urged them to excesses. In the South, equally deplorable occurrences signalised the spirit that actuated them. We have narrated their congregation at Toulon to the number of seven or eight thousand; their violence towards the representatives upon divers occasions, tearing from them prisoners accused of emigration; and their efforts to draw into the revolt the workmen of the arsenal, the garrison, and the crews of the ships of war. The fleet was ready to set sail, and they determined to prevent it. The crews of certain vessels arrived from Brest, and united to the Toulon squadron for the expedition in meditation, were altogether adverse to them; but they could rely on the seamen belonging to the port of Toulon. They pitched upon nearly the same period for their outbreak as the patriots of Paris. The representative Charbonnier, who had solicited leave of absence, was charged with secretly instigating them. They arose in insurrection on the 23d Floreal (14th May), marched on the commune of Soulies, seized upon fifteen emigrant prisoners, and carried them in triumph to Toulon; they consented, however, to surrender them to the representatives. But on the following days they again revolted, stirred up the workmen of the arsenal, appropriated the arms it contained, and surrounded the representative Brunel, to exact from him an order for the liberation of the patriots. The representative Nion, who was on board the fleet, hurried to the assistance of his colleague; but the sedition proved too formidable. The two deputies were compelled to sign the order of liberation. Brunel, overwhelmed with shame for having yielded, blew out his brains; Nion sought refuge in the squadron. Thereupon the insurgents resolved to march on Marseilles, in order, as they stated, to arouse the whole South. But the representatives on mission at Marseilles planted a company of artillery on the route, and took all possible precautions to prevent the execution of their projects. On the 1st of Prairial, they were masters of Toulon, but unable to extend their sway; they directed their endeavours to gain over the crews of the squadron, of whom a part resisted their blandishments, whilst the remainder, comprising Provençal seamen alone, betokened a spirit of mutiny and an intention to join them.

The narrative of these events was communicated to the convention on the 8th Prairial. It was well calculated to provoke a fresh ebullition against the patriots and Mountaineers. The insurrections at Toulon and Paris were at once deemed the result of concert; the Mountaineer deputies were proclaimed their secret organisers, and the wrath against them was lashed to fury. Instantly, decrees of arrest were passed against Charbonnier, Escudier, Ricord, and Salicetti, all four accused of agitation in the southern departments. The deputies incarcerated on the 1st Prairial, whose judges were not yet appointed, became the objects of ruthless malediction. Without regard to their quality of representatives, they were consigned to the military commission instituted to try the authors and accomplices of the insurrection of the 1st Prairial.

One only was excepted, the aged Rhul, whose moderation and virtues were attested by several deputies. The tribunal of the Eure-et-Loir was assigned for the trial of the ex-mayor Pache, his son-in-law Audouin, the ex-minister Bouchotte, and his adjuncts Daubigny and Hasseufratz, and the three principal agents of Robespierre's police, Héron, Marchand, and Clemence. The sentence of exile pronounced against Billaud, Collot, and Barrère, ought to have been definitive as a judgment passed: it was not so considered. In this hour of rigour, the punishment was deemed too light: it was decided they should be tried again, and arraigned before the tribunal of La Charente-Inferieure, to receive the doom of death destined for all the leaders of the revolution. Hitherto, the remaining members of the former committees had appeared forgiven; the brilliant services of Carnot, Robert Lindet, and Prieur [de-la-Côte-d'Or], had seemingly availed to protect them against their enemies: they were now denounced with extreme virulence by the Girondist Henri Larivière. Robert Lindet, although defended by numerous deputies who avouched his merit and services, was decreed under arrest. "Carnot *organised victory*," exclaimed sundry voices: even the most furious of the reactors shrunk from proposing a decree against the vanquisher of the coalition. Prieur-de-la-Côte-d'Or happily escaped further observation. But all the members of the old committee of general safety not yet arrested, were involved in the common fate. David, who owed a previous absolution to admiration of his genius, was arrested with Jagot, Elie-Lacoste, Lavicomterie, Dubarran, and Bernard of Saintes. The only exception made was in favour of Louis of the Lower Rhine, whose known humanity pleaded all-powerfully in his behalf. Lastly, the report previously ordered against those who had fulfilled missions, and who were stigmatised with the epithet of proconsuls, was demanded on the instant. Proceedings were immediately ordered against Artigoyte, Mallarmé, Javognes, Sergent, Monestier, Lejeune, Allard, Lacoste, and Baudot; and it was moreover resolved that the conduct of every member who had been intrusted with any mission whatsoever, should be investigated and minutely reviewed. Thus, not one of the leaders of that government which had saved France, was pardoned: members of committees, deputies on missions, underwent a common anathema. Carnot alone, whom the esteem of the armies rendered it expedient to respect, was spared from ignominy; but Lindet fell, a citizen equally useful and more generous, but whom the lustre of victories was wanting to shield from the base obduracy of the reactors.

Assuredly, such sacrifices were more than needful to satisfy the manes of young Féraud; solemn honours rendered to his memory might have sufficed. In truth, the convention decreed a funereal sitting on his account. The hall was hung in black; all the representatives appeared in grand mourning costume. Soft and melancholy music opened the scene, and Louvet subsequently delivered an eulogium upon the young representative, so devoted, so courageous, so early taken from his country. A monument was voted to perpetuate his heroism. The occasion was seized to ordain a commemorative festival in honour of the Girondists. The homage was just and commendable; victims so illustrious, although they had endangered their country, merited sympathy and reverence; but flowers strewed upon their tombs would have been sufficient, blood was not required. And yet it was shed in floods; for what party, even that which assumes humanity as its device, is wise in anger? It seemed, indeed, as if the convention, not content with its several diminutions, had taken some stern resolution to augment them of its own action. The impeached deputies, originally conducted to the castle of La Taureau, in order to prevent any attempt in their favour, were remanded to Paris, and the process against them prepared with the greatest diligence. The old man Rhul, who had been alone excepted from the decree of impeachment, repudiated such clemency; believing liberty for ever lost, he struck a dagger into his heart. Affected by so many mournful scenes, Louvet, Legendre, and Fréron, urged that the deputies, consigned to the military commission should be arraigned before their constitutional judges; but Rovère, an old terrorist, now become a rabid royalist, and Bourdon-de-l'Oise, implacable as a man who had quaked with many a mortal dread, insisted upon the maintenance of the existing decree, and succeeded in enforcing its execution.

The deputies were led before the commission on the 29th Prairial (17th June.) Notwithstanding the most assiduous researches, no fact had been discovered demonstrating their secret connivance with the insurgents. Such a discovery, in fact, was rather difficult, as they had been profoundly ignorant of the intended movement; they were even unacquainted with each other, save that Bourbotte knew Goujon, having met him on a mission to the armies. It was merely proved that, during the predominance of the insurrection, they had endeavoured to invest some of the commands of the populace with a legal sanction. They were found guilty, nevertheless; for a military commission, to whose mercies a government commends important state criminals, would betray its trust were it to return them absolved, to shame and upbraid the prosecutor. Forestier alone was acquitted; he had been conjoined with the others, although he had not made a single motion during the famous sitting. Peyssard, who had simply uttered an exclamation during the conflict, was adjudged to banishment. Romme, Goujon, Duquesnoi, Duroi, Bourbotte, and Soubrany, were condemned to death. Romme was a simple and austere man; Goujon, young, handsome, and gifted with engaging qualities; Bourbotte, equally youthful with Goujon, combined a highly cultivated mind with a rare fortitude; Soubrany was an ex-noble, sincerely devoted to the cause of the revolution. At the moment their sentence was pronounced, they delivered to the registrar letters, signets, and portraits, intended for their families. They were then removed, to be placed in a secluded chamber, preparatory to their conveyance to the scaffold. They had vowed never to reach it. They only possessed a knife and a pair of scissors, which they had concealed in the lining of their raiment. On descending the staircase, Romme first pierced his body, and, fearful lest he should miscarry in his purpose, struck himself several times, on the heart, the throat, and the face. He transferred the knife to Goujon, who, with a steady hand, gave himself a mortal stab, and fell lifeless. From the grasp of Goujon, the liberating weapon passed successively to the hands of Duquesnoi, Duroi, Bourbotte, and Soubrany. Unfortunately, Duroi, Bourbotte, and Soubrany, failed to inflict mortal wounds on themselves; they were dragged weltering in blood to the scaffold. Soubrany, bathed in blood, retained, despite his anguish, the self-possession and haughty aspect for which he had been always remarkable. Duroi manifested deep regret at his attempt having proved abortive. "Enjoy," he exclaimed—"enjoy your triumph, gentlemen royalists!" Bourbotte preserved all the serenity of youthful manhood; he spoke with imperturbable tranquillity to the people. At the instant he was about to receive the fatal stroke, it was perceived the adze had not remounted; the instrument of death required adjustment: he employed the interval in delivering a few additional observations. He assured the spectators that none died more devoted to his country, more attached to its welfare and liberty. The number present at the execution was small: the period of political fanaticism had elapsed; slaughter no longer proceeded with that wild fury which steeled the hearts of men, and rendered them insensible to emotions of pity. A deep feeling of commiseration was aroused in the minds of all on learning the details of this afflictive scene, and the Thermidorians reaped a deserved measure of oppro-

brium. Thus, in this long succession of contrary ideas, victims were sacrificed to all; the ideas even of clemency, humanity, and reconciliation, had their hecatombs: so true it is that in revolutions none can remain pure from human blood.

The Mountaineer party was thus entirely destroyed. The patriots had just been suppressed at Toulon. After a sanguinary engagement on the highway to Marseilles, they had been compelled to lay down their arms, and surrender the city which they hoped to secure as a basis for insurrectionising France. They were consequently extinct as an obstacle to the predominant party; and, according to precedent, their fall involved the proscription of several revolutionary institutions. The celebrated tribunal, almost reduced, since the law of the 8th Nivose, to an ordinary court of justice, was definitively abolished. All prisoners were remitted to the criminal tribunals trying after the forms of process observed in 1791; conspirators alone were to be judged by the procedure established on the 9th Nivose, and without the privilege of appeal. The phrase "revolutionary," as applied to institutions and authorities, was discarded. The national guards were re-organised on the ancient footing; operatives, servants, indigent citizens, the *people*, in short, were excluded from its ranks; and the care of the public tranquillity again devolved on the class most interested in its maintenance. At Paris, the national guard, organised in battalions and brigades, and commanded in rotation by the chiefs of brigade, was placed under the supreme direction of the military committee. Furthermore, the concession so ardently desired by the Catholics, the restitution of the churches, was granted them; they possessed them under the burden of upholding those fabrics at their own cost. This measure, indeed, although the consequence of the reaction, was advocated by the most reflective minds. They deemed it calculated to calm the Catholics, who would never consider they had recovered religious freedom so long as they were debarred from celebrating the ceremonies of their faith in the accustomed edifices.

The financial discussions, interrupted by the events of Prairial, were resumed by the assembly on the restoration of tranquillity, as still involving the most urgent and painful claims on its attention. It revived the regulation that only one description of bread should be sold, in order to remove from the populace a pretext for invective against the luxury of the rich; it ordered estimates of the stocks of grain, with the view of assigning the superfluity of each department to the supply of the armies and large cities; and it rescinded the decree permitting a free traffic in gold and silver. Thus the exigency of circumstances constrained a recurrence to some of those revolutionary measures which had been most virulently reprobated. The spirit of gambling, meanwhile, had reached a fearful height. The race of butchers, bakers, and grocers, as separate callings, was extinct; every one bought and sold bread, meat, spices, oils, &c. The granaries and vaults were filled with articles of merchandise and consumption, on which speculation operated. On the Exchange, at the Palais-Royal, wheaten bread was sold at 25 and 30 francs the pound. Regraters swept the markets, and bought up the fruits and vegetables brought by the country people, in order to force up prices. They purchased in advance the growing crops and herds of cattle grazing, in anticipation of future profits. The convention prohibited these forestallers from appearing in the markets before a certain hour. It was obliged to decree that licensed butchers alone should be competent to purchase cattle, and that crops could not be sold before maturity. Thus extraordinary confusion was introduced into all the relations of life; individuals, altogether unconnected with the speculations of commerce, became alive to each variation of the assignat, in order to throw the loss on others, and obtain for themselves the utmost value of any article of food or merchandise.

We have seen that, repudiating the two schemes of reducing the assignat to its current value and of levying the taxes in kind, the convention had preferred a project for disposing of the national domains by private contract, at thrice the valuation of 1790. This was, as we have already explained, the only mode of selling them, since exposing them to auction always tended to enhance the prices in proportion to the depression of assignats, to such an extent, in fact, that the public could not possibly compete. So soon as the law was passed, the number of applications was prodigious. When it became generally known that a person had only to be the first applicant to obtain lands at thrice the valuation of 1790 in assignats, competitors poured in from all quarters. For certain properties several hundred offers were lodged; at Charenton, three hundred and sixty were made for a domain escheated by the Fathers of Mercy; for another, even five hundred were submitted. The district court-houses were crowded with aspirants. Simple clerks, men without fortune, but in whose hands assignats had momentarily accumulated, hastened to apply for national property. As they were only bound to pay one-sixth immediately, and the residue after the lapse of several months, they purchased with trifling sums considerable estates, with the intention of re-selling them at a profit to those who had been less alert. Owing to this eagerness, domains which the local authorities were not aware had become national property, were signalised as such. The plan conceived by Bourdon-de-l'Oise was consequently attended with complete success, and hopes might reasonably be indulged that, in a short time, a large proportion of the domains would be sold, and the assignats either retired or enhanced. It is true that on these sales the republic suffered losses, which, numerically calculated, were very considerable. The estimation of 1790, founded on the apparent rent, was frequently inaccurate; for the lands of the clergy, and those of the order of Malta, were let at extremely low money-rents; the farmers made up the deficiency in free-will offerings, which often amounted to three or four times the amount of the stipulated payment. A farm leased ostensibly at 1000 francs, produced in reality 4000: by the valuation of 1790, this farm was estimated at 25,000 francs; it was now purchasable for 75,000 in assignats, which were actually worth only 7500 francs. At Honfleur, the salt magazines, which had cost 400,000 francs in erecting, were to be sold for 22,500 effective francs. Agreeably to this calculation, the loss was enormous; but it was necessary to submit to it, save that it might be rendered less, by demanding four or five times the valuation of 1790, instead of three times only, as at present contemplated.

Rewbel and many other deputies failed to comprehend this necessity: they saw only the apparent loss. They asserted that the wealth of the republic was wilfully wasted, and that its resources would be dried up. The operation provoked remonstrances on all sides. Those who did not understand the question, and they were not few, and those who saw with reluctance the lands of the emigrants distributed, coalesced to obtain a suspension of the decree. Balland and Bourdon-de-l'Oise defended it with energy: they lacked sufficient insight to rely upon the essential reason, to wit, that more should not be demanded for the domains than purchasers could give; but they alleged with truth that the numerical loss was not so great as it actually appeared; that 75,000 francs in assignats were certainly worth only 7500 francs in specie, but that specie intrinsically possessed twice the value of former times, and that 7500 francs represented in fact 15,000 or 20,000 francs of 1790. They argued, moreover, that the actual loss was counterbalanced by the advantages of bringing to a speedy close the financial catastrophe, of retiring or enhancing the assignats, of terminating the speculations on commodities by direct-

ing the paper to land, of delivering to private industry the mass of national property, and, finally, of blasting the last hopes of the emigrants.

The decree was nevertheless suspended. The local authorities were ordered to continue to receive applications, in order that all the national property might be made known through the instigation of individual cupidity, and thus a more exact account thereof be framed. A few days afterwards, the decree was abrogated altogether, and a return to the system of sales by auction commanded.

Thus, after obtaining a glimpse of the means whereby the crisis might be averted, the convention retraced its steps, and fell back into the direful distress whence it had the opportunity of emerging. However, since it refused to follow out measures calculated to enhance the assignats, it could not persist in upholding the monstrous fallacy of the nominal value, which was ruining the republic and all individuals paid in paper. It was compelled to revert to the proposition previously submitted for reducing the assignats. It had rejected the plan of levelling them to the standard of specie, because the English, it was alleged, having a superfluity of the precious metals, would be masters of the course of exchange; it had declined to reduce them to the standard of corn, because the price of grain had advanced considerably; it had refused to adopt time as a scale, and to reduce the paper monthly at a certain rate, because that was equivalent to demonetisation or striking it from the circulation and declaring a bankruptcy. All these reasons were frivolous, for, whether specie, corn, or time, were taken to determine the reduction of the paper, it would be equally demonetised, or, in other words, branded as a circulating medium. Bankruptcy did not consist in reducing the value of the assignat as between individuals, for such reduction had in fact taken place, and to recognise it would have merely the effect of preventing cruel robberies; bankruptcy was more real by re-establishing the sale of national property by the way of auction. What the republic had promised, in reality, was not that the assignats should bear such or such a value as between individuals (which did not depend upon it), but that they should command such an amount of property; now, by establishing the system of auctions, the assignats no longer commanded that quantity of property; they became equally useless with regard to the domains as with reference to commodities; they underwent a similar depreciation from the effect of competition.

Another measure than that of specie, corn, or time, for regulating the reduction of assignats, was therefore to be found: the quantity in circulation was taken as the basis. It is undeniable in principle that the augmentation of the circulating medium tends to augment proportionally the price of all objects. Thus, if an article had been worth one franc, when there were two thousand millions of a currency in circulation, it must be worth two francs when there are four thousand millions of that currency, three when there are six, four when there are eight, five when there are ten. Supposing that the actual circulation of assignats amounted to ten thousand millions, it was now necessary to pay five times more for any commodity than when there were only two thousand millions. A scale of proportion was established, commencing at the period when there were but two thousand millions in circulation, and it was decreed that, in every payment made in assignats, a fourth should be added to the principal for every five hundred millions added to the circulation. Thus, a sum of two thousand francs, due when there were two thousand millions in circulation, would be liquidated, when there were two thousand five hundred millions, by two thousand five hundred francs; when there were three thousand millions, by three thousand francs; and at present, when there were ten thousand millions, the liquidation could be effected only by ten thousand francs.

Those who regarded demonetisation* as a bankruptcy, could have had their apprehensions but little calmed by such a measure as this, for it merely substituted one mode of driving the assignat out of circulation for another; instead of demonetising in the proportion of specie, corn, or time, it demonetised in that of issues, which amounted to the same thing, with one inconvenience the more. By the new scale, every emission would lower to a certain and prescribed amount the value of the assignat; consequently, by issuing five hundred millions, the state would rob the holder of assignats of a fourth, a fifth, a sixth, &c., of what he possessed.

At the same time, this scale, which had its inconveniences in common with the other proposed reductions to the standard of specie or corn, ought at least to have been made applicable to all transactions; but this the convention did not venture to attempt—it was rendered applicable at first only to taxes and arrears of taxes. Promises were made to apply it to the public functionaries when their number should have been reduced, and to the fundholders of the state when the receipts of the taxes, gathered according to the new scale, should permit them to be paid on the same basis. In like manner, the advantage of this improved mode of accounting was not extended to private creditors, the owners of houses in town or country, the proprietors of kilns, &c. The only favoured class was that of landowners. As the farmers were making enormous profits by their produce, and paying, through the convenient agency of assignats, only the tenth or twelfth fraction of their covenanted rents, they were constrained henceforth to liquidate them agreeably to the new scale. They were to render an amount of assignats proportioned to the quantity emitted since the date of their contracts of lease.

Such were the measures by which it was sought to lessen the evils of over-speculation and stockjobbing, and to terminate the grievous calamity of a disordered state of the exchanges. They consisted, as we see, in prohibiting speculators from forestalling consumers in the purchase of the necessaries of life, and in regulating payments in assignats upon a scale graduated by the quantity of paper in circulation.

The close of the Jacobin Club in Brumaire had commenced the ruin of the patriots, the event of the 12th Germinal had accelerated it, and that of the 1st Prairial had consummated it. The great mass of citizens who had opposed them, not from a tendency to royalism but from the dread of a new reign of terror, were at the present moment furiously incensed, and persecuted them with merciless rigour. All the men who had zealously assisted the revolution were immured or disarmed. Acts equally arbitrary were committed towards them as any that had been enforced against the former "suspected." The prisons were filled as before the 9th Thermidor, but their inmates were revolutionists. The number of the detained was not, as previous to that era, nearly one hundred thousand, but certainly twenty or twenty-

* [Demonetisation is a term, we believe, not to be found in the glossary of British political economists, and for the very fortunate reason that the idea it represents has never been suggested in this country. Although pains have been taken to explain the word, by paraphrasing it in the text, it may not be quite obvious to all readers. To elucidate it more fully, we will take the instance of a bank of issue stopping payment; on the occurrence of such a catastrophe, its notes necessarily become no longer current, and, in fact, become *demonetised*, that is, struck out of the circulating medium of the country. France is perhaps the only country in the world wherein it was ever seriously contemplated to declare of no value a currency which the government had issued on its plighted faith, to the extent of nearly five hundred millions sterling. The distress to individuals consequent upon such a measure can be scarcely imagined, so great and universal must it have been. The bare proposition of so flagrant a violation of national honour shows into what a wretched condition the revolution had thrown France in this particular.]

five thousand. The royalists were in exuberant spirits. The disarming or imprisonment of the patriots, the execution of the Mountaineer deputies, the proceedings commenced against sundry others, the suppression of the revolutionary tribunal, the restoration of the churches to the services of religion, the recomposition of the national guards—were so many measures inflating them with joy and hope. They flattered themselves with the idea that they should speedily provoke the revolution to destroy itself, and witness the republic immuring or guillotining all the men who had founded it. To hasten that consummation, they intrigued in the sections, inflamed them against the revolutionists, and urged them to direful excesses. A multitude of emigrants re-entered France, either with false passports or under pretext of soliciting their erasure from the list of the proscribed. The local administrations, remodelled since the 9th Thermidor, and filled with men of weak character or secretly hostile to the republic, lent themselves to all the official falsehoods craved from them; any act tending to mitigate the hardships of those who were called the victims of terror seemed to them defensible; and they thus furnished too many enemies of their country with the means of revisiting it to rend and convulse it. At Lyons and in all the southern departments, the royalist agents continued to gather stealthily. The companies of Jesus and the Sun had committed fresh massacres. Ten thousand muskets, destined for the army of the Alps, had been fruitlessly distributed to the national guard of Lyons; it had made no use of the arms, but looked calmly on whilst a number of patriots were slaughtered (25th Prairial). The Saône and the Rhone had once more floated with corpses. At Nismes, Avignon, and Marseilles, similar massacres had been perpetrated. In the last-named city, men had proceeded to the Fort Saint-Jean, and renewed the horrors of September against the prisoners confined therein.

The dominant party in the convention, composed of Thermidorians and Girondists, albeit intent on crushing the revolutionists, yet observed the royalists with uneasiness, and felt the necessity of curbing them. It immediately caused a decree to be passed, ordaining that the city of Lyons should be disarmed by a detachment from the army of the Alps, and that the authorities which had permitted the massacre of the patriots should be superseded. At the same time, the civil committees of the sections were enjoined to revise the lists of detention, and to direct the enlargement of those who were immured upon insufficient grounds. Thereupon the sections, stimulated by the royalist intriguers, expressed great indignation; they presented menacing petitions to the convention, and complained that the committee of general safety liberated terrorists and restored them their arms. The sections of Lepelletier and the Theatre-Français (Odéon), always the most ardent against the revolutionists, insolently demanded whether it were intended to reinvigorate the prostrated faction, and whether it were not merely to stifle the recollection of terrorism, that royalism was spoken of in France.

To these petitions, often most irreverently couched, the interested fomenters of disorder added such rumours as were best adapted for keeping the public mind in agitation. Toulon had been delivered into the hands of the English; the Prince of Condé and the Austrians were on the point of entering France by Franche-Compté, whilst the English were to penetrate by the West; Pichegru was dead; provisions would shortly fail altogether, since it had been determined to replace them on a basis of free trade; all the committees had suddenly assembled, alarmed at the public dangers, to deliberate in concert on the expediency of re-establishing the system of terror. The journals devoted to the cause of royalism originated and aggravated all such and many other sinister reports; and, amidst this general agitation, it might be truly said that the reign of anarchy had come. The Thermidorians and the counter-revolutionists deceived themselves when they stigmatised as anarchy the order of things preceding the 9th Thermidor: that system had been a fearful dictatorship; but anarchy had veritably commenced, since two factions, nearly equal in strength, arose to wage an inveterate warfare, without the government being sufficiently powerful to restrain them.

CHAPTER XLIII.

SITUATION OF THE ARMIES IN THE YEAR 3.—FIRST INDICATIONS OF PICHEGRU'S TREASON.—INTRIGUES OF THE ROYALISTS IN LA VENDEE AND BRITTANY.—RENEWAL OF HOSTILITIES IN THOSE COUNTRIES.—EXPEDITION OF QUIBERON.—PEACE WITH SPAIN.—PASSAGE OF THE RHINE BY THE FRENCH ARMIES.

The situation of the armies had undergone little change, and, although half of the favourable season was elapsed, no important event had occurred. Moreau had received the command of the army of the North, encamped in Holland; Jourdan that of the Sambre-and-Meuse, stationed on the Rhine towards Cologne; and Pichegru that of the army of the Rhine, cantoned from Mayence to Strasburg. The troops were in a state of destitution, daily augmented by the relaxation of all the springs of government and by the ruin of the paper-money. Jourdan was devoid of a bridge-equipage for passing the Rhine, and of horses to draw his artillery and baggage-waggons. Kléber, before Mayence, possessed not the fourth of the *materiel* necessary for besieging that fortress. The soldiers deserted in numbers to the interior. The greater part deemed they had done enough for the republic in bearing its victorious banners to the banks of the Rhine. The government was incapable of forwarding supplies, and equally so to occupy or rekindle their ardour by grand operations. It dared not remand by force those who abandoned their colours. It was notorious that the young men of the first requisition, who had returned into the interior, were neither sought after nor punished; at Paris even, they enjoyed the favour of the committees, for whom they often formed a volunteer militia. Thus the number of desertions was considerable; the armies had lost the fourth of their effective force, and that feeling of a general laxity was every where predominant, which so powerfully tends to detach the soldier from the service, to render the officers discontented, and to place their fidelity in peril. The deputy Aubry, to whom, in the committee of public welfare, the constitution of the army was confided, had wrought a complete reaction against all the patriot officers in favour of those who had not served in the two great campaigns of 1793 and 1794.

If the Austrians had been less dispirited, now was the moment for them to avenge their reverses; but they slowly concentrated beyond the Rhine, and ventured no demonstration to impede the only two operations attempted by the French armies—the siege of Luxumbourg and that of Mayence. Those two fortresses were the sole points still retained by the coalition on the left bank of the Rhine. The fall of Luxumbourg would complete the conquest of the Low Countries, and render it definitive; that of Mayence would deprive the Imperialists of a *tête-de-pont*, which always allowed them to clear the Rhine in security. Luxumbourg, blockaded during the whole winter and spring, surrendered from famine on the 6th Messidor (24th June). Mayence could be captured by a siege alone, but the materiel was deficient; it was necessary to invest the place on both banks, and, for that purpose, either Jourdan or Pichegru must pass the Rhine, an operation difficult in the presence of the Austrians, and impossible in the absence of bridge equipages for the transit. Thus the French armies, although victorious, were arrested by the Rhine, which they were unable to cross for lack of means, and drooped, in

common with the whole administrative action, under the paralysing influence of the existing government.

On the frontier of the Alps, the situation of the French was still less satisfactory. On the Rhine, they had at all events gained the important acquisition of Luxumbourg, whereas on the Italian frontier they had recoiled. Kellermann commanded the two armies of the Alps; they were in the same state of destitution as the others; and, in addition to the effects of desertion, they had been weakened by draughts of divers detachments. The government had conceived the absurd idea of attempting a sudden attack on Rome. Actuated by a desire to avenge the assassination of Basseville, it had embarked 10,000 men on board the Toulon squadron, completely refitted by the exertions of the old committee of public welfare; these it determined to send to the mouth of the Tiber, there to be landed for the purpose of levying a contribution on the papal city, and after that exploit to be reshipped with all convenient promptitude. Fortunately, a naval engagement sustained against Lord Hotham, from which both parties had retired equally crippled, prevented the execution of the scheme. The division which had been drawn from the army of Italy was restored; but, at the same time, it became necessary to detach a corps on Toulon, in order to crush the terrorists, and another on Lyons, in order to disarm the national guard, which had allowed the massacre of the patriots. In this manner, the two armies of the Alps found themselves weakened by the loss of part of their strength in presence of the Piedmontese and Austrians, reinforced by ten thousand men arrived from the Tyrol. General Devins, seizing the moment when Kellermann had dispatched one of his divisions to Toulon, had attacked his right towards Genoa. Kellermann, unable to resist his superior force, had been obliged to fall back. Still occupying with his centre the Col di Tende, on the Alps, he had ceased to extend his right as far as Genoa, and had taken up a position behind the line of Borghetto. Fears were entertained that the communication would be interrupted with Genoa, whose trade in grain must be exposed to many obstacles, should the Riviera di Ponente be occupied by the enemy.

In Spain, nothing decisive had been performed. The French army of the Eastern Pyrenees still occupied Catalonia to the banks of the Fluvia. Fruitless actions had been fought on the banks of that river, and it had been unable to establish itself beyond the barrier. In the Western Pyrenees, Moncey was engaged in organising his army, suffering from disease, with the intention of returning to Guipuscoa and advancing into Navarre.

Although the French armies had not lost ground, except in Italy, and had even subjugated one of the strongest fortresses in Europe, they were, as we perceive, defectively supplied, feebly conducted, and benumbed by the effects of the general anarchy prevailing in every branch of the administration.

This, then, was a favourable moment, not for vanquishing them, for the peril of an attack would have revived their energy, but for practising on their fidelity and attempting projects of counter-revolution. We left the royalists and foreign cabinets contemplating various enterprises on the insurgent provinces—Puisaye and England concerting a plan of descent in Brittany, the agents at Paris and Spain projecting an expedition into La Vendée. The emigrants were at the same time speculating on an incursion into France by another point. They designed to attack her on the east, whilst the expeditions adventured by Spain and England were operating on the west. The Prince of Condé had his head-quarters on the Rhine, where he commanded a corps of 2500 infantry and 1500 cavalry. All the emigrants dispersed over the continent were to be strictly enjoined to unite with him, under pain of being no longer suffered by the powers to remain in their territories; his corps would be thus augmented by the hitherto useless emigrants; and, leaving the Austrians occupied on the Rhine in checking the republican armies, it might endeavour to penetrate by Franche-Comté, and march on Paris, whilst the Count d'Artois, with the insurgents of the west, was approaching that capital on the other side. Should the emigrants not succeed, they had the hope at least of obtaining a capitulation similar to that of the Vendéans: they had the same reasons for demanding it. "We are Frenchmen," those who took part in the expedition might urge, "who have had recourse to civil war—but in France, and without including foreigners in our ranks." According to the partisans of this project, it was in truth the only mode whereby the emigrants could ever return to France, combining the alternative chances of a counter-revolution or of an amnesty.

The English government, which had taken the corps under Condé into its pay, and which ardently desired a diversion towards the east whilst it was operating on the west, was urgent that the Prince of Condé should hazard an enterprise, no matter of what kind. It promised him, through the medium of its ambassador in Switzerland, Wickham, ample subsidies and all necessary means for forming new regiments. The gallant prince had no higher ambition than to have an expedition intrusted to him; he was altogether incapable of directing an affair of importance, or a battle, but he was ready to rush into the jaws of danger when prompted by astuter heads.

At this time the idea was suggested to him that Pichegru, who commanded the army of the Rhine, might be open to seduction, from considerations of the following nature. The terrible committee of public welfare no longer overawed the generals, or kept over them a watchful eye and a suspended arm; the republic, paying its officers in assignats, gave them scarcely wherewithal to satisfy their most pressing wants; the disorders now convulsing it put its existence in peril, and must alarm the ambitious men, rendering them fearful of losing by its fall the eminent positions they had gained. It was known that Pichegru was addicted to the pleasures of wine and women; that the 4000 francs he received per month in assignats, being scarcely worth 200 francs on the frontiers, must be inadequate to gratify his desires; and that he had expressed disgust at serving under a government so unstable and tottering. It was remembered, also, that in Germinal he had taken arms against the patriots on the Champs-Elysées. All these circumstances tended to inspire hopes that Pichegru might probably be accessible to tempting offers. Accordingly, the prince addressed himself to M. de Montgaillard for the execution of the project, and he again to a bookseller of Neufchâtel, M. Fauche-Borel, who, the denizen of a prudent and flourishing republic, consented to become the obscure servitor of a dynasty under which he had not been born. This M. Fauche-Borel repaired to Altkirch, where the head-quarters of Pichegru were then fixed. After following him to several reviews, he succeeded in attracting his attention by perseveringly hovering on his steps: at length, he ventured to accost him in a corridor: he spoke to him at first of a manuscript he wished to dedicate to him, and Pichegru, having in some sort provoked a confidential disclosure, he concluded by explaining his purpose. Pichegru demanded from him a letter signed by the Prince of Condé himself, that he might know with whom he was really treating. Fauche-Borel returned to Montgaillard, and the latter to the prince. An entire night was consumed in inducing the prince to write a letter of eight lines. Now he was averse to styling Pichegru a general, apprehensive of thereby acknowledging the republic; now he refused to impress his arms on the envelope. Eventually, the letter being written, Fauche-Borel returned to Pichegru, who, recognising the holograph of the prince, immediately entered on the negotiation. He was offered for him

self the dignity of marshal, the government of Alsace, a million in specie, the castle and park of Chambord in fee, with twelve pieces of cannon taken from the Austrians, and a pension of 200,000 francs, with reversion to his wife and children. He was offered, with regard to his army, the confirmation of all commissions, pensions for the commandants of fortresses who should surrender them, and exemption from taxes, during fifteen years, for the towns which should open their gates. But it was required that Pichegru should hoist the white flag, deliver the fortress of Huningen to the Prince of Condé, and march with him on Paris. Pichegru was too cunning to accept such propositions. He would not deliver Huningen and raise the white standard in his army; that would commit and compromise him too effectually. He demanded that he should be allowed to pass the Rhine with a chosen corps; there he promised to unfurl the white banner, unite with the Prince of Condé, and subsequently march on Paris. It is not clear how his design could be thereby promoted; for it was as difficult to seduce the army beyond as on this side the Rhine; but he avoided the danger of surrendering a fortress, of being surprised in the criminal act, and of having no excuse to allege for his treason. Besides, after gaining the other bank of the Rhine, he would still have it in his power to repudiate the treason, if he failed to settle terms with the Prince of Condé and the Austrians; or, if he were discovered too soon, he might profit by the passage of the river to execute the operations commanded him by his government, and then profess he had listened to the propositions of the enemy only to make them instrumental to his discomfiture. In each case he reserved the faculty of betraying either the republic or the prince with whom he was treating. Fauche-Borel returned to his employers; but he was again sent back to insist on the same proposals. He thus went to and fro several times, without being able to terminate the difference, which always consisted in the positive determination of the prince to obtain Huningen, and that of Pichegru the passage of the Rhine. Neither was disposed to recede, to give up in advance so considerable an advantage. The motive which chiefly weighed with the prince in refusing consent to Pichegru's preliminary demand, was founded on the necessity of an application to the Austrians for authority to grant the passage of the river: he desired to act without their concurrence, and to monopolise the honour of the counter-revolution. It would appear, however, he was obliged to refer the matter to the Aulic Council; and in the interim, Pichegru, vigilantly watched by the representatives, found it necessary to suspend his correspondence and postpone his treason.

Whilst these things were passing on the frontiers, the agents in the interior, Lemaitre, Brottier, Despomelles, Laville-Heurnois, Duverne-Despresle, and others, continued their intrigues. The young prince, son of Louis XVI., had died of a tumour on the knee, the result of a scrofulous affection. The royalist agents affirmed he had been poisoned; and made diligent inquiries after works treating on the ceremonial of coronations to send to Verona. The regent had become king in their eyes, under the title of Louis XVIII. The Count d'Artois had in like manner become Monsieur.

In the insurgent districts of La Vendée and Brittany the pacification had only been apparent. The inhabitants, who began to enjoy repose and security, were, it is true, disposed to remain at peace; but the chiefs and the warlike men who surrounded them, only awaited an occasion for resuming their arms. Charette, having under his orders those rural guards into which all those had entered whose tastes were of a decidedly military character, was engaged, under pretext of executing the police of the country, in forming the nucleus of an army preparatory to a recommencement of hostilities. He seldom quitted his camp at Belleville, and received there numerous royalist emissaries. The agents at Paris had forwarded to him a letter from Verona, being a reply to that epistle he had formerly written to excuse the pacification. The pretender relieved him from all anxiety on that point, assured him of his continued confidence and favour, confirmed his nomination as lieutenant-general, and announced to him the approaching succours of Spain. The agents at Paris, improving on the expressions of the prince, flattered the ambition of Charette with a most alluring perspective: they promised him the command of all the royalist districts, and the aid of a considerable expedition intended to be dispatched from the ports of Spain, bearing the French princes and ample supplies. As to the expedition preparing in England, they appeared to put no faith in it. The English, they said, had always promised and always deceived; at the same time, it might be expedient to make use of their assistance, if the opportunity offered, but for a very different object from that which they proposed to themselves: the succours destined for Brittany must be landed in La Vendée, and that country subjugated to Charette, who alone enjoyed the confidence of the present king. Such ideas were well calculated to gratify at once the ambition of Charette, his animosity against Stofflet, his jealous spleen at the importance recently acquired by Puisaye, and his resentment against England, which he denounced for having never afforded him countenance or aid.

With regard to Stofflet, he had less inclination than Charette to resume arms, although he had manifested much greater repugnance to lay them down. His district of country was more sensible of the benefits of peace than the others, and exhibited an unequivocal distaste for a renewal of hostilities. He himself was deeply mortified at the preference shown for Charette. He had equally merited that distinction of lieutenant-general conferred on his rival, and he was thoroughly disgusted at the injustice of which he deemed himself the victim.

Brittany, organised as heretofore, was completely ripe for an outbreak. The leaders of the Chouans had secured, like the Vendéan chiefs, the organisation of their best soldiers into regular companies, under the pretence of constituting a rural police. Each of the chiefs had formed a company of chasseurs, wearing a uniform of green coat and pantaloons, and red vest, and composed of the most intrepid amongst the Chouans. Cormatin, continuing his old career, had assumed an amazing importance. He had established at La Prévalaye what he denominated his head-quarters; he publicly dispatched orders, dated from that locality, to all the Chouan chiefs; he travelled through the various districts for the purpose of inspecting the companies of chasseurs; he affected to punish infractions of the treaty when any had been committed, and acted in all respects as if he were the veritable governor of Brittany. He often rode into Rennes decked in his Chouan uniform, which had become the prevailing fashion: there he received in polite circles the flattering homage of the inhabitants and the blandishments of the women, who thought they beheld in him a personage of supreme importance, and the grand leader of the royalist party.

Secretly, he fomented the hostile spirit rife amongst the Chouans, and maintained a correspondence with the royalist agents. His position with regard to Puisaye was embarrassing; he had disobeyed him and belied his confidence, insomuch that his only resource thenceforth was to throw himself into the arms of the agents at Paris, who had given him hopes of receiving the command of Brittany, and confided to him the secret of their negotiations with Spain. That power promised 1,500,000 francs per month, on condition that England should not be allowed to participate. Nothing could be more agreeable to Cormatin than a plan based on a rupture with England and Puisaye. Two other

officers, whom Puisaye had sent from London into Brittany, Messieurs de la Vieuville and Dandigné, had likewise fallen into the system of the Paris agents, being persuaded that England designed to repeat the deception practised at Toulon, make use of the royalists in order to secure a port, and incite Frenchmen to combat against Frenchmen, but to afford no real succour capable of consolidating the power of the royalist party and ensuring its triumph. Whilst these ideas prevailed amongst one portion of the Breton chiefs, those of Morbihan, Le Finistère, and the Côtes-du-Nord, long connected with Puisaye, accustomed to serve under him, organised by his efforts, and strangers to the intrigues of Paris, remained attached to their old leader, stigmatised Cormatin as a traitor, and wrote to London that they were ready to fly to arms. They made diligent preparations, purchased munitions and bales of cloth for fashioning into black collars, their distinctive peculiarity, decoyed the republican soldiers, and induced them to desert. Their success in these practices was owing to the advantage they possessed of having provisions in abundance, they being masters of the country, while the republican soldiers, insufficiently fed and unable to eke out their scanty rations with valueless assignats, were compelled to forsake their colours in order to subsist. Moreover, the government had been imprudent enough to leave numerous Bretons in the regiments serving against the royalist districts, and it was only natural they should pass into the ranks of their compatriots.

Hoche, whose vigilance was ever on the alert, observed with attention the state of the country. He saw the patriots persecuted under colour of the law for disarming them, the royalists full of presumptuous confidence, the agricultural produce kept back by the farmers, the highways insecure, the public vehicles obliged to start with convoys for protection, the Chouans congregating in secret assemblies, and frequent communications interchanged with the Channel Islands: moved by these portents, he had written to the committee and the representatives that the pacification was an infamous deception, that the republic had been beguiled, and that every thing announced a speedy resumption of arms. He had employed the interval in forming moveable columns, and distributing them throughout the country, with the view of maintaining tranquillity, and of falling upon the first insurgent band that might be mustered. But the number of his troops was insufficient for the extent of the country and the immense line of coast. Every moment the apprehension of a movement in some part of the province, or the reported appearance of the English fleet on the coasts, demanded the presence of his columns, and they were worn out by constant marching. In so arduous and harassing a service, a resignation, infinitely more meritorious than the courage of braving death, was essential both on his part and on that of his army. Unfortunately, the soldiers indemnified themselves for their fatigues and hardships by excesses: such conduct deeply afflicted the young general, and his anxieties were redoubled by the twofold solicitude of curbing his own troops and watching the enemy.

He had shortly an opportunity of detecting Cormatin in flagrant delinquency. Dispatches from him to divers Chouan chiefs were intercepted, and positive proof of his secret machinations was obtained. Apprised that he intended to visit Rennes on a fair-day with a number of disguised Chouans, and fearing he contemplated an attempt on the arsenal, Hoche caused him to be arrested on the evening of the 6th Prairial, and thus put an end to his career. The various chiefs immediately exclaimed against the act, and complained that the treaty was violated. Hoche published in reply the letters of Cormatin, and sent him with his accomplices to the prison of Cherbourg; at the same time, he held all his columns in readiness to overwhelm the first rebels who should show themselves. The Chevalier Desilz having arisen in Morbihan, was promptly attacked by General Josnet, who destroyed three hundred of his men, and completely routed him, the chief himself falling in the action. In the Côtes-du-Nord, Bois-Hardi likewise started into insurrection: his corps was dispersed, and himself taken and killed. The soldiers, furious at the bad faith of that young chief, who was the most formidable in the country, cut off his head and elevated it on the point of a bayonet. Hoche, indignant at this breach of military generosity, wrote a noble letter to his soldiers, and ordered the culprits to be sought out and punished. This speedy destruction of two chiefs who had attempted to renew the rebellion, overawed the others; they remained quiet, awaiting with impatience the arrival of that expedition so long announced. Their motto was—"*The King, England, and Bonchamp!*"

At this moment active preparations were proceeding at London. Puisaye had come to a perfect understanding with the British ministers. They declined to grant him all they had originally promised, because the pacification diminished their confidence in the project; but they gave him the emigrant regiments and considerable warlike stores to effect the disembarkation, and they promised him all the resources of the monarchy if the expedition had a successful commencement. The obvious interest of England was a pledge of the sincerity of these promises; for, driven from the continent since the conquest of Holland, she regained a field of warfare, carried that field of warfare into the very heart of France, and composed her armies of Frenchmen. The means placed at the disposal of Puisaye may be thus sketched. The emigrant regiments on the continent had, since the last campaign, passed into the service of England; those forming the corps under Condé were, as we have mentioned, to act on the Rhine; the others, which were mere wrecks, were to be shipped at the mouth of the Elbe and transported into Brittany. Besides these old regiments, which bore the black cockade and were disgusted with the fruitless and murderous service in which they had been hitherto employed by the coalition, England had consented to form nine new regiments to be in her pay, but which were to mount the white cockade, in order that their object might appear more peculiarly French. The difficulty consisted in recruiting them; for, if in the early moments of fervour the emigrants had agreed to serve as common soldiers, they refused to do so now. It was proposed to take French deserters and prisoners collected on the continent. Deserters were not to be found, for the conqueror but rarely deserts to the vanquished; prisoners, therefore, were the only resource. The Count d'Hervilly having discovered certain Toulon refugees at London, who had been enrolled in a regiment, incorporated them into his own, and thus succeeded in swelling it to eleven or twelve hundred men, that is to say, to more than two-thirds of its complement. The Count d'Hector composed another of sailors who had emigrated, and thus mustered a regiment of six hundred men. The Count du Dresnay found in the prisons several Bretons, enrolled against their will in the first requisition, and made prisoners during the war: of these he collected four or five hundred. But these constituted all the Frenchmen that could be gathered to serve in the regiments distinguished by the white cockade. Thus, of the nine contemplated, only three were formed, whereof one had two-thirds, and the other two but one-third of their respective complements. Lieutenant-colonel Rothalier, however, who commanded four hundred Toulon artillerymen, was still at London. Of these a regiment of artillery was composed, to which were joined sundry French engineers, embodied as a separate engineer corps. As to the host of emigrants who refused to serve except in their former grades, and were unable to obtain soldiers for the formation of regiments, it was resolved to constitute them as skeleton-regiments, to be filled up in Brittany with insurgents. There, men being

abundant, and experienced officers rare, they would find no difficulty in resuming their appropriate functions. They were sent to Jersey in order to be organised and ready to follow the descent. Whilst thus engaged in marshalling troops, Puisaye at the same time sought to provide himself with funds. England had originally undertaken to furnish him with a sufficient quantity of specie; but he desired to procure assignats. Accordingly, he obtained authority from the princes to fabricate three thousand millions of forged assignats; for this employment he designed the idle ecclesiastics who could not wield the sword. The Bishop of Lyons, viewing this measure in a different light from the princes and Puisaye, prohibited the clergy from lending their aid in its execution. Puisaye then applied to other more pliable instruments, and succeeded in forging the quantity he purposed to carry with him. He likewise desired to be accompanied by a bishop, who might perform the part of a papal legate to the Catholic districts. He remembered that an intriguer, the pretended Bishop of Agra, had gained an extraordinary influence over the minds of the peasants by assuming that usurped title in the first Vendéan war. He consequently took with him the Bishop of Dol, who held a commission from Rome. In fine, he procured from the Count d'Artois the necessary powers to command the expedition, and nominate to commissions, pending his own arrival. The English ministry, too, on its part, confided to him the direction of the expedition; but, distrusting his temerity and his extreme anxiety to land, it stipulated that the Count d'Hervilly should command the emigrant regiments until the descent were consummated.

All the dispositions being made, a squadron took on board the regiment of D'Hervilly, the two regiments of D'Hector and Du Dresnay, all wearing the white cockade, the four hundred Toulon artillerymen commanded by Rothalier, and an emigrant regiment of old embodiment, that of La Châtre, known under the name of the Loyal-Emigrant, and reduced by the war on the continent to four hundred men. This gallant remnant was to be reserved for decisive actions. In the squadron were likewise shipped provisions for an army of 6000 men during three months, 100 saddle and draught horses, 17,000 complete infantry uniforms, 4000 cavalry uniforms, 27,000 muskets, ten field-pieces, and 600 barrels of powder. Puisaye was presented with ten thousand louis in gold and letters of credit on England, to add to his false assignats financial resources of a more assured character. The squadron intrusted with this expedition comprised three ships of the line of 74 guns, two frigates of 44, four brigs of 30 to 36, and several gunboats and transports. It was commanded by Commodore Warren, one of the most distinguished and intrepid officers in the English navy. It constituted the first division. Immediately subsequent to its departure, it was agreed that another naval division should proceed to take up at Jersey the emigrant officers there organising; that, after so doing, it should cruise for some time before Saint Malo, where Puisaye had opened communications, and which certain traitors had promised to deliver into his hands; and that after this cruise, if Saint Malo were not surrendered, it should follow Puisaye, and convey to him the emigrant officers. At the same time, transport ships were to be detached to the mouth of the Elbe, to receive the emigrant regiments wearing the black cockade, and transport them to Puisaye. It was expected that these different detachments would arrive almost simultaneously with himself. If all he had stated were realised—if the disembarkment were effected without difficulty—if the natives of Brittany flocked to his standard—if he succeeded in taking up a solid position on the coasts of France, whether it were Saint-Malo, L'Orient, Port-Louis, or any other port that he contrived to seize—then a fresh expedition, bearing an English army, additional supplies of military stores, and the Count d'Artois in person, would immediately put to sea Lord Moira had in fact been commissioned to visit the continent in quest of that prince.

These arrangements were liable to only two objections, but those of a serious character. The expedition was divided into several detachments, and the French prince, above all, was not placed at the head of the first.

The expedition set sail towards the end of Prairial (middle of June). Puisaye carried with him the Bishop of Dol, a numerous body of clergy, and forty noblemen, all bearing an illustrious name, and serving as simple volunteers. The point of disembarkment was a mystery for all except Puisaye and Commodore Warren, and Messieurs de Tinténiac and d'Allegre, whom Puisaye had dispatched to announce his arrival.

After long and anxious deliberation, the southern coast of Brittany had been preferred, and the Bay of Quiberon finally pitched upon, as an admirable and secure station, and one well known to the English, from their having long used it as an anchoring ground. Whilst the expedition was under sail, Sir Sidney Smith and Lord Cornwallis made threatening demonstrations along the whole extent of the coast, in order to deceive the republican armies as to the true point of disembarkation; and Lord Bridport, with the squadron stationed off the Isle of Ushant, protected the convoy. The French Atlantic fleet had not yet recovered the effects of the disastrous cruise during the previous winter, in the course of which the Brest squadron had been dreadfully shattered by tempestuous weather. However, Villaret-Joyeuse was ordered to depart with nine ships of the line anchored off Brest, to relieve a division blockaded at Belle-Isle. He weighed anchor accordingly, and, after relieving the division and giving chase to sundry English vessels, he returned towards Brest, when he encountered a sudden squall of wind which dispersed his fleet. Much time was lost in uniting it again, and in the interval he fell in with the expedition destined for the coasts of France. He was superior in force, and might have completely destroyed it; but Commodore Warren, descrying the danger, crowded all sail, and placed his convoy in the distance, so as to present the appearance of a second line: at the same time he detached two corvettes in quest of the powerful squadron under Lord Bridport. Villaret, deeming he could not give battle with advantage, resumed his course for Brest, according to the instructions he had received. But Lord Bridport hove in sight at this moment, and immediately attacked the republican fleet. It was the 5th Messidor (23d June). Villaret, wishing to form parallel with the *Alexandre*, which was a bad sailer, wasted irreparable time in fruitless manœuvres. His line was thrown into confusion: he lost three vessels, the *Alexandre*, the *Formidable*, and the *Tiger*, and, being unable to regain Brest, was obliged to run for L'Orient.

The expedition having thus signalised its outset by a naval victory, continued to steer for the Bay of Quiberon. A division of the squadron diverged to summon the garrison of Belle-Isle in the name of the King of France, but it received from General Boucret an energetic reply, backed by a volley of cannon-balls. The convoy came to anchor in the Bay of Quiberon, on the 7th Messidor (25th June). Puisaye was aware, from the information he had gathered, that there were but few troops on the coast; he proposed, in his ardour, to make an immediate descent on shore. The Count d'Hervilly, who was a brave officer, well calculated to discipline a regiment, but incapable of skilfully directing an operation, and above all, vastly punctilious with regard to authority and duty, stated that he commanded the troops, that he was answerable for their safety to the English government, and that he would not hazard them on a strange and hostile coast until time had been taken to reconnoitre. He consumed an entire day in surveying the coast with a telescope; and, though he had not descried a single soldier, he still refused to allow the troops to land. Puisaye and

Commodore Warren insisting on the descent, D'Hervilly ultimately acceded; and, on the 9th Messidor (27th June), those heedless and imprudent Frenchmen alighted, full of joyful anticipation, on that soil to which they were bringing the horrors of civil war, and on which they were appointed to meet so mournful a fate.

The bay in which they had cast anchor is formed on one side by the shore of Brittany, and on the other by a promontory nearly a league broad and two leagues in length; it is the well-known peninsula of Quiberon. It adjoins the mainland by a narrow tongue of sand, a league in length, and called La Falaise. The fort of Penthièvre, erected between the peninsula and La Falaise, defends the approach on the land side. In this fort was a garrison of seven hundred men. The bay, formed by this promontory and the coast, offers to vessels one of the safest and best sheltered roads on the continent.

The expedition disembarked in the bottom of the bay at the village of Carnac. At the instant of its arrival, several chiefs, Dubois-Berthelot, D'Allegre, George Cadoudal, and Mercier, forewarned by Tinténiac, hastened with their troops, dispersed the detachments guarding the coast, drove them into the interior, and repaired to the shore. They brought four or five thousand men inured to war, but ill-clad, badly armed, advancing without order, and resembling a gang of plunderers rather than an array of soldiers. With these Chouans had mingled the peasants of the neighbourhood, crying, "The king for ever!" and carrying eggs, fowls, provisions of all kinds, to the liberating army, come to restore to them their prince and their religion. Puisaye, overjoyed at this demonstration, already concluded that all Brittany was ready to rise in insurrection. The emigrants who accompanied him experienced different impressions. Having lived in courts or served in the best appointed armies of Europe, they viewed with disgust and apprehension the soldiers to be placed under their command. Sarcasms and murmurs already began to circulate. The chests of muskets and uniforms were exposed; the Chouans fell impetuously thereupon; some sergeants of D'Hervilly's regiment attempted to establish order; a scuffle ensued, and, but for the intervention of Puisaye, fatal consequences might have resulted. These first circumstances were little calculated to promote confidence between the insurgents and the regular troops, who, coming from England and belonging to that power, were regarded with a certain degree of suspicion by the Chouans. However, the bands which arrived were all armed, and in the course of two days their number amounted to ten thousand men. They were invested with red coats and muskets, and Puisaye then prepared to assign them leaders. There was a deficiency of officers, for the forty volunteer noblemen who had followed him were insufficient; the skeleton regiments were not yet at his disposal, for, according to the plan agreed upon, they were still cruising before Saint Malo; he therefore proposed to draught officers from the regiments in which they abounded, distribute them amongst the Chouans, march rapidly on Vannes and Rennes, allow the republicans no time to concentrate, stir up the whole country, and advance to take a position behind the important line of Mayenne. Once there, master of forty leagues of country, with the entire population in action, Puisaye deemed it would be then the time to organise the irregular troops. D'Hervilly, gallant but fastidious, methodical, and holding these uncouth Chouans in contempt, refused his officers. Instead of giving them to the Chouans, he wished to pick out from amongst the latter men to complete the regiments, and then advance, reconnoitring cautiously and selecting safe positions. This but ill accorded with Puisaye's views. He attempted to enforce his authority; D'Hervilly denied it, stating that the command of the regular troops belonged to him, that he was responsible for their safety to the English government, and that he must take care not to compromise them. Puisaye represented to him that he held that command only during the voyage, but that landed on the soil of Brittany, he, Puisaye, was the supreme chief and director of the operations. He forthwith dispatched a corvette to London, to obtain an explanation of the powers confided to him; and, in the interim, he conjured D'Hervilly not to foil the enterprise by baneful divisions. D'Hervilly was a man unquestionably of loyal intentions, but not at all adapted for civil war, and he had moreover an invincible repugnance towards the tatterdemalion insurgents. All the other emigrants, besides, thought with him they were not parties to *Chouannise;* that Puisaye would endanger them by advancing into Brittany; that it was in La Vendée they ought to have landed, where they would have met the illustrious Charette, and doubtless very different soldiers.

Several days were lost in contentions of this nature. The Chouans were finally distributed into three corps, and sent to take up advanced positions so as to occupy the roads leading from L'Orient to Hennebon and Aurai. Tinténiac, with a corps of 2500 Chouans, was stationed on the left at Landevant; Dubois-Berthelot, with a nearly equal force, on the right towards Aurai. The Count de Vauban, one of the forty volunteer noblemen who had accompanied Puisaye, and one of those whom reputation and merit placed in the first rank, was ordered to occupy a central position at Mendon with four thousand Chouans, so as to be able to succour either Tinténiac or Dubois-Berthelot. He had the command of the whole line, defended by nine or ten thousand men, and projected four or five leagues into the interior. The Chouans, thus planted in the van, immediately demanded why troops of the line were not associated with them; they relied much more on those troops than on themselves; they had come to rally around them, to follow and support them, but expecting at the same time that they would be the first to advance, in order to sustain the formidable shock of the republicans. Such were their murmurings. Vauban solicited at least four hundred men, both to resist, in case of need, a first attack, and to encourage the Chouans, afford them an example, and prove to them they were not intended to be exposed alone. D'Hervilly at first refused the application, then took time for consideration, and eventually sent the required detachment.

The expedition had been disembarked five days, and had advanced only three or four leagues into the land. Puisaye was wroth and discontented; but he suppressed his chagrin, hoping to overcome the delays and obstacles his companions in arms opposed to his designs. Deeming that, under any circumstances, it would be advisable to secure a basis of operations, he proposed to D'Hervilly the seizure of the peninsula by surprising the fort of Penthièvre. Once masters of that fortress, which closed the peninsula towards the land, and supported on both sides by the English squadrons, they would hold an unassailable position, and the peninsula itself, a league in width and two leagues in length, would become a possession as sure as the ports of Saint-Malo, Brest, or L'Orient, and more commodious. The English would have ample facilities for landing there all the succours they had promised in men and stores. This measure of security was of a nature to please D'Hervilly: he yielded his consent, but recommended a regular siege of the fort of Penthièvre. Puisaye paid no attention to his advice, and projected an attack by way of assault: Commodore Warren, animated with the utmost zeal, undertook to support it by all the fire of his squadron. They commenced to cannonade it on the 1st July (13th Messidor), and the decisive attack was fixed for the 3d July. Whilst making his preparations, Puisaye dispatched envoys through all Brittany, in order to arouse Scépeaux, Charette, Stofflet, and other chiefs of the insurgent provinces.

Tidings of the disembarkation had spread with singular rapidity; the intelligence traversed Brittany in two days, all France in a few more. The royalists full of joy, the revolutionists of wrath, deemed the emigrants already at Paris. The convention instantly delegated two extraordinary commissioners to Hoche, selecting for the mission Blad and Tallien. The presence of the latter on the threatened point was intended to prove that the Thermidorians were equally opposed to royalism as to terror. Hoche, calm and energetic, forthwith wrote to the committee of public welfare to allay its fears. "Composure," so he expressed himself, "activity, the provisions we need so much, and the twelve thousand men you have promised me so long: such are our wants." He issued the requisite orders to his chief of the staff; he directed General Chabot to plant himself between Brest and L'Orient, with a corps of 4000 men, in order to fly to the aid of either of those ports if menaced. "Watch especially over Brest," he said to him; "in extremity, shut yourself in the place, and defend it to the death." He wrote to Aubert-Dubayet, who commanded the coasts of Cherbourg, to detach troops to the north of Brittany, for the purpose of guarding Saint-Malo and the coast. To secure the south, he begged Canclaux, who was still watching Charette and Stofflet, to send him General Lemoine with an auxiliary force through Nantes and Vannes. He subsequently caused all his troops to concentrate on Rennes, Ploermel, and Vannes, disposing them on those three points with the view of guarding his rear. Finally, he advanced in person on Aurai with all the strength he could muster at the moment. On the 14th Messidor (2d July) he appeared at Aurai with from three to four thousand men.

Brittany was thus entirely encompassed. Now were to be dissipated the illusions which the first war of La Vendée had generated. Because in 1793, the peasants of La Vendée, encountering in combat mere national guards, composed of citizens who were ignorant how to handle a gun, had been able to occupy all Poitou and Anjou, and afterwards organise in their marshes and ravines a focus of rebellion difficult to destroy, it was imagined that Brittany would rise at the first signal from England. But the Bretons were far from having the ardour of the first Vendéans; certain brigands merely, under the appellation of Chouans, were resolutely bent on war, or, to speak more correctly, on pillage; and moreover, a young captain, whose activity equalled his genius, commanding experienced troops, curbed the entire population with a firm and dexterous hand. The only hope of kindling the embers of revolt in Brittany, under such circumstances, rested on the promptitude and rapidity wherewith the expedition, come to rally it under the royal standard, advanced into the country; but, as we see, it loitered, under the gloomy auspices of discord, on the strand it had been first cast upon.

Nor was this all. Part of the Chouans who were under the influence of the royalist agents at Paris, desired, before joining Puisaye, the presence of a prince in his camp. The objections of those agents and of all those who participated in their intrigues were, that the expedition was insufficient and fallacious, and that England had appeared in Brittany only to repeat the occurrence of Toulon. They no longer alleged that she purposed to bestow the crown on the Count d'Artois, because he was not there, but on the Duke of York; they wrote, urging their adherents not to aid the expedition, which, they stated, must be compelled to re-embark and make the descent in concert with Charette. That chief was perfectly favourable to this view of matters. He evaded the requests of Puisaye's agents by asserting that he had sent M. de Scépeaux to Paris, in order to claim the execution of one of the articles contained in his treaty, and that he must therefore await the return of that officer to avoid exposing him to the chance of arrest by prematurely resuming arms. Stofflet, who was better inclined towards Puisaye, answered, that if the rank of lieutenant-general were assured to him, he would instantly march and cause a diversion on the rear of the republicans.

Thus all things conspired against Puisaye—counterviews entertained by the royalists of the interior, jealousies harboured by the Vendéan chiefs, and an able adversary, disposing of forces perfectly organised, and sufficiently numerous to keep in check whatever royalist zeal might lurk amongst the Bretons.

Meanwhile, the 15th Messidor (3d July), the day assigned by Puisaye for attacking the fort of Penthièvre, arrived. The soldiers who defended it had been devoid of bread for three days. Threatened with an assault, bombarded by the fire of the ships, and commanded pusillanimously, they sounded a parley, and surrendered the fortress to Puisaye. At that precise moment, Hoche, established at Aurai, executed an attack upon all the advanced posts of the Chouans, for the purpose of restoring the communications from Aurai to Hennebon and L'Orient. He had ordered the attack to be simultaneous on Landevant and on the post towards Aurai. The Chouans under Tinténiac, vigorously assailed by the republicans, were unable to stand before those disciplined troops. Vauban, who was placed intermediately at Mendon, hastened with a part of his reserve to the aid of Tinténiac, but he found the corps of that leader dispersed, and the band he himself led melted away at the sight; he was compelled to fly with precipitation and swim across two small inlets of the sea, in order to rejoin the residue of his Chouans at Mendon. On his right, Dubois-Berthelot had been repulsed; whereby the republicans were enabled to advance on both his flanks, and expose him to the risk of being enclosed within their two divisions. It was at this critical instant that the four hundred troops of the line he had required would have been of essential service in sustaining his Chouans and rallying them to the combat; but D'Hervilly had remanded them for the attack on the fort. However, he inspired his soldiers with an impulse of courage, and induced them to profit by the occasion, in order to fall on the rear of the republicans, whom the ardour of pursuit had carried far into the van. He accordingly recoiled towards his left, and charged upon a village which the republicans had just entered in the heat of their chase after the Chouans. They were unprepared for this rough and sudden onslaught, and were compelled to fall back. Vauban subsequently returned towards his position of Mendon; but he found it deserted; all had taken to flight around him; and he also was obliged to retire, but with order, and after an act of hardihood which had checked the impetuosity of the enemy.

The Chouans were indignant at having been exposed alone to the attack of the republicans, and they inveighed most bitterly against the withdrawal of the four hundred men of the line. Puisaye upbraided D'Hervilly with the abstraction; the latter retorted that he had recalled them for the assault on the fort. Such reciprocal complaints were calculated rather to widen than to heal the breach, and on both sides great irritation prevailed. However, the fort of Penthièvre had been taken. Puisaye caused all the military stores sent by the English to be landed on the promontory; he likewise fixed his head-quarters there, removed most of the troops into it, and resolved to establish himself solidly on that advantageous station. He gave orders to the engineers to perfect the defences of the fort, and to throw up advanced works. On its turrets was planted the white banner, in conjunction with the English standard, as the symbol of alliance between the kings of France and England. It was agreed that the garrison should be composed by draughting a detachment from each regiment in proportion to its force. D'Hervilly, who was very solicitous to complete his own regiment, especially with good troops, proposed to the republicans who had been taken pri-

soners to pass into his service, and to form a third battalion in his regiment. Largesses, the provisions so long withheld from them, the reluctance to remain as prisoners, and the hope of being soon enabled to return to Hoche, decided their acquiescence in the proposal; and they were consequently enrolled in the corps commanded by D'Hervilly.

Puisaye, whose design to march into the interior was still inflexible as ever, and who had only paused to take the peninsula with the view of assuring himself a position on the coast, now addressed D'Hervilly in a more peremptory tone, laying before him the strongest reasons to induce his compliance with his views, and threatening to demand his dismissal if he persisted in controverting them. D'Hervilly appeared for a moment to accede to his projects. The Chouans, as Puisaye represented, required, in order to elicit their bravery, the support and example of regular soldiers; hence it was necessary to distribute in their van and on their rear troops of the line, thus place them in the midst, and, with twelve or thirteen thousand men, comprising nearly three thousand of the line, push over the forces under Hoche, who had at the moment but five or six thousand men at the utmost. D'Hervilly consented to this plan. Meanwhile, Vauban, who found his position extremely hazardous, having lost that he had originally occupied, demanded orders and succours. D'Hervilly sent him an order, couched in most pedantic terms, wherein he enjoined him to fall back on Carnac, and prescribed to him a series of manœuvres such as the best-trained troops of Europe only could have executed.

On the 5th July (17th Messidor), Puisaye issued from the peninsula to hold a review of the Chouans, and D'Hervilly likewise came forth with his regiment, to prepare for the execution of the project, agreed upon the previous day, to march into the interior. Puisaye encountered nothing but dejection, despondency, and discontent, amongst the men who, a few days earlier, had manifested such enthusiasm. They said it was evident they were to be exposed alone, and sacrificed to the republican troops of the line. Puisaye appeased them as well as he could, and endeavoured to cheer their spirits and re-animate their courage. D'Hervilly, on his part, beholding those unfortunate men, accoutred in red coats, wearing their ill-adjusted uniforms and carrying their bayonets in so ungainly a fashion, exclaimed that nothing could be made of such wretched troops, and wheeled round with his regiment. Puisaye met him as he drew off, and asked him whether it was thus he purposed fulfilling the stipulated plan. D'Hervilly replied that he would never risk himself in an enterprise with such soldiers; that the only course left was to re-embark, or shut themselves up in the peninsula, to await fresh orders from London, which, as he surmised, would bring directions to make the descent in La Vendée.

On the following day, 6th July (18th Messidor), Vauban was secretly apprised that the republicans were preparing to attack his whole line. The intimation found him in a most perilous situation. His left rested on a post called Saint-Barbe, which communicated with the peninsula; but his centre and right skirted the coast of Carnac, and had only the sea for a retreat. Thus, if he were strongly assailed, his right and centre might be driven into the sea; his left alone could find refuge in Quiberon, through Saint-Barbe. His Chouans, utterly dispirited, were incapable of maintaining their ground; no other plan was open to him, therefore, save to throw his centre and right on his left, and defile by La Falaise into the peninsula. But in that case he shut himself up in that strip of land without the possibility of leaving it: for the post of Saint-Barbe, which was to be abandoned, although defenceless on the land side, was impregnable on the side of La Falaise, and completely commanded it. Thus this project of retreat was equivalent to a determination to retire altogether into the peninsula of Quiberon. Consequently Vauban demanded aid, in order that he might be saved the necessity of adopting that alternative. D'Hervilly transmitted him further orders, drawn up in all the pomposity of the military style, and containing a positive injunction to hold Carnac to the last extremity. Puisaye served a formal summons on D'Hervilly to send troops, which drew from him a promise to forward a detachment.

At break of day on the morrow, 7th July (19th Messidor), the republicans were seen advancing in deep columns, and making dispositions to attack the ten thousand Chouans along their whole line. The latter cast their eyes towards La Falaise, but discerned no appearance of a movement on the part of the regular troops. Thereupon they broke out into furious outcries against the emigrants for not coming to their assistance. Young George Cadoudal, whose soldiers refused to fight, entreated them not to disband; but they gave no heed to his solicitations. George, sharing their exasperation, exclaimed that those miscreants of English and emigrants had arrived only to ruin Brittany, and that it was unfortunate the sea had not engulfed them rather than transported them to that coast. Vauban, in this state of affairs, ordered his right and centre to recoil upon his left, with the view of saving them by La Falaise, in the peninsula. The Chouans rushed precipitately to the point indicated; the greater part were followed by their families, flying from the vengeance of the republicans. Old men, women, children, bearing their household wrecks, and intermingled with several thousand Chouans in their military garb, covered that long and narrow tongue of sand, lashed on both sides by the waves, and already furrowed by cannon-balls and bullets. Vauban, gathering around him all the chiefs, endeavoured to rally the bravest of the men, urging them not to expose themselves by a precipitate flight to certain destruction, and conjuring them, for their safety and honour, to make a retreat in good order. "They would cover with shame that troop of the line," he told them, "which so disgracefully left them to bear the whole brunt of the peril." By degrees he infused into them a degree of confidence; they turned to face the enemy, braved his fire, and retorted it. Thereupon, owing to the admirable fortitude of the chiefs, the retreat began to be executed with calmness; the ground was disputed inch by inch. Still, a vigorous charge might have proved irresistible, and forced the retiring Chouans into the sea; but, fortunately, the gallant Warren, mooring his ships and gunboats inshore, opened a tremendous fire on the republicans from both sides of La Falaise, and prevented them for that day at least from further pursuing their advantage.

The fugitives flocked to enter the fort, but for a time access was debarred them; they accordingly fell upon the palisades, tore them up, and poured pell-mell into the peninsula. At that moment, D'Hervilly appeared with his regiment; Vauban encountered him, and, under an impulse of anger, warned him he would bring his conduct under review before a council of war. The Chouans overspread the area of the promontory, on which were perched sundry hamlets and cottages. All the accommodation was forestalled by the officers and soldiers of the regiments, who defended their quarters from invasion; disputes and tumults ensued, but finally the Chouans stretched themselves on the ground. A half-ration of rice was distributed amongst them, which they consumed in the raw state, being destitute of the means of cooking food.

Thus the expedition, which was to have carried so speedily and triumphantly the banner of the Bourbons and the English to the banks of the Mayenne, was at present confined within the limits of a promontory jutting two leagues into the sea. Its conductors had twelve or fifteen thousand souls the more to support, to whom they could give neither shelter, nor fuel, nor

utensils to prepare their victuals. The peninsula, defended by a fortress at its gorge, and flanked on both sides by the English squadrons, might be deemed an invulnerable possession; but it suddenly became untenable by the want of provisions. On board the squadron, in fact, had been shipped only supplies calculated to maintain six thousand men during three months, and there were eighteen or twenty thousand tongues clamorous for food. To escape from this dolorous position by a sudden assault on Saint-Barbe was scarcely possible; for the republicans, relaxing not an instant in their ardour, were intrenching that post in a manner to render it impregnable from the peninsula. Whilst confusion, animosities, and dejection, prevailed amid the incongruous assemblage of Chouans and emigrants, in the camp of Hoche, on the contrary, soldiers and officers were animated with one spirit, fired with an emulous zeal to perfect the defences of their position. "I saw," says Puisaye, "the officers themselves, in their shirts, and merely distinguished by their cravats, wielding the pick-axe, and accelerating the labours of their soldiers."

However, Puisaye determined upon a sortie that very night, in order to interrupt the works; but the darkness, combined with the terrors of the enemy's cannonade, threw the ranks into confusion, and he found it necessary to draw in the troops. The poor Chouans were stricken with despair: they loudly complained of having been villanously deceived; they lamented their old mode of warfare, and clamoured to have their forests restored to them. They suffered the pangs of hunger, too. D'Hervilly, for the purpose of constraining them to enlist in the regiments, had issued an ordinance, to the effect that only half-rations should be distributed to the irregular troops. They broke into open mutiny. Puisaye, without whose knowledge the order had been promulgated, immediately cancelled it; full rations were granted, and the malecontents pacified.

Besides the ability and spirit for which Puisaye was eminent, he was distinguished for an extraordinary perseverance under difficulties: he was never discouraged. He now conceived the idea of selecting the choicest amongst the Chouans, and disembarking them on the coast in two divisions, with instructions to scour the country to the rear of Hoche, muster the chiefs from whom no tidings had as yet come, and bear *en masse* on the camp of Saint-Barbe, so as to take it in rear, whilst the troops from the peninsula were attacking it in front. This project promised the advantages of reducing the number of consumers by six or eight thousand, employing those detached in beneficial activity, rekindling the zeal of the Breton chiefs, at present so singularly sluggish, and preparing the way for an attack on the rear of the camp of Saint-Barbe. The scheme formed, he picked his men from the Chouan ranks with the best discrimination, and assigned four thousand to Tinténiac, together with three intrepid chiefs, George Cadoudal, Mercier, and D'Allegre, and three thousand to Messieurs Jean-Jean and Lantivy. Tinténiac was to be landed at Sarzeau, near the mouth of the Vilaine; Jean-Jean and Lantivy near Quimper. Both were enjoined, after sweeping over a wide area, to unite at Baud on the 15th July (27th Messidor), and march in conjunction, at dawn on the 16th, upon the rear of the camp of Saint-Barbe. At the instant of departure, the Chouan chiefs sought out Puisaye, and entreated him, their old leader, to accompany them, representing to him that the traitorous English would assuredly ruin him: it was impossible for Puisaye to comply with these friendly instances. The troops sailed for their destinations, and were happily disembarked. Puisaye lost no time in writing to London that all would be yet repaired, but that supplies of provisions, ammunition, and troops, must be immediately forwarded, together with the person of a French prince.

Whilst these arrangements were progressing in the peninsula, Hoche had collected from eight to ten thousand men at Saint-Barbe. Aubert-Dubayet provided him, from the coasts of Cherbourg, with troops to guard the north of Brittany, and Canclaux had sent a considerable reinforcement from Nantes, under the orders of General Lemoine. The representatives had foiled all the machinations tending to deliver up L'Orient and Saint-Malo. The prospects of the republicans, therefore, brightened with the lapse of every day. Moreover, Lemaitre and Brothier, the royalist agents, were straining every nerve to thwart the expedition. They had at the commencement written to Brittany, condemning and disparaging it. As they described it, the expedition had a dangerous object in view, manifested by the fact of the prince's absence, and that no good royalist ought to aid it. In consequence, emissaries had gone abroad and circulated orders, in the name of the king, to abstain from participating in any movement; they had also warned Charette to persist in his inaction. Adhering, nevertheless, to their good old practice of profiting by the succours of England while deriding and duping it, the agents had formed a scheme for turning them to account in the present instance. Implicated in the intrigue to deliver Saint-Malo into the hands of Puisaye, their design was to call the emigrant officers cruising on board the English fleet into that place, and take possession of the port in the name of Louis XVIII., leaving Puisaye to act at Quiberon as he best could, and, as they insinuated, in behalf of the Duke of York. The plot touching Saint-Malo having failed, they fixed upon Saint-Brieuc, retained before that coast the flotilla bearing the skeleton regiments, and hastily dispatched emissaries to Tinténiac and Lantivy, with whose disembarkation they were acquainted, to enjoin them to move upon Saint-Brieuc. It was thus their aim to form in the north of Brittany a counter-expedition, more sure, as they prognosticated, than the enterprise of Puisaye in the south.

Tinténiac had, as we have intimated, effected a landing without loss or accident: after carrying several republican posts, he had advanced to Elven. At that place he received a command, delivered in the name of the king, to march on Coëtlogon, there to await fresh orders. He alleged in objection the commission given him by Puisaye, and the impropriety of hazarding the success of an arranged plan by departing from the point indicated. He yielded, however, hoping, by means of a forced march, to reach the background of Saint-Barbe by the 16th. Jean-Jean and Lantivy, having landed with equal good fortune, were preparing to move towards Baud, when they likewise were served with an injunction to march upon Saint-Brieuc.

Meanwhile, Hoche, disquieted as to his rear, felt compelled to send out detachments to arrest the bands of whose march he had been apprised; but he retained in Saint-Barbe a force sufficient to resist an assault. He was much incommoded by the English gunboats, which opened a destructive fire on his troops whenever they ventured to appear on La Falaise, and his hopes of reducing the emigrants were thus almost restricted to the tardy operation of famine.

Puisaye, on his part, was engaged in diligent preparations for the important day of the 16th July (28th Messidor). On the 15th, a naval division cast anchor in the bay; it proved to be that formerly dispatched to the mouth of the Elbe to receive the emigrant regiments which had entered the service of England, and were known as the regiments with the black cockade. It brought the legions of Salm, Damas, Béon, and Péregord, reduced in all to eleven hundred men, by the losses of the campaign, and commanded by a distinguished officer, M. de Sombreuil. The squadron likewise contained additional supplies of provisions and ammunition, and announced the coming of three thousand English led by Lord Graham, and the speedy advent of the Count d'Artois with more considerable

forces. A letter from the English minister informed Puisaye that the emigrant officers in the other division were detained upon the northern coast by the royalist agents, who professed to have it in their power to secure them the possession of a port. Another dispatch, which arrived at the same time, terminated the difference between Puisaye and D'Hervilly, by confirming the former in the absolute command of the expedition, and conferring on him, moreover, the title of lieutenant-general in the army of England.

Puisaye, thus rendered free in his command, completed his arrangements for the grand enterprise of the morrow. He would have willingly postponed the projected attack, in order to afford Sombreuil's division time to disembark; but, every thing having been fixed for the 16th, and that day distinctly assigned to Tinténiac, he could not defer it. On the evening of the 15th, he detached Vauban with 1200 Chouans to land on the beach at Carnac, for the purpose of causing a diversion on the extremity of the camp of Saint-Barbe, and uniting with the Chouans appointed to assail it from the rear. It was late before the boats were got ready, and Vauban was unable to embark until midnight. He had orders to discharge a rocket if he succeeded in landing, and to shoot up a second if he should fail to hold his ground on shore.

At break of day on the 16th, Puisaye issued from the peninsula with the whole force at his disposal. He marched in columns. The gallant regiment of the Loyal-Emigrant was in the van, with the artillerymen under Rothalier. On the left advanced the regiments of Royal-Marine and Drusenay, with six hundred Chouans, commanded by the Duke de Levis. D'Hervilly's regiment, and a thousand Chouans, commanded by the Chevalier de Saint-Pierre, occupied the right. These united corps scarcely mustered four thousand men. Whilst advancing along La Falaise, they perceived a rocket in the air discharged by the Count de Vauban; not seeing a second, they concluded that Vauban had succeeded. They continued their march. Suddenly a distant sound, as of musketry, was heard. "It is Tinténiac," exclaimed Puisaye; "forward!" Thereupon the charge was sounded, and the assailants moved with quicker step on the intrenchments of the republicans. Hoche's vanguard, commanded by Humbert, was stationed in front of the heights of Saint-Barbe. At the approach of the enemy it fell back, and withdrew into the lines. The attacking force pushed onwards in confidence and exultation: suddenly a corps of cavalry, which had remained in position, made a movement askance, and unmasked a formidable range of batteries. A fire of musketry and artillery instantly opened on the emigrants; grape-shot, balls, and shells, showered thickly upon them. On the left, the regiments of Royal-Marine and Drusenay lost whole ranks without swerving; the Duke de Levis was seriously wounded at the head of his Chouans; on the right, the regiment of D'Hervilly marched intrepidly amid the appalling fire. Meanwhile, the musketry thought to have been heard on the flanks and rear had ceased to resound. Neither Tinténiac nor Vauban, therefore, had attacked, and all hope of storming the camp was extinguished. At this moment, the whole republican army, infantry and cavalry, moved out of its intrenchments; Puisaye, seeing further perseverance in the attempt must lead to certain destruction, instructed D'Hervilly to give orders for the right to retreat, whilst he himself executed that movement on the left. D'Hervilly, who confronted the fire with the utmost courage, unhappily received a bullet in his chest at this instant; he charged an aide-de-camp to convey the order of retreat; the aide-de-camp was swept away by a cannon-ball. Not being warned, therefore, the regiment of D'Hervilly, and the thousand Chouans under Saint-Pierre, continued to advance despite the terrible fire. Whilst a retreat was sounded on the left, the charge was sounded on the right. The confusion and the carnage were frightful. In this dismal state of things, the republican cavalry fell furiously on the emigrant army, and drove it in disorder back on La Falaise. Rothalier's ordnance, embedded in the sand, was captured. After many feats of heroic valour, the whole army fled to the fort of Penthièvre; the republicans followed at their utmost speed, and would have entered the fortress with the fugitives, but an unhoped-for aid intervened to check the ardour of pursuit: Vauban, who was understood to be at Carnac, appeared at the extremity of La Falaise with his corps of Chouans, and by his side stood Commodore Warren. Planted in gunboats, and pouring on La Falaise a terrific fire, they caused the republicans to pause, and once more saved the unfortunate army of Quiberon.

Thus Tinténiac had not appeared. Vauban, too late in embarking, had failed to surprise the republicans, and being subsequently ill supported by his troops, who plunged their muskets in the water to avoid the necessity of fighting, had returned near the fortress. His second rocket, sent up in the sun's rays, had not been perceived; and it was thus that Puisaye, deceived in all his combinations, had sustained this disastrous repulse. All the regiments had undergone heavy losses: that of Royal-Marine had lost out of seventy-two officers fifty-three; the others had suffered in proportion.

It must be allowed that Puisaye acted with great precipitation in attacking the camp. Four thousand men, proceeding to assail ten thousand, strongly intrenched, ought to have been assured beyond all doubt that the co-operative movements on the rear and the flanks were ready to be executed as prearranged. It was assuredly not sufficient to have assigned a rendezvous for troops, having numerous difficulties to surmount, to conclude at once that they must arrive at the hour and place fixed; a signal, or some other means, ought to have been agreed upon, whereby intelligence might be communicated, and the desired combination secured. In this respect, although deceived by the report of distant firing, Puisaye had not evinced adequate caution. At the same time, he had himself participated in all the dangers of the enterprise, and given a sufficient answer to those who affected to suspect his personal bravery, because they could not deny his talents.

It is not difficult to account for Tinténiac's breach of engagement. He had received at Elven orders to march on Coëtlogon, with which strange injunction he had complied, in the hope of regaining the lost time by a forced march. At Coëtlogon he had found sundry females commissioned to deliver him an order to move upon Saint-Brieuc. This order emanated from the agents opposed to Puisaye, who, using the name of the king, on whose behalf they always affected to speak, desired to make the corps detached by Puisaye concur in promoting the counter-expedition which they meditated on Saint-Malo or Saint-Brieuc. Whilst conferences were holding on the subject of this command, the castle of Coëtlogon was attacked by the detachments which Hoche had dispatched in pursuit of Tinténiac; that unfortunate leader hastened to the scene of action, and in a few moments fell lifeless, pierced by a bullet in the temple. His successor in the command consented to march on Saint-Brieuc. On their side, also, Messieurs Jean-Jean and Lantivy, who had landed in the vicinity of Quimper, had found similar orders; the leaders were divided in opinion, and their soldiers, already discontented, seeing this conflict of orders and projects, finally dispersed. Such were the circumstances preventing either of the corps detached by Puisaye to effect a diversion from arriving at the rendezvous. The agency of Paris, with its peculiar schemes, had thus deprived Puisaye of the emigrant officers it detained upon the northern coast, of two detachments it had kept from repairing to Baud on the 14th, and, lastly, of the aid and concurrence of those numerous

chiefs it had interdicted from sharing in any movement.

Shut up in Quiberon, Puisaye had no longer any hope of emerging in order to advance into the interior; it only remained for him to re-embark ere driven by famine, and proceed to attempt a more fortunate descent on another part of the coast, in La Vendée to wit. The major part of the emigrants were extremely favourable to this idea; the renown of Charette led them to anticipate in La Vendée a great general at the head of a splendid army. They were likewise gratified with a plan which promised to take from Puisaye the management of the counter-revolution, if any such were to be consummated.

Meanwhile, Hoche was occupied in attentively surveying the peninsula, and canvassing the means of penetrating into it. It was defended in front by the fort of Penthièvre, and on the flanks by the English squadrons. To effect a landing in boats was out of the question, and to reduce the fortress by a regular siege was equally impracticable, for it could be reached only by La Falaise, always swept by the fire of the English gunboats. In fact, the republicans were unable to make even a reconnoissance without being mowed down by continuous volleys. Consequently, a nocturnal surprise, or famine, could alone give Hoche possession of the promontory. A circumstance determined him to attempt a surprise, however hazardous it might be. The prisoners, who had been enrolled almost against their will in the emigrant regiments, could have been reconciled to the change by success alone; but, setting aside their patriotism, they were urged by pressing motives of interest to take part with a victorious enemy, who would treat them as deserters if taken with arms in their hands. Many of them repaired at night to the camp of Hoche, asseverating that they had enlisted only to get out of prison, or to avoid being subjected to the confinement of one. They indicated to him a mode of penetrating into the peninsula. A rock stood on the left of Fort Penthièvre; it was possible to make the circuit of that rock by wading into the water breast high, and then a path would be found conducting to the elevation of the fort. The fugitives gave assurance, in the name of their comrades composing the garrison, that they would aid in opening its gates.

Hoche no longer hesitated, notwithstanding the danger of such an enterprise. He formed his plan according to the information given him, and resolved to force his way into the peninsula, in order to capture the whole expedition before it had time to re-embark on board the ships. On the evening of the 20th July (2d Thermidor), the sky was overcast; Puisaye and Vauban ordered patrols for the specific purpose of averting the chance of a nocturnal attack. "In such weather," they said to the officers, "you must compel the enemy's sentinels to keep discharging their muskets." All appearing to them tranquil, they retired to rest in full security.

The preparations were speedily completed in the republican camp. At the approach of midnight, Hoche put his army in motion. The sky was densely charged with clouds; a strong wind agitated the waves; their united roar covered the tramp of soldiers and the clang of arms. Hoche disposed his troops in columns on La Falaise, and assigned three hundred grenadiers to Adjutant-General Ménage, a young republican of intrepid courage. He ordered him to defile towards the right, plunge into the sea with his grenadiers, turn the rock on which the walls of the fortress rested, scale the pathway, and attempt thus to introduce himself into the fort. These dispositions made, he marched forward in profound silence: patrols to whom red uniforms had been given, taken from the dead in the action of the 16th, and possessing the pass-word, deceived the advanced sentinels. The assailants proceeded without being recognised. Ménage entered the sea with his three hundred grenadiers, the howling of the wind drowning the noise they made in moving through the water. Several fell and regained their footing, others were engulfed in deep holes. At length, scrambling from rock to rock, they reached the land in the wake of their gallant leader, and succeeded in ascending the path conducting to the fortress. In the interim, Hoche had arrived beneath the walls with his columns. But at this critical moment the sentinels discovered one of the false patrols; even in the obscurity of the night they perceived a dark and moving mass; instantly they discharged their pieces; the alarm was given. The Toulonnese artillerymen flew to their guns, and opened a vigorous cannonade on Hoche's troops: they were thrown into disorder, their ranks confounded, and the whole assailing body on the point of giving way. But at this instant Ménage reached the elevation of the fort; the soldiers of the garrison, confederates of the besiegers, appeared on the battlements, held out the butt-ends of their muskets to the republicans, and thus helped them to scale the walls of the fortress. All together then fell on the remainder of the garrison, slew those who resisted, and immediately hoisted the tricoloured flag. Hoche, amidst the confusion into which the enemy's batteries had thrown his columns, retained all the composure for which he was remarkable; he sought out the commanding officers, remanded each to his post, restored the regularity of the ranks, and rallied his army under the tremendous fire from the fort. The darkness beginning to decrease, he descried the republican banner floating on the pinnacle of the fortress. "What!" he cried to his soldiers, "will you recoil when your comrades have already planted their standard on the walls?" He led them upon the advanced works, in which a body of the Chouans was encamped; they penetrated on all sides, and finally rendered themselves masters of the fortress.

At this moment, Vauban and Puisaye, aroused by the firing, hastened to the scene of action; but it was too late. They met, flying in all the precipitancy of terror, the Chouans, the officers abandoned by their soldiers, and the portion of the garrison which had remained faithful. Hoche made but a transient pause after the capture of the fort; he marshalled a part of his columns, and advanced into the peninsula before the expedition could have time to re-embark. Puisaye, Vauban, and all the chiefs, retired towards the interior, where were still encamped the regiment of D'Hervilly, the wrecks of the regiments Drusenay, Royal-Marine, and Loyal-Emigrant, together with the legion of Sombreuil, landed two days earlier, and eleven hundred men strong. By taking up a good position, and there was more than one such on the promontory, and manning it with the three thousand regular troops they yet possessed, they might have given the squadron time to rescue the unfortunate emigrants. The fire of the gunboats would have protected the embarcation: but consternation was predominant amongst the fugitives; the Chouans rushed into the sea with their families, to seize some fishing-boats moored along the shore, and pushed off to the squadron, which the stormy weather kept at a considerable distance. The troops, scattered in the peninsula, ran to and fro, incapable of concentrating. D'Hervilly, well adapted for vigorously defending a position, and thoroughly conversant with the locality, lay mortally wounded; Sombreuil, who had succeeded to his command, was unacquainted with the ground, was ignorant where he might make a stand, whither he ought to retire, and, although of unquestionable bravery, appeared in this emergency to have lost the necessary presence of mind. Puisaye, meanwhile, having reached Sombreuil's quarters, indicated to him a favourable position. Sombreuil inquired whether he had sent to the squadron desiring it to approach nearer; Puisaye replied that he had dispatched a skilful and trusty pilot; but the wind was high—the pilot would not arrive sufficiently early in the opinion of men exposed

to the imminent hazard of being driven into the sea. The republican columns were advancing; Sombreuil grew more urgent. "Is the squadron apprised?" he demanded of Puisaye. Unable to give any satisfactory answer, Puisaye agreed to go on board in person to urge the approach of the commodore—a commission he might have more suitably delegated to another, for he ought to have been the last to withdraw from the danger. An important consideration decided him—the necessity of securing his correspondence, which would have compromised numberless individuals in Brittany if it had fallen into the hands of the republicans. There were doubtless as pressing reasons for saving it as for saving the army itself; but Puisaye might have sent it on board without going in person. He departed, and arrived alongside the commodore simultaneously with the pilot he had already dispatched. The distance, the darkness, and the roughness of the weather, had prevented the disaster from being perceived on board the squadron. Admiral Warren, who during the whole expedition had seconded the emigrants with the greatest zeal, lost no time in hoisting sail, and eventually hove-to within cannon-shot of the shore, at the moment that Hoche, at the head of seven hundred grenadiers, was closing on Sombreuil's legion, and forcing it almost to the water's edge. How melancholy a spectacle did that coast present at the instant! The raging surf scarcely permitted the boats to near the shore; a despairing multitude of Chouans and fugitive soldiers plunged into the water up to their necks, in order to reach the boats, many being drowned amid the breakers in their anxious haste to meet them; whilst several hundreds of unfortunate emigrants, placed between the sea and the bayonets of the republicans, were reduced to the alternative of throwing themselves into the waves or upon the bristling weapons of their enemies, suffering at the same time from the fire of the English squadron equally with the republicans themselves. A few boats had gained the shore, but on a different point. On that side there was only one corvette, which kept up an astonishing fire, and retarded for a moment the march of the republicans. Some grenadiers cried out, it is stated, to the emigrants—"Surrender; no injury will be done to you." This phrase passed from rank to rank. Sombreuil attempted to approach the republicans to open a parley with General Humbert; but the continued fire prevented him from accomplishing his purpose. An emigrant officer forthwith swam off to the squadron to obtain a cessation of the cannonade. Hoche was determined to grant no capitulation; he was too well acquainted with the laws against the emigrants to venture upon contracting an engagement, and he was incapable of promising what he could not perform. He has affirmed, in a letter published through all Europe, that he heard none of the pledges attributed to General Humbert, and that he would not have sanctioned them. Some of his soldiers might have exclaimed "Surrender!" but he offered no terms, came under no obligation. He advanced imperturbably; and the emigrants, having no alternative but to surrender or to sell their lives, conceived hopes that they would probably be treated like the Vendéans. They threw down their arms. No capitulation, even verbally, was made with Hoche; Vauban, who was present, allows that no convention took place, and even asserts that he advised Sombreuil not to surrender upon the vague expectations inspired by the shouts of a few soldiers.

Several of the emigrants fell on their swords; others threw themselves into the waves to join the ships. Commodore Warren made all practicable efforts to surmount the obstacles arising from the roughness of the sea, in order to save the greatest possible number of those unfortunate persons. There were many who, on seeing the boats draw near, had plunged into the water to their necks; the republicans fired at their heads from the beach. Sometimes they attempted to enter boats already overloaded, and those already therein, apprehensive of being swamped, hacked off their hands with their sabres.

Let us quit, however, these scenes of horror, where appalling calamities visited in retribution egregious faults. Several were the causes that had contributed to foil the success of the expedition. In the first place, too great a reliance had been placed on Brittany. A people veritably disposed to rebel arises with one impulse, as did the Vendéans in May 1793, goes in quest of leaders, entreats, and forces them to become its rulers and directors, not postponing its outbreak until it be sedulously organised, nor suffering two years of oppression, to revolt after the oppression itself has ceased. But, had the population of Brittany been actuated by the most eager desire to hail a liberator, such an overseer as Hoche would have repressed its manifestations. Thus Puisaye unquestionably laboured under much delusion. Still, important aid might have been drawn from this population, numbers might have been found prepared to combat, if a considerable expedition had advanced to Rennes, and chased before it the army which kept the country in check. For this end, it was indispensable that the chiefs of the insurgents had been in concert with Puisaye, and Puisaye with the agency at Paris; that the most opposite instructions had not been transmitted to the Chouan chiefs, some receiving orders to remain quiescent, others directed upon points distant from those assigned by Puisaye; that the emigrants had formed a more correct idea of the war they were about to prosecute, and entertained somewhat less contempt for the peasants devoted to their cause; that the English had been less distrustful of Puisaye, fettered him with no adjunct in the command, given him at once all the means they destined for him, and entered upon the expedition with their full measure of strength; above all, that a great prince had been at the head of the enterprise—that he should be great indeed was scarcely needed, so that he had been the first to set foot on shore. At his presence, all obstacles would have vanished. The dissensions of the Vendéan chiefs amongst themselves, of the Vendéan chiefs with the Breton chief, of the Breton chief with the agents at Paris, of the Chouans with the emigrants, of Spain with England—that discord in all the elements of the enterprise—would have instantaneously ceased. At the appearance of the prince, all the enthusiasm of the country would have been fired, jealousies or rivalries have ceased, every one have submitted to the pre-eminence of the prince, and concurred with alacrity in the undertaking. Hoche might have been encompassed, and, despite his talents and vigour, compelled to recede before an influence all-powerful in those districts. Doubtless, he had behind him those valiant armies which had conquered Europe; but Austria might have occupied them on the Rhine, and prevented them from detaching strong reinforcements; the government no longer possessed the energy of the great committee, and the revolution would assuredly have encountered infinite hazard. Subverted twenty years earlier, its benefits would not have had time to take root and become consolidated; all the incredible efforts, the immortal victories, the torrents of blood, which had illustrated it, would have produced no fruit for France; or at least, if it were not reserved for a handful of fugitives to have subjugated to their yoke a brave nation, they would have placed its regeneration in peril, whilst, with regard to themselves, they would not have abandoned their cause without strenuous efforts to render it paramount, and their pretensions, however fatal to the country, would have derived factitious honour from their energy and fortitude.

The blame of the failure, meanwhile, was charged upon Puisaye and England by the malignants composing the royalist party. Puisaye, as they maintained, was a traitor suborned by Pitt to renew the scenes of Toulon. Nevertheless, it was undoubted that Puisaye

had done all he could under the circumstances. It was preposterous to suppose that England did not desire success; her precautions with regard to Puisaye himself, the selection she made of D'Hervilly to interpose lest the emigrant regiments might be too rashly compromised, and finally, the zeal manifested by Commodore Warren in rescuing the unfortunate survivors from the peninsula, prove that, notwithstanding her crafty genius, she had not meditated the base and revolting crime attributed to her. Justice to all be our motto, even to the implacable enemies of the revolution and of France!

Commodore Warren disembarked on the Isle of Houat the forlorn remnants of the expedition, and there awaited fresh orders from London, and the arrival of the Count d'Artois, who was on board the *Lord Moira*, to regulate his further proceedings. Despair reigned on that little island: the emigrants and Chouans, in the greatest misery, and afflicted with a contagious malady, indulged in passionate recriminations, and bitterly upbraided Puisaye. The despair was yet greater at Aurai and Vannes, whither the thousand emigrants taken in arms had been transported. Hoche, after subduing them, had hurried from the dismal spectacle, and proceeded in pursuit of Tinténiac's band, known under the appellation of the Red Army. The fate of the prisoners rested not on his fiat; he was powerless for the aggravation or mitigation of their punishment. The laws existed, and he could neither evade nor annul them. He left the question concerning them to be decided by the committee of public welfare and by Tallien. That deputy hastily departed for Paris, where he arrived on the eve of the anniversary of the 9th Thermidor. On the morrow was celebrated, according to the new mode adopted, within the walls of the convention itself, a festival in commemoration of Robespierre's fall. All the representatives assembled in grand costume; a numerous orchestra executed patriotic airs; choristers chanted hymns composed by Chénier. Courtois read a report on the achievement of the 9th Thermidor. Tallien afterwards read a report on the affair of Quiberon. The intention of arrogating a double triumph was remarked as too palpable in him; nevertheless, his services of the previous year, and those he had just rendered, procured him boundless applause. His presence, in fact, had been of considerable advantage to Hoche. On the same day a banquet was given by Tallien: the principal Girondists were associated with the Thermidorians as his guests; Louvet and Lanjuinais appeared conspicuously at the festive board. Lanjuinais proposed a toast to the 9th Thermidor, and to the courageous deputies who had prostrated the tyranny. Tallien proposed a second to the seventy-three, to the twenty-two, to all the deputies who had been the victims of the reign of terror: Louvet added these words —"*And to their intimate union with the men of the 9th Thermidor.*"

They had great need of union, in truth, to combat in concert the adversaries of various kinds now threatening the republic. Great joy prevailed in Paris, increased by the reflection how signal must have been the danger had the expedition in the West been able to co-operate with that which the Prince of Condé had prepared towards the East.

The fate of the prisoners was a subject requiring immediate decision. Numerous solicitations were addressed to the committees; but, in the present position of affairs, it was impossible to spare them. The republicans were constantly asserting that the government intended to recall the emigrants, restore to them their property, and, consequently, re-establish royalty; the royalists, always presumptuous, maintained the same thing; they stated that their friends governed the country, and the more their hopes were excited the more audacious did they prove themselves. To evince the least lenity on this occasion, was to justify the fears of the first, the idle anticipations of the latter; it would drive the republicans to despair, and stimulate the royalists to still bolder enterprises. The committee of public welfare ordered the laws to be enforced, and assuredly there were no Mountaineers within its pale to influence the resolution; it felt the impossibility of acting otherwise. A commission, located at Vannes, was instructed to separate the prisoners enrolled in their own despite from the real emigrants. These latter were shot. The soldiers allowed as many to escape as they could. Several brave men perished, certainly, but they could have anticipated no other doom, after carrying war into their native country and being taken with arms in their hands. Less menaced by enemies of every description, and in particular by their own confederates, the republic might have pardoned them; it was debarred from doing so under actual circumstances. M. de Sombreuil, albeit a man of bravery, yielded at the moment of death to an impulse little worthy of his courage. He wrote a letter to Commodore Warren, in which he accused Puisaye with all the virulence of desperation. He commissioned Hoche to forward it to the commodore. Although it contained a false assertion, Hoche, respecting the wishes of a dying man, transmitted it to the commodore; but he repelled the statement of Sombreuil in a letter of his own: "I was at the head of Humbert's seven hundred grenadiers," he said, "and affirm that no capitulation was made" All the contemporaries to whom the character of the young general was known, have deemed him incapable of falsehood. Eye-witnesses have moreover confirmed his assertion. Sombreuil's letter was singularly prejudicial to the emigrants and to Puisaye; and it was judged so dishonourable to the memory of its author that the republicans were charged with fabricating it, an imputation in every respect worthy of the miserable fables propagated by the emigrants.

Whilst the royalist party thus sustained so rude a check at Quiberon, a discomfiture equally fatal was preparing for it in Spain. Moncey had again entered Biscay, taken Bilboa and Vittoria, and was closely pressing Pampeluna. The favourite who governed the court of Madrid, after repudiating the overtures of peace made by the French government at the commencement of the campaign, because he was not the medium through which they were submitted, now determined to negotiate, and dispatched the Chevalier Yriarte to Basle. The peace was signed at that place with the envoy of the republic, Barthélemy, on the 24th Messidor (12th July), the very time disasters were thickening so portentously at Quiberon. The conditions were the restitution of all the conquests of France on the territory of Spain, and, in requital, the cession to France of the Spanish portion of Saint-Domingo. Here France made great concessions for an advantage almost illusory, for Saint-Domingo no longer belonged to either power; but those concessions were dictated by the soundest policy. France had nothing to covet beyond the Pyrenees; she had no interest in weakening Spain: on the contrary, it behoved her, had it been possible, to restore to that power the strength it had lost in a contest so detrimental to the interests of both nations.

This peace was hailed with the most lively satisfaction by all who loved France and the republic. It detached another power from the coalition, it showed a Bourbon recognising the republic, and it rendered two armies disposable for transference to the Alps, the West, or the Rhine. The royalists were struck with consternation. The agents at Paris, especially, dreaded lest their intrigues might be divulged, lest their letters to Spain should be made public. England would have therein read their real sentiments respecting her; and, although that power was grossly vituperated for the affair of Quiberon, it was henceforth their only pecuniary resource: hence the necessity of conciliating it, with a mental reserva

tion to deride and deceive it when the opportunity occurred.*

An exploit, not less important in its consequences, was achieved by the armies of Jourdan and Pichegru. After long delays, it had been finally decided that the Rhine should be passed. The French and Austrian armies confronted each other upon the opposite banks, from Basle to Düsseldorf. The defensive position of the Austrians on the Rhine was excellently chosen. The fortresses of Düsseldorf and Ehrenbreitstein covered their right; Mayence, Manheim, and Philipsbourg, their centre and left; the Neckar and the Maine, taking their sources not far from the Danube, and flowing almost parallel towards the Rhine, formed two important lines of communication with the hereditary states, brought supplies in profusion, and covered the two flanks of the army when operating concentrically towards Mayence. The plan to be followed on this scene of warfare was identical for both the Austrians and French: according to the opinion of an eminent general and a celebrated critic, it was incumbent on both to act concentrically between the Maine and the Neckar. The obvious plan for the French armies under Jourdan and Pichegru was to attempt the passage of the Rhine towards Mayence, at a short distance from each other, subsequently unite in the valley of the Maine, separate Clairfayt from Wurmser, and ascend between the Neckar and the Maine, striving to repulse successively the two Austrian generals. In like manner, the Austrian generals were called upon to concentrate their forces, in order to debouch by Mayence upon the left bank. If they were anticipated, if the Rhine were passed on any point, they ought to concentrate between the Neckar and the Maine, prevent the junction of the two French armies, and seize an opportunity for falling on one or other. The Austrian commanders had every advantage for taking the initiative, as they occupied Mayence, and could debouch, when they pleased, on the left bank.

The French, however, took the initiative. After a tedious delay, the Dutch boats had at length reached the height of Düsseldorf, and Jourdan prepared to cross the Rhine. On the 20th Fructidor (6th September), he passed, at Eichelcamp, Düsseldorf, and Neuwied, by a bold manœuvre. He advanced by the Düsseldorf road to Frankfort, between the line of the Prussian neutrality and the Rhine, and arrived at the Lahn on the 4th complementary day or Sans-Culottide (20th September). In the mean time, Pichegru had been ordered to attempt the passage over the Upper Rhine, and to summon Manheim. That flourishing town, threatened with a bombardment, surrendered, contrary to all expectation, on the 4th complementary day (20th September). From that moment all the advantages were with the French. Pichegru, based on Manheim, had only to draw thither all his army and unite with Jourdan in the valley of the Maine. They would then be enabled to divide the two Austrian generals, and act concentrically between the Maine and the Neckar. It behoved Jourdan especially to move with all dispatch from his position between the neutral line and the Rhine; for his army, having no means of transport for its supplies, and being unable to treat the country in a hostile manner, must soon be reduced to destitution unless he marched forward.

Thus, at this era, fortune smiled benignantly on the republic. Peace with Spain, the destruction of the expedition hazarded by England on the coasts of Brittany, the passage of the Rhine, offensive operations propitiously commenced in Germany—success beamed on all quarters. It remained for its generals and statesmen to profit by the concurrence of so many auspicious events.

* The fifth volume of Puisaye's Memoirs contains proof that such were the views entertained.

CHAPTER XLIV.

MACHINATIONS OF THE ROYALIST PARTY.—DIRECTORIAL CONSTITUTION, AND DECREES OF THE 5TH AND 13TH FRUCTIDOR.—ACCEPTANCE THEREOF BY THE PRIMARY ASSEMBLIES.—INSURRECTION OF THE 13TH VENDEMIAIRE; DEFEAT OF THE INSURGENT SECTIONS. —DISSOLUTION OF THE NATIONAL CONVENTION.

Defeated on the frontiers, and abandoned by the court of Spain, on which it relied most securely, the royalist party was reduced to intrigue in the interior; and it must be allowed that, at this moment, Paris was an admirable arena for intrigues. The preparation of the constitution was nearly completed; the period when the convention should abdicate its authority, France be convoked to elect new representatives, and a fresh assembly replace that which had reigned so long, was the most favourable that could be imagined for prosecuting counter-revolutionary projects.

In the sections of Paris violent passions were in fermentation. The frequenters of those assemblies were not royalists, but they unconsciously aided royalism. They had laboured to oppose the terrorists; they had become inflamed by their arduous struggle, desired to persecute the vanquished, and inveighed against the convention, because it refused to carry persecution to an extreme limit. They were ever ready to recall to recollection that the terror had emanated from the convention itself; they demanded from it a constitution and a code of laws, and the termination of its prolonged dictatorship. The majority of the men who urged these demands, scarcely cast a thought upon the Bourbons. They were members of the wealthy third-estate of 1789—merchants, shopkeepers, proprietors, advocates, literary men, who were at last determined to insist upon the re-establishment of laws and the enjoyment of their rights; young men, sincerely republican, but blinded by their wrath against the revolutionary system; and sundry ambitious personages, writers in journals, and orators of sections, who, to make way for themselves, wished the convention to retire from the stage. The royalists lurked behind this mass. They were composed of certain emigrants and priests who had returned, divers creatures of the old court who had lost lucrative posts, and many indifferent and timid individuals who shuddered at the idea of a tempestuous democracy. These latter rarely visited the sections; but the former were assiduous in their attendance, and employed all possible means for keeping them in agitation. The instructions given by the royalist agents to their confidants, were to adopt the language of the sectionists, inveigh upon the same topics, demand like them the punishment of the terrorists, the accomplishment of the constitution, and the trial of the Mountaineer deputies; but to insist upon these things with a greater degree of violence, so as to compromise the sections with the convention and provoke fresh commotions; for every turmoil afforded a chance, and might at all events serve to excite disgust for a republic so incessantly the prey of tumult and disorder.

Such machinations were fortunately possible at Paris alone, for that is invariably the most agitated city in France—that wherein discussions on public questions are carried on with the greatest heat, where the desire and pretention of dictating to the government are universal, and where opposition is always first manifested. Excepting Lyons, Marseilles, and Toulon, where the populations were engaged in massacres, the rest of France viewed with comparative indifference the political struggles of the time, and took an infinitesimally less part therein than the sections of Paris.

Combined with all they said or prompted in the sections, the intriguers in the service of royalism circulated pamphlets and published articles in the journals. Moreover, they prevaricated egregiously,

as was their wont, arrogated an importance they were far from possessing, and wrote abroad that they had seduced the principal leaders of the government. By means of such arrant mendacity alone, they contrived to procure money, and had recently obtained from England several thousands of pounds sterling. Nevertheless, it is certain that, although they had not gained Tallien or Hoche, as they boasted, they had succeeded with some members of the convention—two or three, perhaps. As men who had fallen within their toils were mentioned Rovère and Saladin, originally two rabid revolutionists, and of late become equally rabid reactors. It is credible, also, that they had moved, by more delicate appliances, sundry of those deputies holding moderate sentiments, who felt an inclination favourable to representative monarchy, that is to say, to a Bourbon pretending to be bound by laws on the English model. Pichegru had been tempted by abrupt offers of a castle, artillery, and money; legislators and members of committees may have been more cautiously addressed: "France is too extensive a country to be a republic; she would be far happier under a king, with responsible ministers, hereditary peers, and deputies." This idea, indeed, without being suggested, might naturally occur to contemplative personages, especially those who deemed themselves well adapted for fulfilling the functions of deputies or hereditary peers. Be that as it may, the Lanjuinais', Boissy-d'Anglas, Henri-Larivière, and Lesage [d'Eure-et-Loire], were regarded at this epoch as secret royalists.

We perceive that the means wielded by the agency were not very potent; but they sufficed to harass public tranquillity, infuse apprehensions into the minds of men, and above all, recall to the memory of the French those Bourbons, the only implacable enemies of the republic, whom its arms were unable to vanquish, for traditions are not obliterated by bayonets.

Amongst the seventy-three reintegrated deputies, there were assuredly monarchists; but in general they were republicans; the Girondists were all so, or nearly all. Nevertheless, the newspapers in the counter-revolutionary interest lauded them with singular pertinacity, and thus succeeded in rendering them suspected by the Thermidorians. To vindicate themselves from these affected eulogies, the seventy-three and the twenty-two strenuously protested their attachment to the republic; in sooth, none would have then dared to speak slightingly of that republic. How dismal an inconsistency, indeed, if they had not cherished it, after having made such sacrifices of blood and treasure for its establishment!—after having immolated in its cause thousands of Frenchmen in civil warfare or in resisting foreign aggression! Therefore, to love the republic, or at least to profess that affection, was an imperative obligation. However, notwithstanding these protestations, the Thermidorians were distrustful; they relied with confidence only on Daunou, whose probity and severe principles were incontestible, and on Louvet, whose ardent mind had remained unequivocally republican. After having lost so many illustrious friends, and in his own person encountered so many perils, Louvet could not believe the whole to have been a dream—that those valuable lives had been taken to pave the way for royalty. Accordingly, he had completely identified himself with the Thermidorians. These again approximated day by day more closely to the Mountaincers—to that body of sturdy republicans, whose ranks they had themselves so wofully thinned.

The Thermidorians desired to pass stringent measures against the return of the emigrants, who continued to pour into France, some with false passports and under fictitious names, others under pretence of seeking the erasure of their names from the emigrant lists. Almost all presented false certificates of residence, and alleged they had not left France, but had remained in concealment or been pursued only on occasion of the events of the 31st May and 2d June. Under pretext of prosecuting their appeals before the committee of general safety, they flocked to Paris, where many fomented the agitations in the sections. Amongst the most eminent personages returned to Paris was Madame de Staël,* who had reappeared in France with her consort, the ambassador from Sweden. She had thrown open her saloons, where she gratified her ruling ambition of displaying her varied and brilliant powers. A republic was far from distasteful to the soaring hardihood of her mind, but she would have accepted it only on condition of seeing her proscribed friends shining in its councils—on condition of sweeping away those revolutionists, who passed doubtless for men of energy, but as uncouth and devoid of intellectual refinement. From their hands, in truth, the saved republic would be thankfully received, but with the intention of promptly excluding them from the legislature and the government. Foreigners of distinction, all the ambassadors of friendly powers, the men of letters most renowned for their talents and wit, assembled under the roof of Madame de Staël. It was no longer the saloon of Madame Tallien, it was hers, which attracted all attention; and that circumstance alone may afford an estimate of the change French society had undergone during the previous six months. Madame de Staël was asserted to intercede for emigrants, endeavouring to procure the recall of Narbonne, Jaucourt, and several others. Legendre formally denounced her from the tribune. The journals were filled with complaints of the influence exercised by the coteries formed around the foreign ambassadors, and advocated the necessity of suspending all appeals for erasures. The Thermidorians, indeed, caused the adoption of a decree, enacting that every emigrant returned to solicit his erasure should be bound to repair to his commune, and there await the decision of the committee of general safety.† By this expedient, it was hoped that the capital might be freed from a multitude of intriguers who contributed to disturb its tranquillity.

The Thermidorians were anxious, at the same time, to check the persecutions directed so remorselessly against the patriots. They had already induced the committee of general safety to liberate Pache, Bouchotte, the noted Héron, and several others. It must be allowed they might have selected a better object for their commiseration than the last-named personage. The sections had previously presented petitions on the subject of these liberations, as we have recorded; they now remonstrated with redoubled vehemence. The committees, thus provoked, replied that it was fitting the imprisoned patriots should be forthwith tried, and no longer detained if they were innocent. To propose their trial was tantamount to a proposition for their enlargement, since their delinquencies were for the most part of that political character which rendered their arraignment impossible. Excepting certain members of the revolutionary committees, guilty of atrocious excesses, the majority could not be legally condemned. Several sections ap-

* [Madame de Staël was the daughter of Necker, the finance minister in the early period of the revolution. She is distinguished as the authoress of two celebrated works, "Corinne," and "De l'Allemagne." The latter especially is a work of extraordinary merit, not only from the matchless graces of its style, the admirable picture it presents of Germany, and the masterly analysis of German literature and philosophy it contains, but also from the sublime sentiments it upholds in all that concerns the great interests of humanity. The work was proscribed in France under Napoleon, his police minister, the Duke de Rovigo, writing to Madame de Staël that her production was not "*French!*" and ordering her to quit the realm within a week. The disgraceful conduct of Napoleon towards this lady pourtrays his character in one of its meanest and most contemptible phases. Through his unrelenting animosity she led a life of exile for many years, and resided for some time in England, where her celebrity secured her admission into the most elevated circles.]

† Decree of the 18th August.

peared before the convention to request that they might be granted a few days of consecutive permanence, in order to assign grounds for the arrest and disarming of those they had incarcerated; they alleged that, in the hurry of the moment, they had been unable to search for proofs or to particularise reasons; but they offered to furnish them. The convention repudiated these insidious demands, which cloaked the desire of obtaining permission to assemble in permanent meetings, and it instructed the committees to submit a project for bringing the detained patriots to trial.

This project gave rise to a stormy discussion. On one side it was proposed to send the patriots before the departmental tribunals; on the other, members, apprehensive of local prejudices and passions, opposed the selection of those judicatories, and advocated the appointment of a commission of twelve members taken from the convention, empowered to institute a preliminary investigation touching the detained, to liberate those against whom insufficient charges were preferred, and to consign the remainder to the criminal courts. They argued that this commission, unaffected by the animosities rankling in the departments, would act with greater justice and impartiality, and avoid confounding patriots simply misled by the ardour of their zeal with men undoubtedly culpable of having participated in the cruelties of the decemviral tyranny. All the inveterate enemies of the patriots exclaimed against the suggestion of this commission, which would doubtless proceed after the manner of the committee of general safety when remodelled subsequent to the 9th Thermidor, that is to say, by liberating *en masse*. They tauntingly asked how this commission of twelve members could investigate twenty or twenty-five thousand different cases. They were answered very shortly, that it would manage like the committee of general safety, which had adjudicated upon eighty or a hundred thousand, on occasion of the prisons being thrown open. But this was precisely the mode of deciding on incarcerations now considered so objectionable. After a debate of several days, interspersed with petitions, one emulous of the other in the audaciousness of its terms, the resolution was finally passed that the patriots should be tried by the departmental tribunals, and the decree was referred to the committees, for the purpose of being modified in certain of its practical provisions. The continuation of the report upon deputies denounced for acts committed whilst on missions was likewise carried. Decrees of arrest were passed* against Lequinio, Lanot, Lefiot, Dupin, Bô, Piorry, Maxieu, Chaudron-Rousseau, Laplanche, and Fouché; and the process against Lebon was commenced. At this period, the convention had as many of its members in prison as during the reign of terror. Thus the partisans of clemency had no especial reason to deplore the past; they had returned the full measure of evil for evil.

Meanwhile, the constitution had been presented by the commission of eleven. It was discussed during the three months of Messidor, Thermidor, and Fructidor, year 3, and was *seriatim* decreed with little variation. Its authors were Lesage, Daunou, Boissy-d'Anglas, Creuzé-Latouche, Berlier, Louvet, Larévellière-Lépaux, Lanjuinais, Durand-Maillane, Baudin of the Ardennes, and Thibaudeau. Sieyes had refused to form part of the commission; for on the topic of constitutions he was even more dogmatical than on other subjects. The contemplation of his whole life had been centred on constitutions; they formed his peculiar vocation. He had one ready-wove in his brain, and he was not the man to bury it in the recesses thereof. He propounded it on his own behalf, and without the intervention of the commission. The convention, from respect for his genius, willingly accorded him a hearing, but declined to adopt his scheme. We shall find it reappear at a later date, and that will be the appropriate time for making known this conception, which presents so remarkable a feature in the history of the human mind. That which the assembly adopted was in accordance with the progress made in practical knowledge. In 1791, men were at once so inexperienced and confiding, that they had not imagined as possible the existence of an aristocratic body controlling the will of the national representation, and yet they had admitted and retained with reverence, almost with affection, the royal power. But, upon more mature reflection, they might have recognised that an aristocratic body is of all countries, and even that it is more peculiarly suitable to republics; that a great state may very well dispense with a king, but never with a senate. In 1795, however, they had enjoyed abundant opportunities of judging to what disorders a single assembly is exposed, and they cheerfully consented to the establishment of a legislative body divided into two assemblies. They were then less irritated against aristocracy than against royalty, because, in truth, they dreaded the latter more at the moment. Thus they displayed greater solicitude in guarding against its semblance when deciding the composition of an executive power. The commission contained a monarchical party, comprising Lesage, Lanjuinais, Durand-Maillane, and Boissy-d'Anglas. This party proposed a president: the idea was repelled. "Some day, perhaps," said Louvet, "you would have a Bourbon presented to you." Baudin of the Ardennes and Daunou suggested two consuls; others demanded three. Five directors, deciding by a majority, were preferred. None of the essential attributes of royalty was conferred on this executive authority, such as inviolability, the sanction of laws, the judicial prerogative, or the right of peace and war. It simply possessed the common inviolability of deputies, the promulgation and execution of laws, the direction, but not the decision of war, and the negotiation, but not the ratification of treaties.

Such were the principles on which reposed the directorial constitution. The convention accordingly decreed the institution of—

A council, called *of the Five Hundred*, composed of five hundred members, thirty years of age at least, solely enjoying the privilege of originating laws, and renewable by a third every year;

A council, called *of the Ancients*, composed of two hundred and fifty members, forty years of age at least, all to be either married or widowers, enjoying the privilege of sanctioning laws, and also renewable by a third yearly;

Lastly, an executive directory, composed of five members, deliberating by a majority, renewable every year by a fifth, having responsible ministers, promulgating laws and enforcing their execution, holding the disposition of the land and sea forces, managing external relations, possessing the power to repel sudden hostilities but not to make war without the consent of the legislative body, and to negotiate treaties, submitting them to the ratification of the legislative body, with the reservation of secret articles, which it had the faculty of stipulating if they were not in contravention of the patent articles.

These different authorities were to be nominated in the following manner:—

All the citizens, twenty-one years of age, met of right in primary assemblies every first day in the month of Prairial, and appointed electoral assemblies. These electoral assemblies met every 20th of Prairial, and appointed the two councils. The two councils nominated the directory. It was judged that the executive power, holding its appointment from the legislative body, would be more dependent on it, and a consideration, founded on existing circumstances, strengthened the determination. The republic not being yet integrally associated with the habits of France, being rather a theory of enlightened men or of those compromised in the revolution than

* Decrees of the 8th and 9th August.

an universal sentiment, it was deemed impolitic to intrust the composition of the executive power to the masses. Hence the conclusion that, during the first years at least, the authors of the revolution, necessarily predominating in the legislative body, should hold the power of selecting directors capable of defending their work.

The judicial functions were confided to elective judges. Justices of peace were instituted. A civil tribunal was established for each department, adjudicating causes arising in the department in the first instance, and by appeal those arising in adjacent departments. A criminal court, composed of five members and a jury, was added to the list of judicatories.

Communal assemblies were not admitted; in lieu were introduced municipal and departmental administrations, composed of three or five members and more, according to the population; they were to be formed by the mode of election. Experience prompted the adoption of certain accessory dispositions of great importance. Thus the legislative body itself assigned the place of its sessions, and could remove into any commune it pleased to select. No law could be passed without three preliminary readings, unless it were qualified as a measure of urgency, and were so recognised by the council of ancients. This regulation was intended to prevent those hasty and often-revoked decisions for which the convention had been so remarkable. Moreover, all societies self-styled popular, holding public meetings, having a regular organisation of officers (a *bureau*) and tribunes, with affiliations, were interdicted. The press was entirely unshackled. The emigrants were for ever expelled from the territory of the republic, the national domains irrevocably secured to the purchasers, and all creeds declared free, albeit not recognised or supported by the state.

Such was the constitution based upon the hope of maintaining France as a republic. After its adoption, a material question occurred: the Constituent Assembly, through an ostentatious disinterestedness, had excluded its members from the legislative body which superseded it; was the convention to do the same? There can be no doubt such a determination would have been an act of great imprudence. Among a volatile and fickle people, who, after sitting under the yoke of monarchy for fourteen centuries, had cast it off in a moment of enthusiasm, the republic was not so firmly rooted as to warrant abandoning its establishment to the course of events. The revolution could only be efficiently defended by its authors. The convention was composed in great part of members of both the Constituent and Legislative Assemblies; it comprised the men who had abolished the ancient feudal constitution on the 14th July and 4th August 1789, who had subverted the throne on the 10th August, who had on the 21st January immolated the head of the Bourbon dynasty, and who, during the space of three years, had made astounding efforts against banded Europe to uphold their work—they alone were capable of adequately sustaining the revolution, now consecrated in the directorial constitution. Thus, abjuring all mawkish disinterestedness, they boldly decreed, on the 5th Fructidor (22d August), that the new legislative body should, in the fraction of two-thirds, be composed of the existing convention, and that only one-third should be newly chosen. This decision originated the further question whether the convention should itself designate the two-thirds conserved, or leave that task to the electoral assemblies. After an acrimonious disputation, it was agreed, on the 13th Fructidor (30th August), that the electoral assemblies should be charged with that selection. The convention ordained, moreover, that the primary assemblies should meet on the 20th Fructidor (6th September) to accept the constitution and the two supplementary decrees of the 5th and 13th Fructidor. It likewise decreed that, after having recorded their votes on the constitution and the decrees, the primary assemblies should re-constitute themselves, and forthwith make, that is to say, in the year 3 (1795), the elections appointed for the 1st Prairial of the following year. The convention thereby proclaimed its immediate purpose to lay down the dictatorship and put the constitution in operation. It lastly resolved that the armies, although usually debarred from the privilege of deliberating, should nevertheless muster on the fields of warfare they occupied at the moment, in order to vote the constitution. It was fitting, the advocates of this measure urged, that those who were to defend should have the option of accepting the constitution. Furthermore, the armies, by this exercise of the suffrage, would feel still greater interest in the cause of the revolution.

The adoption of these resolutions threw the numerous and various enemies of the convention into a paroxysm of rage and disappointment. The constitution was an object of mere secondary importance to the majority amongst them. Any suited their views, so long as it gave occasion for a general renewal of the members of the government. The royalists desired that renewal as a means of provoking confusion, and with the view also of returning as many men favourable to their cause as possible, thus availing themselves of the republic itself to work out their schemes of royalty. It was especially dear to them, moreover, as presenting an opportunity of discarding the conventionalists, who were so deeply interested in opposing the counter-revolution, and of throwing the government into the hands of new men, inexperienced, not compromised like their predecessors, and more easy of seduction. Many literary men, authors, and obscure personages, who were devoured by a passion to enter the political career, not from any counter-revolutionary zeal, but simply from personal ambition, likewise desired this complete renewal, in order that the number of vacant seats might be multiplied. All these overspread the sections, and incited them against the decrees. The convention, they said, wished to perpetuate itself in power; it spoke of the rights of the people, and yet indefinitely postponed their exercise; it controlled them in their suffrages, and took from them the power of preferring men unsullied by crimes; it evinced a determination forcibly to preserve a majority composed of the individuals who had covered France with scaffolds. Thus, they added, the new legislature would not be purged of all the terrorists; France would not be perfectly at ease touching her future destiny; she could not enjoy the certainty of never again beholding a horrible system of terror predominant. These declamations acted upon a great number of minds—the burgher class of the sections, which was sufficiently favourable to the new institutions, but laboured under an excessive dread of the revival of terror; conscientious but irreflective men, who cherished dreams of spotless republics, and longed to see a new and pure generation seated in power; young men, enamoured of the same utopian chimeras; and, in fine, that large community greedy of novelty—all these viewed the conduct of the convention in thus prolonging its existence for two or three years with regret and disapprobation. The tribe of journalists inveighed with wonted virulence. Sundry individuals who held rank in literature or had figured in the former assemblies, appeared in the tribunes of the sections. Suard, Morellet, Lacretelle the younger, Fiévée, Vaublanc, Pastoret, Dupont of Nemours, Quatremère of Quincy, Delalot, the violent convert La Harpe, General Miranda, escaped from the imprisonment to which his behaviour at Neerwinden had consigned him, the Spaniard Marchenna, saved from the proscription of his friends the Girondists, and Lemaitre the leader of the royal agency, signalised themselves by pamphlets or vehement orations in the sections. An universal turmoil prevailed.

The plan open to the malecontents was perfectly simple, namely, to accept the constitution and reject the decrees. This they accordingly proposed to do at Paris, and strenuously urged all the sections in France to imitate the example. But the intriguers who agitated the sections, and who were bent on pushing the opposition into insurrection, advocated a more extensive plan. They held that the primary assemblies, after having accepted the constitution and rejected the decrees of the 5th and 13th Fructidor, should constitute themselves permanent, declare the powers of the convention at an end, and the electoral assemblies free to choose as their deputies whomsoever they thought fit, and refuse to separate until after the installation of the new legislative body. The emissaries of Lemaitre circulated this scheme in the environs of Paris; they wrote into Normandy, where views favourable to the constitution of 1791 were assiduously inculcated, into Brittany, the Gironde, into every district, in short, where they maintained relations. One of their letters was intercepted and read from the tribune. The convention heard without alarm of the machinations in progress against it, and awaited with composure the decision of the primary assemblies throughout France, assured that the majority would declare in its favour. Nevertheless, suspecting the design of an outbreak in prospective, it ordered some troops to advance, and collected them in the camp of Les Sablons, under Paris.

The section of Lepelletier, erst Saint-Thomas, took a prominent part upon this occasion, as from its well-known sentiments was but natural: it appeared, with those of the Mail, the Butte-des-Moulins, the Champs-Elysées, and the Théatre-Français (L'Odéon), to present petitions to the assembly. They all concurred in demanding whether the Parisians had proved themselves delinquent, whether the convention distrusted them, since it had summoned troops; they moreover complained of the pretended violence offered to the freedom of election, and used this insolent expression: "Merit our suffrages, not command them." The convention replied with dignified firmness to these addresses, contenting itself with stating that it awaited with respect the manifestation of the national will, that it would defer thereto when unequivocally expressed, and that it would compel all others to yield a like obedience.

The chief object of the malecontents was to establish a central point of communication with all the sections, in order to give them a common impulse, and thus organise a revolt. Examples had been sufficiently plentiful to show that such was the primary want. The section of Lepelletier undertook to form the required centre: it was well entitled to the honour, for it had ever approved itself the most turbulent. It commenced by publishing an act of guarantee, equally inconsiderate and futile. "The powers of the constituent body," it said in substance, "ceased in presence of the sovereign people; the primary assemblies represented that sovereign people; they had the right to express any opinion whatsoever on the constitution and the decrees; they were under mutual safeguards as respected each other, and ought to give reciprocal guarantees of their independence." These, as general maxims, were undeniable, saving a modification to be appended—that the constituent body retained its powers until the fiat of the majority was pronounced. For the rest, these vain generalities were only intended as introductory to a further and graver step. The section of Lepelletier urged each of the forty-eight sections of Paris to nominate a delegate, in order that the sentiments entertained by the citizens of the metropolis on the constitution and the supplementary decrees might be expressed. Herein was involved an infraction of the laws; for the primary assemblies were prohibited from holding intercommunications—from corresponding by delegates or addresses. The convention cancelled the resolution of the section, and declared that its execution would be considered a misdemeanour affecting the public security.

The sections, not being yet sufficiently emboldened, succumbed, and proceeded to collect the votes on the constitution and the decrees. They commenced by expelling, without the semblance of any legal form, the patriots who came to record their suffrages. In some, they were quietly turned to the door of the hall; in others, they were warned by placards to remain at home, for if they presumed to appear at the sections, they would be ignominiously driven from the precincts. The persons thus debarred from exercising their franchise were very numerous; they flocked to the convention to protest against the violence offered to them. The convention reprobated the conduct of the sections, but declined to interfere, in order to avoid the appearance of canvassing for votes, and to let the very abuse prove the freedom of the deliberation. The patriots, thus excluded from their sections, took refuge in the galleries of the convention, and occupied them in great numbers; they daily pressed the committees with solicitations to restore them their arms, affirming that they were ready to employ them in the defence of the republic.

All the sections of Paris, except that of the Quinze-Vingts, accepted the constitution and rejected the decrees. The case was very different in the rest of France. Opposition, as usual, was less ardent in the provinces than in the capital. The royalists, the intriguers, the ambitious, all who had interested motives for urging the renewal of the legislative body and the government, had chiefly congregated at Paris, and were numerous there only; consequently, in the provinces the assemblies deliberated with calmness, although without the slightest constraint. They adopted the constitution almost unanimously, and the decrees by a large majority. As to the armies, they received the constitution with enthusiasm, both in Brittany and La Vendée, on the Alps and on the Rhine. The camps, converted into primary assemblies, resounded with acclamations. They were full of men devoted to the revolution, attached to it by the very perils they had undergone in its cause. That violent revulsion which had taken place in Paris against the revolutionary government was unfelt in the armies. The conscripts of 1793, with whom their ranks were filled, preserved in grateful remembrance the famous committee, which had directed and supported them so incomparably better than the new government. Removed from the sphere of private life, accustomed to brave hardships, fatigues, and death, animated by the lust of glory and by dazzling illusions, they still retained that enthusiasm, which, in the interior of France, was rapidly decaying—they were proud to call themselves soldiers of a republic upheld by them against all the kings of Europe, and with which they were closely identified, as in some sort their own work. They swore with fervour and sincerity never to let it perish. The army of the Sambre-and-Meuse, commanded by Jourdan, partook the noble sentiments of its gallant leader. It was the same which had conquered at Watignies and raised the blockade of Maubeuge; the same that had vanquished at Fleurus and given Belgium to France; the same, in fine, which, by the victories on the Ourthe and the Röer, had assured to her the bulwark of the Rhine. That army, which had best merited of the republic, was also the most attached to it. It had recently passed the Rhine; it paused on its triumphant march, and exhibited the solemn spectacle of sixty thousand men marshalled on a foreign battle-field, greeting with one accord the new republican constitution of their country.

Tidings of these events, arriving successively in Paris, diffused joy amongst the members of the convention, and corresponding sadness amongst the sectionaries. These had daily appeared, to present addresses, wherein they announced the vote of their

assemblies, and proclaimed with insulting rapture that the constitution was accepted and the decrees rejected. The patriots, massed in the galleries, murmured at these declarations; but when the returns from the departments were read, recording for the most part the acceptance of both the constitution and the supplementary decrees, the patriots broke into frantic acclamations, and exulted in peals of derisive mirth over the crestfallen sectionists seated at the bar. The concluding days of Fructidor passed in scenes of this description. At length, on the 1st Vendémiaire of the year 4 (23d September 1795), the general result of the suffrages was proclaimed.

The constitution was accepted almost unanimously by the voters, and the decrees by an immense majority. Several thousand votes, nevertheless, had been given against the decrees, and, here and there, some had ventured to demand a king—a sufficient proof that the most perfect freedom had reigned in the primary assemblies. That very day, the constitution and the decrees were solemnly declared by the convention laws of the state. This declaration was followed by prolonged plaudits. The convention subsequently decreed that the primary assemblies which had not yet appointed their electors should be bound to conclude that nomination before the 10th Vendémiaire (2d October); that the electoral assemblies should be formed on the 20th, and finish their operations by the latest on the 29th (21st October); and, lastly, that the new legislative body should meet on the 15th Brumaire (6th November).

This issue of the great experiment was desolation to the sectionists. They had hoped, up to the last moment, that France would pronounce a verdict similar to that of Paris, and that they would be delivered from what they called "the two-thirds;" but the decree just passed cut off every ray of hope. Affecting to discredit the honest computation of the votes, they sent delegates to the committee of decrees, in order to investigate the records. This invidious proceeding was met with unmerited courtesy. They were allowed to examine the records, and to compare the account of votes; they found it correct. Thenceforth they had not even this forlorn objection of an error or a fraud in the calculation; nothing remained to them save an insurrection. But this was a desperate expedient, and, moreover, one not easily compassed. Those ambitious characters who desired to supplant the men of the revolution in the government of the republic; the youths who were eager to display their courage, the majority of whom, indeed, had served in the armies; the royalists, in fine, who had no other resource than an attack by force, might willingly expose themselves to the hazards of a conflict; but that mass of peaceable men, prompted to attend the sections by a dread of the terrorists rather than by political courage, was to be roused with difficulty. In the first place, insurrection was opposed to their principles: how could the avowed enemies of anarchy assail with arms the established and recognised authority of the state? Parties, it is true, are not scrupulous about contradictions or inconsistencies: but then, again, how were burghers, who had never left their desks or domiciles, to venture an attack on troops of the line fortified with artillery? However, the royalist and ambitious agitators bestirred themselves in the sections; they discoursed largely on the public interest, and on honour; they averred that the feeling of security was altogether inconsistent with the longer governance of the present conventionalists; that the country would always remain exposed to the revival of terrorism; and that, at any rate, it was ignominy to recede and tamely submit. They adroitly seized the occasion, too, to enlist vanity as one of their moving influences. The youths who had been in the armies were boisterous and exuberant; they rallied, inspirited the timid, and prevented them from manifesting their fears. An act of energy was determined upon. Groups of youths traversed the streets, vociferating, "Down with the two-thirds!" When the soldiers of the convention interfered to disperse or prevent them uttering seditious cries, they presented arms, and often discharged a volley. There were divers collisions and many shots fired in the very midst of the Palais-Royal.

Lemaitre and his colleagues, perceiving their designs thus prospering, called several Chouan chiefs and emigrants to Paris; these they sedulously secreted, awaiting the signal to bring them forth. They had succeeded also in provoking commotions at Orleans, Chartres, Dreux, Verneuil, and Nonancourt. At Chartres, a representative, by name Letellier, having failed in his efforts to quell a riot, passed a bullet through his head. Although these disturbances had been suppressed, a successful rising in Paris would probably lead to a general movement. Nothing was omitted to foment it, and too speedily the success of the conspirators appeared complete.

The expedient of an insurrection was not yet fully resolved upon; but the honest burghers of Paris gradually allowed themselves to be overcome by the hair-brained youths and the crafty intriguers. In a short while they were found indulging in bravadoes equally with the others, and became irrevocably committed. The section of Lepelletier still maintained its reputation for superior turbulence. As we have already intimated, it had been deemed essential, before forming any enterprise, to establish a central direction. The means of accomplishing this purpose had been anxiously canvassed for some time. It was suggested that the assembly of electors, nominated by all the primary assemblies of Paris, might become this central authority; but, according to the late decree of the convention, that assembly was not to meet before the 20th, a delay which the excitement of the moment could not brook. The section of Lepelletier thereupon imagined a resolution, founded on a sufficiently singular allegation. The constitution, it set forth, interposed but twenty days between the meeting of the primary assemblies and that of the electoral assemblies. The primary assemblies were convoked on this occasion for the 20th Fructidor; the electoral assemblies ought therefore to meet on the 10th Vendémiaire. The convention had fixed the 20th, however, for their muster, evidently with the view of postponing the period for putting the constitution in operation, and dividing power with the new third. In consequence, premising the necessity of protecting the rights of the citizens, the section Lepelletier resolved that the electors already appointed should immediately assemble; and it communicated the resolution to the other sections, craving their approval and concurrence. Several of these acceded accordingly. The assembly was fixed for the 11th, at the Théatre-Français (L'Odéon).

On the 11th Vendémiaire (3d October), a portion of the electors congregated in the theatre, under the protection of certain battalions of the national guard. A multitude of persons, attracted by curiosity, gathered on the Place de L'Odéon, and soon formed a considerable assemblage. The committees of general safety and public welfare, together with the three representatives who, since the 4th Prairial, had retained the direction of the armed force, were always united on important occasions. They hastened to the convention in order to denounce this preliminary infraction, which evidently denoted, as they deemed, an ultimate project of insurrection. The convention was engaged in celebrating, in the hall of its sessions, a funereal festival in honour of the lamented Girondists. It was proposed to postpone the solemnity: Tallien controverted the suggestion; he said it would be unworthy of the convention to interrupt its proceedings; amidst all perils it ought to pursue the even tenor of its duties. A decree was passed, enjoining every meeting of electors, formed either in an illegal manner or before the prescribed term, or for an object alien to their electoral functions, immediately to separate. To

afford those an outlet who might be disposed to recede, a clause was added to the decree, bearing that all who had been led into illegal practices, and should forthwith return to their duty, would be exempted from prosecution. Certain officers of police, under an escort of six dragoons, were dispatched to the Place de L'Odéon, with instructions to proclaim the decree. The committees were desirous to avoid, as far as possible, the employment of force. The crowd around the Odéon had increased as the night advanced. The interior of the theatre was dimly lighted; the boxes were filled with a vast concourse of sectionaries; those who took an active part in the movement perambulated the stage in great excitement. Indecision reigned in the meeting; the malecontents ventured neither to deliberate nor to decide. On learning the arrival of the officers of police commissioned to read the decree, they hurried to the open square. The crowd had already surrounded those functionaries; they instantly rushed upon them, extinguished the torches they carried, and compelled the dragoons to fly. They then returned into the theatre, in exultation at this achievement; they delivered sundry orations, and vowed with oaths to resist tyranny; but no measure was taken to abet the decisive act they had just committed. Meanwhile the night was progressing: many of the sectionaries and of the curious retired; the theatre began rapidly to disgorge its unruly occupants, and remained completely deserted at the approach of the armed force, which speedily reached the locality. The committees had ordered General Menou, appointed since the 4th Prairial general of the army of the interior, to advance with a column from the camp of Les Sablons. The column arrived with two pieces of ordnance, but discovered no living soul either loitering on the square or lurking in the theatre of L'Odéon.

This occurrence, although without result, caused a great sensation. The sectionaries were flushed with their demonstration of strength, and invigorated in courage, as generally happens after an open defiance of authority. The convention and its partisans viewed with alarm the events of this day; and, more prompt to dread the resolutions of their adversaries than the latter to form them, they no longer doubted an insurrection was intended. The patriots, albeit wroth with the convention, which had treated them so severely, but inspired with their usual indomitable ardour, felt that they ought to sacrifice their resentment to their cause; and, in the course of that same night, they flocked in numbers to the committees, for the purpose of tendering their assistance and demanding arms. Some had but just issued from prison, others had been excluded from the primary assemblies, all had the most powerful motives for zeal. To them were joined numerous officers struck from the rolls of the army by the reactor Aubry. The Thermidorians, still predominating in the committees, and now entirely allied to the Mountain, were well disposed to receive the offers of the patriots with approbation, and their opinion was supported by more than one Girondist. Louvet, in meetings which were held at the house of a common friend of the Girondists and the Thermidorians, had already proposed to re-arm the faubourgs and even re-open the Jacobin Club, reserving the power of subsequently closing it should the necessity recur. The committees, therefore, promptly determined to deliver arms to all the citizens who presented themselves, and gave them for officers the military men then at Paris without employment. The veteran General Berruyer was charged to command them. This operation of arming the patriots was effected during the morning of the 12th. The intelligence quickly travelled into all the quarters of Paris. It furnished an admirable pretext for the agitators of the sections, who were striving to compromise the peaceable citizens of the metropolis. The convention purposed, they alleged, to recommence the system of terror, since it had re-armed the terrorists; it was preparing to let them loose on all honest people; persons and property were no longer in safety; arms must be taken up in pure self-defence. In truth, the sections of Lepelletier, the Butte-des-Moulins, the Social Contract, the Théatre-Français, the Luxembourg, the Rue Poissonnière, Brutus, the Temple, declared themselves in insurrection, caused the tattoo to be beaten in their wards, and enjoined all citizens in the national guard to repair to their battalions, in order to watch over the public safety, menaced by the terrorists. The section of Lepelletier forthwith constituted itself permanent, and became the centre of all the counter-revolutionary machinations. The drummers and proclamators of the sections overspread Paris with singular audacity, and carried every where the signal of revolt. The citizens, excited by the reports in circulation, hastened in arms to their sections, ready to yield to all the suggestions of impetuous and imprudent youths, and of a perfidious faction.

The convention declared itself in permanence, and charged its committees to watch over the public safety and the execution of its decrees. It repealed the law which ordained the disarming of the patriots, and thus legalised the steps taken by the committees. At the same time, it published a proclamation designed to tranquillise the inhabitants of Paris and calm their disquietude as to the intentions and patriotism of the men to whom arms had been restored.

The committees, perceiving that the section of Lepelletier had become the focus of intrigue, and would shortly perhaps be the head-quarters of rebellion, resolved that the section should be surrounded and disarmed without delay. Menou received a fresh order to quit Les Sablons with a corps of troops and artillery. This General Menou, an excellent officer, mild and moderate as a citizen, had led throughout the revolution a painful and harassing existence. Sent to combat in La Vendée, he had been tormented by all the vexatious proceedings of the Ronsin party. Transferred to Paris, and threatened with a trial, he had owed his life to the timely occurrence of the 9th Thermidor. Nominated general of the army of the interior on the 4th Prairial, and directed to march on the faubourgs, he had upon that occasion to oppose men who were his natural enemies—men, moreover, proscribed by opinion, and who, above all, cared, in their furious energy, too little for the lives of others to inspire scruples about sacrificing theirs; but now it was the superior population of the capital, the youth of the best families, the class, in short, which ruled opinion, that he was appointed to massacre, if it persisted in its heedless criminality. He was thrown, therefore, into cruel perplexity by this consideration, as is usual with a weak man who shrinks from resigning his commission, and yet cannot reconcile himself to a rigorous line of duty. He put his columns in motion with great tardiness; he allowed the sections the whole day of the 12th to act and publish proclamations as they listed; he even opened a secret parley with some of their leaders, instead of acting promptly; and declared to the three representatives intrusted with the direction of the armed force, that he would not have under his orders the battalion of patriots. The representatives intimated to him, in reply, that the battalion, so obnoxious in his eyes, was placed under the sole command of General Berruyer. They urged him to fulfil the injunctions of the committees, without denouncing to them his indecision and lukewarmness. They detected, moreover, a similar repugnance on the part of sundry officers, and amongst others, in the two generals of brigade, Despierre and Debar, who, pretending illness, absented themselves from their posts. At length, as night was closing in, Menou advanced, with the representative Laporte, on the section of Lepelletier. It was sitting in the convent of the Filles Saint-Thomas, which has been since replaced by the fine structure of the Exchange. They proceeded thither by the Rue Vivienne. Menou ac-

cumulated his infantry, cavalry, and artillery, in this street, placing himself in a position where he would have fought under great disadvantages, encompassed by the multitude of sectionaries, who blocked all the outlets and crowded the windows of the houses. He eventually planted his cannon before the door of the convent, and entered, with the representative Laporte and a battalion, into the hall occupied by the section. The members of the section, instead of being formed into a deliberative assembly, were under arms and drawn up in line, with their president, M. Delalot, at their head. The general and the representative summoned them to surrender their arms; they sternly refused. The president Delalot, seeing the faintness and hesitation with which the summons was made, replied with warmth, addressed the soldiers of Menou pertinently and with much presence of mind, and announced that the last extremities must be resorted to before the section would lay down its arms. To commence an engagement in that confined area, or to retire and bombard the convent with cannon-balls, was a dolorous alternative undoubtedly; but if Menou had spoken with firmness and pointed his cannon in readiness to fire, it is questionable whether the resolution of the sectionaries would not have quailed. Menou and Laporte preferred a capitulation; they undertook to withdraw the troops of the convention, on receiving a pledge that the section would instantly separate: it gave, or feigned to give, the required promise. A part of its battalion actually defiled as if to retire. Menou, on his part, left the building with his company, and wheeled round his columns, which experienced great difficulty in traversing the multitude amassed in the surrounding quarters. Whilst he thus weakly recoiled before the firmness of the section, that body re-entered its hall of session, and, proud of its successful resistance, was more than ever confirmed in its rebellious spirit. The report quickly circulated that the decrees were not executed, that the insurrection was triumphant, that the troops had returned without having succeeded in enforcing the authority of the convention. Numerous spectators of the late scene flew to the galleries of the convention, which was in permanence, apprised the deputies of its incidents, and soon from all sides voices were heard vociferating, "We are betrayed! we are betrayed! General Menou to the bar!" The committees were ordered to attend and give explanations.

At this moment the committees, warned of the pusillanimous retreat of their general, were in the utmost alarm and agitation. They determined to arrest Menou, and judge him on the instant. But his punishment could not retrieve affairs; what he had lacked fortitude to perform required to be done, and promptly too. But forty individuals, discussing measures of execution, were little adapted for resolving and acting with the necessary vigour and precision. Nor were three persons, holding the command of the armed force, fitted to exercise an authority equal to the emergency. The idea of nominating a single leader was suggested, as on all critical occasions; and at this instant, which vividly recalled the dangers of the 9th Thermidor, memory reverted to the deputy Barras, who, in his capacity of general of brigade, had received the command on that famous day, and acquitted himself with all the energy desirable. The deputy Barras was tall in stature, and possessed a sonorous voice; he was incapable of making long speeches, but he excelled in the art of extemporising short, graphic, and vehement phrases, which obtained for him the reputation of a resolute and sincere man. He was now, accordingly, appointed general of the army of the interior, and given as adjuncts the three representatives previously charged with the direction of the armed force. This selection of the committees proved singularly happy, from a circumstance which may be deemed fortuitous. Barras had near him an officer eminently qualified to command, and he dared not have displayed the deplorable meanness of throwing aside a man he knew to be more able than himself. All the deputies commissioned to the army of Italy were acquainted with the young officer of artillery who had decided the capture of Toulon, and carried Saorgio and the lines of the Roya. That young officer, after attaining the rank of general of brigade, had been superseded by Aubry, and was condemned to loiter in Paris, inactive and almost reduced to indigence.* He had been introduced to Madame Tallien, who received him with her accustomed amiability, and even exerted her powers of solicitation in his behalf. His figure was slight, and somewhat short, his cheeks hollow and livid; but his expressive features, his fixed and piercing eyes, the firmness and originality of his language, attracted attention. He frequently spoke of a decisive theatre of war, where the republic would find victories and peace: he meant Italy. He laboured assiduously to impress that belief: it was the constant theme of his discourse. Thus, when the lines of the Apennines were lost under Kellermann, he was called before the committee to propound his views. The committee at that time confided to him the framing of dispatches, and he had remained attached to the direction of the military operations. Barras remembered him on the 12th Vendémiaire, and demanded him as second in command, which was accorded. The two nominations, submitted to the convention the same night, were immediately confirmed. Barras delegated the care of the military operations to the young general, who undertook the charge with alacrity, and proceeded to issue orders with extreme activity.

Meanwhile, the call to arms had continued to beat in all the quarters of Paris. Emissaries had been dispatched in every direction to extol the resistance and success of the section Lepelletier, exaggerate its dangers, inculcate that those dangers were common to all the sections, pique their spirit of emulation and honour, and excite them to rival the brave grenadiers of Saint-Thomas. These instigations were successful. Men hastened from all parts, and a central military committee was at length formed in the section of Lepelletier, under the presidency of the journalist Richer-Serizy. The project of an insurrection was finally decided: the battalions mustered, irresolute men were borne along almost in their own despite, and the whole burgher class of Paris, deluded upon a false point of honour, prepared to play a part little adapted to its habits or fitted to promote its interests.

The time was past for entertaining the idea of

* [The following notice of Bonaparte at this period, when we reflect on his future destiny, seems inexpressibly interesting. It is taken from the memoirs of the Duchess D'Abrantes:—

"On Bonaparte's return to Paris, he was in very destitute circumstances. From time to time he received remittances, I suspect from his brother Joseph; but with all his economy, these supplies were insufficient. He was therefore in absolute distress. Junot used often to speak of the six months they passed together in Paris at this time. When they took an evening stroll on the Boulevard, which used to be the resort of young men mounted on fine horses and displaying all the luxuries which they were permitted to show at that time, Bonaparte would declaim against fate, and express his contempt for the coxcombs, who, as they rode past, would eulogise in ecstacy the manner in which Madame Scio sang. 'And is it on such beings as these,' he would say, 'that Fortune confers her favours? Heavens, how contemptible is human nature!' His friend Junot used occasionally to resort to the gaming-table; he was often successful, and on these occasions he and Bonaparte used to make merry and pay off their most pressing debts. The latter was at that time attired in the costume he wore almost ever after. He had on a grey greatcoat very plainly made, buttoned up to his chin; a round hat, which was either drawn over his forehead so as almost to conceal his eyes, or stuck upon the back of his head so that it appeared in danger of falling off; and a black cravat very clumsily tied." It was at this time that he is stated to have left his sword at a coffee-house in security of his reckoning, redeemed by Talma, the celebrated tragedian.]

marching on the section Lepelletier, to crush the insurrection in embryo. The convention had only about five thousand troops of the line at its disposal. If all the sections manifested the like zeal, they could bring together forty thousand men, perfectly armed and organised, and it was assuredly not with five thousand men the convention could venture to advance through the streets of a large capital, upon forty thousand redoubtable adversaries. The utmost hope, therefore, was to defend the convention by converting it into an intrenched camp. This was the course projected by General Bonaparte. The sections were devoid of artillery; they had all delivered up their cannon after the 4th Prairial, and the most turbulent at present were then the first to give the example, in order to ensure the disarming of the Faubourg Saint-Antoine. This was a circumstance of great advantage to the convention. The entire park was located in the camp of Les Sablons. One of Bonaparte's first measures was to order Colonel Murat to take three hundred horses and bring the whole into Paris. That officer arrived at the very moment a battalion of the section Lepelletier was advancing to seize the park; he outstripped the battalion, yoked his horses, and dragged the pieces to the Tuileries. Bonaparte then took his precautions for barricading the avenues. He had five thousand soldiers of the line; a troop of patriots, which, since the preceding night, had been increased to fifteen hundred men; several gendarmes of the tribunals, disarmed in Prairial and re-armed on this occasion; and, lastly, the police legion, and a few invalids, the whole scarcely amounting to eight thousand men. He distributed his troops and artillery in the streets Cul-de-sac Dauphine, L'Echelle, Rohan, and Saint-Nicaise; on the Pont-Neuf, the Pont-Royal, and the Pont Louis XVI.; on the places Louis XV. and Vendôme—on all the points, in short, whereby the convention was accessible. He placed his corps of cavalry, and a part of his infantry, in reserve on the Carrousel and in the garden of the Tuileries. He directed that all the provisions stored in Paris should be transported to the Tuileries, and that a depôt of munitions, and an infirmary for the wounded, should be likewise established in that palace. He sent a detachment to seize the depôt of Meudon, and to occupy its heights, with the view of retiring on that point with the convention in case of a reverse. He caused the Saint-Germain road to be blockaded, in order to prevent cannon being brought to the rebels; and chests of arms to be conveyed to the Faubourg Saint-Antoine, in order to arm the section of the Quinze-Vingts, which had alone voted for the decrees, and whose zeal Fréron had proceeded to kindle. These dispositions were completed during the morning of the 13th. Orders were issued to the republican troops to await aggression, and to avoid provoking it.

During the like interval, the committee of insurrection, established at the section of Lepelletier, had likewise made its dispositions. It had declared the governing committees out of the pale of the law, and instituted a species of tribunal to judge those who should resist the sovereignty of the sections. Sundry generals had appeared to offer it their services—a Vendéan, known under the name of the Count de Maulevrier, and a young emigrant, called Lafond, emerged from their retreats to direct the movement. The Generals Duhoux and Danican, who had commanded the republican armies in La Vendée, had joined the insurgents. Danican was a restless personage, better calculated to shine as a declaimer in clubs than as the commander of an army; he had been a friend of Hoche, who often rebuked him for his vagaries and inconsistencies. He was now at Paris, erased from the army-list, discontented with the government, and quite prepared to embrace any desperate project; he was appointed generalissimo of the sections. The determination having been irrevocably taken to wage battle, and the citizens being committed to the enterprise past recall, a regular plan of attack was digested. The sections of the Faubourg Saint-Germain, under the orders of the Count de Maulevrier, were to start from the Odéon with the view of attacking the Tuileries by the bridges; the sections on the right bank of the Seine were to advance by the Rue Saint-Honoré and all the cross streets leading from the Rue Saint-Honoré to the Tuileries. A detachment, under the orders of young Lafond, was to occupy the Pont-Neuf, so as to preserve the communication between the two divisions of the sectionary army. In the van of the columns were stationed the young men who had served in the armies, and who were best adapted for standing the fire of artillery. Of the forty thousand men composing the national guard, twenty or twenty-seven thousand at the utmost were present under arms. An infinitely surer manœuvre was open to them than that of confronting the fire of the batteries in deep columns; this consisted in throwing up barricades in the streets, enclosing the convention and its troops in the Tuileries, seizing upon the surrounding houses, directing thence a continuous fire, picking off the defenders of the national representation, and thus leisurely reducing them by bullets and famine. But the insurgents thought only of a direct assault, and expected by a single charge to penetrate to the palace, and force their way into its precincts.

In the course of the morning, the section of Poissonnière intercepted the artillery horses and the arms intended for the section of the Quinze-Vingts; that of Mont-Blanc carried off the provisions destined for the Tuileries; a detachment of the section Lepelletier took possession of the Treasury. Lafond, at the head of several companies, moved towards the Pont-Neuf, whilst other battalions proceeded by the Rue Dauphine. General Carteaux had been charged to guard that bridge with four hundred men and four pieces of cannon. Not wishing to commence the engagement, he retired upon the quay of the Louvre. The battalions of the sections advanced on all sides, and drew up a few paces from the posts of the convention, sufficiently near to converse with the sentinels.

The troops of the convention would have had a decided advantage if they had taken the initiative, and probably, by making a sudden attack, they would have thrown the assailants into confusion; but the generals had been recommended to await aggression. In consequence, notwithstanding the acts of hostility already committed, notwithstanding the abduction of the artillery horses, the seizure of the provisions destined for the Tuileries and of the arms forwarded to the Quinze-Vingts, and the murder of an hussar attached to the ordnance, slain in the Rue Saint-Honoré, they still persisted in maintaining a defensive attitude.

The forenoon had thus elapsed in preparations on the part of the sections, in observance on the part of the conventional army, when Danican, before beginning the combat, deemed it fitting to dispatch an envoy to the committees with a tender of conditions. Barras and Bonaparte were visiting the posts when the envoy was conducted to them, his eyes bandaged as in a place of war. They directed him to be led before the committees. The envoy spoke in very menacing terms, and offered peace on condition that the patriots were disarmed and the supplementary decrees of the 5th and 13th Fructidor repealed. Such conditions were inadmissible; and, furthermore, none could be then entertained. However, the committees, deliberating to avoid a specific answer, resolved to nominate twenty-four deputies for the purpose of fraternising with the sections—an expedient which had often succeeded; for words of conciliation have a mighty effect on men ready to engage in mortal strife, and they willingly accede to an arrangement which may obviate the necessity of the murderous appeal. Meanwhile Danican, receiving no reply to his propositions, issued orders for the attack. Volleys of musketry were heard: Bonaparte sent into one of the rooms of the convention eight hundred guns and car

touche-boxes, in order to arm the representatives themselves, who would serve, in case of need, as a body of reserve. This precaution made manifest the full extent of the danger. Each deputy hastened to take his seat, and, following the precedent of earlier crises, the assembly awaited in profound stillness the result of the combat, the first regular battle it had waged against the revolted sections.

It was half-past four, afternoon. Bonaparte, accompanied by Barras, mounted his horse in the court of the Tuileries, and galloped to the post of the Cul-de-sac Dauphine, fronting the church of Saint-Roch. The sectionary battalions filled the Street Saint-Honoré, and were pushing towards the entrance of the cul-de-sac. One of their best battalions had taken post on the steps of the church Saint-Roch, and was placed in an advantageous position for shooting the conventional artillerymen. Bonaparte, well aware of the importance of the first blow, immediately advanced his pieces, and ordered a general discharge. The sectionaries retorted by a continuous volley of musketry; but Bonaparte, showering upon them grape-shot, obliged them to recoil on the steps of the church Saint-Roch; he instantly debouched into the Street Saint-Honoré, and directed upon the church a troop of patriots, who fought by his side with the greatest intrepidity, and who were moreover animated by the injuries they had to avenge. The sectionaries, after a vigorous resistance, were dislodged. Bonaparte, turning his pieces to the right and to the left, swept the whole length of the Rue Saint-Honoré. The assailants forthwith fled on all sides, and retreated in the utmost disorder. Thereupon Bonaparte left to an officer the task of continuing the fire and completing the defeat; he himself returned towards the Carrousel, and hurried to the other posts. He every where ordered discharges of grape, and soon put to flight those unfortunate sectionaries, so imprudently exposed in deep columns to the effects of artillery. The sectionaries, although having at their head men of great bravery, fled precipitately towards the head-quarters of the Filles Saint-Thomas. Danican and the other leaders then recognised the fault they had committed in marching on intrenched cannon instead of throwing up barricades and effecting a lodgment in the houses contiguous to the Tuileries. However, their courage was still buoyant, and they determined to make a renewed effort. They agreed to operate a junction with the columns advancing from the Faubourg Saint-Germain, with the view of attempting a general assault on the bridges. Accordingly, they rallied from six to eight thousand men, directed them towards the Pont-Neuf, where Lafond was posted with his troop, and coalesced with the battalions coming from the Rue Dauphine, under the command of Count Maulevrier. All blended together, advanced in close column from the Pont-Neuf towards the Pont-Royal, following the Quay Voltaire. Bonaparte, always present where danger called, had hastened to this locality. He planted several batteries on the quay of the Tuileries, which runs parallel with the Quay Voltaire; he caused the cannons placed at the end of the Pont-Royal to be moved forward, and pointed so as to enfilade the quay whereby the assailants were approaching. These measures taken, he allowed the sectionaries to draw near; suddenly he gave the word to fire. Volleys of grape poured from the bridge, and mowed the sectionaries in front; simultaneous discharges crossed from the quay of the Tuileries, and swept them in flank. Dreadful havoc ensued in their ranks: the insurgents were stricken with dismay. Young Lafond, still undaunted, rallied around him his firmest soldiers, and continued to push for the bridge, with the hope of capturing the ordnance. A redoubled fire scattered his column. He vainly strove to rally it a last time; it fled and dispersed in all directions before the terrific thunder of the artillery.

At six o'clock, the conflict, commenced half an hour before five, was over. Bonaparte, who had evinced merciless energy in action, and fired on the population of the capital as on Austrian battalions, now gave orders to load with powder only, to consummate the discomfiture of the rebels. Some sectionaries had intrenched themselves on the Place Vendôme, in the church of Saint-Roch, and in the Palais-Royal. He caused his troops to debouch by all the avenues of the Rue Saint-Honoré, and detached a corps which, starting from the Place Louis-Quinze, traversed the Rue Royale, and skirted the Boulevards. He thus rendered the Place Vendôme untenable, cleared the church of Saint-Roch, invested the Palais-Royal, and blockaded its area, in order to avoid the hazards of a nocturnal combat.

The following morning a few shots sufficed to procure the evacuation of the Palais-Royal and the convent of the section Lepelletier, where the insurgents had contemplated intrenching themselves. Bonaparte threw down some barricades formed near the barrier of Les Sergents, and stopped a detachment advancing from Saint-Germain with cannon for the sectionaries. Tranquillity was entirely re-established during the forenoon of the 14th. The dead were removed with all speed, and every other trace of the melancholy conflict forthwith obliterated. Three or four hundred bodies were collected, killed and wounded on both sides.

This victory excited general joy amongst the sincere friends of the republic, who could not be insensible to the influence of royalism in the recent movement. It restored to the menaced convention, that is to say to the revolution and its authors, the authority they so much needed for the consolidation of the new institutions. At the same time, an universal sentiment prevailed adverse to harshness and severity. A reproach was ready-coined against the convention: malignants were prepared to assert that it had fought on the late occasion under the banner of terrorism, and with the view of re-establishing its reign. Hence the importance of averting all pretext for the imputation that it purposed to shed blood. Moreover, the sectionaries had approved themselves but sorry conspirators, and showed they were far from possessing the energy of the patriots; they had hastened to regain their homes, satisfied with their escape from the dangers of the day, and proud of having braved for an instant that artillery which had so often shattered the lines of Brunswick and Cobourg. So that they were left to indulge in harmless boasts of their courage, there was little fear of their becoming dangerous. Upon these considerations, therefore, the convention contented itself with dismissing the staff of the national guard, dissolving the companies of grenadiers and chasseurs, which were the best organised of the sectionary forces, and contained almost all the young men of the "gilded youth," placing the national guard for the future under the orders of the general commanding the army of the interior, ordaining the sections Lepelletier and the Théatre-Français to be disarmed, and instituting three commissions to try the chiefs of the rebellion, who, however, had for the most part disappeared.

The companies of grenadiers and chasseurs quietly yielded to the order for their dissolution; the sections of Lepelletier and the Théatre-Français surrendered their arms without resistance; all, in fact, evinced a docile and submissive spirit. The committees, fully participating in the general bias to lenity, allowed the implicated to escape by flight or to remain in careless concealment at Paris. The commissions pronounced all their sentences in contumacy. One only of the armed leaders was apprehended—young Lafond. He had inspired considerable interest by his intrepidity, and a wish to spare him was entertained; but he obstinately insisted on avowing himself a returned emigrant, and vindicating his rebellion: it was found impossible to pardon him. So great was the tolerance, that a member of the committee formed to direct the

insurrection at the section of Lepelletier, M. de Castellane, encountering a patrol one night, who challenged him with the usual cry, "Who goes there?" replied, "Castellane, an outlaw!" The consequences of the 13th Vendémiaire, therefore, were singularly bloodless, and the capital was saved from any of those harrowing scenes which had so often thrown it into sadness and gloom. The guilty retired, or walked freely abroad, and the saloons resounded with narratives of the exploits they were not afraid to recount. Instead of punishing those who had attacked it, the convention rewarded those who had defended it; it declared they had deserved well of the country, voted them subsidies, and accorded to Barras and Bonaparte, in particular, distinguished honours. Barras, already celebrated for his conduct during the 9th Thermidor, reaped vast additional renown from the affair of Vendémiaire: the preservation of the convention was attributed to his exertions. However, he had the candour to throw part of his glory on his young lieutenant. "It is General Bonaparte," he said, "whose prompt and skilful dispositions saved this edifice." These words were warmly applauded. The command of the army of the interior was confirmed to Barras, and the post of second in command to Bonaparte.

The royalist intriguers were somewhat puzzled to account for this issue of the grand insurrection. They wrote to Verona that they had been deceived by every one; that money had been deplorably deficient; that "where there ought to have been gold they had scarcely found old rags;" that "the monarchist deputies, those from whom they had promises, had wofully deceived them, and played a villanous game;" that "they were a Jacobinical race, in whom no trust could be placed;" that, "unfortunately, those who wished well to the cause had not been sufficiently *compromised* and *committed*;" that "the royalists of Paris with black and green collars and braided hair, who were such braggadocios under the roofs of theatres, had fled at the first musket-shot, and concealed themselves beneath the beds of the women who countenanced them."

Lemaitre, their leader, had been arrested with other instigators of the section Lepelletier. At his house a quantity of papers had been seized: the royalists were struck with apprehension lest these papers might betray the secret of their plot, and, above all, lest Lemaitre himself might make fatal revelations. Still they were far from losing courage; their trusty adepts in agitation continued to perambulate the sections. The impunity allowed to the sectionaries had conduced to resuscitate their hardihood. Since the convention, they argued, although victorious, dared not punish them, it clearly recognised that opinion was on their side; it could not be sure of the justice of its cause since it thus hesitated. Accordingly, notwithstanding their defeat, they assumed an air of superiority over the convention, and reappeared in the electoral assemblies to carry the elections in conformity with their views. Those assemblies were appointed to meet on the 20th Vendémiaire and to continue until the 30th; the new legislative body was convoked for the 5th Brumaire. At Paris, the royalist agents secured the nomination of the conventionalist Saladin, whom they had previously gained. In several departments they provoked collisions; schisms ensued in many of the electoral assemblies, and those bodies separated into two hostile parts.

These machinations, this revival of audacity, contributed greatly to irritate the patriots who had seen, in the events of the 13th, all their prognostics realised, and were proud at once of having divined so justly, and of having overcome by their courage the danger they had foretold. They were naturally desirous that the victory should not be wholly useless to their party, but lead to retributive severities on their adversaries, and reparations to their friends detained in the prisons. Thus they framed petitions, wherein they craved the liberation of patriots in captivity, the dismissal of the officers appointed by Aubry, the restoration to their grades of those superseded by him, the trial of the incarcerated deputies, and their reintegration on the electoral lists, if they should be proved innocent. The Mountain, supported by the galleries which were filled with patriots, cheered these demands, and contended with vehemence for their adoption. Tallien, the civil leader of the predominant party, as Barras was its military chief, and who had recently approximated towards the Mountain, strove to moderate its violence, and caused the withdrawal of the last demand relative to the insertion of the imprisoned deputies on the electoral lists, as contrary to the decrees of the 5th and 13th Fructidor. Those decrees, in fact, declared ineligible the deputies actually suspended from their functions. However, the Mountain was equally difficult to keep in check as the sectionaries; and it seemed almost impossible that the latter days of the National Convention, which had but a decade to sit, could elapse without some final storm to illustrate its demise.

The intelligence from the frontiers likewise tended to foment agitation, by arousing suspicions on the part of the patriots, and stimulating the inextinguishable hopes of the royalists. We have mentioned that Jourdan had passed the Rhine at Düsseldorf, and advanced on the Sieg; that Pichegru had entered Manheim, and thrown a division beyond the Rhine. These propitious events had failed to inspire the so-much-vaunted Pichegru with any great conception, and he had fully demonstrated either his incapacity or perfidy. According to analogous deductions, we should attribute his errors to incapacity, for, even with the contemplation of treachery, a man never refuses an opportunity of obtaining signal advantages: they always serve to enhance the value of his defection. Nevertheless, contemporaries worthy of credit have judged that his false manœuvres must be imputed to treachery; in which case he is the only general known in history who has wilfully contrived his own discomfiture. It was not a mere corps he ought to have thrown beyond Manheim, but his entire army, in order to seize upon Heidelberg, which is the essential point where the roads cross leading from the Upper Rhine into the valleys of the Neckar and the Maine. He would thus have occupied the point whereby Wurmser could effect a junction with Clairfayt, for ever separated those two generals, and made sure of the position, enabling him to unite with Jourdan and to form with him a mass capable of successively overwhelming Clairfayt and Wurmser. Clairfayt, discerning the danger, quitted the banks of the Maine, and hastened to Heidelberg; but his lieutenant, Kwasdanovich, aided by Wurmser, had already succeeded in dislodging from Heidelberg the division which Pichegru had planted in that place. Thereupon, Pichegru being immured in Manheim, and himself relieved from all apprehensions as to his communications with Wurmser, Clairfayt immediately marched on Jourdan. This latter general, squeezed between the Rhine and the line of the Prussian neutrality, debarred from using the country in a hostile manner, and having no service organised for drawing resources from the Low Countries, found himself in a most critical position, where he could neither advance forward nor operate a junction with Pichegru. Moreover, Clairfayt, not respecting the neutrality, had extended his forces in such a manner as to turn his left, and threaten to drive him into the Rhine. It was impossible for Jourdan, therefore, to remain where he was. The representatives and the generals, convoked in a council of war, recommended that he should recoil on Mayence, and form the blockade of that city on the right bank. But that position would be equally hazardous with the preceding; it left him in the same destitution, exposed him to the attacks of Clairfayt in a disadvantageous situation, and subjected him to the risk of losing his communications

towards Düsseldorf; in consequence, it was ultimately determined that he should execute a retreat, with the view of regaining the Lower Rhine, which he accomplished in good order, and without being incommoded by Clairfayt, who, revolving a grand project, returned upon the Maine in order to keep in the vicinity of Mayence.

The effect of these tidings, intimating the retrograde march of the army of the Sambre-and-Meuse, was aggravated by sinister rumours touching the army of Italy. Schérer had joined it with two excellent divisions from the Eastern Pyrenees, rendered disposable by the peace with Spain; but nevertheless that general was stated to view his position as extremely precarious, and to have demanded succours in *materiel* and supplies, which the government could not forward to him, and without which he threatened to make a retrograde movement. Lastly, reports were circulated of a second expedition from England, bearing the Count d'Artois and numerous troops for disembarkation.

These various tidings, although little alarming as regarded the stability of the republic, which still held the course of the Rhine, possessed two additional armies to detach, the one into Italy and the other into La Vendée, and had such recent grounds, in the event at Quiberon, for confidently relying on Hoche and disregarding the expeditions of the emigrants, tended notwithstanding to reinvigorate the royalists, prostrated for the moment by the 13th Vendémiaire, and to exasperate the patriots, discontented with the manner in which that victory had been used. The discovery of Lemaitre's correspondence, above all, produced a most baneful impression. Therein was detected the entire plot, as it had been long suspected. All doubts were removed as to the existence of a secret agency established at Paris, communicating with Verona, La Vendée, and all the provinces of France, fomenting counter-revolutionary movements, and maintaining intelligence with several members of the convention and the committees. The very boasting of those wretched agents, who plumed themselves on having gained sometimes generals, sometimes deputies, and who professed to hold intimate relations with the monarchists and the Thermidorians, contributed still more to excite distrust, and to throw doubts upon the honesty of the members of the right side.

Rovère and Saladin had been previously designated as disguised royalists, and now irrefragable proofs were obtained against them. The latter had published a pamphlet against the decrees of the 5th and 13th Fructidor, and been rewarded therefor by the suffrages of the Parisian electors. Lesage [d'Eure-et-Loire], Larivière, Boissy-d'Anglas, and Lanjuinais, were likewise marked as secret accomplices of the royalist agency. Their silence during the days of the 11th, 12th, and 13th Vendémiaire, had given rise to severe comments. The counter-revolutionary journals, by assiduously extolling them, contributed to compromise them more effectually. These same journals, which so zealously lauded the seventy-three, fiercely vituperated the Thermidorians. Under such circumstances, a rupture must almost necessarily ensue. The seventy-three and the Thermidorians still continued to meet at the house of a common friend; but mutual alienation and want of confidence were manifested in their intercourse. Towards the latter days of the session, conversation turned, at one of these meetings, on the new elections, on the intrigues of the royalists to influence them, and on the silence of Boissy-d'Anglas, Lanjuinais, Larivière, and Lesage, during the scenes of Vendémiaire. Legendre, with his usual impetuosity, upbraided the four deputies who were present with this silence. They attempted to justify themselves. Lanjuinais allowed to escape him the singular expression of the *massacre* of the 13th Vendémiaire, thus exhibiting a marvellous confusion of ideas, or sentiments but slenderly republican. Tallien, upon hearing this phrase, was moved with the utmost wrath, and prepared to leave the apartment, exclaiming that he would not longer remain in the society of royalists, but proceed to denounce them before the convention. The company intercepted him in his purpose, calmed his irritation, and strove to palliate the language of Lanjuinais. Nevertheless, the parties separated in avowed hostility.

Meanwhile, the excitement grew more vivid in Paris; misgivings multiplied on all sides, and suspicions of royalism extended vaguely and indefinitely. Tallien moved the convention to resolve itself into a secret committee, and then formally denounced Lesage, Larivière, Boissy-d'Anglas, and Lanjuinais. His proofs were not sufficient; they rested only on deductions more or less probable, and the accusation was not sustained. Louvet, although attached to the Thermidorians, declined to support the denunciation against the four deputies, who were his personal friends; but he accused Rovère and Saladin, and expatiated on their conduct in vehement terms. He retraced their career in its alternations from the most rabid terrorism to the most violent royalism, and provoked a decree of arrest against them. The like proceeding was adopted against Lhomond, compromised by Lemaitre and by Aubry, the author of the military reaction.

The adversaries of Tallien moved, in reprisal, the publication of a letter from the pretender to the Duc d'Harcourt, wherein, speaking of what was communicated to him from Paris, he said, "I cannot believe that Tallien is a royalist of the true kind." It will be recollected that the agents at Paris pretended to have gained Tallien and Hoche. Their habitual vauntings, and their calumnies with respect to Hoche, suffice to acquit Tallien of the imputation. The letter itself had very little effect, for Tallien, since the catastrophe of Quiberon, and his conduct in Vendémiaire, had departed so far from any semblance of royalism as to be esteemed a sanguinary terrorist. Thus, the men who ought to have acted in concert—directed their common efforts to save a revolution which was their own work—viewed each other with distrust and animosity, and suffered themselves to be tarnished in reputation, if not actually seduced, by the machinations of royalism. Owing to the calumnies of the royalists, this illustrious assembly closed as it had begun, in turmoil and contention.

Tallien eventually proposed the appointment of a commission, to consist of five members, charged to propound efficacious measures for upholding the revolution during the transition from one government to the other. The convention acceded, and nominated Tallien, Dubois-Crancé, Florent-Guyot, Roux [de-la-Marne], and Pons of Verdun. The design of this commission was to counteract the manœuvres of the royalists in the electoral assemblies, and to calm the apprehensions of the republicans as to the composition of the new government. The Mountain, ever buoyant and ardent, imagining that this commission would realise all its views, believed for a moment, and circulated the report, that all the elections were to be annulled, and the operation of the constitution suspended, for a time to come. The Mountaineers were in truth firmly persuaded that the present was not the period for abandoning the revolution to itself, that the royalists were not sufficiently subdued, and that the revolutionary government ought to be prolonged in order to consummate their suppression. The counter-revolutionists laboured insidiously to propagate similar rumours. The deputy Thibaudeau, who had hitherto acted neither with the Mountaineers, the Thermidorians, nor the Monarchists, but had nevertheless betokened a firm adherence to republican principles, and on whom the choice of thirty-two departments had just fallen (for by nominating him the electors gained the advantage of avoiding a declara-

tion in favour of any party)—Thibaudeau was very naturally inclined to deem the public mind in a much sounder state than the Thermidorians. He held that Tallien and his party calumniated the nation by advocating so many precautions against it; he even surmised that Tallien entertained personal schemes—that he meditated planting himself at the head of the Mountain, and maturing a dictatorship, under pretext of preserving the republic from the royalists. He accordingly denounced, in virulent and unmeasured terms, this pretended project of dictatorship, and discharged against Tallien an unexpected tirade, whereat all the republicans were sorely amazed, for the motive was to them a complete enigma. This attack, indeed, ruined Thibaudeau in the opinion of those most predisposed to mistrust; and henceforth intentions were imputed to him which he had certainly not formed. If he could refer to his position as a regicide, it was well known, from seized letters,* that the death of Louis XVI. could be expiated by services rendered to his heirs, and this distinction was consequently no longer regarded as an undoubted guarantee. Thus, albeit a sincere republican, his outburst against Tallien injured him in the estimation of the patriots, and procured him extravagant eulogies from the royalists. He was designated *the Rod of Iron.*

The convention passed to the order of the day, and awaited the report of Tallien from the commission of five. The result of that commission's labours was a project of law containing the following provisions:—

Exclusion from all civil, military, legislative, and judicial functions, of emigrants and relatives of emigrants, until a general peace.

Permission for all who were unwilling to live under the laws of the republic to quit France and remove their property.

Dismission of all officers who had not served during the revolutionary system, that is to say, since the 10th August, and who had been appointed since the 15th Germinal, that is to say, since the administration of Aubry.

These dispositions were adopted and embodied in a decree.

Thereafter the convention promulgated, in solemn form, the union of Belgium with France, and its subdivision into departments. Finally, on the 4th Brumaire, on the eve of dissolution, it resolved to terminate its long and tempestuous career by a signal homage to humanity. It decreed that the punishment of death should be abolished in the French republic from the period of general peace; it changed the name of the Place de la *Revolution* to that of Place de la *Concorde*; and it pronounced an amnesty for all acts having reference to the revolution, save for the revolt of the 13th Vendémiaire. This was setting at liberty the men of all parties, except Lemaitre, against whom alone of all the conspirators of Vendémiaire sufficient proofs to warrant condemnation existed. The sentence of banishment against Billaud-Varennes, Collot-d'Herbois, and Barrère, which had been revoked in order that they might undergo a new trial, or in other words a judgment of death, was confirmed. Barrère,† who alone had not yet embarked, was appointed to be transported forthwith. All the prisons were ordered to be thrown open. At length, two hours and a half after mid-day of the 4th Brumaire year 4 (26th October 1795), the president of the convention delivered these words: "The National Convention declares that its mission is fulfilled, and its session terminated." Cries enthusiastically repeated of "Long live the republic!" accompanied and followed these last words.

Thus closed the protracted and memorable session of the National Convention. The Constituent Assembly had found the old feudal organisation to destroy and a new organisation to construct: the task of the Legislative Assembly had been to essay this new organisation, burdened with the king left as a component part of the constitution. After an experiment of several months, it ascertained and proclaimed the incompatibility of the king with the new institutions, and his confederacy with coalesced Europe; it suspended the king and the constitution, and abdicated its functions. The convention, therefore, on its convocation, encountered a dethroned king, an abrogated constitution, war declared against Europe, and, as resources in the emergency, an administration utterly subverted, a paper-money greatly depreciated, and antiquated forms of regiments, hollow and emasculated skeletons. Thus, it was not liberty the convention had to assert in presence of an enfeebled and contemned throne; it was liberty it had to defend against all Europe—a task of very different import. Undaunted in the crisis, it proclaimed the republic in the teeth of the hostile armies; it immolated the king to render its contest irrevocable; eventually it arrogated all authority, and resolved itself into a dictatorship. Within its own pale, voices arose to invoke humanity when it would hear only of energy; it stifled them. Speedily this dictatorship, which it had assumed over France in the exigency of general peril, twelve members assumed over it, for the like reason and in aggravated exigency. From the Alps to the ocean, from the Pyrenees to the Rhine, those twelve dictators seized upon all, men and things, and commenced with the nations of Europe the greatest and most terrible struggle recorded in history. In order to remain supreme directors of this mighty undertaking, they smote all parties successively; and, according to the condition of human weakness, they exhibited their qualities in their extremes. Those qualities were fortitude and energy; the excess was cruelty. They shed torrents of blood, until, become useless through victory and odious by the abuse of power, they succumbed. The convention thereupon resumed the dictatorship, and began by degrees to relax the springs of its redoubtable administration. Tranquillised regarding its safety by victory, it listened to the voice of humanity, and yielded to its spirit of regeneration. During a year it was actuated by the desire of devising and establishing whatever was good and great in a community; but factions, crushed beneath a merciless authority, revived under a government of clemency and forbearance. Two factions, in which were amalgamated, in infinite shades, the friends and enemies of the revolution, attacked it in turn. It vanquished the first in Germinal and Prairial, the second in Vendémiaire, and to the last day manifested an heroic courage amidst dangers. Finally, it framed a republican constitution, and, after a strife of three years, with Europe, with factions, and with itself, bleeding and mutilated, it abdicated, and transferred France to the Directory.

It has left behind it terrible reminiscences; but for its exculpation it has one—one single fact to allege, and all reproaches sink before that stupendous fact—it saved France from foreign invasion! The preceding assemblies had left France in peril and hazard, it bequeathed France saved and victorious to the Directory and the Empire. If the emigration had succeeded in subduing France in 1793, no trace had remained of the labours of the Constituent Assembly, or of the benefits resulting from the revolution; instead of those admirable civil institutions—of those magnificent achievements which signalised the Constituent, the Convention, the Directory, the Consulate, and the Empire—France would have been a prey to such sanguinary and degrading anarchy as we now deplore beyond the Pyrenees. By repelling the aggression of the kingly conspiracy against the republic, the convention secured to the revolution an uninterrupted action of thirty years on the area of France, and

* *Moniteur* of the year 4, page 150. Letter from D'Entraigues to Lemaitre, dated the 10th October 1795.

† [Barrère, it appears, has only died this year, 1841. He is reported to have expired on the 13th February at Turbes, his native place, at the advanced age of 85.

afforded to its works time for consolidation, and for acquiring that force which enables them to defy the impotent wrath of the inveterate foes of humanity.

To the men who call themselves with pride "patriots of 1780," the convention will always justly reply, "You had provoked the struggle; it is I who sustained and terminated it."

CHAPTER XLV.

INSTALLATION OF THE LEGISLATIVE BODY AND DIRECTORY.—FIRST MEASURES OF THE DIRECTORY.—RESUMPTION OF HOSTILITIES IN BRITTANY AND LA VENDEE.—FORCED LOAN BY THE DIRECTORY.—ARMISTICE CONCLUDED ON THE RHINE.—OPERATIONS OF THE ARMY OF ITALY.—EXPEDITION OF ISLE-DIEU, AND DEPARTURE OF THE ENGLISH SQUADRON.—RESULTS OF THE CAMPAIGN OF 1795.

THE 5th Brumaire year 4 (27th October 1795) was the day assigned for putting in force the directorial constitution. On that day, the two-thirds of the convention, retained in the new legislative body, were to unite with the third freely chosen by the electoral assemblies, divide into two councils, take formal organisation, and proceed to nominate five directors for wielding the executive power. During the first moments devoted to the organisation of the legislative body and the directory, the old governing committees were to remain in activity, and preserve the delegation of all authority. The members of the convention, commissioned to the armies or to the departments, were to continue their functions until the installation of the directory was duly notified to them.

The public mind was in a state of anxiety and ferment. The moderate and the ultra patriots showed an equal irritation against the party which had attacked the convention on the 13th Vendémiaire. They were filled with apprehensions, and exhorted each other to coalesce, to array themselves in a firm compact, in order to resist royalism; they loudly asserted the necessity of calling to the Directory, and to all places of power, such men only as were irrevocably committed to the cause of the revolution; they were tormented with doubts touching the deputies of the new third, and inquired with solicitude into their names, their past lives, and their known or presumed opinions.

The sectionaries, scattered on the 13th Vendémiaire, but treated with unexampled lenity after the victory, had again become presumptuous. Proud of having withstood artillery for an instant, they seemed to imagine that the convention, in sparing them, had dreaded their spirit and strength, and tacitly recognised the justice of their cause. They were every where to be met boasting of their great deeds; in the saloons they reviled with disgusting impertinence the assembly which had just resigned the government, and exulted at the prospect of the things to be achieved by the newly elected deputies.

Those deputies, thus appointed to take their seats amidst the veterans of the revolution, and to represent the opinions generated in France after its long convulsions, were far from justifying either the apprehensions of the republicans or the hopes of the counter-revolutionists. In their number appeared sundry members of the old assemblies, such as Vaublanc, Pastoret, Dumas, Dupont [de Nemours], and the honest and learned Tronchet, who had rendered such eminent services to French legislation. The majority, however, were new men, not those extraordinary characters who shine at the outbreak of revolutions, but several possessing those solid qualifications which, in the career of politics as in that of arts, follow in the wake of genius; for example, jurisconsults and administrators, such as Portalis, Simeon, Barbé-Marbois, and Tronçon-Ducoudray. In general, the newly elected members, saving certain notorious counter-revolutionists, belonged to that class of moderate men, who, having taken no part in events, and having consequently never been exposed to commit wrong or yield to delusion, professed to cherish the republic, but apart from what they called its crimes. They were naturally well disposed to censure the past; but they were reconciled with the convention and the republic by their election; for men willingly pardon an order of things in which they have gained station and eminence. In fine, strangers to Paris and to politics, timid as yet on the novel arena, they sought out and paid court to the most distinguished members of the National Convention.

Such were the dispositions of men on the 5th Brumaire. The re-elected members of the convention met and attempted to settle in concert the nominations yet to be made, so as to secure the control of the government. By virtue of the celebrated decrees of the 5th and 13th Fructidor, the number of conventionalists in the new legislative body was fixed imperatively at five hundred. If this number were not completed by the re-elections, the members present on the 5th Brumaire were to resolve themselves into an electoral body to supply the vacancies. A list was drawn out at the committee of public welfare, in which were included several decided Mountaineers. This list was not wholly sanctioned, but nevertheless known patriots only were inserted in it. On the 5th, all the deputies present, gathered in a single assembly, constituted themselves into an electoral body. In the first place, they completed the two-thirds of the conventionalists who were to sit in the legislative body; afterwards, they framed a list of all the deputies who were married and above forty years of age, and selected by ballot two hundred and fifty to form the Council of Ancients.

On the morrow, the Council of Five Hundred met at the Manége, in the former hall of the Constituent Assembly, and chose Daunou president, and Rewbell, Chénier, Cambaceres, and Thibaudeau, secretaries. The Council of Ancients assembled in the former hall of the convention, and called Larévellière-Lépaux to the chair, and Baudin, Lanjuinais, Bréard, and Charles Lacroix, to the bureau. These selections were highly appropriate, and proved that the majority in both councils were wedded to the republican cause. Thereafter the councils declared they were constituted, interchanged communications by message to that effect, confirmed provisionally the powers of the deputies, and postponed their formal verification until after the organisation of the government.

The most important of all the elections yet remained, that of the five magistrates to be invested with the executive power. In their nomination were involved at once the fate of the republic and the fortune of individuals. The five directors, in fact, holding the appointment of all public functionaries and of all officers in the army, would be enabled to compose the government at their pleasure, and to fill it with men favourable or adverse to the republic. The destiny of individuals, moreover, would rest entirely with them; they could open or close at will the career of public employment, and reward or discourage talents consecrated to the cause of the revolution. Hence the influence they must of necessity exercise was immense. Consequently, attention was keenly directed to the choice of those high dignitaries.

The conventionalists congregated privately to decide their suffrages. Their unanimous opinion was in favour of electing regicides, in order to secure additional guarantees. After fluctuating for some time, their choice eventually fell on Barras, Rewbell, Sieyes, Larévellière-Lépaux, and Le Tourneur. Barras had rendered great services in Thermidor, Prairial, and Vendémiaire; he had been in some respect the martial legislator opposed to all the factions; the last struggle of the 13th Vendémiaire especially had elevated him high in consideration. although the merit of the mili-

tary dispositions on that celebrated occasion belonged exclusively to young Bonaparte. Rewbell, immured in Mayence during the siege, and frequently called into the committees since the 9th Thermidor, had adopted the views of the Thermidorians, and betokened aptitude and application in the conduct of affairs, together with a certain fortitude of character. Sieyes was regarded as the first speculative genius of the age. Larévellière-Lépaux had voluntarily associated himself with the Girondists on the day of their proscription, returned amidst his colleagues on the 9th Thermidor, and since combated with zeal the two factions which had alternately assailed the convention. A mild and humane personage, he was the only Girondist whom the Mountain viewed without suspicion, and the only patriot whose virtues the counter-revolutionists dared not deny. He had but one drawback, in the opinion of certain cavillers, namely, the deformity of his person; they sneeringly remarked, that the directorial mantle would sit uncouthly on his shoulders. Finally, Le Tourneur, known as a patriot, esteemed for his honesty of character, was an old officer of engineers, who had in recent times replaced Carnot at the committee of public welfare, albeit far from possessing the talents of his predecessor. Some of the conventionalists would have seen with complacency the elevation to a seat in the directory of one of the generals who had most distinguished themselves in military commands, as Kléber, Moreau, Pichegru, or Hoche; but the majority were apprehensive of giving too much influence to soldiers, and repudiated the idea of investing any of them with supreme power. In order to render their selections certain, the conventionalists agreed to employ an expedient, which, without being illegal, bore a strong affinity to guile and covin. Agreeably to the constitution, the Council of Five Hundred, in the case of all nominations, was to present a decemviral leet to the Council of Ancients. The latter, out of the ten candidates, culled one. For the five directors, therefore, it was requisite to send up the names of fifty candidates. The conventionalists, who formed the majority in the five hundred, resolved to place Barras, Rewbell, Sieyes, Larévellière-Lépaux, and Le Tourneur, at the head of the list, and append thereto forty-five unknown names, from which it would be impossible to make an eligible choice. By this device, the five candidates whom the conventionalists wished to plant in the directory must be perforce preferred.

This plan was faithfully pursued, save that a name happening to be deficient among the forty-five, the leet was completed with that of Cambaceres, to the great gratification of the new third and all the moderates. When the list was presented to the Ancients, they manifested much displeasure at this artful mode of coercing their votes. Dupont [de Nemours], who had already figured in the preceding assemblies, and was an avowed opponent, if not of the republic, at least of the convention, strongly advocated an adjournment. "Doubtless," he argued with great plausibility, "the forty-five individuals who complete this list are not unworthy of your choice, for the contrary supposition would imply that it has been purposely intended to constrain your suffrages in favour of five personages. Assuredly these names, which now come before you for the first time, belong to men of modest virtue, and who are consequently worthy to represent a great republic; but we require time to enable us to know them and form an estimate. Their very modesty, which has conduced to keep them in the shade, calls upon us to institute researches in order that we may appreciate their merit, and authorises us to demand a postponement." The Ancients, however, although discontented with the subterfuge, really participated in the sentiments of the majority of the Five Hundred, and confirmed the five nominations thus adroitly imposed upon them. Larévellière-Lépaux, out of two hundred and eighteen voters, obtained the suffrages of two hundred and sixteen, so nearly unanimous was the feeling of esteem for that exemplary individual. Le Tourneur obtained one hundred and eighty-nine; Rewbell, one hundred and seventy-six; Sieyes, one hundred and fifty-six; and Barras, one hundred and twenty-nine. The latter, being more a party man than the others, naturally provoked dissents and attracted fewer votes.

These five nominations gave unqualified satisfaction to the revolutionists, who saw themselves thereby secured of the government. But it was nevertheless a question whether all the directors would accept the appointment. There was not much doubt about three of them, but two were known to have no predilection for power. Larévellière-Lépaux, a simple and modest man, little adapted for the difficult part of managing men and things, found and sought pleasure only at the Botanical Garden (*Jardin des Plantes*), with the brothers Thouin: it was very questionable whether he would be prevailed upon to undertake the duties of director. Sieyes, with a powerful mind capable of grasping all subjects—matters of business equally with principles—was notwithstanding incompetent by character to bear the burdens of government. Perhaps, also, his spleen at a republic not constituted according to his ideas, rendered him less disposed to accept the direction of its affairs. As to Larévellière-Lépaux, a consideration was urged upon him which proved irresistible to his honest nature: he was assured that his association with the magistrates who were to govern the republic was advisable and necessary. In truth, a man of spotless and acknowledged virtue was really indispensable as an adjunct to persons recommended solely by their reputation as men of business or of action, and such a character was supplied by the adhesion of Larévellière-Lépaux. He yielded to the solicitations wherewith he was besieged. But the repugnance of Sieyes could not be overcome; he refused, asseverating that he candidly believed himself unfit for government.

It became necessary to provide a substitute. Carnot at this period enjoyed a vast consideration in Europe. His military services, great and real undoubtedly, were much exaggerated; the entire series of French victories was attributed to his inspiration; and, although he had been a member of the famous committee of public welfare, the colleague of Robespierre, Saint-Just, and Couthon, he was known to have often opposed those redoubtable triumvirs with fortitude and vigour. In him was seen combined the endowment of rare military genius with the stern, unbending characteristics of a stoic. Sieyes and he were the two most renowned personages of the epoch; and, for the credit of the Directory, it seemed expedient to replace one of such reputations by the other. Carnot was consequently inscribed on the new leet, along with men who rendered his election constrained, except that Cambaceres was again added to the list, which thus contained but eight unknown names. The ancients, however, hesitated not to prefer Carnot; he obtained one hundred and seventeen votes out of two hundred and thirteen, and became one of the five directors.

Thus Barras, Rewbell, Larévellière-Lépaux, Le Tourneur, and Carnot, were the five magistrates charged with the government of the republic. Amongst these five individuals, there was no man of genius or even of imposing celebrity, excepting Carnot. But this defect was unavoidable at the conclusion of a sanguinary revolution, which, in the course of a few years, had swept away whole generations of superior men in all orders of service. The assemblies could no longer boast of an extraordinary orator; in diplomacy there was not a single esteemed negotiator. Barthélemy alone, by his treaties with Spain and Prussia, had attracted a degree of attention; but the patriots regarded him with aversion and distrust. In the armies great generals were already formed, and still greater generating; but at present there was no

decided superiority, and furthermore, the military were objects of jealousy and suspicion. There existed, accordingly, but two great reputations, as we have stated, those of Sieyes and Carnot. In the impossibility of procuring the first, the latter had been secured to the directorial board. Barras could acquit himself in action, Rewbell and Le Tourneur were indefatigable in toil, Larévellière-Lépaux was sage and upright. It would have been hardly possible, at the moment, to have better or otherwise composed the supreme magistracy.

The situation in which these five magistrates were called to power was most deplorable; and infinite courage and public spirit on the part of some, much ambition on the part of others, could alone have induced them to accept so onerous a burden. The country had just witnessed a conflict wherein it had been found requisite to invoke the aid of one faction to combat another. The patriots who had fought so resolutely were importunate; the sectionaries had not ceased to be presumptuous. The day of the 13th Vendémiaire, in short, had not been one of those victories followed by retributive vengeance, which, albeit subjecting the government to the sway of a triumphant faction, delivered it at least from the turbulence of the vanquished faction. The patriots were reinvigorated, the sectionaries were not subjugated. Paris teemed with intriguers of all parties; it was at once convulsed by all the discordant elements of ambitious strife, and stricken with woful misery.

Now, equally as in Prairial, provisions failed in all the large towns; the paper-money occasioned disorder in every transaction, and left the government without resources. The convention having refused to dispose of the national domains for thrice the valuation of 1790 in assignats, the sales had been suspended; the paper, which could be redeemed only by such sales, had remained in circulation, and its depreciation had proceeded with alarming strides. In vain had a scale of proportion been devised, to diminish the loss of those who received assignats; that scale reduced them merely to a fifth, whereas they retained not even the one hundred and fiftieth fraction of their primitive value. The state, receiving paper alone in payment of taxes, was ruined equally with individuals. It collected, certainly, a moiety of the land-tax in kind, which furnished it with partial supplies for the nourishment of the armies; but the means of transport were frequently deficient, and those articles of subsistence perished in the magazines. Its expenditure, moreover, was greatly increased by the necessity of provisioning Paris. It dispensed the rations for a sum in assignats, which scarcely covered the hundredth part of the cost. At the same time, this was the only possible mode of providing the fundholders and public functionaries, who were paid in assignats, with even a modicum of bread; but this exigency had swelled the disbursements of the state to an enormous extent. Having nothing but paper to meet it, the state had issued assignats without measure, and had carried in a few months the emission from twelve to twenty-nine thousand millions. By former redemptions and funds in the exchequer, the quantity in actual circulation amounted to nineteen thousand millions [eight hundred millions sterling], an appalling sum, exceeding all known calculations in finance. In order to avoid the further multiplication of issues, the commission of five, instituted during the latter days of the convention for the purpose of propounding extraordinary measures of police and finance, had caused the adoption in principle of an extraordinary war-contribution, amounting to twenty times the land-tax, and ten times the miscellaneous imposts, the amount whereof might reach to six or seven thousand millions in paper. But this contribution was decreed only in principle; meanwhile, purveyors were given inscriptions of stock, which they received at a ruinous rate. Five francs of annuity were accepted for ten francs of capital. Moreover, the expedient of a voluntary loan, at three per cent., had been essayed, on terms equally disastrous to the state, without, however, attracting many subscribers.

In this melancholy state of things, the public functionaries, utterly unable to exist upon their appointments, resigned their offices; the soldiers deserted the armies, which had lost a third of their effective force, and returned into the towns of the interior, where the weakness of the government permitted them to remain with impunity. Thus five armies and an immense metropolis to sustain, with the bootless faculty of issuing assignats without worth; those armies to recruit, and the whole government to reconstruct, amid the assaults of two hostile and inveterate factions—such the task of the five magistrates now raised to the supreme administration of the republic.

The necessity of order is so strongly felt in human societies, that they themselves tend spontaneously to its establishment, and marvellously second those who are charged with the care of reorganising them: it would be indeed impossible to accomplish the task were it otherwise, but we are not the less bound to admire the courage and efforts of those who venture to grapple with the difficulties of such an undertaking. The five directors, on repairing to the palace of the Luxembourg, found not a single article of furniture within its walls. The keeper lent them a rickety table, a sheet of letter-paper, and an inkstand, enabling them to indite their first communication, which announced to the two councils that the Directory was constituted. Not a penny in specie was discovered at the Treasury. The assignats necessary for the service of the following day were struck off each night, and they issued reeking damp from the presses of the republic. The greatest uncertainty prevailed as to the supplies of provisions, and during several days it had been impossible to distribute more than a few ounces of bread or rice to each of the people.

The first demand of the Directory was for a vote of credit. According to the new constitution, it was requisite that every disbursement should be preceded by a vote of credit, with allocation to the respective ministries. The two councils were to pass the vote, and then the treasury, which had been rendered independent of the directory, would deliver the funds granted by the decree of the two councils. The directory demanded, in the first place, three thousand millions of assignats, which were accorded; these it had to exchange forthwith for specie. But here a difficulty arose, whether the directory or the treasury ought to be intrusted with this negotiation. The treasury, by being permitted to make contracts, departed from its province of mere superintendence; nevertheless the question was solved by conferring upon it the commission of negotiating the paper. The three thousand millions could at the utmost produce twenty or twenty-five millions in metallic currency. Thus they could merely avail to satisfy immediate current wants. The digestion of a regular plan of finance was meanwhile undertaken, and the directory intimated to the two councils that it would be submitted to them in the course of a few days. In the interim, Paris, which was utterly destitute, must be subsisted. There was no longer an organised system of requisitions; consequently the Directory asked power to exact, by the formality of summonses, in the departments contiguous to that of the Seine, the quantity of 250,000 quintals of grain, on account of the land-tax payable in kind. The Directory subsequently demanded a variety of laws for the suppression of abuses of all kinds, and particularly of desertion, which was daily diminishing the strength of the armies. At the same time, it proceeded to select the individuals who were to compose the administration. Merlin of Douay was appointed to the ministry of justice; Aubert-Dubayet was called from the army on

the coasts of Cherbourg to receive the portfolio of the war department; Charles Lacroix was placed in the office of foreign affairs; Faypoult in that of finances; and Benezech, an enlightened administrator, in that of the interior. From the multitude of solicitors who importuned it, the Directory next strove to cull the men most capable of filling public offices. In the precipitation to which it was condemned, it could scarcely avoid making certain bad selections. It confided employments to a great number of patriots, who had signalised themselves too conspicuously to be impartial and discreet. The 13th Vendémiaire had rendered them necessary, and obliterated the apprehensions they had formerly excited. The entire government, therefore—directors, ministers, and agents of all grades—was constituted in hostility to the 13th Vendémiaire and to the party which had provoked that day. The conventional deputies, even, were not yet remanded from their missions; the Directory, wishing to afford them time to complete their operations, had merely for that purpose to avoid formally notifying to them its installation. Fréron, commissioned to the southern departments to quell the counter-revolutionary excesses there prevailing, was thus enabled to continue his circuit through those unfortunate districts. The five directors laboured indefatigably, and manifested, in these the first moments of their administration, the same exemplary zeal as had been displayed by the members of the great committee of public welfare during the ever-memorable days of September and October 1793.

Unhappily, the difficulties of their task were aggravated by military reverses. The retreat to which the army of the Sambre-and-Meuse had been constrained, gave rise to the most alarming rumours. By a superlatively vicious plan, and the treachery of Pichegru, the projected invasion into Germany had been completely foiled, as we have previously narrated. The French had designed to pass the Rhine on two points, and occupy the right bank by two armies. Jourdan, starting from Düsseldorf after having crossed the river under flattering auspices, had proceeded on the Lahn, hemmed in between the Rhine and the Prussian frontier, and incapable of drawing supplies from a neutral country, where he was debarred from living at discretion. But this distress would have only lasted a few days, if he could have advanced into the hostile territories and effected a junction with Pichegru, who had obtained, by the occupation of Manheim, so easy and unexpected a means of passing the Rhine. Jourdan would have repaired by this junction the errors of the plan of campaign prescribed to him; but Pichegru, who was still discussing the conditions of his defection with the agents of the Prince of Condé, had merely thrown beyond the Rhine a weak and insufficient corps. He persisted in refusing to pass the river with the bulk of his army, and left Jourdan alone, *en flèche*,* in the midst of Germany. This position could not be maintained. All who had the smallest conception of warfare trembled for Jourdan. Hoche, who, although sufficiently engaged with his harassing command in Brittany, cast an eye of interest on the operations of the other armies, wrote in terms of great anxiety on the subject. Jourdan was eventually compelled to retire and repass the Rhine, and he therein acted with consummate prudence, and merited every eulogium for the manner in which he effected his retreat.

The enemies of the republic exulted at this retrograde movement, and indulged in comments calculated to diffuse dismay and apprehension. Their malignant predictions were unfortunately realised at the very moment of the installation of the Directory. The inherent vice of the plan adopted by the committee of public welfare consisted in dividing the French forces, thus leaving the enemy, who occupied Mayence, the advantage of a central position, and suggesting to him thereby the idea of uniting his troops and moving their entire mass on one or other of the French armies. General Clairfayt owed to this situation a brilliant conception, which attested a higher genius than he had hitherto exhibited, or than he showed indeed in its execution. A corps of about thirty thousand French blockaded Mayence. In possession of that place, Clairfayt could thence debouch and overwhelm this blockading army, before Jourdan and Pichegru had time to reach the spot. He seized the suitable moment with admirable judgment. Scarcely had Jourdan retired upon the Lower Rhine by Düsseldorf and Neuwied, ere Clairfayt, leaving a detachment to observe him, marched on Mayence, and there concentrated his forces, with the view of suddenly debouching on the blockading division. This division, under the orders of General Schaal, stretched in a semicircle around Mayence, forming a line of nearly four leagues. Although great care had been taken to fortify this line, its extent did not allow of its being barred throughout. Clairfayt, who had accurately surveyed it, discovered more than one point easily accessible. The extremity of this semicircular line, which ought to have rested on the upper course of the Rhine, left between the last intrenchments and the river a spacious plain. It was upon this point that Clairfayt resolved to direct his principal effort.

On the 7th Brumaire (29th October), he debouched by Mayence in formidable strength, but nevertheless with forces not sufficiently numerous to render his operation decisive. Military men, in truth, have censured him for leaving on the right bank a corps, which, employed in action on the left bank, would have inevitably ensured the ruin of a part of the French army. He propelled a column along the meadow-land stretching over the space between the Rhine and the line of blockade, which marched with arms poised. At the same time a flotilla of gunboats ascended the stream to aid the movement of this column. Clairfayt directed the remainder of his army on the front of the lines, and ordered a prompt and vigorous attack. The French division placed at the extremity of the semicircle, finding itself at once attacked in front, turned by a corps defiling along the river, and bombarded by a flotilla from the rear, was seized with a panic, and fled in disorder. The division under Saint-Cyr, which was stationed immediately approximate, was thereupon uncovered, and threatened with inevitable destruction. Fortunately, the rapid appreciation and judgment of its general extricated it from peril. He gave the command to wheel round front to rear, and executed his retreat in good order, warning the other divisions to follow his example. From that moment the whole semicircle was abandoned, the division of Saint-Cyr made its movement of retreat on the army of the Upper Rhine, whilst the divisions of Mengaud and Renaud, which occupied the other part of the line, finding themselves separated, recoiled on the army of the Sambre-and-Meusé, whereof a column, commanded by Marceau, had by a happy hazard advanced into the Hunds-Rück. The retreat of these latter divisions was extremely difficult, and might have become altogether impossible, had Clairfayt, fully comprehending the whole value of his admirable manœuvre, acted with stronger masses and with adequate rapidity. He might, in the opinion of military critics, after breaking the French line, have rapidly turned the divisions descending towards the Lower Rhine, enveloped and hemmed them in the recess the Rhine forms by its bend from Mayence to Bingen.

Clairfayt's manœuvre, nevertheless, was supremely dexterous, regarded as the first of the kind attempted by the allies. Whilst he thus carried the lines of

* [The French are so much better adepts in military terms than the English, that it is found absolutely necessary to adopt their phraseology, which is at once concise and expressive. *En flèche* may be Anglicised "*far ahead*," as an arrow shot from the bow, consequently isolated from co-operating forces.]

Mayence, Wurmser, making a simultaneous attack on Pichegru, wrested from him the bridge of the Neckar, and afterwards drove him behind the walls of Manheim. Thus, the two French armies, repulsed beyond the Rhine, preserving, it is true, Manheim, Neuwied, and Düsseldorf, but separated from each other by Clairfayt, who had swept away the whole blockading force before Mayence, might incur the extremest hazards before a bold and enterprising general. The late events had greatly shaken their confidence; many fugitives had recovered from their alarm only when beyond the frontier, and an absolute destitution added to the dispiriting effects of defeat. By a fortunate chance, Clairfayt acted with tardiness and excessive circumspection, consuming infinitely more time than needful to concentrate all his forces.

These mournful tidings, which reached Paris on the 11th and 12th Brumaire, at the very moment of the installation of the Directory, materially contributed to aggravate the difficulties attending the new republican organisation. Other events, less dangerous in reality, but equally grave in aspect, were passing in the West. A renewed disembarkment of emigrants menaced the republic in that quarter. After the disastrous descent at Quiberon, which was effected, as we have recorded, with but a portion of the forces collected by the English government, the wrecks of the expedition had been embarked on board the English fleet, and eventually put on shore in the small island of Houat. There were landed the ill-fated families of Morbihan, who had so eagerly rushed to hail the expedition on its arrival, and the sad remnant of the emigrant regiments. An epidemic disease and inveterate discord reigned among the forlorn groups cooped up on this petty surface. After the lapse of a short period, Puisaye, invoked by all the Chouans who had ruptured the pacification, and who attributed to the English alone, and not to their old leader, the misfortune of Quiberon, had returned into Brittany, where he had made every preparation for a renewal of hostilities. During the Quiberon expedition, the chiefs of La Vendée had remained inert, on account of the expedition not having been directed to their shores, on account of the orders transmitted by the Paris agents prohibiting them from aiding Puisaye, and finally, on account of their repugnance to compromise themselves until encouraged by some successful achievement. Charette alone had become embroiled with the republican authorities, on the subject of various disorders committed in his district of country, and of certain military preparations he was charged with making, and he had almost openly revolted. He had recently received, through the medium of Paris, additional favours from Verona, and obtained the command-in-chief of the Catholic provinces, which was the great object of his ambition. This new dignity, albeit congealing the zeal of his rivals, had tended to stimulate his own in a singular degree. He confidently anticipated a fresh expedition destined for his province; and Commodore Warren having offered him the munitions remaining from the Quiberon expedition, he no longer hesitated; he made a general attack along the shore, drove in the republican posts, and secured some barrels of powder and muskets. The English fleet, at the same time, disembarked on the coast of Morbihan the unfortunate families it had borne from their native land, and who had been suffering the extremities of hunger and misery on the Isle of Houat. Thus the pacification was broken, and the war recommenced.

The three republican generals, Aubert-Dubayet, Hoche, and Canclaux, respectively commanding the three armies styled of Cherbourg, Brest, and the West, had long regarded the pacification as ruptured not only in Brittany but also in the Lower Vendée. They had all three met in consultation at Nantes, but had taken no definitive resolution. They had, nevertheless, arranged their forces to hasten individually upon the first threatened point. The rumour of a fresh disembarkation gained ground; it was stated, truly enough, that the division sent to Quiberon was only the first, and that another would shortly arrive. Apprised of the new dangers menacing the coasts, the French government nominated Hoche to the command of the army of the West. The victor of Weissembourg and Quiberon, in truth, was the man to whom, in this pressing exigency, the national confidence was justly due. He immediately repaired to Nantes, in order to replace Canclaux. The three armies appointed to keep in check the insurgent provinces, had been successively reinforced by detachments drawn from the North, and by several of the divisions rendered disposable from the peace with Spain. Hoche obtained permission to draught additional detachments from the armies of Brest and Cherbourg, to augment that of La Vendée, which he thus increased to 44,000 men. He established strongly intrenched posts on the Sevre-Nantaise, which flows between the two Vendées, and which separated the country of Stofflet from that of Charette. His object was thus to isolate those two chiefs, and prevent them from acting in concert. Charette had entirely thrown off the mask, and again proclaimed war. Stofflet, Sapinaud, and Scépeaux, jealous of Charette's appointment as generalissimo, intimidated, moreover, by Hoche's preparations, and uncertain of the arrival of the English, refrained as yet from any demonstration. The English squadron at length appeared, first in the Bay of Quiberon, and subsequently in that of Isle-Dieu, off the coast of Lower Vendée. It carried 2000 English infantry, 500 fully equipped cavalry, sundry emigrant skeleton regiments, provisions, habiliments for a considerable army, funds in specie, and, above all, the long-expected prince. More numerous forces were to follow, if the expedition commenced with the harbinger of success, and if the French prince betokened a sincere intention of putting himself at the head of the royalist party. Scarcely was the squadron signalled off the coasts, ere all the royalist chiefs sent emissaries to the prince, to assure him of their devotedness, to claim the honour of his presence, and to concert their operations. Charette, master of the sea board, was most advantageously placed to facilitate the disembarkation, and his reputation, combined with the prepossessions of the emigrants, attracted the expedition to his vicinage. He had likewise dispatched agents to settle a plan of operations.

Hoche, meanwhile, carried on his preparations with his accustomed activity and promptitude. He formed the project of moving three columns from Challans, Clisson, and Saint-Hermine, three points placed on the circumference of the country, and propelling them on Belleville, the head-quarters of Charette. These three columns, from twenty to twenty-two thousand men strong, would, he expected, by their imposing mass, overawe the district, ruin the principal establishment of Charette, and throw him, by a sudden and vigorous attack, into such disorder as to disable him from protecting the disembarkation of the emigrant prince. Hoche accordingly ordered the columns to march, and united them at Belleville without encountering any obstacle. Charette, whose principal force he hoped to surprise and overthrow, was not at Belleville; he had collected nine or ten thousand men, and proceeded towards Luçon, with the view of carrying the war into the midst of the country, and thereby diverting the attention of the republicans from the coasts. His plan was well conceived; but it failed through the unwavering fortitude of his opponents. Whilst Hoche took possession of Belleville with his three columns, Charette was before the post of Saint-Cyr, which covers the route from Luçon to Les Sables. He attacked that post with all his forces: two hundred republicans intrenched in a church offered an heroic resistance, and gave the division of Luçon, which heard the cannonade, time to hasten to their succour

Charette, taken in flank, was completely defeated, and obliged to disperse with his bands in order to regain the interior of the Marais.

Hoche, not finding the enemy as he anticipated, and comprehending the true intent of his movement, led his columns to the points whence they had started, and occupied himself in establishing an intrenched camp at Soullans, near the coast, with the design of falling on the first corps which should attempt to land. During this interval, the emigrant prince, surrounded by a numerous council and the envoys of all the Breton and Vendéan chiefs, had continued in deliberation upon the various schemes of descent propounded to him, and allowed to Hoche ample time for preparing his means of resistance. The English vessels, meanwhile, hovering in sight of the coasts, tormented the republicans with apprehensions, and inflated the royalists with hopes.

Thus, precisely at the time the Directory was installed, a defeat before Mayence and an impending disembarkation in La Vendée, were topics of alarm seized upon with perfidious avidity by the enemies of the government, to harass and impede its establishment. The Directory explained or denied many of the rumours so diligently circulated respecting the situation of affairs on the two frontiers, and promulgated elucidations as to the occurrences that had recently happened. It could not disguise the defeat sustained before the lines of Mayence; but it showed, in reply to the exaggerations of the alarmists, that Neuwied and Düsseldorf still remained in possession of the French; that Manheim also was in their hands; that, consequently, the army of the Sambre-and-Meuse held two *têtes-de-pont*,* and the army of the Rhine one, enabling them to debouch, when circumstances warranted, beyond the Rhine; and that their situation was therefore analogous to that of the Austrians, since, if the latter enjoyed facilities for acting on both banks through Mayence, the former had equivalent advantages through Düsseldorf, Neuwied, and Manheim. The reasoning was just; but the contingency was doubtful, whether or not the Austrians, pursuing their success, would wrest from their adversaries both Neuwied and Manheim, and consolidate themselves on the left bank, between the Vosges and the Moselle. As to La Vendée, the government detailed the vigorous dispositions made by Hoche, which satisfied all considerate minds, but failed to banish the fears of the ultra-patriots, or to prevent the counter-revolutionists from labouring assiduously to instil dread.

Amidst these dangers, the Directory redoubled its efforts to reorganise the government, the administrations, and, above all, the finances. Three thousand millions had been granted to it, as we have mentioned, and had produced at the uttermost twenty or twenty-five millions in specie. The voluntary loan opened at three per cent., during the concluding days of the convention, had been suspended; for the terms offered by the state bound it to pay the interest in specie on an amount of stock commensurate with the capital advanced in paper, involving a most ruinous loss. The extraordinary war-tax proposed by the commission of five had not yet been enforced, and it occasioned complaints as a last revolutionary act of the convention against the public contributors. All the ramifications of the public service were on the eve of stagnation. Individuals, reimbursed debts according to the scale of proportion, urged such pressing remonstrances, that it had been found necessary to suspend coercive acquittances. The postmasters, paid in assignats, intimated their intention to throw up their offices, as the insufficient payments of the government subjected them to heavy deficits. The service of the posts would therefore fail altogether, that is to say, all communications, even by letter, would cease throughout the area of France. Hence the urgency of developing without delay the financial plan already announced to be in preparation. It was commanded as the primary necessity of the state, and the first importunate duty of the Directory. It was at length communicated to the finance commission.

The mass of floating assignats might be estimated at twenty thousand millions [eight hundred and forty millions sterling]. Even supposing the assignats still worth the hundredth fraction of their value, and not the one hundred and fiftieth, their actual value did not exceed two hundred millions [eight millions four hundred thousand pounds]: it is certain they did not pass for more in circulation, and that those who possessed them could not make them available at a higher rate. The reality might therefore be at once legalised, assignats taken only for what they were veritably worth, and admitted as currency only at the par of exchange, whether in transactions between individuals, in the discharge of taxes, or in the payment for national domains. Thus, in one instant, this great and appalling mass of paper, this enormous debt, would disappear. There yet remained nearly seven thousand millions, specie value, in national domains, including in the calculation those of Belgium and the national forests: ample resources existed, therefore, to redeem these twenty thousand millions, when reduced to two hundred millions, and to offer a basis for future expenses. But this mode, so prompt and bold, of solving all difficulties, was not easily to be compassed; it was repudiated, both by the scrupulous, who regarded it as a bankruptcy, and by the patriots, who condemned it as tending to ruin the assignats.

Both classes of objectors exhibited slender powers of induction. This bankruptcy, if it were one, was inevitable, and came to pass at no distant date. The material point at present was to abridge the calamity, that is to say, the confusion in values, and restore the just equipoise, the paramount justice due from the state to the whole community. Doubtless, at the first blush, it appeared a bankruptcy to take, in 1795, for one franc, an assignat which, in 1790, had been issued for one hundred, and which then embodied a promise of one hundred francs in land. Upon that basis, the twenty thousand millions of paper ought to have been estimated at the same number of millions in bullion, and integrally redeemed; but the national domains would have scarcely paid a third of that sum. Even in the case of ability to pay the sum integrally, the question must have arisen how much the state had truly received for this emission of twenty thousand millions: four or five thousand millions, perhaps. At such depreciation those assignats had been accepted when received from the state, and it had already redeemed by sales an equal amount in national property. It would therefore have been the cruellest injustice with regard to the state, that is to say, to those contributing to its burdens, to estimate the assignats according to their primitive value. Hence the necessity of consenting to estimate them at a reduced standard: the process had been already commenced by the adoption of the scale of proportion.

Undoubtedly, if there were individuals yet holding the first assignats issued, having retained without once exchanging them, such persons were exposed to a prodigious loss; for, having received them almost at par, they would now suffer the full extent of the reduction. But this was a purely gratuitous fiction. No one had kept assignats in his coffers, for paper is not what men hoard or treasure up: all had hastened to pass them away, and each had sustained a portion of the loss. Every body had already endured his share of this pretended bankruptcy, and accordingly it was no longer one. The bankruptcy of a state consists in throwing upon a few individuals, that is to say, creditors, a debt which ought to be borne by the community at large; now, if every member of that

* [*Tete-de-pont* a military term, requiring a circumlocutory interpretation. It signifies the possession of a bridge as the basis or medium of operations, or, in some cases, the possession of an advantageous position for effecting or defending a passage.]

community had more or less suffered from the depreciation of assignats, the bankruptcy was illusory—it affected no one. A still stronger argument might have been urged than all the others. If assignats had undergone depreciation in the hands of only a few individuals—if they had really lost value only for a few individuals—they had now passed into the possession of speculators in paper, and it would have been that class, much more than that of the veritable sufferers, who would have reaped the advantage of an insensate restoration of value. Thus, Calonne had published a pamphlet in London, wherein he stated, with great justice, that the belief was vain and unsubstantial that France must sink beneath the burden of assignats; that this paper-money offered the means of making without declaring a bankruptcy. He ought to have stated, to express himself with greater accuracy, that it presented a mode of throwing that bankruptcy upon the whole community, or, in other words, of rendering it null and innocuous.

It was, therefore, reasonable and just to legalise the reality—to take the assignat for what it was really worth. The patriots contended that this course would ruin the assignats, which had saved the revolution, and reprobated the idea as a conception emanating from the royalists. Those who professed to reason with more enlightenment and greater knowledge of the subject, maintained that the paper would be utterly depressed, and no circulating medium left in the country, lacking the assignats perished and the metals either hoarded or exported abroad. The future demonstrated the error of those who used such reasoning; but a simple calculation might have at once inspired them with juster notions. Thus, the twenty thousand millions of assignats represented less than two hundred millions; now, according to all estimations, the circulation could not be kept up formerly with less than two thousand millions, gold or silver. If, therefore, the assignats were a constituent element of the circulation only to the extent of two hundred millions, how was the deficiency supplied? It is very evident that the precious metals must have circulated in great quantity; and they did so circulate, but in the provinces and rural districts, far from the observation of the government. Besides, the precious metals, like all other merchandise, always come where the demand imperiously calls them; and, after driving away the paper, they would have spontaneously returned, as they returned, in fact, when the paper expired of itself.

Hence it was a twofold error, nevertheless firmly imbedded in the minds of men, to regard the reduction of the assignat to its real value as a bankruptcy and as a sudden destruction of all circulating medium. The scheme had one inconvenience, which, however, was not objected to it, as we shall shortly learn. The finance commission, fettered by the general prejudices prevalent, could only partially adopt the true principles of the matter. After having concerted with the Directory, it digested the following project:—

Until, by the new plan to be adopted, the sale of property and the collection of taxes brought into the exchequer real and not fictitious payments, it was still necessary to make use of assignats. It was accordingly proposed to increase the emission to thirty thousand millions, under a solemn obligation not to exceed that amount. On the 30th Nivose, the copperplate was to be publicly broken. Thus the public would be satisfied as to the exact quantity of the new issues. To the thirty thousand millions emitted were to be distinctly appropriated one thousand millions of money in national domains; whereby the assignat, which was worth in circulation but the one hundred and fiftieth fraction, and much less, would be liquidated at a thirtieth, which promised a considerable advantage to the holders of the paper. Another thousand millions of lands were to be assigned as recompenses to the soldiers of the republic, in fulfilment of an old pledge to those defenders of the country. Thus there would remain five out of the seven thousand millions disposable. In these five were included the national forests, the moveables of the crown and emigrants the royal palaces, and the property of the Belgian clergy. Five thousand millions in national property. therefore, lay at the disposal of the state. But the great difficulty was to realise that valuation. The assignats had been originally devised as the means of bringing that dormant capital into circulation, in anticipation of sales being effected. But the assignats being practically suppressed, since ten thousand millions only could be henceforth added to the twenty existing—a sum which, at the utmost, represented but one hundred millions of money—how was the value of the domains to be realised in advance and made subservient to the expenses of the war? Herein lay the sole objection that might be urged against the liquidation of the paper and against its suppression. The plan of mortgage schedules was conceived, which had been suggested the preceding year. According to this revived scheme, the state would borrow, and give to the lenders schedules bearing specific hypothecations on particularised domains. In order to prosecute this system of borrowing, it was proposed to recur to financial companies, which would take charge of these schedules in the first instance. Thus, instead of a paper with a forced circulation, which possessed merely a general hypothec over the mass of national property, and the value whereof fluctuated from day to day, there would be substituted, by the medium of schedules, a voluntary paper-money, which was specifically charged on an estate or a messuage, and which could undergo no other fluctuation than the value of the hereditament it *bonâ fide* represented. This, indeed, was not properly a paper currency. It was not exposed to depression, because it was not forcibly introduced into the circulation; but for that very reason it would be impracticable to negotiate it. In short, the difficulty always consisting, now equally as at the commencement of the revolution, in bringing into circulation the value of the domains, the question was, whether it were better to force the circulation of that value or to leave it voluntary. The first mode being utterly exhausted, it was natural that recourse should be had to the latter.

It was therefore determined, that, after increasing the paper to thirty thousand millions, after appropriating one thousand millions of money's worth in property as an absorbing medium for that paper, and reserving another thousand millions in lands for the soldiers of the country, the state should issue schedules for a sum proportioned to the public exigencies, and, by means of those schedules, treat with financial companies. The national forests were not to be scheduled; it was intended to keep them in the hands of the state. They formed nearly two out of the five thousand millions remaining disposable. Simply the alienation of their produce during a certain number of years to the companies was contemplated.

The consequence of this project, founded on the reduction of assignats to their real value, would be to admit them for the future in all transactions only at the par of exchange. In the interim, until, by the sale of the thousand millions specially assigned in their behalf, they could be redeemed, they were to be receivable by individuals and by the state simply at their current value. Thus, the disorder in all social transactions would cease, and fraudulent payments become impossible. The state would receive real funds from the taxes, which would at least cover the ordinary expenditure, and the extraordinary expenses of the war alone would have to be borne by the national property. The assignats were to be received at par only in satisfaction of arrears of taxes—arrears which were considerable, amounting to thirteen thousand millions. Thereby an easy mode of discharging their obligations was afforded to tax-payers in arrear, on

condition they took advantage of it without delay; and that sum of thirty thousand millions, redeemable in national domains at the rate of a thirtieth, would be so far diminished.

This plan, adopted by the Five Hundred after a long discussion in secret committee, was forthwith submitted to the Ancients. Whilst the latter were preparing to discuss it, additional questions were brought before the Five Hundred, touching the manner whereby the soldiers who had deserted to the interior might be remanded to their flags, and touching the mode of nominating judges, municipal officers, and functionaries of all kinds, whom the electoral assemblies, agitated by the passions rampant in Vendémiaire, had not had time or inclination to elect. The Directory thus laboured with indefatigable industry, and continually provided fresh subjects of deliberation to the two councils.

The financial scheme submitted to the Ancients rested on sound principles; it developed resources, for France still possessed many great and undoubted; but, unfortunately, it failed to obviate the material difficulty, for it did not render those resources sufficiently actual and available. It is very evident that France, with taxes adequate to defray her annual expenditure when the paper no longer rendered the receipt illusory, and with seven thousand millions of national property to redeem the assignats and provide for the extraordinary expenses of the war—it is very evident, we say, that France had resources. The difficulty consisted in meeting the instant emergencies of the state, whilst founding a plan upon equitable principles and adapting it to the future.

Now, the Ancients were loath to believe that assignats must be so promptly relinquished. The power of creating a further quantity of ten thousand millions involved at the utmost a resource of one hundred millions cash—but a small fund to proceed upon whilst awaiting the receipts prognosticated from the new plan. Moreover, would companies be found to treat for the lease of forests during twenty or thirty years? Would they be found to accept the schedules, that is to say, free assignats? In the uncertainty prevailing whether it would be possible to render the national property available by the new expedients, ought the old manner of turning them to account to be renounced, that is to say, forced assignats? The Council of Ancients, which evinced great severity in judging the resolutions of the Five Hundred, and had already rejected more than one, set its veto on the financial project, and refused to sanction it.

This rejection occasioned a general feeling of anxiety, and replunged all things into the utmost uncertainty. The counter-revolutionists, overjoyed at the conflict between the branches of government, proclaimed the difficulties of the situation to be insuperable, and the republic doomed to perish through the corroding evil of the finances. The most enlightened men, who are not always the most dauntless, feared their prognostics would be too surely realised. The patriots, driven to the highest pitch of irritation by the avowed design of abolishing assignats, were clamorous against the destruction of this last revolutionary creation, which had saved France; they demanded that, without any more devious experiments, the credit of assignats should be re-established by the expedients of 1793—the *maximum*, *requisitions*, and *death*. A degree of violence and excitement prevailed, which recalled the most turbulent epochs. To fill up the measure of calamity, the events on the Rhine grew more ominous: Clairfayt, without profiting by his victory as a great captain, had nevertheless gained fresh advantages. Having summoned to his aid the corps of La Tour, he had marched on Pichegru, attacked him on the Pfrim and canal of Frankendhal, and successively repulsed him even to the walls of Landau. Jourdan had advanced on the Nahe through a difficult country, and evinced the noblest zeal in pushing the war amidst hideous mountains, in order to disengage the army of the Rhine; but his efforts could only arrest the impetuosity of the enemy, without repairing the losses of the French.

If, therefore, the barrier of the Rhine remained to the French in the Low Countries, it was lost parallel with the Vosges, and the Austrians had driven them from a vast semicircle stretching around Mayence.

In this dismal crisis, the Directory addressed an urgent message to the Council of Five Hundred, and proposed one of those extraordinary measures which had been adopted in the most pressing emergencies of the revolution. This was a forced loan of six hundred millions in real funds, either specie or assignats at the par of exchange, levied on the wealthiest classes. The proposal seemed the harbinger of a renewed series of arbitrary acts, like its prototype, the forced loan exacted by Cambon from the rich; but, as this new loan was to be immediately exigible, as it would absorb all the circulating assignats, and furnish besides a surplus of three or four hundred millions in specie, and as, above all, it was absolutely necessary to find instant resources, the legislature sanctioned it.

The law decided that the assignats should be received at the one hundredth fraction: therefore, two hundred millions of the loan would suffice to absorb twenty thousand millions of paper. All thus paid into the exchequer were to be burnt. It was hoped that the paper, thus almost entirely withdrawn, would rebound from its depression, and that in extremity more might be issued, and this resource again made serviceable. After the absorption of the assignats, there would remain four hundred millions, out of the loan of six hundred millions, to receive in specie—a fund sufficient to satisfy the wants of the two next succeeding months, for the expenditure of this year (year 4—1795-1796) was estimated at fifteen hundred millions.

Certain adversaries of the Directory, who, without materially interesting themselves in the state of the country, were solely intent on thwarting the new government at all hazards, sounded the tocsin of alarm in this instance with transcendent vehemence. This loan, they asserted, would sweep away all the specie in France, even had she sufficient to pay it; as if the state, in taking four hundred millions of specie, would not throw them back into the circulation by purchases of grain, cloth, leather, iron, &c. The state intended to burn the paper only. The real question was, whether France could furnish, within a short interval, four hundred millions in articles of subsistence and merchandise, and commit two hundred millions of paper to the flames—an amount ostentatiously described as twenty thousand millions. There is no doubt she could. The only inconvenience was in the mode of perception, which would be necessarily vexatious, and thereby become less productive; but, truly speaking, the wit of man was sorely baffled. To limit the assignats to thirty thousand millions, that is to say, to secure merely one hundred millions real cash in advance, then destroy the plate, and commit the fortune of the state to the chance of selling the yearly produce of the forests and negotiating the proposed schedules, or, in other words, to the emission of a voluntary paper, had appeared too bold an experiment. In the uncertainty how free will might act, the legislative councils preferred to force the French to contribute extraordinarily.

By the forced loan, it was concluded, a portion at least of the paper would return to the state coffers, and with it a certain quantity of specie; and still, moreover, the plate would remain—a very valuable possession after the absorption of the greater part of the assignats. Nevertheless, other resources were not renounced: it was determined that a portion of the domains should be scheduled, an operation requiring much time, for the description of each hereditament must be inserted in the schedules, and contracts subsequently negotiated with financial companies. A decree was passed for

exposing to sale the messuages situated in towns, estates consisting of less than three hundred acres, and, lastly, the property of the Belgian clergy. The alienation of all the former royal palaces was likewise ordered, excepting Fontainebleau, Versailles, and Compiègne. The moveables of the emigrants were also directed to be forthwith converted into money. All these sales were appointed to be made by auction.

The government, therefore, shrunk as yet from decreeing the reduction of the assignats to the par of exchange, which would have obviated the greatest evil of the time—the ruin inflicted on all who were obliged to receive them, both individuals and the state. It was deterred by considerations from destroying them by this prompt and simple measure. It decided, at the same time, that in the forced loan they should be received as one for a hundred; that for arrears of contributions they should be received for their full value, in order to encourage the discharge of those arrears, which might be anticipated to bring in thirteen thousand millions; that the forced repayments of principal sums should still be suspended, but that house-rents and interests of all kinds should be paid at the rate of ten for one, which was still a very onerous arrangement for those who drew their incomes from such sources. The payment of the land-tax and of territorial rents was maintained on the old basis, that is to say, half in kind, half in assignats. The customs-duties were to be levied half in assignats, half in specie. This proviso was applied to the customs, because specie was already plentiful on the frontiers. There was likewise a special provision with regard to Belgium. The assignats had not penetrated into that part of the republic; accordingly, it was determined that the forced loan and the taxes should be there collected in specie alone.

Thus, the existing government of France timidly reverted to specie, not daring boldly to solve all difficulties by one decisive step, and betraying the temporising hesitation usual in such cases. The financial expedients were, therefore, the forced loan, the national domains exposed to sale, and the collection of arrears; all which, promising to lodge large amounts of paper in the state coffers, would permit a future issue. Moreover, regular receipts in specie might be relied on.

The subjects next in importance to the questions of finance were those relative to desertion and to the nomination of the non-elected functionaries. Touching the first, a measure was required for recomposing the armies; and with regard to the latter, one for completing the organisation of the municipal bodies and the courts of justice.

Desertion to the enemy, a crime very rare, was punished with death. The penalty to be inflicted for seducing soldiers was discussed with much warmth. Notwithstanding a severe opposition, however, seduction was punished in the same manner as desertion to the enemy. All furloughs granted to the young men of the requisition were to expire in ten days. The pursuit after conscripts who had forsaken their banners, when confided to the municipalities, was found to be conducted with apathy and to be of none effect; wherefore the duty was transferred to the gendarmerie. Desertion to the interior was punished with detention for the first offence, and with the galleys for the second. The grand plan of requisition framed in August 1793, which remained the sole measure of recruitment that had been adopted, provided a sufficient number of men to fill the armies; it had sufficed for three years to maintain them on a respectable footing, and it might still prove adequate by means of a new law more effectually ensuring its execution. The propositions of the government were assailed by the opposition, which of course strove to impede the action of the executive; but they were adopted by the majority of the two councils.

Numerous electoral assemblies had consumed the interval of their convocation in debates on the decrees of the 5th and 13th Fructidor, and failed to nominate individuals to compose the local administrations and the tribunals. Such as were held in the provinces of the West, had been debarred from making those appointments by the civil war. Others had allowed the privilege to lapse through negligence. The conventionalist majority, actuated by the desire of rendering all the parts of the government harmonious, and of perfecting one homogeneous revolutionary whole, maintained that the Directory should have the nominations. It seems natural that the rights citizens think fit to relinquish should devolve on the government, or in other words, that the action of the government should make amends for the inaction of individuals. Accordingly, in all cases where the electoral assemblies had allowed the constitutional term to elapse, or refrained for any cause from exercising their privileges, the Directory was naturally the party to supply the vacancies. To convoke new assemblies would involve an infringement of the constitution, which prohibited such recall, and offer, moreover, a recompense to disobedience and revolt; above all, the opportunity would be seized to provoke fresh troubles. Besides, there already existed analogous provisions in the constitution, tending to resolve the question in favour of the Directory. Thus, it was empowered to fill up nominations in the colonies, and to replace functionaries deceased or resigned in the period occurring between the elections. The opposition controverted this doctrine with great force. Dumolard in the Council of Five Hundred, Portalis, Dupont [de Nemours], and Tronçon-Ducoudray, in the Council of Ancients, objected that this right of appointment would confer a royal prerogative on the Directory. This minority, which secretly inclined rather to a monarchy than a republic, here changed parts with the republican majority, and advocated democratical views with strange exaggeration. At the same time, the discussion, conducted at once with warmth and decorum, was not disturbed by any violent outbreak. The Directory obtained the nominations, on the sole condition of making its selections amongst the men who had been already honoured by the suffrages of the people. This determination was inspired by a regard to principles; but policy recommended it even more forcibly. New elections, and their concomitant agitation, were thereby avoided, and the whole administration of the country, comprehending local authorities, courts of justice, and the executive, was rivetted in a compacter unity.

The Directory, therefore, was armed with the means of procuring funds, recruiting the army, and completing the organisation of the civil and judicial administration. It had a majority in the two councils. A systematic opposition had arisen, it is true, in the Five Hundred and the Ancients; certain members of the new third disputed the augmentation or extent of its attributes, but their opposition was calm, and free from unseemly virulence. It seemed as if they respected its extraordinary situation and its courageous labours. Doubtless, they likewise respected, in this government elected and supported by the conventionalists, the still all-puissant revolution yet smouldering with wrath. The five directors had divided amongst themselves the general service of the state. Barras superintended the composition and Carnot the movement of the armies; Rewbell managed the foreign relations; Le Tourneur and Larévellière-Lépaux the internal administration. On all important measures, however, they deliberated in common. They had, since their first occupation of the Luxembourg, possessed but sorry furniture; they eventually drew from the Garde-Meuble the necessary articles for the embellishment of that residence, and began to represent the French republic with a more imposing dignity. Their antechambers were crowded with eager applicants, amongst whom it was not always easy to choose with very nice discrimination. Faithful to the nature and origin of its institution, however, the Directory invariably selected the most decided adherents of the revolution. Warned by

the revolt of the 13th Vendémiaire, it had marshalled a considerable force to guarantee Paris and the seats of government from the hazards of an assault. Young Bonaparte, who had rendered himself so conspicuous on the 13th Vendémiaire, was intrusted with the command of this force, styled the army of the interior. He had subjected it to a total reorganisation, and located it in the camp of Grenelle. He had embodied in a single corps, under the name of the legion of police, a portion of the patriots who had offered their services on the 13th Vendémiaire. Those patriots belonged for the most part to the old gendarmerie dissolved after the 9th Thermidor, which had been entirely composed of soldiers formerly enrolled in the French guards. Bonaparte afterwards organised the constitutional guard of the Directory and that of the two councils. This formidable and well-directed force was adequate to impress the turbulent with a wholesome feeling of respect, and to keep all parties in awe and order.

Firm in its line of policy, the Directory manifested its principles still more unequivocally in various measures of detail. It persisted in abstaining from any formal notification of its installation to the conventional deputies on missions in the departments. It enjoined the managers of theatres to proscribe the recitation of all popular airs but one, the *Marseillaise.* The *Reveil du Peuple* was interdicted. This order was censured as puerile: it is certain dignity would have been best consulted by prohibiting every species of song; but the object of the government at present was to rekindle republican enthusiasm, unhappily somewhat dormant and lukewarm. The Directory prompted prosecutions against sundry royalist journalists, who had continued to write with the same violence as in Vendémiaire. Although the freedom of the press was unlimited, the law of the convention against writers who should provoke to the return of royalty, furnished a medium of repression in extreme cases. Richer-Serizy was indicted; the process was opened against Lemaitre and Brottier, whose correspondence with Verona, London, and La Vendée, proved their character of royalist agents and their influence in the troubles of Vendémiaire. Lemaitre was condemned to death as the principal agent; Brottier was acquitted. Two secretaries of the committee of public welfare were ascertained to have communicated to them important papers. The three deputies, Saladin, Lhomond, and Rovère, placed under arrest on account of the 13th Vendémiaire, but subsequent to their actual re-election by the electoral assembly of Paris, were reintegrated by the two councils, on the ground that they were already deputies when proceedings were commenced against them, and that the forms prescribed by the constitution with regard to deputies had not been observed. Cormatin, and the Chouans seized with him as infractors of the pacification, were likewise put on their trial. Cormatin was sentenced to expatriation for having continued secretly to foment civil war; the others were acquitted, to the great displeasure of the patriots, who complained most bitterly of the indulgence evinced by the tribunals.

The conduct of the Directory with reference to the minister of the court of Florence, demonstrated even more emphatically the republican rigour of its sentiments. A convention had been signed with Austria, whereby it was agreed to deliver into her hands the daughter of Louis XVI., the sole remnant of the family immured in the Temple, on condition that the deputies betrayed by Dumouriez should be surrendered to the French advanced posts. The princess emerged from the Temple on the 28th Frimaire (19th December). The minister of the interior attended in person to receive her, and conducted her, with signal marks of respect, to his residence, whence she departed, accompanied by the individuals she had selected for that purpose. A munificent allowance was granted for her journey, and she was thus honourably conveyed to the frontier. The royalists failed not to publish verses and articles on the unfortunate captive, at the moment of her being finally restored to liberty. Count Carletti, the Florentine minister, who had been accredited to France on account of his known attachment to the country and the revolution, demanded from the Directory permission to visit the princess in his character of ambassador of an allied court. This minister had become suspected, doubtless erroneously, owing to the very exaggeration of his republicanism. It appeared inconceivable that the envoy of an absolute prince, and especially of an Austrian prince, could honestly entertain such extreme opinions. The Directory, as the sole reply to his demand, signified to him an order forthwith to leave Paris, but declared at the same time that this proceeding was purely personal to the ambassador, and not intended as an insult to the court of Florence, with which the French republic remained, and wished to remain, on terms of amity.

Six weeks at the uttermost had elapsed since the Directory was installed, and already it began to be firmly seated in authority; the parties were becoming habituated to the idea of an established government, and, meditating less upon its subversion, prepared to combat it within the limits prescribed by the constitution. The patriots, adhering to their favourite idea of a club, congregated at the Pantheon; they often gathered within that spacious edifice to the number of four thousand and upwards, composing an assemblage bearing a strong affinity to that of the effete Jacobins. Obedient, however, to the letter of the constitution, they abstained from any direct violation of its prohibitions affecting the meetings of citizens, abjuring every semblance of organisation as a political assembly. Thus they appointed no regular officers to constitute a *bureau;* they distributed no tickets amongst themselves; the individuals present were not distinguished as spectators and initiated associates; they maintained neither correspondence nor the relations of affiliation with other societies of a like nature. With these exceptions, the club had all the characteristics of the old parent society, and its passions, if more dulled by time, were only the more obstinately rooted.

The sectionaries resolved themselves into associations more analogous to their tastes and manners. Now, as under the convention, they included secret royalists in their ranks, but comparatively few in number; the majority of them, from undefined apprehensions, and from an affectation of fashion, were declared enemies of terrorists and conventionalists, whom they professed to confound, and whose predominance in the new government they regarded with spleen and anger. They formed societies, where they met to read the newspapers and converse on political topics with all the suavity and polish of the saloons, and where such perusal and conversations were followed by dancing and music. The winter was advancing, and these personages abandoned themselves to gaiety, as a proof of hostility to the revolutionary system—a system, by the way, which was beyond the power of revival, for no Saint-Justs, Robespierres, or Couthons, were alive to enforce upon the French, by the agency of terror, odious and impossible manners.

The two parties had their respective journals. The patriots had *Le Tribun du Peuple, L'Ami du Peuple, L'Eclaireur du Peuple, L'Orateur Plébéien, Le Journal des Hommes Libres:* these publications were thoroughly Jacobinical. *La Quotidienne, L'Eclair, Le Véridique, Le Postillon, Le Messager, La Feuille du Jour,* passed for royalist journals. The patriots, in their club and peculiar prints, betokened great discontent and irritation, although the government was assuredly well attached to the revolution. It was, undoubtedly, less against the government than against events that their wrath was excited. The reverses on the Rhine, the new movements in La Vendée, and the dismal financial crisis, were to them so many grounds for reverting

to their cherished doctrines. If the armies were beaten, if assignats fell, it was because of the indulgent laxity—because recourse was not boldly had to the grand revolutionary expedients. The new financial system, especially, which betrayed the desire to abolish assignats, and seemed too sure a precursor of their ultimate suppression, had aroused their choler in a supreme degree.

To their adversaries no other subjects of invective were needed than this very irritation of the patriots. Terror, so they inculcated, was on the eve of resuscitation. Its partisans were incorrigible: the Directory vainly strove to obey their wishes; they were not satisfied; they were engaged in renewed agitations, they had re-opened the old den of the Jacobins, and were meditating all imaginable atrocities.

Such were the labours of the government, the tendencies of opinion, and the situation of parties, in Frimaire year 4 (November and December 1795).

The military operations, continued despite the season, began to promise more auspicious results, and to afford the new administration some solace for its arduous efforts. The zeal wherewith Jourdan had plunged into the Hundsrück through a horrible country, and without any of the physical resources calculated to alleviate the sufferings of his army, had somewhat re-established affairs on the Rhine. The Austrian generals, whose troops were equally fatigued with the French, finding themselves exposed to a series of stubborn conflicts, in the heart of winter, proposed an armistice, during which the two hostile armies should retain their actual positions. The armistice was accepted, on condition of its cessation being proclaimed ten days before the resumption of hostilities. The line which separated the two armies, following the Rhine from Düsseldorf to above Neuwied, left the river at that point, formed a semicircle from Bingen to Manheim, passing by the foot of the Vosges, rejoined the Rhine above Manheim, and skirted it all the way to Basle. Thus the French had lost all that the semicircle encompassed on the left bank—a loss, at the same time, which a well-conceived manœuvre might repair. The great misfortune consisted in having forfeited for the moment the ascendancy of victory. The armies, overwhelmed with hardships and exhaustion, entered into cantonments, and in the interim, the preparations requisite for putting them in a state to open a decisive campaign early in the ensuing spring, were diligently prosecuted.

On the Italian frontier, likewise, the season failed to put an entire stop to the operations of war. The army of the Eastern Pyrenees had been transported to the Alps. The march from Perpignan to Nice had necessarily occupied a lengthened interval, and had been additionally delayed by the want of provisions and of shoes for the soldiers. At length, towards the month of November, Augereau appeared with a superb division, which had already gathered laurels in the plains of Catalonia. Kellermann, as previously chronicled, had been compelled to fall back on his right wing, and to relinquish the immediate communication with Genoa. He had his left on the Great Alps, and his centre in the Col di Tende. His right was stationed behind the line called of Borghetto, one of the three detected and marked out by Bonaparte during the preceding year as available in case of a retreat. Dewins, vastly elated with his inconsiderable success, reposed on the Genoese coast, and talked in a majestic strain about his projects, without, however, attempting the execution of any. The brave Kellermann had awaited with impatience the reinforcements from Spain, in order to resume the offensive and recover his communication with Genoa. He longed to terminate the campaign by a brilliant action, which might restore the Riviera to the French, open to them the avenues of the Apennines and of Italy, and detach the King of Sardinia from the coalition. The French ambassador in Switzerland, Barthélem forcibly inculcated that a victory towards the Maritime Alps would immediately ensure a peace with Piedmont and the definitive cession of the barrier of the Alps. The French government, in unison with Kellermann as to the necessity of attacking, dissented from him with regard to the plan of operations, and superseded him in favour of Schérer, whom his achievements at the battle on the Ourthe and in Catalonia had already recommended to favourable notice. Schérer arrived in the middle of Brumaire, and resolved to attempt a decisive blow.

It is known that the chain of the Alps, now become the Apennines, trenches closely on the Mediterranean from Albenga to Genoa, and leaves between the sea and the crest of the mountains merely narrow and rapid slopes, which have a breadth of scarcely three leagues. On the opposite side, on the contrary, that is to say, towards the valley of the Po, the slopes decline gently upon a space of twenty leagues. The French army, placed on the maritime slopes, was encamped between the mountains and the sea. The Piedmontese army, under Colli, fixed in the intrenched camp of Ceva, on the reverse of the mountain ridge, guarded the avenues of Piedmont against the left of the French army. The Austrian army, stationed partly on the summit of the Apennines, at Rocca-Barbenne, and partly on the maritime flank in the basin of Loano, thus communicated with Colli by its right, occupied with its centre the pinnacle of the mountains, and blocked the shore with its left, so as to intercept the French communications with Genoa. Upon a contemplation of this state of things a conception was vividly presented to the mind. Move in force on the right and centre of the Austrian army, drive it from the crests of the Apennines, and wrest from it all the upper heights: such the plan pointed out to the French. They would thus isolate the Austrians from Colli, and, marching rapidly along the mountain tops, enclose their left in the basin of Loano, between the mountains and the sea. Massena, one of the generals of division, had seized this idea and propounded it to Kellermann. Schérer likewise discerned all the advantages of the plan, and resolved to put it in execution.

Dewins, after having essayed a few attempts on the French line of Borghetto during the months of August and September, had renounced the intention of any further aggressive movement for the year. He had fallen into bad health, and given up the command to Wallis. The officers of his army thought only of enjoying to the utmost the pleasures of winter in Genoa and the environs. Schérer, after procuring for his forces supplies of provisions and twenty-four thousand pairs of shoes, whereof they were absolutely devoid, fixed his movement for the 2d Frimaire (23d November). With thirty-six thousand men he prepared for an attack upon forty-five thousand; but the excellent choice of the point whereon he purposed to direct his efforts compensated the inferiority of strength. He instructed Augereau to drive the left of the enemy into the basin of Loano; he ordered Massena to fall on their centre at Rocca-Barbenne, and seize upon the summit of the Apennines; lastly, he enjoined Serrurier to keep in check the army under Colli, who formed the right on the opposite flank. Augereau, whilst pushing the Austrian left into the basin of Loano, was to operate leisurely; Massena, on the contrary, was to defile rapidly along the crests and turn the basin of Loano, with the view of hemming in the Austrian left; Serrurier was directed to beguile the attention of Colli by false demonstrations of attack.

On the morning of the 2d Frimaire, the French cannon startled the Austrians, who had but little expectation of a battle. The officers hastened from Loano and Finale to place themselves at the head of their amazed troops. Augereau attacked with vigour but with preconcerted composure. He was arrested by the brave Roccavina. That general, placed on an

eminence in the middle of the basin of Loano, defended it with obstinacy, and allowed himself to be surrounded by the division under Augereau, resolutely refusing to surrender. When he was enveloped, he rushed headlong on the encompassing line, and rejoined the Austrian army, sweeping over the bulk of a French brigade.

Schérer, restraining the ardour of Augereau, obliged him to skirmish before Loano, in order to avoid pushing the Austrians too rapidly on their line of retreat. In the interim, Massena, charged with the brilliant part of the plan, scaled, with the temerity and vigour which distinguished him on all occasions, the crests of the Apennines, surprised Argenteau, who commanded the right of the Austrians, threw him into extreme disorder, chased him from all his positions, and appeared in the evening on the heights of Melogno, which formed the enclosure of the basin of Loano and barred its rear. Serrurier, by a series of firm and skilfully devised attacks, had kept Colli and the whole adverse right in check.

On the evening of the 2d, the French encamped on the positions they had gained, amidst deplorable weather. By dawn on the 3d, Schérer resumed his operation: Serrurier, being reinforced, prepared to engage Colli more seriously, with the view of completely isolating him from his allies; Massena continued to occupy all the crests and gorges of the Apennines; Augereau, ceasing to restrain his ardour, impetuously assailed the Austrians, whose rear-ground had been thus intercepted. From that moment, the Imperialists began their retreat, impeded by dismal weather and most frightful roads. Their right and centre recoiled in disorder upon the reverse flank of the Apennines, whilst their left, pressed between the mountains and the sea, retired arduously along the line of coast by the route of Corniche. A storm of wind and snow prevented the pursuit being prosecuted with all the requisite activity; nevertheless, five thousand prisoners, several thousands disabled on the field, forty pieces of cannon, and immense magazines, were the results of this engagement, which proved one of the most disastrous fought by the allies since the commencement of the war; whereas, on the part of the French, it has been deemed most ably planned and conducted, by experienced military critics.

Piedmont was struck with consternation at the tidings of this defeat; all Italy, indeed, trembled, and was consoled only by the hope that the advanced season would deter the French from carrying forward their operations. Abundant magazines, meanwhile, served to alleviate the sufferings and privations of their army. This important achievement occurred most opportunely to dispel the gloom brooding over France, and to strengthen the nascent government. It was proclaimed and greeted with rapturous joy by all true patriots.

In the provinces of the West, also, events simultaneously took a turn not less favourable to the government. Hoche, having augmented the army occupying the two Vendées to 44,000 men, planted intrenched posts on the Sèvre-Nantaise, so as to separate Stofflet from Charette, and dispersed the first assemblage gathered by the latter chief; and, by means of a camp at Soullans, guarding the whole coast of the Marais, was fully prepared to oppose a disembarkation. The English squadron, anchored off Isle-Dieu, was, on the contrary, in a very forlorn condition. The island on which the expedition had so injudiciously landed, was a bare surface, without shelter or resource, and less than three quarters of a league in area. The shores of the islet, moreover, afforded no safe anchorage. The vessels were exposed to all the violence of the wind, on a rocky ground which cut the cables and nightly placed them in imminent peril. The confronting coast, on which it was proposed to disembark, presented to contemplation a long, flat, narrow beach, on which the waves were incessantly breaking, and which the boats, taken athwart by the billows, could not approach without incurring great danger of being swamped. Every day increased the hazards of the English squadron and the means of Hoche. Six weeks had already elapsed since the French prince first set foot on Isle-Dieu. The envoys of the Chouans and Vendéans clustered around him, and, amalgamated with his own staff, proffered their views and counsel with emulous ardour, each labouring to give his own predominance. All wished to possess the prince, but all were agreed that his immediate disembarkment was essential, whatever point might obtain the preference.

It cannot be denied that this sojourn of six weeks in Isle-Dieu, within view of the coasts, had rendered a disembarkation more difficult. A descent on a hostile land, like the passage of a river, should not be preceded by a prolonged hesitation, which puts the enemy on his guard and intimates to him the menaced point. When the resolution to assail the coast was finally taken, and all the chiefs were forewarned, the descent should have been suddenly attempted at a point where the communication with the English squadron might be maintained, and the Vendéans and Chouans enabled to concentrate with their forces. There is little doubt that, if the disembarkation had been effected on the coast without this long preliminary menace, forty thousand royalists from Brittany and La Vendée might have been mustered before Hoche had time to put his battalions in motion. When we remember what occurred at Quiberon—the facility with which the descent was accomplished, and the interval that elapsed before the republican troops could be assembled—we readily comprehend how easy this second descent would have been, if it had not been wilfully jeopardised by a lengthened cruise off the coasts. Moreover, in the previous expedition, the supremacy of Puisaye was distasteful to the chiefs; whereas, in the present one, the name of the prince would have rallied them all, and stirred twenty departments. True, the emigrants when landed would have had many rude combats to sustain; they must have submitted to encounter the chances that Stofflet, Charette, and others had braved for nearly three years—to disperse, perchance, before their enemy, fly like marauding partisans, conceal themselves in woods, reappear, again seek concealment, and, in fine, incur the risk of being captured and shot. Thrones are won by such means. There was no degradation in *Chouannising* amid the woods of Brittany, or amidst the marshes and thickets of La Vendée. A prince, issuing from those retreats to regain the throne of his fathers, would not have been less glorious than Gustavus Vasa, emerging from the mines of Dalecarlia. For the rest, it is probable that the presence of the prince would have awakened sufficient zeal in the royalist districts to enable him, with a numerous army steadfast under his banner, to attempt enterprises of greater pith and moment. It is, at the same time, equally probable that none of those around him would have possessed sufficient genius to cope with the young plebeian who commanded the republican army; but, at all events, the glory of contesting victory was to be gained. There are often consolations amid discomfiture: Francis I. found such after the defeat of Pavia.

If, therefore, the disembarkation had been practicable at the moment the squadron arrived, it was no longer so after loitering six weeks at Isle-Dieu. The English naval officers declared that the station would speedily become untenable, and that some determination must be forthwith taken. All the coast of Charette's country was covered with troops; there was no possibility of effecting a descent except beyond the Loire, towards the mouth of the Vilaine, or in Scépeaux's district, or again in Brittany, in concert with Puisaye. But the emigrants and the prince were averse to a descent any where but in Charette's neighbourhood, and expressed confidence in that leader

alone. Now, the thing was impracticable on Charette's line of coast. The prince, according to the assertion of M. de Vauban, demanded to be recalled by the English ministry. That ministry at first refused his application, unwilling that the expenses of its armament should be altogether fruitless. Ultimately it left the prince at liberty to adopt what step he chose.

Immediately thereupon preparations were made for departure. Long and useless instructions were framed for the royalist chiefs. They were told that superior orders prevented for the moment the execution of the enterprise; that Messieurs Charette, Stofflet, Sapinaud, and Scépeaux, must arrange to assemble a force of twenty-five or thirty thousand men beyond the Loire, which, with the junction of the Bretons, might be swelled into an effective army of forty or fifty thousand men, sufficient to protect the disembarkment of the prince; that the point of descent would be intimated so soon as those preliminary measures had been taken; and that all the resources of the English monarchy would be freely lavished in aiding the efforts of the royalist districts. With these instructions were combined sundry thousands of pounds sterling for each chief, a supply of muskets, and a small quantity of gunpowder. These articles were landed at night on the coast of Brittany. The provisions the English had stored in their squadron having become damaged, they were cast into the sea. It was found necessary to consign to a like fate the five hundred horses belonging to the English cavalry and artillery. Those animals were almost all diseased from the effects of the prolonged navigation.

The English squadron set sail on the 15th November (26th Brumaire), and left as its parting legacy consternation amongst the royalists. It was the English, they were taught, who had compelled the prince to forsake them: they were filled with indignation, and inveighed in terms of unmeasured virulence against the perfidy of England. Charette was the most deeply incensed, and he had good reason to be so, for he was the most compromised. Charette had resumed arms in anticipation of a great expedition—in the hope of receiving powerful succours capable of establishing an equality of strength between him and the republicans: these expectations belied, he could see before him nothing but destruction—an inevitable and speedy destruction. The threatened descent had drawn upon him all the forces of the republicans; this time he could entertain no hopes of a negotiation; the fate awaiting him, if taken, must be stern and merciless, without any right on his part to complain of an enemy who had once so generously forgiven him.

He determined to sell his life dearly, and to devote his last moments to a desperate struggle. He waged several engagements in endeavours to pass to the rear of Hoche, pierce the line of the Sèvre-Nantaise, and reach the country of Stofflet, in order to coerce that partisan into a resumption of hostilities. His efforts were vain, and he was driven back into the Marais by the columns of Hoche. Sapinaud, whom he had engaged to retake arms, surprised the town of Montaigu, and attempted to penetrate as far as Châtillon; but he was stopped before that place, defeated, and obliged to disband his corps. The line of the Sèvre could not be forced. Stofflet, behind that fortified barrier, was constrained to remain in tranquillity, and, indeed, he was not disposed to resume arms. He viewed with secret pleasure the approaching ruin of a rival who had been loaded with titles, and who had meditated his deliverance into the hands of the republicans. Scépeaux, also, between the Loire and the Vilaine, dared not move. Brittany was disorganised by discord. The division of Morbihan, commanded by George Cadoudal, had revolted against Puisaye, at the instigation of the emigrants who accompanied the French prince, and who still harboured against him their old resentments. They were anxious to wrest from him the command of Brittany. However, the division of Morbihan was the only one that denied the authority of the generalissimo.

It was in this state of things that Hoche commenced the great work of pacification. That young soldier, an able politician as well as general, perceived that the agency of arms alone must be ineffectual to subjugate an enemy who baffled all pursuit and was impervious to regular warfare. He had already dispatched several moveable columns in the wake of Charette; but soldiers, heavily armed and under the necessity of carrying every thing with them, and ignorant, moreover, of the country, could not keep pace with the fleetness of peasants who bore nothing but their muskets, sure of finding provisions every where, and cognisant of every petty ravine and thicket in the land. Accordingly, he countermanded his orders for pursuit, and formed a plan, which, followed with constancy and firmness, promised to revive the reign of peace in those desolated provinces.

The inhabitant of La Vendée was at once a peasant and a soldier. Amidst all the horrors of civil war he had never ceased to cultivate his fields and tend his flocks. His musket was ever at his side, concealed under the soil or in the midst of straw. At the first signal from his chief he flew to the rendezvous, attacked the republicans, disappeared through the woods, returned to his fields, and again concealed his musket: so the republicans found him a mere unarmed peasant, in whom it was impossible to recognise the recent soldier. In this manner the Vendéans carried on incessant hostilities, reared sufficient produce for their maintenance, and remained, as it were, unassailable to their enemies. Whilst they always possessed the means of inflicting injury and recruiting their strength, the republican armies, to whom an exhausted administration could no longer forward the requisite supplies, lacked all essential articles, and pined under the most horrible destitution.

Under such circumstances, the only mode of making the Vendéans feel the war sensibly was by perpetrating devastations—a course that had been adopted during the system of terror, but which had only tended to excite more inveterate animosities without causing the cessation of the civil war.

Hoche devised an ingenious scheme for reducing without destroying the country, by abstracting its arms, and appropriating a part of its produce for the use of the republican army. In the first place, he adhered to the plan of distributing several intrenched camps, whereof some, situated on the Sèvre, separated Charette from Stofflet, whilst others covered Nantes, the coast, and Les Sables. He next formed a circular line resting on the Sèvre and the Loire, whereby it was intended progressively to encompass the whole district. This line was composed of strong posts, connected together by patrols, so that not an interval remained free to admit the passage of an enemy at all numerous. These posts were charged to occupy every market-town and village, and disarm the inhabitants. To succeed in that operation, they were directed to seize the cattle, which usually depastured in common, and the corn stored in granaries, and to arrest the most notable of the inhabitants; the cattle, corn, and inhabitants thus taken as hostages, were to be restored only when the peasants should have voluntarily surrendered their arms. Now, as the Vendéans prized their flocks and grain more than the Bourbons or Charette, it was pretty certain they would give up their weapons. To frustrate any deception on the part of the peasants, who might deliver a few damaged pieces and retain the rest, the officers intrusted with the care of disarming them were to insist upon an inspection of the registers of enrolment kept in each parish, and demand as many muskets as there were names enrolled. In default of these registers, they were enjoined to make a calculation of the population, and exact a number of fire-arms equivalent to the fourth of the male inhabi-

tants. After receiving the arms, they were commanded to restore the cattle and grain with scrupulous fidelity, save a portion deducted under the title of impost, to be deposited in magazines formed to the rear of the line of circumvallation. Hoche strongly inculcated upon his officers the necessity of treating the inhabitants with the greatest mildness, and of observing the strictest good faith in the restitution of their flocks, stores, and above all, their hostages. He especially exhorted them to hold conciliatory converse with the people, manifest an interest in their welfare, forward some of them to his head-quarters, and make them presents in grain or in different objects. He likewise prescribed sedulous regard towards the incumbents. The Vendéans, he urged, were actuated by but one genuine sentiment—attachment to their priests. Those ecclesiastics wanted merely protection and repose; let them be assured on those two points, let even certain benefits be added, and the affections of the country would be retrieved to the republic.

The line, which was denominated the line of disarmment, was intended to envelop Lower Vendée circularly, advance by gradual steps, and conclude by grasping it in close tension. As it moved forward, it would leave behind it the country disarmed, reduced, and even reconciled with the republic. Moreover, it would protect such districts from a return of the insurgent chiefs, who were accustomed to punish by devastations submission to the republic and the deposit of arms. Two moveable columns were to precede it, for the purpose of engaging those chiefs and seizing them if possible; and thus, steadily compressing them more and more, it must speedily surround and inevitably capture them. The utmost vigilance was recommended to the commandants of posts, in maintaining communications by patrols, and preventing armed bands from penetrating the line and returning to wage war in the rear. However watchful the attention, nevertheless, it might occur that Charette and some of his followers were able to baffle the vigilance of the posts, and clear the line of disarmment; but, in that case even, which was possible, they could only pass with a few individuals, and would find themselves in disarmed localities, restored to repose and security, tranquillised by humane treatment, and furthermore intimidated by that vast network of troops embracing the country. The contingency of a revolt on the rear was also foreseen. Hoche ordered that one of the moveable columns should immediately recoil on the insurgent quarter, and that, to punish it for not having surrendered all its arms and for having again appealed to them, its flocks and grain should be carried off, and the principal inhabitants arrested. The effect of such chastisement was undoubted; dispensed with justice, its infliction was sure to inspire, not hatred, but a salutary dread.

The project thus sagaciously conceived by Hoche was forthwith put in execution, that is to say, during the months of Brumaire and Frimaire (November and December). The line of disarmment, passing by Saint-Gilles, Légé, Montaigu, and Chantonnay, formed a semicircle, the right extremity whereof rested on the sea, the left on the River Lay, to be progressively advanced until Charette was cooped up in impracticable marshes. Upon the wisdom of the execution the success of a plan of this nature entirely depended. Hoche guided his officers by detailed instructions marked by good sense and perspicuity, and was himself on every point to amend irregularities. It was no longer merely a war he had to prosecute, but a grand political operation, which required equal prudence and vigour. The inhabitants soon began to surrender their arms, and to become reconciled with the republican troops. Hoche granted certain appropriate relief to the indigent from the magazines of the army; he visited in person the inhabitants detained as hostages, kept them under guard for a few days, and then dismissed them well satisfied. To some he gave cockades, to others caps worn by the police, and sometimes corn to those who needed it to sow their fields. He maintained a correspondence with the incumbents, who had great confidence in him and acquainted him with all the secrets of the country. He thus commenced to acquire a great moral influence—the veritable power wherewith such a war might be best terminated. Meanwhile, the magazines formed on the rear of the line of disarmment were filled with grain, large flocks of cattle were herded, and the army began to enjoy abundance, through the very simple expedient of collecting taxes and penalties in kind.

Charette had retreated into the woods, with one hundred or one hundred and fifty men, equally desperate with himself. Sapinaud, who, at his instigation, had again taken up arms, offered to lay them down a second time, on the sole condition of having his life spared. Stofflet, enclosed in Anjou with his minister Bernier, welcomed to his district all the officers who abandoned Charette and Sapinaud, and sought to strengthen himself with their spoils. At his head-quarters of Laval, he held a species of court, composed of emigrants and officers. He enrolled men and levied contributions, under pretext of organising the rural guards. Hoche kept an attentive eye upon his movements, pressed upon him more closely with the intrenched camps, and threatened him with an immediate disarming on the first cause of offence. An expedition which Hoche dispatched into Le Loroux, a country which had a sort of independent existence, obeying neither the republic nor any chief, struck Stofflet with dismay. Hoche was prompted to undertake this expedition in order to procure supplies of wine and wheat, with which Le Loroux abounded, and whereof the city of Nantes was entirely devoid. Stofflet was grievously alarmed, and solicited an interview with Hoche. He might plausibly protest his fidelity to the treaty, intercede for Sapinaud and the Chouans, affect the part of mediator in a new pacification, and secure by such means a prolongation of influence. It was his object thus to probe the views of Hoche regarding him. Hoche expressed to him the complaints of the republic, and intimated that if he afforded asylum to every brigand, continued to levy men and money, and attempted to be any thing more than the temporary chief of the police of Anjou, or to play the part of a prince, he would instantly seize him and disarm his province. Stofflet promised unlimited submission, and retired full of disquieting reflections touching the future.

Hoche was beset with additional difficulties at this critical moment. He had drawn under his standard draughts from the two armies of Brest and Cherbourg. The impending danger of a descent had procured him these reinforcements, which had increased to 44,000 men the troops assembled in La Vendée. The generals commanding the armies of Cherbourg and Brest now reclaimed the detachments they had lent, and the Directory seemed to approve their demands. Hoche wrote that the operation he had just commenced was of the utmost moment; that if he were deprived of the troops he had spread like a net around the Marais, the subjugation of Charette's country, and the destruction of that chief, which were imminent, would be postponed indefinitely; that it would be better to finish what was already so far advanced before proceeding elsewhere; and that, after such accomplishment, he would use all diligence in returning the troops he had borrowed, and even furnish his own to the general commanding in Brittany, in order that the same measures might be there applied which had already produced such happy effects in La Vendée. The government, struck with the reasons of Hoche, and having great confidence in him, summoned him to Paris, with the intention of approving all his plans and conferring on him the command of the three armies of La Vendée, Brest, and Cherbourg. It was at the end of Frimaire that the order reached him to

visit Paris, for the purpose of concerting with the Directory the operations best adapted for putting an end to this, the most calamitous of wars.

Thus terminated the campaign of 1795. The capture of Luxumbourg, the passage of the Rhine, the victories on the Pyrenees, followed by peace with Spain, the destruction of the emigrant army at Quiberon, had illustrated the commencement and the middle. The end was less propitious. The retreat of the armies over the Rhine, the loss of the lines before Mayence, and of part of the territory at the foot of the Vosges, occurred to obscure for a while the lustre of victory; but the battle of Loano, laying open the avenues of Italy, re-established the French ascendancy in arms, whilst the labours of Hoche in the West prepared the way for the veritable pacification of La Vendée, so often prematurely announced.

The coalition, reduced to England and Austria, with a few straggling princes of Italy and Germany, was in the last throes of its efforts, and would have demanded peace but for the late successes on the Rhine. Clairfayt was invested with a vast renown; and the next campaign was apparently expected to open in the heart of the Rhenish provinces.

Pitt, who stood in need of subsidies, convoked a second parliament in autumn to demand fresh sacrifices. The inhabitants of London still invoked peace with their former pertinacity. The society called the Corresponding Society had met in the open air, and adopted addresses, couched in bold and menacing language, against the continuance of the war and in favour of parliamentary reform. As the king went down to parliament, his carriage was assailed with stones, the windows were broken, and an air-gun was even supposed to have been discharged at his person. Pitt, passing through the streets of London on horseback, was recognised by the people, pursued to his residence, and covered with mud. Fox and Sheridan, armed with all the powers of their eloquence, had a rigorous account to exact. Holland conquered, Belgium incorporated with the French republic, its conquest rendered in some sort definitive by the reduction of Luxumbourg, enormous sums shamefully expended in La Vendée, and unfortunate Frenchmen fruitlessly exposed to death, were serious subjects of accusation against the ability and policy of the government. The Quiberon expedition, in particular, excited general indignation. Pitt essayed its defence by alleging the fact that English blood had not flowed. "Alas!" retorted Sheridan, in a bitter repartee, "if no English blood trickled, English honour gushed out at every pore."

Pitt, with his usual impassibility, represented all the events of the year as misfortunes which must be expected when the fortune of war is risked; but he laid great stress on the recent victories of Austria on the Rhine; he infinitely overrated their importance in a military sense, as likewise their effect in facilitating negotiations with France. Adhering to his accustomed topics, he maintained that the French republic touched the limit of its power; that an inevitable bankruptcy was on the point of throwing it into complete confusion and prostration; and that, by having supported the war for another year, the advantage had been gained of reducing the common enemy to extremity. He solemnly promised, at the same time, that if the new French government gave token of becoming established and assuming a regular form, he would seize the first opening to negotiate. He concluded by asking a new loan of three millions sterling, and penal laws against the press and political societies, to which he attributed the outrages offered to the king and himself. The opposition replied to him, that the boasted victories on the Rhine were merely ephemeral; that defeats in Italy had since destroyed the effect resulting from any advantages obtained in Germany; that the French republic, perpetually reduced to the last gasp, arose more vigorous than ever at the opening of each campaign; that the assignats had sunk long ago, they had performed the service for which they were instituted, the resources of France were independent of that paper currency, and if she were really verging to a state of exhaustion, Great Britain was advancing to that catastrophe much more rapidly; finally, that the national debt, daily augmented, had reached an appalling amount, and threatened speedily to crush the energies of the British nation. As to the laws against the press and popular meetings, Fox declared, in a transport of indignation, that if they were passed, the English people had no other resource than resistance; and that he would regard resistance no longer as a question of duty, but one of prudence. This assertion of the right of insurrection provoked a violent outburst, which was terminated by the adoption of Pitt's propositions: he obtained the new loan and the repressive laws, promising to open a negotiation as soon as practicable. The session of parliament was prorogued on the 2d February 1796 (13th Pluviose year 4).*

Pitt had not the slightest intention to conclude peace. He merely purposed to make demonstrations to satisfy public opinion and facilitate the success of his loan. The possession of the Low Countries by France rendered all idea of peace insupportable. His pledge simply implied that he would take an opportunity of commencing a feigned negotiation, and offering inadmissible conditions.

Austria, to satisfy the empire, which clamoured for peace, had made overtures through the medium of Denmark. That power, on the part of Austria, had claimed from the French government the formation of an European congress; to which the French government had replied, with justice, that a congress would render all negotiation impracticable, because too many interests would be brought into collision; that if Austria wished for peace, she had only to make a direct proposition, since France was ready to treat individually with all her enemies, and to seal a peace without any intermediate agency. This reply was consonant with reason, for a congress would have necessarily complicated the negotiations, the subject-matter of one treaty being mixed up with that of another, so that the peace with Austria might have been made contingent on peace with England or the empire, and thus rendered any conclusion impossible. For the rest, Austria desired no other rejoinder, as she had no real inclination to negotiate. She had lost too much, and her recent successes had inspired too sanguine hopes, for her to lay down arms with complacency. She strove to reanimate the courage of the King of Sardinia, whom the victory of Loano had greatly alarmed, and promised him for the ensuing campaign a numerous army and a different general. The honours of a triumph were decerned to Clairfayt on his entrance into Vienna: his carriage was drawn by the people, and the favours of the court happily mingled with the incense of popular enthusiasm.

Thus closed, for all Europe, the fourth campaign of this ever memorable war.

CHAPTER XLVI.

CONTINUATION OF ADMINISTRATIVE LABOURS BY THE DIRECTORY.—PARTIES IN THE LEGISLATIVE BODY.—DISCONTENT OF THE JACOBINS.—INSTITUTION OF THE MINISTRY OF POLICE.—FINANCIAL EMBARRASSMENTS; CREATION OF MANDATS.—CONSPIRACY OF BABŒUF.—PACIFICATION OF LA VENDEE; DEATHS OF STOFFLET AND CHARETTE.

THE republican government was at once encouraged and strengthened by the events wherewith the cam-

* [The session in question was not closed until the 19th May 1796. The inaccuracy of French authors in treating of British affairs has often been remarked.]

paign had finally terminated. The convention, by incorporating Belgium with France, by comprehending it within the constitutional area, had imposed on its successors the obligation of concluding treaties solely on the basis of the Rhine remaining the barrier of France. New efforts were requisite, therefore—a fresh campaign, more decisive than the preceding, was required, to constrain the house of Austria and England to acquiesce in the galling fact of French aggrandisement. With this necessity before it, the Directory laboured without intermission to complete the armies, re-establish the finances, and repress the factions.

The Directory exhibited the utmost rigour in executing the laws relative to the young conscripts, and obliged them to rejoin the armies with stern harshness. It had caused to be annulled all pleas of exemption, and had instituted in each canton a medical board to adjudicate upon cases of infirmity. A great number of young men had intruded themselves into the offices of administration, where they defrauded the republic and manifested a dangerous spirit. Strict orders were accordingly issued that no persons should be retained in the public offices but such as were free from the requisition.

The finances attracted the especial attention of the Directory. It strove with indefatigable activity to accelerate the collection of the forced loan of six hundred millions; but an interval must necessarily elapse before it could touch the funds arising from that loan, from the alienation of the produce of the national forests, from the sale of domains three hundred acres in extent, and from the payment of contributions in arrear. In the interim means were to be found to meet the expenses, which unfortunately pressed multitudinously, inasmuch as the installation of the new government was the period which had been assigned as the era of general liquidation, and the winter, moreever, was the season appointed for the preparations of war. To forestall the receipts from all these sources, the Directory had been compelled to employ that resource which had been purposely left at its disposition —the issue of assignats. But it had already emitted in one month from twelve to fifteen thousand millions, in order to obtain a few millions in specie; and the crisis had at length arrived when it was no longer possible to negotiate them at any sacrifice whatsoever. It thereupon conceived the idea of issuing a current paper at short dates, representing the income of the year, as is practised in England with exchequer bills, and as is now usual in France with royal bills. In consequence, it emitted, under the title of rescriptions, bills to bearer, payable at the treasury with the bullion which would continuously flow in, as well from the forced loan, which, in Belgium, was exigible in specie alone, from the produce of the customs, and from the contracts made with the companies which should undertake the management of the forests. It issued at first thirty millions of these rescriptions, and speedily increased them to sixty millions, using the aid of bankers in the operation.

Financial companies were no longer prohibited. The government determined to render them instrumental in the establishment of a bank—an institution needful to public credit, especially at a moment when the belief was prevalent that specie had entirely departed from France. It constituted a company, and proposed to endow it with a certain quantity of national domains to serve as the capital of a bank. This bank was to issue notes, which would have lands as their pledge, and would be payable at sight, like all bank-notes. It was to lend the state a sum proportioned to the quantity of domains so hypothecated. This, we gather, was only another mode of drawing on the value of the national property; instead of resorting to the medium of assignats, that of bank-notes was adopted.

The success of this experiment was extremely problematical; but, in its miserable situation, the government had recourse to every device, and was justified by the pressure of circumstances. Its most commendable operation was the suppression of rations and the reinstatement of free traffic in the article of provisions. We have often alluded to the efforts imposed upon the government, by having taken upon itself the charge of alimenting Paris, and to the heavy burden thence resulting upon the treasury, which bought corn in genuine money, and distributed it to the people of the capital for a nominal value. It recovered scarcely the two-hundredth part of the expenditure; and thus the republic almost virtually subsisted the population of Paris.

The new minister of the interior, Benezech, keenly sensible to the inconveniences of this system, and convinced that existing circumstances warranted its relinquishment, exhorted the Directory to evince the requisite courage. Trade was beginning to resume its wonted course; corn reappeared in all the markets; the people insisted upon receiving their wages in specie, and they were consequently enabled to defray the price of bread, which, in intrinsic currency, was moderate. The minister Benezech, therefore, formally proposed to the Directory to suppress the distribution of rations, which were paid in assignats alone, reserving them merely for the indigent, and for the public fundholders and functionaries, whose annual incomes did not exceed one thousand specie francs. Excepting these three classes, all others were henceforth to provide themselves at the bakers' shops on the principle of free trade.

This was a very bold measure, and required no ordinary courage to attempt. The Directory put it into immediate execution, regardless of the discontent it might engender amongst the people, and of the provocative to turmoil it might furnish to the two factions confederated against the tranquillity of the republic.

Besides these measures, it devised others not less calculated to exacerbate individuals, but which were equally necessary. One of the chief wants of the armies—a want always severely felt in the progress of lengthened warfare—was horses. The Directory demanded from the two councils authority to levy all horses kept for pleasure, and to take, paying for the same, the thirtieth horse employed in agriculture and wainage. The acknowledgment of a horse thus appropriated was to be received in satisfaction of taxes.

This measure, though harsh, was indispensable, and was sanctioned.

The two councils seconded the Directory in all its endeavours, and betokened in every respect an identical spirit, apart from the opposition, hitherto guarded, of the minority. Divers discussions had occurred touching the verification of the powers, the law of the 3d Brumaire, the successions of emigrants, the priests, and the events in the southern departments; and parties began to assume a more distinct development.

The verification of the powers having been referred to a commission, which had numerous investigations to institute relative to the members whose eligibility might be contested, its labours had necessarily occupied a long interval, and the legislature had sat two months ere its report was ready for presentation. It gave rise to a variety of altercations on the intent and meaning of the law of the 13th Brumaire. That law, we remember, proclaimed an amnesty for all crimes and misdemeanours committed during the revolution, excepting those having reference to the 13th Vendémiaire; it excluded from political functions the kinsmen of emigrants and the individuals who, in the electoral assemblies, had declared rebelliously against the decrees of the 5th and 13th Fructidor. It had been the crowning act of energy on the part of the conventionalists, and it was singularly repugnant to the men of moderate tendencies and to the counter-revolutionists who lurked behind them. Several deputies came

within its application, and particularly one named Job Aymé, member for La Drôme, who had excited to violence the electoral assembly of his department, and who was accused of belonging to the Company of Jesus. A member of the Five Hundred ventured to move the abrogation of the law. This proposition caused all parties to emerge from the reserve they had hitherto observed. A contention, similar to those which so often divided the convention, occurred in the Council of Five Hundred. Louvet, always true to the revolutionary cause, eagerly ascended the tribune to defend the law. Tallien, who had enacted so conspicuous a part since the 9th Thermidor, and whom the lack of personal consideration had alone prevented from attaining a seat in the Directory, here showed himself the stanch upholder of the revolution, and delivered a discourse which produced a great sensation. The opponents of the law of Brumaire had dwelt upon the circumstances under which it was passed; they had appeared to insinuate that it was an abuse of the victory gained on the 13th Vendémiaire with regard to the vanquished of that day; and they had spoken largely of Jacobins and their revived effrontery. "Let men cease to alarm us," exclaimed Tallien, "by descanting on terror, by recalling epochs totally different from the one of the present time, and by leading us to dread their return. Assuredly, the times are greatly changed: at the epochs to which they so affectedly revert, the royalists had not raised an audacious front; fanatical priests and returned emigrants were not protected; Chouan chiefs were not acquitted. Wherefore, then, compare circumstances which have nothing in common? It is too evident they would arraign the 13th Vendémiaire, the measures which followed that memorable day, and the men who, in those great dangers, saved the republic. So be it! Let our enemies mount this tribune: the friends of the republic will defend us from it. The very men who, during those disastrous occurrences, urged a deluded multitude to the cannon's mouth, would reproach us for the efforts we required to make in order to repel that multitude; they would fain revoke the measures the most pressing danger forced you to adopt: but no, they will not succeed! The law of the 3d Brumaire, the most important of those measures, will be maintained by you, forasmuch as it is necessary to the constitution; and surely you will maintain the constitution." "Yes, yes! we will!" cried numerous voices. Tallien subsequently proposed the exclusion of Job Aymé. Several members of the new third vigorously opposed this exclusion. The debate was characterised by extreme warmth. Eventually the law of the 3d Brumaire was ratified by a renewed sanction, and Job Aymé definitively expelled. Moreover, the scrutiny was ordered to be continued as to such members of the new third whom the provisions of that law similarly affected.

The next subject of discussion was relative to emigrants, and their right to successions not yet fallen. A law of the convention, passed to prevent emigrants from receiving succours, seized their patrimonies and declared the successions to which they had rightful claims, fallen by anticipation, and devolved to the republic. In consequence, a sequestration had been placed on the property of the parents of emigrants. A resolution was submitted to the Five Hundred, authorising a partition, and the abstraction of the part due to emigrants, in order that the sequestration might be raised. A vigorous opposition was offered by the new third. They essayed to combat the proposal, which partook undoubtedly of the revolutionary character, by reasons drawn from common law; they alleged it involved a violation of the rights of property. The council, nevertheless, adopted the resolution. It fared otherwise with the Ancients. This latter council, from the mature age of its members, from its attributes as supreme examiner, naturally acted with more deliberation and circumspection than that of the Five Hundred. It was less influenced by the adverse passions; it was less revolutionary than the majority, and much more so than the minority. Like every intermediate body, its tendencies were of a medium nature; and it rejected the measure, because it would promote the execution of a law it deemed unjust. The councils subsequently decreed that the Directory should be empowered to adjudicate supremely upon demands of erasure from the list of emigrants. They renewed all the laws against the priests who had not taken the oath, or who had retracted it, and against those whom the departmental administrations had condemned to expatriation. They enacted that those priests should be treated as returned emigrants if they reappeared on the French soil. They abated their rigour only in behalf of such as were infirm and unable to transport themselves abroad, who were enjoined to seclusion.

Another topic yet more violently agitated the councils, and provoked a passionate explosion. Fréron continued his mission in the southern departments, where he compounded the administrations and tribunals of ardent revolutionists. The members of the Companies of Jesus, and the counter-revolutionists of every grade, who had indulged in assassinations since the 9th Thermidor, found themselves in their turn exposed to reprisals, and uttered vehement outcries. The deputy Siméon had already urged temperate remonstrances. The deputy Jourdan of Aubagne, a man of ungovernable impulses, and the ex-Girondist Isnard, now vented the most bitter complaints in the Council of Five Hundred, and occupied several sittings with their declamations. The two parties were violently excited. Jourdan and Talot commenced to quarrel in the assembly itself, and almost committed themselves to a pugilistic encounter. Their colleagues happily interfered and separated them. A committee was nominated to frame a report on the state of the South.

These different scenes of contention brought forth the antagonist parties in more distinct array. The majority was considerable in the councils, and actuated congenially with the Directory. The minority, though overborne, daily evinced additional hardihood, and openly manifested its spirit of reaction. This was an exaggerated phasis of the feeling more or less predominant since the 9th Thermidor, which had at first most justly declared against the enormities illustrative of the reign of terror, but had from day to day grown more encroaching and impassioned, until it finally called in question the whole revolution. A few members of the conventional two-thirds voted with the minority, and certain of the new third with the majority.

The conventionalists seized the occasion furnished them by the approaching anniversary of the 21st January, to subject their colleagues suspected of royalism to a painful ordeal. They proposed to hold a festival every 21st of January, commemorative of the last king's death, on which day every individual member of the two councils and the Directory should take an oath of hatred to royalty. This formality of an oath, so often enforced by the ruling parties, could never be regarded as a guarantee; it was simply a vexation of the conquerors, who derived a malicious pleasure from constraining the vanquished to perjure themselves. The project was adopted by the two councils. The conventionalists were all impatience for the sitting of the 1st Pluviose year 4 (21st January 1796), to enjoy the spectacle of their colleagues of the new third passing up to the tribune to anathematise their supposed opinions. Each council assembled that day with extraordinary pomp and ceremony. A festival was prepared in Paris, at which the Directory and all the authorities were appointed to assist. When the time arrived for taking the oath, some of the newly elected betokened embarrassment. The ex-constituent Dupont de Nemours, a member of the Ancients, who retained in advanced age great asperity

of temper, and always evinced a spirit of determined hostility to the present government, could not altogether dissemble his chagrin, and as he pronounced the words, "*I swear hatred to royalty*," he added, "*and to every species of tyranny.*" It was a mode he selected of avenging himself for the refined torture, and of swearing hatred to the Directory in indirect terms. Loud murmurs arose, and Dupont de Nemours was obliged to restrict himself to the official formula. In the Council of Five Hundred, a member named André would have abjured with the same addendum, but was in like manner confined to the strict phraseology of the oath. The president of the Directory delivered an energetic harangue, and the whole government thus solemnly published a profession of faith purely and unequivocally revolutionary.

At this period it occurred that the deputies who had been exchanged for the daughter of Louis XVI. made their appearance in Paris. Their names were, Quinette, Bancal, Camus, Lamarque, Drouet, and Beurnonville, ex-minister of war. They gave a detailed statement of their sufferings in captivity; their words were heard with lively indignation, testimonies of affectionate sympathy were accorded them, and, amidst general satisfaction, they assumed the seats the convention had reserved for them in the two councils. It had been already decreed, in fact, that they should be as of right members of the legislative body.

Thus things stood with the government and parties during the winter of the year 4 (1795-1796.)

France, which desired above all things a stable government and the re-establishment of laws, was beginning to cherish the new state of things, and would have altogether approved it, but for the efforts still required of her for the salvation of the republic. The rigorous execution of the edicts regulating the conscription, the forced loan, the levy of every thirtieth horse, and the wretched condition of the fundholders paid in assignats, were grave subjects of complaint; without such topics of grievance, the new government would have been found excellent. It is only the nobler portion of a nation that is truly sensible to glory, to liberty, to lofty and generous ideas, and consents to undergo sacrifices in their name. The mass sighs for sluggish repose, and cries aloud to be spared sacrifices. There are moments, doubtless, when that opaque and inert mass is animated—stirred by grand and rooted passions: so we saw it in 1789, when liberty was to be achieved, and in 1793, when liberty was to be defended. But, exhausted by these efforts, the great majority of Frenchmen were averse to renew or continue them. It indeed required a government of surpassing ability and vigour to obtain from them the resources necessary to the consolidation of the republic. Fortunately, the youthful generation, always allured by the prospective charms of wild adventure, presented a teeming source for recruiting the armies. The conscripts manifested at first some repugnance to leave their homes and kindred, but they yielded after a slight resistance. Transported to the camps, they quickly acquired a decided taste for war, and distinguished themselves by prodigies of valour. The stagnant community, from whom contributions of money were exacted, was much more difficult to subdue and to reconcile with the government.

The enemies of the revolution took as their staple text the new sacrifices imposed upon France, and declaimed in their journals against the conscription, the forced loan, the forcible levy of horses, the state of the finances, the distress of the fundholders, and the ruthless execution of the edicts regarding emigrants and priests. They affected to consider the government as still based on revolutionary principles, and possessing all their inherent despotism and violence. The nation, they held, could not yet place confidence in it, or confide with security in the future. They inveighed especially against the design of a fresh campaign; they pretended that the tranquillity, the fortunes, and the lives of the citizens, were sacrificed to the vain ambition of conquests, and evinced regret that the revolution should have reaped the honour of giving Belgium to France. At the same time, it was not surprising, they said, that the government should be actuated by such a spirit, or indulge in such projects, when it was remembered that the Directory and the councils were filled with the members of an assembly blackened by the perpetration of hideous crimes.

The patriots, who, in the art of reproaching and recriminating, were equally practised adepts, found on the other hand the government too feeble, and showed a palpable tendency to accuse it of undue concession to the counter-revolutionists. Their complaints were, that emigrants and priests were allowed to return, that the conspirators of Vendémiaire were daily acquitted, that the young men of the requisition were not remanded to the armies with sufficient severity, and that the forced loan was collected with laxity. They especially disapproved of the financial system the government appeared disposed to adopt. We have previously learned that the idea of suppressing assignats had irritated them, and that they had demanded an immediate recurrence to the revolutionary expedients which, in 1793, had rallied the paper to par. The design of having recourse to financial companies, and of establishing a bank, awakened all their prejudices. The government, they said, was about to throw itself into the hands of stockjobbers; by the institution of a bank, it would ruin the assignats, and utterly destroy the paper-money of the republic, for the advantage of a private paper, the creation of stockjobbers. The suppression of rations also roused their indignation. They deemed it an attack on the revolution to restore articles of consumption to free traffic, and to cease the further alimenting of Paris: it betrayed the purpose of starving the people and driving them to despair. On this point the journals of the royalists coincided with those of the Jacobins, and the minister Benezech was assailed with vituperations from both parties.

The wrath of the patriots against the new government was inflamed to the highest pitch by an additional circumstance. The law of the 3d Brumaire, which amnestied all offences having reference to the revolution, nevertheless excepted particular crimes, as robberies and assassinations, which were still amenable to the application of the laws. Thus, the proceedings commenced during the latter days of the convention against the perpetrators of the massacres of September, were continued as ordinary indictments against murder. The conspirators of Vendémiaire were, at the same time, put upon their trial and almost universally acquitted. The process against the authors of September, on the contrary, was prosecuted with extreme rigour. The patriots were incensed to fury. A certain Babœuf, a rabid Jacobin, already incarcerated in Prairial, and who now owed his liberty to the law of amnesty, had started a journal, in imitation of Marat, under the title of the *Tribune of the People.* What the imitation of such a model would be is easy of conjecture. More violent than that of Marat, the journal of Babœuf was distinguished not so much by its cynicism as its loathsome vulgarity. The accidents extraordinary circumstances had provoked were here reduced into system, and upheld with a blindness and frenzy hitherto unexampled. When peculiar ideas, which have been paramount for a while, verge to depression, they remain imbedded in certain heads, and resolve themselves into mania and imbecile aberration. Babœuf was the leader of a sect of infatuated creatures, who maintained that the massacre of September had been incomplete, that it ought to be renewed and rendered general, so as to be made definitive. They openly advocated an agrarian law, from which the Hébertists themselves had shrunk, and called into requisition a new term, "the general happiness," to express the aim of their system. The phrase alone was sufficient to

characterise them as arrived at the last stage of demagogical absolutism. The pages of Babœuf excited a shudder on their perusal. Men of honest intentions pitied his extravagance; the alarmists feigned to believe in the advent of a new terror; and, sooth to say, the meetings of the society of the Pantheon furnished a specious pretext for their fears. It was in the spacious edifice of Saint-Geneviève that the Jacobins had virtually reopened their club, as we have previously intimated. More numerous than ever, they mustered nearly forty thousand souls, vociferating with united clamour into the still hours of night. They had gradually overstepped the constitution, and had assumed all it prohibited, that is to say, a bureau, a president, and tickets; in short, they had resumed the character of a political assemblage. The standard themes of declamation in this boisterous congregation were afforded by emigrants, priests, stockjobbers—the blood-suckers of the people—the project of a bank, the suppression of assignats, and the proceedings instituted against the patriots.

The Directory, which found itself daily more firmly consolidated and less exposed to dread counter-revolution, inclined more obviously to conciliate the approbation of all moderate and reasonable men. Acting upon a due sense of its position, it determined to repress this violent outbreak on the part of the Jacobin faction. It possessed the means in the constitution and the existing laws: it resolved to enforce them. In the first place, it caused several numbers of Babœuf's journal to be seized, as provoking to the subversion of the constitution; and in the next place, it closed the society of the Pantheon and some others formed by the *gilded youth*, in which the journals were read and balls held. These latter were located in the Palais-Royal and on the Boulevard des Italiens, under the titles of the *Chess Club*, the *Salon des Princes*, and *Salon des Arts*. They were not at all formidable, and were comprehended in the measure merely as an evidence of impartiality. The ordinance on the subject was published and executed on the 8th Ventôse (27th February 1796). An edict obtained from the councils appended a condition to those already imposed on popular societies by the constitution: henceforth the number of members in any such society was restricted to sixty.

The minister Benezech, attacked with virulence by both parties, tendered his resignation. The Directory refused to accept it, and wrote him a letter laudatory of his services. This letter was made public. The new system concerning provisions was resolutely maintained; the indigent, the fundholders, and the public functionaries whose incomes were below one thousand specie francs, alone received rations. A further measure of relief was considered just towards the unfortunate fundholders, who were still paid in assignats. The councils decreed they should be paid in assignats after the ratio of ten to one; an augmentation utterly inadequate, by the way, for assignats scarcely commanded the two-hundredth portion of their nominal value.

The Directory accompanied these measures by the recall of the conventional deputies on missions. It replaced them by commissioners of the government. These commissioners, accredited to the armies or provincial administrations, were to represent the Directory and superintend the execution of the laws. They were not invested, as formerly, with unlimited powers in the armies; but in pressing cases, where the power of the general was insufficient, as in the instance of requisitions either for provisions or troops, they might issue an order of urgency, which was to be provisionally executed, and afterwards submitted to the approbation of the Directory. Frequent complaints having arisen against sundry of the functionaries nominated by the Directory immediately after its installation, it directed its civil commissioners to keep a watchful eye upon their proceedings, to gather the complaints urged against them, and to forward to it the names of those whose dismissal they deemed expedient.

With the view of more narrowly observing the factions, which, now driven from their public resorts, would prosecute their schemes in secret, the Directory conceived the project of creating a special ministry of police.

The police is an important object in unsettled and troubled times. The three preceding assemblies had each assigned a numerous committee to exercise its functions; and the Directory, now considering they ought not to be left among the accessory attributes of the minister of the interior, proposed to the two councils the establishment of a special ministry. The opposition objected that it would prove an inquisitorial institution, in which they judged correctly; but it was unhappily an evil inseparable from a period of factious turbulence, and especially from one wherein stubborn and inveterate factions were perforce restricted to furtive machinations. The directorial proposition received the legislative sanction. The deputy Cochon was intrusted with the duties of this new ministry.

Moreover, additional laws fettering the liberty of the press were desired by the Directory. The constitution declared that liberty unlimited, save such provisions as might be rendered necessary to curb its excesses. But the two councils, after a solemn discussion, rejected the whole project of restrictive law. The parts were again reversed upon this subject. The partisans of the revolution, who ought to have been advocates of illimitable freedom, upheld measures of repression; and the opposition, whose secret bias inclined much more to monarchy than to the republic, declared for unrestricted liberty—so completely are parties governed by interest! At the same time, the decision was commendable. The press may be left unshackled without danger: truth alone is formidable; falsehood is powerless, and the more it exaggerates the more does its influence dwindle. No government that ever existed has perished through sheer mendacity. Little moment that a Babœuf celebrated the virtues of an agrarian law, or that a *Quotidienne* depreciated the grandeur of the revolution, calumniated its heroes, and strove to restore banished princes. The government had simply to contemn their declamatory effusions: a week of exaggeration and falsehood exhausts the pens of pamphleteers and libellists. But experience and the light of philosophy are needed before governments will admit these axioms. The time had perhaps not arrived for the convention to risk their practical efficacy. The Directory, however, which was more tranquil and more securely seated, ought to have comprehended their force and acted in accordance therewith.

The last measures of the Directory, to wit, the closing of the society of the Pantheon, the refusal to accept the resignation of Benezech, the recall of the conventionalists on missions, and the dismissal of certain obnoxious functionaries, produced the happiest effect; they tended to reassure those who conscientiously feared the revival of terror, condemned to silence those who malevolently affected to dread it, and satisfied reflective minds anxious to see the government hold a position paramount to all sub-agitating factions. The coherency and activity manifested by the Directory in its labours, combined with other considerations to command esteem. Hopes of permanent repose, confidence in the durability of the actual order of things, gradually gained ground. The five directors had assumed a certain outward state. Barras, more prone to the relaxations of pleasure than his colleagues, dispensed the honours of the Luxembourg, and in some degree impersonated the whole Directory. Society presented almost the same aspect as during the preceding year, exhibiting a singular medley of conditions and origins, great freedom of manners, an insatiable thirst for pleasures, and an inordinate luxury. The saloons of the director were crowded with generals whose education

and fortune had been acquired within two years, contractors and other business men who had enriched themselves by speculations and embezzlements, exiles who had returned and now strove to attach themselves to the government, men of talent who, beginning to have faith in the republic, desired to attain place and station therein, finally, intriguers on the alert for confidences and favours. Women of all origins flocked to display their charms in those saloons, and to exert their influence, at a time when all was to be solicited and obtained. If sometimes manners lacked that reserve and dignity which are so much affected in France, and which are the fruits of a polished, calm, and exclusive society, there reigned an extreme liberty of thought, and that fertility of ideas, that grasp of intellect, which the spectacle and habitual handling of momentous affairs naturally impart. The men who composed that society were enfranchised from the enervating thraldom of routine, and the dull monotony of insignificant traditions; all their acquirements were due to native hardihood and to personal experience. They had witnessed the grand events of modern history—they had taken and were taking part therein; and it is easy to imagine how such things must have stimulated the young, the ambitious, the buoyant in hope. There glittered in the first rank the youthful Hoche, who, from a private soldier in the French guards, had become in one campaign general-in-chief, and had, in the course of two years, given himself a finished education. Endowed with personal grace and beauty, renowned as one of the first captains of his day, and scarcely twenty-seven years of age, he was the hope of the republicans and the idol of the women, always smitten with external comeliness, talent, and glory. Beside him was already remarked the young Bonaparte, who had not yet gained fame, but whose services at Toulon and on the 13th Vendémiaire were appreciated, whose character and mein occasioned observation as pourtraying singularity, whilst his mind evinced its striking qualities of originality and vigour. In this society, where Madame Tallien shed the lustre of her beauty, Madame Beauharnois of her grace, Madame de Staël diffused the rays of genius, exalted by the inspiring influences of circumstances and of liberty.

These young men, called to pre-eminence in the state, selected their consorts, sometimes from amongst the females of antiquated rank, who deemed themselves honoured by their choice, and sometimes in the families of those who had reaped wealth amidst the disasters of the epoch, who were delighted to ennoble fortune by an alliance with reputation. Bonaparte had recently espoused the widow of the unfortunate General Beauharnois. The paths to distinction were multiform; each prepared to throw himself into the destiny befitting his qualifications, already spurred by anticipations of a brilliant future. War on the continent, war at sea, the legislature, the magistracy—a great republic, in short, to defend and govern—such the objects held up to inflame desires. The government had lately made a precious acquisition, in the person of an ingenious and profound writer, who devoted his rising talents to reconcile opinion with the new republic. M. Benjamin Constant had just published a work entitled "On the Force of Government," which had produced a powerful impression. He therein demonstrated the necessity of upholding a government on which hung the sole hopes of France and of all parties.

The harassing subject of the finances still chiefly occupied the attention of the government. The last measures had merely proved an adjournment of the difficulties. They had conferred on the government a certain quantity of domains for immediate sale, the power of leasing the large forests, and the levy of a forced loan, whilst the engraving of assignats had been left to it as an extreme resource. To anticipate the produce of these various resources, it had, as we have seen, created sixty millions of rescriptions, upon the model of exchequer bills or royal bonds, payable with the first specie which should fall into the coffers of the state. But these rescriptions had been negotiated slowly and arduously. The bankers, assembled to concert a scheme of territorial bank based on the national domains, had dispersed on hearing the outcries of the patriots against stockjobbers and revenue-farmers. The forced loan was collected much more tardily than had been expected. The assessment had proceeded upon purely arbitrary bases, inasmuch as the loan was to be levied on the most affluent classes; every one appealed, and each quota of the loan was contested with those appointed to gather it. Scarcely a third had reached the treasury in two months. A few millions in bullion, and a few thousand millions in paper, had been at length amassed. Utterly inadequate, therefore, in its results, the government had been driven to the extreme resource left to it in the failure of the others, the graving-plate of assignats. The issues had been increased within the last two months to the unparalleled sum of forty-five thousand millions (£1,890,000,000 sterling). Twenty thousand millions had scarcely produced one hundred millions of specie, for the assignats bore only the two-hundredth fraction of their value. The public was obviously unwilling to take any more of them, as they were no longer available for any purpose. They could not be used in liquidation of debts, for that coercive process was suspended; in the payment of land-rents and taxes they were only valuable for the half, since the other moiety was exigible in kind; they were refused in the markets, or accepted according to their actual reduced worth; lastly, they were taken in purchases of domains only at the rate of the market value, as the system of auctions always drove up offers in proportion to the depreciation of the paper. It was impossible to employ them, therefore, in any manner capable of eliciting value. An emission of unascertained extent caused extraordinary amounts to dwindle into insignificant sums. Thousands of millions signified at the utmost millions. That absolute depression whereof we have spoken when animadverting on the refusal to interdict auctions in the sale of national property,* was now realised.

Men in whom the revolution had left its prejudices implanted—for all systems and all modes of authority engender such, to be long harboured—desired that assignats should be enhanced, by assigning a vast quantity of domains in hypothecation, and resorting to violent measures to give them currency. But there is nothing more impracticable in the world than to re-establish the credit of a paper-money. Assignats were to be abandoned as hopeless.

It may be asked, why not abolish the paper-money at once, by reducing it to its real value, which was two hundred millions at the uttermost, and by exacting the taxes and payments for national property either in specie or in assignats at the standard of value? Specie, in fact, was reappearing, and even somewhat abundantly, especially in the provinces; thus demonstrating the futility of the apprehensions entertained of its great scarcity; the fact itself being avouched by the circumstance of the paper holding a place in the circulation merely to the extent of two hundred millions: but other considerations prevented the sudden renunciation of a paper currency. The only wealth of the state, it must always be borne in mind, consisted in the national domains. Their sale appeared neither certain nor proximate. Unable to wait, therefore, until their worth came spontaneously to the treasury by purchases, the government must needs forestall it by paper, and make issues to be redeemed hereafter: in short, the value of those domains was to be expended before it was received. This necessity of disbursing before selling suggested the creation of a new paper.

The schedules, which contemplated a special hypo-

* Vide page 510 of this History.

thec on particular properties, would have occasioned tedious delays, as they must have contained a special description of each hereditament; besides, they were dependent on the inclination of individuals, and failed to obviate the real substantial difficulty. The paper now imagined was, under the name of *mandats*, to represent a determinate amount of property. The domains were made subject to purchase, without auction and by simple agreement, at prices in mandats equivalent to the valuation of 1790, which was calculated at twenty-two years' purchase. Of these mandats two thousand four hundred millions were to be created, and domains of corresponding value, according to the estimate of 1790, were to be forthwith assigned in specific security. Thus, these mandats could undergo no variation apart from the domains themselves, since they represented a fixed quantity. They could not, it is true, attain the standard of bullion, for the domains were not worth so much as in 1790; but they would necessarily bear the value of the domains.

It was resolved to employ a portion of these mandats in retiring the assignats. The copperplate of the assignats was finally broken on the 30th Pluviose year 4 (19th February.) By that time it had served to manufacture forty-five thousand five hundred millions. By means of different payments, arising from the forced loan and outstanding arrears, the floating mass had been reduced to thirty-six thousand millions, and would be shortly still further reduced to twenty-four thousand millions. These twenty-four thousand millions, divided by thirty, represented eight hundred millions: it was decreed they should be exchanged for eight hundred millions of mandats, which was a liquidation of the assignat at the rate of one-thirtieth of its nominal value. An additional quantity of six hundred millions of mandats was to be issued for the public service; and the remaining one thousand millions were to be deposited in a coffer with three keys, and abstracted under the authority of decrees as emergency demanded.

This creation of mandats was a re-impression of assignats, varying only in the figure, the denomination, and the peculiarity of possessing a determinate value in relation to property. It was as if, beyond the twenty-four thousand millions remaining in circulation, other forty-eight thousand millions had been added, making in the whole seventy-two thousand millions; and as if these seventy-two thousand millions were to be received in payment of national domains, at thirty times the valuation of 1790, which supposed two thousand four hundred millions' worth of lands assigned in hypothecation. Thus the figure was lowered, the relation to property fixed, and the name changed.

The mandats were decreed on the 26th Ventôse (16th March.) The domains were to be forthwith exposed to sale, and delivered to the bearer of mandats on simple contracts. One-half of the price was to be paid in the first decade, and the other within three months. The national forests were set apart, and the two thousand four hundred millions' worth of property was taken from the estates of less than three hundred acres. Contemporaneous with the emission, such measures were enacted as the adoption of a paper-money necessitates. The mandat being the money of the republic, all payments were to be made in that currency. Obligations stipulated upon a metallic basis, house and farm rents, interest on loans, taxes, excepting taxes in arrear, dividends on state-stocks, pensions, salaries of public functionaries—all were to be paid in mandats. A long discussion occurred on the subject of the land-tax. Those who foreboded that mandats would decline after the manner of assignats, maintained that, in order to assure the state a certain receipt, the land-tax should be continued exigible in kind. The difficulties of the collection were objected in rejoinder, and a resolution was eventually passed that it should be paid in mandats, as likewise the customs-duties, dues of enrolment, stamp-duties, postages, &c. Nor were these the only regulations deemed requisite. It was judged essential to accompany the creation of the new paper with those stringent provisions accessory to the employment of forced values. It was ordained that gold and silver should no longer be considered in the light of merchandise, or allowed to be sold against paper, and *vice versa*. After the lessons experience had taught, this was a preposterous measure. Another equally so was adopted at the same time, which greatly injured the Directory in public opinion—namely, the closing of the Bourse or Stock Exchange. It might have been well aware that shutting up a public mart will not prevent a thousand being opened elsewhere.

In making mandats a new currency, and rendering them in all cases the substitute of specie, the government committed a grave error. Even though it sustained its value, the mandat could never equal the standard of money. The mandat was worth, we will allow, as much as the land, but it could not be worth more. Now, the land was not worth the half of the price estimated in 1790: a property, even in fee, of one hundred thousand francs, would not bring fifty thousand in specie. How, then, were one hundred thousand francs in mandats to be worth one hundred thousand in specie? This difference, therefore, ought at all events to have been taken into account. So, independently of all other causes of depreciation, the government had to encounter a preliminary objection, arising from the fall in the value of land.

So pressing were the exigencies, that promises of mandats were put into circulation, until the mandats themselves should be ready for emission. From the first moment, these promises circulated at a rate inferior to their nominal value. Great alarm ensued the fear was general that the new paper, on which such expectations had been built, was about to fall like the assignats, and leave the republic utterly without resource. There was a cause, however, for this decline, which might be soon remedied. It was requisite to frame instructions for the guidance of the local administrations, with the view of regulating the very complicated cases which must necessarily arise from the sale of domains on simple contract; and this operation required considerable time, and retarded the commencement of the sales. During this interval the mandat fell, and many alleged its value would decline so rapidly that the state would not open the sales at all, and abandon the domains for a nominal equivalent; that the mandats would fare as the assignats before them—they would be depressed to nullity, and then they would be received in payment of domains, not at their emitted but at their sunken value. Malignants thus endeavoured to inculcate that the new paper was a mere decoy, that the domains were never intended to be alienated, and that the republic purposed to reserve them as an ostensible and everlasting pledge for every variety of paper fabrication it might choose to issue. Nevertheless, the sales were opened. Numerous applicants subscribed their names. The mandat of one hundred francs had fallen to fifteen. It rallied successively to thirty, forty, and in some localities to eighty-eight francs. Thus for a while the success of the new operation was confidently anticipated.

It was amidst factions secretly conspiring against it, that the Directory devoted its energies to these arduous toils. The agents of royalty continued their furtive machinations. The death of Lemaitre had not discouraged them. Brottier, having been acquitted, had become the head of the agency; Duverne de Presle, Laville-Heurnois, and Despomelles, were conjoined with him, and formed the clandestine royal committee. These personages possessed no greater influence than in times past: they intrigued, clamoured lustily for money, boasted of numerous correspondences, and promised marvels. They were still the medium of com

munication between the pretender and La Vendée, where they had divers agents. They persisted in their former opinions, and, seeing the insurrection quelled by Hoche and on the point of dying away, they were still more confirmed in the plan of effecting every thing at Paris, by a movement in the interior. They professed, as in the days of the convention, to be in relation with several deputies of the new third; and maintained that the expedient course was to temporise, work upon opinion through journals, disparage the government, and perfect such preparations as might secure the return of deputies essentially counter-revolutionary in the elections of the succeeding year. They thus flattered themselves they should destroy the republican constitution by means of the constitution itself. This plan was undoubtedly the least chimerical they had formed, and is that which gives the most favourable idea of their intelligence.

The patriots, on their part, concocted plots with equal diligence, and, from the means they held at disposal, of a more formidable character. Driven from the Pantheon and completely discountenanced by the government, which had separated from them and dismissed them from their employments, they had declared against it, and become its irreconcilable enemies. Perceiving themselves the objects of vigilant supervision, they had found it necessary to envelop their proceedings in the deepest secrecy, and to observe such arrangements as might keep the leaders of the conspiracy altogether unknown. They had chosen four persons to form a directory of public welfare; Babœuf and Drouet were of the number. This secret directory was intended to communicate with twelve principal agents unacquainted and unconnected with each other, and charged to organise societies of patriots in all the quarters of Paris. These twelve agents, thus acting in their respective circuits, were strictly enjoined not to allow the names of the four members composing the secret directory to transpire; they were instructed to speak and enforce obedience in the name of a mysterious and supreme authority, instituted to direct the efforts of the patriots towards the attainment of *general happiness*, as their ultimate aim was expressed. In this manner the ramifications of the conspiracy were almost impenetrable; for, supposing one of the agents was seized, the others would still remain unknown. This organisation was perfected in accordance with the plan imagined by Babœuf: societies of patriots were formed throughout Paris, which, through the medium of the twelve principal agents, received the impulse of an unknown authority.

Babœuf and his colleagues, meanwhile, canvassed the mode whereby what they called *the deliverance* was to be accomplished, and the parties in whom power should be vested after they had dispatched the Directory, dispersed the councils, and put the people in possession of their sovereignty. They were too doubtful of the provinces and of opinion in general to incur the hazards of an election and to summon a new assembly. They determined, therefore, to nominate one composed of the most trusty Jacobins in each department, the selection to be made by themselves. This assembly they purposed to complete by adding all the Mountaineers of the old convention who had not been re-elected. Yet even these Mountaineers appeared to them deficient in the essential guarantees, for many had adhered, in the latter days of the convention, to what they stigmatised as liberticide measures, and had even accepted offices from the Directory. They finally agreed, however, to allow the admission, into the new assembly, of sixty-eight of those displaced deputies who were deemed the most pure. This assembly was to wield all the powers of government, until the *general happiness* was secured.

In prosecution of these views, it was necessary to enter into communication with the non-elected conventionalists, of whom the greater part were in Paris. Babœuf and Drouet accordingly opened conferences with them. The choice of measures afforded the principal subject of discussion. The conventionalists found those proposed by the insurrectionary directory somewhat too extravagant: their voice was given for the re-establishment of the late convention, with the organisation prescribed by the constitution of 1793. Eventually, the parties came to an understanding, and the insurrection was prepared for the month of Floreal (April-May). The means the secret directory contemplated calling into requisition were truly appalling. In the first place, it held correspondence with the principal towns of France, for the purpose of rendering the projected revolution simultaneous and identical in all quarters. At the appointed time, the patriots were to muster, with banners flying, on which was to be inscribed the following motto:—"*Liberty—Equality—Constitution of* 1793—*General Happiness.*" Whoever should resist the sovereign people was doomed to death. The five directors, certain members of the Five Hundred, and the general of the army of the interior, were preliminarily marked for slaughter. The Luxembourg, the Treasury, the Telegraph, the arsenals, and the depôt of artillery at Meudon, were to be seized. With the view of stimulating the people to rise, and of *no longer feeding them with vain promises*, all the inhabitants in competent circumstances were to be compelled to lodge, clothe, and maintain every man who had taken part in the insurrection. The bakers and wine-dealers were to furnish bread and liquids to the people, receiving an indemnity from the republic, under pain of being hanged at the lantern in case of refusal. Every soldier who should join the ranks of the insurgents was to retain his accoutrements in full ownership, receive a sum of money, and enjoy the privilege of returning to his family. It was hoped that these inducements would gain over all those who served with reluctance. To seduce the soldiers who had an actual partiality for war, the houses of the royalists were offered them for pillage. In order that the armies might be kept at their full complement, and those replaced who should return to their homes, it was intended to confer on recruits such advantages as would infallibly ensure a spontaneous levy of many thousands.

Such were the terrible and desperate schemes contemplated by these infuriated men. They purposed Rossignol, formerly general in La Vendée, to command the Parisian army of insurrection. They had already tampered with the legion of police, which formed part of the army of the interior, and was entirely composed of patriots, gendarmes of the tribunals, and old French guardsmen. The legion, in fact, mutinied, but too prematurely, and was dissolved by the Directory. The minister of police Cochon, who followed the progress of the conspiracy, which was divulged to him by an officer belonging to the army of the interior who had been urged to co-operate therein, allowed it to proceed in order to trace all its ramifications. On the 20th Floreal (9th May), Babœuf, Drouet, and the other leaders and agents, were to meet at the house of a carpenter in the Rue Bleue. Some officers of police, stationed in the environs, seized the conspirators and immediately conducted them to prison. Others apprehended at the same time the ex-conventionalists Laignelot, Vadier, Amar, Ricord, Choudieu, the Piedmontese Buonarotti, Anotenelle, ex-member of the Legislative Assembly, and Lepelletier of Saint-Fargeau, the brother of him who had been assassinated. The Directory applied to the two councils for a decree of accusation against Drouet, who was a member of the Five Hundred, and it consigned the whole band to the high national court, which was not yet organised, but the necessary steps were forthwith taken for that purpose. Babœuf, whose effrontery rivalled his fanaticism, wrote a singular letter to the Directory, which fully pourtrayed the delirious state of his intellect. "I am a power," so he expressed

himself to the five directors; "fear not, therefore, to treat with me as an equal. I am the chief of a formidable sect, which you will not destroy by sending me to death, and which, after my execution, will only be the more incensed and dangerous. You have but one link in the conspiracy; it is nothing your having arrested a few individuals; leaders will continually start up again. Spare yourselves an useless effusion of blood: you have not yet created any great sensation; avoid doing so, and treat with the patriots; they remember you were formerly sincere republicans; they will forgive you, if you will act in concert with them for the welfare of the republic."

The Directory vouchsafed no attention to this extravagant effusion, and ordered the indictments to be preferred. The process must necessarily occupy a lengthened interval, for it was determined to proceed in strict adherence to formalities. This last act of vigour tended most materially to strengthen the Directory in public opinion. The end of winter was approaching; the factions were vigilantly watched and curbed; the administration was directed with zeal and assiduity; the remodelled paper-money alone occasioned disquietude; it had, nevertheless, furnished temporary resources towards the preparations for the campaign about to open. The season for military operations had in fact arrived. The British minister, always astute in his policy, had made the advance to the French government which the general feeling of his nation imposed as a duty. He had instructed his agent in Switzerland, Wickham, to address certain preposterous questions to Barthélemy, the minister of France. This overture, made on the 17th Ventôse (7th March 1796), had for object to demand whether France was disposed to peace, whether she would consent to a congress for the purpose of discussing its conditions, and whether she would intimate in advance the principal bases on which she was resolved to treat. Such a proceeding was merely an idle concession of Pitt to the growing discontent of the British nation, in order to gain a pretext, founded on the refusal of France, for requiring fresh sacrifices. If Pitt had been really sincere, he would not have intrusted this overture to an agent without powers; he would not have demanded an European congress, which, from the complication of questions, must have been engaged in interminable negotiations, and which, moreover, France had already refused to Austria through the medium of Denmark; finally, he would not have inquired on what bases the negotiation was to open, since he was well aware that, according to the constitution, the Austrian Netherlands had become an integral portion of the French territory, which the present government was not competent to detach. The Directory, in no mood to be duped, caused Wickham to be answered, that neither the form nor the object of his communication was of a nature to impress belief in the sincerity of the advance; but, to evince its pacific intentions, it consented to reply to questions that did not merit the condescension, and declared its readiness to treat on the bases fixed by the constitution. This was tantamount to a definitive announcement that France would never renounce Belgium. The letter of the Directory, couched in firm and temperate terms, was forthwith published together with that of Wickham. It presented the first example of a diplomacy at once frank and firm, and free from any vainglorious assumption.

The conduct of the Directory was approved by the whole nation, and on both sides vigorous preparations were made for recommencing hostilities. Pitt solicited from parliament an additional loan of seven millions sterling, and he attempted to negotiate another for the emperor of three millions. He had been for some time past labouring to arouse the King of Prussia from his neutrality, and to drag him again into the contest; he offered him funds, and represented to him that, coming in at the close of the war, when all parties were exhausted, he would wield an incontestible superiority. The King of Prussia, however, too sapient to relapse into his former error, turned a deaf ear to the delusive proposal, and adhered to his neutrality. A part of his army was stationed in Poland, to complete the incorporation of the recent acquisitions; the other was ranged along the Rhine, ready to defend the line of neutrality against either of the powers that should violate it, and to afford protection to such of the states of the empire as should claim the mediation of Prussia. Russia, always profuse in promises, prudently abstained from sending troops, and occupied herself in organising the share of Poland she had taken under her dominion.

Austria, inflated by her successes at the close of the last campaign, prepared for war with zest, and indulged in the most presumptuous hopes. The general to whom she had been indebted for that transient gleam of returning fortune, was nevertheless superseded, despite the lustre of his glory. Clairfayt, having given offence to the Aulic Council, was replaced in the command of the army of the Lower Rhine by the young Archduke Charles, of whom great expectations were formed, without his eminent talents, however, being as yet discerned. He had exhibited, in the preceding campaigns, the qualities of an excellent officer in subordinate commands. Wurmser was still at the head of the army of the Upper Rhine. To confirm the King of Sardinia in his warlike intentions, a considerable reinforcement had been detached to the imperial army battling in Piedmont, and the command conferred on General Beaulieu, who had achieved a high reputation in the Low Countries. Spain, commencing to reap the benefits of peace, had her attention fixed on the impending struggle; and, now more enlightened as to her real interests, offered up vows for the success of France.

The Directory, inspired with all the zeal of a new government, and eager to illustrate its administration, meditated great designs. It had placed the armies in a respectable state as to force; but, whilst forwarding them men, it had been unable to furnish other requisite supplies. All Belgium had been put under contribution to aliment the army of the Sambre-and-Meuse; extraordinary efforts had been necessary to enable that of the Rhine to exist amidst the mountains of the Vosges. Still they were both deficient in the means of transport and in horses for the cavalry, without the utmost exertions of the government being available to repair the evil. The army of the Alps had subsisted on the magazines taken from the Austrians after the battle of Loano; but it was devoid of raiment and shoes, and the pay was in arrear. The victory of Loano had thus remained without result. The armies in the western provinces, owing to the precautions of Hoche, were in a better condition than any of the others, but even they were not provided with all they needed. Yet, notwithstanding this destitution, the French armies, inured to suffering, accustomed to rely on precarious expedients, and thoroughly imbued with the martial spirit in the course of their glorious campaigns, were animated with all the aspirations heralding great achievements.

The Directory contemplated, we say, vast projects. It desired to finish the war of La Vendée before the advance of spring, and subsequently assume the offensive on all points. Its combined aim was to propel the armies on the Rhine into Germany, in order to blockade and besiege Mayence, complete the submission of the princes of the empire, isolate Austria, transport the theatre of the war into the heart of her hereditary dominions, and provide subsistence for the troops, at the expense of the enemy, in the rich valleys of the Maine and the Neckar. With regard to Italy, it cherished yet grander schemes, suggested by General Bonaparte. As the French had not profited by the victory of Loano, they must, according to the views of that officer, gain a second, compel the King of Sardinia

to conclude peace or wrest from him his territories, then cross the Po, and proceed to pluck from Austria the brightest jewel in her crown, Lombardy. That was the decisive field of action; there the most sensible blow was to be inflicted on Austria—an equivalent conquered to requite her surrender of Belgium, peace to be won, and perhaps fair Italy enfranchised. Moreover, the most impoverished of the armies would be nourished and recruited in that most fertile region of the globe.

The Directory, pondering on these ideas, made certain alterations in the command of the armies. Jourdan retained the command he had so well merited of the army of the Sambre-and-Meuse. Pichegru, who had betrayed his country, and whose treason was already suspected, was superseded by Moreau, who commanded in Holland. Pichegru was offered the embassy to Sweden, which he declined. Beurnonville, recently returned from captivity, succeeded Moreau in the command of the French army in Holland. Schérer, whose failure to profit by the victory of Loano had caused dissatisfaction, was superseded. A young enterprising general was needed to prosecute a bold campaign. Bonaparte, who had already distinguished himself in the army of Italy, and who, moreover, manifested so keen a perception of the advantages to accrue from a march beyond the Alps, appeared the most eligible man to replace Schérer. He was accordingly promoted from the command of the army of the interior to that of the army of Italy. He immediately departed to join his troops at Nice. Full of ardour and joy, he said on starting that in a month he would be at Milan or at Paris. Such exuberance might betoken rashness; but in a young soldier, appointed to a hazardous enterprise, it was of good augury.

Equally important changes were effected in the three armies which guarded the insurgent provinces. Hoche, summoned to Paris in order to concert with the Directory a plan calculated to put an end to the civil war, had been received with justly merited favour and the most flattering testimonies of esteem. The Directory, duly estimating the sagacity of his projects, had approved them all; and in order that none might thwart their execution, it had amalgamated the three armies of Cherbourg, Brest, and the West, into one, under the title of the army of the coasts of the ocean, and invested him with the supreme command thereof. It was the principal army belonging to the republic, for it amounted to one hundred thousand men, extended over several provinces, and required in the generalissimo a junction of civil and military powers almost unprecedented. So vast a command was the greatest proof of confidence that could be given to a general. It was assuredly not misplaced in Hoche. Possessing in his twenty-seventh year that rare union of civil and military talents which often proves dangerous to liberty, and even stirred by lofty ambition, he had not that culpable audacity of mind which prompts an illustrious captain to aspire to something beyond the quality of citizen; he was a sincere republican, and rivalled Jourdan in patriotism and disinterestedness. Liberty might applaud his triumphs without fear, and wish him victories in full reliance on his unabated allegiance.

Hoche had scarcely passed a month at Paris. He had hastened his return into La Vendée, in order to consummate the pacification of that country, if possible, by the end of winter or the commencement of spring. His plan of disarmment and pacification was reduced into form and converted into a decree by the Directory. According to this plan, it was arranged that a cordon of disarmment should be extended around all the insurgent provinces, and sweep them successively. Pending their complete pacification, they were subjected to martial law. All the towns were declared in a state of siege. In principle, it was affirmed that the army was to live at the cost of the insurgent country; consequently, Hoche was authorised to collect the taxes and the forced loan, either in kind or in specie, as he might deem fitting, and to form magazines and chests for the use and support of the army. The towns exposed to suffer famine from the hostile determination of the cultivators to keep back supplies, were to be provisioned after military usage, by columns attached to the principal amongst them. Pardon was offered to all the rebels who should lay down their arms. As to the chiefs, they who were taken in actual hostilities were appointed to be shot, whilst they who submitted were to be incarcerated or detained under surveillance in specified towns, or conducted forth of France. The Directory, coinciding with the suggestion of Hoche that La Vendée should be tranquillised before any steps were taken with regard to Brittany, empowered him to terminate his operations on the left bank of the Loire before concentrating his troops on the right bank. So soon as La Vendée was entirely subjugated, a line of disarmment was intended to embrace all Brittany, from Granville even to the Loire, and to move forward, traversing the whole Breton peninsula, to the extremity of Finistère. It was left to the discretion of Hoche to fix the period when the provinces, appearing to him subdued, should be relieved from martial law and restored to the constitutional system.

Hoche, who reached Angers towards the end of Nivôse (mid-January), found his operations sadly deranged during his absence. The success of his plan depending chiefly on the manner in which it was executed, his presence was indispensably requisite. General Willot had supplied the want inefficiently. The line of disarmment had made little progress. Charette had broken it, and passed to the rear. The regular system enjoined for gathering provisions having been ill observed, and the army having often lacked necessaries, it had again relapsed into defective discipline, and committed acts calculated to alienate the inhabitants. Sapinaud, after having attempted an aggression upon Montaigu, as previously recorded, had obtained from General Willot terms of peace so flagrantly absurd as to render their ratification by Hoche impossible. Stofflet, still enacting the prince, and Bernier the prime-minister, incorporated the deserters who fled from Charette, and carried on secret preparations. The towns of Nantes and Angers laboured under a deplorable scarcity. The patriots, chased from the surrounding districts, had taken refuge within their walls, and, filling the clubs, gave vent to the most furious declamations, worthy of Jacobins in their most palmy days. The belief was current that Hoche had been called to Paris to be deprived of his command. Some alleged him to have been superseded as a royalist, others attributed his disgrace to the fact of his being a Jacobin.

His return dispelled all doubts, and retrieved the evils caused by his absence. He reorganised the line of disarmment, stocked the magazines, and provisioned the towns, declaring them all in a state of siege. Authorised henceforth to exercise a military dictatorship, he shut up the Jacobin clubs formed by the refugee patriots, and especially a society known at Nantes under the title of *Chambre Ardente*. He refused to sanction the peace granted to Sapinaud; he caused his country to be occupied, and gave him the option of leaving France or lurking in the woods, under the promise of being shot if taken. He pressed more closely upon Stofflet than before, and recommenced the pursuit of Charette. He confided to Adjutant-General Travot, who combined great intrepidity with all the activity of a marauding partisan, the charge of following Charette with several columns of light infantry and cavalry, with directions to allow him no repose or gleam of hope.

Charette, in fact, hunted day and night, had no chance of escaping. The inhabitants of the Marais, disarmed and watched, could afford him no succours. They had already delivered up seven thousand mus-

kets and more, sundry pieces of ordnance, and forty barrels of powder, so any resumption of arms on their part was almost impossible. Moreover, had their capabilities been ever so ample, inclination would have restrained them, for they found themselves happy in the enjoyment of the tranquillity now assured to them, and shuddered at the thoughts of exposing themselves to fresh devastations. The peasants, indeed, came voluntarily forward to divulge to the republican officers the roads taken by Charette, and the retreats he sought to repose his wearied body for a while; and when they could surprise any of those who accompanied him, they conveyed them to the army. Charette, escorted by scarcely a hundred devoted adherents, and followed by certain females whom he reserved for his private gratifications, still spurned all idea of surrender. Tormented by suspicions, he occasionally put his hosts to death, if the fear of being betrayed by them was suggested to his mind. He is stated to have caused the murder of a parish priest whom he suspected had denounced him to the republicans. Travot more than once encountered him, slew sixty of his men, several of his officers, and amongst the rest his brother. Then there remained around the wandering chief but forty or fifty men.

Whilst Hoche thus harassed Charette without remission, and prosecuted his plan of disarmment, Stofflet suddenly cast his eyes about him in dismay, and became convinced that, encompassed on all sides as he was, when Charette and Sapinaud were destroyed and all the Chouans subjugated, the species of principality he had carved for himself in Upper Anjou must be doomed to speedy annihilation. He held it would be folly to wait until all the royalists were exterminated: so, alleging as his pretext a regulation of Hoche, he again raised the standard of revolt and resumed hostilities. Hoche was at that moment on the banks of the Loire, purposing to visit Calvados, that he might judge in person the state of affairs in Normandy and Brittany. He immediately postponed his journey, and made preparations to overwhelm Stofflet, before his revolt could attain any formidable progress. In truth, he was well pleased that Stofflet himself supplied an opportunity of breaking the pacification. This additional warfare gave him little uneasiness, and enabled him to treat Anjou like the Marais and Brittany. He moved his columns from several points simultaneously—from the Loire, the Layon, and the Sèvre-Nantaise. Stofflet, assailed on all sides, was unable to withstand the shock. The peasants of Anjou were even more sensible to the blessings of peace than those of the Marais; they had not responded to the appeal of their old leader, and had left him to commence the war with the evil-disposed of the district and the emigrants abounding in his camp. Two bands he had mustered were dispersed, and himself obliged, like Charette, to scour the woods. But he had neither the indefatigability nor the dexterity of that chieftain, and his country was fortunately not so well adapted for concealing a troop of fugitive marauders. He was betrayed by his own adherents. Enticed into a farm-house under pretence of a conference, he was seized, pinioned, and delivered to the republicans. We are assured that his faithful minister, the Abbé Bernier, aided and abetted in the treacherous act. The capture of this chief was highly important, from the moral effect it was fitted to produce on the rebellious districts. He was conducted to Angers, and, after undergoing an interrogatory, shot on the 7th Ventôse (26th February), in presence of an immense concourse.

This intelligence caused a transport of joy, giving presage that the civil war would soon terminate in those unfortunate provinces. Hoche, amidst the painful anxieties inseparable from such a system of warfare, was distressed by accumulated annoyances. The royalists, as was to be expected, called him a miscreant and a blood-drinker, although he used legitimate means only to subjugate them; but the patriots themselves tormented him with their calumnies. The refugees of La Vendée and Brittany, whose turbulence he repressed, and whose sloth he crossed by withdrawing from them support when their farms might be safely occupied and tilled, denounced him in virulent terms to the Directory. The authorities of the towns he declared in a state of siege exclaimed against the establishment of the military system, and likewise denounced him. The rural communes, made amenable to penalties for transgressions, or to the military collection of the taxes, also raised the voice of complaint. There was one incessant din of abuse and remonstrance. Hoche, whose disposition was irritable, was several times urged to desperation, and formally demanded his recall. But the Directory refused his application, and soothed him by repeated assurances of unalterable esteem and confidence. It presented him, in the name of the nation, with two superb steeds, a gift not only acceptable as a recompense but prized as an indispensable succour. This young general, who relished the fascinations of pleasure, who was at the head of an army counting one hundred thousand men, and who administered the revenues of several provinces, nevertheless often suffered the extremest privations. His appointments, paid in paper, were valueless. He was devoid of horses, bridles, saddles, and he craved permission to appropriate, reimbursing their worth, six bridles, six saddles, some horse-shoes, a few bottles of rum and loaves of sugar, from the magazines left by the English at Quiberon: an admirable example of delicacy, which the republican generals frequently gave, but which was to become every day more rare, in proportion as the range of conquest extended, and martial virtues gave way before the seductions of abundant spoils and the contamination of courtly habits.

Encouraged by the government, Hoche continued his efforts to consummate his task in La Vendée. An universal pacification now depended solely on the capture of Charette. That chief, reduced to extremities, sent to solicit from Hoche permission to retire into England. Hoche acceded to the request, in accordance with the authority vested in him by the edict of the Directory relative to the chiefs embracing the option of submission. But Charette had made this demand merely for the purpose of obtaining a short respite, and he refused to profit by Hoche's acquiescence. On the other hand, the Directory was averse to extend mercy to Charette, inasmuch as it considered that famous chieftain would always remain a source of disturbance in the district; and it consequently enjoined Hoche to grant him no accommodation. But when Hoche received these fresh instructions, Charette had already avowed that his proposal was a mere feint to gain an interval of repose, and declared that he would accept no pardon from the republicans. He had again committed himself to the mazes of the forests.

It was impossible for Charette much longer to baffle the pursuit of the republicans. Encircled by columns of infantry and cavalry, watched by soldiers disguised as peasants, betrayed by the inhabitants, who desired to preserve their province from devastation, tracked through the woods like a wild beast, he fell on the 2d Germinal (22d March) into an ambuscade laid for him by Travot. Armed to the teeth, and surrounded by a few brave followers who strove to cover him with their bodies, he defended himself like a lion at bay, and finally sunk on the ground weltering from several sabre wounds. He declined to surrender his sword except to the intrepid Travot, who treated him with all the regard due to his indomitable courage. He was conducted to the republican head-quarters, and admitted to the table of Hédouville, chief of the staff. He conversed with great serenity, and manifested no regret for the fate awaiting him. Transferred at first to Angers, he was subsequently removed to Nantes, to yield up his life at the place which had been the

scene of his triumphal entry. He underwent an interrogatory, wherein he replied with fortitude and becoming calmness. He was questioned as to the alleged secret articles in the treaty of La Jaunaye, and he confessed that none existed. He sought neither to palliate his conduct nor to disguise his motives; he avowed that he was the servant of royalty, and that he had laboured with all his force to subvert the republic. He bore himself with dignity and stern indifference. Led to execution amidst a vast assemblage of people, who were not sufficiently generous to forgive him the calamities they had suffered during the civil war, he retained all his composure. He was still covered with blood; he had lost three fingers in his last conflict, and carried his arm in a scarf. His head was bandaged with a kerchief. He refused to allow his eyes to be covered, or to kneel. Remaining erect, he drew his arm from the scarf and gave the signal. He was instantly stretched lifeless. The 9th Germinal marks the date.

Thus ended this celebrated man, whose invincible courage entailed many evils on his country, and who merited distinction in some other and better career. Compromised by the last descent attempted on his coasts, he flung away all idea of peace, and battled to the last with the energy of despair. He evinced, it is affirmed, a vivid resentment against the princes for whom he had struggled, deeming himself cruelly abandoned.

The death of Charette occasioned an exultation as great as could the most signal victory over the Austrians. It decided the suppression of the civil war. Hoche, considering that nothing remained to be done in La Vendée, withdrew the bulk of his troops to move them beyond the Loire and disarm Brittany. He left, nevertheless, a sufficient body of troops to check the isolated marauders who usually survive the termination of civil wars, and to complete the disarming of the country. Before proceeding into Brittany, he had to quell a movement of revolt which occurred in the vicinity of Anjou, towards Berry. It was the occupation of but a few days. He thereafter marched with twenty thousand men into Brittany, and, adhering strictly to his plan, encircled it with a vast cordon, stretching from the Loire to Granville. The unfortunate Chouans were utterly incapable of withstanding so mighty and well-concerted an effort. Scépeaux, between the Vilaine and the Loire, was the first to tender his submission. He delivered up a considerable quantity of arms. In proportion as they were driven towards the ocean, the Chouans became more stubborn. Destitute of ammunition, they fought man to man, with dagger, sword, and bayonet. Ultimately they were hurled to the very shores of the sea. Then Morbihan, which had long been severed from Puisaye, surrendered its arms. The other divisions followed this example one after the other. In a short while all Brittany was subjugated, and Hoche had merely to distribute his hundred thousand men into a multitude of cantonments, to keep watch over the country, and to draw supplies more easily. The task remaining for him to accomplish involved only the cares of administration and police; he required a few months more of mild and able government to allay animosities and re-establish concord. Despite the furious outcries of factions, Hoche was feared, beloved, respected in the provinces, and the royalists began to pardon a republic so worthily represented. The clergy, above all, whose confidence he had studiously laboured to conciliate, were entirely devoted to him, and held him exactly instructed in all he was interested to know. Every thing, therefore, presaged the continuance of peace and the final cessation of calamitous warfare.

England could now no longer rely on the western provinces as the means of assailing the republic in its vital parts. She beheld, on the contrary, an army of 100,000 men arrayed on their coasts, whereof 50,000 had become disposable, and might be employed in some enterprise of fatal moment to herself. Hoche, in fact, meditated a grand design, which he reserved for the middle of summer. The government, grateful for the services he had just rendered, and desirous of compensating him for the repulsive duties he had so magnanimously performed, prompted the legislature to proclaim, in solemn edict, as for armies which gained great victories, that the army of the ocean and its general had deserved well of the country.

Thus La Vendée was pacified by the month of Germinal, before any of the armies had taken the field. The Directory was at liberty to attend without disquietude to its stupendous operations abroad, and even to draw, in emergency, useful reinforcements from the coasts of the ocean.

CHAPTER XLVII.


CAMPAIGN OF 1796.—CONQUEST OF PIEDMONT AND LOMBARDY BY GENERAL BONAPARTE.—BATTLES OF MONTENOTTE AND MILLESIMO.—PASSAGE OF THE BRIDGE OF LODI.—MILITARY OPERATIONS IN THE NORTH.—BATTLES OF RADSTADT AND ETTLINGEN.—THE ARMY OF ITALY ON THE ADIGE AND THE DANUBE.


The fifth campaign of liberty was on the eve of commencement. It was appointed to open on the finest military theatres in Europe—on the most varied in impediments, in accidents of conformation, in lines of defence and attack. On the one hand were the great valley of the Rhine and the two transversal valleys of the Maine and the Neckar; on the other were the Alps, the Po, and Lombardy. The armies to be ranged under the banners of the republic were more perfectly inured to war than any ever mustered in arms; they were sufficiently numerous to occupy the ground on which they were to act, but not sufficiently so to render combinations needless, and reduce the war to a mere torrent of invasion. They were commanded by young generals, free from the trammels of antiquated routine, free from slavish adherence to long-descended traditions, but instructed, nevertheless, and glowing with the enthusiasm aroused by mighty circumstances. All combined, therefore, to ensure a struggle, obstinate, varied, fertile in combinations, and fitted to absorb the contemplation of men.

The design of the French government, as we have intimated, was to invade Germany, for the purpose of subsisting its armies in the enemy's country, detaching the princes of the empire from the coalition, investing Mayence, and menacing the hereditary states of Austria. It purposed, at the same time, to attempt a bold experiment in Italy, with the view of nourishing its troops on that fertile soil and wresting it from the grasp of the house of Hapsburg.

Two superb armies, of seventy to eighty thousand men each, were confided to two celebrated commanders on the Rhine. Thirty thousand famished soldiers were abandoned to a young man, unknown, but of daring mind, to tempt fortune beyond the Alps.

Bonaparte reached the head-quarters at Nice on the 6th Germinal year 4 (26th March). He found every thing in a deplorable state. The troops were in the last condition of misery. In rags and shoeless, penniless, and often destitute of food, they still bore up with marvellous courage against their accumulated sufferings. Thanks to that active, industrious spirit which characterises the French soldier, they had organised a system of foraging, and descended in alternate bands into the plains of Piedmont to gather provisions. An absolute deficiency of horses for the artillery existed. The cavalry, for the convenience of pasturage, had been sent to the rear on the banks of the Rhone. The thirtieth horse and the forced loan had not been levied in the southern departments, on account of the troubles prevailing. The whole resources placed at the disposal of Bonaparte consisted of two thousand


Arco
Rivi
Torbole
Mori
Ala
Rocca d'Anfo
LAGO DI GARDA
la Corona
Rivalta
Salo
Caprino
Bois
Dolce
Pezzena
Rivoli
la Chiusa
Gavardo
Chiese R.
Toscolano
Desenzano
Pt. S. Marco
Lonato
Peschiera
Monte Chiaro
Pozzolengo
Castelnuovo
Bussolengo
Pol
R. Adige
Tomba
S. Giovanni Lupatoto
Villa franca
Castiglione di Stiviere
Solferino
Cavriana
Borghetto
Vallegio
Medole
Guidizzolo
R. Mincio
Goito
Roverbella
Isola della scala
Cagliara
Due Castelli
Cittadella
la Favorita
Castellaro
Castellucchio
S. Giorgio
Pradella
MANTUA
Marcaria
Ospitaletto
Cerese
Pietole
Villimpenta
SERAGLIO
Governolo
Borgoforte
R. Po


MAP
OF THE SEAT OF WAR
BETWEEN THE MINCIO & THE ADIGE
to illustrate the Campaign of
1796.
Primolano
R. Brenta
BASSANO
Marostica
S OF TYROL
R. BACCHIGLIONE
VICENZA
Monte Bello
Soave
Caldiero
Villa Nova
Poveil
S. Bonifacio
LONIGO
Arcole
S. Gregorio
Albaredo
COLOGNA
MONTAGNANA
ESTE
Monselice
Anghiari
Cerea
LEGNAGO
Vangaizza
RIVER ADIGE
RIVER PO

louis in gold and a million in bills, whereof a part had been already protested. To retrieve affairs in some degree, a negotiation had been opened with the Genoese government. The French had not yet received any satisfaction for the outrage committed on the frigate *La Modeste;* and, in reparation of that violation of neutrality, they demanded, on the part of the senate of Genoa, the advance of a loan and the surrender of the fortress of Gavi, which commanded the road from Genoa to Milan. They likewise insisted on the recall of the Genoese families expatriated for their attachment to France.

Such was the situation of the army when Bonaparte arrived to assume the command. It presented a very different aspect with reference to men. They were, for the most part, soldiers hurried to the armies at the period of the national levy, in vigorous manhood, perfectly disciplined, accustomed to privations, and hardened to war in the rugged conflicts amid the heights and gorges of the Alps and Pyrenees. The generals partook the qualities of their soldiers. The principal were Massena, a young Nissard, of uncultivated mind, but of quick and accurate perception amidst dangers, and of indomitable tenacity; Augereau, formerly a fencing-master, whom eminent valour and the art of animating soldiers had carried to the highest grades; Laharpe, an expatriated Swiss, in whom courage was combined with information; Serrurier, a major of the olden time, methodical and brave; lastly, Berthier, whom his activity, his precision in arranging details, his topographical erudition, his rapidity of measurement with the eye, either as to the extent of particular ground or to the numerical force of a column, eminently adapted for the post of chief of the staff.

This army had its depôts in Provence. It was ranged along the chain of the Alps, connected by its left with the forces under Kellermann, guarding the Col di Tende, and extending towards the Apennines. The active army amounted to upwards of thirty-six thousand men. Serrurier's division was stationed at Garessio, beyond the Apennines, watching the Piedmontese in their intrenched camp of Ceva. The divisions of Augereau, Massena, and Laharpe, forming a mass of about thirty thousand men, were on this side the Apennines.

The Piedmontese, to the number of twenty or twenty-two thousand men, and under the orders of Colli, were encamped at Ceva, on the reverse of the mountains. The Austrians, thirty-six or thirty-eight thousand strong, were advancing by the routes from Lombardy towards Genoa. Beaulieu, who commanded them, had achieved distinction in Flanders. He was a veteran burning with all the ardour of youth. The enemy, therefore, could oppose about sixty thousand soldiers to the thirty thousand that Bonaparte had to place in line; but the Austrians and Piedmontese were weakened by discord. Agreeably to the old plan, Colli's object was to cover Piedmont, Beaulieu's to maintain his communication with Genoa and the English.

Such the respective force of the two parties. Although Bonaparte was already favourably known to the army of Italy, in the camp his appointment to the command at so early an age gave rise to many rude comments. Stunted and attenuated in form, with nothing striking but his Roman features and a piercing, sparkling eye, neither his person nor his past life presented much to dazzle the minds of men. He was received with comparative coldness. Massena already bore him ill-will, for having acquired a paramount influence over Dumerbion, in 1794. Bonaparte, however, addressed his army in energetic and inspiriting language. "Soldiers," he said, "you are half-starved and almost wholly naked. The government owes you much, but can do nothing for you. Your patience and courage are honourable to you, but they procure you neither advantage nor glory. I am about to lead you into the most fertile valleys of the world; you will there find flourishing cities and teeming provinces; you will there reap honour, glory, and riches. Soldiers of Italy, will you lack courage?" The army hailed this language with beaming pleasure: young officers, who all had their fortunes yet to carve, adventurous and needy soldiers, asked nothing better than to behold those fair regions thus temptingly indicated. Bonaparte completed an arrangement with a purveyor, and procured for his troops a part of the pay so far in arrear. He distributed to each of his generals four louis in gold, whereby the state of the finances at that time may be estimated. He afterwards transferred his head-quarters to Albenga, and drew all the services along the shore, exposed to the fire of the English gunboats.

The plan to follow was the same which had so forcibly offered itself the previous year on occasion of the battle of Loano. To penetrate by the lowest ridge of the Apennines, and separate the Austrians from the Piedmontese, by strongly deploying on their centre, was the simple idea suggested to Bonaparte on a view of the localities. He commenced operations so promptly, that he indulged hopes of surprising the enemy, and throwing him into disorder. However, he failed in his purpose of anticipating him. Before his arrival, General Cervoni had been pushed on Voltri, near to Genoa, in order to intimidate the senate of that city, and constrain it to acquiesce in the demands of the Directory. Beaulieu, dreading the result of this movement, hastened to enter on action, and marched his army on Genoa, partly on one flank, partly on the other flank of the Apennines. Bonaparte's plan, therefore, was still feasible, except so far as the intention of surprising the Austrians was concerned. Several routes conducted from the back of the Apennines to their maritime flank; first that leading by the Bocchetta to Genoa, next that of Acqui and Dego, which crosses the Apennines by the ridge of Montenotte, and opens into the basin of Savona. Beaulieu left his right wing at Dego, moved his centre, under Argenteau, towards the height of Montenotte, and proceeded in person, with his left, by the Bocchetta and Genoa, on Voltri, skirting the sea. Thus, his position was that of Dewins at Loano. A part of the Austrian army was between the Apennines and the sea; the centre, under Argenteau, was on the very summit of the Apennines at Montenotte, connected with the Piedmontese encamped at Ceva, on the other side of the mountain chain.

The two armies, breaking ground at the same time, came into collision on the road, on the 22d Germinal (11th April.) Upon the coast, Beaulieu encountered the vanguard of Laharpe's division, which had been detached on Voltri to alarm Genoa, and repulsed it. Argenteau, with the centre, traversed the ridge of Montenotte, intending to fall at Savona upon the centre of the French army during its supposed march on Genoa. He found at Montenotte only Colonel Rampon, at the head of 1200 men, and obliged him to take refuge in the old redoubt of Montelegino, which barred the route from Montenotte. This intrepid colonel, feeling the importance of the threatened post, intrenched himself in the redoubt, and resisted with determined obstinacy all the efforts of the Imperialists. Thrice he was attacked by the whole Austrian infantry, and thrice he repelled its assault. Amidst the most murderous fire, he made his soldiers swear to die in the redoubt rather than abandon it. The soldiers took the oath, and remained all night under arms. This act of heroism averted the derangement of General Bonaparte's plans, and perhaps the failure of the entire campaign.

Bonaparte was at this moment at Savona. He had not intrenched the height of Montenotte, because, when the resolution is taken to assume the offensive, such a proceeding is rarely necessary. He was speedily apprised of what had occurred during the day at

Montelegino and Voltri. He instantly discerned that the moment was come for putting his plan in execution, and he manœuvred accordingly. During the same night he drew back his right, formed by Laharpe's division, which had been engaged with Beaulieu along the coast, and moved it, by the route to Montenotte, in front of Argenteau. He directed Augereau's division on the same point, to support Laharpe. Finally, he ordered Massena to march by a by-path over the Apennines, so as to plant himself on the rear of Argenteau. On the 23d (12th April), by dawn, all his columns were in motion. Stationed on an elevated point, he beheld Laharpe and Augereau marching on Argenteau, whilst Massena, winding along the chain, struggled to attain his rear. The Austrian infantry resisted with courage; but, enveloped on all sides by superior forces, it was put to flight, leaving two thousand prisoners, and several hundreds of dead and wounded. It retreated in disorder on Dego, where the remainder of the army was located.

Thus Bonaparte, to whom Beaulieu attributed the design of defiling along the coast on Genoa, had suddenly diverged, and, pouring up the roads traversing the Apennines, had broken the Austrian centre, and debouched victoriously beyond the rampart of the mountains.

Bonaparte deemed it of little moment to have overwhelmed the enemy's centre, unless the Austrians were definitively separated from the Piedmontese. That very day (23d) he advanced to Carcare, in order to render his position more central between the two allied armies. He was in the valley of the Bormida, which flows south through Italy. Lower down, confronting him, at the bottom of the valley, were the Austrians, who had rallied at Dego, guarding the route by Acqui into Lombardy. On his left, he had the gorges of Millesimo, which join the valley of the Bormida, and in which were stationed the Piedmontese, guarding the route by Ceva into Piedmont. Thus, on his left he required to force the gorges of Millesimo, in order to open the route to Piedmont, and in front to carry the position of Dego, in order to gain possession of the route by Acqui, conducting into Lombardy. Then, master of the two routes, he would irrevocably separate the allies, and be enabled at will to fall upon either. On the morning of the following day (13th April), he moved his army forward: Augereau, on the left, attacked Millesimo, whilst the divisions of Massena and Laharpe advanced into the valley on Dego. The impetuous Augereau assailed the gorges of Millesimo with such vigour, that he forced their entrance, won his way through them, and gained their extremity, before General Provera, who was planted on a height, had time to fall back. That commander was posted in the ruins of the castle of Cossaria. Perceiving himself surrounded, he prepared to defend his position; Augereau encircled it, and summoned him to surrender. Provera attempted to parley and open a negotiation. It was important not to be delayed by this obstacle, and the French immediately mounted to the assault of his post. The Piedmontese hurled a deluge of stones on their heads, rolled down immense fragments of rock, and crushed whole lines. Nevertheless, the brave Joubert animated his soldiers, and scaled the height at their head. Arrived within a short distance, he fell pierced by a bullet. At this accident, the soldiers recoiled. The French were compelled to encamp in the evening at the foot of the height; they threw up intrenchments of fallen trees, and kept watch during the night to prevent the escape of Provera. Meanwhile, the divisions charged to act in the bottom of the valley of the Bormida had marched on Dego, and carried the approaches. The next day was to witness the decisive struggle.

On the 25th (14th April), accordingly, the attack was renewed on all points. On the left, Augereau, in the gorge of Millesimo, repulsed all the efforts made by Colli to disengage Provera, fought the whole day, and reduced Provera to despair. That general at length laid down his arms at the head of 1500 men. Laharpe and Massena, on their side, fell on Dego, where the Austrian army had been reinforced, during the 22d and 23d, by the corps recalled from Genoa. The assault was terrific; after several charges, Dego was stormed. The Austrians lost a part of their artillery, and left 4000 prisoners, of whom twenty-four were officers.

During this action, Bonaparte had remarked a young officer, named Lannes, mounting to the breach with extraordinary intrepidity: he made him colonel on the field of battle.

The army had been now engaged for four days, and it stood in need of repose. Scarcely, however, had the soldiers rested from the fatigues of fighting, ere the din of arms was again heard. Six thousand grenadiers entered Dego, and wrested from the French that position which it had cost them such efforts to conquer. It proved to be one of the Austrian corps which had remained on the maritime flank of the Apennines, and which were now repassing the mountains. The disorder was so great, that this corps had fallen, without suspecting it, into the midst of the French army The gallant Wukassovich, who commanded these six thousand grenadiers, deeming his only hope of safety to rest on a bold surprise, had attacked and carried Dego. Hence it became necessary to renew the battle and repeat the efforts of the previous day. Bonaparte galloped to the spot, rallied his columns, and propelled them on Dego. They were checked by the Austrian grenadiers; but they returned to the charge, and, inspirited by Adjutant-General Lanusse, who raised his hat on the point of his sword, they re-entered Dego, and recovered their conquest, making several hundred prisoners.

Thus Bonaparte was master of the valley of the Bormida. The Austrians fled towards Acqui on the road to Milan; the Piedmontese, after having lost the gorges of Millesimo, retired on Ceva and Mondovi. He was in possession of all the avenues, had taken nine thousand prisoners, and spread consternation before him. Skilfully manœuvring the mass of his forces, and bearing it now on Montenotte, now on Millesimo and Dego, he had on every occasion overwhelmed his foe, by rendering himself superior on each individual point. The moment was come for deciding his future course. The plan sketched by Carnot enjoined him to neglect the Piedmontese and hasten after the Austrians. Bonaparte considered the Piedmontese army too formidable to be left on his rear; he felt, moreover, that another blow would suffice to destroy it; and he deemed his more prudent course was to consummate the ruin of the Piedmontese. Accordingly, he abstained from further entangling himself in the valley of the Bormida or descending towards the Po, in the track of the Austrians; he diverged to the left, plunged into the gorges of Millesimo, and followed the route to Piedmont. The division under Laharpe alone was appointed to remain in the camp of San-Benedetto, commanding the course of the Belbo and the Bormida, in order to observe the Austrians. The French soldiers were exhausted with fatigue; they had fought on the 22d and 23d at Montenotte, on the 24th and 25th at Millesimo and Dego, lost and retaken Dego on the 26th, enjoyed the 27th only as a day of rest, and were now, on the 28th, again in full march on Mondovi. Amidst these rapid movements, there had been no time for making regular distributions; they were destitute of food, and had given way to some acts of pillage. Bonaparte, indignant at this breach of discipline, punished the pillagers with the utmost rigour, and exhibited equal energy in repressing disorders as in pursuing the enemy. He had acquired in these few days the entire confidence of his soldiers. The generals of division were subdued. They heard with attention, already with ad-

miration, the concise and graphic language of the young captain. From the heights of Monte-Zemoto, which it was necessary to clear in order to reach Ceva, the army beheld the smiling plains of Piedmont and Italy. It contemplated, flowing in their tranquil beds, the Tanaro, the Stura, the Po, and all the streams which meander towards the Adriatic; it discerned in the background the majestic Alps girdled with snow; it was seized with rapture as it gazed on the alluring expanse of *the promised land*.* Bonaparte was at the head of his soldiers: he felt a lively emotion. "Hannibal," he exclaimed, "crossed the Alps; we have turned them!" In this short phrase stood the whole campaign revealed. How bright the destinies that then dawned upon France!

Colli defended the intrenched camp of Ceva only long enough to retard for a moment the march of the French. That excellent officer had contrived to re-invigorate his troops and to restore their drooping courage. He no longer indulged the hope of defeating his redoubtable opponent; but he determined to contest his retreat inch by inch, and to afford the Austrians time to come to his succour by a circuitous march, in performance of the promise they had given. He paused behind the Cursaglia, in front of Mondovi. Serrurier, who, at the commencement of the campaign, had been left at Garessio to observe Colli, had now rejoined the main army. Thus it gained an additional division. Colli was protected by the Cursaglia, a deep and rapid river, which sweeps into the Tanaro. Joubert attempted to pass it on the right, but he was nearly drowned without succeeding in his object. In the centre, Serrurier endeavoured to cross the bridge of Saint-Michel. He succeeded; but Colli, allowing him to advance, fell upon him unawares with his best troops, drove him back on the bridge, and compelled him to repass the river in disorder. The position of the army became disquieting. It had in the rear Beaulieu, who was reorganising his forces; it was of essential moment to reach Colli with the utmost dispatch. Nevertheless, the position seemed almost impregnable, if it were vigorously defended. Bonaparte ordered a fresh attack for the morrow. On the 2d Floreal (21st April), the French marched to the brink of the Cursaglia, and found the bridges abandoned. Colli had resisted on the eve merely to delay the retreat. He was surprised in line at Mondovi. Serrurier decided the victory by the capture of the principal redoubt, that of La Bicoque. Colli left three thousand men killed or prisoners on the field, and continued his retreat. Bonaparte arrived at Cherasco, a place weakly defended, but important from its situation at the conflux of the Stura and Tanaro, and easily fortified with the artillery taken from the enemy. In this position, Bonaparte was twenty leagues from Savona, his point of departure, ten from Turin, and fifteen from Alessandria.

Great was the confusion in the councils of Turin. The king, who was stubborn in temper, repudiated the idea of yielding. The ministers of England and Austria besieged him with exhortations, urging him to shut himself up in Turin, to send his army beyond the Po, and thus to imitate the great examples of his ancestors. They strove to alarm him by depicting the revolutionary influence the French would exercise in Piedmont; they demanded for Beaulieu the three fortresses of Tortona, Alessandria, and Valenza, in order that he might intrench and defend himself in the triangle which they form with the barrier of the Po. This proposal was extremely repugnant to the feelings of the king. To surrender into the hands of his ambitious neighbour in Lombardy the three principal strongholds of his dominions, was an insupportable idea. Cardinal Costa prevailed upon him to throw himself into the arms of the French. He pointed out to him the impossibility of withstanding so rapid a conqueror, the danger of exasperating him by a prolonged resistance, and the probability of thereby driving him to revolutionise Piedmont—and all to serve the alien and even antagonist ambition of Austria. The king acquiesced in the justice of these observations, and directed overtures to be made, through the medium of Colli, to the French general. These reached Cherasco on the 4th Floreal (23d April). Bonaparte had no powers to sign a peace; but he was competent to grant an armistice, and he determined to act upon that authority. He had contravened the plan of the Directory in order to complete the reduction of the Piedmontese; but, at the same time, he had no intention of conquering Piedmont, his object being simply to secure his rear. To subjugate Piedmont, he must have taken Turin, and he had neither the necessary battering train, nor forces sufficient to form a blockading corps and leave an active army disposable. Besides, the catastrophe of the campaign would then have sunk into a mere siege. By concluding an agreement with Piedmont, under essential guarantees, he would be enabled to pursue the Austrians in security, and drive them forth of Italy. There were those about him who held that no conditions ought to be granted; that a king, the kinsman of the Bourbons, should be at all hazards dethroned, and the French revolution diffused through Piedmont. Such, indeed, were the opinions of many soldiers, officers, and generals in the army, and especially of Augereau, who was born in the Faubourg Saint-Antoine, and had inhaled all its sentiments. Bonaparte thought differently; he comprehended the difficulty of revolutionising a monarchy firmly based on military principles, and wherein old habits and ideas had remained stagnant for ages; he deemed it of infinite moment to clear all obstructions from his progress; in short, his great aim was to achieve the rapid conquest of Italy, which depended on the annihilation of the Austrians and their expulsion beyond the Alps. He was determined, therefore, to avoid aught that might complicate his situation or retard his onward course.

Accordingly, he consented to an armistice. But in conceding this favour he added, that, considering the respective positions of the armies, an armistice would be fatal to him, unless certain guarantees were given him for the safety of his rear; in consequence, he demanded the delivery into his hands of the three fortresses of Coni, Tortona, and Alessandria, with all the magazines they contained, which should be taken for the service of the army, reserving the repayment for subsequent stipulation with the republic. He insisted, moreover, that the routes through Piedmont should be thrown open to the French, which would considerably abridge the distance from France to the banks of the Po; that stores should be accumulated on such routes for the use of the troops passing along them; and, lastly, that the Sardinian army should be dispersed into garrisons, in such a manner as to obviate all apprehensions on the part of the French army. These conditions were accepted, and the armistice was signed at Cherasco, on the 9th Floreal (28th April), with Colonel Lacoste and the Count Latour.

It was agreed that plenipotentiaries should immediately depart for Paris, in order to negotiate a definitive treaty. The three fortresses specified were surrendered, with immense magazines. From that moment, the army had its line of operation covered by the three strongest fortifications in Piedmont; it had sure and commodious roads, much shorter than those passing by the Genoese coast, and provisions in abundance; it was reinforced by many soldiers, who, on the cheering reports of victory, hurried from the hospitals; it possessed a numerous artillery, captured at Cherasco and in different places, and horses in great number; in short, it was provided with every thing it could desire, and the promises of the general were

* An expression of Bonaparte.

amply redeemed. During the first days of its entry into Piedmont, it had pillaged, because, in its rapid marches, it had received no distributions of food. Plenty reigning instead of destitution, order was restored. The Count de Saint-Marsan, the Piedmontese minister, visited Bonaparte, and ingratiated himself in his good opinion; even the son of the king journeyed to behold the young conqueror, and testified his esteem with a cordiality that affected him. Bonaparte adroitly repaid the flatteries he received; he sought to dispel alarm as to the intentions of the Directory and the impending danger of revolution. He was sincere in his protestations, for he already cherished an idea, which he partially allowed to transpire in his different conferences. Piedmont had derogated from all her interests when allying herself to Austria; it was to France she ought to cling—to France which was her natural friend; for France, separated from Piedmont by the Alps, could never harbour designs hostile to her independence; on the contrary, it would defend her against the ambition of Austria, and perhaps even procure her aggrandisement. Bonaparte could not promise that the Directory would consent to give any part of Lombardy to Piedmont; for it was not yet subjugated, and the purpose which rendered its conquest desirable was to obtain possession of an equivalent for the cession of the Austrian Netherlands; but vague anticipations of aggrandisement might dispose Piedmont to join in alliance with France, which would thereby gain a reinforcement of twenty thousand excellent troops. He gave no distinct pledges, but he understood how to stimulate, by a few artful hints, the cupidity and hopes of the cabinet of Turin.

Bonaparte, who joined to a mind of the most positive order a strong and brilliant imagination, and who loved to stir emotions, adopted a novel and impressive mode of announcing his successes: he sent his aid-de-camp Murat to make a solemn tender to the Directory of twenty-one banners he had taken from the enemy. He subsequently addressed to his soldiers the following proclamation:—

"Soldiers!—In fifteen days you have gained six victories, taken twenty-one standards, fifty-five pieces of cannon, several fortified places, and conquered the richest part of Piedmont. You have made fifteen thousand prisoners,* slain or wounded more than ten thousand men. You had hitherto contended for sterile rocks, illustrated by your courage, but useless to the country; you now rival by your achievements the armies of Holland and the Rhine. Devoid of all aids, you have shown how to dispense with them. You have won battles without artillery, you have passed rivers without bridges, made forced marches without shoes, bivouacked without brandy and often without bread. Republican phalanxes, the soldiers of liberty, were alone capable of enduring what you have suffered: all praise be rendered unto you, soldiers! A grateful country will owe to you its prosperity; and if, as conquerors of Toulon, you heralded the immortal campaign of 1793, your present victories presage one still more glorious. The two armies which formerly attacked you with bold assurance, fly panic-struck before you; the malignant men who derided your misery and rejoiced in prognostications of the triumphs of your enemies, are confounded and struck with trepidation. But, soldiers, you have done nothing, whilst any thing remains to be done. Neither Turin nor Milan is yours: the ashes of Tarquin's conquerors are still trampled by the assassins of Basseville! Is it true there are some amongst you whose courage slackens—who would prefer returning to the peaks of the Apennines and the Alps? No, I will not believe it. The victors of Montenotte, of Millesimo, of Dego, of Mondovi, burn to carry yet farther the glory of the French nation!"

As tidings of these events, these trophies and proclamations, arrived successively at Paris, the feeling of joy rose to exuberance. One day announced a victory which opened the Apennines and gave two thousand prisoners; another, a more decisive victory, which severed the Piedmontese from the Austrians, and gave six thousand prisoners. The following days brought still more propitious intelligence—the destruction of the Piedmontese army at Mondovi, the submission of Piedmont at Cherasco, and the certainty of an approaching peace, the sure harbinger of others. The rapidity of the success, the number of the prisoners, surpassed all that had been yet witnessed. The language of the proclamations, glowing with the reminiscences of antiquity, electrified the imagination. Men, marvelling, asked each other whence came this young general, whose name, known to certain appreciators and unknown to France, now burst forth with such sudden lustre. It was yet strange in their ears; and fervid congratulations were exchanged that the republic thus beheld new talents emerging daily to glorify and defend it. The councils three several times resolved, by solemn edicts, that the army of Italy had deserved well of the country, and decreed a festival to Victory, in celebration of the auspicious commencement of the campaign. The aid-de-camp detached by Bonaparte presented the banners to the Directory. The ceremony was singularly imposing. On the same day several foreign ambassadors were received, and the government appeared encircled with a new halo of consideration.

Piedmont subdued, General Bonaparte was free to march in pursuit of the Austrians, and advance to the conquest of Italy. The victories of the French had profoundly agitated the populations of that country. Circumstances rendered it of essential moment that he who was about to enter it, at the head of an invading army, should possess the qualities of an able politician as well as those of a great captain, to act with the requisite prudence. It is known how Italy presents itself to one coming from the Apennines. The Alps, the highest mountains of Europe, after describing a vast semicircle, within which they enclose Upper Italy, return upon themselves, and abruptly shoot in an oblique line towards the south, thus forming a long peninsula bathed by the Adriatic and the Mediterranean. Bonaparte, arriving from the west, and having cleared the chain at the point where it begins to dwindle, and continues, under the name of the Apennines, to vein the peninsula, had in front the fertile semicircle of Upper Italy, and on his right the long and narrow peninsula which constitutes Lower Italy. A number of petty states divided that country, which has always sighed after union, without which there can never be a great national existence.

Bonaparte had traversed the territories of Genoa, which are situated on this side the Apennines, and advanced into Piedmont, which lies beyond. Genoa, an ancient republic, founded by Doria, had alone, of all the Italian governments, preserved the traces of former energy. Planted between the two belligerent armies for the last four years, it had contrived to maintain its neutrality, and had thus secured all the advantages of commerce. It contained, in its capital and on the coast, nearly one hundred thousand inhabitants; it usually supported a force of from three to four thousand troops; in emergency it could arm the peasants of the Apennines, and thereby muster an excellent militia; in fine, it enjoyed large revenues. Two parties divided it: the party opposed to France held the superiority, and had expelled several families. The Directory purposed to demand the recall of those families, and an indemnity for the outrage committed on the French frigate *La Modeste*.

On quitting Genoa, and proceeding to the right into the peninsula, along the southern range of the Apennines, first appears Tuscany, a happy region, stretching on both sides of the Arno, basking under the most genial of climates, and reposing in one of the best

* Ten or eleven thousand only.

sheltered parts of Italy. A portion of this district formed the small republic of Lucca, peopled by one hundred and forty thousand inhabitants; the remainder constituted the grand-dutchy of Tuscany, recently governed by the Archduke Leopold, and now by the Archduke Ferdinand. In this country, the most enlightened and polished of Italy, the philosophy of the eighteenth century had mildly germinated. Leopold had distinguished his rule by admirable legislative reforms, and attempted with success experiments the most honourable to humanity. The Bishop of Pistoia had even commenced a species of religious reform, by propagating the Jansenist doctrines. Although the French revolution had alarmed the gentle and timid minds of Tuscany, yet it was there that France had the most appreciators and friends. The archduke, albeit an Austrian, had been one of the first potentates in Europe to acknowledge the republic. He possessed a million of subjects, six thousand troops, and a revenue of fifteen millions. Unfortunately, Tuscany, of all the Italian principalities, was the least capable of defending itself.

After Tuscany come the states of the Church. The provinces subjected to the Pope, extending on both flanks of the Apennines, reaching from the Mediterranean to the Adriatic, were the worst administered in Europe. They had merely their excellent system of agriculture, handed down from remote tradition, which is common to all Italy, and supplies the wealth of manufacturing industry, long banished from its confines. Excepting in the legations of Bologna and Ferrara, where a profound contempt prevailed for the government of priests, and at Rome, the ancient seat of learning and of arts, where a few nobles had imbibed the philosophy of their class throughout Europe, the human intellect had remained in the most disgraceful barbarism. A superstitious and savage multitude, lazy and ignorant monks, composed the population of two millions and a half of subjects. The army consisted of four or five thousand soldiers, of what quality it is unnecessary to mention. The reigning pope, an arrogant personage, fond of magnificence, jealous of his authority and of that of the holy see, entertained an inveterate antipathy to the philosophy of the eighteenth century; he thought to redeem for the chair of St Peter a portion of its former influence by displaying an extraordinary pomp, and he extended his patronage to works calculated to advance the arts. Relying on the sanctity of his person and the fascination of his eloquence, which was great, he had formerly undertaken a journey to the court of Joseph II., to confirm his wavering faith in the doctrines of the church, and to exorcise the philosophy which seemed unhappily to have taken root in the mind of that prince. That journey had not proved particularly propitious. The pontiff, seized with holy horror at the French revolution, had launched an anathema against it, and preached a crusade; he had even suffered the assassination of the French agent, Basseville, in the city of Rome itself. Instigated by the monks, his subjects partook his hatred against France, and imprecated with fanatical frenzy on learning the success of her arms.

The extremity of the peninsula and Sicily compose the kingdom of Naples—the most powerful in Italy, the most analogous, by ignorance and barbarism, to the states of the Church, and even worse governed, if it were possible. There reigned a Bourbon, a soft and imbecile prince, devoted to a single object of solicitude—fishing. That pursuit absorbed all his time, and whilst he gave himself madly to the gratification of this darling passion, the government of his kingdom was abandoned to his wife, an Austrian princess, the sister of Marie-Antoinette, Queen of France. This princess, capricious and dissolute, had a favourite suborned by the English, the minister Acton, and therefore conducted affairs in the most insensate manner. England, whose policy was always directed to gain a footing on the continent, by swaying the petty states bordering on the sea, had attempted to spread her enthralling patronage over Naples, as she had long done in Portugal and Holland. She stimulated the hatred of the queen against France, and inflamed her moreover with the ambition of preponderating supremely in Italy. The population of the kingdom of Naples amounted to 6,000,000. The army counted 60,000 men; but, very different from the brave and docile soldiers of Piedmont, the Neapolitan soldiers, true lazzaroni, without cohesion and without discipline, were characterised by the usual cowardice of armies devoid of organisation. The court of Naples had always promised to add 30,000 men to the army of Dewins, but had dispatched only 2400 cavalry, a well-mounted and sufficiently creditable troop.

Such were the principal states situated in the peninsula to the right of Bonaparte. Confronting him, in the semicircle of Upper Italy, his eye first embraced, on the slope of the Apennines, the dutchy of Parma, Placentia, and Guastalla, comprising 500,000 inhabitants, supporting 3000 men under arms, furnishing four millions of revenue, and governed by a Spanish prince, an old pupil of Condillac, but who, despite the soundness of his education, had fallen under the yoke of priests and monks. A little farther to the right, still on the slope of the Apennines, appeared the dutchy of Modena, Reggio, and Mirandola, containing a population of 400,000 souls, maintaining a standing army of 6000 men, and groaning under the authority of the last descendant of the illustrious house of Este. This morbid prince had conceived such dread of the spirit of the age, that he had become a prophet through the pure force of fear, and had foretold the revolution. His predictions were now cited. Actuated by his deadly terrors, he had resolved to fortify himself against the strokes of fortune, and had amassed immense wealth by grinding his dominions. Avaricious and timid, he was held in contempt by his subjects, who are amongst the most intelligent and satirical of the Italians, and irresistibly disposed to embrace the new ideas. Farther onward, beyond the Po, gleamed Lombardy, governed by an archduke as an Austrian viceroy. That balmy, luxuriant region, bounded by the Alps, whose streams fertilise its soil, and by the Adriatic, whose waters bear to it the wealth of the East, covered with cornfields, rice-plantations, meadows, flocks, and rich beyond all the provinces of the world, was discontented under its foreign masters. It was still Guelph,* notwithstanding its long slavery. It contained 1,200,000 inhabitants. Milan, the capital, was one of the most enlightened cities in Italy; less favoured with regard to the arts than Florence or Rome, it was nearer the illumination of the north, and it contained a great number of men who sighed for the civil and political regeneration of their countrymen.

The last state of Upper Italy was the ancient republic of Venice. That republic, with its old oligarchy enrolled in the Golden Book, its state-inquisition, its sombre silence, its distrustful and astute policy, was no longer a formidable power either for its subjects or its neighbours. With its territories on the mainland, situated at the foot of the Tyrol, and those of Illyria (Dalmatia), it counted nearly three millions of subjects. It could raise 50,000 Sclavonian troops, excellent soldiers, inasmuch as they were well formed, well disciplined, and well paid. It was rich in the wealth of other days; but it is known that, for the last two centuries, its commerce had passed into the ocean, and carried its treasures to the insular populations of the Atlantic. It scarcely retained a few vessels, and the passages of the canals were almost choked. Nevertheless, it was still endowed with ample reve-

* [The Guelphs and Ghibellines are the traditional factions of Italy. The Guelphs opposed, the Ghibellines upheld, the predominance of the German emperors in Italy, who claimed over most of its states a feudal superiority.]

nues. Its policy consisted in amusing the people, in repressing their energies by pleasure and somniferous repose, and in observing the strictest neutrality in its foreign relations. The nobles on the mainland were jealous, however, of the Golden Book, and bore with impatience the yoke of the oligarchy seated on the canals. In Venice itself, a burgher class sufficiently opulent began to exercise reflection. In 1793, the coalition had constrained the senate to declare against France; it had yielded, but it reverted to its neutral policy the moment other powers commenced to treat with the French republic. As we have previously recorded, it had hastened to concur with Prussia and Tuscany in sending an ambassador to Paris. Now again, yielding to the instances of the Directory, it had recently enjoined the head of the house of Bourbon. Louis XVIII., to quit Verona. That prince obeyed; but, on his departure, he demanded the restitution of a suit of armour presented by his ancestor Henry IV. to the senate, and the erasure of his family name from the pages of the Golden Book.

Such at that time was Italy. The general spirit of the age had penetrated it, and found numerous proselytes. The inhabitants were far from wishing a revolution, especially those who pondered on the frightful scenes which had sullied the French; but all, though in different degrees, desired a reform, and there was not a heart which did not throb with emotion at the idea of the independence and consolidation of the Italian nation. That population of agriculturists, burghers, artists, nobles, the priests excepted, who knew the church only as their country, was animated with the hope of seeing all the divisions of the country united in one aggregate, under an identical government, republican or monarchical, but Italian. Surely twenty millions of men, with an admirable soil, a large extent of coast, excellent harbours, and magnificent cities, might compose a glorious and puissant state! But, alas! they had no army. Piedmont alone, always engaged in the wars of Europe, possessed brave and disciplined troops. Doubtless nature had not refused natural courage to the other regions of Italy; but natural courage is of no avail without a strong military organisation. Italy had not a regiment which could support the view of the French or Austrian bayonets.

At the approach of the French, the opponents of political reform were filled with dismay—its partisans with joy. The great mass was uneasy and anxious; it had vague, uncertain presentiments; it knew not whether it ought to fear or hope.

The design and the orders of Bonaparte on entering Italy tended simply to drive out the Austrians. His government desiring, as we have intimated, to procure peace, meditated the conquest of Lombardy merely to restore it to Austria, obtaining from her in return the absolute cession of the Low Countries. It was no part of Bonaparte's scheme, therefore, to enfranchise Italy, and, indeed, with little more than thirty thousand men, the enforcement of a political regeneration might well seem chimerical. At the same time, the Austrians once repulsed beyond the Alps, and his power well assured, he might exercise great influence, and, according to circumstances, attempt important modifications. If, for example, the Austrians, beaten on all points—on the Po, the Rhine, and the Danube—were obliged to cede Lombardy itself; if the inhabitants, really inspired with the love of liberty, spontaneously declared for it on the approach of the French armies, then high destinies might open for Italy. But, meanwhile, Bonaparte was bound to assign no such object, lest he should thereby exasperate the princes whom he left on his rear. His determination, consequently, was to abstain from manifesting any revolutionary projects, but equally so from damping the ardour of imagination, and to await the effect produced by the presence of the French upon the Italian people.

It was thus that he had refrained from encouraging the malecontents of Piedmont, because he saw a country difficult to revolutionise, a strong government, and an army whose co-operation might be rendered available.

No sooner was the armistice of Cherasco signed, than he put his army in motion. Many of his officers and soldiers disapproved a march in advance. "What!" said they, "we are but thirty and a few thousand strong—we have revolutionised neither Piedmont nor Genoa—we are leaving behind us those governments, our secret enemies, and we are about to attempt the passage of a great river like the Po, to push through Lombardy, and probably induce, by our appearance, the republic of Venice to throw fifty thousand men into the scale against us!" Bonaparte had orders to advance, and he was not the man to flinch from the execution of a daring commission; but, in truth, he was prepared to execute it, because it corresponded with his own views, which were founded on substantial reasons. "Piedmont and Genoa," he said, "would embarrass us much more if they were thrown into a state of revolution. Thanks to the armistice, we have a route secured by three strong fortresses; all the governments of Italy will submit, if we succeed in driving the Austrians beyond the Alps; Venice will tremble, if we are victorious at her side; the roar of our cannon will even decide her to ally herself with us. It behoves us, therefore, to advance not only beyond the Po, but beyond the Adda, the Mincio, even to the line of the Adige; there we will besiege Mantua, and make all Italy quake behind us." The young general, his ideas inflamed by his progress, revolved even more gigantic projects than those he avowed to his army. He designed, after having annihilated Beaulieu, to plunge into the Tyrol, repass the Alps, and pour into the valley of the Danube, there to unite with the armies from the banks of the Rhine. This colossal and imprudent scheme was inspired by the twofold presumption of youth and success acting upon a vast and comprehensive mind, insatiable for results. He wrote to his government for authority to execute it.

He had opened the campaign on the 20th Germinal (9th April); the submission of Piedmont was consummated on the 9th Floreal (28th April) by the armistice of Cherasco: the operation had occupied eighteen days. He proceeded forthwith in pursuit of Beaulieu. He had stipulated with Piedmont for the surrender of Valenza to secure the passage of the Po; but this condition was a feint, since it was not at Valenza he intended to cross that river. Beaulieu, on learning the particulars of the armistice, had resolved to seize by surprise the three fortresses of Tortona, Valenza, and Alessandria. He succeeded in capturing Valenza alone, into which he threw the Neapolitans. After this achievement, perceiving Bonaparte advancing rapidly, he hastily repassed the Po, in order to place the river between him and the French army. He proceeded to encamp at Valleggio, at the conflux of the Po and the Tecino, towards the apex of the angle formed by those two streams. He reared some intrenchments to strengthen his position and to oppose the passage of the French army.

Bonaparte, on quitting the territories of the King of Sardinia, and entering those of the Duke of Parma, received envoys from that prince, who came to propitiate the clemency of the conqueror. The Duke of Parma was the relative of Spain; it was prudent, therefore, to treat him with consideration, a course which, on other grounds, coincided with the views of the general. But it was allowable to exercise upon him some of the rights of war. Bonaparte met his envoys at the passage of the Trebbia; he affected to be indignant that the Duke of Parma had not seized the moment to make his peace when Spain, his kinsman, was negotiating with the French republic. Eventually he granted an armistice, exacting a subsidy of two millions in specie, whereof the

army-chest was in great need, sixteen hundred horses, necessary for the artillery and the baggage-waggons, a considerable quantity of wheat and oats, authority to traverse the dutchy, and the establishment of hospitals for his invalids at the cost of the prince. The general did not limit himself to these terms. He loved and appreciated the arts as an Italian; he was sensible how much they added to the splendour of an empire, and how great the effect they produce on the imaginations of men: he demanded twenty pictures, to be selected by French commissioners, for transportation to Paris. The envoys of the duke, too happy to disarm, at this price, the anger of the general, consented to all his proposals, and hastened to execute the conditions of the armistice. They offered a million, however, to save the picture of Saint-Jerome. Bonaparte addressed his army:—"This million we shall soon have spent, and we shall find many others to receive. A masterpiece of art is eternal; it will embellish our country." The million was refused.

Bonaparte, after thus obtaining the advantages of conquest without its delays or difficulties, continued his march. The condition expressed in the armistice of Cherasco, relative to the passage of the Po at Valenza, together with the direction of the principal French columns towards that town, led to the belief that Bonaparte purposed to attempt the passage of the river in its vicinity. Whilst the bulk of his army was already concentrated on the point where Beaulieu was lying in wait, on the 17th Floreal (6th May), he diverged, with a corps of 3500 grenadiers, his cavalry, and twenty-four pieces of cannon, skirted the banks of the Po, and arrived on the morning of the 18th at Placentia, after a march of sixteen leagues and thirty-six hours. The cavalry had seized on the road all the boats that were found on the shore of the river, and carried them to Placentia. It had captured, moreover, a considerable quantity of forage, and the medicine-chest of the Austrian army. A ferry-boat transported the vanguard, commanded by Colonel Lannes. The moment that officer reached the opposite bank, he fell with his grenadiers on some Austrian detachments which were scouring the left side of the river, and dispersed them. The residue of the grenadiers successively crossed the Po, and the construction of a bridge was hastily commenced for the passage of the army, which had received orders to descend in like manner to Placentia. Thus, by means of a feint and a bold march, Bonaparte found himself beyond the Po, and with the advantage of having turned the Tecino. If, in fact, he had passed higher up the river, besides the difficulty of doing so in presence of Beaulieu, he would have come upon the Tecino, and must have effected a second passage. But, at Placentia, that obstacle was averted, for the Tecino has there blended with the Po.

On the 18th Floreal, the division under Liptai, being the first apprised of the French manœuvre, had moved on Fombio, a short distance from the Po, on the road to Pizzighitone. Bonaparte, careful not to allow it to establish itself in that position, where the whole Austrian army might rally, and where he might be afterwards compelled to give battle with the Po at his back, instantly resolved to attack with the force he had with him. He accordingly charged the division, which had intrenched itself, dislodged it, after a sanguinary conflict, and made two thousand prisoners. The remnant of the division, gaining the road to Pizzighitone, threw itself into that place.

On the evening of the same day, Beaulieu, informed of the passage of the Po at Placentia, arrived to the succour of Liptai's division. Ignorant of the discomfiture of that division, he fell foul of the French advanced posts, was warmly received, and obliged to recoil in all haste. Unfortunately, the gallant Laharpe, so serviceable to the army by his intelligence and intrepidity, was slain by his own soldiers amidst the obscurity of the night. The whole army regretted that brave Swiss, whom the tyranny of Berne had driven into France.

The Po cleared, the Tecino turned, Beaulieu beaten and unable to keep the field, the route to Milan lay open. It was natural that the youthful conqueror should be impatient to enter it. But, above all things, Bonaparte desired to complete the destruction of Beaulieu. With that view, it was not enough to have defeated him, he desired also to turn him, cut off his retreat, and oblige him, if possible, to lay down his arms. To attain this object, he required to forestall him at the passages of the rivers. Numerous streams descend the Alps, and flow through Lombardy on their course to the Po and the Adriatic. After the Po and the Tecino, come the Adda, the Oglio, the Mincio, the Adige, and several others. Bonaparte had now before him the Adda, which he could not turn like the Tecino, because for that purpose he must have crossed the Po at Cremona. The Adda was to be passed at Pizzighitone; but the wreck of Liptai's division had thrown itself into that place. Bonaparte hastened to ascend the Adda, to reach the bridge of Lodi. Beaulieu was there long before him; therefore he could not be anticipated in the passage of the river. But Beaulieu had at Lodi only twelve thousand infantry and four thousand cavalry. Two other divisions, under Colli and Wukassovich, had made a detour upon Milan, to throw a garrison into the citadel, and were afterwards to return upon the Adda and cross it at Cassano, considerably below Lodi. By attempting, therefore, to clear the Adda at Lodi, despite the presence of Beaulieu, the French might reach the other bank before the two divisions, which were to pass at Cassano, had accomplished their prescribed movement. In such case, there would be every probability of intercepting them.

Bonaparte arrived before Lodi on the 20th Floreal (9th May). This town is situated on the same side of the river as that whereby the French army approached. Bonaparte caused a sudden attack to be made upon it, and carried it in spite of the Austrians. They, thereupon quitting the town, retired by the bridge, and proceeded to join the bulk of their army on the opposite bank. It was this bridge the French had to cross, upon leaving Lodi, in order to clear the barrier of the Adda. Twelve thousand infantry and four thousand cavalry were drawn up on the opposite bank; twenty pieces of artillery enfiladed the bridge; a swarm of sharpshooters lined the shore. It was not customary in war to brave such defences; a bridge defended by sixteen thousand men and twenty pieces of ordnance, presented an obstacle never sought to be surmounted. The French army was placed under shelter from the fire behind the walls of Lodi, awaiting orders from the general. Bonaparte issued from the town, traversed the margin of the river amidst a shower of balls and grape, and, after deciding on his plan, returned into Lodi to put it in execution. He directed his cavalry to ascend the course of the river, and attempt to pass at a ford above the bridge. He then assembled a column of six thousand grenadiers; he went through their ranks, encouraged them, and communicated to them, by his presence and words, an extraordinary courage. He ultimately ordered them to debouch by the gate opening on the bridge, and to advance at full speed. He calculated that, from the rapidity of the movement, the column would not have time to suffer very severely. This formidable column closed its ranks and emerged, rushing along the bridge with intrepid ardour. A terrible fire opened upon it; the front ranks were all laid prostrate. Still it advanced: arrived on the middle of the bridge, it wavered; but the generals animated it by their voice and example. It took fresh courage, moved onwards, flew upon the pieces, and cut down the artillerymen who essayed to defend them. At this instant, the Austrian infantry approached to support the artillery;

but after what it had just achieved, the indomitable column contemned mere bayonets; it charged upon the Austrians precisely as the French cavalry, which had found a ford, appeared to menace their flanks: it worsted and dispersed them, securing two thousand prisoners.*

This stroke of transcendent hardihood struck the Austrians with amazement; but unfortunately it proved useless. Colli and Wukassovich had succeeded in gaining the Brescia highway, and were beyond the reach of interception. If the main object had failed, the line of the Adda at least was carried; the courage of the soldiers was exalted to the highest pitch of enthusiasm, and their devotion to their general rendered boundless.

In their exuberant gaiety they conceived a singular idea, which strikingly pourtrays the national character. The oldest soldiers mustered one day, and, finding their general very young, resolved to make him pass through all the grades: for his conduct at Lodi they appointed him a corporal, and saluted him, when he appeared in the camp, with the title, since so famous, of the *Little Corporal* (*Petit Caporal*). We shall see them hereafter confer others, as he was judged to have deserved them.

The Austrian army was assured of its retreat into the Tyrol: there was no further inducement to follow it. Bonaparte, therefore, determined to return into the Milanese, in order to take possession and commence the organisation of his conquest. The remnant of Liptai's division had intrenched itself at Pizzighitone, and might convert it into a stronghold. He moved upon that post and expelled it. He subsequently dispatched Massena to precede him at Milan. Augereau retrograded to occupy Pavia. Bonaparte desired to impress that spacious city, celebrated for its university, with a vivid sense of the French power, and sent to overawe it one of the finest divisions of the army. The divisions of Serrurier and Laharpe were left at Pizzighitone, Lodi, Cremona, and Cassano, to guard the Adda.

At length Bonaparte made ready to visit Milan. At the approach of the French army, the partisans of Austria, and all others who were alarmed at the reports current of the French soldiers, who were represented to be quite as barbarous as courageous, had fled, and covered the roads to Brescia and the Tyrol. The archduke had taken his departure; he had been observed to shed tears on quitting his superb capital. The great majority of the Milanese gave way to sanguine hopes, and awaited the advent of the French in the most favourable dispositions. When they had received the first division, commanded by Massena, and saw those soldiers, whose reputation was so formidable, respect property and persons, and manifest all that benevolence so natural to their character, they were transported with joy, and loaded them with their choicest benefits. The patriots, who had hurried from all parts of Italy, impatiently expected the young victor whose exploits were so rapid and dazzling, and whose Italian name was so dulcet in their ears. The Count de Melzi was commissioned to meet Bonaparte with a formal tender of submission. A national guard was formed, attired in the three colours, green, red, and white, and the command thereof intrusted to the Duke of Serbelloni. A triumphal arch was reared to receive the French general. On the 26th Floreal (15th May), one month after the opening of the campaign, Bonaparte made his entry into Milan. The entire population of that metropolis assembled to witness

* [The battle of Lodi was in itself a useless effusion of blood, but it is celebrated in history not only as a surprising feat of arms, but as the achievement which first rendered Bonaparte the idol of the French soldiers, and opened to him the road to future greatness. The account of the battle as given in the text avoids all notice of Bonaparte's personal prowess, upon which the admiration of his troops was founded; and we have consequently deemed it expedient to subjoin a description of the battle, taken from Bourrienne's Memoirs, which enters more into detail.

"It now remained to cross the river; but thirty pieces of cannon, placed in battery, some at the further end of the old bridge, and some a little above, and others a little below it, on the left bank, in order to produce a cross fire, seemed to render such an enterprise next to impossible. More than one brave republican general recommended a pause, which must have ended in a retreat; but Bonaparte, keeping his eyes fixed, and his hand pointing to the bridge, said—'That is the way to Milan—to Rome—to the possession of all Italy; we must cross, let it cost what it may. It must not be said that the tributary Adda stopped those heroes who had forced the Po!' On this occasion the French were pretty well supplied with artillery, and their first operation was to open a heavy fire across the river on the enemy's guns. General Beaumont, who commanded their cavalry, was sent to pass the Adda at a ford about a league above the bridge; and he took with him some flying artillery, with which he was to cannonade the right flank of the Austrians. By an inconceivable imbecility, the ford was not sufficiently guarded, and Beaumont, though not without difficulty, passed through it with his horses and guns. As soon as Bonaparte saw that the heads of the French cavalry were forming on the left bank of the Adda, and that the manœuvre gave great uneasiness to the Austrians, he pointed his sword at the bridge and sounded the charge. It was on the 10th May, and about six o'clock in the evening, when 4000 picked men, shouting 'Vive la Republique!' advanced on the bridge, which was literally swept by the enemy's guns. The first effect was tremendous; the French were involved in a murderous hailstorm of cannon-balls, grape-shot, and musket-balls; they stopped—for a moment they wavered. Then Bonaparte, and Lannes, and Berthier, and Massena, and Cervoni, and D'Allemagne, and Dupas, threw themselves at the head of the columns, which dashed across the bridge, and up to the mouths of the enemy's guns. Lannes was the first to reach the left bank of the Adda, Bonaparte the second. The Austrian artillerymen were bayoneted at their guns before Beaulieu could get to their rescue, for this doomed old general had kept his infantry too far in the rear of the bridge. By this means, also, the French infantry were allowed time to debouch from the *tete-du-pont*, and form in pretty good order. The battle, however, was not over. Though stupid, Beaulieu was brave, and the Austrian troops had not yet lost their dogged obstinacy. They concentrated a little behind the river—they put their remaining artillery in battery, and for some minutes it seemed doubtful whether they would not drive their foes back to the blood-covered bridge, or into the waters of the Adda. But, in addition to Beaumont, who acted with the cavalry on their right flank, Augereau now came up from Borghetto to the opportune assistance of his comrades. Then Beaulieu retreated, but in such good order that the French made but few prisoners. The shades of night closed over a scene of horror: between the town and the bridge of Lodi, and the scene of the prolonged action on the left bank, 2500 men and 400 horses, on the side of the Austrians, lay dead or wounded; and the French could not have left fewer than 2000 men in the same condition, although Bonaparte owned only to the loss of 400.

This battle, which he used to call 'The terrible passage of the bridge of Lodi,' carried his fame to the highest pitch, while the great personal bravery he displayed in it endeared him to the troops. The men, who cannot always appreciate military genius and science, know perfectly well how to estimate courage, and they soon idolise the commander that shows himself ready to share in their greatest dangers. It was on this occasion that the soldiers gave Bonaparte the honorary and affectionate nickname of 'the little corporal!' He was then slight in figure, and had almost an effeminate appearance. 'It was a strange sight,' says a French veteran, 'to see him on that day on foot on the bridge, under a *feu d'enfer*, and mixed up with our tall grenadiers: he looked like a little boy!' Those men of routine and prescription, the Austrian officers, who adhered to the old system of warfare, could not comprehend his new conceptions and his innovations. 'This beardless youth ought to have been beaten over and over again,' said poor Beaulieu; 'who ever saw such tactics?' A day or two after the battle of Lodi, an old Hungarian officer, who did not know his person, was brought in prisoner to the French commander-in-chief. 'Well,' said Bonaparte, 'what do you think of the state of the war now?' 'Nothing can be worse on your side,' replied the old martinet. 'Here you have a youth who absolutely knows nothing of the rules of war; to-day he is in our rear, to-morrow on our flank, next again in our front. Such gross violations of the principles of the art of war are not to be supported!'"]

his arrival. The national guard was marshalled and under arms. The municipality came in procession to deliver him the keys of the city. Acclamations accompanied his progress even to the Serbelloni palace, where preparations had been made for his reception. At this moment the imagination of the Italians was wound up in him equally with that of his own soldiers, and he could henceforth act by moral, as efficaciously as by physical force.

It was not his intention to remain at Milan longer than he had tarried at Cherasco after the submission of Piedmont. He merely proposed to sojourn a sufficient time to organise provisionally the province, draw from it the resources necessary for his army, and regulate all things upon his rear. His grand design still was to hasten on the Adige and Mantua, and, if it were possible, into the Tyrol and beyond the Alps.

The Austrians had left two thousand men in the citadel of Milan. Bonaparte caused it to be immediately invested. It was agreed with the governor of the castle that he should not fire upon the city, for it formed an Austrian possession he was interested in saving from destruction. The works of the siege were commenced without delay.

Bonaparte, without irrevocably committing himself to the Milanese, and without promising them an independence he could not ensure them, inspired them, nevertheless, with sufficient hopes to stimulate their patriotism. He held to them an energetic language, telling them that, to procure liberty, they must merit it by aiding him to deliver Italy for ever from Austria. He instituted provisionally a municipal administration. He caused the formation of national guards in all quarters of the country, in order to give a commencement to the military organisation of Lombardy. He subsequently directed his attention to the wants of the army, and was obliged to impose a contribution of twenty millions on the Milanese. This measure he adopted reluctantly, because it was calculated to operate prejudicially on the public mind; but it occasioned less discontent than might have been anticipated, and, moreover, it was indispensable. Owing to the magazines obtained in Piedmont and to the corn furnished by the Duke of Parma, the army enjoyed provisions in great abundance. The soldiers improved palpably in appearance: they subsisted on excellent bread and meat, and drank good wine. They were quite content, and observed the strictest discipline. The only want yet left unsatisfied was that of raiment. Clad in the old clothes they had so long worn on the Alps, they were tattered and in rags, and could strike beholders with awe only from their glory, their martial firmness, and their admirable discipline. Bonaparte speedily found additional resources. The Duke of Modena, whose territories skirt the Po, below those of the Duke of Parma, dispatched envoys to solicit from him the same conditions as those granted to the Duke of Parma. This old avaricious prince, seeing all his predictions realised, had sought refuge in Venice, carrying with him his treasures, and abandoning the government of his dominions to a regency. Not willing, however, to lose them altogether, he craved leave to negotiate. Bonaparte was not competent to conclude treaties, but he could grant armistices which were equivalent therewith, and which, as he framed them, rendered him master of destinies in Italy. He demanded ten millions, supplies of all kinds, horses, and pictures.

With these resources obtained in the country, he established on the banks of the Po large magazines, and hospitals provided with the paraphernalia requisite for fifteen thousand invalids, and filled all the chests of the army. Deeming himself sufficiently affluent, he forwarded to Genoa a few millions for the Directory. Furthermore, as he was aware the army of the Rhine languished for lack of funds, and was retarded by that deficiency in taking the field, he transmitted through Switzerland a million to Moreau This act evinced the kindly spirit of a comrade in arms, and was equally honourable and advantageous to him, since so timely a remittance would enable Moreau to enter upon the campaign and restrain the Austrians from moving their principal forces into Italy.

Meditating on the aspect of affairs, Bonaparte was more than ever confirmed in his original views. He considered it was not necessary to march against the potentates of Italy; it behoved him to act against the Austrians alone: so that they were effectually resisted and debarred from returning into Lombardy, all the Italian states, trembling under the ascendancy of the French army, would submit one after the other. The Dukes of Parma and Modena had already succumbed: Rome and Naples would follow their example, if he remained master of the great avenues of Italy. In like manner, he was called upon to observe neutrality with regard to the populations, and, taking no steps to subvert the existing governments, to wait until the subjects themselves unequivocally declared their sentiments.

But amidst these sagacious reflections and multitudinous labours, he was perplexed by a counteraction of the most baneful tendency. The Directory was charmed with his services; but Carnot, on reading his dispatches, written with energy and precision, and also with extreme imaginative ardour, was alarmed at his gigantic projects. He deemed, with reason, that the proposal to traverse the Tyrol and cross the Alps a second time, was too hazardous and even impracticable a scheme: but, essaying to amend the project of the young captain, he in his turn conceived one infinitely more dangerous. According to Carnot, the course for the French to adopt, after the conquest of Lombardy, was to fall back into the peninsula, and proceed to punish the Pope and the Bourbons of Naples, and to chase the English from Leghorn, where the Duke of Tuscany allowed them to domineer. Under this persuasion, Carnot ordered, in the name of the Directory, that the forces in Italy should be divided into two parts, whereof one was to be left in Lombardy, under the orders of General Kellermann, and the other to march on Rome and Naples, under the orders of Bonaparte. This disastrous project contemplated a repetition of the self-same error the French have always committed, a precipitate advance into the peninsula before the complete reduction of Upper Italy. It was not with the pope or the King of Naples they had to contend for the mastery of Italy, but with the Austrians. Consequently, the line of operations was not at that time on the Tiber, but on the Adige. The impatience to grasp advantages has always impelled the French to Rome and Naples; and whilst sweeping through the peninsula, they have invariably found the route closed upon them. It was natural that republicans should burn with desire to inflict chastisement on a pope and a Bourbon; but they relapsed into the flagrant error of the old kings of France.

Bonaparte, when forming his plan of penetrating into the valley of the Danube, had fixed his eye on the Austrians solely; it was an exaggeration, doubtless, of the true aim, arising in a mind of profound judgment, but tinged with youthful impetuosity; yet, after arriving at this his firm conviction, he could not consent to march into the peninsula; moreover, feeling the importance of concentrated control on a scene of action requiring in equal degrees the display of political and military genius, he could not brook the idea of dividing the command with an old general, brave, but mediocre and self-sufficient. He was swayed by that legitimate egotism of genius, which insists upon executing its task alone, because it feels itself alone capable of accomplishing it. He here conducted himself as if on a field of battle; he risked all his future fortunes, and tendered his resignation in a letter equally firm and respectful. He might surmise the Directory would not venture to accept it; but it is certain that he preferred resignation to obedience,

for he would not consent to ruin both his own fame and his army by executing a vicious plan.

Opposing the most luminous train of reasoning to the false deductions of Carnot, he showed that it was still necessary to make head against the Austrians, and to attend to them alone; that a mere division, defiling backwards on the Po and on Ancona, would suffice to alarm the peninsula, and oblige Rome and Naples to crave mercy. He instantly prepared to depart from Milan, to hasten on the Adige, and commence the siege of Mantua. He proposed to await there the new orders of the Directory, and an answer to his last dispatches.

Meanwhile, he published a new proclamation to his soldiers, eminently adapted to stir their minds, and likewise to make a strong impression upon those of the pope and the King of Naples.

"Soldiers!—You have rushed as a torrent from the summit of the Apennines; you have overthrown and dispersed all who would have opposed your march. Piedmont, delivered from Austrian tyranny, has reverted to its natural sentiments of peace and friendship for France. Milan is yours, and the republican flag waves over all Lombardy. The Dukes of Parma and Modena owe their political existence to your generosity alone. The army which so proudly menaced you no longer finds a barrier to sustain it against your courage; the Po, the Tecino, the Adda, have failed to check you a single day; those vaunted bulwarks of Italy have proved insufficient; you have cleared them as rapidly as the Apennines. Such successes have carried joy into the heart of our native land; your representatives have decreed a festival dedicated to your victories, to be celebrated in all the communes of the republic. There, your mothers, your wives, your sisters, your lovers, rejoice over your achievements, and boast with pride of their relationship to you. Yes, soldiers, you have done much; but does nothing, therefore, remain for you to do? Shall it be said that we have known how to conquer, but that we have not known how to profit by victory? Shall posterity reproach you with having found a Capua in Lombardy? But I already see you flying to arms. Let us go, then! We have yet forced marches to make, enemies to subdue, laurels to gather, injuries to avenge. Let those who have whetted the daggers of civil war in France, who have basely assassinated our ministers, burnt our vessels at Toulon, tremble! The knell of vengeance has sounded. But let the nations be without disquietude! We are the friends of all nations, and more especially of the descendants of Brutus, of the Scipios, and of the great men whom we have taken as models. To restore the Capitol, to place there with honour the statues of the heroes who have rendered it so renowned, to awaken the Roman people, benumbed by several centuries of slavery—such will be the fruit of our victories. They will form an epoch for posterity: you will reap the immortal glory of changing the aspect of the finest region of Europe. The French people, free, respected by the whole world, will give to Europe a glorious peace, which will indemnify it for the sacrifices of all kinds it has made during the last six years. You will then return to your homes, and your fellow-citizens will say, pointing to you, *He belonged to the army of Italy!*"

He tarried but eight days at Milan; he left it on the 2d Prairial (21st May), to proceed by Lodi upon the Adige.

Whilst Bonaparte pursued his march, an unexpected event suddenly recalled him to Milan. The nobles, the monks, the retainers of the fugitive families, and numerous creatures of the Austrian government, had prepared a revolt against the French army. They circulated rumours that Beaulieu, strongly reinforced, was advancing with sixty thousand men; that the Prince of Condé was pouring through Switzerland on the rear of the republicans, and that they would be infallibly destroyed. The priests, exerting their influence over some peasants who had suffered from the passage of the army, excited them to take up arms. Bonaparte's departure from Milan was deemed to present the favourable moment for effecting the revolt and arousing all Lombardy in his rear. The garrison in the citadel of Milan gave the signal by a sally. The tocsin was immediately rung in all the surrounding districts, and armed peasants flocked to Milan in order to dislodge the French. But the division which Bonaparte had left to blockade the citadel gallantly repulsed the garrison within its walls, and dissipated the peasants who appeared with hostile intentions. In the environs of Pavia, the insurgents were more successful. They entered that city, and gained possession of it, despite the efforts of three hundred men whom Bonaparte had posted there as a garrison. Those three hundred men, exhausted with fatigue and sickness, shut themselves up in a fort to avoid being massacred. The insurgents surrounded the fort, and summoned them to surrender. A French general, who chanced to be passing through Pavia at the moment, was seized, and compelled, with the dagger at his throat, to sign an order for the garrison to open the gates. The order was transmitted and obeyed.

This revolt might have led to disastrous consequences; it might have provoked a general insurrection, and conduced to the ruin of the French army. The public spirit of a nation is always more advanced in towns than in the country. Whilst the population of the Italian cities declared almost unanimously for the French, the peasants, instigated by the priests, and injured by the passage of the armies, were malevolently inclined. Bonaparte was at Lodi, when, on the 4th Prairial (23d May), he learnt the events that had occurred at Milan and Pavia. He instantly retraced his steps, with three hundred cavalry, a battalion of grenadiers, and six pieces of artillery. Order was already re-established at Milan. He continued his march on Pavia, sending to herald his approach the Archbishop of Milan. The insurgents had pushed an advanced guard to the village of Binasco. Lannes dispersed it. Bonaparte, deeming he ought to act with decision and vigour, to check the evil in its birth, set fire to this village, with the view of affrighting Pavia by the sight of the conflagration. On his arrival before that city, he paused. It contained thirty thousand inhabitants; it was surrounded by an old wall, and occupied by seven or eight thousand armed peasants. They had closed the gates and manned the walls. To take a large town under such circumstances, with three hundred troopers and a battalion, was no easy task; and yet he could afford to lose no time, for the army was already on the Oglio, and in need of its general. During the night, he caused a threatening proclamation to be affixed to the gates of Pavia, wherein he stated that a deluded multitude, destitute of any effective means of resistance, was defying an army triumphant over kings, and hazarding the welfare of the Italian people; that, adhering to his intention of not making war on nations, he was willing to pardon this delirium, and leave a door open to repentance; but that those who refused to lay down their arms on the instant should be treated as rebels, and their villages burnt. The flames of Binasco, he added, might serve them as a warning. In the morning, the peasants, who preponderated in the city, rejected all overtures of surrender. Bonaparte thereupon caused the walls to be swept by grape and shells, and then sent forward his grenadiers, who broke open the gates with hatchets. They penetrated into the city, and sustained a sanguinary conflict in the streets. However, the resistance they encountered was not of long duration. The peasants fled, and abandoned the unfortunate Pavia to the rage of the conquerors. The soldiers demanded leave to pillage with loud outcries. Bonaparte, to give a severe example, granted them three hours' pillage. They

scarcely counted a thousand men, and could not perpetrate any great enormities in a city so considerable as Pavia. They rushed upon the goldsmiths' shops, and seized a large quantity of jewellery. The most censurable act was the pillage of the Mont-de-Piété; but happily, in Italy as wherever there are poor and ostentatious grandees, the pawnbroking establishments were stored with articles belonging to the higher classes of the community. The houses of Spallanzani and Volta were preserved by the officers, who guarded in person the abodes of those illustrious benefactors of science—an example doubly honourable for France and for Italy!

Bonaparte subsequently let loose upon the country his three hundred horse, who put numbers of the rebellious peasants to the sword. This prompt suppression restored obedience throughout the Milanese, and awed the party in Italy opposed to liberty and France. It is mournful to be obliged to employ such means; but Bonaparte was constrained by overruling necessity, if he wished to save his army and the destinies of Italy from sacrifice. The party of the monks trembled with excessive fear; the misfortunes of Pavia, narrated from mouth to mouth, were heightened by exaggeration, and the French army was reinvested with its terrible reputation.

This enterprise being thus terminated, Bonaparte instantly departed to rejoin his army, which was upon the Oglio, and about to enter the Venetian territory.

At the approach of the French army, the question, so often canvassed at Venice, as to the part to be taken in the contest between Austria and France, was anew anxiously discussed by the senate. A few old oligarchs, whom a spirit of fortitude still actuated, advised an immediate alliance with Austria, the natural patron of all venerable despotisms; but Austrian ambition inspired dread for the future, and French thunder for the moment. Besides, this resolution would have entailed the necessity of assuming arms, a course extremely repugnant to an enervated government. Certain of the younger senators, equally energetic but less infatuated than their older compeers, likewise upheld a courageous line of action; they proposed to arm upon a formidable scale, but to preserve neutrality, threatening with fifty thousand men whomsoever of the two belligerents should presume to violate the Venetian territory. This was a strong resolution, but in truth too strong to be adopted. Divers sagacious men, on the contrary, recommended a third course, to wit, an alliance with France. The senator Battaglia, of mind acute, comprehensive, and equanimous, propounded a series of weighty deductions, which, now recorded, seem almost as if inspired by the spirit of prophecy. As he represented, neutrality, even if armed, was the worst of all possible determinations. Venice would be unable to enforce respect, whatever strength she might deploy; and having attached neither party to her cause, she would be sacrificed sooner or later by both. It was therefore necessary to decide either for Austria or for France. Austria was for the moment expelled from Italy; and even supposing her to possess the means of returning, she could not do so within two months, pending which interval the republic might be utterly destroyed by the French army; moreover, the ambition of Austria was constantly the most formidable for Venice. That power had always envied her provinces in Illyria and Upper Italy, and would seize the first opportunity of wresting them from her. The sole safeguard against this ambition was to be found in France, which had nothing to covet from Venice, and would always be interested in defending her. True, France entertained principles repulsive to the Venetian nobility; but the time had at length come when some sacrifices to the spirit of the age—when some concessions to the nobles of the mainland, by which alone they could be firmly attached to the republic, or reconciled with the Golden Book—were absolutely indispensable. With certain slight modifications on the ancient constitution, the senate might gratify the desires of all classes of Venetian subjects, and conciliate France; if, furthermore, it took up arms for that power, it might hope, perhaps, that in recompense of its services the spoils of Austria in Lombardy would be conceded to it. In every case, however, the senator Battaglia reiterated, neutrality was the course most fraught with evil.

This counsel, whereof time has demonstrated the sagacity, offended too profoundly the pride and prejudices of the old Venetian aristocracy to meet approbation. It must be allowed, at the same time, that the senate regarded the stability of the French power in Italy as too problematical to warrant an alliance with it. There was an ancient Italian maxim which taught that *Italy was the grave of Frenchmen;* and it feared being eventually exposed, without defence, to the vengeance of Austria.

These three plans were all finally repudiated for one more convenient, more suited to the sleepy routine and effeminacy of this antiquated government—a disarmed neutrality. It was decided that envoys should be dispatched to meet Bonaparte, commissioned to protest the neutrality of the republic, and to claim the respect due to the Venetian territory and subjects. A feeling of intense alarm prevailed with respect to the French; but they were known to be of easy disposition, and sensible to good treatment. Orders were given to all the agents of government to receive and accommodate them with every earnest of good will, and in particular to court the generals and officers, so as to propitiate their friendship.

Upon passing the Venetian frontier, Bonaparte had as much need of prudence as Venice itself. That power, although in the hands of a feeble government, was still great; policy enjoined him to refrain from irritating it so far as to force it into a hostile attitude, for in such case Upper Italy would be rendered untenable for the French; but, at the same time, whilst observing the limits of neutrality, he must compel Venice to suffer them on her territory, to allow them to fight within its confines, and even to subsist them if possible. She had granted a passage to the Austrians: that was the ground to be alleged for taking every advantage, for urging every demand, albeit remaining within the bounds of neutrality.

Bonaparte, on entering Brescia, published a proclamation, wherein he stated that, in traversing the Venetian territory for the essential purpose of pursuing the imperial army, which had received permission to cross it, he would respect the dominions and inhabitants of the republic of Venice, that he would cause his army to observe the strictest discipline, that all it took should be reimbursed, and that he was not unmindful of the ancient ties which united the two republics. He was most affably received by the Venetian proveditore of Brescia, and continued his march. He had cleared the Oglio, which flows after the Adda; he now came upon the Mincio, which issues from the Lake of Garda, meanders in the Mantuan plain, forms, after a course of several leagues, a fresh lake, in the midst of which stands the city of Mantua, and finally proceeds to join the Po. Beaulieu, reinforced by ten thousand men, had planted himself on the line of the Mincio, with the intention of defending it. A vanguard of four thousand foot and two thousand horse was stationed in front of the river, at the village of Borghetto. The main army was placed beyond the Mincio, in the position of Valeggio; the reserve was stationed a little to the rear, at Villa-Franca; detached corps guarded the course of the Mincio, above and below Valeggio The Venetian town of Peschiera is situated on the Mincio, as it issues from the lake of Garda. Beaulieu, who desired to possess that place to strengthen the right of his line, deceived the Venetians; under pretext of obtaining a passage for fifty men, he surprised the town, and placed in it a strong

garrison. It had a bastioned circuit, pointed with eighty pieces of cannon.

Bonaparte, advancing upon this line, neglected Mantua, which was on his right, and the time for blockading which had not yet arrived, and pushed on his left towards Peschiera. His design was to pass the Mincio at Borghetto and Valeggio. For that purpose it was requisite to beguile Beaulieu touching his real intention. He operated here as on the passage of the Po; he directed a corps on Peschiera and another on Lonato, so as to disquiet Beaulieu respecting the Upper Mincio, and lead him to suppose that he intended either to pass at Peschiera or to turn the lake of Garda. At the same time, he directed his more serious attack on Borghetto. This village, situated in advance of the Mincio, was, as we have stated, guarded by four thousand infantry and two thousand cavalry. On the 9th Prairial (28th May), Bonaparte commenced the engagement. He had hitherto experienced difficulty in bringing his cavalry into action. It was little accustomed to charge, because the use previously made of it had been inconsiderable, and it was, moreover, intimidated by the high reputation of the German cavalry. Bonaparte determined at all hazards to put it to the test, as he attached great importance to the services it might render. In advancing on Borghetto, he distributed his grenadiers and carabineers on the right and left of his cavalry, planted the artillery in the rear, and, after thus enclosing it, spurred it on the enemy. Supported on all sides, and inspirited by the impetuous Murat, it performed prodigies, and put to flight the Austrian squadrons. The infantry afterwards assailed the village of Borghetto, of which it secured possession. The Imperialists, on retiring by the bridge leading from Borghetto to Valeggio, attempted to destroy it. They succeeded, in fact, in breaking an arch. But some grenadiers, conducted by General Gardanne, plunged into the stream of the Mincio, which was fordable at several points, and crossed it, holding their weapons above their heads, and braving the fire from the opposite heights. The Austrians thought they beheld the column of Lodi, and retreated without completing the destruction of the bridge. The broken arch was re-established, and the army enabled to pass. Bonaparte proceeded without delay to ascend the Mincio with the division under Augereau, in order to give chase to the Austrians; but they declined an engagement during the whole day. He thereupon left Augereau's division to continue the pursuit, and returned to Valeggio, where Massena's division was posted, preparing at the moment to boil soup. Suddenly the charge was heard to sound, and the Austrian hussars galloped into the middle of the village. Bonaparte had scarcely time to save himself. He sprang on horseback, and speedily ascertained that the surprise came from one of the enemy's corps stationed to guard the Lower Mincio, which was remounting the river to join Beaulieu in his retreat towards the mountains. Massena's division flew to arms, and rushed in pursuit of this corps, which contrived, nevertheless, to rejoin Beaulieu.

The barrier of the Mincio, therefore, was surmounted. Bonaparte had a second time induced the retreat of the Imperialists, who recoiled definitively into the Tyrol. He had gained an important advantage in having brought his cavalry to bear the brunt of action, and dissipated its dread of that of the Austrians. He attached great value to this circumstance. Little use was made of cavalry before this period, and he had judged it might be rendered eminently serviceable when employed to cover artillery. He had calculated that light artillery and cavalry, employed on fitting occasions, might produce the effect of a mass of infantry ten times the strength. He already regarded with affection young Murat, who possessed the talent of leading squadrons into battle, a merit he then considered extremely rare in officers of that service. The surprise which had placed his person in danger suggested to him another idea: this was to form a corps of picked men, who, under the name of guides, were to accompany him at all times and places. His personal safety was but a secondary object in his eyes; he discerned the advantage of having always near him a devoted corps, capable of the most daring deeds. We shall, in fact, hereafter see him decide a critical event by an opportune charge of twenty-five of those brave men. He gave the command of this new-formed corps to a cavalry officer, distinguished for his cool intrepidity, and well known under the name of Bessières.

Beaulieu had evacuated Peschiera when ascending into the Tyrol. A conflict had occurred with the Austrian rearguard, and it cost the French a severe engagement to make good their entry into the town. The Venetians having been unable to secure it from Beaulieu, it had ceased to be neutral ground, and the French were authorised to establish themselves therein. Bonaparte was well aware that the Venetians had been deceived by Beaulieu, but he resolved to avail himself of the circumstance to obtain from them all he desired. He wanted the line of the Adige, and particularly the important city of Verona, which commands that river; above all, he wanted facilities for provisioning his troops.

The proveditore Foscarelli, an old Venetian oligarch, deeply imbedded in prejudices and actuated by a lively hatred against France, was instructed to visit the head-quarters of Bonaparte. He had been warned that the general was excessively wroth at the affair of Peschiera, and report announced that his ebullitions of wrath were fearful to encounter. Binasco and Pavia attested his severity; two armies overthrown, and Italy conquered, attested his power. The proveditore came to Peschiera, full of terror; on starting for his mission, he had written to his government in a very desponding strain. "*May God in his mercy,*" he exclaimed, "*accept me as a sacrifice!*" The especial object of his embassy was to prevent the French from entering Verona. That city, which had afforded an asylum to the pretender, was plunged in harrowing solicitude. Bonaparte, who was liable to violent gusts of passion, and could feign them likewise in emergency, omitted nothing to aggravate the terror of the proveditore. He inveighed with vehemence against the Venetian government, which professed to be neutral and yet knew not how to make its neutrality respected; which, allowing the Austrians to seize Peschiera, had subjected the French army to the loss of many brave men before that place. He said that the blood of his companions in arms cried aloud for vengeance, and that it should be his care to render it signal. The proveditore laboured to exculpate the Venetian authorities, and eventually introduced the essential topic which brought him to the camp—Verona. He asserted that he had orders to bar its access to both the belligerent powers. Bonaparte, in reply, informed him his communication was too late; that Massena had already proceeded thither; and that, perhaps, as they were now conferring, he had set it on fire, to punish a city which had exhibited the unparalleled effrontery to regard itself for a time as the capital of the French empire. The proveditore supplicated more earnestly, and Bonaparte, feigning to relent, stated that he could at the utmost, supposing Massena had not already entered by main force, grant a delay of twenty-four hours, after which he would put in requisition the terrors of bombardment.

The proveditore withdrew in consternation. He returned to Verona, where he proclaimed the necessity of receiving the French. At their approach, the wealthiest inhabitants, apprehensive that the sojourn of the pretender in their city would be visited on them as an inexpiable offence, fled tumultuously into the Tyrol, bearing with them their most precious commodities. The Veronese, however, speedily regained confidence on beholding the French, and convincing

themselves, with their own eyes, that those republicans were not so barbarous as fame depicted them.

Two other Venetian envoys arrived at Verona to parley with Bonaparte. The senate had selected for the mission two of its members, Erizzo and Battaglia. The latter was the same of whom we have spoken as advocating an alliance with France; and hopes were entertained at Venice that these ambassadors would succeed better than Foscarelli in assuaging the anger of the general. He, in fact, received them much more affably than Foscarelli; and now that he had attained the object of his views, he affected greater placability and consented to hear reason. The further points he desired to compass were periodical supplies of provisions, and if possible an alliance of Venice with France. It behoved him alternately to impress with awe and win by blandishment: he acquitted himself with consummate art. "The first law for men," he said, "is to live. I would willingly spare the republic of Venice the care of victualling us; but since the fate of war has compelled us to come thus far, we are constrained to live where we chance to find ourselves. Let the republic of Venice furnish my soldiers with what they require; it can subsequently account with the French republic." It was agreed that a Jew contractor should procure for the army all that was necessary for it, and that Venice should secretly pay this contractor, in order that it might not appear to violate the neutrality by provisioning the French. Bonaparte afterwards opened the question of an alliance. "I have just occupied the Adige," he said; "I have done so because I wanted a barrier, because that line is the best, and because your government is incapable of defending it. Let it arm 50,000 men, let it place them on the Adige, and I will restore it its fortresses of Verona and Porto-Legnago. At the same time," he added, "you ought to see us here with pleasure. What France sends me to perform in these countries is altogether coincident with the interest of Venice. I come to drive the Austrians beyond the Alps, perhaps to constitute Lombardy an independent state: can any thing be more advantageous to your republic? If it will unite with us, it would probably receive a high reward for such service. We make war on no government: we are the friends of all who will assist us in confining the Austrian power within its proper bounds."

The two Venetians retired, struck with the commanding genius of their young dialogist, who, by turns menacing and caressing, now imperious now ingratiating, discoursing on all topics, military or political, with equal profoundness and eloquence, evinced that the statesman was as precociously developed in him as the warrior. "*This man*," they said in writing to Venice, "*will one day exercise a great influence over his country.*"*

Bonaparte was at length master of the line of the Adige, which possession he had long considered as of essential importance. He attributed all the faults committed during the earlier campaigns of the French in Italy, to the injudicious selection of a defensive line. The lines are numerous in Upper Italy, for sundry rivers traverse it from the Alps to the sea. The largest and most celebrated, the line of the Po, which passes through all Lombardy, appeared to him objectionable, as too extended. An army, in his opinion, was incapable of defending fifty leagues of barrier. A feint could always open the passage of a great river. He himself had cleared the Po a few leagues from Beaulieu. The other rivers, such as the Tecino, the Adda, the Oglio, falling into the Po, were confounded with it and liable to the same exceptions. The Mincio was fordable, and, besides, it likewise joined the Po. The Adige alone, issuing from the Tyrol and flowing into the sea, barred access into Italy. It was deep, and had but one short channel from the mountains to the sea. It was commanded by two places, Verona and Porto-Legnago, very near each other, and which, without being strong, were capable of resisting a first attack. Lastly, after leaving Legnago, it passed amidst impracticable marshes, which protected the lower part of its course. The rivers, further onward in Upper Italy, such as the Brenta, the Piave, the Tagliamento, were fordable, and furthermore turned by the great road from the Tyrol, which opens to their rear. The Adige, on the contrary, had the advantage of being placed at the gorge of that route, which proceeds along its own valley.

Such were the reasons that decided Bonaparte to prefer this line, and a memorable campaign has demonstrated the soundness of his judgment. The line being occupied, it behoved him to think of commencing the siege of Mantua.

That city, situated on the Mincio, lay behind the Adige, and was protected by that river. It was usually regarded as the bulwark of Italy. Seated in the midst of a lake formed by the waters of the Mincio, it communicated with the mainland by five dykes or causeways. Notwithstanding its great reputation, this fortress had inconveniences which diminished its real strength. In the first place, standing amid marshy exhalations, it was exposed to pestilence; and, secondly, when the causeway-heads were carried, the besieged must retreat into the place, and might be there blockaded by a corps much inferior to the garrison. Bonaparte relied upon taking it before a new army could arrive to the succour of Italy. On the 15th Prairial (3d June), he attacked the causeway-heads, one of which was formed by the suburb of Saint-George, and carried them. From that moment, Serrurier could blockade, with eight thousand men, a garrison which was composed of fourteen, whereof ten were under arms and four in the hospitals. Bonaparte caused the works of the siege to be commenced, and the whole lines of the Adige put in a state of defence. Thus, in less than two months, he had conquered Italy. It now remained for him to defend it. But as to his capacity in that respect, serious doubts were entertained, and all eyes were fixed on him as now to undergo his testing ordeal.

The Directory had recently replied to the observations submitted by Bonaparte on the plan of dividing the army and marching into the peninsula. The ideas of Bonaparte were so just and so forcibly expounded, that they could not fail to strike the mind of Carnot, and his services too signal to allow his resignation to be accepted. The Directory hastened to apprise him that his views were approved, to confirm him in the command of all the forces acting in Italy, and to assure him of the unlimited confidence reposed in him by the government. If the magistrates of the republic had possessed the gift of prophecy, they would have done well to accept the resignation of this young man, although he was right in the opinion he upheld, and although his retreat would have deprived the republic of Italy and of a great captain. But at this moment his youth, his genius, his victories, dazzled all understandings, and the interest and deference they were fitted to inspire naturally weighed with the rulers of the country.

Only one condition did the Directory venture to impose on Bonaparte, which was to make Rome and Naples feel the might of the republic. All the sincere patriots in France ardently desired this manifestation. The pope, who had anathematised France, preached a crusade against her, and permitted the assassination of her ambassador in his capital, assuredly merited chastisement. Bonaparte, now free to act as he listed, purposed to achieve this result without quitting his line of the Adige. Whilst one part of the army guarded that line, and another blockaded Mantua and the citadel of Milan, he determined, with a simple division thrown back upon the Po, to overawe the whole peninsula and compel the pontiff and the Queen of

* This prediction is dated 5th June 1796.

Naples to implore the clemency of the republic. He was informed that a great army, detached from the Rhine, was approaching to dispute the possession of Italy with its conquerors. This army, which must traverse the Black Forest, the Vorarlberg, and the Tyrol, could not arrive in less than a month. He had consequently time to accomplish all his designs in the interior, without removing too far from the Adige, and so as to be able, by a short retrograde march, to return in face of the enemy.

It was high time, in fact, that he turned his attention to the rest of Italy. The presence of the French army had tended to develop opinions through the peninsula with singular rapidity. The Venetian provinces were ready to discard the aristocratic yoke under which they groaned. The city of Brescia manifested an unequivocal disposition to revolt. In all Lombardy, and especially at Milan, public spirit was fermenting with accelerated progress. The dutchies of Modena and Reggio, the legations of Bologna and Ferrara, bore impatiently the sway of their duke and the pope. On the other hand, the contrary party was becoming more hostile. The Genoese aristocracy, in particular, was animated with the worst spirit, and meditated sinister projects on the rear of the French. The Austrian minister Gerola was the secret instigator of those designs. The dominions of Genoa were largely composed of petty fiefs holding of the empire. The Genoese nobles invested with these fiefs collected the deserters, the bandits, the Austrian prisoners who had contrived to escape, the Piedmontese soldiers who had been disbanded, and formed companies of partisans known under the name of *Barbets*. These infested the Apennines on the points by which the French army had entered; they stopped the couriers, pillaged the convoys, massacred the French detachments when they were not sufficiently numerous to defend themselves, and rendered the communications with France precarious and hazardous. In Tuscany the English had become masters of the port of Leghorn, owing to the protection of the governor, and French commerce was harassed and banished. Lastly, Rome was making hostile preparations, England having promised it several thousand men; and Naples, constantly kept in agitation by the caprices of a violent queen, threatened a formidable demonstration. The imbecile king, quitting for a moment his ignoble pursuits, had publicly implored the Divine assistance; in a solemn ceremony, he had divested himself of the royal insignia and consecrated them at the foot of the altar. The whole Neapolitan population had applauded the monarch and rent the air with vengeful vociferations; a multitude of blustering caitiffs, incapable of handling a musket or confronting a French bayonet, demanded arms, and vowed to march against the invaders of Italy.

Although these movements portended nothing very alarming for Bonaparte, so long as he wielded a disposable force of six thousand men, he was urged to repress them before the arrival of the new Austrian army, which would require the presence of all his forces on the Adige. He began to receive reinforcements from the army of the Alps, which enabled him to employ fifteen thousand men in the blockade of Mantua and the castle of Milan, to station twenty thousand for the defence of the Adige, and to move a division on the Po to execute his plans in the south of Italy.

He forthwith repaired to Milan with the view of opening the trenches around the citadel and hastening its reduction. He ordered Augereau, who was on the Mincio, very near the Po, to pass that river at Borgo-Forte, and advance on Bologna. He directed Vaubois to march from Tortona to Modena, with four or five thousand men arrived from the Alps. In this manner, he was enabled to move eight or nine thousand men into the legations of Bologna and Ferrara, and thence to menace the whole peninsula.

He waited for a few days until the inundations on the Lower Po had subsided, before putting his column in motion. Meanwhile, the court of Naples, as fickle as it was violent, had passed from fury to dejection. On learning the last victories of the French in Upper Italy, it had dispatched the Prince of Belmonte-Pignatelli with tenders of submission to the conqueror. Bonaparte referred the question of peace to the Directory, but deemed it fitting to grant an armistice. He was not prepared to advance to the gates of Naples with a few thousand men, and especially at a moment when expecting the arrival of the Austrians. It was sufficient for his immediate purpose to disarm that power, deprive Rome of its support, and embroil it with the coalition. He could not impose contributions on it, as on the other petty princes he had at his mercy, but he wrung from it engagements to open all its ports to the French, withdraw from England five ships and several frigates it had furnished to the naval force of that state, and, finally, recall from the Austrian army the two thousand four hundred cavalry serving in its ranks. This troop of horse was to remain in the hands of Bonaparte, with authority to constitute it captive on the first violation of the armistice. Bonaparte was well assured that such conditions would not satisfy his government; but, at the moment, it behoved him to secure tranquillity in his rear, and he demanded only what he thought he could obtain. The submission of the King of Naples would disable the pope from making any effectual resistance; thus, the expedition on the right of the Po would dwindle, as he wished, into an affair of a few days, and he could return with security to the Adige.

After signing this armistice, he took his departure for the Po, intending to put himself at the head of the two columns he had directed upon the States of the Church, the one under Vaubois, recently arrived from the Alps to reinforce him, and the other under Augereau, which had retrograded from the Mincio on the Po. He viewed with considerable uneasiness the dispositions evinced by Genoa, because it commanded one of the two routes leading into France, and because its senate had always been distinguished for energy in its determinations. He felt that he would have to demand the expulsion of twenty families, the feudatories of Austria and Naples, in order to ensure the preponderance of France in its councils; but he had no orders on this point, and he was moreover repugnant to adopt steps savouring of revolution. He consequently contented himself with writing a letter to the senate, in which he required that the governor of Novi, who had protected the brigands, should be punished in an exemplary manner, and that the Austrian minister should be expelled from Genoa. He furthermore insisted upon a categorical explanation. "Can you, or can you not," he asked, "deliver your territory from the assassins who infest it? If you are unable to take measures, I will take them for you. I will have the towns and villages burnt where a murder is committed; I will have the houses burnt which afford asylum to murderers, and signal chastisement inflicted on the magistrates who tolerate their presence. The murder of a Frenchman shall bring desolation on whole communes that have not prevented it." As he was acquainted with diplomatic procrastination, he detached his aid-de-camp Murat to bear his letter and read it in person to the senate. "We must use a mode of communication," he wrote to the minister Faypoult, "which will electrify those lofty personages." He dispatched Lannes at the same time, with twelve hundred men, to ravage the imperial fiefs. The mansion of Augustin Spinola, the chief instigator of the revolt, was burnt to the ground. The *Barbets* taken with arms in their hands were shot without mercy. The senate of Genoa, intimidated at these portents, superseded the governor of Novi, dismissed the minister Gerola, and undertook to guard the routes with its own troops. It sent Vincent Spinola to Paris, in

order to arrange with the Directory all subjects of dispute—the indemnity due for the frigate *La Modeste*, the expulsion of the feudatory families, and the recall of the exiled families.

Bonaparte subsequently marched on Modena, where he arrived on the 1st Messidor (19th June); Augereau entered Bologna on the same day.

The inhabitants of Modena exhibited the utmost enthusiasm. They poured forth to greet his arrival, and appointed a deputation to congratulate him in glowing terms. The principal amongst them besieged him with solicitations, and earnestly besought him to emancipate them from the yoke of their duke, who had carried his accumulated extortions to Venice. Inasmuch as the regency left by the duke had adhered faithfully to the conditions of the armistice, and as Bonaparte had no grounds of justification warranting him to exercise the rights of conquest on the dutchy, he could not satisfy the wishes of the Modenese: their requests, moreover, involved a question policy rendered it expedient to adjourn. He contented himself with fostering hopes, and in the interim recommended tranquillity. He departed for Bologna. The fortress of Urbino stood on his route; it was the first place belonging to the pope. He summoned it to surrender, and the garrison capitulated. It contained sixty pieces of cannon of large calibre and a few hundred men. Bonaparte caused this heavy artillery to be transported to Mantua, as an auxiliary battering train for the siege of that city. He then advanced to Bologna, where Augereau's division had preceded him. The joy of the inhabitants was boundless. Bologna is a city containing fifty thousand souls, magnificently embellished, and celebrated for its artists, its men of science, and its university. Affection towards France and detestation of the Holy See were the paramount sentiments. Here Bonaparte had no motives for checking ebullitions of revolutionary feeling, as he was in the dominions of an avowed foe, the pope, and he was justified in exercising the right of conquest. The two legations of Ferrara and Bologna commissioned deputies to urge their entreaties: he granted them a provisional independence, promising to procure its recognition on the conclusion of peace.

The Vatican was in dismal alarm, and it hastily dispatched a negotiator to intercede in its favour. The Spanish ambassador, D'Azara, remarkable for his vigorous understanding and his predilection for France, and the minister of a friendly power withal, was chosen as the fittest agent to execute this mission. He had already negotiated for behoof of the Duke of Parma. On his arrival at Bologna, he placed the tiara at the feet of the victorious republic. Faithful to his plan, which consisted as yet in neither subverting nor erecting, Bonaparte was content to demand that the legations of Bologna and Ferrara should remain independent, the town of Ancona receive a French garrison, and the pope furnish twenty-one millions, supplies of corn and cattle, and one hundred pictures or statues. These conditions were accepted. Bonaparte conversed much with the minister D'Azara, and inspired him with an enthusiastic admiration. He transmitted a letter, in the name of the republic, to the celebrated astronomer Oriani, and requested an interview. The modest scholar was abashed in presence of the young conqueror, and rendered him only the touching homage of embarrassment. Bonaparte neglected no opportunity of honouring Italy, of awakening its pride and its patriotism. He was not a barbarous conqueror come to scourge and ravage it, but a hero of liberty, rekindling the fire of genius on its pristine soil, in the ancient land of civilisation. He left Monge, Bertholet, and the brothers Thouin, whom the Directory had commissioned to him, to select the articles destined for the museums of Paris.

On the 8th Messidor (26th June), he passed the Apennines with Vaubois' division, and entered Tuscany. The duke, in terror, sent to him his minister Manfredini. Bonaparte tranquillised him as to his intentions, which, however, he kept profoundly secret. Meanwhile his column moved by forced marches on Leghorn, in which city it made an unexpected appearance, and confiscated the English factory. The governor, Spannochi, was seized, thrust into a close carriage, and dismissed to the grand-duke, with a letter explaining the motives of this act of hostility committed towards a friendly power. The grand-duke was told that his governor had violated all the laws of neutrality by oppressing the French commerce, and by affording asylum to emigrants and other enemies of the republic. It was likewise intimated that, from respect for his authority, the care of punishing this faithless minister was referred to himself. This act of vigour demonstrated to all neutral states that the French general would regulate their police, if they were unmindful of the duty themselves. The French had been unable to seize all the vessels belonging to the English, but their commerce suffered a severe blow. Bonaparte left a garrison in Leghorn, and appointed commissioners to sequestrate all the property appertaining to subjects of England, Austria, and Russia. He subsequently proceeded in person to Florence, where the grand-duke gave him a magnificent reception. After tarrying there a few days, he repassed the Po, and returned to his head-quarters at Roverbella, near Mantua. Thus, an interval of less than three weeks, and a single division deployed on the right bank of the Po, had sufficed him to overawe the princes of Italy, and to ensure peace and quiet during the struggles he had yet to sustain against the Austrian power.

Whilst the army of Italy was performing with such glory the task which had been assigned it in the general plan of the campaign, the armies on the German frontier had not yet been able to move forward. The difficulty of organising their commissariat services, and of procuring horses, had hitherto retained them in inaction. On her part, Austria, who had the strongest motives for promptly taking the initiative, had evinced an inconceivable tardiness in making her preparations, and was not in a condition to commence hostilities before the middle of Prairial (end of May). Her armies were on a formidable footing, and greatly superior to the French. But the successes of the latter in Italy had obliged her to detach Wurmser with thirty thousand of her best troops from the Rhine, for the purpose of rallying and reorganising the wrecks of Beaulieu's forces. Thus, besides its conquests, the army of Italy rendered the important service of relieving from their incubus the armies on the frontier of Germany. The Aulic Council, which had determined to assume the offensive, and to carry the war into the heart of the French provinces, thenceforth thought only of guarding the defensive and opposing an invasion. It would even have willingly allowed the armistice to continue; but its expiry was notified, and hostilities were appointed to commence on the 12th Prairial (31st May).

We have already given a sketch of that theatre of war. The Rhine and the Danube, issuing, the one from the Great Alps and the other from the Suabian Alps, after approximating in the vicinity of the Lake of Constance, separate and proceed on their respective courses, the first towards the north, the latter towards the east of Europe. Two transversal and almost parallel valleys, those of the Maine and the Neckar, form, as it were, two avenues, leading on the one hand into the valley of the Danube through the massive chain of the Suabian Alps, or on the other from the valley of the Danube into that of the Rhine.

This theatre of war, and the plan of operations adapted to it, were not then so well known as now, elucidated as they have since been by great examples. Carnot, who directed the French plans, had adopted a theory based on the celebrated campaign of 1794, which had gained him so vast a renown in Europe.

At that period, the centre of the enemy, being intrenched in the forest of Mormale, in a position defying attack, the French had defiled on his wings, and, by outflanking them, had compelled him to retreat. This result had sunk deep in the memory of Carnot. Endowed with a mind of great originality, but prone to systematise, he had modelled his views upon the incidents of that campaign, and he was persuaded that it was always proper to act simultaneously on the two wings of an army, and strive at all times to outflank them. Military men have regarded this idea as an undoubted progress in the art of war, and as much preferable to the system of cordons disposed to assail the enemy on all points; but it had resolved itself, in the mind of Carnot, into a settled and dangerous system. The circumstances now presenting themselves to him, conduced still more to confirm him in the resolution of pursuing this favourite plan. The army of the Sambre-and-Meuse, and that of the Rhine and Moselle, were both stationed on the Rhine, at two points far distant from one another, and two valleys started from those points, opening the way to the Danube. Here the reasons were all-sufficient for Carnot to form the French into two columns, whereof one ascending by the Maine, the other by the Neckar, they would thus tend to outflank the wings of the imperial armies, and oblige them to retrograde on the Danube. He accordingly enjoined the two generals, Jourdan and Moreau, to proceed, the first from Düsseldorf, the second from Strasburg, and advance separately into Germany. As a great captain and a great critic have both remarked, and as facts subsequently proved, to form into two corps was instantly to give the enemy the faculty and the idea of concentrating his forces, and overwhelming with the entire mass one or other of those two corps. Clairfayt had partially executed that manœuvre in the preceding campaign, by first repulsing Jourdan upon the Lower Rhine, and then throwing himself on the lines of Mayence. Even were the antagonist general not a superior man, he must be thereby constrained to adopt that course; and the thought which genius alone would have inspired, became palpably suggested to his mind.

The invasion, therefore, was planned on this vicious principle. The mode of execution was as injudiciously conceived as the project itself. The line which separated the armies ascended the Rhine from Düsseldorf to Bingen, then described an arc from Bingen to Manheim by the foot of the Vosges, and rejoined the Rhine up to Basle. Carnot directed that the army under Jourdan, debouching by Düsseldorf and the tête-de-pont of Neuwied, should pass, to the number of 40,000 men, on the right bank, in order to draw the attention of the enemy to that point; whilst the rest of his army, 25,000 strong, starting from Mayence under the orders of Marceau, should ascend the Rhine, and, defiling to the rear of Moreau, effect by stealth the passage of the river in the vicinity of Strasburg. Generals Jourdan and Moreau combined in representing to the Directory the evil tendencies of this evolution. Jourdan, reduced to 40,000 men on the Lower Rhine, might be overwhelmed and cut off, whilst the residue of his army would lose incalculable time in ascending from Mayence to Strasburg. It seemed much more natural to allow the passage of the river near Strasburg to be executed by Moreau's extreme right. This manner of proceeding permitted quite as much secrecy as the other, and obviated the loss of a precious interval of time. This modification was admitted. Jourdan, profiting by the two têtes-de-pont he had at Düsseldorf and Neuwied, was first to pass, in order to draw the enemy towards his army, and thus distract attention from the Upper Rhine, where Moreau had a passage to effect by main force.

The plan being thus definitively fixed, preparations were made for putting it in execution. The armies of the hostile nations were nearly equal in strength. Since the departure of Wurmser, the Austrians had along the extensive line of the Rhine one hundred fifty and some odd thousand men, cantoned from Basle to the environs of Düsseldorf. The French had as many, without counting 40,000 men specifically assigned for the defence of Holland, and maintained at its cost. There were certain discrepancies, nevertheless, between the two armies. The Austrians, in their 150,000 men, mustered almost 38,000 horse and 115,000 foot soldiers; whereas the French had upwards of 130,000 foot, and only 15,000 or 18,000 horse at the utmost. This superiority in cavalry gave the Imperialists a decided advantage, especially in retreats. They possessed the still greater advantage of obeying a single general. Since the removal of Wurmser, the two Imperial armies had been placed under the supreme command of the young Archduke Charles, who had already distinguished himself at Turcoing, and from whose talents happy auguries were drawn. The French had two excellent generals, but acting separately, at a great distance from each other, and under the direction of a cabinet seated two hundred leagues from the theatre of war.

The armistice expired on the 11th Prairial (30th May). Hostilities commenced by a general reconnaissance on the advanced posts. Jourdan's army extended, as we are aware, from the environs of Mayence to Düsseldorf. At the latter place he had a tête-de-pont for debouching on the right bank, after which he might ascend between the line of Prussian neutrality and the Rhine to the banks of the Lahn, with the eventual intention of moving from the Lahn on the Maine. The Austrians had fifteen or twenty thousand men scattered from Mayence to Düsseldorf, under the orders of the Prince of Wurtemburg. Jourdan caused Kléber to debouch by Düsseldorf with 25,000 men. That general drove back the Austrians, worsted them at Altenkirchen on the 16th Prairial (4th June), and ascended the right bank between the line of neutrality and the river. When he had reached the height of Neuwied and covered that point, Jourdan, profiting by his tête-de-pont, crossed the river with a part of his forces, and rejoined Kléber on the opposite bank. He thus found himself on the Lahn with about 45,000 men, on the 17th Prairial (5th June). He had left Marceau with 30,000 men before Mayence. The Archduke Charles, who was in the vicinity of Mayence, on learning that the French were repeating the enterprise of the preceding year, and again debouching by Düsseldorf and Neuwied, recoiled with a portion of his troops on the right back, to oppose their march. Jourdan proposed to attack the corps under the Prince of Wurtemburg before he was reinforced; but, being obliged to defer the operation for a day, he lost the opportunity, and was himself attacked at Wetzlar on the 19th (7th June). He skirted the Lahn, having his right on the Rhine and his left at Wetzlar. The archduke, acting with the mass of his forces on Wetzlar, defeated his extreme left, composed of Lefebvre's division, and compelled it to fall back. Jourdan, worsted on the left, was constrained to retire on his right, which touched the Rhine, and thus found himself thrown towards that river. To avoid being forced into it, he must attack the archduke, or, in other words, give battle with the Rhine at his back. He would thus expose himself, in case of defeat, to the difficulties of a retreat on his bridges at Neuwied and Düsseldorf, and perhaps to a disastrous rout. A battle was therefore dangerous, and even useless, since he had fulfilled his object by attracting the enemy to him, and inducing a diversion of the Austrian forces from the Upper to the Lower Rhine. He consequently deemed it prudent under the circumstances to recoil, and gave orders for a retreat, which was conducted with order and firmness. He repassed at Neuwied, and directed Kléber to descend to Düsseldorf, and there likewise cross the Rhine. He recommended him to march leisurely, but to shun any serious action. Kléber, feeling himself too closely pressed at Ukerath,

and carried away by his martial instinct, suddenly faced his enemy and inflicted on him a severe but fruitless blow, and regained his intrenched camp at Düsseldorf. Jourdan, in thus advancing subsequently to return, had performed an ungrateful task for the benefit of the army of the Rhine. Ill-informed persons, in fact, might regard this operation as a defeat; but the zeal of that brave general made him superior to personal considerations, and he waited with composure until the army of the Rhine should have profited by the diversion he had effected, to resume the offensive.

Moreau, who had evinced exemplary prudence, firmness, and imperturbability, in the operations wherein he had been previously employed towards the North, completed his dispositions to perform the task now assigned him. He had resolved to cross the Rhine at Strasburg. That large city formed an excellent point of departure. He could concentrate within it a considerable number of troops. The woody islands, which break the current of the Rhine at that point, facilitated the passage. The fort of Kehl, situated on the opposite bank, might be easily surprised; once occupied, it would become available as a protection to the bridge intended to be thrown before Strasburg.

All arrangements being made in furtherance of this design, and the attention of the enemy directed towards the Lower Rhine, Moreau ordered, on the 26th Prairial (14th June), a general attack on the intrenched camp of Manheim. The object of this attack was to fix on Manheim the attention of General Latour, who commanded the troops on the Upper Rhine under the Archduke Charles, and to confine the Austrians within their line. The attack, conducted with ability and vigour, was completely successful. Immediately afterwards, Moreau directed a part of his forces on Strasburg; a report was circulated that they were proceeding into Italy to reinforce the army there; and, in order to strengthen the rumour, stores of provisions were accumulated on the routes through Franche-Comté. Other troops started at the same time from the environs of Huningen to descend on Strasburg; and as to these, it was pretended they were going into garrison at Worms. These movements were so concerted, that the troops should arrive at the prescribed point on the 5th Messidor (23d June). On that day, in fact, 28,000 men were assembled in the polygon of Strasburg and in the environs, under the command of General Desaix. Ten thousand men were to attempt the passage below Strasburg, in the vicinity of Gambsheim, and 15,000 were to cross from Strasburg to Kehl. On the same evening, the gates of Strasburg were closed, in order that advice of the passage might not be conveyed to the enemy. During the night the troops marched in silence towards the river. The boats were conveyed into the Mobile branch, and thence into the Rhine. The large isle of Ehrlen-Rhein presented an intermediate point favourable to the passage. The boats landed on its shore 2600 men. Fearful of giving the alarm by the report of fire-arms, those brave soldiers charged at the point of the bayonet the troops distributed in the isle, put them to flight, and allowed them no time to break down the little bridges which conducted from the isle to the right bank. These bridges they passed in pursuit; and although neither artillery nor cavalry could follow them, they ventured to debouch alone on the great plain which abuts on the river, and approached Kehl. The Swabian contingent was encamped at a short distance from that place, at Wilstett. The detachments which arrived thence, especially the cavalry, rendered very perilous the situation of the French infantry, which had thus so daringly debouched on the right bank. It hesitated not, however, to send back the boats which had transported it, and thereby to cut off the hope of retreat, in order to bring fresh detachments in aid. Additional troops, in fact, arrived; the French advanced on Kehl, assailed the intrenchments with the bayonet, and stormed them. The artillery found in the fort was instantly turned upon the hostile troops arriving from Wilstett, and they were repulsed. Thereupon a bridge was constructed between Strasburg and Kehl, which was finished the following day, 7th Messidor (25th June). The whole army passed over it. The 10,000 men sent to Gambsheim had not been able to attempt the passage, on account of the flooded state of the river. They remounted to Strasburg, and crossed the stream by the bridge just thrown over it.

This operation had been executed with secrecy, precision, and hardihood. However, the dissemination of the Austrian troops from Basle to Manheim detracted considerably both from the difficulty and the merit. The Prince of Condé was located at Brisach on the Upper Rhine with 3800 men; the contingent of Swabia, to the number of 7500, was at Wilstett, nearly opposite Strasburg; and 8000 men, or thereabouts, under Starrai, were encamped between Strasburg and Manheim. The Austrian forces, therefore, were not very formidable in this quarter; but that very advantage was owing to the secrecy of the passage, and the secrecy again to the prudence with which it had been arranged.

In this situation an opportunity was presented for effecting a series of brilliant achievements. If Moreau had acted with the rapibity of the conqueror of Montenotte, he might have fallen on the corps scattered along the river, destroyed them one after the other, and even succeeded in overwhelming Latour, who was repassing from Manheim on the right bank, and could have at the moment scarcely thirty-six thousand men under his command. He would thus have extinguished the army of the Upper Rhine before the Archduke Charles could have returned from the banks of the Lahn. History shows that promptitude and rapidity are all-powerful in war, as in all situations of life. The enemy, anticipated on all points, is cut off in detail; suffering blow after blow, he has no time to recover himself, becomes demoralised, and loses at once understanding and courage. But this rapidity, whereof we have witnessed such signal examples on the Alps and the Po, supposes more than simple activity; it supposes a grand design, a master mind to form it, great passions impelling to the daring pretension. Nothing great in this world is accomplished without passions—without the ardour and boldness they impart to thought and resolution. Moreau, a man of lucid apprehension and of fortitude, had not that inspiring glow, which, in the tribune or in war, in all situations, elevate men and lead them in their own despite to mighty consummations.

Moreau employed the interval between the 7th and 10th Messidor (25th and 28th June) in collecting his divisions on the right bank of the Rhine. That of Saint-Cyr, which he had left at Manheim, was advancing by forced marches. Whilst awaiting that division, he had at hand 53,000 men, whereas around him were disseminated but 20,000 of the enemy. On the 10th (28th June), he attacked 10,000 Austrians intrenched on the Renchen, defeated them, and took 800 prisoners. The remains of that corps recoiled on Latour, who was ascending the right bank. On the 12th (30th June), Saint-Cyr having arrived, the whole army was on the German side of the river. It counted 63,000 foot soldiers and 6000 horse, forming a total of 71,000 men. Moreau gave the right to Ferino, the centre to Saint-Cyr, and the left to Desaix. He found himself at the base of the Black Mountains.

The Swabian Alps form a barrier which throws, as we know, the Danube to the east, the Rhine to the north: it is through this chain the Neckar and the Maine wind their course to the Rhine. They are mountains of moderate elevation, covered with wood, and traversed by narrow defiles. The valley of the Rhine is separated from that of the Neckar by a ridge called the Black Mountains. Moreau, now clear of

the Rhine, was at their base. He must surmount them to debouch into the valley of the Neckar. The Swabian contingent and the corps of Condé ascended towards Switzerland to guard the upper passes of the Black Mountains. Latour, with the principal corps, was returning from Manheim to guard the lower passes by Rastadt, Ettlingen, and Pforzheim. Moreau might, without danger, have neglected the detachments retiring in the direction of Switzerland, and moved, with the entire mass of his forces, on Latour: he must infallibly have overwhelmed him. Then he would have debouched victoriously into the valley of the Neckar, before the Archduke Charles. But, as a circumspect general, he confided to Ferino the task of following with his right the detached corps of Swabia and Condé, whilst he sent Saint-Cyr, with the centre, directly towards the mountains, to occupy certain heights, and skirted in person their base, to reach Rastadt and meet Latour. This march was doubly enjoined him by his own caution and the plans of Carnot. He wished to cover himself on all points, and at the same time to extend his line towards Switzerland, to be prepared to support by the Alps the army of Italy. He commenced his movement on the 12th (30th June). He marched between the Rhine and the mountains, in a broken country, intersected with wood and ploughed by torrents. He advanced with discretion, and only arrived at Rastadt on the 15th (3d July). There was still time to overwhelm Latour, who had not been yet joined by the Archduke Charles. That prince, on being apprised of the passage over the Rhine, had started with a reinforcement of 25,000 men, proceeding by forced marches. He left 36,000 on the Lahn, and 27,000 before Mayence, to keep Jourdan in check, the whole under the orders of General Wartensleben. He was hastening to the scene of action with all possible dispatch; but his heads of columns were as yet far distant. Latour, after having left a garrison in Manheim, had at the utmost 36,000 men under his command. He was drawn up on the Murg, which flows into the Rhine, having his left at Gernsbach, in the mountains; his centre, at their foot, towards Kuppenheim, a little in advance of the Murg; his right in the plain, skirting the woods of Neiderbuhl, which stretch to the bank of the Rhine; and his reserve at Rastadt. It was imprudent in Latour to engage before the arrival of the archduke. But his position inspiring him with confidence, he determined to resist, in order to cover the great road which, from Rastadt, opens on the Neckar.

Moreau had with him only his left wing; his centre, under Saint-Cyr, had remained behind to take possession of some posts in the Black Mountains. This circumstance reduced the inequality of force. He attacked Latour on the 17th (5th July). His troops conducted themselves with distinguished valour, carried the position of Gernsbach on the Upper Murg, and penetrated to Kuppenheim, towards the centre of the enemy's position. But in the plain his divisions experienced difficulty in debouching, under the heavy fire of the artillery and in presence of the numerous Austrian cavalry. Nevertheless, the French attained Niederbuhl and Rastadt, and succeeded in rendering themselves masters of the Murg on all points. They made a thousand prisoners.

Moreau halted on the field of battle, without attempting to pursue the enemy. The archduke had not arrived, and he might yet have annihilated Latour; but he found his troops fatigued, he felt the necessity of drawing Saint-Cyr to his assistance, in order to act with a greater mass, and he waited until the 21st (9th July) before hazarding a fresh attack. This interval of four days allowed the archduke to come up with a reinforcement of 25,000 men, and the Austrians to give battle on equal terms.

The respective positions of the two armies were nearly the same. They were both on a line perpendicular to the Rhine, a wing in the mountains, the centre at their base, the other wing in the woody and marshy plain skirting the river. Moreau, on whom appreciation dawned slowly but always in time, as he preserved the calmness requisite to rectify his errors, had become sensible, during the conflict at Rastadt, of the importanee of making his principal effort in the mountains. He, in fact, who was master of them, possessed the avenues into the valley of the Neckar, the main object of dispute; he might, moreover, outflank his adversary, and push him into the Rhine. Moreau had an additional reason for fighting in the mountains, namely, his superiority in infantry and his inferiority in cavalry. The archduke equally felt the importance of establishing himself on them; but he had, in his numerous squadrons, a reason for also keeping on the plain. He amended the position assumed by Latour: he threw the Saxons into the mountains to outflank Moreau; he reinforced the plateau of Rothensohle, where his left rested; and he deployed his centre at the foot of the mountains in front of Malsch, and his cavalry in the plain. He purposed to attack on the 22d (10th July). Moreau anticipated him, and attacked on the 21st (9th July).

General Saint-Cyr, whom Moreau had countermanded, and who now formed the right, assailed the plateau of Rothensohle. He displayed all that precision and ability in manœuvring which distinguished him during his eminent career. Finding himself unable to dislodge the enemy from that formidable position, he surrounded him with sharpshooters, made a spirited charge, and pretended to fly, in order to induce the Austrians to quit their position and rush in pursuit of the French. This stratagem succeeded. The Austrians, seeing the French advance and then fly in disorder, plunged after them. Saint-Cyr, who had troops in readiness, thereupon propelled them on the Austrians, who had quitted their position, and rendered himself master of the plateau. After this achievement, he advanced, intimidated the Saxons destined to outflank the French right, and obliged them to fall back. At Malsch, in the centre, Desaix engaged the Austrians in an animated action, took and lost that village, and concluded the day by moving on the last heights which wind along the foot of the mountains. In the plain, the French cavalry had not engaged, Moreau having kept it on the skirts of the woods.

The battle, therefore, was indecisive, except in the mountains. But that was the important point; for Moreau, by pursuing his success, might extend his right wing around the archduke, wrest from him the avenues of the valley of the Neckar, and push him into the Rhine. It is true that the archduke, if he lost the mountains, which were his base, might, in his turn, deprive Moreau of the Rhine, which was the French base; he might renew his effort in the plain, defeat Desaix, and, advancing along the Rhine, set Moreau, as it were, adrift in a hostile country. On such occasions, it is the least adventurous who is compromised; he who deems himself cut off, is so in fact. The archduke considered it incumbent on him to retire, that he might not endanger, by a hazardous evolution, the Austrian monarchy, whose only support rested on his army. He has been blamed for this resolution, which led to the retreat of the Imperial armies, and exposed Germany to an invasion. We may admire those dazzling and daring flights of genius, which achieve great results at the risk of great perils; but we cannot mould them into precedents. Prudence is a stern duty, in such a situation as that of the archduke; and he cannot be justly censured for having retrograded, in order to forestall Moreau in the valley of the Neckar, and thus protect the hereditary states. His determination was promptly taken to abandon Germany, which no line could now cover, and to move, by ascending the Maine and the Neckar, on the grand line guarding the hereditary states, that of the Danube, This river, defended by the two fortresses of Ulm and Ratisbon, was the surest bulwark of Austria. There

concentrating his forces, the archduke was close upon his resources, and in possession of a great river, with forces equal to those of the enemy, with the power of manœuvring on both banks, and of overwhelming one of the two invading armies. The enemy, on the contrary, would be far from his resources, at an immense distance from his base, without that superiority of strength which obviates the danger of such removal, with the disadvantage of a most difficult country to traverse, either for invading or retreating, and finally, with the inconvenience of being divided into two armies and commanded by two generals. Thus the Imperialists gained by approximating to the Danube all that the French forfeited. But, to ensure all these advantages, the archduke must reach the Danube without suffering the calamity of a defeat; consequently his course henceforward was to retire with firmness, but avoiding the hazard of an engagement.

The archduke therefore ordered Wartensleben, after leaving garrisons in Mayence, Ehrenbreitstein, Cassel, and Manheim, to retire gradually by the valley of the Maine, and to gain the Danube, engaging the enemy sufficiently day by day to sustain the moral courage of his troops, but not sufficiently to compromise them in a general action. He adopted the same plan with his own army; he moved it from Pforzheim into the valley of the Neckar, and there delayed only the time necessary to collect his parks and to secure them leisure to retire. Wartensleben retrograded with 30,000 foot and 15,000 horse, the archduke with 40,000 infantry and 18,000 cavalry, which made 103,000 men in all. The remainder was in the fortresses, or had defiled by the Upper Rhine into Switzerland before General Ferino, who commanded Moreau's right wing.

As soon as Moreau had constrained the Austrians to retreat, the army under Jourdan again passed the Rhine at Düsseldorf and Neuwied, manœuvring as it had previously done, and advanced on the Lahn, with the view of subsequently debouching into the valley of the Maine. The two French armies, therefore, marched forward in two columns, along the Maine and the Neckar, following the two imperial armies, which effected their retreat in admirable order. The numerous squadrons of the Austrians, hovering in the rear, kept the French in check, covered their infantry from insult, and rendered futile all efforts to force it into battle. Moreau, having had no fortress to mask when detaching himself from the Rhine, led on 71,000 men. Jourdan, having been obliged to blockade Mayence, Cassel, and Ehrenbreitstein, and to assign 27,000 men to conduct those operations, advanced with but 46,000, being a mere trifle superior to Wartensleben.

In accordance with the vicious plan of Carnot, the French generals still deemed it imperative to outflank the wings of the enemy, that is to say, to derogate from the essential object—the junction of the two armies. This junction would have enabled the French to bear down upon the Danube in a mass of 115,000 or 120,000 men, an overwhelming, enormous mass, which would have destroyed all the calculations of the archduke, rendered nugatory all his endeavours to concentrate his forces, passed the Danube before his eyes, carried Ulm, and, with that basis, menaced Vienna and shaken the imperial throne.*

Conformably, then, with this plan of Carnot, Moreau was to bear towards the Upper Rhine and the Upper Danube, and Jourdan towards Bohemia. Moreau was supplied with an additional reason for keeping in that direction, namely, the possibility of communicating with the army of Italy by the Tyrol, which presumed the execution of Bonaparte's gigantic plan, justly discountenanced by the Directory. As Moreau desired, at the same time, not to be too far detached from Jourdan, but to give him his left hand whilst he extended the right to the army of Italy, he was seen, on the banks of the Neckar, occupying a line of fifty leagues. Jourdan, on his part, charged to outflank Wartensleben, was compelled to remove from Moreau; and as Wartensleben, a general of the old routine school, failed to comprehend the idea of the archduke, and instead of approximating to the Danube diverged towards Bohemia in order to cover it, Jourdan, striving to outflank him, was forced to expand still more widely. Thus it chanced that the antagonist armies did, each for itself, the contrary of what they ought to have done. There was, however, this difference between Wartensleben and Jourdan, that the first derogated from an excellent order, and that the latter was obliged to follow a bad one. The fault of Wartensleben was exclusively his own, that of Jourdan was chargeable on the director Carnot.

Moreau fought with the enemy at Canstadt to gain the passage of the Neckar, and subsequently plunged into the defiles of the Alb, a chain of mountains which separates the Necker from the Danube, as the Black Mountains separate it from the Rhine. He cleared those defiles, and finally debouched into the valley of the Danube, towards the middle of Thermidor (end of July), after a month's march. Jourdan, after having passed from the banks of the Lahn to those of the Maine, and met the enemy in conflict at Freidberg, halted before the city of Frankfort, which he threatened to bombard unless it were instantly delivered into his hands. The Austrians consented to this surrender on condition of obtaining an armistice for two days. By this suspension of arms they would be enabled to cross the Maine and gain a considerable advance; but it would save from destruction a flourishing city, whose resources might be serviceable to the army. Jourdan assented to the proposition. The place was surrendered on the 28th Messidor (16th July). Jourdan imposed contributions upon Frankfort, but evinced great moderation in the levy, and even displeased his army by the regard he manifested for a hostile country. The report of the abundance amidst which the army of Italy revelled had inflamed the desires of the French soldiers, and they panted for the like profusion in Germany. Jourdan afterwards ascended the Maine, took possession of Wurzburg on the 7th Thermidor (25th July), and eventually debouched beyond the mountains of Swabia, on the banks of the Naab, which falls into the Danube. He was almost parallel with Moreau, and at the same period, that is to say, towards the middle of Thermidor (commencement of August). Swabia and Saxony had acceded to a neutrality, sent agents to Paris to treat for peace, and consented to pay contributions. The Saxon and Swabian troops accordingly withdrew, and thus weakened the Austrian army by twelve thousand men, who had been in fact of little use, having fought without energy or zeal.

Thus, in the middle of summer, the French armies, masters of Italy, which they wholly ruled, and of one-half of Germany, which they had overrun as far as the Danube, held the most menacing of attitudes towards Europe. For two months La Vendée had been hushed and subdued. Of the one hundred thousand men distributed over the western provinces, fifty thousand might be detached and moved on any point at pleasure. The pledges of the Directorial government could not have been more gloriously redeemed.

* On this subject may be consulted the deductions which Napoleon has drawn, and which he has accredited by such memorable examples.

CHAPTER XLVIII.

INTERNAL STATE OF FRANCE IN THE MIDDLE OF 1796. —FINANCIAL EMBARRASSMENTS.—RENEWAL OF THE FAMILY-COMPACT WITH SPAIN, AND PROJECT OF QUADRUPLE ALLIANCE.—PROJECTED EXPEDITION INTO IRELAND.—BATTLES OF LONATO AND CASTIG-

LIONE IN ITALY. — OPERATIONS ON THE DANUBE; BATTLE OF NERESHEIM.—MARCH OF BONAPARTE ON THE BRENTA; BATTLES OF ROVEREDO, BASSANO, AND ST GEORGE.—BATTLE OF WURZBURG; RETREAT OF MOREAU AND OF JOURDAN.

FRANCE had never worn a more imposing external aspect than during this summer of 1796; but its domestic situation bore little analogy with its outward splendour. Paris, in particular, offered a singular spectacle. The patriots, deeply incensed at the arrest of Babœuf, Drouet, and their other leaders, execrated the government, and no longer rejoiced at the victories of the republic, since they conduced to the advantage of the Directory. The avowed enemies of the revolution obstinately denied them altogether; whilst men tired of and estranged from it seemed to place but little credence in them. Certain newly enriched individuals, who owed their wealth to stockjobbing or to contracts, displayed an unbridled luxury, and manifested a most ungrateful indifference for that revolution which had raised them to affluence. This morbid condition was the inevitable result of a general fatigue in the nation, of inveterate passions in parties, and of cupidity stimulated by a financial crisis. But, happily, there were still many Frenchmen enthusiastic republicans, whose sentiments had not varied—whose hearts were gladdened by the victories of the armies—who, far from denying them, hailed the tidings with transport, and who pronounced with zealous affection and admiration the names of Hoche, Jourdan, Moreau, and Bonaparte. These desired that additional efforts should be made—that the malignants and the lukewarm should be compelled to contribute, with all their means, to the glory and grandeur of the republic.

To obscure the lustre of the victories, the factions applied themselves to decry the generals. They were especially envenomed against the youngest and most brilliant, Bonaparte, whose name, in the short space of two months, had become so famous. On the 13th Vendémiaire he had struck terror into the royalists, and they treated him with corresponding asperity in their journals. It was known that he had exhibited a sufficiently imperious character in Italy; attention had been peculiarly drawn to the manner in which he acted with regard to the states of that country, granting or refusing at his pleasure armistices which determined the question of peace or war; and it was moreover ascertained that, without using the medium of the treasury, he had remitted funds to the army of the Rhine. Hence a malicious pleasure was taken in averring him to be intractable, and in circulating assurances that he was to be superseded. Thus a great general was to be lost to the republic—an importunate glory to be abruptly stifled. In this spirit the malignants disseminated rumours of the most preposterous description; they even ventured to assert that Hoche, who was then at Paris, was on the eve of starting to arrest Bonaparte in the midst of his army. The government deemed it fitting to write a letter to Bonaparte contradicting these reports, and in which it reiterated the expression of its entire confidence. It caused this letter to be published in all the journals. The gallant Hoche, incapable of any base jealousy towards a rival who in two months had placed himself above the first generals of the republic, likewise wrote to repudiate the part malevolence assigned to him. The letter he penned on this occasion, so honourable to both the young heroes, is worthy of record; it was addressed to the minister of police, and was made known through the usual channels of publicity.

"Citizen minister—Men who, concealed or unknown during the first years of the foundation of the republic, now appear in it only to seek the means of destroying it, and speak of it only to calumniate its firmest upholders, have for the last few days circulated reports most injurious to the armies and to one of the general officers who command them. Is it then no longer sufficient for them, in order to attain their object, to correspond openly with the conspiring horde domesticated at Hamburg? Must they, in order to obtain the favour of the masters they would fain give to France, degrade the leaders of our armies? Do they think that the latter, as weak as in times past, will allow themselves to be slandered without daring to reply—to be accused without defending themselves? Why, then, is Bonaparte the object of these men's fury? Is it because he has defeated their friends and themselves in Vendémiaire? Is it because he dissolves the armies of kings, and furnishes to the republic the means of gloriously terminating this honourable war? Ah! intrepid youth, what republican soldier burns not with desire to imitate thee? Courage, Bonaparte! Lead our victorious armies to Naples and to Vienna; reply to thy personal enemies by humbling kings—by investing our arms with a new lustre; and leave us to take care of thy glory!

I have smiled with pity on seeing a man, who in other respects has great intelligence, profess disquietude, which he feels not, concerning the powers granted to the French generals. You know them all indifferently well, citizen minister. Which of them, even suppósing him to possess sufficient influence over his army to make it march against the government—which of them, I ask, could attempt to do so, without being instantly overpowered by his colleagues in command? The generals scarcely know each other, rarely correspond together. Their number ought to inspire confidence as to the designs gratuitously attributed to one of them. Are we ignorant of the sway exercised over men by envy, ambition, hatred, I may add, I think, love of country and honour? Dismiss your fears, then, good republicans.

Some journalists have carried absurdity to the point of sending me into Italy to arrest a man whom I esteem, and of whom the government has the greatest reason to be proud. They may be assured that in the times in which we live, few general officers would undertake to discharge the duties of gendarmes, although many are disposed to combat factions and the factious.

Since my residence at Paris I have seen men of all opinions; I have been able to appreciate some at their just value. There are those who think that the government cannot go on without them: these bellow to get places. Others, although no one concerns himself about them, think that their destruction has been sworn: they bellow to render themselves interesting. I had seen emigrants, more Frenchmen than royalists, weep for joy at the recital of our victories; I have since seen Parisians cast doubts on their reality. It has appeared to me that an audacious party, but devoid of means, would subvert the actual government to substitute anarchy in lieu; that a second, more dangerous, more astute, having friends in all quarters, labours for the overthrow of the republic, to confer on France the hobbling constitution of 1791 and a thirty years' civil war; lastly, that a third, if it continues to despise the two others and wield over them the empire with which the laws invest it, will vanquish them, because it is composed of sincere, indefatigable, and honest republicans, whose means are talents and virtues—because it counts in the number of its partisans all the good citizens, and the armies, which have assuredly not conquered for the last five years to allow their country to be enslaved."

These two letters dissipated all sinister reports, and imposed silence on the malevolent.

In the midst of its glory, the government inspired pity by its indigence. The new paper-money had sustained its credit but a short period, and its fall deprived the Directory of an important resource. We remember that, on the 26th Ventôse (16th March), two thousand four hundred millions of mandats had been created, and hypothecated on a corresponding value in national domains. Part of those mandats

had been devoted to the redemption of the twenty-four thousand millions of assignats remaining in circulation, and the remainder to meet growing exigencies. It was in some sort, as we have stated, a re-issue of the old paper, with a new title and a new figure. The twenty-four thousand millions of assignats were replaced by eight hundred millions of mandats; and, instead of issuing other forty-eight thousand millions of assignats, sixteen hundred millions of mandats were created. The difference was therefore in the name and the amount. There was a great distinction, also, in the hypothecation; for the assignats, from the effect of auctions, did not represent a determinate value of property; the mandats, on the contrary, being exchangeable against property on the simple offer of the valuation of 1790, did actually represent the sum of two thousand four hundred millions. This advantage, however, failed to prevent their depreciation, which was the result of different causes. France was altogether adverse to paper, and refused to put any faith in it. Now, however solid may be the guarantees, when no heed is given to them, they are as if they existed not. Moreover, the amount of the paper, although reduced, was not sufficiently so. Twenty-four thousand millions of assignats were converted into eight hundred millions of mandats, thereby reducing the old paper to the thirtieth part; whereas it ought to have been reduced to the two-hundredth part, in strict relation to the actual circumstances, for twenty-four thousand millions were worth at the utmost but one hundred and twenty millions. To reproduce them in the circulation to the extent of eight hundred millions, by changing them into mandats, was an error. It is true that an equivalent amount of property was allocated for them; but an estate which in 1790 was worth one hundred thousand francs, would now command but twenty-five or thirty thousand francs; consequently, the paper bearing this new title and figure, had it even exactly represented the domains, could be worth, like them, but the third of the value. Therefore, the endeavour to give it circulation at par, was again to uphold a fiction. Thus, even had it been possible to revive confidence in paper, the exaggerated supposition of its value must always have caused it to decline. Accordingly, although its circulation was forced by legislative provision, it was accepted for a very brief interval. The violent measures which had intimidated in 1793, were inoperative at the present time. All transactions were conducted on a metallic basis. The specie, which had been deemed buried or exported abroad, appeared abundantly in circulation. Such as had been concealed was again brought forth, such as had been carried out of France was re-imported. The southern provinces were filled with dollars, which came from Spain, drawn thither by the demand. Gold and silver flow, like all articles of merchandise, where a demand exists for them; only their price is higher, which is kept up until the supply be adequate and the want be satisfied. There were still certain frauds committed by liquidations in mandats, because the laws, giving a forced currency to the paper, permitted its employment in acquittances of bygone engagements; but few ventured to take advantage of the enactment, and all fresh bargains were universally made in specie. Nothing but gold or silver was seen in the markets; the wages of the labouring population were paid exclusively in coin. It might have been imagined that no paper-money existed in France. The mandats were found only in the hands of speculators, who received them from the government, and sold them to intending purchasers of national property.

In this manner, the financial crisis, although still subsisting for the state, had almost ceased for individuals. Commerce and industry, profiting by the first interval of repose, and the partial communications reopened with the continent in consequence of the victories of the republic, began to resume some activity. It is not necessary, as governments have the folly to allege, that production should be encouraged to become prosperous; all it requires is not to be cramped. It seizes the first moment to develop itself with wonderful activity. But if individuals recovered at this period a degree of competence, it was otherwise with the government, that is to say, with its heads, its agents of all kinds, military, administrative, or magisterial, and its creditors, who were reduced to the direst misery. The mandats given to them were useless in their hands; their only mode of turning them to account was to dispose of them to the speculators in paper, who took them at the rate of six for one hundred, and afterwards resold them to the purchasers of national domains. Thus the stockholders were perishing in absolute destitution; the functionaries of government threw up their situations; and, contrary to usage, instead of soliciting employments, men shunned or resigned them. The armies of Germany and Italy, living in the enemy's country, were excepted from the common misery; but the armies in the interior were in a deplorable state of distress. Hoche subsisted his soldiers solely by the provisions collected in the western provinces, and he was obliged to maintain the military system in those districts, that he might be enabled to levy contributions in kind. As to the officers and himself, they had not wherewithal to clothe themselves. The supply of magazines established in France for troops marching through it, had often failed, because the contractors would advance nothing more. The detachments sent from the coasts of the ocean to reinforce the army of Italy were stopped on the road. On some occasions even hospitals had been closed, and the unfortunate soldiers who occupied them expelled from the asylum the republic owed to their infirmities, because neither medicines nor aliment could be provided for them. The gendarmerie was entirely disorganised. Being neither clad nor equipped, it scarcely performed any duty. The gendarmes, wishing to save their horses, which were not replaced, no longer protected the routes; brigands, who abound at the close of civil wars, infested them. They scoured the country, and even penetrated into towns, committing murder and robbery with unparalleled audacity.

Such, then, was the internal state of France. The particular characteristic of this new crisis was the destitution of the government amidst a return of comparative affluence amongst individuals. The Directory drew its means of livelihood from the proceeds of paper alone, eked out by certain remittances sent it by the armies from abroad. General Bonaparte had already transmitted to it thirty millions, together with one hundred carriage-horses, to contribute somewhat to its pomp.

It was now proposed to demolish the whole fabric of paper-money. For that purpose all forced currency must be abrogated, and the taxes received only in real worth. It was accordingly declared, on the 28th Messidor (16th July), that every one might bargain as he pleased, and stipulate in money of his own choosing; that mandats should be receivable only at their current value; and that the rate of exchange should be daily ascertained and published by the treasury. The resolution was at length hazarded, also, that the taxes should be gathered in specie, or in mandats at the pair of exchange; the only exception was with regard to the land-tax. Since the creation of mandats, it had been rendered leviable in paper and not in kind. Experience had shown it would have been better to have continued its receipt in kind, because, amidst all the depreciations of the paper, provisions would at least have been collected. It was decided, therefore, after prolonged discussions, and several projects successively rejected by the Ancients, that, in the frontier departments, or those adjoining the stations of armies, the collection might be exacted in kind; but that in the others it should be taken in mandats on a corn standard. Thus, wheat was valued at ten francs the quintal in 1790; it was now valued at eighty francs in man-

dats. Every ten francs of assessment, representing a quintal of wheat, was now to be paid by eighty francs in mandats. It would have been much more simple to exact the payment in specie or in mandats at the par of exchange; but this was too bold a measure. A return, therefore, was commenced to reality, but with hesitation.

The forced loan was not yet collected. The government no longer possessed that despotic energy which might have ensured the prompt execution of such a measure. There remained nearly three hundred millions to receive. It was decreed that, in payment of the loan and of taxes, mandats should be accepted at par and assignats at the rate of one for a hundred, but merely during fifteen days, after which period the paper was to be receivable only at the course of exchange. This was an inducement to encourage the discharge of arrears.

The downfall of mandats being declared, it was no longer possible to receive them in full payment for the national domains specifically allocated in their behalf; and the bankruptcy which had been predicated with respect to them, as previously to assignats, became inevitable. It had been announced, in fact, that, the mandats issued for two thousand four hundred millions having fallen far below that value, and being worth no more than two or three hundred millions, the state would not continue to give the promised amount of property, that is to say, two thousand four hundred millions' worth of land. The contrary had been maintained for a while, in the hope that mandats would retain a certain value; but one hundred francs falling to five or six, the state could no longer give a property, say worth one hundred francs in 1790 and thirty or forty at the present time, for five or six francs. This was the species of bankruptcy the assignats had undergone, the nature of which we have previously explained. The state did then what a sinking-fund does now, which redeems at the price of the day, and which, in case of an extraordinary decline, might happen to redeem at fifty what had been issued at eighty or ninety. Accordingly, it was enacted, on the 8th Thermidor (26th July), that the fourth instalment for the national domains, subscribed for since the law of the 26th Ventôse (that creating the mandats), should be liquidated in mandats at the course of exchange, and in six equal payments. As applications had been made for eight hundred millions' worth of domains, this fourth amounted to two hundred millions.

The paper-money, therefore, was progressing to extinction. It may be asked, why this second issue of mandats was adventured—a new paper so short-lived and unsuccessful. In general, measures of this kind are judged too independently of the circumstances that have commanded them. The apprehension of a total deficiency of specie had doubtless contributed to induce the creation of mandats; and if there had been no other reason, it would have been a very foolish measure, as specie cannot fail altogether in such a country as France; but the principal cause was the imperious necessity of living by the domains and of anticipating their sale. It was indispensably requisite to put their value in circulation before realising it, and for that purpose to emit it in the form of a paper-money. Certainly the resource had not proved considerable, as the mandats had declined so rapidly; but still the state had existed for other four or five months. And was that nothing? The mandats must be considered as a new discount of the value of the national domains—as an expedient pending the actual sale of those domains. We shall see the government pass through many paroxysms of distress ere the moment arrived when that sale could be effectuated in the precious metals.

The treasury was not destitute of resources immediately exigible; but it was with those resources as with the national domains—the difficulty was to render them available. It had yet to receive three hundred millions of the forced loan; three hundred millions for the land-tax of the current year, that is to say, the whole amount of that impost; twenty-five millions of miscellaneous taxes; all the rents of the national domains, and the arrears of those rents, amounting in all to sixty millions; different military contributions; the produce of the moveables of emigrants; divers arrears; eighty millions of paper on foreign countries. All these items, added to the two hundred millions from the last instalment of the price of sold domains, amounted to eleven hundred millions, an enormous sum, but difficult to realise. The treasury only required, to complete its year, that is say, to manage until the 1st of Vendémiaire, four hundred millions; if it could forthwith realise them out of the eleven hundred millions due, its exigencies would be met. For the following year, it had the ordinary contributions, which were all expected to be paid in specie, and which, amounting to five hundred and some odd millions, would cover what was called the ordinary expenditure. For the expenses of the war, in case of a fresh campaign, it had the residue of the eleven hundred millions, of which it was to absorb this year but four hundred millions, and it had, moreover, all further sales of national domains. But the difficulty still consisted in grasping these sums. The disposable funds must come from the products of the year; yet it was almost impracticable to gather all simultaneously from the forced loan, the land and assessed taxes, and the sale of domains. Meanwhile, increased exertions were to be used in collecting the various contributions, and the Directory was invested with the extraordinary power of pledging the Belgian property for one hundred millions in specie. The rescriptions, a species of exchequer bills designed to forestall the receipts of the year, had partaken the fate of all the paper. Being unable to make use of that expedient, the minister paid contractors in ordinances of liquidation, which were to be made good out of the first receipts.

Such were the distresses of this government, so glorious in its outward aspect. The two parties, meanwhile, had never ceased from agitating in the interior. The submission of La Vendée had greatly reduced the hopes of the royalist faction; but the agents at Paris were only the more convinced of the excellence of their old plan, which consisted in refraining from the employment of civil war, and in corrupting opinions and gradually gaining possession of the councils and other authorities. They laboured through their journals to attain these objects. As to the patriots, they had reached the highest pitch of indignation. They had facilitated the flight of Drouet, who had contrived to escape from prison; and they meditated fresh plots, notwithstanding the recent discovery of that formed by Babœuf. Sundry old conventionalists and Thermidorians, heretofore warm partisans of the government they had themselves constituted on the morrow of the 13th Vendémiaire, began to be discontented. By an existing law, ex-conventionalists and all superseded functionaries were enjoined to quit Paris. The police, through inadvertence, sent mandates of withdrawal to four conventionalists, members of the legislative body. These mandates were denounced with acrimony in the Council of Five Hundred. Tallien, who, since the discovery of Babœuf's conspiracy, had strongly declared his adhesion to the system of the government, inveighed with vehemence against the police of the Directory, and against the suspicions with which the patriots were regarded and harassed. His habitual adversary, Thibaudeau, replied to him, and after an animated discussion, mingled with much recrimination, the feeling of resentment was left only rankling the more bitterly. The minister Cochon, his agents and spies, were in an especial degree the objects of detestation on the part of the patriots, who had been the first to experience the effect of their

surveillance. The course of the government was meanwhile distinctly traced; if it had unequivocally declared against the royalists, it had also totally separated from the patriots, that is to say, from that portion of the revolutionary party which desired to revert to a more democratic republic, and which deemed the existing system too mild towards aristocrats. But, setting aside the state of the finances, this position of the Directory, holding aloof from all parties and curbing them with a vigorous hand, whilst deriving support from victorious armies, was upon the whole cheering and auspicious.

The patriots had already made two attempts and suffered two discomfitures since the installation of the Directory. They had essayed to recompose the Jacobin Club at the Pantheon, and had found themselves excluded from that edifice by the government. They had afterwards concocted a mysterious plot under the direction of Babœuf; they had been discovered by the police and deprived of their new leaders. They still pursued their projects, nevertheless, and proposed to hazard a last enterprise. The opposition in the two councils, by again assailing the law of the 3d Brumaire, aroused in them a redoubled inveteracy of rage, and impelled them to a final explosion. They strove to corrupt the legion of police. That legion had been dissolved, and converted into a regiment forming the 21st dragoons. This regiment they now tampered with, hoping that, if they gained it, they would draw after it the entire army of the interior, encamped in the plain of Grenelle. They purposed at the same time to excite a movement in Paris, by discharging muskets and throwing white cockades into the streets, raising shouts of *The king for ever!* and thus leading to the supposition that the royalists were arming and preparing to subvert the republic. Their intention was to take advantage of this pretext, fly to arms, seize upon the government, and induce the camp of Grenelle to declare in their favour.

On the 12th Fructidor (29th August), they executed a part of their scheme, firing petards and scattering white cockades in the streets. But the police, being forewarned, had taken such precautions that they were unable to incite any movement. They were not discouraged, however; and a few days afterwards, on the 22d (9th September), they determined to accomplish their design. Thirty of the principal patriots met at Gros-Caillon, and resolved to form a muster that very night in the quarter of Vaugirard. This quarter, adjacent to the camp of Grenelle, was full of gardens and intersected by stone walls; it presented ramparts behind which they might gather and resist, in case they were attacked. In the evening, accordingly, they assembled to the number of seven or eight hundred, armed with muskets, pistols, sabres, and sword-sticks. This party comprised all the most determined characters in the patriot faction. There were amongst them a few superseded officers, who appeared at the head of the assemblage in their uniforms, and wearing epaulettes. Certain ex-conventionalists in the costume of representatives also formed part of the group; and even Drouet, it is alleged, who had remained since his escape concealed in Paris, was present. An officer of the Directorial guard, at the head of ten horsemen, was patrolling through Paris, when he received intelligence of the muster organised at Vaugirard. He hastened thither at the head of this feeble detachment; but, on his arrival, he was saluted with a volley of musketry and assaulted by two hundred armed men, whereupon he retreated at full gallop. He immediately proceeded to place under arms the Directorial guard, and dispatched an officer to the camp of Grenelle to give the alarm. The patriots lost no time after this flagrant outrage, but repaired in all haste to the plain of Grenelle, counting several hundreds. They advanced towards the quarter of the 21st dragoons, late the legion of police, and sought to gain the regiment by assurances that they had come to fraternise with it. Colonel Malo, who commanded this corps, rushed from his tent, half-clad, sprang on horseback, gathered around him some officers and all the dragoons he encountered, and charged sword in hand upon those who thus proposed to fraternise with his men. This example decided the soldiers: they hurried to their horses, fell upon the crowd, and quickly dispersed it. They slew or wounded a great number of the insurgents, and apprehended one hundred and thirty-two. The noise of the combat aroused the whole camp, which was placed under arms, and spread alarm through Paris. But confidence was speedily restored, on the result and folly of the enterprise being made known. The Directory caused the prisoners to be immured, and demanded from the two councils authority to institute domiciliary visits, for the purpose of seizing, in particular quarters, divers seditious persons whom their wounds prevented from leaving Paris. Having taken part in an armed assemblage, they were amenable to military judicatories, and were consigned to a commission, which promptly commenced by condemning certain of the number to be shot. The organisation of the High National Court was not yet completed; its installation was now accelerated, in order to open the proceedings against Babœuf.

This rash and ill-concerted outbreak was regarded in its true light, namely, as one of those reckless proceedings which characterise an expiring party. The enemies of the revolution alone affected to consider it of importance, that they might found thereon a pretence for renewed clamours repecting terror, and for disseminating alarming rumours. Little apprehension was felt by the community in general; and this abortive enterprise proved, more than all the other successes of the Directory, that its establishment was definitive, and that the factions must renounce all hope of subverting it.

Such were the circumstances presently illustrating the interior of France.

Whilst beyond its confines fresh collisions were about to ensue, important negotiations were proceeding in Europe. The French republic was at peace with several powers, but in alliance with none. The malignants who had asserted it would never be recognised, now boasted it would ever remain without allies. To repel these malevolent insinuations, the Directory sought to renew the Family-Compact with Spain, and projected a quadruple alliance between France, Spain, Venice, and the Ottoman Porte. Such an alliance, composed of the powers of the south in opposition to that existing amongst the powers of the north, would command the Mediterranean and the east, give disquietude to Russia, menace the rear of Austria, and raise up a new maritime enemy to England. Furthermore, it would be productive of great advantages to the army of Italy, by ensuring it the support of the Venetian galleys and of thirty thousand Slavonian soldiers.

Spain was the easiest to decide amongst the powers. She had grievances against England dating from the commencement of the war. The principal were the conduct of the English at Toulon, and the secrecy observed towards the Spanish admiral at the period of the expedition to Corsica. She had still greater causes of complaint since the peace with France; the English had insulted her flag, stopped munitions destined for her ports, violated her territory, captured posts menacing to her possessions in America, outraged the customs-regulations of her colonies, and openly endeavoured to excite them to revolt. These grounds of dissatisfaction, combined with the brilliant offers of the Directory, which led her to anticipate possessions in Italy, and with the victories of the French armies, which warranted a reliance on the accomplishment of such offers, induced Spain to sign, on the 2d Fructidor (19th August), a treaty of alliance offensive and defensive with France, on the bases of the Family-Com-

pact. By the terms of this treaty, the two powers mutually guaranteed all their respective possessions in Europe and in the Indies; they promised a reciprocal aid of eighteen thousand infantry and six thousand cavalry, of fifteen first-rates, fifteen seventy-fours, six frigates, and four corvettes. These succours were to be furnished on the requisition of either of the two powers unhappily involved in war.

Instructions were forwarded to the French ambassadors at Constantinople and Venice, to impress upon the Sublime Porte and the republic the advantages necessarily accruing to them from a concurrence in the proposed alliance.

The French republic, therefore, was no longer isolated, and it had provided England with a new naval foe. Indications were positive that the declaration of war by Spain against England would speedily follow the treaty of alliance with France.

The Directory was preparing at the same time embarrassments of a different nature for Pitt. Hoche was at the head of a hundred thousand men, distributed along the coasts of the ocean. La Vendée and Brittany being subjugated, he ardently desired to employ these forces in a manner worthy of his talents, and to add fresh laurels to those he had won at Weissembourg and Landau. He suggested to the government a scheme he had long revolved—namely, an expedition into Ireland. Now, he urged, that civil war had been repelled from the coasts of France, it was fitting to visit that pestilence on the shores of England, and requite her, by arousing the Catholics of Ireland, for the evils she had inflicted on France by abetting the Poitevins and Bretons. The moment was favourable: the Irish were more than usually irritated by the oppression of the English government; the whole population of the British Islands was suffering dreadfully from the war, and, an invasion occurring to fill the measure of calamity, it might be driven to the verge of desperation. The finances of Pitt, too, were in a tottering state. Thus, such an enterprise, directed by Hoche, might lead to momentous consequences. The project was heartily approved. The minister of marine, Truguet, an excellent republican and able minister, promoted it with all his energies. He collected a squadron in the harbour of Brest, and used every exertion compatible with the state of the finances to equip it efficiently. Hoche mustered all the best troops in his army, and drew them near Brest in readiness to embark. Care was taken to spread various reports as to their destination: now an expedition to Saint-Domingo, now a descent at Lisbon, to drive the English out of Portugal, in concert with Spain, was alleged to be in contemplation.

England, suspecting the object of these preparations, was in serious alarm. The treaty of offensive and defensive alliance between Spain and France foreboded her new dangers, whilst the defeats of Austria inspired the dread of losing her last and powerful ally. Her finances, moreover, were in a gloomy condition: the bank had contracted its discounts; capital began to fail; and the loan opened for the emperor had been closed, in order that additional funds might not be extracted from the circulation. The Italian ports were shut against English vessels; the Spanish were on the eve of being so; those of the ocean, as far as the Texel, were already barred. Thus the commerce of Great Britain was materially crippled. To all these sinister circumstances were superadded the disorders attendant upon a general election; for the parliament, verging upon its seventh year, had been dissolved. The elections were conducted amidst clamorous maledictions against Pitt and the war.

The empire had almost wholly abandoned the cause of the coalition. The dutchies of Baden and Wurtemburg had recently signed a definitive peace, permitting to the belligerent armies the right of passage over their dominions. Austria was in great trepidation, on beholding two French armies upon the Danube, and a third upon the Adige, apparently blocking ingress into Italy. She had dispatched Wurmser with 30,000 men, to marshal several reserves in the Tyrol, to rally and reorganise the wrecks of Beaulieu's army, and to descend into Lombardy with 60,000 men. On that side she deemed herself less in danger, and felt but little solicitude; whereas she was greatly alarmed for the Danube, and fixed on it her most anxious attention. To prevent untoward rumours, the Aulic Council had prohibited at Vienna all allusion to political events; it had organised a levy of volunteers, and laboured with indefatigable industry to equip and arm fresh troops. Catherine, who always promised and never fulfilled, rendered a solitary service she guaranteed the Gallicias to Austria, which permitted the latter to withdraw the troops stationed in those provinces, and march them towards the Alps and the Danube.

Thus France intimidated her enemies in all quarters, and the result of the coming shock along the Danube and the Adige was impatiently awaited by expectant mortals. On the immense line stretching from Bohemia to the Adriatic, three armies arrayed against other three were about to engage in deadly conflict, and the fate of Europe hung upon the issue.

In Italy, negotiations had been actively prosecuted pending the resumption of hostilities. Peace had been concluded with Piedmont, a treaty having succeeded the original armistice. This treaty stipulated the definitive cession of the dutchy of Savoy and the county of Nice to France; the destruction of the forts of Susa and Brunette, situated at the gorge of the Alps; the occupation during the war of the fortresses of Coni, Tortona, and Alessandria; a free passage for the French troops through the territories of Piedmont, and the purveyance of what was necessary for those troops during the transit. The Directory, at the instigation of Bonaparte, would have contracted, moreover, an offensive and defensive alliance with the King of Sardinia, in order to procure an auxiliary force of 10,000 or 15,000 men from his army. But that potentate, in return, demanded Lombardy, of which France could not yet dispose, and which indeed she still purposed to use as an equivalent for the Low Countries. This concession being accordingly refused, the king declined to accede to an alliance.

The Directory had not yet brought the negotiation with Genoa to a termination; the subjects of dispute continued to be the recall of the exiled families, the expulsion of the families feudatories of Austria and Naples, and the indemnity for the frigate *La Modeste*.

With Tuscany, the relations were amicable; nevertheless, the measures that had been employed towards the Leghorn merchants, to wring forth revelations of merchandise belonging to the enemies of France, had created a feeling of dissatisfaction. Rome and Naples had sent envoys to Paris, conformably to the terms of the armistice; but the negotiations for peace proceeded languidly. It was evident the Italian diplomatists were awaiting the issue of events in the field, ere finally committing themselves to conditions. The populations of Bologna and Ferrara were still animated with their pristine enthusiasm for the liberty they had provisionally acquired. The regency of Modena and the Duke of Parma were quiescent. Lombardy was absorbed in intense anxiety for the result of the campaign. The French had addressed repeated applications to the senate of Venice, for the purpose of inducing it to concur in the project of a quadruple alliance, and thereby securing a useful auxiliary for the army of Italy. Besides these direct overtures, their ambassadors at Constantinople and Madrid had indirectly, through the Venetian legations at those cities, enforced the advantages to accrue from the proposed alliance; but all such representations had proved ineffectual. Venice detested the French, now that she saw them planted on her territory and their principles becoming diffused amongst her population. She no longer adhered to an unarmed neutrality; on the con-

trary, she was arming with activity. She had given orders to the commandants of the isles to send the disposable galleys and troops into the canals, and she had called sundry Slavonian regiments from Illyria. The podestat of Bergamo was engaged in secretly arming the brave and superstitious peasants of the Bergamasco. Funds were collected by the twofold expedient of contributions and voluntary gifts.

Bonaparte held that, for the present, the policy of the French was to temporise on all sides, to spin out negotiations, to conclude nothing definitively, and to affect ignorance of all hostile manifestations, until fresh military events had decided either their expulsion from or their establishment in Italy. He deemed it advisable to adjourn the questions they had to settle with Genoa, and to persuade her they were content with the concessions already granted, in order that she might be found friendly in the adverse predicament of a retreat. The Duke of Tuscany, also, ought not to be irritated by the conduct of the French agents at Leghorn. Bonaparte assuredly did not esteem it fitting to leave a brother of the emperor in that dutchy, but he was desirous that he should not be alarmed too prematurely. The commissioners of the Directory, Garreau and Salicetti, having issued an ordinance banishing the French emigrants from the environs of Leghorn, Bonaparte addressed to them a letter, wherein, without much regard for their quality, he severely reprimanded them for having exceeded their powers and vexed the Duke of Tuscany by presuming to arrogate a sovereign authority within his dominions. With regard to Venice he was equally disposed to observe the *status quo*. Only, he complained loudly of certain assassinations committed on the roads, and of the preparations he saw making around him. His object in harbouring grounds of quarrel was that he might continue to draw supplies of provisions and have an excuse for mulcting the republic in a penalty of several millions, if he triumphed over the Austrians. "If I conquer," he wrote, "a simple estafette will suffice to rid me of all the difficulties rearing against me."

The citadel of Milan had fallen into his power. The garrison had surrendered as prisoners of war; the whole artillery had been transported to Mantua, where he had collected a considerable train. He would have willingly finished the siege of that city before the new Austrian army came up to relieve it; but his hopes of succeeding in that design were slender. He employed in the blockade only so many troops as were indispensably necessary, on account of the fevers epidemic in the vicinage. Nevertheless, he pressed the place closely, and projected one of those surprises which, according to his own expression, *depend upon a goose or a dog;* but the fall of the waters in the lake prevented the passage of the boats destined to convey a body of disguised troops. Thenceforth he relinquished the idea for the time of rendering himself master of Mantua. The approach of Wurmser, moreover, summoned him to a scene of more imminent danger.

The army, which entered Italy with thirty and a few thousand men, had received but feeble reinforcements to retrieve its casualties. Nine thousand men had reached it from the Alps. The divisions drawn from the army under Hoche had been unable to traverse France. Owing to that reinforcement of 9000 men and to the invalids who had emerged from the depôts in Provence and Var, the army had replaced its losses, and even gained strength. It counted nearly 45,000 men, spread along the Adige and around Mantua, at the moment when Bonaparte returned from his march into the peninsula. The complaints which attacked the soldiers before Mantua reduced it again to 40,000 or 42,000 men. This was its force in the middle of Thermidor (end of July). Bonaparte had left mere depôts at Milan, Tortona, and Leghorn. Two armies, one of Piedmontese and one of Austrians, he had already scattered to the winds; now he had to confront a third more formidable than the preceding.

Wurmser marched at the head of 60,000 men: 30,000 were draughts from the Rhine, all excellent soldiers. The remainder was composed of Beaulieu's discomfited divisions, and battalions drawn from the interior of Austria. More than 10,000 men were immured in Mantua, without including the sick. Thus the entire army constituted a force exceeding 70,000 men. Bonaparte had nearly 10,000 around Mantua, and could oppose only about 30,000 to the 60,000 on the point of debouching from the Tyrol. With such an inequality of strength, it required infinite prowess in the soldiers, and a most fertile genius in the general, to restore the balance.

The line of the Adige, to which Bonaparte attached so much value, was to become the scene of the struggle. We have already detailed the reasons which induced him to prefer it before all others. The Adige had not the length of the Po, or of the rivers which, flowing into the Po, mingle their lines with it; it passed directly into the sea, after a course of moderate extent; it was not fordable, and could not be turned in the Tyrol, like the Brenta, the Piave, and the rivers more advanced towards the extremity of Upper Italy. This river has been the theatre of such great events, that we have felt bound to describe its course with some minuteness.

The waters of the Tyrol form two lines, that of the Mincio and that of the Adige, almost parallel, and each a barrier to the other. Part of those mountain streams compose in the mountains themselves a large and longitudinal lake, which is called the Lake of Garda; they afterwards issue from it at Peschiera and traverse the Mantuan plain, become the Mincio, form a new lake around Mantua, and finally proceed to join the Lower Po. The Adige, formed by the waters of the upper valleys of the Tyrol, flows beyond the preceding line; it descends through the mountains parallel with the Lake of Garda, emerges into the plain in the environs of Verona, then runs parallel with the Mincio, hollows out a broad and deep bed as far as Legnago, and, at a few leagues from that town, ceases to be confined, and is converted into impassable morasses, which intercept the entire space comprised between Legnago and the Adriatic. Three routes were at the option of the advancing Austrians: the first, crossing the Adige abreast of Roveredo, before the formation of the Lake of Garda, winded round that lake, and conducted to its rear at Salo, Gavardo, and Brescia. Two other routes, starting from Roveredo, followed the two banks of the Adige in its course parallel with the Lake of Garda. The one, skirting the right bank, proceeded between that river and the lake, passed through the mountains, and opened into the plain between the Mincio and the Adige. The other, following the left bank, conducted into the plain towards Verona, and thus fell on the front of the defensive line. The first of the three, that which crossed the Adige above the Lake of Garda, combined the advantages of turning both the two lines of the Mincio and the Adige, and of leading to the rear of the army guarding them. But it was not very practicable, being accessible only to light artillery, and therefore suitable for a diversion, but not for a main operation. The second, descending from the mountains between the lake and the Adige, passed the river at Rivalta or Dolce, points where it was weakly defended; but it meandered in the mountains through positions easily defended, such as those of La Corona and Rivoli. The third and last, winding beyond the river into the midst of the plain, debouched on its farther bank and fell on the best defended part of its course, from Verona to Legnago. Thus all the three routes presented peculiar obstacles. The first could be pursued by a detachment simply; the second, passing between the lake and the river, encountered the positions of La Corona and Rivoli; the third plunged on the Adige, which runs,

between Verona and Legnago, in a broad and deep channel, and is defended by two fortresses only eight leagues asunder.

Bonaparte had planted General Sauret with 3000 men at Salo, to guard the route conducting to the rear of the Lake of Garda. Massena, with 12,000, intercepted the route winding between the Lake of Garda and the Adige, and occupied the positions of La Corona and Rivoli. Despinois, with 5000, was in the environs of Verona; Augereau, with 8000, at Legnago; and Kilmaine, with 2000 horse and the light artillery, was in reserve, occupying a central position at Castel-Nuovo. It was here that Bonaparte had fixed his head-quarters, in order that he might be equidistant from Salo, Rivoli, and Verona. Attaching great value to Verona, which commanded three avenues over the Adige, and suspecting the intentions of Venice, he determined to drive out the Slavonian troops garrisoned within it.* Pretending they were hostile to the French troops, under pretext of preventing collisions, he issued orders for their evacuation. The proveditore obeyed, and the French garrison alone remained in Verona.

Wurmser had pitched his head-quarters at Trent and Roveredo. He detached 20,000 men under Quasdanovich to take the route turning the Lake of Garda, and to debouch on Salo: 40,000 he kept under his own command, distributing them on the two routes skirting the Adige, one division being intended to attack La Corona and Rivoli, and the other to debouch on Verona. He thus expected to envelop the French army, which, being assailed concomitantly on the Adige and to the rear of the Lake of Garda, might be forced on its front and cut off from its line of retreat.

The renown of Wurmser had outstripped his arrival. Throughout all Italy his approach was the topic of speculation, and the party adverse to Italian independence exhibited an exulting gladness and hardihood. The Venetians were unable to restrain their satisfaction within the bounds of moderation. The Slavonian soldiers thronged the public places, and, stretching out their hands to the passers-by, demanded the price of the French blood they were about to shed. At Rome, the agents of France were insulted; the pope, emboldened by the prospect of a speedy deliverance, stopped the carriages conveying the first instalment of the contribution that had been imposed on him; he even sent back his legate to Ferrara and Bologna. The court of Naples, also, abandoned to the counsels of folly, spurned the conditions of the armistice, and marched troops to the frontiers of the papal dominions. A painful solicitude, on the contrary, prevailed in the cities devoted to France and liberty. Tidings from the Adige were awaited with impatience. The Italian imagination, so prone to magnify, had exaggerated the discrepancy of strength. Wurmser was reported to command two armies, the one of 60,000, the other of 80,000 men; and it was asked how such a handful of French could possibly resist so overpowering a mass. The famous proverb was in all mouths—"*Italy is the grave of the French.*"

On the 11th Thermidor (29th July), the Austrians came in presence of the French posts, and surprised them all. The detachment sent to turn the Lake of Garda arrived at Salo and thence repulsed General Sauret. General Guyeux alone stood his ground with a few hundred men, and immured himself in an old building, whence he refused to move, although he had neither bread nor water, and but a scanty supply of munitions. On the two routes skirting the Adige, the Austrians advanced with equal success; they forced the important position of La Corona between the Adige and the Lake of Garda, and they surmounted the obstacles of the third route, and debouched into the plain before Verona. Bonaparte received tidings of these reverses at his head-quarters of Castel-Nuovo. Couriers arrived in quick succession; and in the course of the following day, 12th Thermidor (30th July), he learnt that the Austrians had pushed on from Salo to Brescia, and that his retreat on Milan was consequently barred; that the position of Rivoli was forced like that of La Corona; and that the Austrians were on the point of crossing the Adige. In this alarming situation, having lost his defensive line and his line of retreat, it was natural he should feel somewhat dismayed. It was his first visitation of misfortune. Either influenced by the enormity of the peril, or, having already resolved to adopt a daring course of action, he wished to share the responsibility with his generals, he summoned a council of war, and, for the first time, asked the opinion of his officers. All declared for a retreat. Without support in front, and one of the two routes into France being intercepted, none deemed it consistent with prudence to hold their ground. Augereau alone, whose conduct at this period was the most glorious of his life, strongly insisted upon an appeal to the fortune of arms. He was young and ardent; he had learnt in the faubourgs to speak the language of camps, and he declared that he had sturdy grenadiers who would not retire without fighting. Little capable of estimating the resources which the situation of the armies and the nature of the ground still afforded, he spoke only upon the impulse of courage, and tended by his martial ardour to animate the genius of Bonaparte. He, the latter, dismissed the generals without intimating his opinion; but his plan was fixed. Although the line of the Adige was forced, and that of the Mincio and the Lake of Garda was turned, the ground was such as still to offer many resources to a man of genius and resolution.

The Austrians, divided into two corps, were descending both banks of the Lake of Garda: their junction was to be effected at the termination of the lake, and, arrived there, they would have 60,000 men to overwhelm 30,000. But, by concentrating at the point of the lake, their junction might be prevented. By rapidly forming a main mass, the French might overpower the 20,000 who had turned the lake, and immediately afterwards return to the 40,000 who had defiled between the lake and the Adige. But, to occupy the extremity of the lake, it was necessary to call in all the troops from the Lower Adige and the Lower Mincio; Augereau must be withdrawn from Legnago and Serrurier from Mantua, for so extensive a line was no longer tenable. This involved a great sacrifice, for Mantua had been besieged during two months, a considerable battering train had been transported before it, the fortress was on the point of capitulating, and, by allowing it to be revictualled, the fruit of these vigorous efforts, an almost assured prey, escaped his grasp. Bonaparte, however, did not hesitate; between two important objects, he had the sagacity to seize the most important and sacrifice to it the other—a simple resolution in itself, but one which displays not alone the great captain but the great man. It is not in war merely, it occurs in politics and in all the situations of life, that men encounter two objects, and, aiming to compass both, fail in each. Bonaparte possessed that rare and decisive vigour which prompts at once the choice and the sacrifice. Had he persisted in guarding the whole course of the Mincio, from the extremity of the Lake of Garda to Mantua, he would have been pierced; by concentrating on Mantua to cover it, he would have had 70,000 men to cope with at the same time—60,000 in front and 10,000 in the rear. He sacrificed Mantua, and concentrated at the point of the Lake of Garda. Orders were forthwith dispatched to Augereau to quit Legnago, and to Serrurier to quit Mantua, for the purpose of concentrating their forces towards Valeggio and Peschiera upon the Upper Mincio. During the night of the 13th Thermidor (31st July), Serrurier burnt his artillery-frames, spiked his cannon, buried his projectiles, and threw his powder into the water, preparatory to his departure to rejoin the active army.

Bonaparte, husbanding every moment of time, determined to march in the first place on the hostile corps the most advanced, and the most dangerous from the position it had taken up. This was the army of 20,000 men under Quasdanovich, which had debouched by Salo, Gavardo, and Brescia, on the rear of the Lake of Garda, and threatened the communication with Milan. On the very day that Serrurier abandoned Mantua, the 13th (31st July), Bonaparte retrograded with the intention of falling upon Quasdanovich, and repassed the Mincio, at Peschiera, with the greater part of his forces. Augereau recrossed it at Borghetto, by the bridge that had been the scene of so glorious an action at the period of the first conquest. The rearguards were left to watch the progress of the enemy, who had passed the Adige. Bonaparte ordered General Sauret to advance and extricate General Guyeux, who was shut up in an old building with 1700 men, without water or provisions, and who had heroically defended himself for two days. He resolved to march in person on Lonato, whither Quasdanovich had already pushed forward a division; and he directed Augereau to move on Brescia, in order to restore the communication with Milan. Sauret succeeded in disengaging General Guyeux, repelled the Austrians into the mountains, and took from them several hundred prisoners. Bonaparte, with the brigade of Allemagne, was not in time to attack the Austrians at Lonato; he was anticipated. But after a vigorous engagement, he repulsed the enemy, made his way into Lonato, and captured 600 prisoners. Augereau, meanwhile, marched on Brescia; he entered it the following day (1st August), without encountering opposition, delivered some prisoners taken by the Austrians, and forced the latter to recoil towards the mountains. Quasdanovich, who expected to have reached the rear of the French army and surprised it, was astonished to find imposing masses on all points, confronting him with such impetuosity. He had lost but few men either at Salo or Lonato; but he deemed it incumbent to halt and avoid engaging himself further, before learning what had become of Wurmser with the principal Austrian army. He accordingly paused.

Bonaparte stopped short, also, on his part. Time was precious in this direction; it behoved him not to push success beyond the strictly essential point. It was enough to have awed Quasdanovich; he was now to return and make head against Wurmser. He retrograded with the divisions of Massena and Augereau. On the 15th (2d August), he planted Massena's division at Ponte-San-Marco, and Augereau's at Monte-Chiaro. The rearguards he had left on the Mincio became by this evolution his advanced guards. His arrival was not too early, for the 40,000 men under Wurmser had crossed not only the Adige but the Mincio. The division under Bayalitsch, having masked Peschiera by a detachment, and passed the Mincio, was advancing on the road to Lonato. The division under Liptai had cleared the Mincio at Borghetto, and driven General Valette from Castiglione. Wurmser had proceeded, with two divisions of infantry and one of cavalry, to raise the blockade of Mantua. On beholding the French gun-carriages in ashes, their artillery spiked, and all the traces of an extreme precipitation, he discerned, not the calculation of genius, but the result of a panic; he was filled with joy, and entered in triumph the city he had come to deliver. This event occurred on the 15th Thermidor (2d August).

Bonaparte, returned to Ponte-San-Marco and Monte-Chiaro, allowed himself no interval of repose. His troops had been constantly in motion; he himself had never been off horseback; nevertheless, he determined to give battle on the following morning. He had before him Bayalitsch at Lonato and Liptai at Castiglione, presenting a front of 25,000 men. The object was to attack them before Wurmser returned from Mantua. Sauret had a second time abandoned Salo: Bonaparte again detached thither Guyeux, to retake the position and keep Quasdanovich in check. After these precautions on his left and rear, he resolved to march forward to Lonato with Massena, and to throw Augereau on the heights of Castiglione, forsaken the preceding day by General Valette. He deprived that general of his command before the whole army, in order to impress upon his lieutenants the duty of firmness. On the morrow, the 16th (3d August), all the French forces were in motion. Guyeux re-entered Salo, which rendered still more impracticable any communication between Quasdanovich and the main Austrian army. Bonaparte advanced on Lonato; but his vanguard was worsted, some pieces were captured, and General Pigeon remained a prisoner. Bayalitsch, flushed with this success, pushed forward with confidence, and extended his wings around the French division. He had two objects in executing this manœuvre—first, to surround Bonaparte, and, secondly, to extend his right so as to enter into communication with Quasdanovich, whose cannon he heard at Salo. Bonaparte, relieved from apprehensions touching his rear, allowed himself to be outflanked with imperturbable coolness; he threw some tirailleurs on his threatened wings, and then drawing up the eighteenth and thirty-second demi-brigades of infantry, he ranged them in close column, assigned a regiment of dragoons to support them, and charged impetuously on the centre of the enemy, who had weakened by expanding himself. He overthrew all opposition with this brave infantry, and pierced the Austrian line. The Imperialists, thus cut in two, lost their presence of mind; one part of this division under Bayalitsch fled in all haste towards the Mincio, but the other, which had stretched out to communicate with Quasdanovich, found itself driven towards Salo, where Guyeux was in force. Bonaparte caused it to be pursued with the utmost promptitude, in order to place it between two fires. Junot led the pursuit with a regiment of cavalry. He rushed forward at full speed, slew six troopers with his own hand, and fell covered with sabre wounds. The fugitive division, taken between the corps stationed at Salo and that following from Lonato, broke rank, fled in disorder, and left at every step hundreds of prisoners. Whilst the pursuit was thus proceeding, Bonaparte moved to the right, to Castiglione, where Augereau had been fighting since the morning with admirable intrepidity. His orders were to carry the heights on which Liptai's division had planted itself. After an obstinate conflict, several times renewed, he had eventually succeeded in his aim; and Bonaparte, on his arrival, found the enemy retiring on all points. Such was the battle known as that of Lonato, fought on the 16th Thermidor (3d August).

Its results were considerable. The French had captured twenty pieces of cannon, taken 3000 prisoners from the division cut off and thrown back on Salo, and pursued the scattered remnants into the mountains. They had made 1000 or 1500 prisoners at Castiglione; slain or wounded 3000 men; and effectually terrified Quasdanovich, who, finding the French army before him at Salo, and hearing it in the distance at Lonato, deemed it omnipresent. They had almost disorganised the divisions of Bayalitsch and Liptai, who recoiled on Wurmser. This general now arrived with 15,000 men, rallied around him the two worsted divisions, and commenced to deploy in the plains of Castiglione. Bonaparte, on the morning of the 17th (4th August), perceived him put himself in line to receive battle. He resolved to assail him once more, and engage in a final conflict to decide the fate of Italy. But, for that purpose, it was requisite he should concentrate at Castiglione all his disposable troops. He consequently deferred till the morrow this decisive battle. He started off at a gallop for Lonato, in order to accelerate in person the movement of his troops. He had

in the last few days completely exhausted five horses. He trusted implicitly to none for the execution of his orders; he saw and verified all with his own eyes; infused animation every where by his presence. It is thus a great mind communicates its impulse to a vast mass, and quickens it with its fire. He arrived at Lonato about noon. His orders were already in the course of execution; part of the troops was in march for Castiglione, and another portion had moved towards Salo and Gavardo. One thousand men at the utmost remained at Lonato. Scarcely had Bonaparte entered that place ere an Austrian herald presented himself with a summons to surrender. The general, greatly surprised, was at a loss to comprehend how by possibility he could be in presence of the Austrians. The enigma was however shortly explained. The division cut off at the battle of Lonato and driven back on Salo, had been partly captured; but a corps of about four thousand men had wandered all night in the mountains, and, perceiving Lonato almost abandoned, had conceived the design of penetrating into it, and thus opening a passage to the Mincio. Bonaparte possessed only a thousand men to oppose this corps, and above all, he had no time to spare for an engagement. He caused all the officers who were with him to mount on horseback, and then ordered the herald to be led forward and the bandage removed from his eyes. The German officer was seized with amazement on beholding so numerous a staff. "Unfortunate man," said Bonaparte, addressing him, "are you ignorant then that you are in the presence of the general-in-chief, and that he is here with all his army? Go, tell those who sent you that I give them but five minutes to surrender, or I will put them to the edge of the sword, as a just chastisement for the insult they have presumed to pass upon me." He immediately directed the artillery to be brought forward, threatening to open a cannonade upon the columns that were advancing. The herald returned to report what he had seen and heard, and the four thousand men laid down their arms before one thousand.* Bonaparte, saved by this opportune display of his presence of mind, distributed his orders for the coming struggle. He added fresh troops to those already detached on Salo. The division under Despinois was united with that under Sauret, and the two combined, profiting by the ascendancy of victory, were enjoined to attack Quasdanovich, and drive him definitively into the mountains. He recalled all the rest to Castiglione. He returned there during the night, and, without allowing himself an instant of repose, mounted another horse, and visited the field of battle to make his final dispositions. The ensuing day was to decide the destiny of Italy.

The plain of Castiglione was appointed as the scene of this memorable conflict. A series of heights, formed by the last ridges of the Alps, run from the Chiesa to the Mincio, by Lonato, Castiglione, and Solferino. At the foot of these heights extends the plain which was to serve as the field of battle. The two armies were drawn up in opposite array, perpendicularly to the line of heights, upon which both rested a wing. Bonaparte touched them with his left, Wurmser with his right. The former commanded 22,000 men at most; the latter 30,000. Wurmser had an additional advantage: his wing in the plain was covered by a redoubt placed on the detached eminence of Medolano. Thus he was supported on both flanks. To counterbalance the advantages of number and position, Bonaparte relied on the ascendancy of victory and on the dexterity of his evolutions. Wurmser would naturally tend to prolong his right, which rested on the line of heights, in order to open a communication towards Lonato and Salo. It was thus Bayalitsch had acted two days before, and the same course was imperative on Wurmser; for his main object was necessarily to effect a junction with his large detachment. Bonaparte resolved to encourage this movement, from which he hoped to derive important benefit. He had now at disposal the division under Serrurier, which, pursued by Wurmser since it had quitted Mantua, had been hitherto unable to enter into line. It was coming up by Guidizzola. Bonaparte ordered it to debouch towards Cauriana, on the rear of Wurmser. He awaited its fire to begin the battle

By break of day the two armies entered on action. Wurmser, impatient to attack, moved his right along the heights; Bonaparte, to encourage this movement, drew back his left, which was formed by Massena's division; he kept his centre immoveable in the plain. Shortly he heard the fire of Serrurier. Thereupon, whilst he continued to draw back his left, and Wurmser to extend his right, he caused the redoubt of Medolano to be attacked. He in the first place directed twenty pieces of light artillery upon that redoubt, and, after vigorously cannonading it, detached General Verdier, with three battalions of grenadiers, to storm it. That gallant officer advanced, supported by a regiment of cavalry, and carried the redoubt. The left wing of the Austrians was then uncovered, at the very moment that Serrurier, arrived at Cauriana, spread alarm on their rear. Wurmser immediately threw a part of his second line to his left, thus deprived of support, and placed it in aid to make head against the French about to debouch from Medolano. He moved the residue of his second line to the rear, in order to cover Cauriana, and thus continue to oppose the progress of the enemy. But Bonaparte, seizing the moment with his accustomed promptitude, now ceased to refuse his left and centre; he instantly gave Massena and Augereau the signal they were impatiently awaiting. Massena with the left and Augereau with the centre fell upon the weakened line of the Austrians, and charged it with impetuosity. Attacked so abruptly on his whole front, menaced on his left and rear, the enemy began to yield ground. The ardour of the French redoubled. Wurmser, seeing his army compromised, gave the signal for retreat. His foe pursued, capturing sundry prisoners. To put him completely to rout, the French must have used redoubled celerity, and driven him in disorder on the Mincio. But, for the last six days, the troops had been fighting and marching without intermission, they were unable to advance, and slept on the field of battle. Wurmser lost this day but 2000 men; but he had not the less lost Italy.

On the following day, Augereau pushed on to the bridge of Borghetto and Massena to Peschiera. Augereau opened a cannonade, which was followed by the retreat of the Austrians; and Massena engaged in a rearguard action with the division which had masked Peschiera. The Mincio was abandoned by Wurmser; he retook the road to Rivoli, between the Adige and the Lake of Garda, in order to regain the Tyrol. Massena followed him to Rivoli and to La Corona, and resumed his former positions. Augereau presented himself before Verona. The Venetian proveditore, with the intention of affording the Austrians time to evacuate the city and save their baggage, demanded an interval of two hours before opening the gates: Bonaparte shivered them into fragments with cannon-balls. The Veronese, who were devoted to the cause of Austria, and had unequivocally expressed their sentiments at the moment of the French retreat, dreaded the wrath of the conqueror; but he caused the greatest forbearance to be observed towards them.

On the side of Salo and the Chiesa, Quasdanovich effected a difficult retreat behind the Lake of Garda. He ventured to halt and defend the defile of Rocca d'Anfo; but he was worsted, and lost 1200 men. Ere long the French had again taken up all their former positions.

* This fact has been called in question by an historian, M. Botta; but it is corroborated by all the accounts, and I have received an assurance of its authenticity from the quartermaster-general of the active army, M. Aubernon, who passed the four thousand prisoners in review.

This campaign had occupied six days. In that interval, thirty and a few thousand men had put sixty thousand to flight. Wurmser had lost twenty thousand men, of whom seven or eight thousand were killed and wounded, twelve or thirteen thousand taken prisoners. He was repulsed into the mountains, and rendered incapable of keeping the field. Thus had vanished that formidable host before a handful of heroes. Such extraordinary results, unparalleled in history, were due to the promptitude and vigour of resolution displayed by the young captain. Whilst two numerous armies covered both shores of the Lake of Garda, and the courage of all was shaken, he had contrived to reduce the campaign to a single contingency—the junction of those two armies at the extremity of the Lake of Garda; he had not hesitated to make a mortifying sacrifice, giving up the blockade of Mantua to concentrate his forces on the decisive point; and, falling irresistibly on each of the hostile masses in turn, at Salo, Lonato, and Castiglione, he had successively disorganised them, and repelled them into the mountains whence they had issued.

The Austrians were overcome with terror, the French were transported with admiration of their young general. Zeal and confidence in him animated every breast. A battalion felt competent to make three fly. The old soldiers, who had nominated him corporal at Lodi, saluted him as sergeant at Castiglione. Throughout Italy a profound sensation reigned. Milan, Bologna, Ferrara, the towns in the dutchy of Modena, and all the friends of liberty, were in ecstacies of joy. Grief pervaded convents and antiquated aristocracies. The governments which had been betrayed into indiscretions—Venice, Rome, Naples—were in trepidation.

Bonaparte, correctly appreciating his position, did not deem the contest terminated, albeit he had deprived Wurmser of 20,000 men. The veteran marshal had retreated into the Alps with 40,000. There he would repose, reanimate and recruit his forces, and it was to be presumed would again fall on Italy. Bonaparte had lost several thousand men, prisoners, killed, or wounded; he had a great number in hospital: he judged it expedient still to temporise, to keep his eyes on the Tyrol, his feet on the Adige, and to content himself with overawing the Italian powers, until he enjoyed the opportunity of chastising them. Thus he merely intimated to the Venetians that he was aware of their preparations, and continued to supply his army at their expense, postponing the negotiations for an alliance. He had learnt the arrival at Ferrara of a legate from the pope, commissioned to resume possession of the legations; him he summoned to his head-quarters. This legate, by name Cardinal Mattei, fell at his feet, ejaculating, "*Peccavi.*" Bonaparte placed him under arrest in a seminary. He wrote to M. d'Azara, who was his intermediary with the courts of Rome and Naples, complaining of the imbecility and bad faith of the papal government, and announcing his purpose of speedily returning to the south, should circumstances constrain him. As to the court of Naples, he held yet more menacing language. "The English," he said to M. d'Azara, "have persuaded the King of Naples that he is somebody; I will prove to him that he is nobody. If he persist, despite the armistice, in collecting troops, I bind myself, in presence of Europe, to march against his pretended seventy thousand men with six thousand grenadiers, four thousand horse, and fifty pieces of cannon."

He addressed a conciliatory but firm note to the Grand-Duke of Tuscany, who had allowed the English to take possession of Porto-Ferrajo, and apprised him that France would be justified in punishing him for such negligence by occupying his territories, but that, in consideration of ancient amity, she would refrain from enforcing the right. He changed the garrison of Leghorn, in order to intimidate the Tuscans by a movement of troops. He was silent with Genoa. He dispatched an energetic remonstrance to the King of Sardinia, who tolerated the Barbets in his dominions, and detached a roving military commission to seize and shoot the Barbets found on the roads. The population of Milan had evinced the most friendly dispositions towards the French. He forwarded a letter to that city, couched in delicate and noble terms, expressive of his gratitude. His late victories inspiring stronger hopes of retaining Italy, he considered he might commit himself more frankly with the Lombards; he granted them arms, and permission to levy a legion at their own charge, the ranks whereof were eagerly filled up by the Italians favourable to liberty, and by the Poles wandering through Europe since the last partition. Bonaparte testified his satisfaction to the populations of Bologna and Ferrara. The people of Modena craved to be delivered from the regency established by the duke. Bonaparte had already certain motives for breaking the armistice, inasmuch as the regency had caused provisions to be conveyed to the garrison of Mantua; but he determined to wait yet a while. He solicited succours from the Directory to repair his losses, and consolidated himself at the portals of the Tyrol, ready to fall on Wurmser and destroy the remnant of his army the moment he learnt that Moreau had crossed the Danube.

Whilst these great events were passing in Italy, others of almost equal moment were progressing in Germany. Moreau had gradually driven back the archduke, and arrived about the middle of Thermidor (early part of August) on the Danube. Jourdan had reached the Naab, which falls into that river. The chain of the Alb, which separates the Neckar from the Danube, is composed of mountains of moderate elevation, terminating in table-lands, and traversed by defiles narrow as the fissures of rocks. It was by these defiles Moreau had debouched on the Danube, into a broken country, intercepted by ravines and covered with wood. The archduke, who cherished the design of concentrating himself on the Danube, and retrieving his strength on that powerful barrier, suddenly formed a resolution which placed in needless jeopardy his sagacious plan. He learnt that Wartensleben, instead of falling back on him, as near to Donawerth as possible, was recoiling on Bohemia, with the preposterous intention of covering it; and he became apprehensive lest the army of the Sambre-and-Meuse, taking advantage of this false movement, which uncovered the Danube, should attempt to effect its passage. He resolved, therefore, to pass it himself, defile rapidly on the other bank, and confront Jourdan. But the river was lined with his magazines, and time was required for emptying them; moreover, he was unwilling to execute the passage under the eyes of Moreau, and liable to his assaults; wherefore he conceived the project of removing him from his vicinity, by giving him battle with the Danube at his back—a faulty conception, for which he afterwards severely blamed himself, since it exposed him to the risk of being forced into the river, or at least of not making good his arrival on it entire, a condition indispensable for the success of his ulterior designs.

On the 24th Thermidor (11th August), he halted before the positions of Moreau, intending to make a general attack upon him. Moreau was at Neresheim, occupying the positions of Dunstelkingen and Dischingen by his right and centre, and that of Nordlingen by his left. The archduke, wishing in the first place to remove him from the Danube, next to cut him off, if possible, from the mountains through which he had debouched, and lastly, to prevent him communicating with Jourdan, attacked him, in order to achieve all his aims, on all points simultaneously. He succeeded in turning Moreau's right, by dispersing his flanking corps; he advanced even to Heidenheim, almost on his rear, and occasioned so much alarm that all the ammunition magazines were hastily carried

back. In the centre, he essayed a vigorous attack, but it was not sufficiently decisive. On the left, towards Nordlingen, he made threatening demonstrations. Moreau was not intimidated either by the demonstrations made on his left or by the excursion beyond his right; and, judging with reason that the essential point was in the centre, he acted in opposition to the tactics deemed sacred by ordinary generals, always in extreme terror when their enemy threatens to outflank them: he weakened his wings to the profit of the centre. His precaution and foresight were justified by the event. The archduke, redoubling his efforts on the centre, towards Dunstelkingen, was repulsed with loss. Both armies reposed on the field of battle.

Moreau found himself the following day in a disagreeable predicament, by the retrograde movement of his magazines, which left him without munitions. However, he determined to put a bold front on the matter, and manifest an intention to attack. But the archduke, anxious to repass the Danube, felt no inclination to renew the combat: he continued his retreat, with infinite firmness, on the river, crossed it without being incommoded by Moreau, and broke down the bridges as far as Donawerth. He now received intelligence of what had passed between the two armies which had operated by the Maine. Wartensleben had not thrown himself into Bohemia as he feared; he had rested on the Naab in presence of Jourdan. The young Austrian prince thereupon formed a very admirable resolution, the consequence, in some measure, of his long retreat, and well calculated to decide the campaign. His object in falling back on the Danube had been to concentrate himself on that river, in order that he might be enabled to act against one or other of the two French armies with a superior mass of troops. The battle of Neresheim might have compromised this plan, if, instead of being indecisive, it had proved altogether adverse. But, having retired unbroken on the Danube, he might now profit by the separation of the French armies, and fall upon one of the two. Accordingly, he resolved to leave General Latour with 36,000 men to occupy Moreau, and to move in person with 25,000 towards Wartensleben, in order to overwhelm Jourdan by their junction. Jourdan's army was the weakest of the two French armies. At an equally great distance from its base, it scarcely counted upwards of 45,000 men. It was obvious it could offer no effectual resistance, and might even be exposed to great disasters. Jourdan beaten and driven back on the Rhine; Moreau, on his part, unable to remain in Bavaria; and the archduke possibly enabled to advance on the Neckar and intercept him in his line of retreat—such the conception, which has been esteemed by far the brightest amongst those distinguishing the Austrian generals during these long wars: like the combinations illustrating the genius of Bonaparte in Italy at the time, the idea originated with a very young man.

The archduke left Ingolstadt on the 29th Thermidor (16th August), five days after the battle of Neresheim. Jourdan, posted on the Naab, between Naaburg and Schwandorf, was unprepared for the storm about to burst on his head. He had detached General Bernadotte to Neumarkt on his right, with the view of putting himself in communication with Moreau—an object impossible to accomplish, and for which a detached corps was uselessly jeopardised. The archduke, arriving from the Danube, necessarily encountered this detachment. General Bernadotte, attacked by superior forces, offered an honourable resistance, but was obliged to repass with rapidity the mountains through which the army had debouched from the valley of the Maine into that of the Danube. He retreated to Nuremberg. The archduke, after detaching a corps to pursue him, moved with the rest of his forces on Jourdan. The latter, warned of the arrival of a reinforcement, and apprised of the danger Bernadotte had incurred, and of his retreat to Nuremberg, likewise prepared to repass the mountains. At the moment he was getting under march, he was attacked by both the archduke and Wartensleben; he had an arduous combat to sustain at Amberg, and lost his direct route upon Nuremberg. Thrown with his parks, his cavalry, and his infantry, into cross-roads, he ran the greatest danger, and prosecuted, during a period of eight days, a most difficult retreat, reflecting equal credit on himself and his troops. He regained the Maine at Schweinfurt on the 12th Fructidor (29th August), and proposed to direct his march on Wurtzburg, there to halt, rally his corps, and once more try the fortune of arms.

Whilst the archduke was executing this brilliant movement against the army of the Sambre-and-Meuse, he afforded Moreau an opportunity of effecting a similar evolution, equally brilliant and decisive. An enemy never attempts a bold manœuvre without uncovering himself, and without opening many excellent chances to his antagonist. Moreau, having only 38,000 men before him, might have easily overwhelmed them by acting with moderate vigour and promptitude. He might have done more (in the opinion of Napoleon and the Archduke Charles): he might have attempted a movement promising results altogether transcendent. He ought himself to have followed the march of the enemy, wheeled upon the archduke, as that prince had wheeled upon Jourdan, and fallen suddenly upon his rear. The archduke, taken between Jourdan and Moreau, must have incurred incalculable hazards. But, for that purpose, he required to execute a very extended movement, promptly change his line of operation, and throw himself from the Neckar on the Maine; above all, he must have derogated from the instructions of the Directory, which enjoined him to diverge towards the Tyrol, in order to outflank the wings of the enemy and open a communication with the army of Italy. The youthful conqueror of Castiglione would not have hesitated to make this bold march, and to commit an act of disobedience calculated to decide the campaign in a victorious manner: but Moreau was incapable of such a determination. He remained several days on the banks of the Danube, ignorant of the archduke's departure, and slowly exploring a ground which was then but little known. Eventually apprised of the movement his enemy had just operated, he felt misgivings for the fate of Jourdan; but, not venturing to adopt an energetic determination, he resolved to clear the Danube and advance into Bavaria, in the hope of thereby drawing the archduke back, adhering at the same time to the plan of the Directory. He might have readily concluded, however, that the archduke would not quit Jourdan before he had driven him out of the field, and would not be diverted from the execution of a decisive project by an inroad into Bavaria. Moreau, nevertheless, crossed the Danube, in the wake of Latour, and approached the Lech. Latour evinced an intention of disputing the passage of the Lech; but, too extended to sustain himself on its banks, he was obliged to abandon it, after maintaining an unfortunate rencounter at Friedberg. Moreau subsequently moved on towards Munich: on the 15th Fructidor (1st September) he took up positions at Dachau, Pfaffenhofen, and Geisenfeld.

Thus fortune began to frown on the French in Germany, in consequence of that vicious plan which, by dividing their two armies, exposed them to the hazard of being separately defeated. Meanwhile, events of importance were occurring in Italy.

We have seen that Bonaparte, after having repulsed the Austrians into the Tyrol and resumed his former positions on the Adige, meditated fresh projects against Wurmser, whom he was not content to have weakened by 20,000 men; his army he desired utterly to destroy. This consummation was necessary for the fulfilment of the various designs he entertained. Wurmser annihilated, he might push onwards even to Trieste, ruin

that sea-port so valuable to Austria, afterwards return upon the Adige, dictate terms to Venice, Rome, and Naples, whose malevolence was still manifest as ever, and, lastly, hoist the standard of liberty in Italy, by constituting Lombardy, the legations of Bologna and Ferrara, perhaps even the dutchy of Modena, into an independent republic. Revolving such projects, he determined to advance into the Tyrol, assured now of being seconded by the presence of Moreau on the other flank of the Alps.

Whilst the French troops employed a respite of three weeks in recovering from their fatigues, Wurmser was engaged in reorganising and reinforcing his army. Fresh detachments, draughted from Austria and the Tyrolean militia, enabled him to augment his army to nearly 50,000 men. The Aulic Council sent him another chief of the staff, Lauer, general of engineers, with new instructions as to the plan to be followed for carrying the line of the Adige. Wurmser was to leave 18,000 or 20,000 men under Davidovich to guard the Tyrol, and to descend with the residue, through the valley of the Brenta, into the plains of Vicenza and Padua. The Brenta takes its rise not far from Trent, diverges from the Adige in the form of a curve, again runs parallel with that river in the plain, and finally flows into the Adriatic. A causeway, starting from Trent, leads into the valley of the Brenta, and proceeds through Bassano into the plains of Vicenza and Padua. Wurmser was to traverse this valley, debouch into the plain, and attempt the passage of the Adige between Verona and Legnago. This plan was not more judiciously conceived than the preceding, since it again embodied the evil principle of dividing the forces into two corps, and placing Bonaparte in the midst.

Wurmser commenced operations simultaneously with Bonaparte. The latter, ignorant of Wurmser's designs, but foreseeing with rare sagacity that during his inroad into the depths of the Tyrol the enemy might possibly move to try the line of the Adige, left General Kilmaine at Verona with a reserve of nearly 3000 men, and with capabilities of resistance for at least two days. General Sahuguet remained with a division of 8000 men before Mantua. Bonaparte set off with 28,000, and ascended by the three routes of the Tyrol—by that which winds behind the Lake of Garda, and by the two which skirt the Adige. On the 17th Fructidor (3d September), Sauret's, now become Vaubois' division, after having fought several actions in its devious course behind the Lake of Garda, reached Torbole, the upper extremity of the lake. On the same day, the divisions under Massena and Augereau, who at first skirted the two banks of the Adige but had subsequently united on one by the bridge of Golo, arrived before Serravalle. Their vanguard became embroiled with the enemy, and took from him sundry prisoners.

The French had now to ascend a deep and narrow valley: on their left was the Adige, on their right lofty mountains. Frequently the river, sweeping to the foot of the mountains, left only the breadth of the road, and thus formed dismal defiles for an army to surmount: of such there were several to clear before penetrating into the Tyrol. But the French, bold and nimble, proved equally adapted for this kind of warfare as for that they had carried on in the spacious plains of Mantua.

Davidovich had stationed two divisions, the one at the camp of Mori, on the right bank of the Adige, to make head against Vaubois, advancing along the highway from Torbole to Roveredo, after leaving the Lake of Garda; the other at San-Marco, to guard the defile against Massena and Augereau. On the 18th Fructidor (4th September), the French descried the Austrian division posted under Wukassovich to defend the defile of San-Marco. Bonaparte, promptly adopting the tactics suitable to the locality, formed two corps of light infantry, and distributed them to the right and the left on the neighbouring heights, then, after harassing the Austrians a while, he drew up the eighteenth demi-brigade in close column by battalions, and ordered General Victor to force the pass at its head. A furious conflict ensued: the Austrians resisted with obstinacy, but Bonaparte decided the engagement by commanding General Dubois to charge at the head of the hussars. That brave officer rushed on the Austrian infantry, broke it, and fell pierced by three bullets. He was removed in the arms of death. "Before I die," he said to Bonaparte, "let me know if we are victorious." On all sides the Austrians fled and retreated to Roveredo, situated a league from San-Marco: they were pursued at racing speed. Roveredo is a short distance from the Adige; Bonaparte detached Rampon, with the thirty-second, towards the ground separating the river from the town; he urged Victor, with the eighteenth, on the town itself. The latter entered the principal street of Roveredo at full charge, swept the Austrians before him, and reached the further extremity of the town at the instant Rampon accomplished its outer circuit. Whilst the main army thus carried San-Marco and Roveredo, Vaubois arrived at Roveredo with his division by the other bank of the Adige. The Austrian division under Reuss had disputed with him the camp of Mori, but he had stormed it the same morning; and now all the French divisions were united towards the middle of the day abreast of Roveredo, on both banks of the Adige. But the most difficult part of the undertaking yet remained for achievement.

Davidovich had rallied his two divisions on his reserve in the defile of Calliano, a formidable pass, far more dangerous than that of Marco. At that point, the Adige, encroaching on the mountains, left between its channel and their base the mere breadth of the road. The gorge of the defile was closed by the castle of La Pietra, which connected the mountain with the river, and was crowned with artillery.

Bonaparte, pursuing the same course of tactics, distributed his light infantry to the right, on the acclivities of the mountain, and to the left on the bank of the river. His soldiers, born on the banks of the Rhone, the Seine, or the Loire, rivalled in agility and daring the famed hunters of the Alps. Some clambered from rock to rock, attained the summit of the mountain, and opened a fire overhead upon the enemy. Others, not less intrepid, crept along the river, gaining a footing wherever they could, and so turned the fort of La Pietra. General Dammartin planted happily a battery of light artillery, which told with great effect: the castle was won. Thereupon the infantry passed through it, and charged in close column upon the Austrian army amassed in the defile. Artillery, cavalry, and infantry, became all amalgamated inextricably, and fled in horrible disorder. Young Lemarois, aid-de-camp of the general-in-chief, undertook to stop the flight of the Austrians: he galloped forward at the head of fifty hussars, pressed along the side of the Austrian mass, and, turning quickly round, attempted to check the fugitive van. He was thrown from his horse, but he spread terror through the ranks of the Austrians, and gave time to the cavalry, which was rushing in pursuit, to secure several hundred prisoners. Here finished this series of engagements, which conferred on the French the defiles of the Tyrol, the town of Roveredo, the whole Austrian artillery, and four thousand prisoners, omitting from the calculation the dead and wounded. Bonaparte classed the events of this day under the title of the battle of Roveredo.*

* [An animated and succinct account of Bonaparte's progress into the Tyrol occurs in the Annual Register for 1796, rather an unfavourable record of his exploits in general:—

"As the republicans moved forward, they successively drove the Austrian outposts from Alla and Serravalle, and compelled them to retire, with the loss of three or four hundred men, to Marco and Mori. At six in the morning, the two latter posts

On the morrow, 19th Fructidor (5th September), the French entered Trent, the capital of the Italian Tyrol. The bishop had previously taken to flight. Bonaparte, with the view of tranquillising the Tyrolese, who were strongly attached to the house of Austria, addressed them in a proclamation, wherein he invited them to lay down their arms, and to refrain from committing hostilities against his army, upon which conditions he promised their property and public establishments should be respected. Wurmser was not found at Trent. Bonaparte had surprised him at the very moment he was commencing his march to put his plan into execution. Perceiving the French entangle themselves in the Tyrol, with the intention, perhaps, of communicating with Germany, Wurmser was only the more fortified in his resolution of descending by the Brenta, in order to force the Adige during their absence. He even hoped that, by a rapid circuit, which would lead him to Verona, he might shut up the French in the upper valley of the Adige, and thus at once envelop and cut them off from Mantua. He had set out two days earlier, and must have already reached Bassano: Bonaparte instantly formed a most daring resolution. He determined to leave Vaubois in charge of the Tyrol, and push on through the gorges of the Brenta in pursuit of Wurmser. He could take with him but 20,000 men, and Wurmser had 30,000; he might be cooped up in those fearful ravines, if Wurmser held him at bay; he might likewise arrive too late to fall on Wurmser's rear, and the Austrians might have had time to pass the Adige: all these contingencies were possible. But, on the other hand, his 20,000 were equivalent to the 30,000 of his adversary; if Wurmser attempted to make head, and to shut him up in the gorges, he would ride roughshod over his body; if he had twenty leagues to accomplish, he would do so in two days, and arrive in the plain as soon as Wurmser. Then he would drive him either on Trieste or on the Adige. If he drove him on Trieste, he would pursue him, and burn that port before his eyes; if he drove him on the Adige, he would enclose him between his army and that river, and thus envelop the enemy who vainly dreamt of ensnaring him in the gorges of the Tyrol.

This young soldier, whose conceptions were formed and acted upon with the rapidity of lightning, ordered Vaubois, the very day of his arrival at Trent, to march on the Lavisio, and wrest that position from Davidovich's rearguard. He superintended in person the execution of this enterprise, pointed out to Vaubois the positions he was to guard with his 10,000 men, and prepared to advance with the 20,000 remaining, and plunge into the ravines of the Brenta.

He started at dawn on the 20th (6th September), and slept that evening at Levico. The following morning he resumed his march, and arrived before another defile, known as the pass of Primolano, where Wurmser had posted a division. He employed the same manœuvres as before, throwing riflemen on the heights and on the bank of the Brenta, and then charging in column along the road. The defile was carried. A small fort stood beyond: it was surrounded and stormed. Some hardy soldiers, scouring the road, got in front of the fugitives, retarded their flight, and afforded the army time to come up and capture them. Three thousand prisoners were taken by the French, who arrived the same evening at Cismone, having travelled twenty leagues in two days. Bonaparte was eager to advance still further, but the soldiers were unable; he himself was overcome with fatigue. He had outstripped his staff, and found himself without retinue or provisions; he divided a piece of ration-bread with a soldier, and threw himself on the ground, impatiently awaiting the break of day.

This extraordinary and unexpected march appalled Wurmser. He had never imagined his enemy would adventure into such gorges, at the imminent hazard of being enveloped; he now proposed to take advantage of the position of Bassano, which closes them, and bar their outlet with his whole army. If he succeeded in keeping him at bay, Bonaparte would be cooped up in the curve of the Brenta. He had already detached the division under De Mezaros to try Verona, but he countermanded it in order to contend on this point with all his forces: it was not probable, however, the order would arrive in time. The town of Bassano is situated on the left bank of the Brenta, communicating with the right bank by a bridge. Wurmser planted the two divisions of Sebottendorf and Quasdanovich on the two banks of the Brenta, in advance of the town. He disposed six battalions as a vanguard in the defiles which precede Bassano and shut in the valley.

On the morning of the 22d (8th September), Bonaparte left Cismone and advanced on Bassano. Massena marched on the right bank, and Augereau on the left. The French carried the defiles and debouched in presence of the hostile army, drawn up on both banks of the Brenta. Wurmser's troops, disconcerted by the temerity of the French, failed to resist with the courage they had exhibited on so many occasions they faltered, broke, and retired into Bassano. Augereau pushed on to the entrance of the town. Massena, from the opposite bank, had to force a passage over the bridge; he carried it in close column, as had been the bridge of Lodi, and reached the town at the same time as Augereau. Wurmser, whose head-quarters were still at Bassano, had scarcely time to save himself, leaving in the hands of the French 4000 prisoners and immense military stores. Bonaparte's plan, therefore, was executed; he had debouched into the plain as soon as Wurmser, and it now only remained for him to envelop the Austrians by driving them on the Adige.

Wurmser, in the disorder of so precipitate a movement, found himself separated from the remains of the division under Quasdanovich. That division retired towards Friuli, whilst he, pressed by the divisions of Massena and Augereau, which closed against him the road to Friuli and repelled him on the Adige, formed the resolution of cutting his way across the Adige and throwing himself into Mantua. He had drawn to him the division under De Mezaros, which had been making fruitless efforts to carry Verona. His force did not exceed 14,000 men, of which 8000 were infantry and 6000 excellent cavalry. He skirted the Adige in quest of a point to effect a passage. Luckily for him, the post which guarded Legnago had been moved to Verona, and a detachment, sent to occupy that town, had not yet arrived. Wurmser, seizing this fortunate hazard, secured Legnago. Being now certain of regaining Mantua, he granted some repose to his troops, who were exhausted with fatigue.

Bonaparte followed him without respite. He was deeply chagrined on learning the omission which had saved Wurmser; however, he did not yet despair of orestalling him at Mantua. He threw Massena's division to the other bank of the Adige by the ferry of Ronco, and directed it on Sanguinetto, to bar the road

were attacked by the French, and by noon the Austrians were not only expelled from them, but were pursued through Roveredo, as far as the defile of Calliano. Bonaparte did not pause for a moment. He ordered the division of Massena to advance immediately against this almost impregnable pass. The order was obeyed, the defile was carried, and the troops which defended it were thrown into utter confusion with astonishing rapidity. By nightfall the routed Austrian army was driven beyond Trent; having, in the course of the day, suffered, independently of the killed and wounded, a loss of five thousand men taken prisoners, twenty-five pieces of cannon, seven standards, and a profusion of ammunition and baggage. On the following morning the republicans entered Trent, to which place no French army had ever before been able to penetrate. From Trent a division was dispatched against the position of Lavis, which was mastered with as little trouble as either of the former."]

to Mantua. He sent Augereau on Legnago itself. Massena's vanguard, outstripping his division, entered Cerea on the 25th (11th September), at the moment of Wurmser's arrival from Legnago, with all his army. This vanguard of cavalry and light infantry, commanded by Generals Murat and Pigeon, made an heroic resistance, but was overpowered; Wurmser cut it down, and continued his march. Bonaparte came galloping up alone during the action; he narrowly escaped being taken, and had to save himself in all haste.

Wurmser passed through Sanguinetto, and learning that all the bridges over the Molinella were broken down, except that of Villa Impenta, he descended to that point, there cleared the river, and pushed rapidly for Mantua. General Charton attempted to stop him with 300 men formed in square; those brave men were cut to pieces or taken. Wurmser thus arrived at Mantua on the 27th (13th September). These slight advantages afforded some consolation for the previous disasters of the intrepid and veteran general. He spread himself in the environs of Mantua, and kept the field for an interval, owing to his numerous and well-appointed cavalry.

Bonaparte arrived with breathless celerity, furious against the negligent officers who had caused him to lose so glorious a prize. Augereau had retaken Legnago and captured the Austrian garrison, 1600 strong. Bonaparte ordered him to proceed to Governolo, on the Lower Mincio. He then engaged Wurmser in sundry skirmishes, with the view of drawing him out of the fortress; and during the night of the 28th-29th (14th-15th September), he took up a position in the background, in order to induce Wurmser to show himself in the plain. The old general, elated with his petty successes, did in fact deploy out of Mantua, between the citadel and the suburb of Saint-George. Bonaparte attacked him on the 3d complementary day of the year 4 (19th September). Augereau, advancing from Governolo, formed the left; Massena, moving from Due-Castelli, formed the centre; Sahuguet, with the blockading corps, composed the right. Wurmser had still 21,000 men in line. He was worsted on all points, and driven into the fortress with the loss of 2000 men. A few days afterwards he was completely cooped up within the walls of Mantua. The numerous cavalry he had brought with him, become of no use, served merely to augment the number of unprofitable consumers. He killed and salted all the horses. His garrison consisted of twenty and some thousand men, of whom several thousand were in hospital.

Thus, although Bonaparte had failed to reap all the fruits of his daring march on the Brenta, and to compel the marshal to surrender at discretion, he had entirely ruined and dispersed his army. A few thousand men were chased into the Tyrol under Davidovich; a few thousand had fled into Friuli under Quasdanovich; Wurmser, with twelve or fourteen thousand, had shut himself up in Mantua. Thirteen or fourteen thousand were prisoners; six or seven thousand killed and wounded. The Austrian army had accordingly again suffered a loss of twenty thousand men in ten days, besides a considerable train of artillery. Bonaparte had lost seven or eight thousand, of whom fifteen hundred were prisoners, the residue killed, wounded, or sick. Thus, to the armies of Colli and Beaulieu, destroyed on entering Italy, was now to be added that of Wurmser, twice scattered, first in the plains of Castiglione, and secondly on the banks of the Brenta. The trophies of Montenotte, Lodi, Borghetto, Lonato, and Castiglione, were outshone by the recent glories of Roveredo, Bassano, and Saint-George: at what period of history had such great results been witnessed, so many enemies slain, so many prisoners, standards, pieces of ordnance captured! The tidings diffused fresh joy through Lombardy, and terror through other portions of the peninsula. France was in raptures of admiration for the general of the army of Italy.

On the other theatres of the war the fortune of arms was less propitious for the French. Moreau had advanced on the Lech, as we have seen, in the hope that his progress would bring back the archduke and disengage Jourdan. Such an expectation was groundless, for the archduke must have been ignorant of the importance of his movement, if he were deterred from its execution by considerations prompting him to return towards Moreau. The campaign depended upon the events that were to occur on the Maine. If Jourdan were defeated and driven back on the Rhine, the progress of Moreau would only tend to compromise him the more, and expose him to lose his line of retreat. The archduke, accordingly, contented himself with detaching General Nauendorff, with two regiments of cavalry and some battalions, to reinforce Latour, and continued his pursuit of the army of the Sambre-and-Meuse.

That valiant army retired with the most poignant regret, retaining all the consciousness of power. It was the same that had performed many glorious deeds during the first years of the revolution; the same that had conquered at Watignies, at Fleurus, and on the banks of the Ourthe and the Röer. It had unlimited confidence in its general and in itself. The retreat had not discouraged it, for it was well persuaded that it yielded only to superior combinations, and to the mass of the opposing forces. It ardently desired an opportunity of coping with the Austrians, and retrieving the honour of its flag. Jourdan was actuated by the same sentiment. The Directory had written to him that he must at all hazards maintain himself in Franconia, on the Upper Maine, both to secure his winter-quarters in Germany, and above all, to cover Moreau, who had advanced even to the gates of Munich. Moreau, on his own part, had just communicated to Jourdan, under date of the 8th Fructidor (25th August), his march beyond the Lech, the advantages he had gained, and the project he had formed of still proceeding onwards in order to bring back the archduke. All these reasons decided Jourdan to try the fate of a battle, although he was confronted by very superior forces. He would have deemed himself wanting to the dictates of honour if he had quitted Franconia without fighting, and left unaided his colleague in Bavaria. Deceived, moreover, by the movement of General Nauendorff, Jourdan surmised that the archduke had actually set out to regain the banks of the Danube. He halted, therefore, at Wurtzburg, a place which he judged it important to preserve, but the citadel of which alone had been retained by the French. He gave some rest to his troops, made certain changes in the distribution and command of his divisions, and announced his intention of engaging the enemy. The army evinced the greatest ardour in carrying all the positions Jourdan considered it advisable to occupy before joining battle. He had his right resting on Wurtzburg, and the rest of his line on a series of positions stretching along the Maine as far as Schweinfurth. The Maine separated him from the enemy. One part only of the Austrian army had crossed that river, which confirmed him in the idea that the archduke had returned to the Danube. He placed at the extremity of his line, at Schweinfurth, Lefebvre's division, to assure his retreat on the Saal and Fulda, in case the battle should cause him to lose the road to Frankfort. He thus deprived himself of a second line and a corps of reserve; but he deemed it fitting to make that sacrifice to the necessity of ensuring his retreat. He determined to attack on the morning of the 17th Fructidor (3d September).

In the course of the preceding night, the archduke, apprised of his adversary's design, rapidly passed the remainder of his army beyond the Maine, and deployed his superior forces before the eyes of Jourdan. The battle began with advantage to the French; but their cavalry, assailed in the plain stretching along the

Maine by a formidable force of cavalry, was broken, rallied, was again broken, and found shelter only behind the lines and well-supported fire of their infantry. If his reserve had not been so far removed from him, Jourdan might have gained the victory; to summon Lefebvre he dispatched some officers, who were unable to penetrate through the numerous hostile squadrons. He hoped, however, that Lefebvre, seeing that Schweinfurth was not menaced, would march to the point of danger; but he hoped in vain, and drew back his army to protect it from the redoubtable cavalry of the enemy. The retreat was conducted in good order on Arnstein. Jourdan, the victim of the Directory's vicious plan, and of his zeal towards his colleague, now felt it incumbent to recoil on the Lahn. He continued his march without intermission, sent orders to Marceau to retire from before Mayence, and arrived behind the Lahn on the 24th Fructidor (10th September). His army, in this arduous march to the frontiers of Bohemia, had only lost some five or six thousand men. It sustained a serious loss in the death of young Marceau, who was pierced by the bullet of a Tyrolian ranger, and who could not be borne from the field of battle. The Archduke Charles caused him to be tended with the greatest care, but he soon expired. The young hero, regretted by both armies, was interred amid salvos of artillery from the hostile camps.*

Whilst these events were passing on the Maine, Moreau, still beyond the Danube and the Lech, was impatiently awaiting tidings from Jourdan. None of the officers detached to convey him intelligence had arrived. He remained inactive, without venturing to adopt a decisive resolution. In the interval, his left, under the orders of Desaix, sustained a rude encounter with Latour's cavalry, which, united with that of Nauendorff, suddenly debouched by Langenbrück. Desaix made such excellent and prompt dispositions, that he repulsed the numerous squadrons of the enemy, and dispersed them in the plain, after subjecting them to considerable carnage. Moreau, yet tormented by uncertainty, at length determined, after a delay of twenty days, to attempt a movement in quest of information. He resolved to approach the Danube, in order to extend his left wing to Nuremberg, and either obtain news of Jourdan or carry him succour. On the 24th Fructidor (10th September), he repassed the Danube with his left and centre, leaving his right alone beyond that river, towards Zell. The left, under Desaix, advanced as far as Aichstatt. In this singular situation, he stretched his left towards Jourdan, who, at the moment, was sixty leagues from him; he had his centre on the Danube, and his right beyond it, exposing one of those three corps to certain destruction, if Latour had known how to profit by their isolation. All military authorities have censured Moreau for this movement, as one of those half measures which involve all the peril of great ones without any of their advantages. In fact, Moreau having failed to seize the occasion of rapidly wheeling on the archduke, when that prince diverged on Jourdan, he could only compromise himself the more effectually by thus placing himself astride the Danube.

* ["The flying French were eagerly pursued by the Austrians. On the 19th, Lieutenant-General Hotze came up, at Hochstebach, with their rearguard under General Marceau, who made a stand, to give the rest of the army time to pass the defiles of Altenkirchen. After a gallant resistance, Marceau was defeated, mortally wounded, and made prisoner. Every care and attention was lavished by the Austrian chiefs on the captive general, who, though only twenty-seven years of age, was one of the most accomplished, intelligent, and brave of the French officers; and was not less humane than able and courageous. On the 21st he expired, and his body was restored to his countrymen by the Archduke, on condition that the Austrians should have notice of the time of his funeral, that they might join in paying to him those military honours which he justly deserved. He was buried in the intrenched camp at Coblentz; and, during the interment, discharges of artillery were fired by the hostile armies on the opposite banks of the Rhine."—*Annual Register* for 1796, p. 195.]

Eventually, after tarrying four days in this anomalous position, he felt its danger, again removed his army over the Danube, and resolved to ascend its course in order to approximate towards his basis of operations. He now learned the forced retreat of Jourdan on the Lahn, and no longer doubted that, after having driven back the army of the Sambre-and-Meuse, the archduke would hasten on the Neckar, to bar the return of the army of the Rhine. He was likewise apprised of an attempt made by the garrison of Manheim on Kehl, with the view of destroying the bridge by which the French army had debouched into Germany. In this state of affairs, his hesitation was at an end, and a march to regain France became imperative. His position was extremely perilous. Entangled in the midst of Bavaria, obliged to repass the Black Mountains to return on the Rhine, having in front Latour with 40,000 men, and exposed to encounter the archduke on his rear with 30,000, he might justly anticipate the direst disasters. But if he were devoid of the vast and fiery genius his rival displayed in Italy, he possessed that firmness of mind which rendered him superior to the dejection wherewith men of more ardent temperaments are sometimes stricken. He commanded a superb army, sixty and some thousand men strong, unshaken by the demoralising effect of a defeat, and placing in its chief an unbounded confidence. Duly estimating so invaluable a possession, he was not alarmed at his position, and prepared to pursue his route with tranquillity. Reflecting that the archduke, after beating back Jourdan, would in all probability return upon the Neckar, he feared that he should find that river already occupied; he consequently ascended the valley of the Danube, intending to make straightway for that of the Rhine by the route of the Forest Towns. Those avenues being the most distant from the point actually occupied by the archduke, seemed to him the safest.

Remaining beyond the Danube, therefore, he composedly ascended it, resting one of his wings on the river. His artillery and baggage-waggons proceeded before him, without confusion, and every day his rearguards bravely repulsed the enemy's vanguards. Latour, instead of passing the Danube, and endeavouring to anticipate Moreau at the entrance of the defiles, was content to follow him step by step, without venturing to bring him into action. When he had arrived near the lake of Feder See, Moreau deemed it fitting to pause. Latour had divided his force into three corps: he had given one to Nauendorff, and sent him to Tubingen, on the Upper Neckar, by which Moreau had no intention of passing; he was at Biberach in person with the second; and the third was stationed at a considerable distance, at Schussenried. Moreau, who was approaching the Valley of Hell (the Höllenthal), through which he purposed to retire, felt the importance of not being too closely pressed during the passage of that defile; therefore, seeing behind him Latour insulated, and aware that a victory would give firmness to his troops for the remainder of the retreat, he halted on the 11th Vendémiaire, year 5 (2d October), in the vicinity of the lake of Feder See, not far from Biberach. The country was mountainous, woody, and intersected with valleys. Latour was ranged on different heights, which might be isolated and turned, and which, moreover, had at the back a deep ravine, that of the Riss. Moreau attacked him on all points, and, skilfully contriving to penetrate through his positions, assailing some in front and turning others, drove him back, and threw him into the Riss, taking from him four thousand prisoners. This important victory, known as that of Biberach, repelled Latour a considerable distance, and singularly invigorated the spirit of the French army. Moreau resumed his march, and approached the defiles. He had already gone past the routes which traverse the valley of the Neckar and open into that

of the Rhine; there remained to him the road which, proceeding by Tuttlingen and Rothweil, towards the sources of the Neckar, follows the valley of the Kintzig, and terminates at Kehl; but Nauendorff had already occupied it. The detachments from Manheim had joined the latter, and the archduke was also drawing nigh. Moreau preferred to ascend a little higher, and proceed through the Valley of Hell, which, traversing the Black Forest, formed certainly a long elbow, but led to Brisach, a point more distant from the archduke. In consequence, he posted Desaix and Ferino with the left and right towards Tuttlingen and Rothweil, in order to cover himself on the side of the defiles occupied by the principal Austrian forces; and he sent the centre, under Saint-Cyr, to force the Valley of Hell. At the same time, he dispatched his great parks on Huningen, by the route of the Forest Towns. The Austrians had surrounded him with a number of small corps, as if they had hoped to envelop him, and had nowhere placed themselves in force to resist him. Saint-Cyr merely encountered a detachment in the Valley of Hell, passed without difficulty to Neustadt, and arrived at Friburg. The two wings immediately followed him, and debouched through that dismal defile into the valley of the Rhine, with the attitude of a victorious army rather than with that of an army in retreat.*

Moreau reached the valley of the Rhine on the 21st Vendémiaire (12th October.) Instead of repassing the Rhine by the bridge of Brisach, and skirting the river on the French bank to Strasburg, he resolved to advance along the right bank to Kehl, in presence of the whole Austrian army. Whether he desired to make a more imposing return, or he hoped to maintain himself on the right bank and cover Kehl by moving straightway on it, in either case he had insufficient grounds for hazarding a battle. By recrossing the Rhine at Brisach, he might have proceeded without obstacle to Strasburg, and once more debouched by Kehl. That tête-de-pont was capable of resisting long enough to afford him time to arrive. To march, on the contrary, in face of the hostile army, now wholly assembled under the archduke, and thus expose himself to a general battle with the Rhine at his back, was an inexcusable imprudence, when there was no longer any motive for assuming the offensive, or any necessity for protecting the retreat. On the 28th Vendémiaire (19th October), the two armies confronted each other on the banks of the Eltz, from Waldkirch to Emmendingen. After a sanguinary and varying conflict, Moreau perceived the impossibility of penetrating to Kehl along the right bank, and took a resolution to proceed over the bridge of Brisach. Deeming it impracticable, however, to pass all his army over that bridge without the confusion of overcrowding, and being very solicitous to forward troops with the utmost dispatch to Kehl, he detached Desaix with the left on Brisach, and returned towards Huningen with the centre and right. This determination has been judged equally imprudent with that which led to the battle of Emmendingen; for Moreau, weakened by one-third of his army, incurred the hazard of being effectually compromised. He relied, it is true, upon a very admirable position, that of Schliengen, which covers the avenue of Huningen, upon which he might halt and fight, in order to render the passage more tranquil and safe. He accordingly recoiled upon that point, halted there on the 3d Brumaire (24th October), and sustained an obstinate and drawn battle. After securing his baggage leisure to traverse the stream by this day's conflict, he evacuated the position during the night, regained the left bank, and moved in the direction of Strasburg.

Thus ended this celebrated campaign, and this still more celebrated retreat. The result sufficiently portrays the fundamental error of the plan. If, as Napoleon, the Archduke Charles, and General Jomini have demonstrated—if, instead of forming two armies, advancing in isolated columns, under two independent generals, with the paltry intention of outflanking the wings of the enemy, the Directory had constituted a single army of one hundred and sixty thousand men, whereof a detachment of fifty thousand would have besieged Mayence, and the remaining one hundred and ten thousand, united in a single corps, would have invaded Germany by the valley of the Rhine, the Valley of Hell, and Upper Bavaria, the imperial armies must have been compelled constantly to retrograde, without being enabled to concentrate advantageously against a mass inordinately superior The famous evolution of the young archduke would have been impossible, and the republican flag have been borne to the gates of Vienna. Under the prescribed plan, Jourdan was an involuntary scapegoat. His operations, uniformly unfortunate, were those of constrained devotedness, both when he cleared the Rhine for the first time, in order to draw upon him the forces of the archduke, and also when he advanced into Bohemia and fought at Wurtzburg. Moreau alone, with his fine army, might have in part retrieved the vices of the plan, either by hurrying on and crushing all before him at the moment he debouched by Kehl, or by closing on the rear of the archduke when he moved on Jourdan. He was either afraid or incompetent to adopt any such steps; but we are to allow, that if he failed to evince a ray of genius—if to a decisive and victorious manœuvre he preferred a retreat—he at all events displayed in that retreat an excellent judgment and an indomitable firmness. It was doubtless not so difficult as it has been represented, but it was conducted nevertheless in a very imposing manner.

The young archduke was indebted to the absurdity of the French plan for a brilliant conception, which he realised with prudence; but, like Moreau, he lacked that ardour, that audacity, if you will, which might have rendered the blunder of the French government fatal to its armies. Conceive what would have happened if on either side had been engaged the impetuous genius which had annihilated three armies beyond the Alps! If the 70,000 men of Moreau, at the moment they debouched from Kehl, or if the Imperialists, at the moment they quitted the Danube to wheel on Jourdan, had been conducted with the vigour and promptitude exhibited in the Italian campaign, assuredly the war would have been forthwith terminated most disastrously for one of the two powers.

The campaign endowed the young archduke with a resplendent fame in Europe. In France, a grateful feeling was engendered towards Moreau, for having led back in safety the army compromised in Bavaria. The greatest anxiety had been felt respecting that army, especially from the time when, Jourdan being repelled, the bridge of Kehl menaced, and the communications through Swabia intercepted by a multitude of detached corps, nothing was known of its operations or its fate. But when, after an interval of poignant disquietude, it was seen debouching into the valley of the Rhine in so perfect an attitude, men were enchanted with the general who had so auspiciously redeemed it. His retreat was extolled as a masterpiece of art, and straightway compared to that of the Ten Thousand. None ventured, indeed, to oppose it to the brilliant triumphs of the army of Italy; but as there are always many whom superior genius and high fortune mortify, and whom less shining merit rather gratify, all such declared for Moreau, vaunted

* [The Valley of Hell crosses the Black Mountains between Neustadt and Friburg. It is a gloomy and terrible defile, six miles in length, shut in on each hand by lofty, pointed, woody rocks, and in some places not more than a few fathoms wide. At the bottom rushes a torrent. It is curious that the pass by which Moreau thus saved his army had appalled the celebrated Villars in 1702. When urged to traverse it by the Elector of Bavaria, he replied, "Pray, excuse me; I am not quite devil enough to go by such a road."]

his consummate prudence and ability, and esteemed it preferable to the electric hardihood of young Bonaparte. From this period, Moreau had for partisans all who prefer secondary to transcendent talents; and, it must be confessed, in a republic we almost pardon such enemies of genius, when we see how that genius can become culprit towards the liberty which has quickened, fostered, and raised it to the pinnacle of glory.

CHAPTER XLIX.

INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL SITUATION OF FRANCE AT THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE YEAR 5.—OVERTURES BY ENGLAND TOWARDS A NEGOTIATION WITH THE DIRECTORY.—ARRIVAL OF LORD MALMESBURY AT PARIS.—PEACE WITH NAPLES AND GENOA; FRUITLESS NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE POPE; DEPOSITION OF THE DUKE OF MODENA; FOUNDATION OF THE CISPADÁN REPUBLIC.—NEW EFFORTS OF THE AUSTRIANS IN ITALY; PERILOUS POSITION OF THE FRENCH ARMY; BATTLE OF ARCOLE.

The result of the German campaign proved highly prejudicial to the republic. Its enemies, who persisted in denying its victories or predicting for it cruel reverses of fortune, deemed their prognostics fulfilled, and exulted with undisguised malevolence. Those rapid conquests in Germany, they said, had then no stability. The Danube and the talents of a young prince had brought them to a speedy termination. There was little doubt the rash army of Italy, which appeared so firmly established on the Adige, would be thence scourged in its turn, and chased over the Alps as the armies of Germany over the Rhine. It is true, the conquests of General Bonaparte seemed to rest on a somewhat more solid basis. He had not merely driven Colli and Beaulieu before him; he had annihilated them: he had not merely repulsed the new army of Wurmser; he had first disorganised it at Castiglione, and eventually dissipated it on the Brenta. Thus there were better hopes of holding ground in Italy than in Germany; but a malicious pleasure was taken in disseminating sinister reports. Numerous forces were arriving, it was confidently alleged, from Poland and Turkey, destined for the Tyrol; the imperial armies of the Rhine could now send additional detachments; and, with all his genius, General Bonaparte, having constantly fresh enemies to encounter, must finally reach the limit of success, were it only from the exhaustion of his own army. It was natural that, under actual circumstances, such conjectures should be formed; for imagination, after exaggerating successes, inevitably tends to exaggerate reverses.

The armies of Germany had retired without sustaining any material damage, and yet held the line of the Rhine. There was nothing so very disastrous in this, save that the army of Italy was thereby left without support, which was doubtless a serious calamity. Moreover, the two principal armies, by their return upon the French territory, must become chargeable upon the national finances, which were still in a deplorable state: and herein lay the cruellest dilemma. The mandats, having ceased to possess a forced currency, had sunk interminably; and even had that not been the case, they were nearly all expended, few remaining at the disposal of government. They were held chiefly at Paris, by certain speculators, who sold them to the purchasers of national domains. The arrears due to the state were still considerable, but were not paid; the taxes and the forced loan were collected with difficulty; the national domains, taken under contracts of purchase, were paid for only in part; the instalments still due were not yet exigible according to the law; and the additional sales effected from time to time were not sufficiently numerous to supply the treasury. It was upon the funds arising from such sales, however, together with the proceeds of the loan and articles obtained upon ministerial promises of reimbursement, that the services of government were carried on. The budget for the year 5 had recently been prepared, divided into ordinary and extraordinary expenses. The ordinary expenses amounted to 450 millions; the extraordinary to 550 millions. The land-tax, the customs, the stamp-duty, and other sources of income, were assigned to bear the ordinary expenditure. The 550 millions of extraordinaries would be sufficiently covered by the arrears of taxes due the preceding year, and of the forced loan, and by the payments still to make for domains purchased. There was in addition the resource of the domains yet possessed by the republic; but all these items were to be realised—the old and inveterate difficulty. The contractors, remaining unpaid, refused to continue their supplies, and all the services were in destitution. The public functionaries and fundholders received no salaries or dividends, and lacked the necessaries of life.

Thus, the isolation of the army of Italy, and the miserable state of the finances, were calculated to inspire the enemies of France with sanguine hopes. The scheme of a quadruple alliance, formed by the Directory, between France, Spain, the Porte, and Venice, had hitherto ripened only into an alliance with Spain. This last-named power, induced by the offers of France, and her brilliant fortune in the middle of summer, had determined, as we have seen, to renew the family-compact with the republic, and had recently issued a declaration of war against Great Britain. Venice, notwithstanding the instances of Spain and the invitations of the Porte, and despite the victories of Bonaparte in Italy, had declined to unite herself with the republic. It was vainly urged upon her that Russia regarded with a covetous eye her colonies in Greece, and Austria her provinces in Illyria; that her union with France and the Porte, who envied none of her possessions, would guarantee her from those ambitious foes; that the repeated victories of the French upon the Adige ought to satisfy her touching a return of the imperial armies and the vengeance of the emperor; that the co-operation of her forces and navy would render that return still more improbable; that neutrality, on the contrary, would leave her without a friend or protector, and perhaps expose her to serve as spoils of accommodation between the belligerent powers. Venice, blinded with antipathy towards the French, and engaged in preparations evidently intended against them, since she consulted the Austrian minister upon the choice of a general, repudiated for the second time the alliance pressed upon her. She clearly discerned the danger of Austrian ambition; but that of French principles was the greatest and most urgent in her eyes, and she replied to all the overtures, that she would adhere to her unarmed neutrality, which was false, as she was arming with the utmost diligence. The Porte, staggered by the refusal of Venice, and influenced by the suggestions of Vienna and London, had not acceded to the project of alliance. There consequently remained but France and Spain, whose union might contribute to wrest the Mediterranean from the English, but might likewise endanger the Spanish colonies. Pitt, in fact, was revolving plans to induce their revolt against the mother country, and he had already commenced his intrigues in Mexico. The negotiations with Genoa were not yet brought to a close, for the points at issue were at once the payment of a sum of money, the expulsion of certain families, and the recall of certain others. Neither were they more advanced with Naples, since the Directory insisted upon a contribution, and the Queen of Naples, who treated with repugnance, refused to consent to that condition. The peace with Rome was not concluded, on account of an article enforced by the Directory; it required the Holy See to revoke all the briefs

issued against France since the commencement of the revolution, which wounded the pride of the aged pontiff in a peculiar degree. He convoked a conclave of cardinals, who decided that the revocation could not be made. The negotiations were broken off. They were recommenced at Florence, where a congress was opened. The nuncios of the Pope having declared that the bulls were irrevocable, and the French commissioners having intimated, on the other hand, that the revocation was a condition *sine qua non*, the parties separated in a few minutes. The expectation of succour from the Kings of Naples and England encouraged the pontiff in his refusal. He had previously dispatched Cardinal Albani to Vienna, in order to implore the aid of Austria, and to concert with her his measures of resistance.

Such were the relations of France with Europe. Her enemies, on their side, were greatly exhausted. Austria felt comforted, it is true, by the retreat of the French armies which had advanced to the Danube; but she was in grievous alarm for Italy, and was making fresh preparations to recover it. England was reduced to a sad state. Her establishment in Corsica was precarious, and the speedy loss of that island seemed to her inevitable. The object of the French government was to close all the ports in Italy against her, and another victory won by General Bonaparte would suffice to provoke her total exclusion from that country. The war with Spain threatened to drive her from the Mediterranean and to jeopardise Portugal. The whole coast, as far as the Texel, was inaccessible to her. The expedition preparing by Hoche in Brittany disquieted her regarding Ireland. Her finances were in peril, her bank was shaken, and the people clamoured for peace; the opposition had gained strength in the recent elections. These constituted reasons sufficiently urgent to recommend ideas of peace, and the late reverses of France might suggest hopes that she would be constrained to accept any offers of a pacific tendency. But the royal family and the aristocracy had a great repugnance to treat with France, since in their eyes it involved an approval of the revolution. Pitt, less wedded to aristocratical principles, and solely occupied with the promotion of English interests, would have willingly concluded peace, but under a condition, indispensable to his views and inadmissible for the republic—the restitution of the Low Countries to Austria. Pitt, as we have already remarked, was a true Englishman, in pride, ambition, and prejudices. The greatest offence of the revolution was, in his estimation, not so much the birth of a colossal republic as the union of the Low Countries with France.

The Low Countries, in fact, constituted an important acquisition for France. It conferred upon her the possession of provinces the richest and most fertile on the continent, and above all of a manufacturing country; it gave her the mouths of the most important rivers for the commerce with the north of Europe—the Scheldt, the Meuse, and the Rhine; a considerable augmentation of coast, and consequently of shipping; excellent and advantageous ports, especially that of Antwerp; and, lastly, a prolongation of maritime frontier in the most dangerous direction for the English frontier, opposite the defenceless coasts of Essex, Suffolk, Norfolk, and Yorkshire. In addition to these positive benefits, the acquisition of Belgium had a further value for France: Holland fell under her immediate influence when no longer separated by Austrian provinces. Thus the French line became extended, not only as far as Antwerp, but even to the Texel, and the shores of England were enveloped by a range of hostile coast. When we reflect, moreover, on the family-compact with Spain, at that time a powerful and well-organised kingdom, we can readily comprehend that Pitt must have felt solicitude touching the naval power of England. It is a principle with every Englishman, thoroughly imbued with national ideas, that England ought to rule at Naples, Lisbon, and Amsterdam, in order to maintain a footing on the continent, and to break the long line of coasts which may prove adverse to her. This tenet was as firmly rooted in 1796 as that which taught every injury inflicted on France to be a benefit secured for England. Accordingly, to procure a momentary respite for his finances, Pitt would have consented to a temporary peace, but on condition that Belgium was restored to Austria. He was well inclined, therefore, to open a negotiation on that basis. He could scarcely hope that France would admit such a preliminary, for Belgium was the principal acquisition of the revolution, and the constitution actually debarred the Directory from treating for its alienation. But Pitt was little acquainted with the continent; he sincerely believed France to be ruined; and it was in perfect good faith that he came forward every year to announce the exhaustion and fall of the republic. He thought that if France had ever been disposed for peace, she must be so at the present moment, both on account of the depreciation of mandats, and on account of the retreat of her armies from Germany. Besides, whether he deemed the condition admissible or not, an importunate motive urged him to open a negotiation. This was the necessity of satisfying public opinion, which imperiously demanded peace. In fact, to obtain a levy of 60,000 militia and 15,000 seamen, he required to prove, by a signal demonstration, that he had done his utmost to conclude a treaty. Another consideration of equal moment weighed with him: by taking the initiative, and commencing a solemn negotiation at Paris, he would bring into discussion the general interests of Europe, and prevent Austria from opening a separate negotiation. This latter power, in truth, was less concerned for the recovery of the Low Countries than England to restore them to her. Belgium was for her a distant province, detached from the centre of her dominions, exposed to continual invasions from France, and deeply inoculated with revolutionary ideas—a province she had several times endeavoured to exchange for other possessions in Germany or Italy, and which she had retained solely because Prussia had always opposed her aggrandisement in Germany, and no combinations had ever been feasible admitting the cession of an equivalent in Italy. Pitt held that a formal negotiation, opened at Paris on behalf of all the allies, would obviate individual arrangements, and prevent any accommodation relative to the Low Countries. He desired, furthermore, to have an agent in France, who might judge her more nearly, and obtain certain information touching the expedition preparing at Brest. Such were the motives which, without even the expectation of concluding a peace, induced Pitt to make an advance towards the Directory. He was not content, as in the preceding year, with directing a trifling communication through Wickham to Barthélemy; he sent to demand passports for an envoy invested with powers from Great Britain. This extraordinary step on the part of the most implacable enemy of the republic, had something glorious for it. The English aristocracy was so far humbled as to solicit peace from the regicide republic. The passports were immediately granted. Pitt made choice of Lord Malmesbury, formerly Sir James Harris, and son of the author of "Hermes." This individual was not known as the friend of republics; he had contributed to the oppression of Holland in 1787. He arrived at Paris with a numerous suite on the 2d Brumaire (23d October 1796).

The Directory appointed the minister Delacroix to represent it. The two negotiators met at the Foreign Office on the 3d Brumaire year 5 (24th October 1796.) The French minister exhibited his credentials. Lord Malmesbury announced himself as the plenipotentiary of Great Britain and her allies, empowered to negotiate a general peace. He subsequently delivered in his powers, which were signed by England alone.

The French minister thereupon inquired whether he held a commission from the allies of Great Britain to treat in their name. Lord Malmesbury replied, that so soon as the negotiation was opened, and the principle on which it might be based admitted, his Britannic Majesty was assured of obtaining the concurrence and sanction of his allies. He then submitted to Delacroix a note from his court, in which it prescribed the principle on which the negotiation was to be based. This principle was that of reciprocal restitution of conquests by the belligerents. The note stated that England had made conquests in the French colonies; France had made conquests on the continent from the allies of England; there were consequently subjects of restitution on each side: but the principle of mutual compensation must be first conceded ere explanations were given touching the objects to be compensated. The English cabinet obviously shunned any premature and positive explication respecting the retrocession of the Low Countries, and put forward this general principle in order that the negotiation might not be broken off at its very commencement. The minister Delacroix replied, that he would refer the subject to the consideration of the Directory.

The Directory could not relinquish the Low Countries; such a surrender was beyond its powers, and even had it been otherwise, paramount obligations forbade it. France had pledged her honour towards those provinces, and could not expose them to the vengeance of Austria, by restoring them, without disgrace. Besides, she was entitled to indemnities for the unjust war so long waged against her; she had a right to receive some equivalent for the aggrandisements of Austria, Prussia, and Russia, in Poland, obtained by a flagrant crime; it behoved her, in fine, to persist in the design of recovering her natural barrier: for all which reasons, it had become imperative on her to retain Belgium, and uphold the provisions of the constitution. The Directory, firmly resolved to perform its duty in this respect, might have abruptly closed a negotiation, the clear intent of which was to demand the abandonment of the Low Countries, and to prevent an arrangement with Austria; but it would thereby have afforded ground for the allegation that it did not desire peace, accomplished one of the principal intentions of Pitt, and furnished him with excellent reasons for requiring additional sacrifices from the English nation. It replied on the very following day. France, it stated, had already treated separately with the majority of the powers composing the coalition, without their having invoked the concurrence of all the allies; that to render the negotiation general was to render it interminable, and to justify the belief that the present negotiation was not more sincere than the overture made the preceding year through the medium of the minister Wickham. Moreover, the English envoy was not provided with credentials from the allies in whose name he professed to speak. Lastly, the principle of compensations was intimated in too vague and general a form to permit either its admission or rejection. The application of such a principle must always depend on the nature of the acquisitions and the capacity of the respective belligerents to preserve them. Thus, the Directory added, the French government might have dispensed with returning any answer; but, to prove its inclination for peace, it declared its perfect readiness to entertain every specific proposition, whenever Lord Malmesbury should be invested with authority by the powers in behalf of whom he claimed to treat.

Having nothing to conceal in this negotiation, but being, on the contrary, enabled to act with the utmost frankness, the Directory resolved to render it public, and to publish in the newspapers the notes of the British envoy and the replies of the French minister. It accordingly ordered the immediate publication of Lord Malmesbury's memorial and the answer it had made thereto. This mode of proceeding was calculated to disconcert somewhat the tortuous policy of the British cabinet, but it did not necessarily infringe propriety by deviating from usage. The rejoinder of Lord Malmesbury was to the effect that he would apply to his government for further instructions. He must be deemed a singular plenipotentiary who possessed such inadequate powers, that, at the occurrence of each difficulty, he was obliged to refer its elucidation to his court. The Directory might have in this detected a subterfuge, and a design to spin out the negotiation under a vain semblance of treating; nor could it view with satisfaction the prolonged sojourn of a foreigner, whose intrigues might prove dangerous, and who had come to discover the secret of the armaments preparing in the French ports. Nevertheless, it manifested no displeasure; it allowed Lord Malmesbury to await the answer of his court, and, in the interim, to observe the different parties, estimate their strength, and speculate on that of the government. The Directory, in sooth, had little to dread from the scrutiny.

Meanwhile, the situation of the French was becoming perilous in Italy, notwithstanding the recent triumphs of Roveredo, Bassano, and Saint-George. Austria was making gigantic preparations to recover Lombardy. The assurances given by Catherine of Russia, guaranteeing the safety of the Gallicias, had permitted the emperor to transport the troops in Poland towards the Alps. The confident hope of preserving peace with the Ottoman Porte had, in like manner, prompted him to uncover the Turkish frontier, and all the reserves of the Austrian empire were directed upon Italy. A numerous and loyal population, moreover, afforded copious means of recruitment. The Imperial government displayed extraordinary zeal and activity in enrolling new soldiers, incorporating them in veteran regiments, arming and equipping them. An excellent army was thus mustered in Friuli, comprising the wrecks of Wurmser, the troops drawn from Poland and Turkey, the detachments from the Rhine, and the recruits. Marshal Alvinzy was commissioned to undertake the command. Sanguine expectations were indulged that this third army would be more fortunate than the two preceding, and finally wrest Italy from its youthful conqueror.

Bonaparte, during the interval, was importunate in demanding succours and in urging pacifications with the Italian powers on his rear. He earnestly exhorted the Directory to treat with Naples, to renew the negotiations with Rome, to conclude with Genoa, and to arrange an offensive and defensive alliance with the King of Sardinia, in order that he might obtain aid in Italy, if none could be forwarded to him from France. He desired permission to proclaim the independence of Lombardy and of the dominions under the Duke of Modena, with the view of securing partisans and auxiliaries devotedly attached to his cause. The policy he recommended was most expedient, and the distress of his army fully warranted his strenuous entreaties. The rupture of the negotiations with the pope had a second time caused the contribution imposed by the armistice of Bologna to be countermanded. One instalment only had been transmitted. The contributions levied on Parma, Modena, and Milan, were exhausted, either by the expenses of the army or by the remittances sent to the government. Venice furnished provisions in an adequate ratio, but the pay of the troops was in arrear. The funds exigible from the foreign commerce of Leghorn were still under litigation. Amidst the richest regions of the earth, the army began to experience privations. But its most serious calamity was the hollowness of its ranks, thinned by the Austrian fire. It had not destroyed so many enemies without undergoing grievous emaciation. It had received reinforcements to the extent of 9000 or 10,000 men since the commencement of the campaign, whereby the number of Frenchmen led into Italy had been increased to nearly 50 000: but at the

present moment it contained only thirty and a few thousands, so great had been the havoc of war and pestilence. Twelve battalions had recently arrived from La Vendée, but deplorably crippled by desertions; the other detachments promised were not forthcoming. General Willot, who held command in the southern departments, and who was instructed to direct several regiments upon the Alps, detained them to quell the disturbances his own incapacity and truculent spirit had provoked in the provinces under his rule. Kellermann could scarcely weaken his line, for his first duty was to be constantly prepared to repress Lyons and the environs, where the Companies of Jesus still murdered and devastated. Bonaparte solicited the eighty-third and fortieth demi-brigades, comprising nearly 6000 good troops, and stated that all his apprehensions would be dissipated if they came up in time.

He complained that the negotiation with Rome had not been confided to him, as he would have delayed the communication of an ultimatum until the payment of the contribution. "So long as your general," he said, "is not the centre of all in Italy, every thing will go wrong. I may easily be accused of ambition; but I am in truth satiated with honours. I am ill; I can scarcely sit on horseback; courage alone remains to me, which is not enough for the post I occupy. People begin to enumerate us," he added; "the prestige of our might is wearing away. Troops—or Italy is lost."

The Directory, feeling the importance of detaching Naples from Rome and securing the rear of Bonaparte, eventually concluded a treaty with the King of the Two Sicilies. It waived all objectionable demands, and the Neapolitan court, which the late victories of the French had intimidated, which saw Spain making common cause with France, and which feared that the English would be speedily driven from the Mediterranean, acceded to the treaty. The peace was signed on the 19th Vendémiaire (10th October). It was stipulated that his Sicilian majesty should withhold succours of every kind from the enemies of France, and close his ports against the armed ships of the belligerent powers. The Directory subsequently brought the negotiations with Genoa to a close. An untoward circumstance accelerated their termination: Nelson captured a French vessel in sight of the Genoese batteries. This violation of the neutrality egregiously compromised the republic of Genoa; the French party within it assumed a bolder tone—the adverse party shrunk into timidity; the determination was carried to conclude an alliance with France. The Genoese ports were shut against the English. Two millions were paid to France as an indemnity for the frigate *La Modeste*, and two millions more furnished as a loan. The feudatory families were not exiled, but all the partisans of France, expelled from the country and the senate, were recalled and reinstated. Piedmont was again urged to accept an offensive and defensive alliance. Its monarch had recently expired; his young successor, Charles-Emanuel, evinced friendly dispositions towards France, but he was not satisfied with the advantages she offered him as the price of his alliance. The Directory undertook to guarantee his dominions, which he held by an uncertain tenure amidst the general convulsion and the various republics ready to start into existence. But the reigning king, like his predecessor, demanded the cession of Lombardy, which the Directory could not promise, having to husband equivalents for treating with Austria. The Directory afterwards empowered Bonaparte to resume the negotiations with Rome, and conferred upon him full powers for that purpose.

The papal court had previously dispatched Cardinal Albani to Vienna. It had built lofty hopes on Naples, and, in the delirium of its rage, had insulted the Spanish legation. Naples suddenly failing it, and Spain manifesting her high displeasure, it was in the agonies of alarm, and presented a favourable moment for renewing overtures of peace. Bonaparte desired, in the first place, to wring from it money; next, although he contemned its temporal power, he regarded with uneasiness its moral influence over populations. The two Italian parties, procreated by the French revolution, and stimulated into development by the presence of the French armies, were daily growing in mutual exasperation. If Milan, Modena, Reggio, Bologna, and Ferrara, were the strongholds of the patriot party, Rome was the centre of the monkish and aristocratic party. It was still possible for the Vatican to arouse fanatical fury and greatly harass and perplex the French, especially now that the struggle for mastery with the Austrian army was about to be decided. Bonaparte felt that it was yet incumbent on him to temporise. Of free and independent mind, he despised all the fanaticisms which depress the human intellect; but, as a man of action, he dreaded the power unassailable by force, and preferred to elude rather than contend with it. Besides, although educated in France, his birth had occurred in the heart of Italian superstition, and he was far from partaking that disgust towards the Catholic religion which prevailed so deeply and universally amongst the French at the close of the eighteenth century. Thus he entertained no such repugnance to treat with the Holy See as existed at Paris. By gaining time, he would avoid the necessity of a retrograde march into the peninsula, avert priestly anathemas, and possibly recover the sixteen millions countermanded to Rome. He accordingly instructed the minister Cacault to disavow the demands of the Directory as to religious concerns, and to insist only on the material conditions. He selected Cardinal Mattei, whom he had immured in a convent, as an envoy to Rome; setting him at liberty, he charged him to convey his exhortations to the ear of the Pope himself. "The court of Rome," he wrote to him, "wishes war; it shall have it; but, previously, I owe it to my country and humanity to make a last effort to recall the Pope to reason. You know, my lord cardinal, the strength of the army I command: to destroy the temporal power of the Pope, the will is all I need. Go to Rome, see the holy father, enlighten him as to his true interests; release him from the intriguers who surround him, and who would ruin both him and Rome itself. The French government yet permits me to hear the words of peace. All may be accommodated. War, so disastrous to nations, brings fearful results on the vanquished. Save the Pope from the calamities which threaten him. You are well aware how sincerely I desire to conclude by peace a contest which war would terminate for me without glory as without peril."

Whilst employing such means "*to deceive*," as he expressed it, "*the old fox*," and to guard against the consequences of fanaticism, Bonaparte sought to foment the spirit of liberty in Upper Italy, so that he might oppose patriotism to superstition. The whole of Upper Italy was in a ferment: the Milanese, wrested from Austria, the provinces of Modena and Reggio, impatient under the yoke fastened upon them by their old absent duke, and the legations of Bologna and Ferrara, protected from the galling servitude of the Pope, loudly demanded their independence and their establishment as republics. He could not proclaim the independence of Lombardy, for victory had not yet sufficiently decided its fate; but he gave it hopes and encouragement. As to the provinces of Modena and Reggio, they lay immediately on the rear of his army—their confines touching Mantua. He had grounds of complaint against the regency, which had forwarded provisions to the garrison; and he had recommended the Directory not to grant peace to the Duke of Modena, but to rest satisfied with the armistice, in order to reserve the power of punishing him in case of necessity. Circumstances becoming every day more difficult, he determined, without consulting the Directory, to adopt a resolute course of action. It was unquestionable that the regency had again

recently proved delinquent, and infringed the armistice, by furnishing supplies to Wurmser, and affording an asylum to one of his detachments. He instantly declared the armistice broken; and, by virtue of the rights of conquest, he drove away the regency, and pronounced the Duke of Modena deposed and his states free. The enthusiasm of the inhabitants of Reggio and Modena was excited to the highest pitch. Bonaparte organised a municipal government, to administer the country provisionally, until it was definitively constituted. Bologna and Ferrara had already formed themselves into a republic, and were commencing to levy troops. Bonaparte planned the union of these legations with the Dutchy of Modena, in order to mould them into a single republic, which, wholly seated on this side the Po, should be styled *The Cispadan Republic.* He conceived, that if, on the conclusion of peace, the restoration of Lombardy to Austria were unavoidable, it might be possible to prevent the restitution of the Modenese and the legations to the Duke of Modena and the Pope; and that thus a republic, the offspring and ally of the French republic, would be erected beyond the Alps, to serve as the focus of French principles, and the asylum of persecuted patriots, whence liberty might one day expand over the whole of Italy. He was not sufficiently sanguine to believe that the enfranchisement of Italy could be accomplished at one blow; he deemed the French government too much exhausted to effect it at the present moment; but thought that he ought at all events to plant the germs of liberty in this first campaign. That object would be fulfilled by incorporating Bologna and Ferrara with Modena and Reggio. The spirit of locality was adverse to such junction; but he hoped to surmount that obstacle by his all-powerful influence. He visited the different cities, in all of which he was received with enthusiasm, and decided them to send one hundred deputies from the various districts of their territory to Modena, there to form a national assembly, charged to constitute the Cispadan Republic. This convention, accordingly, met at Modena on the 25th of Vendémiaire (16th October). It was composed of advocates, landowners, and merchants. Awed by the presence of Bonaparte, and directed by his counsels, it evinced an exemplary discretion. It voted the amalgamation into a single republic of the two legations and the dutchy of Modena; it abolished feudalism, and decreed civil equality; it nominated a commissioner, empowered to organise a legion of 4000 men, and ordained the formation of a second assembly, which was appointed to meet on the 5th Nivôse (25th December), in order to frame a constitution. The Reggians displayed an unbounded zeal. An Austrian detachment having sallied out of Mantua, they flew to arms, surrounded, captured, and conducted it to Bonaparte. Two Reggians were slain in the encounter, and were the first martyrs to Italian independence.

Lombardy was jealous and alarmed at the favours granted to the Cispadan states, and drew therefrom an evil augury for itself. It was feared that, since the French constituted the legations and the dutchy without constituting Lombardy, they harboured the intention of restoring it to Austria. Bonaparte again strove to encourage the Lombards, pointed out to them the difficulties of his position, and repeated to them that they must gain independence by vigorously sustaining him in his arduous struggle. They resolved to increase to 12,000 men the two Italian and Polish legions, of which they had already commenced the organisation.

Bonaparte thus secured friendly governments around him, prepared to direct all their efforts to support him. Their troops, doubtless, were of little value; but they were capable of forming the police of the conquered countries, and in this manner would render disposable the detachments he was obliged to employ for that service. They might, aided by a few hundreds of French, resist a first attempt of the pope, if he had the folly to make one. Bonaparte endeavoured, at the same time, to reassure the Duke of Parma, whose dominions abutted on the new republic; his friendship might be useful, and his kinsmanship with Spain enjoined deference and forbearance. He flattered him with the prospect of possibly acquiring certain towns amidst the dismemberments of territory. He thus availed himself of the resources of policy, to supply that deficiency of strength which his government could not replenish; and, in so doing, he performed his duty towards France and Italy, and executed his task, too, with all the consummate tact of a veteran diplomatist.

Corsica had just been emancipated by his exertions. He had collected the principal refugees at Leghorn, given them arms and officers, and boldly thrown them into the island to uphold the revolt of the inhabitants against the English. The expedition succeeded; his native land was rescued from English thraldom, and the Mediterranean would, in all probability, soon enjoy the like deliverance. It might be reasonably anticipated, that the Spanish squadrons, united with those of France, would for the future close the Straits of Gibraltar against the fleets of England, and reign paramount throughout the Mediterranean.

He had, therefore, employed the time elapsed since the events on the Brenta in ameliorating his position in Italy; but if he had somewhat less to dread from the princes of that country, the danger on the side of Austria was only becoming more alarming, and his forces to parry it were lamentably inadequate. The eighty-third and fortieth demi-brigades he had so urgently requested, were still detained in the south of France. He had 12,000 men in the Tyrol, under Vaubois, planted in advance of Trent on the banks of the Lavisio; about 16,000 or 17,000 under Massena and Augereau, on the Brenta and the Adige; lastly, 8000 or 9000 before Mantua; so that his army consisted of 36,000 or 38,000 men. Davidovich, who had remained in the Tyrol after the discomfiture of Wurmser, with a few thousand men, now commanded 18,000. Alvinzy was advancing from Friuli on the Piave with about 40,000. Bonaparte was consequently in extreme jeopardy; for to resist 60,000 men he had but 36,000, fatigued by a triple campaign, and daily diminished by the fevers they caught in the rice plantations of Lombardy. He wrote despondingly to the Directory, and warned it he was about to lose Italy.

The Directory, discerning the full extent of the peril menacing Bonaparte, and being unable to forward him succours with sufficient celerity, formed the design of suspending hostilities by means of a negotiation. Lord Malmesbury was at Paris, as we have mentioned: he was awaiting the reply of his government to the communications of the Directory, which had insisted upon his producing credentials from all the powers, and expressing himself more clearly respecting the principle of compensation. The English ministry, after an interval of nineteen days, had at length, on the 24th Brumaire (14th November), intimated in rejoinder that the pretensions of France were unprecedented, and that it was usual for a belligerent to demand to treat in the name of its allies, before possessing their formal authority; that England was assured of obtaining such authority, but that it was previously necessary for France to give a frank explanation touching the principle of compensation, which was the sole basis whereon the negotiation could be opened. The British cabinet added, that the answer of the Directory was filled with unbecoming insinuations as to the intentions of his Britannic majesty, which it was beneath his dignity to rebut, and that he would refrain from dwelling on them, to avoid impeding the progress of the negotiations. On the same day, the Directory, determined to be prompt and categoric, replied to Lord Malmesbury that it

admitted the principle of compensation, but required him forthwith to specify the objects to which he would apply that principle.

The Directory was competent to return this answer without committing itself too far, since, albeit refusing to cede Belgium and Luxembourg, it had at its disposal Lombardy and sundry other small territories. For the rest, the negotiation itself was obviously illusory; the Directory could anticipate no real result therefrom; and it resolved to baffle the subtlety of England by dispatching an envoy direct to Vienna, empowered to conclude a separate accommodation with the emperor. The first proposition this envoy would submit, established an armistice in Germany and Italy, to continue for at least six months. The Rhine and the Adige were to divide the armies of the two powers. The sieges of Mantua and Kehl were to be suspended. The provisions necessary for the diurnal consumption of Mantua might be daily introduced, so as to leave the two parties in their present state at the close of the armistice. France would thus secure the preservation of Kehl, and Austria that of Mantua. A negotiation was to be immediately opened for the conclusion of peace. The conditions offered by France were the following:—Austria to cede Belgium and Luxembourg to France; France to restore Lombardy to Austria, and the Palatinate to the Empire, thus relinquishing, on the latter point, the barrier of the Rhine; and to consent, moreover, with the view of indemnifying Austria for the loss of the Low Countries, to the secularisation of several bishoprics included in the Germanic empire. The emperor to undertake that he would neither directly nor indirectly interfere in the affairs between France and the Pope, and lend his influence to procure for the Stadtholder indemnities in Germany. This last was a condition essential to the tranquillity of Holland, and to the satisfaction of the King of Prussia, whose sister had espoused the deposed stadtholder. These terms were singularly moderate, and proved the desire felt by the Directory to terminate the horrors of warfare, and its lively solicitude for the army of Italy.

The Directory selected as the bearer of these propositions General Clarke, who was employed in the offices of the war department under Carnot. His instructions were signed on the 26th Brumaire (16th November). But before he could prepare for his mission, reach Vienna, and obtain a reception or a hearing, some considerable interval must elapse, and, meanwhile, events followed each other with wondrous rapidity in Italy.

Marshal Alvinzy, having thrown bridges over the Piave, had moved towards the Brenta by the 11th Brumaire (1st November). The plan of the Austrians, upon this occasion, was to attack concurrently by the mountains of the Tyrol and by the plain. Davidovich was to chase Vaubois from his positions, and descend the two banks of the Adige to Verona. Alvinzy, on his part, was to cross the Piave and the Brenta, advance on the Adige, enter Verona with the bulk of his army, and effect a junction with Davidovich. The two Austrian armies were intended to start from that point, and march in concert to the deblockade of Mantua and the deliverance of Wurmser.

Alvinzy, after passing the Piave, moved on the Brenta, where Massena was posted with his division. He, Massena, having ascertained the strength of the enemy, thereupon recoiled. Bonaparte marched to his aid with the division of Augereau. He enjoined Vaubois, at the same time, to check Davidovich in the valley of the Upper Adige, and to wrest from him, if he could, his position on the Lavisio. He proceeded in person to meet Alvinzy, resolved, despite the disproportion of forces, to attack him impetuously, and disperse his army at the very commencement of the campaign. He arrived on the morning of the 16th Brumaire (6th November) in sight of the enemy. The Austrians had taken up positions in front of the Brenta, from Carmignano to Bassano; their reserves had remained in the rear, beyond the Brenta. Bonaparte directed upon them all his forces. Massena attacked Liptai and Provera before Carmignano; Augereau attacked Quasdanovich before Bassano. The actions were animated and sanguinary; the troops displayed an indomitable prowess. Liptai and Provera were driven beyond the Brenta by Massena; Quasdanovich was repulsed on Bassano by Augereau. Bonaparte desired to have penetrated into Bassano that very day; but the approach of the Austrian reserves prevented him. It became necessary to postpone the assault until the following day. The unfortunate tidings reached him during the night that Vaubois had sustained a reverse on the Upper Adige. That general had bravely attacked the positions of Davidovich, and success was already dawning on his efforts; but suddenly a panic had seized upon his soldiers, notwithstanding all their approved valour, and they fled in disorder. He had eventually rallied them in that famous defile of Calliano, where the army had evinced such signal intrepidity in the invasion of the Tyrol. Whilst trusting to maintain himself in that rugged pass, Davidovich, directing a corps on the other bank of the Adige, turned Calliano, and doubled the position. Vaubois sent to apprise Bonaparte that he must retire to avoid being cut off, and expressed his fears lest Davidovich should forestall him in the important positions of La Corona and Rivoli, which cover the route into the Tyrol between the Adige and the Lake of Garda.

Bonaparte instantly discerned the danger of further pressing upon Alvinzy, when Vaubois, who was with his left in the Tyrol, might probably lose La Corona, Rivoli, even Verona, and be driven back into the plain. He would then have been cut off from his principal wing, and placed with 15,000 or 16,000 men between Davidovich and Alvinzy. He consequently took an instant resolution to retrograde. He directed a trusty officer to fly to Verona, there collect all the troops he could muster, and move them to Rivoli and La Corona, so as to anticipate Davidovich in those posts, and secure Vaubois leisure to reach them.

On the morrow, 17th Brumaire (7th November), he wheeled back, and passed through the town of Vicenza, whose inhabitants were greatly amazed to behold the French army in retreat after the successful combats of the eve. He repaired to Verona, at which place he concentrated his army. He ascended alone to Rivoli and La Corona, where he had the satisfaction of finding Vaubois's troops rallied and prepared to make head against a fresh attack of Davidovich. He determined to impress a stern lesson on the thirty-ninth and eighty-fifth demi-brigades, which had yielded to a panic. He assembled the whole division, and, addressing those two demi-brigades, he upbraided them with their want of discipline and their flight. Then turning to the chief of the staff, he said: "Let it be inscribed on the colours that the thirty-ninth and eighty-fifth no longer form part of the army of Italy." These expressions caused in the soldiers of the two demi-brigades the most poignant sorrow; they surrounded Bonaparte, assured him they had fought one against three, and entreated to be sent into the vanguard, that they might show whether or not they were worthy of the army of Italy. Bonaparte indemnified them for his severity by a few gracious phrases, which transported them with joy, and he left them firmly resolved to avenge their tarnished honour by a desperate valour.

Only 8000 men, of the 12,000 he commanded before his recent mishap, survived to Vaubois. Bonaparte distributed them to the best advantage in the positions of La Corona and Rivoli, and, after satisfying himself that Vaubois could hold his ground there for a few days, and cover his left and rear, he returned to Verona to operate against Alvinzy. The highway leading from the Brenta to Verona, following the foot

of the mountains, passes by Vicenza, Montebello, Villa-Nuova, and Caldiero. Alvinzy, surprised to see Bonaparte fall back on the morrow of a successful engagement, had followed him at a distance, surmising that the progress of Davidovich alone could have induced him to retrograde. He indulged the flattering hope that his plan of junction at Verona was about to be accomplished. He halted about three leagues from Verona, on the heights of Caldiero, which command the route. These heights afforded an admirable position for holding at bay an army issuing from Verona. Alvinzy established himself on them, planted batteries, and omitted nothing to render the position impregnable. Bonaparte reconnoitered the ground, and determined to attack him without delay; for the situation of Vaubois at Rivoli was very precarious, and allowed him but little time to act separately against Alvinzy. He marched against him in the afternoon of the 21st (11th November), repulsed his vanguard, and bivouacked with the divisions of Massena and Augereau at the base of Caldiero. At break of day, he discovered that Alvinzy, strongly intrenched, was prepared to give battle. The position was assailable on one side, that which rested on the mountains, and which had not been fortified by Alvinzy with sufficient precaution. Bonaparte directed Massena on that point, and charged Augereau to attack the rest of the line. A hot engagement ensued; but the rain fell in torrents, which gave a decided advantage to the Austrians, whose artillery had been previously placed in good positions, whereas that of the French, obliged to move in roads become impracticable, could not be brought on the suitable points, and was thus rendered wholly inoperative. Nevertheless, Massena succeeded in scaling the height neglected by Alvinzy. But suddenly the rain changed to a frigid sleet, which a coarse wind drove violently upon the faces of the soldiers. At this moment, Alvinzy marched his reserve on the position that Massena had carried, and recovered all his posts. Bonaparte vainly strove to repeat his efforts; the case was hopeless. The two armies passed the night in mutual presence. The rain poured incessantly, and reduced the French soldiers to the most dismal condition. The next morning, 23d Brumaire (13th November), Bonaparte re-entered Verona.

The situation of the army had become most critical. After having fruitlessly driven the enemy beyond the Brenta, and sacrificed without benefit a multitude of brave men; after having lost the Tyrol and 4000 men on the left; after having fought an unsuccessful battle at Caldiero, with the view of forcing Alvinzy from Verona, thereby still further diminishing its strength unavailably—all resource seemed at an end. The left, which scarcely counted 8000 men, was liable every moment to be repelled from La Corona and Rivoli, and in that case Bonaparte would be surrounded at Verona. The two divisions of Massena and Augereau, which formed the active army opposed to Alvinzy, were reduced, by the two battles, to 14,000 or 15,000 men. How could a force of 14,000 or 15,000 men cope with one of nearly 40,000? The artillery, by which the French had always contrived to counterbalance the superiority of their foes, was rendered immoveable by the state of the roads, so that no hope remained of contending with any chance of success. The army was stricken with dismay. Those hardy soldiers, tested by so many fatigues and perils, began to murmur. Like all intelligent troops, they were subject to emotions of discontent, because they were capable of reflection and judgment. "After having destroyed," they said, "two armies sent against us, we are expected also to destroy those which were opposed to the armies of the Rhine. Wurmser succeeds Beaulieu; Alvinzy succeeds Wurmser: the contest is renewed every day. We cannot perform the task of all. It is not our province to combat Alvinzy, any more than it was our part to fight Wurmser. If all had done their duty like us, the war would have been finished. Still," they added, "if succours were only given us proportioned to our dangers! But we are abandoned at the extremity of Italy; we are left alone to contend with two innumerable armies. And when, after having shed our blood in myriads of actions, we are at last driven over the Alps, we shall return without honour or glory, like fugitives who have failed in their duty." Such was the language of the soldiers in their bivouacks. Bonaparte, who partook their dissatisfaction and chagrin, wrote to the Directory, on the 24th Brumaire (14th November), in a desponding and upbraiding strain. "All our superior officers," he said, "all our chosen generals, are disabled; the army of Italy, reduced to a handful of men, is exhausted. The heroes of Millesimo, Lodi, Castiglione, and Bassano, have died in the service of their country or are in the hospitals. There remain to the regiments only their renown and their honest pride. Joubert, Lannes, Lamare, Victor, Murat, Charlot, Dupuis, Rampon, Pigeon, Ménard, Chabrand, are wounded. We are isolated in the depths of Italy: the brave men who survive see death inevitable, amidst such continual hazards and with forces so greatly inferior. Perhaps, the knell of the valiant Augereau, of the intrepid Massena, is about to sound —— Then! then, what will become of these heroic men? This idea renders me cautious; I dare no longer confront death, as it would be a cause of discouragement to those who are the objects of my solicitude. If I had received the eighty-third, composed of 3500 men known to the army, I would have answered for all! Perhaps, within a few days, 40,000 will be insufficient! To-day," added Bonaparte, "we give the troops repose; to-morrow, according to the movements of the enemy, we will act."

Whilst addressing these bitter complaints to the government, he affected, nevertheless, a perfect confidence in the eyes of his soldiers. He instructed the officers to enforce upon them that a vigorous effort must be made, and that such effort would be the last; that, Alvinzy vanquished, the resources of Austria would be utterly exhausted, Italy conquered, peace secured, and the glory of the army immortal. His presence, his words, reanimated drooping courage. The invalids, burning with fever, poured in numbers from the hospitals, on learning that the army was in danger, and hurried to resume their stations in its ranks. Deep and anxious emotions throbbed in all hearts. The Austrians had approached Verona in the course of the day, and exhibited the ladders they had prepared for mounting the walls. The Veronese manifested their joy at the expectation that, within a few hours, Alvinzy would be united to Davidovich in their city, and the French exterminated. Some amongst them, compromised by their attachment to the French cause, perambulated the streets in sadness, counting the diminutive force of their champions.

The army waited with breathless interest the orders of the general, expecting every moment he would command a movement. However, the day of the 24th elapsed, and, contrary to custom, the order of the day gave no announcement. But Bonaparte had not wasted time: after pondering on the scene of warfare, he had formed one of those resolutions wherewith despair inspires genius. Towards night, an order was issued for all the army to get under arms. The utmost stillness was enjoined. The troops were put in motion; but, instead of proceeding forward, they retrograded, repassed the Adige by the bridges of Verona, and issued from the city by the gate leading to Milan. They imagined the intention of defending Italy was finally relinquished: a mournful dejection oppressed the ranks. At some distance from Verona, however, they diverged to the left: instead of continuing to remove from the Adige, they began to skirt it and descend its course. They fol-

lowed it for a space of four leagues. Eventually, after a march of several hours, they arrived at Ronco, where a bridge of boats had been constructed by the foresight of the general; they recrossed the stream, and, at break of day, once more found themselves beyond the Adige, which they feared to have abandoned for ever. The plan conceived by their general was extraordinary, and one well fitted to surprise both armies. The Adige, on leaving Verona, ceases for an interval to flow perpendicularly from the mountains to the sea, and bends towards the east: in this oblique course, it approaches the route from Verona to the Brenta, upon which Alvinzy was encamped. Bonaparte, when at Ronco, was consequently on the flank, and almost on the rear, of the Austrians. In this position he was stationed amid vast morasses. These marshes were traversed by two causeways, whereof the one, to the left, ascending the Adige by Porcil and Gombione, led again to Verona, whilst the other, to the right, passed over a small river called the Alpon, at the village of Arcole, and joined the road from Verona near Villa-Nuova, behind Caldiero.

Bonaparte, therefore, held at Ronco two causeways, both of which communicated with the high road occupied by the Austrians—the one between Caldiero and Verona, the other between Caldiero and Villa-Nuova. His project was based on the following considerations:—Amidst these morasses, the advantage of numbers became of no avail; the armies could deploy only on the causeways, and on causeways the intrepidity of the heads of columns decides every thing. By the causeway on the left, which joined the road between Caldiero and Verona, he could fall on the Austrians if they attempted to storm Verona. By that on the right, which passed the Alpon at the bridge of Arcole, and terminated near Villa-Nuova, he could debouch on the rear of Alvinzy, capture his magazines and baggage, and intercept his retreat. He was thus unassailable at Ronco, and extended his two arms around the enemy. He had barricaded the gates of Verona, and left Kilmaine in it with 1500 men, in order to withstand a first assault. This combination, so singularly bold and profound, struck the army with mingled admiration and astonishment; it instantly comprehended the latent purpose, and resumed all its buoyant aspirations.

Bonaparte planted Massena on the left dyke or causeway, with the view of ascending to Gombione and Porcil, and taking the enemy in flank if he marched on Verona. Augereau he directed on the right to debouch upon Villa-Nuova. The day had now fully broken. Massena placed himself in observation on the left dyke; Augereau, to traverse the right dyke, had to cross the Alpon by the bridge of Arcole. Some Croatian battalions, detached to reconnoitre the country, chanced to occupy that position at the moment. They lined the river, and pointed their cannon on the bridge. They saluted Augereau's vanguard with a vigorous fire, and compelled it to recoil. Augereau hurried to the spot, and again led his troops forward; but the fire from the bridge and the opposite bank once more checked them. He was obliged to yield before this obstacle, and halt in his march.

Meanwhile, Alvinzy, who had his attention centred on Verona, and who believed the French army still there, was surprised to hear a brisk firing amidst the marshes. He never supposed that General Bonaparte could have chosen such ground, and he concluded it came from some detached corps of light troops. But his cavalry soon arrived to inform him that the engagement was serious, and that the firing proceeded from all quarters. Without being fully enlightened on the matter, he dispatched two divisions: one, under Provera, followed the left dyke; the other, under Mitrouski, proceeded along the right dyke, and advanced on Arcole. Massena, perceiving the Austrians approach, allowed them to advance on the narrow causeway; and when he deemed them sufficiently entangled, he charged upon them at full speed, threw them back, hurled them into the marsh, and cut down and submerged a considerable number. On the other side, Mitrouski's division arrived at Arcole, debouched over the bridge, and wound along the dyke like Provera's. Augereau fell upon it, broke it, and cast part of it into the marsh. He pursued it, and attempted to pass the bridge in its wake; but the bridge was even better guarded than in the morning; a numerous artillery defended the approach, and all the rest of the Austrian line was drawn up on the bank of the Alpon, firing on the dyke and raking it crosswise. Augereau seized a flag, and bore it on the bridge. His soldiers followed him, but a terrible fire forced them back. Generals Lannes, Verne, Bon, and Verdier, were dangerously wounded. The column recoiled, and the troops crept along the side of the dyke to protect themselves from the Austrian balls.

Bonaparte saw from Ronco the whole Austrian army break up; for, now apprised of the danger, it hastened to quit Caldiero, to avoid being taken in the rear at Villa-Nuova. It was with deep mortification he perceived a decisive result escaping him. He had indeed sent Guyeux with a brigade to attempt the passage of the Alpon below Arcole, but several hours must be consumed in the execution of that enterprise; and yet it was of the last importance to clear the Alpon without a moment's delay, in order to arrive in time on the rear of Alvinzy, and obtain a complete triumph: the fate of Italy hung on the contingency. The conviction formed, he galloped off with all speed, arrived near the bridge, threw himself from his horse, approached the soldiers, who had squatted on the sides of the dyke, asked them if they were still the conquerors of Lodi, animated them by his words and gestures, and, snatching a banner, exclaimed to them, "Follow your general!" At this cry, many of the soldiers remounted on the causeway and followed him; unfortunately, the impulse could not be communicated to the whole column, the residue of which remained behind the dyke. Bonaparte advanced, bearing the flag aloft, amidst a storm of bullets and grape. All his generals surrounded him. Lannes, already wounded by two shots in the course of the day, was struck by a third. Young Muiron, the general's aid-de-camp, essayed to cover him with his body, and fell lifeless at his feet. However, the column was on the point of clearing the bridge, when a final discharge stopped and swept it back. The rear abandoned the head of the column. Thereupon the soldiers who stood near the general seized him in their arms, bore him away amidst the roar and smoke of the fire, and endeavoured to reseat him on horseback. An Austrian column, which charged upon them, threw them in disorder into the marsh. Bonaparte fell, and sunk to his middle in the bog. The soldiers instantly perceived his extreme peril: "Forward!" they shouted, "to save the general!" They flew, at the heels of Belliard and Vignolles, to extricate him. They drew him from the miry pit, planted him on horseback, and he returned to Ronco.

By this time, Guyeux had succeeded in passing below Arcole, and in carrying the village by the opposite bank. But it was too late. Alvinzy had removed his magazines and baggage; he had deployed in the plain, and was in a position to frustrate the designs of Bonaparte. All this display of heroism and genius was consequently fruitless. Bonaparte might have avoided the obstacle of Arcole by throwing his bridge over the Adige a little below Ronco, that is to say, at Alboredo, a point whereat the Alpon has united with the Adige. But in that case he must have debouched into the plain, which it behoved him to shun;* and he would not have been in a capacity to

* I here mention a criticism often addressed to Bonaparte respecting this celebrated battle, and the reply he has himself made in his Memoirs.

hasten by the left dyke, in case of need, to the relief of Verona. He was therefore justified in acting as he had; and, although the success was not complete, important results were gained. Alvinzy had quitted his formidable position of Caldiero; he had again descended into the plain; he no longer menaced Verona, and he had lost a great number of men in the marshes. The two dykes had become the only intermediate field of battle between the two armies, which ensured the advantage to prowess, and took it from superiority of force. In fine, the French soldiers, animated by the conflict, had recovered all their confidence.

Bonaparte, who had to attend to manifold cares and hazards at once, now turned his attention to his left wing, stationed at Rivoli and La Corona. As it might be momentarily overpowered, he desired to have it in his power to fly to its aid. He therefore judged it requisite to fall back from Gombione and Arcole, repass the Adige at Ronco, and bivouac on this side the river, that he might be in a position to succour Vaubois, if, during the night, he should learn his defeat. Such was this first day of the 25th Brumaire (15th November).

The night passed over without any untoward intelligence. Vaubois was known to be still in possession of Rivoli. The exploit of Castiglione served to protect Bonaparte on that quarter. Davidovich, who commanded a corps in the affair at Castiglione, had received such an impression from that event, that he durst not advance before obtaining certain tidings of Alvinzy. Thus the spell of Bonaparte's genius hovered where he was himself absent. The morning of the 26th Brumaire (16th November) dawned; the hostile troops met on the two dykes. The French charged with the bayonet, drove in the Austrians, forced a great number into the marshes, and made numerous prisoners. They captured several standards and pieces of cannon. Bonaparte directed a fire across the Alpon, but adventured no decisive effort to pass it. As the night closed in, he again drew back his columns, removed them along the dykes, and rallied them on the other bank of the Adige, content to have harassed the enemy during the whole day, and awaiting more certain information from Vaubois. The second night elapsed as before; the news from Vaubois were cheerful. A third day might be devoted to a definitive struggle with Alvinzy. At length the sun rose for the third time upon this fearful field of carnage. It was the 27th Brumaire (17th November). Bonaparte calculated that the enemy, in killed, wounded, drowned, and prisoners, must have lost nearly a third of his army. He deemed him exhausted and discouraged, whilst he found his own soldiers full of enthusiasm. He therefore resolved to quit the dykes, and carry the field of battle into the plain beyond the Alpon. As on the preceding days, the French, debouching from Ronco, encountered the Austrians on the causeways. Massena still occupied the left dyke; on the right dyke was planted General Robert, who was instructed to charge whilst Augereau diverged to cross the Alpon, near its junction with the Adige. Massena experienced at first a strenuous resistance; but he placed his hat on the point of his sword, and thus marched at the head of the soldiers. As on the previous occasions, many of the enemy were slain, stifled, and taken. On the right dyke, General Robert advanced for a while with success; but he was killed, and his column eventually repulsed almost to the bridge of Ronco.

Bonaparte, spying the danger, placed the thirty-second in a plantation of willows which skirted the dyke. Whilst the antagonist column, victorious over Robert, was advancing, the thirty-second suddenly sprang from its ambuscade, took it in flank, and threw it into irremediable disorder. It comprised 3000 Croats; the greater part were killed or made captive. The dykes being thus swept, Bonaparte determined to clear the Alpon: Augereau had already passed it on the extreme right. Bonaparte recalled Massena from the left to the right dyke, directed him upon Arcole, which was evacuated, and thus moved his whole army into the plain, confronting that of Alvinzy. Before ordering the charge, he sought to infuse terror by means of a stratagem. A marsh, stocked with reeds, covered the left wing of the enemy: he directed Colonel Hercule to take twenty-five of his guides,* defile through the reeds, and make a sudden onslaught with a loud clang of trumpets. The intrepid band of twenty-five straightway proceeded to execute the order. Bonaparte then gave the signal to Massena and Augereau. They charged impetuously on the Austrian line, which stubbornly resisted. But, at a critical moment, a great noise of trumpets was heard: the Austrians, believing themselves assailed by an entire division of cavalry, yielded ground. At the same instant, the garrison of Legnago, which Bonaparte had called out to demonstrate on their rear, appeared in the distance, and added to their disquietude. Thereupon they retired; and, after seventy-two hours of murderous conflict, discouraged and overwhelmed with fatigue, they ceded the victory to the heroism of a few thousand warriors, and to the genius of a great captain.

The two armies, exhausted by their efforts, passed the night in the plain. By daybreak on the morrow, Bonaparte recommenced the pursuit on Vicenza. Arrived at the point of the high road leading from Verona to the Brenta which touches Villa-Nuova, he devolved upon his cavalry alone the task of pursuing the enemy, and returned towards Verona by the route of Villa-Nuova and Caldiero, for the purpose of bearing succours to Vaubois. He learnt on the way that Vaubois had been constrained to abandon La Corona and Rivoli, and to fall back on Castel-Nuovo. He redoubled his speed, and arrived the same evening at Verona—passing over the field of battle which Alvinzy had occupied. He entered the city by the gate opposite that through which he had departed. When the Veronese saw that handful of men, who had issued as fugitives by the Milan gate, return as conquerors by the Venice gate, they were amazed beyond expression. Friends and foes were alike unable to restrain their admiration of the general and the soldiers who had so gloriously changed the fortune of the war. From that moment, fears and hopes were equally dismissed that the French were to be expelled from Italy. Bonaparte instantly sent forward Massena to Castel-Nuovo, and Augereau to Dolce, by the left bank of the Adige. Davidovich, assailed on all sides, was promptly driven back into the Tyrol, with the loss of sundry prisoners. Bonaparte contented himself with reoccupying the positions of La Corona and Rivoli, without attempting to ascend as far as Trent, and to regain possession of the Tyrol. The French army was greatly weakened by this last struggle. The Austrian army had lost 5000 prisoners and 8000 or 10,000 killed and wounded, but was still upwards of 40,000 strong, including the corps under Davidovich. It retreated into the Tyrol and on the Brenta, to repose after its fatigues; it was far from having suffered like the armies of Wurmser and Beaulieu. The French, from their exhaustion and deficiency, had been able merely to repulse without destroying it. All idea of pursuing it was necessarily relinquished, or, at all events, until the promised reinforcements should have arrived. Bonaparte contented himself with occupying the Adige from Dolce to the sea.

This fresh victory occasioned a rapturous joy both in Italy and in France. All men extolled that indomitable spirit which, with a force of 14,000 or 15,000 in array against 40,000, had never dreamt of retreating; that fertile and profound genius which had so promptly discovered, in the dykes of Ronco, a per-

* [If the reader has forgotten who Bonaparte's "guides" were, he will find an account of their institution at page 584 of this history.]

fectly new field of battle, that annihilated the advantage of number, and opened up the flanks of the enemy. They celebrated more especially the heroism displayed at the bridge of Arcole; and the young general was every where depictured in the midst of the fire and the smoke, bearing a flag in his hand. The two councils, when declaring, according to usage, that the army of Italy had deserved well of their country, decreed, moreover, that the standards borne by Generals Bonaparte and Augereau on the bridge of Arcole, should be presented to them as trophies to be preserved in their families: an admirable and noble recompense, worthy of an heroic age, and infinitely more glorious than the diadem subsequently awarded by infatuation to transcendent genius!

CHAPTER L.

CLARKE AT THE HEAD-QUARTERS OF THE ARMY OF ITALY.—RUPTURE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE BRITISH CABINET. — EXPEDITION TO IRELAND. — ADMINISTRATIVE LABOURS OF THE DIRECTORY DURING THE WINTER OF THE YEAR V.—STATE OF THE FINANCES. — CAPITULATION OF KEHL. — LAST ATTEMPT OF AUSTRIA UPON ITALY.—VICTORIES OF RIVOLI AND LA FAVORITA. — FALL OF MANTUA.— CLOSE OF THE MEMORABLE CAMPAIGN OF 1796.

General Clarke, charged with pacific overtures to the Emperor of Austria, reached, on his way to Vienna, the head-quarters of the army of Italy. The essential object of his mission had lapsed, for the battle of Arcole rendered an armistice unnecessary. Bonaparte, whom General Clarke was instructed to consult, entirely disapproved of the projected armistice and of its conditions. The reasons he alleged were just and potential. An armistice could now produce but one advantage, namely, the preservation of the fortress of Kehl on the Rhine, which the Archduke Charles was besieging with inexorable pertinacity; and, for this very secondary object, Mantua was relinquished. Kehl merely afforded a *tête-de-pont*, which was not indispensable for invading Germany. The capture of Mantua, on the contrary, involved the definitive conquest of Italy, and would warrant the exaction, in restitution, of Mayence and the entire line of the Rhine. An armistice would evidently jeopardise this conquest; for Mantua, filled with invalids and reduced to stinted rations, could not defer its surrender more than a month. The provisions to be introduced, according to the stipulation, would tend to recruit the health and vigour of the garrison. It would be impossible to ascertain the exact quantity exigible under the convention: and Wurmser, by instituting a rigid economy, might husband supplies enabling him to prolong his resistance, in case hostilities were eventually resumed. The series of battles fought to cover the blockade of Mantua, would thus become altogether fruitless, and the contest must be recommenced with all the attendant sacrifices. Nor was this all. The Pope would, of course, be comprehended in the armistice by Austria, and thus would be lost the opportunity of chastising him, and extorting from him twenty or thirty millions, necessary for behoof of the army, and serviceable in the prosecution of a fresh campaign. In short, Bonaparte, diving into the future, recommended that, instead of suspending hostilities, they should be continued with vigour; but that the war should be centred on its true theatre, and a reinforcement of 30,000 men detached into Italy. He undertook on such terms to march on Vienna, and win in two months a peace, the frontier of the Rhine, and a republic in Italy. Undoubtedly, such a combination placed in his hands all the military and political operations of the war; but whether it were dictated by selfishness or otherwise, it was based on sound and comprehensive views, and the future demonstrated its wisdom.

Nevertheless, in obedience to the Directory, communications were forwarded to the Austrian generals on the Rhine and the Adige, proposing to them an armistice, and requesting a safe conduct for Clarke. The Archduke Charles replied to Moreau that he could not hearken to any proposal for an armistice, as his powers did not embrace such a subject, and that it must be referred to the Aulic Council. Alvinzy returned a similar answer, and dispatched a courier to Vienna. The Austrian ministry, secretly devoted to England, was little inclined to entertain the overtures of France. The cabinet of London had imparted to it the mission intrusted to Lord Malmesbury, and laboured to persuade it that the emperor would act more advantageously for himself by taking part in the negotiation opened at Paris, than by concluding a separate accommodation, since the English conquests in the two Indias were to be sacrificed in order to procure for him the restitution of the Low Countries. Besides the instigations of the English cabinet, the imperial counsellors had other reasons for rejecting the propositions of the Directory. They flattered themselves with the speedy reduction of the fortress of Kehl, when the French, checked along the course of the Rhine, would be unable to clear that bulwark, and additional detachments might be safely withdrawn for removal to the Adige. These detachments, joined to the new levies in most active progress throughout the Austrian possessions, would allow another attempt to be made on Italy; and perhaps that terrible army, which had annihilated so many Austrian battalions, would finally succumb under such reiterated assaults.

The inflexibility of the German character was in this instance perfectly exemplified; despite such disastrous reverses, the idea of recovering the fair region of Italy was yet clung to with steadfast tenacity. Hence, access to Vienna was denied to the French envoy. Moreover, repugnance was felt to the presence of an observer in the metropolis of the empire, and no desire existed for opening a direct negotiation. The armistice, indeed, would have been welcome on the Adige, but not on the Rhine. Clarke was informed, in reply, that if he betook himself to Vicenza, he would there find the Baron von Vincent, with whom he might confer as to him seemed meet. An interview between these parties was accordingly held at Vicenza. The Austrian nuncio intimated that the emperor could not receive an envoy from the republic, as that would imply a recognition; and, with respect to the armistice, he declared that it was admissible with a limitation to Italy. This restriction was preposterous; and it is difficult to conceive how the Austrian ministry could seriously submit such a proposition, for whilst it rescued Mantua, it abandoned Kehl to fate, and the French must have been shallow indeed to accept so bootless a reciprocity. At the same time, the cabinet of Vienna, mindful to prepare the way for a separate negotiation in case of exigency, allowed its nuncio to inform the French commissioner that if he had any proposals to make relative to peace, he might repair to Turin and communicate them to the Austrian ambassador resident at the Sardinian court. Thus, through the suggestions of England and the futile hopes of the imperial councillors, the noxious scheme of an armistice was frustrated. Clarke proceeded to Turin, in order to profit, should circumstances render it expedient, by the intermediary offered him at that court. He had, besides, another mission—to watch General Bonaparte. The genius of that young man had appeared so extraordinary, his character so absolute and energetic, that, without any precise ground, he was supposed ambitious. He had insisted upon conducting the war according to his own ideas, and had tendered his resignation when a plan was prescribed to him which he disapproved;

he had acted with sovereign independence in Italy, dispensing to its princes peace or war, under the specious appellation of armistices; he had complained with haughty indignation that the negotiations with the Pope were not left exclusively to his management, and had demanded that the task of prosecuting them should be forthwith delegated to him; he treated with harshness the commissioners Garau and Salicetti, when they ventured to adopt measures which provoked his displeasure, and he had obliged them to quit his head-quarters; in fine, he had not scrupled to remit funds to other armies without any warrant on the part of the government, and without using the indispensable medium of the public treasury. All these facts indicated a man lustful to perform alone what he deemed himself alone capable of fitly accomplishing. It was as yet but the impatience of genius, scorning the thraldom of dictation; but in this impatience the germ of despotic will might be detected. When seen to arouse Upper Italy against its old lords, and to create or subvert states, he was alleged to contemplate his own elevation to the dukedom of Milan. A presentiment of his aspiring ambition was general, and he himself foreboded the imputation. He complained of being accused, and laboured to dispel obloquy, without the Directory having by word or act given occasion for such disclaimers.

Clarke, therefore, besides his mission to negotiate, was privily instructed to observe Bonaparte. The latter was apprised of the fact, and, acting with the sternness and address peculiar to him, he rendered it obvious he knew the object of his mission, and speedily subjugating him by his ascendancy and insinuating grace—as ineffable, it is represented, as his genius—he converted him into a warm adherent. Clarke possessed considerable acuteness, but he had too large a share of vanity to play the adroit and subtle spy. He remained in Italy, sojourning sometimes at Turin and sometimes at head-quarters, and eventually became a creature of Bonaparte rather than of the Directory.

At Paris, the English cabinet had exerted its ingenuity to protract the negotiation; but the French government, by prompt and explicit rejoinders, finally constrained Lord Malmesbury to explain himself. That plenipotentiary, as we have recorded, had originally laid down the principle of a general negotiation and of reciprocal compensations: on its part, the Directory had insisted upon the production of credentials from all the allies, and upon a more precise explanation of the compensatory principle. The English envoy had taken nineteen days to compose an answer; ultimately, he had replied that the credentials were solicited, but that before obtaining them, the French government must distinctly admit the principle of compensations. The Directory had then demanded that the objects of retrocession should be forthwith specified. At this point we left the negotiation. Lord Malmesbury again wrote to London, and, after a lapse of twelve days, delivered a communication on the 6th Frimaire (26th November), to the effect that his court had nothing to add to its previous statements, so long as the French government refrained from formally admitting the proposed principle. This amounted to a subterfuge; for, by demanding the specification of the objects intended for compensation, France evidently admitted the principle itself. To correspond with London, and consume twelve days for such an evasion, was assuredly trifling with the Directory. It answered, as was its wont, on the following day; and in a note of four lines, stated that its previous note necessarily implied the admission of the compensation principle, but that, to obviate doubts, it formally admitted that basis, and demanded the immediate designation of the objects to which it was to be made referable. The Directory begged to be informed, moreover, whether Lord Malmesbury must write to London as every question arose. Lord Malmesbury replied vaguely that he would be obliged to communicate with his cabinet whenever the question required fresh instructions. He wrote once more, and remained twenty days a passive sojourner in Paris. The time had now come when he must leave the indefinite generalities wherein he had shrouded his intentions, and introduce the delicate topic of the Low Countries. To explain his views on that point was to break off the negotiation, and it is clear the British cabinet sought to delay the rupture as long as possible. At length, on the 28th Frimaire (18th December), Lord Malmesbury had an interview with the minister Delacroix, and delivered to him a note wherein the pretensions of the British government were set forth. It required France to restore to the powers of the Continent all she had conquered: to Austria, Belgium and Luxumbourg; to the Empire, the German principalities on the left bank of the Rhine; to evacuate the whole of Italy, and replace it in the *status quo ante bellum*; to restore certain portions of territory to Holland, such as the Maritime Flanders, for example, so that it might be rendered independent; in fine, to make modifications in her existing constitution. The English cabinet undertook to restore the colonies of Holland only in case the Stadtholderate were re-established, and even then not all: it claimed to retain some as an indemnity for the war, the Cape of Good Hope being of the number. For all these sacrifices, it offered the restitution of two or three islands which the fortune of war had torn from France in the Antilles, Martinique, Saint Lucia, and Tobago, burdened, moreover, with the condition that the whole of Saint-Domingo should not remain under French dominion. Thus France, after an iniquitous war, in which all the justice had been on her side, in maintaining which she had disbursed enormous sums, and wherefrom she had emerged victorious, was not to have a single province, whilst the northern powers had partitioned a powerful kingdom, and England had made enormous acquisitions in India! France, which still occupied the line of the Rhine and was mistress of Italy, was to evacuate the Rhine and Italy on the simple summons of England! Such conditions were absurd and inadmissible; the mere submission of them was offensive, and they ought not to have been entertained. Delacroix, however, listened to them with a politeness which affected the British envoy, and even led him to hope the negotiation might be continued.

Delacroix, in the course of the conference, relied on an argument which was valueless, to wit, that the Low Countries were declared national territory by the constitution; to which the English minister objected a fact equally pithless in the controversy—that the treaty of Utrecht assigned them to Austria.* The constitution might be obligatory on the French nation, but it neither concerned nor bound foreign nations. The treaty of Utrecht was, like all treaties made in this world, an arrangement resulting from force, which force might sweep away. The only reason the French minister ought to have given was, that the union of Belgium with France was just, agreeable to all natural and political harmonies, and warranted by victory. After a lengthened discussion on various accessory points of the negotiation, the two ministers separated. Delacroix reported the result to the Directory, which, justly irritated, resolved to answer the English minister as he richly merited. The memorial of the British plenipotentiary was not signed, having been merely enclosed in a signed letter. The Directory demanded, during the same day, that

* [M. Thiers has here adopted an ingenious mode of representing the case. Lord Malmesbury did not adduce the treaty of Utrecht as the chief reason for the restitution of the Low Countries, but to show the futility of Delacroix's plea about the French constitution. Delacroix told Malmesbury that the union of Belgium with France by the constitution was notorious to the whole world, and Malmesbury replied that when the French made that constitution, the treaty of Utrecht was equally notorious.].

it should be completed by the necessary forms, and that Lord Malmesbury should furnish his *ultimatum* within twenty-four hours. Lord Malmesbury, much embarrassed, replied that the memorial was sufficiently authenticated by its enclosure within a signed letter, and that with respect to an *ultimatum*, it was contrary to all usage to demand one so abruptly. On the following day, the 29th Frimaire (19th December), the Directory intimated to him that it would never listen to any proposition contrary to the laws and treaties which bound the republic. It added, furthermore, that Lord Malmesbury finding it necessary to consult his government every moment, and enacting a part purely passive in the negotiation, his presence at Paris was useless, and that consequently he was ordered to withdraw, he and all his suite, within forty-eight hours. The Directory stated in conclusion, that the negotiation might be carried on by the interchange of couriers, if the British government thought fit to adopt the basis fixed by the French republic.

Thus finished this negotiation, in which the Directory, so far from infringing established forms, as was alleged, gave a veritable example of frankness in its intercourse with hostile powers. There was no usage violated in its progress. The communications of governments are characterised, like all the relations between individuals, by the peculiar spirit of the age, of the situation, and of the men wielding the sovereign functions. A strong and victorious government holds a language very different from a feeble and vanquished government; and it befitted a republic supported by justice and victory, to speak with decision, promptitude, and publicity.

Pending these events, the grand project of Hoche on Ireland was executed. The English government had viewed the preparations with the utmost alarm, well aware the blow would fall on a vulnerable point, and possibly be productive of disastrous consequences. Notwithstanding the rumours artfully disseminated of an expedition to Portugal or to America, the British minister had sagaciously divined the object of the armaments fitting out at Brest. Pitt had called out the militia, put the coasts in a state of defence, and issued directions to remove every thing into the interior if the French should effect a disembarkation.

Ireland, the intended destination of the expedition, was in a state calculated to inspire the deepest solicitude. The advocates of parliamentary reform and the Catholics formed a body sufficiently numerous to hoist the standard of rebellion. They were ready to adopt a republican government under the guarantee of France, and had sent secret agents to Paris to concert with the Directory. Thus the opportunity seemed auspicious for an expedition into that island, being well-timed for occasioning England the most serious embarrassments, and for reducing her to accept a peace upon somewhat different conditions than she now presumed to offer. Hoche, who had consumed the two fairest years of his life in La Vendée, and who saw the great theatres of action occupied by Bonaparte, Moreau, and Jourdan, burned to open one for himself in Ireland. England was as noble an antagonist as Austria, and the honour to be reaped in combating and vanquishing her was not less brilliant. A new republic had been reared in Italy, as a centre to diffuse the rays of liberty through all that land. Hoche deemed it glorious and possible to establish one in Ireland, by the very side of aristocratic England. He had cultivated an intimate intelligence with Admiral Truguet, the minister of marine, a man of aspiring views. They had pondered together on the means of restoring the importance of the navy and of accomplishing great deeds; for at this time all men strained their faculties to the utmost, all meditated prodigies for the glory and happiness of France. The offensive and defensive alliance concluded with Spain at St Ildefonso, rendered ample resources available, and permitted hopes of mighty achievements. By uniting the Toulon fleet with the Spanish squadrons, and concentrating them in the British Channel with those which France possessed on the Atlantic, a most formidable force might be collected, and a decisive effort made to emancipate the seas; at all events, a firebrand might be thrown into Ireland, and the conquests of England in India seriously interrupted. Admiral Truguet, keenly alive to the importance of carrying instant succours to India, held that the Brest squadron, without awaiting the junction of the French and Spanish fleets in the Channel, should immediately put to sea, land the army of Hoche in Ireland, keep a few thousand men on board, crowd all sail for the Isle of France (the Mauritius), there receive the battalions of blacks presently organising, and transport these auxiliaries into India, to sustain Tippoo Saib in his contest. This vast project was liable to the objection of disembarking in Ireland only a portion of the army destined for the expedition, and of leaving it exposed to great hazards, pending the problematical junction of the squadron under Admiral Villeneuve, appointed to sail from Toulon, of the Spanish fleet which was scattered in the ports of Spain, and of the squadron under Richery expected from America. The enterprise thus planned by Truguet was not attempted. It was determined to await the arrival of Richery from America, and meanwhile, despite the low ebb of the state finances, extraordinary efforts were made to equip the squadron lying in Brest. In Frimaire (December) it was in a fit state for sea. It comprised fifteen line-of-battle ships, twenty frigates, six brigs, and fifty transports. It might carry twenty-two thousand men. Hoche finding it impossible to act in concert with Villaret-Joyeuse, that commander was superseded for Morard-de-Galles. The Bay of Bantry was assigned as the place of disembarkation. Sealed orders were lodged with each captain, prescribing the course he was to take and the anchorage to choose, in case of accident.

The expedition set sail on the 26th Frimaire (16th December). Hoche and Morard-de-Galles were stationed on board a frigate. The French squadron, under favour of a thick mist, escaped the English cruisers, and scudded into the open sea without being perceived. But during the night of the 26th–27th, a frightful storm dispersed it: one vessel foundered. Rear-admiral Bouvet, however, manœuvred to rally the squadron, and, after a lapse of two days, succeeded in mustering it, with the exception of a ship and three frigates. Unfortunately, the frigate bearing Hoche and Morard-de-Galles was of the number of the missing. The squadron bore away for Cape Clear, off which it manœuvred during several days, awaiting the two commanders. At length, on the 5th Nivôse (24th December), it entered the Bay of Bantry. A council of war decided upon a disembarkation, but it became impracticable from the boisterous weather. The squadron was again driven off the Irish coast. Rear-admiral Bouvet, alarmed by so many obstacles, afraid of falling short of provisions, and separated from his superior officers, thought it best to make for the coast of France. Hoche and Morard-de-Galles eventually arrived in the Bay of Bantry, and learned the departure of the French flotilla. They returned through incredible perils. Shattered by the sea and pursued by the English, they reached the shores of France only by a sort of miracle. The ship "Les Droits de l'Homme," Captain La Crosse, was parted from the squadron, and performed prodigies. Attacked by two English vessels, it destroyed one and escaped from the other; but sadly crippled, deprived of masts and sails, it succumbed to the violence of the sea. Part of the crew unhappily sunk, the remainder was rescued with much difficulty.

Such was the result of this expedition, which excited great consternation in England, and revealed

her assailable point to foes. The Directory fostered the idea of resuming the enterprise at a subsequent period, and in the interim centered all its attention on the continent, to accelerate the moment when Austria might be induced to lay down her arms. The troops on board the fleet had suffered little; they were forthwith disembarked. The force necessary to maintain the police of the country was left on the coasts, whilst the greater part of the army, which had borne the title of the Army of the Ocean, was marched towards the Rhine. The two Vendées and Brittany were indeed completely subdued by the continual presence and labours of Hoche. An important command was intended for that general, to indemnify him for his former arduous and ungrateful task. The resignation of Jourdan, whom the unfortunate issue of the campaign had disgusted, and who had been provisionally succeeded by Beurnonville, afforded the opportunity of offering Hoche a recompense, long and richly merited by his talents and patriotism.

Winter, already far advanced (January 1797 had commenced), had not interrupted this memorable campaign. On the Rhine, the Archduke Charles prosecuted the sieges of Kehl and the *tête-de-pont* of Huningen: on the Adige, Alvinzy was preparing for a fresh and final effort against Bonaparte. The interior of the republic was sufficiently tranquil: the factions had all eyes fixed on the different theatres of warfare. The consideration and strength of the government vacillated according to the vicissitudes of the campaign. The recent victory of Arcole had shed a lustre around it, and retrieved the evil effect produced by the retreat of the armies of the Rhine. But still that amazing effort of desperate courage failed to dispel all apprehensions touching the retention of Italy. Rumours were current that Alvinzy was reinforcing his army, and the Pope preparing armaments. The malignants asserted that the army of Italy was exhausted; that its general, overwhelmed by the fatigues of an unprecedented campaign, and consumed by an extraordinary malady, was disabled from mounting his horse. Mantua still remained untaken, and a feeling of disquietude was engendered for the events January might bring forth.

The journals of the two parties, revelling in all the licentiousness of the press, continued to be distinguished for virulent diatribes. Those devoted to the counter-revolution were more than usually intent on stirring opinion and disposing it in favour of the cause they advocated, on account of the approach of spring, the season appointed for the new elections. Since the disastrous issue of their contest in La Vendée, it had become the last resource of the royalists to make use of liberty itself as the means of destroying it, and to subvert the republic by influencing the elections. On observing their unscrupulous violence, the Directory gave way to those emotions of indignation from which the most enlightened government cannot always guard itself. Although well inured to the excesses of liberty, the language held in certain journals struck it with alarm: the expediency of allowing free vent to every variety of publication was not then sufficiently understood; the knowledge that falsehood is never to be dreaded, however industriously disseminated, that it becomes innocuous through very violence, and that a government perishes by the force of truth alone, and, above all, by that of suppressed truth, was as yet enigmatical. The Directory, therefore, moved the two councils to enact laws respecting the abuses of the press. The demand gave rise to bitter vituperation; it was accused of a design to oppress liberty during the approaching elections. The laws it solicited were refused. Two regulations only were granted it: one relative to the repression of private calumny, the other to the hawkers of newspapers, who, perambulating the streets, were accustomed, instead of proclaiming them simply by their names, to recommend them by detached phrases, often extremely injurious. Thus a pamphlet was offered for sale through the streets, with such cries as the following: "*Restore us our myriads and —— the camp, if you cannot promote the happiness of the people!*" To avert this scandal, it was provided that newspapers and other writings should be henceforth cried only by their respective titles. The Directory proposed, moreover, the establishment of an official journal of the government. The Five Hundred sanctioned, the Ancients rejected the suggestion. The law of the 3d Brumaire, brought a second time under discussion in Vendémiaire, and made the pretext for the ridiculous attack on the camp of Grenelle, had been confirmed after a protracted debate. It was the topic upon which the two parties were distinctly arrayed in hostility. The provision excluding the relatives of emigrants from public functions, was that which the right side chiefly desired to expunge, and the republicans to retain. After a third attack, it was decided that this provision should be maintained. A single modification was made in the law. As it stood, it excepted from the general amnesty extended to revolutionary delinquencies such as had reference to the 13th Vendémiaire: that event was now sufficiently remote to pardon those who had taken part in it, and who in fact already enjoyed a virtual impunity; consequently, the amnesty was rendered applicable to the crimes of Vendémiaire as to all other deeds purely revolutionary.

Thus the Directory and the upholders of the directorial republic still preserved a majority in the two councils, notwithstanding the opposition of certain madly excited patriots, and of sundry intriguers sold to the counter-revolution.

The state of the finances had the usual effect of penury in private families; it troubled the domestic union of the Directory and the legislative body. The Directory complained that its measures were not always favourably received by the councils; it addressed to them an alarming message, which it rendered public, as if to throw on them the odium of the public misfortunes, should they decline to adopt its propositions. This message, dated the 25th Brumaire (15th December), was conceived in these terms:

"Every branch of the public service suffers under depression. The pay of the troops is in arrear; the defenders of the country are exposed to the horrors of nakedness; their courage is blighted by the discouraging influence of want; disgust, which is the necessary consequence, provokes desertion. The hospitals are deficient in furniture, fuel, and medicines. The charitable institutions, affected by the like destitution, afford no asylum to the indigent and infirm, of whom they were the sole resource. The creditors of the state, the contractors who daily contribute to supply the necessities of the armies, receive but a small proportion of the sums due to them: their distress scares men who might perform the same services with greater punctuality or on more moderate terms. The roads are broken up, the communications interrupted. The public functionaries remain without salaries: from one end of the republic to the other, we see judges and administrators reduced to the horrible alternative of existing with their families in utter wretchedness, or of dishonouring themselves by accepting the bribes of intriguers. A malignant spirit is every where rife; in several localities assassination is reduced to a system, and the police, devoid of activity and strength from the lack of pecuniary means, is unable to check such disorders."

The councils were irritated at the publication of this message, which seemed to charge on them the calamities of the country, and pointedly censured the indiscretion of the Directory. They applied themselves, however, to the immediate consideration of the suggestions it propounded. Specie was every where abundant, except in the coffers of the state. The taxes, exigible in specie or paper at the course of

exchange, dropped in slowly and reluctantly. The national domains, previously sold, were partly paid for; the instalments, still outstanding, were not yet due. Meanwhile, temporary expedients were resorted to; the contractors were put off with ministerial orders or notes of liquidation, a species of postponed paper, which were taken only at a reduced value, and which tended to enhance considerably the rates of all contracts. Thus affairs were in the same situation as we have already so often described.

Great improvements were introduced into the financial system for the year 5. The budget was divided, as we have previously mentioned, into two parts—the ordinary expenditure of 450 millions, and the extraordinary expenditure of 550 millions. The land-tax, estimated at 250 millions, the assessed taxes at 50, the customs, stamp-duty, and fees of registration, at 150, were expected to provide the 450 millions of ordinary expenditure. The extraordinary was to be covered by the arrears of taxes and the produce of the national domains. All imposts were henceforth exigible in specie. There still remained in circulation a quantity of mandats and assignats, which were at once annulled and made receivable at the course of exchange, in satisfaction of arrears. In this manner the disorders resulting from the paper money were effectually cured. The forced loan was definitively closed; it had scarcely produced 400 millions of available funds. The contributions in arrear were ordered to be wholly discharged before the 15th Frimaire of the present year (5th December). Bailiffs were put in requisition to accelerate the collection. The schedules were directed to be immediately made out, in order that the fourth of the taxes of the year 5 might be collected without delay. The question remained to be solved how the value of the national domains was to be realised, now that there was no paper-money to bring it by anticipation into circulation. The last sixth due for the domains under contract of purchase was still to be received. It was determined that, with the view of forestalling this final payment, the purchasers should be required to give obligations payable in specie, falling due at the same period whereat the law obliged them to pay up their instalments, and involving, in case of protest, the forfeiture of the property purchased. This measure would provide the state with eighty and some millions in obligations, which the contractors declared their readiness to accept. They had no longer any confidence in the state, but they had it in individuals; and the eighty millions of this personal paper possessed a value which a paper issued and guaranteed by the republic would not have had. It was decreed, moreover, that the domains hereafter sold should be paid for as follows: a tenth down in specie, five-tenths down in ministerial notes or orders of liquidation issued to contractors, and the remaining four-tenths in four bonds or obligations, one payable annually.

Thus, public credit being exhausted, the government availed itself of private credit; being no longer able to emit paper-money hypothecated on the national property, it required from the purchasers of such property a species of paper which, bearing their signatures, possessed an individual value; and, furthermore, it afforded the contractors an opportunity of reimbursing themselves by acquiring national property on their own account.

These regulations warranted hopes of revived order and certain receipts. To meet the pressing wants of the war ministry, the sum of one hundred and twenty millions was forthwith adjudged to it for the months of Nivôse, Pluviose, Ventôse, and Germinal, the months devoted to preparations for a new campaign, of which sum thirty-three millions were to be taken from the ordinary, and eighty-seven from the extraordinary income. The registration tax, the post-office, the customs, patents, and the land-tax, were expected to furnish the thirty-three millions; the eighty-seven of extraordinaries were to be raised by the produce of the forests, the arrears of military contributions, and the obligations of the purchasers of national domains. These amounts were certain, and must be speedily gathered. All the public functionaries were paid in specie. It was resolved to pay the fundholders in the same manner; but the treasury being unable as yet to give them specie, delivered them drafts to bearer, receivable in payment of national domains, like the ministerial orders and notes of liquidation issued to the contractors.

Such were the administrative labours of the Directory during the winter of the year 5 (1796 to 1797), and the means it husbanded for prosecuting a fresh campaign. The actual campaign, meanwhile, was not yet terminated, and it seemed only too manifest that, notwithstanding ten months of furious warfare, notwithstanding the bleak season of frost and snow, additional battles would yet be fought. The Archduke Charles was obstinately bent on carrying the *têtes-de-pont* of Kehl and Huningen, as if, by possessing himself of them, he would for ever interdict the return of the French to the right side of the Rhine. The Directory, too, was materially interested in giving him occupation at those points, in order to prevent him diverging into Italy. He consumed nearly three months before the fort of Kehl. On both sides the troops distinguished themselves by an heroic courage, and the generals of division evinced talents of the highest practical order. Desaix, especially, immortalised himself by his intrepidity, his imperturbable coolness, and his admirable dispositions around that wretchedly intrenched fortress. The conduct of the two generals-in-chief was not so cordially approved as that of their lieutenants. Moreau was censured for not having profited by the strength of his army, and debouched on the right bank to fall on the besieging army. The archduke was blamed for wasting such prodigious efforts on a mere bridge-head. Moreau surrendered Kehl on the 28th Nivôse, year 5 (9th January 1797); it was but a slight loss. The prolonged resistance of the French demonstrated the solidity of the Rhinish barrier. The troops had suffered little: Moreau had employed the time in perfecting their organisation, and his army now presented a superb appearance. That of the Sambre-and-Meuse, recently placed under the orders of Beurnonville, had not been actively engaged during these last months, but it had been refreshed by repose, and reinforced by numerous detachments from La Vendée; it had, moreover, received an illustrious leader, Hoche, who was at length called to a scene of warfare worthy of his talents. Thus, although it did not yet possess Mayence and had been bereft of Kehl, the Directory might still deem itself powerful on the Rhine. The Austrians, on their side, were elated with the capture of Kehl, and concentrated all their might against the bridge-head of Huningen. But the emperor and his ministers had their attention almost exclusively absorbed by Italy. The exertions of the government to reinforce the army under Alvinzy, and to maintain a last vigorous struggle for preponderance in Italy, partook of the extraordinary. Troops were forwarded by post-relays. The entire garrison of Vienna had been moved to the Tyrol. The inhabitants of the capital, glowing with loyal zeal for the imperial family, had furnished 4000 volunteers, who were embodied under the title of the *Vienna Volunteers*. The empress presented them with banners embroidered by her own hands. A fresh levy had been made in Hungary, and several thousands of the best troops in the empire had been draughted from the Rhine. By means of these diligent operations, worthy of the highest eulogium, Alvinzy's army was reinforced by 20,000 men, and its full strength increased to upwards of 60,000. It was invigorated by rest, and subjected to reorganisation; and, although containing many recruits, it was composed in the greater part of veteran troops. The battalion of Vienna Volunteers was

formed of young men, strangers, it is true, to war, but belonging to good families, animated with lofty sentiments, ardently devoted to the imperial house, and burning to display their personal prowess.

The Austrian ministers had come to a perfect understanding with the Pope, and engaged him to contemn the menaces of Bonaparte. They had sent him Colli and sundry officers to command his army, exhorting him to move it as near as possible to Bologna and Mantua. They had advised Wurmser of approaching aid, and ordered him not to surrender; but, if he were reduced to extremity, to sally from Mantua with all the disposable troops, and especially the officers, and proceed, through the legations of Bologna and Ferrara, into the papal states, to join the Roman army, which he would forthwith organise and march to the rear of Bonaparte. This scheme, doubtless very ably conceived, might have succeeded under a general so renowned for bravery as Wurmser. That veteran marshal, however, maintained himself in Mantua with the greatest fortitude, although his garrison was reduced to subsist on salted horse-flesh and *poulenta*.

Bonaparte, meanwhile, awaited the coming struggle, which was to decide definitively the fate of Italy, and prepared to meet it. As the malignants, who desired the humiliation of the French arms, reported at Paris, he was labouring under a cutaneous disorder, caught before Toulon by loading a cannon with his own hands, which had been injudiciously treated. This malady, little known, combined with the incredible fatigues of the campaign, had greatly weakened him. He could scarcely support himself on horseback; his cheeks were hollow and livid, and his emaciation produced an appearance of almost pitiful debility; his eyes alone, still lively and piercing, announced that the fire of his mind was not extinguished. His physical proportions formed, indeed, a singular contrast with his genius and fame, affording to soldiers, at once gay and enthusiastic, the theme of many a quaint remark. Notwithstanding the prostration of his strength, his highly impassioned temperament sustained him, and communicated to him an activity which left no subject unheeded. He had commenced what he called "*war against the robbers.*" Intriguers of all descriptions had flocked into Italy, to worm their way into the administration of the armies, and to fatten on the spoils of that celebrated country. Whilst simplicity and indigence prevailed in the armies of the Rhine, luxury had crept into the army of Italy, rivalling in extent the glory it had achieved. The soldiers, comfortably clad, well fed, and viewed with complacency by the dark-eyed daughters of the soil, revelled in pleasures and abundance. The officers and generals participated in the common prosperity, and began to found fortunes. As to the contractors, they displayed a scandalous sumptuousness, and purchased with the produce of their exactions the favours of the most beautiful actresses in Italy. Bonaparte, in whom all passions worked, but who, at the moment, was engrossed by one alone, that of glory, lived in a simple and austere manner, and sought relaxation only in the society of his wife, whom he tenderly loved, and whom he had recently called to his head-quarters. Indignant at the disorders existing in the army administration, he instituted a severe scrutiny into the smallest details, examined in person the transactions of the different companies, ordered prosecutions against corrupt agents, and denounced the whole commissariat tribe in the bitterest terms. He upbraided this class especially with a lack of courage, and with abandoning the army on occasions of danger. He recommended the Directory to select men of approved energy; he urged the establishment of a syndicate, which, judging like a jury, should be empowered to punish, upon internal conviction, delinquencies which could never be substantially proved. He willingly pardoned indulgences in his soldiers and officers, which were not likely to act on them as the voluptuousness of Capua did of yore on Hannibal's troops; but he harboured an implacable hatred against those who enriched themselves at the expense of the army, without aiding it by their personal bravery or exertions.

He had manifested a similar spirit of observance and activity in his relations with the Italian powers. Still dissembling with Venice, whose armaments in the lagunes and the mountains of the Bergamasco were not unknown to him, he postponed the period for explanation until the reduction of Mantua. He caused his troops to take provisional occupation of the citadel of Bergamo, which had a Venetian garrison, alleging in justification that he did not deem it sufficiently guarded to resist a sudden attack of the Austrians. He thus protected himself from the chance of perfidy, and overawed the numerous enemies he had in Bergamo. In Lombardy and the Cispadan states, he continued to foster the spirit of liberty, curbing the Austrian and papal party, and moderating the democratic party, which, in all countries, stands in need of control. He maintained himself in friendship with the King of Sardinia and the Duke of Parma. He repaired in person to Bologna, in order to terminate a negotiation with the Duke of Tuscany, and to intimidate the Pope of Rome. The Duke of Tuscany was incommoded by the presence of the French at Leghorn; acrimonious disputes had arisen with the Leghorn merchants respecting the merchandise belonging to the subjects of powers hostile to France. These discussions had engendered infinite animosity; besides, the commodities, which were with such difficulty obtained, were afterwards badly sold, and by a company which had recently defrauded the army of five or six millions. Bonaparte, under these circumstances, esteemed it preferable to treat with the Grand Duke. It was agreed that he should evacuate Leghorn on receiving two millions—a course recommended by the farther advantage of rendering the garrison of that city disposable. He had formed the design of uniting the garrison of Leghorn with the two legions levied by the Cispadan republic, increased by three thousand of his other troops, and pushing this small army into Romagna and the March of Ancona. He wished to seize upon two additional provinces of the Roman state, grasp the private property of the Pope, arrest the taxes, levy by such means the contribution which had been withheld, select hostages from the party opposed to France, and thus establish a barrier between the states of the Church and Mantua. He would thereby render impracticable the plan of a junction between Wurmser and the papal army: he might succeed in terrifying the Pope, and at length oblige him to accede to the conditions proposed by the French republic. In his anger against the Holy See, he had even abjured the idea of pardoning it, and contemplated an entirely new division of Italy. Lombardy might be restored to Austria; a powerful republic might be constituted by adding to the dutchy of Modena and the legations of Bologna and Ferrara, Romagna, the March of Ancona, and the dutchy of Parma; and Rome might be given to the Duke of Parma, which would give great satisfaction to Spain, and compromise the most Catholic of all the powers. He had already begun to put his project in execution; he had advanced to Bologna with three thousand men, whence he menaced the Holy See, which had already formed the nucleus of an army. But the Pope, now assured of a fresh Austrian expedition, and hoping to communicate with Wurmser by the Lower Po, defied the threats of the French general, and even testified a desire to see him advance still farther into his provinces. "The holy father," according to the counsellors of the Vatican, "would quit Rome if it were necessary, and take refuge in the extremity of his dominions. The farther Bonaparte should proceed and remove from the Adige, the greater the danger he must incur, and the more

favourable the chances for the sacred cause." Bonaparte, being gifted with a foresight quite equal to that of the Vatican, had no intention of marching on Rome; he merely purposed to intimidate, and his attention was constantly fixed on the Adige, where he expected every moment the resumption of hostilities. On the 19th Nivôse (8th January 1797), in fact, he learned that a collision had occurred on all his outposts: he instantly repassed the Po with 2000 men, and hastened with all speed to Verona.

His army had received since the battle of Arcole the reinforcements it ought to have received before that critical conflict. The sick had left the hospitals during the winter, and it now counted about 45,000 men under arms. Their distribution was the same as before: 10,000 men, or thereabouts, blockaded Mantua under Serrurier; 30,000 were in observation on the Adige. Augereau guarded Legnago; Massena, Verona; Joubert, who had succeeded Vaubois, Rivoli and La Corona. Rey, with a division of reserve, was at Desenzano, at the bottom of the Lake of Garda. The remaining four or five thousand men were either in the citadels of Bergamo and Milan, or in the Cispadan republic. The Austrians were advancing with sixty and some thousand men, and had twenty besides in Mantua, of whom twelve at least were under arms. Thus in the coming contest, as in the preceding, the proportion of the enemy was twofold. The Austrians had this time formed a new project. They had already essayed all the routes permitting an attack on the double line of the Mincio and the Adige. At the time of Castiglione, they had descended along both shores of the Lake of Garda, by the two valleys of the Chiesa and the Adige. Subsequently, they had debouched by the valley of the Adige and by that of the Brenta, attacking by Rivoli and Verona. Now they had modified their plan, in consequence of their arrangements with the Pope. Their principal attack was intended to be made on the Upper Adige, with 45,000 men under the command of Alvinzy. An accessory attack, independent of the first, was to be adventured with about 20,000 men, under the orders of Provera, by the Lower Adige, in the hope of communicating with Mantua, Romagna, and the Papal army.

Alvinzy was to lead the main attack: he was sufficiently strong to warrant the expectation of complete success, and his instructions enjoined him to push onwards without consideration for what might befall Provera. We have elsewhere described the three routes which issue from the mountains of the Tyrol. That winding behind the Lake of Garda had been neglected since the affair of Castiglione; the other two were again preferred in this instance. The first, meandering between the Adige and the Lake of Garda, passed through the mountains separating the lake from the river, and came upon the position of Rivoli; the other skirted the farther bank of the river, and opened into the plain of Verona, beyond the French line. Alvinzy decided in favour of the route between the river and the lake, which led him at once upon the French line. His efforts were consequently to be directed on Rivoli. That celebrated position requires a particular description. The chain of the Monte-Baldo divides the Lake of Garda from the Adige. The high road winds between the Adige and the foot of the mountains, for a space of several leagues. At Incanale the Adige sweeps up to the very base of the mountains, and debars farther progress along its bank. The road then diverges from the river, ascends by a sort of spiral staircase the flanks of the mountain, and conducts to an extensive plateau, which is that of Rivoli. It commands the Adige on one side, and on the other it is encompassed by the amphitheatre of the Monte-Baldo. An army, in position on this plateau, threatens the spiral way by which it is reached, and in the distance sweeps by its fire both banks of the Adige. The plateau is not easily to be carried in front, on account of the narrow tortuous ascent, which must be climbed to attain its level. Thus an enemy would not choose to attack it by that way alone. Before reaching Incanale, other paths lead over the Monte-Baldo, which, scaling those steep acclivities, likewise conduct to the plateau of Rivoli. They are not practicable either for cavalry or artillery, but they afford an easy access to troops on foot, and may be used for moving a considerable force of infantry to the flank and rear of the army defending the plateau. The plan of Alvinzy was to attack the position by all the avenues simultaneously.

On the 23d Nivôse (12th January) he attacked Joubert, who held all the advanced positions, and forced him back on Rivoli. The same day Provera pushed forward two vanguards, the one on Verona, the other on Legnago, through Caldiero and Bevilagua. Massena, being at Verona, sallied forth, repulsed the vanguard which had advanced to his vicinity, and took 900 prisoners. Bonaparte arrived immediately afterwards from Bologna. He recalled the whole division into Verona, to hold it in readiness to march. During the night he learned that Joubert had been attacked and forced at Rivoli, and that Augereau had perceived considerable forces before Legnago. He was not yet able to divine on what point the enemy was directing his principal mass. He kept Massena's division disposable for any movement, and ordered Rey's division, which was at Desenzano, and which had descried no enemy advancing behind the Lake of Garda, to proceed to Castel-Nuovo, as the most central point between the Upper and Lower Adige. On the following day, the 24th (13th January), couriers arrived in rapid succession. Bonaparte was apprised that Joubert, assailed by an overwhelming force, was on the point of being enveloped; and that by the obstinacy and fortune of his resistance alone he had been enabled still to retain the plateau of Rivoli. Augereau informed him from the Lower Adige, that a brisk firing was maintained along the opposite banks, without having led to any important event. Bonaparte had before him at Verona scarcely 2000 Austrians. He instantly comprehended the project of the enemy, and became convinced that his principal attack was to be directed on Rivoli. He deemed Augereau adequate to defend the Lower Adige: he reinforced him with a corps of cavalry detached from Massena's division. He directed Serrurier, who blockaded Mantua, to move his reserve to Villa-Franca, in order that it might be stationed intermediately as regarded all points. He left at Verona a regiment of infantry and one of cavalry; and, during the night of the 24th-25th (13th-14th January), he set out with the eighteenth, thirty-second, and seventy-fifth demi-brigades of Massena's division, and two squadrons of cavalry. He dispatched an order to Rey not to halt at Castel-Nuovo, but to advance with all speed on Rivoli. He outstripped his troops, and reached Rivoli in person at two in the morning. The weather, which had been rainy the preceding days, had become serene. The sky was cloudless, the landscape glittered in a brilliant moonlight, the air was sharp and piercing. At the moment of his arrival, Bonaparte beheld the whole horizon reddened by the glare of the enemy's fires. He presumed him to possess 45,000 men; Joubert had 10,000 at the utmost: the timely arrival of succours was therefore indispensable. The enemy was divided into several corps. The principal, composed of a massy column of grenadiers, all the cavalry, artillery, and baggage, followed, under Quasdanovich, the high road between the river and Monte-Baldo, intending to advance by the spiral ascent of Incanale. Three other corps, under the orders of Oeskay, Koblotz, and Liptai, composed of infantry solely, had scaled the crests of the mountains, prepared to descend the steps of the amphitheatre which the Monte-Baldo forms around the plateau of Rivoli, and thus reach the field of battle.

A fourth corps, under the command of Lusignan, winding along the verge of the plateau, was to plant itself on the rear of the French army, in order to cut it off from the road to Verona. Alvinzy had, moreover, detached a sixth corps, which, from its position, was altogether excluded from the projected operation. It had passed to the other side of the Adige, and tracked the route which, through Roveredo, Dolce, and Verona, followed its farther bank. This corps, commanded by Wukassovich, could, at the utmost, send a few bullets on the field of battle, across the intervening river.

Bonaparte instantly discerned that the plateau must be preserved at all hazards. He had in front the Austrian infantry descending the amphitheatre, without a single piece of cannon; on his right he had the grenadiers, artillery, and cavalry, moving along the route of the river, and preparing to debouch by the ascent of Incanale on his right flank. On his left, Lusignan was in progress to turn Rivoli. From the opposite bank of the Adige, the volleys of Wukassovich threatened annoyance. Planted on the plateau, he prevented the junction of the different arms, he would sweep down the infantry devoid of cannon, and drive back the cavalry and artillery entangled in a narrow and winding path. In such case, the efforts of Lusignan to turn him, and of Wukassovich to pick off his men, would be of little moment.

His plan being formed with his accustomed promptitude, he commenced operations before break of day. Joubert had been obliged to shrink in compass, so as to occupy only a space proportioned to his force; hence a dread lest the infantry descending the gradations of Monte-Baldo should effect a junction with the head of the column ascending by Incanale. Bonaparte, long before dawn, aroused Joubert's troops, which, after sustaining a combat of forty-eight hours' duration, were seeking repose in a hurried sleep. He assaulted the outposts of the Austrian infantry, drove them in, and expanded more widely over the plateau.

The action speedily raged with fury. The Austrian infantry, without ordnance, recoiled before the French, which was supported with its formidable artillery, and fell back in a semicircle towards the amphitheatre of Monte-Baldo. But a disastrous event occurred at the moment on the French left. Liptai's corps, which held the extremity of the hostile semicircle, charged on Joubert's left, composed of the eighty-ninth and twenty-fifth demi-brigades, which it surprised, broke, and forced to retreat in disorder. The fourteenth, standing immediately next to those two demi-brigades, wheeled round to cover the rest of the line, and resisted with admirable courage. The Austrians mustered all their strength against it, and nearly prevailed in overwhelming it. They strove especially to wrest from it the cannon, the horses of which had been killed. They had already reached the pieces, when an officer exclaimed—"Grenadiers of the fourteenth, will you let your pieces be captured?" Fifty men instantly rushed forward, with this brave officer at their head, repulsed the Austrians, yoked themselves to the pieces, and retrieved them.

Bonaparte, descrying the danger, left Berthier on the threatened point, and started at full gallop for Rivoli, in quest of succours. The first troops of Massena's division had just come up, after having marched all night. Bonaparte took the thirty-second, rendered famous by its exploits during the campaign, and moved it to the left, to rally the two demi-brigades which had yielded. The intrepid Massena advanced at its head, rallied behind him the discomfited troops, and overthrew all who ventured to withstand him. He chased back the Austrians, and planted himself by the side of the fourteenth, which had continued throughout to perform prodigies of valour. The battle was thus re-established on this quarter, and the army again occupied the semicircle of the plateau. But the momentary check on the left had compelled Joubert to fall back with the right; he yielded ground, and the Austrian infantry was a second time approaching the point Bonaparte had been so solicitous to make it abandon: it was on the point of gaining the avenue by which the spiral road of Incanale opened on the plateau. At the same moment, the column composed of artillery and cavalry, and preceded by several battalions of grenadiers, ascended the spiral way, and, with incredible efforts of bravery, repulsed the thirty-ninth. Wukassovich, from the other side of the Adige, poured a continuous volley of bullets to protect this species of escalade. The grenadiers had already scaled the summit of the defile, and the cavalry debouched in their wake on the plateau. Nor was this all: the column under Lusignan, whose fires had been perceived in the distance, and which had been seen turning the position of the French to the left, now placed itself on their rear, intercepted the route to Verona, and barred the way to Rey, who was advancing from Castel-Nuovo with the division of reserve. Lusignan's soldiers, finding themselves on the rear of the French army, clapped their hands and exulted at its inevitable destruction. Thus, on this plateau of Rivoli, hemmed in front by a semicircle of infantry, turned on the left by a strong column, stormed on the right by the bulk of the Austrian army, and raked by the bullets showered from the opposite bank of the Adige, Bonaparte stood isolated, with the divisions of Joubert and Massena, amidst a swarm of enemies. With 16,000 men, he was enveloped by at least 40,000.

In this fearful moment, his presence of mind was unshaken. He manifested all the fire and promptitude of his wonted intuition. Surveying the Austrians under Lusignan, he said, "*Those men are ours;*" and he allowed them to proceed without concerning himself as to their movement. The soldiers, understanding their general's thoughts, partook his confidence, and repeated amongst themselves, "*They are ours!*"

At the present time, the attention of Bonaparte was directed exclusively to his antagonists in front, and to their efforts. His left was covered by the heroism of the fourteenth and the thirty-second; his right was menaced at once by the infantry which had resumed the offensive and by the column escalading the plateau. He forthwith ordered decisive movements. A battery of light artillery and two squadrons, under two brave officers, Leclerc and Lasalle, were directed on the outlet of the pass. Joubert, who, with the extreme right, had that outlet at his back, faced about with a corps of light infantry. All charged together. The artillery first made play on those who had debouched; the cavalry and light infantry then rushed forward with impetuosity. Joubert fell, with his horse slain beneath him; he arose again, more terrible in his wrath, and flew on the enemy with a loaded musket. All who had debouched—grenadiers, cavalry, artillery—were precipitated pell-mell down the inclined way of Incanale. A frightful confusion reigned within its crooked course: some pieces of ordnance rolling into the defile augmented the terror and disorder. At every step the French cut down or made prisoners at discretion. After having delivered the plateau from the assailants who had scaled it, Bonaparte resumed his attack upon the infantry ranged in a semicircle before him: he drove upon it Joubert with the light infantry and Lasalle with two hundred hussars. At this renewed onslaught a panic seized the Austrian infantry, now deprived of all hope of effecting a junction, and it fled in disorder. Thereupon the whole French line moved forward from right to left, pushed the Austrians against the amphitheatre of Monte-Baldo, and hotly pursued them into the mountains. Bonaparte subsequently returned to the rear, and prepared to realise his prediction touching the corps of Lusignan. That division, on beholding the discomfiture of the Austrian army, quickly foresaw its impending fate. After having cannonaded it, Bonaparte ordered the eighteenth and seventy-fifth demi-brigades

to charge it. Those gallant troops advanced chanting the *chant du depart*, and drove Lusignan on the road to Verona, by which Rey was coming up with the reserve. The Austrian corps made at first a show of resistance, then retreated, and finally fell upon the head of Rey's division. Terrified at this unexpected incident, it invoked the clemency of the victor, and laid down its arms to the number of four thousand men. Two thousand had been previously captured in the defile of the Adige.

It was now five o'clock, and the Austrian army might be deemed annihilated. Lusignan was taken; the infantry, which had approached by the mountains, was flying over rugged rocks; the principal column was engulfed on the strand of the river; the subsidiary corps of Wukassovich had beheld the disastrous issue of the combat with fruitless grief, separated by the Adige from the field of battle. This admirable victory beguiled but transiently the thoughts of Bonaparte: his eyes were instantly averted to the Lower Adige, which he had left menaced. He judged that Joubert, with his intrepid division, and Rey, with the division of reserve, would suffice to inflict the last blows upon the enemy, and to wrest from him some thousands of prisoners. He mustered Massena's division, which had fought the previous day at Verona, had subsequently marched all night, again fought the whole day of the 25th (14th), and now once more set out for a dreary nocturnal march in quest of fresh conflicts. Those brave soldiers, anticipating further victories with joyful countenances, seemed insensible to fatigue. They flew rather than marched to cover Mantua, from which fourteen leagues separated them.

Bonaparte learned on the way what had passed on the Lower Adige. Provera, masking his operations from Augereau, had thrown a bridge over the river at Anghuiari, a little below Legnago, and, leaving Hohenzollern beyond the Adige, had marched on Mantua with 9000 or 10,000 men. Augereau, apprised too late, had nevertheless followed in his wake, taken him in rear, and captured from him 2000 prisoners. But Provera was marching on Mantua with 7000 or 8000 men to join the garrison. Bonaparte learned these details at Castel-Nuovo. He was apprehensive lest the garrison might sally forth to act in concert with the corps advancing to its relief, and take the blockading force between two fires. He had marched all the night of the 25th–26th (14th–15th) with Massena's division, and he made it continue the movement during the day of the 26th, in order that it might arrive the same evening before Mantua. He likewise directed thither the reserves which he had left at the intermediate station of Villa-Franca, and hastened to the spot in person to make his dispositions.

On the same day, the 26th (15th January), Provera arrived before Mantua. He presented himself before the suburb of Saint-George, in which Miollis was stationed with 1500 men at the utmost. Provera summoned him to surrender. The valiant Miollis replied by a discharge of artillery. Provera, repulsed, moved to the side of the citadel, hoping Wurmser would make a sortie; but he found Serrurier confronting him. He halted at the palace of La Favorita, between Saint-George and the citadel, and lanched a boat across the lake with a message to Wurmser to debouch from the fortress on the following morning. Bonaparte arrived in the evening, and disposed Augereau on the rear of Provera, Victor and Massena on his flanks, so as to separate him from the citadel, by which Wurmser was to attempt his sally. He opposed Serrurier to Wurmser. The next day, 27th Nivôse (16th January), at break of day, the battle began. Wurmser debouched from the place, and attacked Serrurier with fury; the latter resisted with equal valour, and kept him in check along the lines of circumvallation. Victor, at the head of the fifty-seventh, which on that day received the appellation of *the Terrible*, charged on Provera and overthrew all he encountered. After an obstinate conflict, Wurmser was driven back into Mantua. Provera, hunted like a stag, surrounded by Victor, Massena, and Augereau, disquieted by a sortie of Miollis, laid down his arms with 6000 men. The young volunteers of Vienna formed part of them. After an honourable defence, they surrendered their arms, together with the banner embroidered by the hands of the empress.

Such was the crowning achievement of this memorable campaign, judged by military men one of the most brilliant and extraordinary recorded in history. Intelligence arrived that Joubert, pursuing Alvinzy, had again taken from his shattered forces 7000 prisoners. At the battle of Rivoli 6000 had been secured, making 13,000 in all. Augereau had made 2000 prisoners, Provera had capitulated with 6000 men, 1000 had been picked up before Verona, and a few hundred stragglers besides, which rendered the number of captives, taken in three days, 22,000 or 23,000. Massena's division had marched and fought without respite for four days, marching by night, fighting by day. Thus Bonaparte boasted, with just pride, that his soldiers had surpassed the vaunted celerity of Cæsar's legions. Why he at a later date attached to the name of Massena that of Rivoli will be readily understood. The action of the 25th (14th January) was styled the battle of Rivoli, that of the 27th (16th January), before Mantua, the battle of La Favorita.

Thus, again, in three days, Bonaparte had taken or slain half of the hostile army, and struck it as if with a thunderbolt. Austria had made her last effort, and now Italy lay at the mercy of France. Wurmser, immured in Mantua, was without a ray of hope; he had consumed all his horses, and disease conspired with famine to destroy his garrison. A longer resistance would have been useless, and repugnant to humanity. The old marshal had given proof of a noble courage and a rare fortitude; he might without dishonour prepare to capitulate. He dispatched one of his officers, by name Klenau, to parley with Serrurier. The latter referred the subject to his superior general, who repaired to the conference. Bonaparte, enveloped in his mantle, and without making himself known, listened to the discussion between Serrurier and Klenau. The Austrian envoy descanted largely on the resources remaining to his general, and asserted that he had still provisions for three months. Bonaparte, continuing his disguise, approached the table at which the interlocutors stood, grasped the paper whereon Wurmser's propositions were transcribed, and began to trace some lines on the margin, without uttering a word, to the great amazement of Klenau, who was at a loss to comprehend the action of the unknown. Then rising and uncovering, Bonaparte advanced to Klenau. "Here," he said, "these are the conditions I grant to your marshal. If he had provisions for merely fifteen days, and talked of surrendering, he would not deserve an honourable capitulation. Since he deputes you here, he is reduced to extremity. I respect his age, his bravery, his misfortunes. Convey to him the conditions I grant him: let him leave the place to-morrow, in a month, or in six, he will have conditions neither better nor worse. He can remain as long as it befits his honour."

By this language, by the tone of its delivery, Klenau recognised the illustrious captain, and he hastened to bear to Wurmser the conditions accorded him. The veteran marshal was filled with gratitude on learning the generous treatment vouchsafed him by his young antagonist. He allowed him permission to issue freely from the fortress with all his staff; he even granted him two hundred horsemen, five hundred men to be nominated by himself, and six pieces of cannon, in order that his evacuation might be less humiliating. The garrison was to be conducted to Trieste, there to be exchanged against French prisoners. Wurmser gladly accepted these terms; and to testify his gratitude towards the French general, he informed him

of a plot to poison him planned in the states of the Church. The 14th Pluviose (2d February) was appointed as the day of his evacuation. On quitting Mantua he derived consolation from the idea of surrendering his sword to the conqueror himself; but he found only the brave Serrurier, before whom he was obliged to defile with all his staff. Bonaparte had already departed for Romagna, intent on chastising the Pope and humbling the Vatican. His vanity, lofty as his genius, moved him differently from vulgar minds; he preferred being absent rather than present on the scene of triumph.

With the capitulation of Mantua the campaign was terminated, and Italy definitively conquered.

When we ponder on the whole series of events, the imagination is struck by the multiplicity of engagements, the variety and fecundity of conceptions, and the immensity of the results. Entering Italy with thirty and some thousand men, Bonaparte first separated the Piedmontese from the Austrians at Montenotte and Millesimo, and accomplished the destruction of the first at Mondovi; then hastened after the latter, passed in face of them the Po at Placentia, and the Adda at Lodi, took possession of Lombardy, there halted for an interval, speedily resumed his march, found the Austrians reinforced on the Mincio, and completed their overthrow at the battle of Borghetto. Then he formed at a glance the plan of his future operations: it was upon the Adige he must establish himself to confront the Austrians; as to the princes on his rear, it would be sufficient to employ negotiations and menaces to keep them in check. A second army was sent against him under Wurmser: his only chance of defeating it was by concentrating his forces rapidly, and smiting alternately each of its isolated masses: with prompt resolution, he sacrificed the blockade of Mantua, crushed Wurmser at Lonato and Castiglione, and repulsed him into the Tyrol. Wurmser was reinforced, as had been Beaulieu: Bonaparte anticipated him in the Tyrol, ascended the Adige, cut down all before him at Roveredo, plunged back through the valley of the Brenta, intercepted Wurmser, who expected to be himself the interceptor, worsted him at Bassano, and shut him up in Mantua. This was the second Austrian army destroyed after having been reinforced.

Bonaparte, constantly negotiating and menacing from the banks of the Adige, awaited the approach of the third army. It was a formidable host: it arrived before he had received reinforcements; he was compelled to recede before it; he was reduced to despair, and on the point of succumbing, when he found, amidst an impassable marsh, two lines leading into the flanks of the enemy, and threw himself upon them with an incredible audacity. He was again triumphant at Arcole. But the enemy was arrested, not destroyed: he returned a last time, and more puissant than before. On one side, he descended from the mountains; on the other, he advanced by the Lower Adige. Bonaparte discerned the only point where the Austrian columns, winding in a mountainous country, could effect a junction, threw himself on the celebrated plateau of Rivoli, and, from that position, overwhelmed the principal army under Alvinzy; then, turning his flight towards the Lower Adige, he encompassed the column which had crossed it. His last operation was the most brilliant, for in that instance fortune waited upon genius. Thus, in ten months, besides the Piedmontese army, three formidable armies, thrice reinforced, had been utterly discomfited by an army, which, thirty and a few thousand strong at the commencement of the campaign, had since received but 20,000 to repair its losses. In other words, 55,000 Frenchmen had defeated upwards of 200,000 Austrians, of whom they had captured more than 80,000, and killed or wounded at least 20,000; they had fought twelve pitched battles, and upwards of sixty minor actions, and passed several rivers, defying alike the hostile elements of fire and water. When warfare is a purely mechanical routine, presenting a dry detail of one host assailing another immediately before it, the record is unworthy of history; but when one of those encounters is pourtrayed, wherein we perceive a mass of men moved by a single and transcendent intellect, which develops its powers amidst the roar of thunder, with the equanimity of a Newton or a Descartes in the stillness of the cabinet, then is the spectacle worthy the philosopher equally with the statesman and the soldier; and, if this identification of a multitude with a single individual, which imparts to force its utmost might, serves to protect and defend a noble cause, that of liberty, the exemplification becomes as moral as it is grand.

Bonaparte now hurried to fresh enterprises. He moved towards Rome, for the purpose of terminating the treacherous machinations of that court of priests, intending to return, no longer upon the Adige, but upon Vienna itself. He had, by his successes, centred the war on its veritable theatre, that of Italy, whence the hereditary dominions of the emperor might be easiest overrun. The government, enlightened by his achievements, forwarded him reinforcements, with which he might advance to Vienna, and dictate a glorious peace in the name of the French republic. The close of the campaign had stimulated all the hopes its commencement had engendered.

The victory of Rivoli filled the patriots with unmeasured joy. In all public places exulting reference was made to the twenty-two thousand prisoners captured during the late events, and the testimony of the authorities of Milan, who had passed them in review and certified their number, was triumphantly cited to silent the affected doubts of the malevolent. The surrender of Mantua still further augmented the general enthusiasm. From that moment, the conquest of Italy was believed definitive. The courier who brought the intelligence reached Paris in the evening. The garrison was forthwith assembled, and the tidings published amid the glare of torches, the flourish of trumpets, and the rapturous exclamations of all true Frenchmen. Days for ever renowned, evoking painful regret on retrospection! At what epoch was France as a nation greater or more glorious! The storms of the revolution appeared hushed; the murmurs of parties were heard only as the dying echoes of the tempest. Those remains of agitation were indeed regarded as the vital principle of a free state. The trade and finances of the country were happily emerging from a dismal crisis, and its soil, restored to industrious cultivators, promised more than wonted fecundity. A government composed of citizens, all equals, ruled the republic with moderation; the worthiest were called to succeed them. All voices were free. France, at the pinnacle of power, was mistress of all the territory stretching from the Rhine to the Pyrenees, and from the Ocean to the Alps. Holland and Spain were about to unite their fleets with hers, and to attack in concert the maritime despotism. She was resplendent with immortal glory. Redoubtable armies bore her three colours fluttering triumphantly in the face of the kings who had conspired to annihilate her. Twenty heroes, differing in character and in talents, similar only in age and courage, led her soldiers to victory. Hoche, Kléber, Desaix, Moreau, Joubert, Massena, Bonaparte, and many others, were rising to fame concurrently. Men canvassed their respective merits; but as yet no eye, however piercing it might be, detected in that galaxy of heroes the unfortunate or the criminal; no eye marked him who was to expire in the flower of his age, wasted by an unknown malady—him who was to perish under the Mussulman's poniard or beneath an enemy's fire—him who would oppress liberty—or him who would prove a traitor to his country: all appeared great, pure, fortunate, ripe for future destinies! This was but for a moment; yet there are isolated moments in the existence of nations as in that of individuals. Internal tranquillity was

beginning rapidly to reproduce wealth; liberty and glory were already abundantly enjoyed. In the words of an ancient, "A country ought to be not only prosperous, but sufficiently glorious." This condition was fully realised. Frenchmen, we who have since seen our liberty stifled, our country invaded, our heroes shot or false to their fame, let us never forget those immortal days of liberty, of greatness, and of bright anticipation.

CHAPTER LI.

SITUATION OF THE GOVERNMENT IN THE WINTER OF THE YEAR 5 (1797).—CHARACTERS AND DISPUTES OF THE FIVE DIRECTORS.—CLUB OF CLICHY; INTRIGUES OF THE ROYALIST FACTION.—PLOT OF BROTTIER AND ACCOMPLICES DISCOVERED.—ELECTIONS OF THE YEAR 5.—GLANCE AT THE SITUATION OF FOREIGN POWERS AT THE OPENING OF THE CAMPAIGN OF 1797.

The late victories of Rivoli and La Favorita, followed by the capture of Mantua, had restored to France all her superiority. The Directory, although still the object of ruthless obloquy, inspired the European powers with a profound dread. "The half of Europe," wrote Mallet-du-Pan,* "is on its knees before this divan, to purchase the honour of becoming its vassal." Fifteen months of firm and glorious sway had rooted the five directors in power, but had at the same time developed their passions and characters. Men cannot long act in conjunction without experiencing individual distastes or predilections, and without associating conformably to their inclinations. Carnot, Barras, Rewbell, Larévellière-Lépaux, and Le Tourneur, were already divided in accordance with this invariable result. Carnot was systematic, obstinate, and haughty. He was entirely devoid of those qualities which impart to the mind comprehensiveness and perspicuity, and to the disposition pliability. He possessed penetration, and could readily master any subject submitted to his investigation; but, once committed to an error, he never retracted. He was a man of strict probity, high courage, and ardent devotion to business, but he never forgave either an injury or a mortification to his self-love; yet he was undoubtedly intellectual and original, which is indeed not uncommon with men wrapped up in themselves. He had formerly quarrelled with the members of the committee of public welfare, for it was impossible that his pride could have ever harmonised with that of Robespierre or Saint-Just, or his lofty courage quailed before their despotism. At present the like mishap unavoidably befell him in the Directory. Independently of those frequent occasions of collision with his colleagues, arising from the common performance of a task so difficult as that of conducting a government, and which so naturally provokes diversity of opinions, he harboured old resentments, particularly against Barras. All his prepossessions as an austere, scrupulous, and laborious man, alienated him from that prodigal, debauched, and indolent colleague; but he above all detested him as the leader of the Thermidorians, the friends and avengers of Danton, and the persecutors of the old Mountain. Carnot, having been one of the chief promoters of Danton's execution, and having subsequently narrowly escaped being involved in the fate of the principal Mountaineers, could not forego his vindictive feelings against the Thermidorians: accordingly, he cherished a rooted hatred against Barras.

Barras had formerly served in India, and had there evinced the qualities of a brave soldier. He was well fitted, during civil broils, to enact a military part, and, as we have seen, that merit had elevated him to a seat in the Directory. Thus, on all difficult occasions, he was prone to boast of mounting on horseback and putting the enemies of the republic to the sword. In person he was tall and handsome; but his expression bore something sombre and sinister, which ill accorded with a character more passionate than malignant. Although reared in an elevated rank, his manners were far from possessing any peculiar elegance. They were, on the contrary, rough, bold, and vulgar. He was endowed with a soundness and penetration of mind which, with study and industry, might have become distinguished faculties; but lazy and ignorant, he knew just so much as may be learned in the course of a chequered career; still, in affairs he was daily called upon to discuss, he gave token of a judgment sufficiently acute to make his defective education a subject of regret. For the rest, dissolute and cynical, violent and false as the sons of the south, who possess the art of concealing duplicity under the mask of bluntness, a republican by feeling and by position, but a man devoid of faith, receiving at his house the most furious revolutionists of the faubourgs and all the emigrants who had returned to France, gratifying the first by his frivolous violence, the latter by his spirit of intrigue—he was in reality a warm patriot, and in secret held out hopes to all parties. He was the sole representative of the entire Dantonist party, lacking the genius of its pristine leader, which had not descended to his successors.

Rewbell, originally an advocate at Colmar, had acquired at the bar and in the different assemblies great experience in the management of affairs. With the rarest penetration and discernment, he combined extensive information, a prodigious memory, and an extraordinary assiduity in toil. These qualities rendered him an invaluable man at the head of a state. He discussed questions with admirable perspicuity, although somewhat prone to subtilise, a remnant of his forensic habits. To a rather prepossessing appearance he joined a perfect knowledge of society; but he was rude and repulsive from the vivacity and bitterness of his language. Notwithstanding the calumnies of libellers and counter-revolutionists, he was a man of strict probity. Unfortunately he was not altogether free from avarice; he was intent on employing his individual fortune in an advantageous manner, which caused him to hold frequent intercourse with men of business, and which furnished a fruitful theme for slander. He devoted himself peculiarly to the department of foreign relations, and was actuated by so keen an attachment to the interests of France, that he would have been willingly unjust towards other nations. An ardent, sincere, and firm republican, he belonged originally to the moderate party in the convention; and he viewed with equal repugnance both Carnot and Barras, the one as a Mountaineer, the other as a Dantonist. Thus Carnot, Barras, and Rewbell, all three sprung from different parties, cordially detested each other; the enmities contracted during a long and painful struggle still survived under the constitutional system; hearts refused to blend in unison, as rivers which join without mingling their waters. Nevertheless, albeit fostering this antipathy, these three men restrained their feelings, and laboured in concord at the common task.

The two remaining directors, Larévellière-Lépaux and Le Tourneur, harboured no resentments against any one. Le Tourneur, of an amiable disposition, but vain, although his vanity was simple and inoffensive, being content with the external symbols of power and the homage of sentinels—he, Le Tourneur, entertained a submissive respect for Carnot. He was prompt to give his opinion, but equally so to retract it when he was proved to be wrong, or if Carnot spoke adversely. His vote, on all occasions, belonged to Carnot.

Larévellière, the best and honestest of men, possessed, with much varied knowledge, a just and observing mind. He was attentive to business, and capable of giving prudent counsel on all subjects; on several

* Secret correspondence with the government of Venice.

important occasions his judicious advice was tendered with paramount advantage. But he was often misled by illusions, or fettered by the scruples of a virtuous heart. He occasionally desired what was impossible, and shrunk from sanctioning what was necessary; for it requires a great mind to determine what is due to circumstances without infringing principles. Speaking with facility, and gifted with unshaken firmness, he was of infinite utility when it became needful to vindicate expedient measures, and he was of essential service to the Directory by his personal consideration.

His part, amidst colleagues so bitterly estranged from each other, was most salutary. Amongst the four directors, his preference was decided in favour of the most able and upright, namely, of Rewbell. He had, nevertheless, avoided forming any intimate connexion, which would have been agreeable to his feelings, but which would have tended to alienate him from his other colleagues. He was not without a partial predilection for Barras, and might have united with him had he found him less corrupt and false. He exercised over that personage a certain ascendancy, from the high consideration he enjoyed, as also from his penetration and his firmness. The dissolute are ever ready to deride virtue, but they are awed by it when they find it armed with the insight which probes, and the courage that scorns to fear them. Larévellière used his influence over Rewbell and Barras to keep them in harmony with each other and with Carnot. Owing to this happy mediator, and owing also to their general zeal for the interests of the republic, those directors acted befittingly together, and performed their allotted tasks, divided upon questions submitted for common deliberation according to their actual opinions rather than according to their private animosities.

With the exception of Barras, the Directors lived with their families, each occupying apartments in the Luxembourg. They displayed but a very moderate share of luxury. Larévellière, nevertheless, indulging in a relish for society, inspired with a love for the arts and sciences, and deeming it incumbent on him to expend his official income in a manner beneficial to the state, was accustomed to receive men of science and literature, entertaining them with a modest and cordial simplicity. He had unfortunately exposed himself to some ridicule, without having in the slightest degree merited it. He professed in all respects the philosophy of the eighteenth century, such as it was expressed in the Savoyard Vicar's profession of faith. He desired the suppression of the Catholic religion, and held that it would soon sink if governments had the prudence to employ against it simply indifference and neglect. He was opposed to superstitious ceremonies and material representations of the divinity; but he thought meetings essential to men, wherein they might discourse in common on morality, and on the great objects of creation. Those subjects, in fact, require to be treated in assemblies, because in them lofty emotions, noble and generous sentiments, are more easily excited and communicated. He had developed his ideas in a published work, wherein he contended that the ritual of the Catholic worship ought to be superseded for meetings somewhat similar to those of the Protestants, but still more simple and free from forms. This doctrine, embraced by sundry well-meaning individuals, was forthwith acted upon. A brother of the celebrated naturalist Haüy formed a society which he styled that of *the Theophilanthropists*, whose meetings were devoted to moral exhortations, philosophical lectures, and pious anthems. Others were instituted for the like purposes. They were held in rooms hired at the expense of the members, and under the surveillance of the police. Although Larévellière approved of them, and believed them well adapted for enticing from the Catholic churches many of those devout persons in whom the necessity of pouring forth their religious feelings in concert with others was all-powerful, he cautiously abstained from appearing in them, or even allowing his family to attend them, lest he might incur the odium of enacting the part of a sectarian leader, and revive the recollection of Robespierre's pontificate. But notwithstanding his reserve, malevolence seized the pretext to throw ridicule upon a magistrate universally respected, and whose life afforded no ground for calumny. At the same time, if Theophilanthropism formed the theme of certain spiritless sarcasms in the saloons of Barras or in the royalist journals, it attracted very little attention generally, and tended in no degree to lessen the esteem wherewith he was regarded.

The member of the Directory who really damaged the reputation of the government was Barras. His life was not simple and retired like that of his colleagues; he exhibited a luxury and prodigality for which his participation in ill-gotten gains could alone account. The finances of the state were managed with strict probity by the directorial majority and by the excellent minister Ramel; but they could not prevent Barras receiving, from the contractors and bankers he supported, considerable portions of the profits they reaped. He had, moreover, divers other modes of defraying his expenses. France was becoming the arbiter of so many states, both great and small, that several princes were moved to cultivate her favour, and to pay large sums for the promise of a vote in the executive cabinet. Instances of this shameful tampering will be hereafter adduced. The splendour that Barras maintained might not have been hurtful, for it behoves the rulers of an empire to draw men around them, that they may study, appreciate, and discreetly choose them; but he was encompassed, not only by practical men, but by intriguers of all sorts, by dissolute women, and by notorious knaves. A shameful contempt of decency prevailed in his saloons. Those clandestine connexions which, in well-regulated societies, are studiously shrouded in mystery, were publicly avowed. Gros-Bois, a seat in the vicinity of Paris, was made the scene of scandalous orgies, which supplied the enemies of the republic with powerful topics of invective against the government. Barras, in truth, never attempted to conceal his conduct, but, as is usual with confirmed debauchees, delighted to publish his excesses. He himself related before his colleagues, who often addressed to him severe reproaches, his precious feats at Gros-Bois and at the Luxembourg; he boasted how he had compelled a celebrated contractor of the time to relieve him from the burden of a mistress who began to pall upon him, and whose profusion he found it inconvenient to sustain; how he had revenged himself on a journalist, the Abbé Poncelin, for certain diatribes levelled against him; how, after drawing him to the Luxembourg, he had caused his domestics to flagellate the unfortunate author. Such conduct, characteristic only of a degenerate prince, practised in a republic, greatly injured the Directory, and would have completely arrayed the feeling of the country against it, had not the virtues of Carnot and Larévellière counterbalanced the infamy of Barras's proceedings.

The Directory, instituted immediately subsequent to the 13th Vendémiaire, formed in hatred of the counter-revolution, composed of regicides, and assailed with unrelenting fury by the royalists, could scarcely be other than zealously republican. But each of its members was more or less identified with the opinions which divided France. Larévellière and Rewbell were distinguished for that moderate but rigid republicanism, which equally abjured the frenzy of 1793, and the violent royalist reaction of 1795. To induce them by any appliances to aid the counter-revolutionary cause, was felt to be impossible. The unerring instinct of party taught that no compromise of principles was to be expected from them, by means either of direct seduction or of insidious flattery in the jour-

nals. Consequently, towards those two directors both factions indulged in venomous censure. The case was different with Barras and Carnot. Barras, although he mingled with all indiscriminately, was in reality an ardent revolutionist. The faubourgs held him in high estimation, always remembering that he had been the general in Vendémiaire, and the conspirators at the camp of Grenelle had been persuaded that he at least sympathised with them. Thus the patriots loaded him with praises, and the royalists with abuse. Certain secret agents of royalism, drawn within his circle by a common spirit of intrigue, might, with reference to his profligacy, entertain hopes; but if so, they were confined to themselves alone. The mass of the party held him in abhorrence, and inveighed against him with demoniacal rancour.

Carnot, an ex-Mountaineer, a member of the old committee of public welfare, and almost a victim of the reaction which followed the 9th Thermidor, must surely have been a decided republican, and was so in fact. At the first moment of his accession to the Directory, he had strenuously advocated the appointments distributed amongst the Mountaineer party; but by degrees, as the alarm provoked by the events of Vendémiaire subsided, his tendencies had undergone a change. Even in the committee of public welfare, he had never cherished any cordial affection for the revolutionary rabble, and had powerfully contributed to destroy the Hébertists. When he saw Barras, who affected to continue *a king of the mob* (*roi de la canaille*), collect around him the remains of the Jacobin party, he had become hostile towards that party; he had displayed infinite energy in the affair of the camp of Grenelle, and with the greater zest that Barras chanced to be somewhat implicated in that disturbance. Moreover, Carnot was haunted with retrospections. The reproach addressed to him, that he had signed the most sanguinary orders of the committee of public welfare, cruelly tormented him. The very natural explanations he had given were not sufficient in his eyes; he was anxious to prove, above all things, that he was not a monster—and to establish that fact to his own satisfaction. he would have made weighty sacrifices. Parties are gifted with wonderful powers of divination and discernment; they are fastidious and captious with regard to men only when in the ascendant; but when vanquished, they are willing to accept all recruits, and exhibit an especial anxiety to win over the directors of armies. The royalists had quickly detected the sentiments of Carnot touching Barras and the patriot party. They comprehended his craving to relieve himself from the sense and stigma of opprobrium; they were sensible of his military importance; and they took care to treat him differently from his colleagues, and to speak of him in the terms they knew the best adapted to affect him. Thus, whilst the whole of their journals teemed with the grossest abuse of Larévellière, Rewbell, and Barras, they had nothing but eulogy and incense for the ex-Mountaineer and regicide, Carnot. Besides, by gaining Carnot, they also won Letourneur; and thus, by a commonplace but potential artifice, like all cunning prostitutions to egotism, two voices in the Directory were to be secured in the counter-revolutionary interest. Carnot had the weakness to yield to this species of seduction; and, without foregoing or becoming absolutely recreant to his internal convictions, he formed, with his friend Le Tourneur, within the pale of the Directory, an opposition analogous to that presented by the new third in the two councils. On all questions submitted to the decision of the Directory, he declared for the opinion adopted by the opposition in the councils. On all occasions, when matters relative to peace or war were discussed, he voted for peace, after the example of the opposition, which professed a marvellous anxiety for its blessings. He had forcibly maintained that great sacrifices should be made to the emperor; and that peace should be concluded with Rome and Naples, without insisting on too rigorous conditions.

The moment such dissensions break forth, they grow in virulence with great rapidity. The party which expects to profit by them lauds beyond measure the men it hopes to gain, and redoubles the tirade of detraction against the others. The usual success had attended such tactics in the present instance. Barras and Rewbell, already hostile to Carnot, became still more so in consequence of the eulogiums so profusely poured upon him, and imputed to his influence the outrageous vituperation with which themselves were assailed. Larévellière in vain employed his good offices to allay their mutual resentment; the schism became, despite his benevolent efforts, every day the wider; and the public, well aware of the existing discord, divided the Directory into a majority and a minority, classing Larévellière, Rewbell, and Barras on one side, Carnot and Le Tourneur on the other.

The various ministers, also, were regarded with peculiar views. As it had been at all times usual to criticise the management of the finances, an incessant clamour persecuted the minister Ramel, albeit an excellent administrator, whom the deplorable state of the exchequer compelled to adopt expedients, at any other time undoubtedly blameable, but under existing circumstances altogether unavoidable. The taxes came slowly in, on account of the almost insurmountable difficulties impeding the collection. It had been found necessary to reduce the land-tax, and the indirect contributions produced much less than had been anticipated. It often happened that the national treasury was absolutely destitute of money; and, in such pressing cases, the funds destined for the extraordinary service were perforce misappropriated to meet the ordinary expenditure, or the receipts were anticipated, and all the strange and onerous contracts were entered into which situations of this nature render inevitable. Then outcries arose against abuses and against malversations, whereas every assistance, on the contrary, should have been afforded to the government. Ramel, who performed the duties of his ministry with equal integrity and talent, was the especial object of all attacks, and was treated as a public enemy by every journal. Almost equal acrimony was exhibited towards the minister of marine, Truguet, known as a frank republican, as the friend of Hoche, and as the patron of all the patriot officers; towards the minister of foreign affairs, Delacroix, a man whose qualities fitted him for the labours of administration, but who was undoubtedly a sorry diplomatist, being withal too formal and arrogant in his intercourse with the ministers of other powers; and, lastly, towards Merlin, who, in the department of justice, evinced all the fervour of a Mountaineer republican. The ministers of the interior, of war, and of police, Benezech, Petiet, and Cochon, were entirely severed from their aforenamed colleagues. Benezech had been assailed with such fury by the Jacobins, for having proposed a recurrence to free traffic in articles of food and an abandonment of the alimentary provision to Paris, that he had become agreeable to the counter-revolutionary party. An able administrator, but reared under the old system, which he still regretted, he partly deserved the favour of those who praised him. Petiet, minister at war, discharged his duties with great efficiency; but, as the creature of Carnot, he was associated in the same category with respect to party. Cochon was likewise recommended by his connexion with Carnot; the discovery he had made of Jacobin plots, and the zeal he had manifested in urging the prosecutions against their authors, procured him the applause of the opposite party, which extolled him with egregious affectation.

Notwithstanding these estrangements, the government was still sufficiently united to administer affairs with vigour, and to pursue with glory its operations against the hostile powers of Europe. The opposition

was effectually curbed by the conventional majority retained in the legislative body. However, the elections were approaching, and the moment was at hand when a new third, elected under the bias predominant at the time, would replace another conventional third. The opposition was sanguine of then acquiring a majority, and of emerging from that state of subjection in which it had hitherto languished. Consequently, its language in the two councils grew insensibly bolder, a portent significant of its swelling hopes. The members who constituted the present minority were wont to assemble at Tivoli, to discuss their projects and concert their course of action. This meeting of deputies had become a club of the most violent character, known under the title of the *Clichy Club*. The newspapers aided the movement. A vast number of young men, who, under the obsolete order of things, must have been content to indite vapid odes, declaimed in fifty or sixty prints against the excesses of the revolution, and against the convention to which they imputed those excesses. None quarrelled with the republic, they asserted, but with those who had drenched its birth in blood. Assemblies of the electors were convoked in advance, and earnest endeavours made to settle the eventual nominations. The identical language, spirit, and passions of Vendémiaire were all in all revived; the same sincerity and delusion existed in the mass, the same ambition actuated individuals, the same perfidy and deception marked the conspirators who furtively laboured in the cause of royalty.

This royalist faction, constantly discomfited, but ever sanguine and wily, was perpetually starting into renewed vitality. Wherever there is a claim supported by pecuniary supplies, intriguers will be found in abundance ready to promote it by any desperate scheme. Although Lemaitre had been condemned to death, La Vendée subjugated, and Pichegru deprived of his command over the army of the Rhine, the machinations of the counter-revolutionists had not ceased; on the contrary, they were continued with extreme activity. Meanwhile, sundry changes had occurred in the positions of individuals. The pretender, designated alternately the Count de Lille and Louis XVIII., had quitted Verona, as we are aware, and repaired to the army on the Rhine. He had tarried for an interval in the camp of the Prince of Condé, where an accident had endangered his life. Standing at a window, a musket-ball struck him, slightly grazing his body. The act, the author whereof remained undiscovered, was of course charged upon the Directory, which was, however, not so inordinately stupid as to suborn assassins to commit a crime that would redound solely to the advantage of the Count d'Artois. The pretender did not sojourn long with the Prince of Condé. His presence in the Austrian army was not agreeable to the cabinet of Vienna (which had always abstained from recognising him), being conscious how surely it would tend still more to embitter the quarrel with France, which was already sufficiently fraught with irritating topics. He received an order to depart, and, on his refusal to obey it, a detachment was sent to enforce compliance. He thereupon retired to Blankemburg, where he continued to be the centre of the royalist correspondence. Condé remained with his corps on the Rhine. The Count d'Artois, after his abortive designs on La Vendée, had withdrawn into Scotland, whence he still held communications with certain intriguers, who travelled to and fro between La Vendée and England.

Lemaitre being dead, his associates had taken his place, and succeeded him in the confidence of the pretender. They were, as we have previously intimated, the Abbé Brottier, of old a preceptor, Laville-Heurnois, a master of requests in times past, a certain Chevalier Despomelles, and a naval officer called Duverne de Presle. The constant system of these agents located at Paris had been to concentrate all action in intrigues conducted at the capital itself; whilst the Vendéans had aimed to effect the great object of the restoration by an armed insurrection, and the Prince of Condé through the treacherous intervention of Pichegru. La Vendée being tranquillised, Pichegru reduced to a private station, and a powerful reaction in obvious progress against the revolution, the Paris agents were the more confirmed in opinion that all their hopes were to be realised by a spontaneous movement throughout the country. First, to secure the elections, next, by the elections to command the councils, and lastly, by the councils to seize upon all offices and upon the Directory itself, seemed to them an assured process for re-establishing royalty, wielding such means only as were afforded by the republican constitution. But for this purpose it was absolutely essential to put an end to that discrepancy of ideas which had always marked and frustrated the counter-revolutionary plans. Puisaye, still secreted in Brittany, pondered as formerly on an insurrection of that province; M. de Frotté, in Normandy, was striving to convert that ancient dutchy into a modern La Vendée; but neither of these two chiefs would enter into communication with the agents at Paris. The Prince of Condé, baffled in his intrigue with Pichegru, still insisted on prosecuting it alone, without the interference of either the Austrians or the pretender, and it was with much reluctance he had imparted to them the secret. To mould these incoherent schemes into one harmonious co-operation, and, above all, to procure money, the Parisian agents dispatched one of their number into the western provinces, into England, Scotland, Germany, and Switzerland. Duverne de Presle was selected for the mission. Failing to deprive Puisaye of his command, he endeavoured, through the influence of the Count d'Artois, to attach him to the system of the Paris agency, and constrain him to concert his measures with it. From the English the most important point was gained—a grant of subsidies. Powers were obtained from the pretender, whereby the agency of Paris was confirmed in the exclusive privilege of originating and directing intrigues. The Prince of Condé was visited, though it would seem he was not rendered either more intelligent or more pliable. M. de Précy, also, who still continued the secret fomentor of troubles in Lyons and the south, was seen in his district. In short, a general plan was arranged, which on paper possessed the requisites of combination and unity; but, unhappily, none felt himself thereby debarred from acting as he might deem fit, with reference to his individual interests and pretensions.

It was agreed that the whole of France should be divided into two agencies, the one comprehending the east and south, the other the north and west. M. de Précy was at the head of the first, the Paris agents directed the latter. These two agencies were to act in concert in all their operations, and to correspond directly with the pretender, who would give them orders from time to time. Secret associations were devised, on the principle of those instituted by Babœuf. Isolated with respect to each other, and ignorant of the names of the chiefs, the discovery of one would not affect the general ramifications of the plot. These associations were to be formed in accordance with the opinions prevalent in France. As it was deemed apparent that the majority of the population, without entertaining any direct wish for the restoration of the Bourbons, desired order and tranquillity, and imputed to the Directory the continuation of the revolutionary system, a sort of masonic confederation was imagined, under the title of *the Society of Philanthropists*, the members of which should bind themselves to exercise their electoral rights, and in favour of men opposed to the Directory. The Philanthropists were to be kept in ignorance of the real object of the machinations, the only design avowed to them being that of strengthening the opposition. Another association, more secret, concentrated, and limited, called *the Society of the*

Faithful, was to be composed of such energetic and devoted men, as the secret of the faction might be safely intrusted with. The Faithful were to be secretly armed, and kept in readiness for all sudden enterprises. They were intended to be enrolled in the national guard, which was not yet organised, because, under favour of that costume, they could more surely execute the orders given them. Their bounden duty, independently of abetting any plan of insurrection, was to watch over the elections, and if conflicts occurred, as had happened in Vendémiaire, to aid the party of the opposition. The Faithful would assist, moreover, in concealing emigrants and priests, fabricating false passports, and harassing revolutionists and purchasers of national property. These associations were to be under the direction of military leaders, who would correspond with the two principal agencies and receive their injunctions. Such was the new plan of the faction, truly a chimerical one, which history would disdain to particularise, if it were not instructive as an evidence of the hallucinations wherewith parties beguile themselves in their adversity. Notwithstanding this boasted combination, the association of the south ripened merely into the production of a few nameless companies, acting without aim or direction, and obeying the impulses solely of vengeance, lust, and rapine. Puisaye, Frotté, and Rochecot, in Brittany and Normandy, laboured apart to kindle another Vendéan conflagration, and disavowed the mixed counter-revolution of the Parisian agents. Puisaye even issued a manifesto, declaring that Brittany would never second projects which did not contemplate, by means of open force, the restoration of an unimpaired and absolute sovereignty to the house of Bourbon.

The Prince of Condé continued on his part to correspond directly with Pichegru, whose strange and capricious conduct can be explained only by the embarrassment of his position. This general, the first known in history to have incurred a voluntary defeat, had himself solicited his recall. This circumstance may well appear surprising, since he thus deprived himself of all means of influence, and consequently rendered it impossible for him to accomplish his professed purposes. It becomes comprehensible, however, on an examination of Pichegru's situation. He could not remain in his command without carrying into execution the enterprise he had undertaken, on account whereof he had already received considerable sums. Before him stood three portentous examples, all different in their kind, those of Bouillé, Lafayette, and Dumouriez, which convinced him that to inveigle an army was a hopeless task. He accordingly resolved to divest himself of the power of attempting any thing, and thus is explained the sudden tender of his resignation, which the Directory, as yet altogether unconscious of his treason, only accepted with reluctance. The Prince of Condé and his agents were infinitely amazed at the conduct of Pichegru, and concluded that he had defrauded them of their money, and that at bottom he had never intended to serve them. But after being superseded, Pichegru returned to the banks of the Rhine, under pretence of selling his carriages, and subsequently proceeded into the Jura, which was his native district. He there renewed his intercourse with the agents of the prince, and represented his resignation to them as a most profound manœuvre. He would be considered, he set forth, as a victim of the Directory, and he was about to connect himself with all the royalists of the interior, and organise a prodigious party; his army, which had passed under the orders of Moreau, poignantly regretted him, and, at the first reverse it suffered, would not fail to claim its former general, and to mutiny unless he were placed at its head. That critical moment he designed to seize, throw aside all disguise, hasten to his army, assume the dictatorship, and proclaim royalty. This ridiculous scheme, had it even been propounded in good faith, must have been altogether dependent on the discomfiture of Moreau, who, as it chanced, even during his famous retreat, had been uniformly victorious. The Prince of Condé, the Austrian generals, to whom he had been obliged to divulge the cherished mystery, and the English minister in Switzerland, Wickham, all began to opine that General Pichegru was an arrant deceiver. They exclaimed against longer continuing the correspondence; but on the entreaties of the intermediate agents, who never willingly confess to an abortive undertaking, the correspondence was continued, in the forlorn hope of deriving some advantage from it, even though trifling. It was carried on through Strasburg, by means of certain spies who crossed the Rhine and repaired to the quarters of the Austrian general Klinglin; and also through Basle, with the English minister Wickham. Pichegru remained in the Jura without accepting or refusing the embassy to Sweden which was offered him, but labouring diligently to get himself elected a deputy, feeding the agents of the prince with empty and most puerile expectations, and receiving from them seasonable supplies of money in return. He held out mighty consequences as inevitably to ensue from his nomination to the Council of Five Hundred; he boasted of an influence which he was far from possessing; he pretended to give the Directory perfidious counsel, and to trepan it into dangerous determinations; he attributed to himself the lengthened resistance of Kehl, which he asserted he had advised with the view of compromising the army. Very little faith was put in these his equivocal services. The Count de Bellegarde wrote—"We are in the situation of the gambler who wishes to regain his money, and who exposes himself to lose still more in attempting to recover what he has lost." The Austrian generals, however, kept up the intercourse, because, in defect of great results, they at least obtained valuable details touching the condition and the movements of the French army. The infamous agents employed in these communications forwarded to General Klinglin all the reports and plans they were enabled to procure. During the siege of Kehl, they had even indicated the points on which the enemy's fire might be directed with the greatest effect.

Such at this time was the degraded position of Pichegru. With a mind of mediocre compass, he was subtle and sagacious, and had sufficient forethought and experience to be aware that any project for effecting a counter-revolution was impracticable at the moment. His perpetual delays, his fables to amuse the credulity of the prince's agents, prove his conviction in this respect; and his conduct under critical circumstances will demonstrate it more infallibly. He did not the less receive, however, the reward of the schemes he never designed to execute, and had the art of procuring it to be pressed upon him without precisely demanding the wages of infamy.

At the same time, his conduct was in strict keeping with that of all the royalist agents. They were finished adepts in impudent prevarication, asserting themselves to wield an influence they never remotely enjoyed, and pretending to sway the most important men, frequently without having exchanged words with them. Brottier, Duverne de Presle, and Laville-Heurnois, boasted of holding numerous members of the two councils at their beck, and pledged themselves to have many more after the forthcoming elections. In this statement they deviated egregiously from the fact: they were in communication only with the deputy Lemerer and a certain Mersan, who had been expelled from the legislative body, by virtue of the law of the 3d Brumaire against the relatives of emigrants. Through Lemerer they professed to command all the deputies composing the assemblage of Clichy. From the speeches and votes of those deputies, they deemed it probable they would applaud the restoration of the monarchy; and hence they considered themselves

authorised to make an immediate tender of their attachment, and even of their repentance, to the King of Blankenburg. The wretches both imposed on the prince and calumniated the members of the Clichy Club. There were in that society ambitious men, sworn foes to the conventionalists, because the latter monopolised the entire government—men exasperated at the revolution—and many of weak character, who were mere creatures in the hands of others; but very few indeed sufficiently bold to contemplate royalty, or of sufficient ability to aid materially in its re-establishment. It was upon such foundations, nevertheless, that the royalist agents built their plans and promises.

From England came all the funds to expedite the anticipated counter-revolution. The subsidies craved by Puisaye were remitted direct from London to Brittany. Wickham, the English minister in Switzerland, was directed to furnish supplies to the two agencies of Lyons and Paris, and to refresh with suitable retainers the zeal of Pichegru, who was, according to the correspondence, "*cut out for great occasions.*"

The agents of the counter-revolution vaunted their dexterity in drawing money from England whilst entertaining a deliberate intention to deceive her. They had agreed with the pretender to accept her donations, without ever following any one of her views, or ever acceding to any one of her suggestions, which, they held, were always to be suspected. England was not their dupe, but entertained for them all the contempt they merited. Wickham, Pitt, and the other English ministers, placed no reliance whatsoever on the operations of such persons, or indulged hopes of a counter-revolution. They merely wanted disturbers, who would keep France in turmoil, spread disquietude and alarm by their machinations, and, without exposing the government to any real danger, inspire it with exaggerated apprehensions. They willingly devoted a million or two of francs per annum to this object. Thus the royalist agents signally erred when they thought to practise such deception on the English. With all their frank alacrity to commit a swindle, they were not successful, for England had an accurate conception of their capacity, and depressed her expectations to that standard.

Such were the projects and means of the royalist faction. Cochon, the minister of police, was partially cognisant of what was going forward; he was aware that correspondents of the court of Blankenburg resided in Paris; in fact, at no time in the course of the revolution, so thickly strewed with successive plots, had a conspiracy been hatched to maturity without previous detection. He sedulously tracked the course of these men, surrounded them with spies, and awaited some overt act on their part to seize them with advantage. They speedily furnished him with the opportunity he desired. Intent on realising their cherished plan of securing the authorities, they turned their attention in the first place to the military commanders of Paris. The principal forces in the capital consisted of the grenadiers of the legislative body and of the troops in the camp of Les Sablons. The grenadiers of the legislative body were a chosen corps of twelve hundred men, whom the constitution had assigned to the two councils as a guard of security and honour. Their commander, Adjutant-General Ramel, was known for his moderate sentiments, which formed a sufficient ground, in the opinion of the pretender's imbecile agents, for deeming him a royalist. The armed force encamped at Les Sablons amounted to nearly twelve thousand men, under the command of General Hatry, a brave officer, whom no hope existed of seducing. The agents consequently fixed their eyes on that colonel of the 21st dragoons, by name Malo, who had so briskly charged the Jacobins, when they made their ludicrous attempt on the camp of Grenelle. They reasoned concerning him as concerning Ramel: because he had repudiated the Jacobins, they concluded he would embrace the royalists. They sounded both these officers, and made them propositions, which were listened to, and the next moment denounced to the minister of police. That functionary enjoined Ramel and Malo to give further ear to the conspirators, in order to ascertain their whole plan. They were accordingly incited to enter into an elaborate development of their projects, means, and prospects, and an early interview was fixed, at which they were to produce the powers they held from Louis XVIII. This occasion was selected for their arrest. The interview was to take place at Colonel Malo's apartments in the Military School. Gendarmes and witnesses were concealed in a manner enabling them to hear every thing that passed, and to start forward at a given signal. On the 11th Pluviose (30th January), the appointed day, the unfortunate dupes duly repaired to Malo's, with their credentials from Louis XVIII., and again expatiated on their promising schemes. When they had sufficiently committed themselves, they were permitted to take leave, but the gendarmes on the watch forthwith secured their persons and conducted them to the office of the police-minister. Their residences were immediately visited, and all their papers seized in their presence. Letters were found which fully proved the conspiracy, and partially revealed the details. It was discovered, for example, that they had taken upon themselves to construct a government in anticipation. They had agreed, in the first instance, until the arrival of the king from Blankenburg, to allow part of the existing authorities to continue. They purposed to retain Benezech in the home department, Cochon in the police; but if the latter, as a regicide, was obnoxious to the royalists, they proposed to put in his place M. Siméon or M. Portalis. They intended likewise to confer the portfolio of finance on M. Barbé-Marbois, "*who possesses*," they stated, "*talents and information, and passes for honest.*" They had certainly never consulted Benezech or Cochon, or Messieurs Portalis, Siméon, and Barbé-Marbois, to whom they were totally unknown; but they had disposed of those parties, as usual, without their knowledge, and merely on account of their presumed opinions.

The detection of this plot produced a deep sensation, rendering manifest, as it did, that incessant vigilance was needful to protect the republic from its old enemies. It excited unfeigned astonishment in the opposition, which approximated to royalism almost unconsciously, and which had been left in total ignorance of the secret. This surprise shows clearly how those imbeciles had prevaricated, when assuring the king at Blankenburg that they swayed numerous members of the two councils. The Directory forthwith determined to arraign them before a military commission. They protested against such a judicature, contending that they had not been taken with arms in their hands, or in prosecution of any attempt by open force. Several deputies, who in sentiment sympathised with their cause, supported them in the two councils; but the Directory nevertheless persisted in sending them before a military commission, as having attempted to inveigle soldiers.

Their defence was characterised by considerable ingenuity. They allowed their character of agents to Louis XVIII., but maintained that the only mission they held was to prepare opinion, and from it alone, not from force, to expect a return to monarchical ideas. They were condemned to death; but their punishment was commuted to imprisonment, in requital of disclosures furnished by Duverne de Presle. That individual made a long confession before the Directory, wherein he unfolded all the machinations of the royalists, and which was deposited in the secret registry. The Directory refrained from publishing the particulars of this revelation, in order that the conspirators might remain in ignorance of its thorough acquaintance with their plans. Duverne de Presle

stated nothing concerning Pichegru, whose intrigues, conducted directly with the Prince of Condé, were unknown to the agents at Paris; but he declared vaguely, upon the strength of rumours, that attempts had been made to establish a correspondence in one of the principal armies.

This arrest of their principal agents might have annihilated the hopes of the royalists, if they had proceeded on a combined plan; but each acting for himself and in his own manner, the disaster of Brottier, Laville-Heurnois, and Duverne de Presle, failed to prevent Puisaye and De Frotté from continuing to intrigue in Normandy and Brittany, M. de Précy at Lyons, and the Prince of Condé on the Rhine.

Babœuf and his accomplices were shortly afterwards brought to trial. All were acquitted, with the exception of Babœuf and Darthé, who suffered the penalty of death on the 6th Prairial (23d May).

The elections now became the momentous subject of speculation. From a spirit of opposition to the Directory, or from pure royalism, numbers exerted themselves to influence the choice of the electoral body. In the Jura, agitation was rife to carry the nomination of Pichegru, and at Lyons of M. Imbert-Colomès, one of Louis XVIII.'s agents in the South. At Versailles, the return of M. de Vauvilliers, a man seriously compromised in the recently discovered plot, was almost assured. Everywhere, in short, selections hostile to the Directory were threatened. At Paris, the electors of the Seine had assembled to preconcert their nominations. They proposed to submit the following questions to the candidates: *Have you purchased national property? Have you been a journalist? Have you written, aided, or done anything in the course of the revolution?* Any who should answer these questions in the affirmative, were to be at once rejected. The exaction of such tests proved the violence of the reaction against all the men who had taken part in the revolution. A hundred journals, besides, teemed with inflammatory diatribes, and worked the public mind into a veritable delirium. The only means of curbing the licentiousness of the press, possessed by the Directory, consisted of the law punishing with death writers promoting the restoration of royalty. The tribunals invariably refused to apply the provisions of so sanguinary a law. The government, for the third time, demanded from the two councils additional enactments on the subject, and its request was once more rejected. It likewise urged that an oath of hatred to royalty should be administered to the electors. A warm discussion ensued on the efficacy of the oath, and the proposition was modified by changing it into a declaration. Each elector was to declare that he was equally opposed to anarchy and royalty. The Directory, on its own part, abstaining from any of the discreditable means so frequently used in representative governments to influence elections, contented itself with selecting men known for their republican sentiments as commissioners to the assemblies, and with issuing circulars, through the minister Cochon, in which it recommended particular candidates to the electors. A loud but senseless outcry was raised against these circulars, which could operate simply as an exhortation, and not at all as an injunction; for the number and independence of the electors, especially in a state where almost all offices were elective, removed them far without the pale of any executive influence or intimidation.

Whilst the elections thus absorbed attention, some share of interest was excited by the vacancy in the directorial body itself. The first anxiety was, as to which of the five directors would be designated by lot, conformably to the constitution, to retire from the government. If the chance fell on Barras, Rewbell, or Larévellière-Lépaux, the opposition felt sure, by the aid of the new third, of nominating a director of congenial views. In such case it anticipated a majority in the executive cabinet; but it therein reckoned too sanguinely, for its absurdities must have shortly driven Carnot and Le Tourneur from its alliance.

The selection of a new director became the theme of animated discussions in the Clichy Club. Cochon and Barthélemy were both proposed. Cochon had somewhat forfeited the good opinion of the counter-revolutionists, since he had caused Brottier and his accomplices to be arrested, and especially since his emission of the circulars to the electors. The majority decided in preference of Barthélemy, French ambassador in Switzerland, who was believed to be secretly connected with the emigrants and the Prince of Condé.

Amidst this universal agitation, the most absurd reports were propagated. It was boldly asseverated that the Directory had resolved to arrest the newly-elected deputies, and to prevent their junction in the legislative councils; nay, that a serious intention was formed to procure their assassination. On the other hand, the friends of the Directory repeated, that articles of impeachment against it had been prepared in the Clichy Club, which were to be presented to the Five-Hundred the moment the new third was installed.

But whilst party spirit thus raged, in the agony of a conflict which was to decide the possession of power and the future direction of the republican government, a fresh campaign was preparing, which seemed destined to be the last. The belligerents were matched as in the preceding campaign. France, united with Spain and Holland, had to contend against England and Austria. The sentiments of the court of Spain were not, and could scarcely be, favourable to the republican French; but its policy, dictated by the Prince of Peace, was unequivocally directed in accordance with their views. It regarded their alliance as the surest protection against their principles, judging with reason they would refrain from attempts to revolutionise it, so long as they found in it a powerful naval auxiliary. It had, moreover, an ancient feud with England, and flattered itself that the junction of all the continental navies would ensure it a grateful vengeance. The Prince of Peace, feeling that his own sway depended on the maintenance of this policy, and that its abandonment would involve his downfall, employed all his influence over the queen to rivet it on Spain, despite the sentiments of the royal family; in which he succeeded according to his desires. It resulted from this state of things, that the French were individually ill-treated in Spain, whilst their government obtained an unlimited acquiescence in its demands. Unfortunately, the French legation evinced neither the consideration due to a friendly power, nor the firmness necessary to protect French citizens. Through her alliance with France, Spain had lost the important colony of Trinidad. She trusted, however, that if France were relieved from Austria this year, and enabled to direct all her strength against England, that power would be speedily made to atone for its successes. The queen was more particularly intent on procuring an aggrandisement in Italy for the benefit of her son-in-law, the Duke of Parma. The question of an enterprise against Portugal, likewise, was again canvassed, and, under favour of the present political convulsion, the court of Madrid was not without hopes of reuniting the whole peninsula under one crown.

As to Holland, her situation was sufficiently deplorable. The country was distracted by all the passions a change of constitution so powerfully tends to arouse. Moderate men, who desired a government in which the ancient federative system might be reconciled with the concentration necessary to impart vigour to the Batavian republic, had to combat three parties equally dangerous. First, the Orangeists, comprehending all the creatures of the Stadtholder, individuals enjoying official incomes, and the populace; secondly, the Federalists, including all the wealthy and powerful families anxious to preserve the old state of things

with the exception of the Stadtholderate, which mortified their pride; lastly, the decided democrats, a turbulent, bold, and implacable party, composed of enthusiasts and adventurers. These three parties waged an interminable strife, and prevented the establishment of the constitution. Besides these internal dissensions, Holland always stood in dread of an invasion by Prussia, which was only kept in check by the successes of France. She found her commerce harassed in the North by England and Russia, and she was losing all her colonies by the treachery of most of her governors. The Cape of Good Hope, Trincomalee, and the Moluccas, were already in the power of the English. The French troops, encamped in Holland to protect it against Prussia, observed a laudable and severe discipline; but the military administrations and commanders were deficient both in forbearance and in honesty. The country was consequently oppressed with merciless exactions. It might be hence concluded that Holland had acted unwisely in linking herself to France, but this would be a superficial inference. Holland, placed between two colossal and hostile states, must necessarily fall under the influence of the conqueror. Under the Stadtholder, she was the vassal of England, and sacrificed to her interests, and shackled, moreover, with domestic slavery. In allying herself to France, she incurred the hazards incidental to the nature of that power, territorial rather than maritime, and endangered her colonies; but she might one day, favoured by the happy junction of the three continental navies, recover what she had lost; and she might hope for an equitable constitution under the ægis of French protection. The fate of nations is thus ruled: if they be strong, they effect their own revolutions, but they undergo all the miseries inseparable from social convulsions, and shed torrents of native blood; if they be weak, they see their neighbours arrive to revolutionise them at the point of the bayonet, and suffer all the inconveniences arising from the presence of a foreign army. True, they are saved from internecine struggles, but condemned to maintain the soldiers who are distributed over their confines to preserve order. Such was the destiny of Holland, and her position with reference to the French. Under these auspices she had not proved of much utility to the French government. Delays and difficulties impeded the reorganisation of her navy and army; the Batavian bonds, in which the war-indemnity of one hundred millions had been paid, had been negotiated for a poor trifle, and the advantages of the alliance had become almost null for France; hence had accrued asperity between the two countries. The Directory reproached the Dutch government with not performing its engagements, and the Dutch government upbraided the Directory with rendering it incapable of fulfilling them. Notwithstanding this gloom upon their relations, the two powers were animated with a like purpose. A fleet and an army for embarkation were preparing in Holland to co-operate in the enterprises contemplated by the Directory.

With Prussia, a large portion of Germany, Denmark, Sweden, and Switzerland, France still continued on terms of strict neutrality. Differences had arisen between France and America. The United States had manifested a spirit equally unjust and ungrateful with regard to France. Washington in his old age had allowed himself to be trepanned into the party of John Adams and the English, who wished to restore aristocratic and monarchical institutions in America. The injurious acts of certain privateers, and the conduct of the agents of the committee of public welfare, served as the pretexts against France—pretexts singularly baseless, for the wrongs of the English towards the American marine were much more glaring, and the demeanour of the French agents had been resented at the time, and ought to have been excused. The supporters of the English party contended that France meant to procure the cession of Louisiana and the Floridas from Spain; that by means of these provinces and of Canada, she would surround the United States, disseminate therein her democratic principles, successively detach all the States from the Union, thus dissolve the American confederation, and form one vast democracy from the Gulf of Mexico to the Five Lakes. There was no truth in this, but such allegations served to inflame animosity, and stir up enemies to France. A treaty of commerce had recently been concluded between America and England, which contained stipulations transferring to the latter power exclusive advantages hitherto reserved to France alone, and well earned by the services she had rendered the American cause. Under these circumstances, a rupture with the United States found advocates in the French government. Monroe, who chanced to be the American minister at Paris, gave the most sagacious counsel to the Directory on this subject. "War with France," he represented, "will force the American government to throw itself into the arms of England, and wholly subject it to the influence of the latter; aristocracy will become predominant in the United States, and liberty be endangered. On the contrary, by patiently enduring the wrongs of the present president, you will leave him without excuse, disabuse the American people, and ensure a different choice at the next election. All the grievances of which France may have to complain will then be redressed." This prudent and prophetic exhortation prevailed with the majority of the Directory. Rewbell, Barras, and Larévellière successfully enforced the views thus inculcated, despite the protest of Carnot, who, although usually predisposed for peace, maintained the policy of appropriating Louisiana, and converting it into a republic.

Such were the relations of France with the powers which ranked either as its allies or simply as its friends. England and Austria had in the preceding year negotiated a treaty of triple alliance with Russia; but the great and crafty Catherine had since ceased to exist. Her successor, Paul, a prince of diseased intellect, and rational only for evanescent intervals, as has often happened in his family, had evinced great regard for the French emigrants, but little eagerness to execute the conditions of the treaty of triple alliance. It would seem that the colossal magnitude of the French revolution had made a deep impression on his mind, and he is even stated to have comprehended the danger of rendering it more formidable by contending against it; indeed, his language to a Frenchman well known for his talents and accomplishments leads strongly to the inference. Without disavowing the treaty, he had adduced the state of his armies and exchequer in exculpation of inaction, and recommended England and Austria to attempt the ways of negotiation. England had endeavoured to prevail on the King of Prussia to join the coalition, but had not succeeded in her aim. That monarch was sensible he had no interest in advancing to the succour of his redoubtable enemy the emperor. France held out to him the promise of an indemnity in Germany for the Stadtholder, who had married his sister; he had therefore nothing to desire individually. His great object was to prevent Austria, defeated and despoiled by France, from obtaining indemnities for her losses in Germany; he even desired to oppose her receiving such indemnities in Italy: thus he had announced that he would never consent to the cession of Bavaria to Austria in exchange for the Low Countries; and at the same time he offered his alliance to the republic of Venice, undertaking to guarantee its integrity in case France and Austria should venture to accommodate their differences at its expense. His manifest purpose, therefore, was to debar the emperor from receiving equivalents for the losses he had suffered in his struggle against France.

Russia still standing aloof from the contest, and

Prussia persisting in her neutrality, England and Austria remained alone in the lists. The situation of England had become one of discouragement. She no longer dreaded, at least for the moment, an expedition against Ireland, but her bank was more seriously threatened than ever; she founded but feeble hopes on Austria, whom she saw gasping for breath; and she viewed with alarm the probability of France, after dictating peace to the continent, overwhelming her with its undivided force. Austria, notwithstanding the reduction of Kehl and Huningen, felt that she had wasted her energies in so obstinately persevering against two mere bridge-heads, and that she ought to have moved the bulk of her forces into Italy. The disasters of Rivoli and La Favorita, and the surrender of Mantua, had placed her in imminent peril. She was obliged to uncover the Rhine, and to reduce her strength on that frontier far beneath that of the French, in order to withdraw troops, together with her Archduke Charles, to the Italian theatre of war. But during the interval occupied by these troops in traversing the distance between the Upper Rhine and the Piave and Isonzo, she was exposed without defence to the assaults of an adversary who seized the advantages of time with admirable promptitude.

The apprehensions of Austria were only too well justified. France was preparing to assail her in her most vital parts, and the campaign we are about to record will show with what vigour and success.

CHAPTER LII.

STATE OF THE FRENCH ARMIES AT THE OPENING OF THE CAMPAIGN OF 1797.—MARCH OF BONAPARTE AGAINST THE ROMAN STATES.—TREATY OF TOLENTINO WITH THE POPE.—FRESH CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE AUSTRIANS.—PASSAGE OF THE TAGLIAMENTO, AND BATTLE OF TARWIS.—PASSAGE OF THE JULIAN ALPS, AND MARCH ON VIENNA.—PRELIMINARIES OF PEACE SIGNED WITH AUSTRIA AT LEOBEN.—PASSAGE OF THE RHINE.—PERFIDY OF THE VENETIANS.—MASSACRE OF VERONA.—FALL OF THE REPUBLIC OF VENICE.

The army of the Sambre and Meuse, reinforced by a considerable portion of the army of the Ocean, had been augmented to eighty thousand men. Hoche, who had been appointed its commander, had tarried but a short while in Paris after his return from the Irish expedition, and repaired with all haste to his head quarters. He had employed the winter in organising his troops, and forming magazines of necessary supplies. Drawing ample resources from Holland and the provinces between the Meuse and the Rhine, which were regarded as conquered countries, he had relieved his soldiers from the wants which afflicted the army of the Rhine. Imagining another distribution of the different arms, he had moulded the whole into a more perfect form of combination, and trained it into the exactest discipline. He panted to lead his eighty thousand men into the field, and recognised no obstacle to prevent him advancing into the very heart of Germany. Eager to illustrate his political views, he cherished a desire to imitate the example of the conqueror of Italy, and to create in his turn a new republic. The provinces between the Meuse and Rhine, which had not been, like Belgium, declared constitutional territory, were provisionally under military rule. If, on the conclusion of peace with the empire, they were refused to France, from repugnance to grant her the barrier of the Rhine, consent might at least be wrung to their constitution as a republic—the friend and ally of the French. Such a republic, under the name of the Cisrhenane republic, might be indissolubly attached to France, and become as useful to her as one of her own provinces. Hoche took advantage of the moment to give it a provisional organisation, and to prepare it for republican institutions. He had formed at Bonn a commission charged with the twofold duty of organising it, and of levying the supplies requisite for his troops.

The army of the Upper Rhine, under the command of Moreau, was far from being in so satisfactory a condition. So far as the bravery and discipline of the soldiers were concerned, nothing was to be desired; but it lacked the necessaries of life; and the want of money preventing even the purchase of a bridge-equipage, its appearance in the field was fatally retarded. Moreau earnestly entreated for the grant of a few hundred thousand francs, but the exchequer was utterly unable to gratify even so moderate a demand. In his distress he had applied to General Bonaparte for a remittance; but the latter could not comply with his wishes until he had brought his enterprise against the papal dominions to a fortunate issue. Owing to this penury, the operations on the Rhine were necessarily delayed.

Prompt and signal blows, meanwhile, were about to be struck in Italy. Bonaparte, when preparing to destroy the last Austrian army at Rivoli, had announced that he would afterwards make an excursion of a few days in the states of the Pope, for the purpose of subduing his holiness to the yoke of the republic, and of gathering the funds he required for the exigencies of his army; and he had added that, if a reinforcement of 30,000 men were sent him, he would clear the Julian Alps, and march boldly on Vienna. This project, justly deemed chimerical the preceding year, had now become feasible. Policy on the part of the Directory could alone oppose any obstacle; it might naturally have felt averse to entrust all the operations of the war in the hands of a young man so absolute in his determinations. However, the confiding Larévellière strongly insisted that he should be furnished with the means of executing a plan so glorious, and one which would, moreover, terminate the war so speedily. It was decided that 30,000 men should be forwarded to him from the Rhine. Bernadotte's division was draughted from the army of the Sambre and Meuse, and Delmas' division from that of the Upper-Rhine, to be transported across the Alps in the depth of winter. Moreau used every effort to put Delmas' division into a suitable state to represent with credit the army of the Rhine in Italy; he selected his best troops, and emptied his magazines to equip them. It was impossible that any could have evinced a more honourable and disinterested feeling. These two divisions, forming twenty and some odd thousand men, passed the Alps in January, at a time when their march was suspected by none. A storm arrested them as they were on the point of clearing the Alpine ridge. The guides recommended a halt until it subsided; but the charge was sounded, and the tempest defied, with drums beating and banners streaming in the gale. They had already descended into the plains of Piedmont, ere their departure from the banks of the Rhine was known.

Bonaparte had scarcely signed the capitulation of Mantua, than he set out, without waiting to witness the humiliation of Marshal Wurmser, and proceeded straightway to Bologna, with the view of taking immediate measures against the Pope. The Directory would have been well pleased if he had finally destroyed the temporal power of the Holy See, but it refrained from imposing this course upon him as an obligation, and left him free to act according to circumstances and his own dictates. Bonaparte had no intention of embarking in such an enterprise. Whilst preparations were in progress throughout Upper-Italy for a march beyond the Julian Alps, he purposed wresting one or two additional provinces from the Pope, and subjecting him to a contribution sufficient to defray the charges of the impending campaign. To attempt more, would be to compromise the general plan against Austria. It especially be-

hoved him to regulate his conduct in such a manner as to avoid a religious war, and to overawe the court of Naples, which had signed a peace, but considered itself in no degree bound by its treaty. That power was anxious to interfere in the dispute, as well with the hope of grasping part of the papal spoils, as for the purpose of averting the establishment of a republic at Rome, and the extension of the revolution to its own portals. Bonaparte assembled at Bologna Victor's division, and the Italian troops newly levied in Lombardy and the Cispadan republic, and marched at their head, to execute in person an enterprise which, to be conducted successfully, required a more than usual display of his tact and promptitude.

The Pope was in mortal disquietude. The emperor had promised him his alliance only on very hard conditions, to wit, at the price of Ferrara and Commachio; but even this alliance had become of no avail since the discomfiture of the Austrian army under Alvinzy. The Holy See had therefore compromised itself to little purpose. The correspondence of Cardinal Busca, secretary of state, and a sworn enemy of France, had been intercepted. The plans laid to destroy the French army by attacking it from the rear were all unfolded, so that not even an excuse remained for deprecating the vengeance of a conqueror whose pacific propositions had been for a whole year spurned and rejected. When the French resident Cacault communicated the manifesto of the general, and requested permission to retire, the papal court hesitated to retain him from a remnant of pride, but it was thrown into direful consternation. Soon, however, it took counsel of despair. The Austrian general Colli, who had arrived at Rome with sundry officers, was placed at the head of the papal troops; fanatical exhortations were delivered throughout the Roman provinces; paradise was promised to all who should take up arms for the Holy See, and every effort made to stir up a Vendée around Bonaparte. Urgent prayers were addressed to the court of Naples, designed to kindle alike the fervour of ambition and the zeal of fanaticism.

Bonaparte advanced with rapidity to quench the conflagration ere it had time to spread. On the 16th Pluviose (4th February), he marched on the Senio, where the papal army was intrenched. It was composed of seven or eight thousand regular troops, and a great number of peasants hastily armed and led by monks. The appearance of this host was signally grotesque. An officer bearing a flag of truce appeared to declare that, if the French army persisted in advancing, it would be fired upon. Notwithstanding this menace, it proceeded towards the bridge over the Senio, which was strongly defended. Lannes ascended the course of the river with a few hundred men, passed it at a ford, and drew up in battle array on the rear of the Roman forces. Thereupon General Lahoz, with the Lombard troops, marched on the bridge, and speedily succeeded in carrying it. The new Italian troops bravely withstood the fire, which for an interval was brisk and sustained. Four or five hundred prisoners were taken, and several peasants put to the sword. The papal army retreated in disorder. It was pursued to Faenza; the gates of the town were forced, and an entrance effected amidst the howls of a furious population and the peals of the tocsin. The soldiers demanded leave to pillage; Bonaparte refused it. He assembled the prisoners captured in the affair on the banks of the Senio, and addressed them in Italian. Those unfortunate men imagined they were drawn out to be slaughtered. Bonaparte rebuked their fears, and intimated to them, amidst their joyful astonishment, that he gave them liberty, on condition they returned to enlighten their countrymen respecting the intentions of the French, who had come to destroy neither religion nor the popedom, but desired simply to remove the evil counsellors with whom the Pope was environed. He subsequently caused food to be distributed amongst them, and then dismissed them. From Faenza Bonaparte pushed rapidly on to Forli, Cesena, Rimini, Pesaro, and Sinigaglia. Colli, with whom not more than three thousand regular troops remained, intrenched himself in advance of Ancona, in a strong position. Bonaparte surrounded him, and took the greater part of his men prisoners. He gave them likewise liberty on the same conditions. Colli retired with his officers to Rome. It now only remained to march on that capital. Bonaparte proceeded straightway to Loretto, whence the treasures were found to have been removed, on which account scarcely a million was collected. The antique wooden Virgin was transported to Paris as an object of curiosity. At Loretto he quitted the coast, and marched by Macerata on the Appenines, intending to cross them and debouch on Rome if it should become necessary. He arrived at Tolentino on the 25th Pluviose (13th February), and there halted, to await the effect produced by his rapid march, and the liberation of the prisoners. He had summoned the general of the Camaldulenses, a friar in whom Pius VI. reposed great confidence, and charged him to bear a mission of peace to Rome. Bonaparte was extremely desirous that the Pope should submit, and accept the conditions he designed to impose upon him. He had no wish to lose time in effecting a revolution at Rome, which would detain him longer than it suited him to tarry, possibly provoke the court of Naples to take up arms, and, by overthrowing the established government, ruin for the moment the Roman finances, and prevent the extraction from the country of the twenty or thirty millions whereof he stood in such pressing need. He held that the Holy See, shorn of its finest provinces for behoof of the Cispadan republic, and exposed to contact with that newly-established democracy, would be speedily invaded by the revolutionary contagion, and swept away by its potent agency. His views were eminently sagacious, and the future demonstrated their forethought. He thus awaited at Tolentino the combined effects of clemency and terror.

The liberated prisoners had, in fact, spread through all parts of the Roman dominions, and especially at Rome, the most favourable reports concerning the French army, and greatly allayed the existing rancour against it. The general of the Camaldulenses reached the Vatican as the Pope was preparing to step into his carriage and quit Rome. The pontiff, encouraged by what this messenger related to him, relinquished all intention of abandoning his capital, dismissed the secretary of state Busca, and dispatched Cardinal Mattei, the prelate Galeppi, the Marquis Massimi, and his nephew the Duke di Braschi, to Tolentino, to treat with the French general. They were vested with full powers to conclude a treaty, provided the republican exacted no sacrifice bearing on faith. The negotiation consequently became an affair of little difficulty, for, on articles of faith, the French general betokened a most accommodating spirit. The treaty was arranged in a few days, and signed at Tolentino on the 1st Ventôse (19th February). Its principal conditions were as follows. The Pope revoked every treaty of alliance against France, recognised the republic, and declared himself at peace and in good intelligence with it. He ceded to it all his rights on the Comtat Venaissin, and surrendered definitively to the Cispadan republic the legations of Bologna and Ferrara, and the rich province of Romagna in addition. The city and important citadel of Ancona were to remain in the possession of France until a general peace. The two provinces of the Duchy of Urbino and of Macerata, which the French army had overrun, were restored to the Pope in consideration of fifteen millions. A similar sum was to be paid in conformity with the provisions of the armistice concluded at Bologna, not yet executed. These thirty millions were payable, two-thirds in money, and one

third in diamonds and other precious stones. The Pope was to furnish besides 800 cavalry horses, 800 draught horses, buffaloes, and other products of the ecclesiastical territory. He bound himself to disavow the murder of Basseville, and to pay 300,000 francs, in compensation, as well to his heirs as to those who had suffered from the consequences of that event. All the objects of art and manuscripts ceded to France by the armistice of Bologna were to be immediately conveyed to Paris.

Such was the treaty of Tolentino, which secured to the Cispadan republic, besides the legations of Bologna and Ferrara, the fine province of Romagna, and obtained for the French army a subsidy of thirty millions, being more than sufficient for the campaign in perspective. Fifteen days had sufficed to bring the expedition to a fortunate issue. Whilst negotiating this treaty, Bonaparte had contrived to keep the court of Naples in wholesome awe, and to free himself from such embarrassments as it could offer. Before quitting Tolentino, he performed a remarkable act, which already bespoke his latent tendencies. Italy, and particularly the states of the Church, swarmed with expatriated French priests. These unfortunate men, seeking refuge in the convents, were not always received in those establishments with the most charitable welcome. The decrees of the Directory warned them from the countries occupied by the French armies, and the Italian monks were not grieved to be delivered from them by the approach of the French troops. The wretched exiles were reduced to despair. Long banished from their native land, and exposed to the scorn and obloquy of strangers, they shed tears on beholding the French soldiers; they even recognised some of them, whose pastors they had been in the rural parishes of France. Bonaparte was easily moved; he furthermore took pleasure in showing himself free from every kind of prejudice, revolutionary or religious; hence, he enjoined, by an ordinance, all the convents in the papal dominions to receive the French priests, maintain them, and afford them a pecuniary allowance. He thus ameliorated their condition, instead of driving them before him as fugitives. He notified to the Directory the motives which had induced him to commit this infraction of its decrees. "By continually expelling these unfortunates from their retreats," he wrote, "you oblige them to return home. It is better that they remain in Italy than migrate to France; they will be useful to us there. They are less fanatical than the Italian priests, and they will enlighten the people whom every means are taken to excite against us. Besides," he added, "they weep on seeing us; how withhold pity for their misfortunes?" The Directory approved his conduct. This action and his explanatory letter, transpiring through the public prints, produced a very great sensation.

Bonaparte immediately returned to the Adige, to execute the boldest march whereof history makes mention. After having once passed the Alps to enter Italy, he now prepared to cross them a second time, to throw himself beyond the Drave and the Muehr, into the valley of the Danube, and to advance on Vienna. No French army had ever appeared in sight of that capital. In the accomplishment of so mighty an undertaking he had to defy appalling dangers. He left Italy in his rear,—Italy, absorbed in terror and admiration, it is true, but still impressed with the belief that the French could not hold it long.

The last campaign of Rivoli and the reduction of Mantua had apparently dissipated all such doubts; but a march into Germany was fitted to revive them in their full extent. The governments of Genoa, Tuscany, Naples, Rome, Turin, and Venice, irritated at the spectacle of the revolution planted on their confines, in the Cispadan and Lombardy, would probably rise in hostilities on tidings of the first reverse. In the uncertainty of the result, the Italian patriots remained quietly observant, to avoid compromising themselves. The army of Bonaparte was much inferior in strength to what it ought to have been, considering the vast hazards his plan involved. The divisions of Delmas and Bernadotte, recently arrived from the Rhine, did not comprise above twenty thousand men; the old army of Italy contained upwards of forty, which, with the Lombard troops, might make about seventy thousand in all. But it would be necessary to leave twenty thousand at least in Italy, fifteen or eighteen in guard of the Tyrol, and thus thirty or thereabouts would be left to march on Vienna,—an incredible temerity! To obviate this difficulty in some degree, Bonaparte attempted to conclude an offensive and defensive alliance with the king of Sardinia, which, indeed, he had long ago desired. This alliance promised to bring him ten thousand men, brave and disciplined troops. The king, who had heretofore deemed the guarantee of his possessions too small a reward for the services he might render, was now happy to embrace the offer, seeing that revolutionary ideas were spreading with so impetuous a wave. He signed the treaty, which was transmitted to Paris. But this treaty ran counter to the views of the French government. The Directory, approving the policy of Bonaparte in Italy, which consisted in awaiting the subversion of governments, neither provoking nor discouraging change, so as to avoid both the trouble and responsibility of revolutions,—the Directory was wishful neither to molest nor to guarantee any prince. The ratification of the treaty was therefore very doubtful, and at any rate it could not arrive in less than fifteen or twenty days. The Sardinian contingent was then to be mustered and put in motion, and by that time Bonaparte would be already beyond the Alps.

Bonaparte was even more solicitous to conclude a similar treaty of alliance with Venice. The government of that republic was making considerable armaments, of which the design was sufficiently obvious. The lagoons were filled with Sclavonian regiments. The podestat of Bergamo, Ottolini, a fit instrument of state-inquisitors, had distributed money and arms amongst the mountaineers of the Bergamasco, and held them ready for a favourable occasion. This Venitian government, however, equally emasculated and perfidious, refrained from compromising itself, and persisted in its pretended neutrality. It had refused the alliance of Austria and Prussia, but it was in arms; and should the French, on entering Austria, sustain reverses, it was prepared to take a decided part, by massacring them in their retreat. Bonaparte, whose astuteness rivalled even that of Venitian aristocracy, was sensible of this danger, and pressed for its alliance rather to secure himself from its evil purposes than to obtain its aid. On passing the Adige, he called to his presence the proveditore Pezâro, the same he had so cruelly terrified the preceding year at Peschiera; he now submitted to him the most frank and amicable overtures. The whole terra-firma, he represented to him, was imbued with revolutionary ideas; a single word from the French would suffice to arouse all the provinces in rebellion against Venice; but, if Venice united herself in alliance with the French, they would refrain from encouraging revolt, strive to calm discontent, guarantee the republic against the ambition of Austria, and, without demanding the sacrifice of its constitution, be content to recommend, for its own welfare and stability, certain indispensable modifications.—The prudent course thus advised was enforced with all the earnestness of sincerity. It is not true that at the very moment Bonaparte lavished these exhortations, the Directory and himself already contemplated the surrender of Venice to Austria. The

Directory entertained no fixed ideas on the subject; or if, pending the issue of events, it revolved any particular plans, they were based on the principle of enfranchising Italy rather than of yielding a portion to Austria. As to Bonaparte, he was sincerely desirous of securing an ally; and if Venice had hearkened to him, if she had cordially embraced his offers, and submitted to modify her constitution, she would have preserved her territory and her ancient laws. Pezaro replied in evasive terms. Bonaparte, perceiving he had nothing to hope, determined to adopt requisite precautions, and to supply all deficiencies by his accustomed resource,—rapidity and vivacity of action.

He had under his command upwards of sixty thousand men, unsurpassed in military qualities by any troops hitherto arrayed for combat. Ten thousand he purposed to leave in Italy, which, united with the Lombard and Cispadan battalions, would form a body of fifteen or eighteen thousand men, sufficient to overawe the Venetians. Fifty and a few thousand remained for offensive operations, which he marked out for disposition according to the nature of the ground and the position of the enemy. Three routes led, across the Rhætian, Norican and Julian Alps, to Vienna: the first towards the left, traversing the Tyrol by the defile of Brenner; the second in the centre, passing Carinthia by the pass of Tarwis; the third on the right, crossing the Tagliamento and the Isonzo, and leading into Carniola. The Archduke Charles had the bulk of his forces on the Isonzo, guarding Carniola and covering Trieste. Two corps, the one at Feltre and Belluno, the other in the Tyrol, occupied the two other roads. Through the neglect of Austria in too tardily moving reinforcements into Italy, six divisions detached from the Rhine had not yet arrived. This omission might have been partly repaired, if the Archduke Charles, planting his head-quarters in the Tyrol, had resolved to operate on the French left. He would have received the six divisions from the Rhine fifteen days earlier; and in that case, Bonaparte, instead of defiling on the right through Carinthia or Carniola, would have been compelled to engage and defeat him before hazarding a march beyond the Alps. But he would have encountered the Archduke with his best troops and found the task by no means easy. The Archduke, however, had strict orders to cover Trieste, the only port belonging to the Austrian empire. He accordingly established himself at the entrance of Carniola, and merely posted accessory corps on the roads through Carinthia and the Tyrol. Two of the divisions draughted from the Rhine were appointed to reinforce General Kerpen in the Tyrol; the other four were to pass behind the Alps, through Carinthia and Carniola, and join the head-quarters in Friuli. The month of March had only commenced. The Alps were covered with ice and snow. How improbable that Bonaparte would seriously think of scaling their fearful crests at such a moment!

Bonaparte conceived that by falling impetuously on the Archduke, before the arrival of the principal forces from the Rhine, he would carry the passes of the Alps with comparative facility, clear them in his wake, successively defeat, as he had always done, the isolated Austrian corps, and, if he were supported by a movement of the armies of the Rhine, advance even to Vienna.

In consequence he reinforced Joubert, who, since the battle of Rivoli, had deservedly obtained his unlimited confidence, with the divisions of Baraguey d'Hilliers and Delmas, and placed him at the head of eighteen thousand men. He instructed him to ascend into the Tyrol, furiously assail Generals Laudohn and Kerpen, drive them beyond the Brenner, on the other side of the Alps, afterwards diverge towards the right through the Pusterthal, and eventually join the grand army in Carinthia. Laudohn and Kerpen might doubtless return into the Tyrol, after Joubert had rejoined the principal army; but they would require time to recover from their defeat, to procure reinforcements and regain the Tyrol, and in the interim Bonaparte would be at the gates of Vienna. In order to conciliate the Tyrolese, he recommended Joubert to caress the priests, to speak well of the Emperor and ill only of his ministers, to seize nothing but the imperial coffers, and to make no changes in the administration of the country. He charged the intrepid Massena, with his fine division, ten thousand strong, to march on the corps stationed in the centre towards Feltre and Belluno, hasten to the gorges of Ponteba which precede the great pass of Tarwis, take possession of the gorges and the pass, and thus secure the entrance into Carinthia. In person he proposed to march with three divisions, twenty-five thousand men strong, on the Piave and the Tagliamento, drive the Archduke before him into Carniola, then diverge towards the road through Carinthia, join Massena at the pass of Tarwis, clear the Alps by that defile, descend into the valley of the Drave and the Muehr, pick up Joubert, and march on Vienna. He relied greatly on the impetuosity and boldness of his attacks, and on the awe usually inspired by the unexpected and terrible blows he was wont to strike.

Before commencing his movements, he conferred on General Kilmaine the command of Upper Italy. Victor's division, distributed in the states of the Pope, awaiting the payment of the thirty millions, was to return within a few days on the Adige, and there form with the Lombards the corps of observation. Meanwhile an extraordinary ferment reigned in the Venitian provinces. The peasants and mountaineers devoted to their priests and to the existing oligarchy on the one hand, and the inhabitants of the towns agitated by the revolutionary spirit on the other, were ready to engage in civil strife. Bonaparte enjoined General Kilmaine to observe the strictest neutrality between the two parties, and set out to execute his vast projects. According to usuage, he published an energetic proclamation, fitted to stimulate still higher the enthusiasm of his soldiers, if that had been possible. On the 20th Ventôse, Year V. (10th March 1797), amidst an intense cold, and with several feet of snow lying on the mountains, he put his whole line in motion. Massena began his operation against the corps in the centre, drove it on Feltre, Belluno, and Cadore, captured a thousand prisoners, in the number of whom was General Lusignan, diverged on Spilimbergo, and plunged into the gorges of Ponteba, which precede the pass of Tarwis. Bonaparte advanced on the Piave with three divisions: the division of Serrurier, which had distinguished itself before Mantua, the division of Augereau, actually commanded by General Guyeux in the absence of Augereau, who had been sent to Paris with the Austrian flags, and the division under Bernadotte recently arrived from the Rhine. This latter offered a strong contrast, by its simplicity and austere deportment, to the old army of Italy, enriched in the teeming plains it had conquered, and composed of the daring, fiery, and intemperate denizens of the south. The soldiers of Italy, proud of their victories, ridiculed those of the Rhine, and called them *the contingent*, in allusion to the contingents of the circles, which, in the armies of the emperor, usually performed their duty sluggishly and indifferently. The soldiers of the Rhine, veterans in arms, were impatient to prove their prowess before their rivals in glory. Already several duels had been fought on account of these jibes, and the emulous eagerness to wrestle gloriously with the enemy was wrought to the highest pitch.

On the 23d (13th March), the three divisions passed the Piave without accident, save only that they nearly

lost a man, who was on the point of being washed away by the current, when a canteen-woman swam to his rescue and brought him happily to shore. Bonaparte presented this heroine with a golden necklace. The enemy's outposts fell straightway back and sought shelter behind the Tagliamento. All the Archduke's troops, distributed in Friuli, were there assembled to dispute the passage. The two youthful adversaries were now at length to confront each other. One, by saving Germany through a luminous conception, had acquired a high reputation the preceding year. He was bold, resolute, and unfettered by the antiquated routine of German tactics, but dubious always of success and in trepidation for his glory. The other had astounded Europe by the fecundity and audacity of his combinations; and nothing in the world daunted him. Modest previous to Lodi, he now deemed no capacity equal to his own, nor any soldier equal to the French soldier. On the morning of the 26th Ventôse (16th March), Bonaparte moved his three divisions on the banks of the Tagliamento through Valvasone. This river, whose bed is often uncertain, falls from the Alps over rocky channels, and divides into a multitude of arms, all fordable. The Austrian army was drawn up on the opposite side, protecting with its fire the shores of the river, and keeping its superb cavalry deployed on its wings, in order to draw from it every advantage on plains so eminently favourable for evolutions.

Bonaparte left the division of Serrurier in reserve at Valvasone, and moved forward the two divisions under Guyeux and Bernadotte, the first to the left, fronting the village of Gradisca, where the enemy was posted, and the latter to the right, in face of Godriopo. The cannonade commenced, and a few cavalry skirmishes occurred on the flanks. Finding the enemy too well prepared, Bonaparte made a feint of giving his troops repose, directed an intermission of the fire, and ordered the soup to be made ready. The device succeeded; the enemy concluded that the divisions having marched all night would now be brought to a halt and recruited with an interval of rest. But at noon, Bonaparte suddenly issued orders for the resumption of arms. The division under Guyeux deployed to the left, that under Bernadotte to the right. Battalions of grenadiers were formed. At the head of each division was placed the light infantry, prepared to disperse as sharpshooters, and then the grenadiers who were appointed to charge, together with the dragoons who were to support them. The two divisions were drawn up in the rear of these two vanguards. Each demi-brigade had its first battalion deployed in line, and the two others formed in close column on the wings of the first. The cavalry was stationed to hover on the wings. The army advanced in this order towards the banks of the river, marching to combat with the precision and coolness of troops on parade.

General Dammartin on the left, and General Lespinasse on the right, pushed forward their artillery. The light infantry dispersed and covered the banks of the Tagliamento with a swarm of sharpshooters. Bonaparte thereupon gave the signal. The grenadiers of the two divisions entered the stream, supported by squadrons of cavalry, and moved steadily through its waters towards the opposite shore. "Soldiers of the Rhine," exclaimed Bernadotte, 'the army of Italy has its eyes on you!" The troops hurried forward with equal intrepidity on both quarters. They rushed upon the hostile army and repulsed it on all sides. The Archduke, however, had posted a mass of infantry at Gradisca on the French left, and held his cavalry on their right, with the view of outflanking and charging them on the plain. General Guyeux attacked Gradisca with impetuosity at the head of his division, and carried it. Bonaparte disposed his reserve of cavalry on his threatened wing, and directed it, under the orders of General Dugua and Adjutant-general Kellermann, to attack the Austrian cavalry. It executed the charge with skill and promptitude, captured the general of the enemy's cavalry, and put it to flight. Along the whole line the Tagliamento was cleared and the Austrians in retreat. The French had taken four or five hundred prisoners; the open nature of the ground prevented them from securing more.

Such was the action of the 26th Ventôse (16th March), called the battle of the Tagliamento. During its progress, Massena, on the centre road, attacked Osopo, seized the gorges of Ponteba, and drove the remains of Lusignan and Ocskay's divisions on Tarwis.

The Archduke Charles perceived that if he resolved to guard the route of Carniola and cover Trieste, he must lose the route of Carinthia, which was the most direct and the shortest, and that which Bonaparte desired to follow in his march on Vienna. The chaussée of Carniola communicates with that of Carinthia and the pass of Tarwis by a cross road which winds along the valley of the Isonzo. The Archduke detached the division under Bayalitsch by this communication towards the pass of Tarwis to anticipate Massena if possible. He himself retired with the remainder of his forces on Friuli, with the design of disputing the passage of the Lower-Isonzo.

Bonaparte pursued him and reduced Palma-Nuova, a Venitian fortress, which the Archduke had occupied, and which contained large magazines. He afterwards marched on Gradisca,* a town situated in front of the Isonzo. He arrived there on the 29th Ventôse (19th March). Bernadotte advanced with his division to the walls of the place, which was weakly fortified, but defended by three thousand men. Meanwhile, Bonaparte sent Serrurier's division below Gradisca, with orders to pass the Isonzo and intercept the retreat of the garrison. Bernadotte, without awaiting the result of this manœuvre, summoned the town to surrender. The Austrian officer in command refused to capitulate. The soldiers of the Rhine demanded leave to assault, burning with ardour to enter the place before their comrades of Italy. They rushed furiously on the intrenchments, but a storm of balls and grape stretched upwards of five hundred on the ground. Serrurier's movement, however, fortunately put an end to the combat. The three thousand Austrians in Gradisca laid down their arms, and delivered up their flags and cannon.

In the meantime Massena had at length reached the pass of Tarwis, and, after a hot engagement, succeeded in securing that avenue of the Alps. Thus Bayalitsch, crossing the country by the Isonzo to anticipate him at this important post, was foiled in his purpose, and doomed to find the approach barred. The Archduke, foreseeing the possibility of this misfortune, left the residue of his army on the route to Friuli and Carniola, with orders to rejoin him behind the Alps at Clagenfurt, and hastened in person to Villach, where numerous detachments were arriving from the Rhine, in order to direct a counter attack on Tarwis, dislodge Massena, and re-open the route to the division under Bayalitsch. Bonaparte, on his side, left Bernadotte's division to continue the pursuit of the corps retiring into Carniola, and with the divisions of Guyeux and Serrurier set off in the wake of Bayalitsch to envelop him from the rear in the valley of the Isonzo.

Prince Charles, having rallied behind the mountains the shattered corps of Lusignan and Ocskay, which had been chased from the pass of Tarwis, strengthened them with six thousand grenadiers, the best and bravest of the emperor's forces, and attacked the defile, in which Massena had merely left a de-

* This town will be distinguished from the one of the same name on the Tagliamento.

tachment. He succeeded in recovering it, and there established himself with the troops of Lusignan and Ocskay and the 6,000 grenadiers. Massena collected the whole of his division to redeem its loss. Both commanders were well aware of the great importance of the position. By securing Tarwis the French became masters of the Alps, and completely encompassed Bayalitsch and his division. Massena led on his brave infantry with headlong impetuosity, exposing himself, as usual, to the front of danger. The Archduke was not less prodigal of his person than the republican general, and repeatedly confronted the fire of the French riflemen. The pass of Tarwis is the most elevated of the Noric Alps, soaring high above and commanding the plains of Germany. The battle was fought above the clouds, in the midst of snow, and on fields of ice. Whole troops of cavalry were overturned and disabled on this dismal scene of conflict. At length, after contesting the ground to his last battalion, the Archduke relinquished Tarwis to his persevering adversary, and was constrained to sacrifice the division of Bayalitsch. Massena, again master of the pass, turned back to meet that unfortunate division, and attacked it in front, whilst pressed from the rear by the divisions of Guyeux and Serrurier, united under the orders of Bonaparte. It had no alternative but to submit at discretion. Many of the soldiers composing it, natives of Carniola and Croatia, saved themselves across the mountains, having thrown down their arms; but five thousand remained in the power of the French, with all the baggage, administrations and magazines of the Austrian army, which had been directed on this route. Thus had Bonaparte reached the summit of the Alps in fifteen days, and, on the side where he himself commanded, fully accomplished the object he had aspired to realize.

In the Tyrol also, Joubert justified the confidence reposed in him by a series of brilliant actions. The two Austrian generals, Laudohn and Kerpen, occupied the two banks of the Adige. Joubert had attacked and defeated them at Saint-Michel, killing 2,000 of their men, and taking 3,000 prisoners. Pursuing them without intermission on Neumarkt and Tramin, and cutting off other 2,000 men, he had driven Laudohn to the left of the Adige, into the valley of Meran, and Kerpen to the right, to the foot of the Brenner. Kerpen, reinforced at Clausen by one of the divisions marching from the Rhine, had attempted to make a stand, and been again defeated. At Mittelwald he had been further reinforced by a second division from the Rhine, had been once more worsted and finally repulsed beyond the Brenner. Having thus swept the Tyrol, Joubert had wheeled to the right, and was now marching through the Pusterthal in order to rejoin his commander-in-chief. It was only the 12th Germinal (1st April), and Bonaparte had already penetrated to the summit of the Alps, taken nearly twenty thousand prisoners, secured the proximate junction of Joubert and Massena with his principal corps, and prepared the way for advancing on Vienna with fifty thousand men. His discomfited antagonist was striving to rally the broken wrecks of his army, and to unite them with the troops arriving from the Rhine. Such were the results of this rapid and audacious movement on the part of the French general.

But whilst Bonaparte was pursuing this swift career of victory, all that he had foreboded on his rear came to pass. The Venitian provinces, stirred by revolutionary ideas, had broken into revolt. They had thus furnished the government of Venice with a pretext for assembling considerable forces, and for putting itself into a condition to overwhelm the French army in case of reverse. The provinces on the right side of the Mincio were the most imbued with the revolutionary spirit from their contiguity to Lombardy. In the towns of Bergamo, Brescia, Salo, and Crema, resided a number of great families, to whom the yoke of the nobility of the Golden-Book was most odious, and who, supported by the bulk of the citizens, formed a powerful party of malcontents. By following the counsels of Bonaparte, opening the pages of the Golden-Book, and making certain modifications in the ancient constitution, the Venitian government would have disarmed the hostility of the formidable party which had arisen in all the provinces of the Terra-Firma; but the accustomed blindness of aristocracies had prevented the adoption of any conciliatory course, and rendered a revolution inevitable. The part taken by the French in this revolution is easily explained, despite the malicious fabrications suggested by hatred and repeated by folly. The army of Italy was composed of southern, that is to say, ardent revolutionists. It was impossible but that in their intercourse with the subjects of Venice they should communicate the sentiments that animated them, and excite dissatisfaction against the most detestable of oligarchies; this was unavoidable and beyond the power of either the French government or generals to avert. The views of the Directory and of Bonaparte were perfectly clear. The Directory desired the natural dissolution of the Italian governments, but was determined to take no active part in hastening their overthrow; and, moreover, it had delegated to Bonaparte the entire conduct of all political as well as military operations in Italy. With respect to Bonaparte himself, he had too much need of concord, tranquillity, and friends in his rear to have any inclination to revolutionize Venice. A compromise between the two parties consorted best with his position. This compromise and the French alliance being refused, he intended on his return to exact by coercion what he had been unable to obtain by persuasion; but, for the present, it was his object to abstain from any attempt at interference, and his opinions in that behalf were explicitly stated to the Directory. Furthermore, he had given General Kilmaine positive injunctions to take no part in political affairs, and to maintain public tranquillity as far as in him lay.

The towns of Bergamo and Brescia, of all those on the Terra-Firma the most unruly and agitated, had long been in communication with Milan; in fact, secret revolutionary committees were formed in various quarters to hold correspondence with the Milanese patriots, and solicit their aid in throwing off the yoke of Venice. The victories of the French removed all doubt as to the definitive expulsion of the Austrians; the patrons of aristocracy therefore were vanquished, and although the French affected neutrality, it was certain they would not employ their arms in subduing populations to a thraldom they had repudiated; hence it was to be inferred that they who rebelled would not only obtain but enjoy unmolested the advantages of freedom. Such was the manner in which the Italians argued. The citizens of Bergamo, the nearest in connection with Milan, applied to the Milanese authorities, inquiring how far they might rely on their assistance and on the support of the Lombard legion commanded by Lahoz. The podestat of Bergamo, Ottolini, the same who, as the faithful agent of the State-Inquisitors, distributed money and arms among the peasants and mountaineers, retained spies in the councils of the Milanese patriots; consequently he was informed of the schemes in contemplation, and furnished with the names of the principal Bergamascans implicated therein. He hastened to dispatch a courier to Venice with the intelligence thus obtained, and in his letters urged the immediate arrest of those he had ascertained to be involved in the insurrectionary project. The inhabitants of Bergamo, apprized of this proceeding of the podestat, sent in pursuit of his mes-

senger, who was overtaken and stopped, and the names of those compromised were forthwith published. This circumstance produced the long-dreaded explosion. On the 11th March, at the very time Bonaparte was advancing on the Piave, the commotion began in Bergamo. The podestat issued threatening proclamations which were disregarded. The French commander, whom Bonaparte had placed in the citadel to watch the movements of the mountaineers of the Bergamasco, saw cause for increased vigilance, and reinforced all his posts. On both sides his aid was invoked; but he replied that he could not interfere in disputes between Venitian subjects and their government, and, moreover, intimated that he had doubled his posts merely as a precaution for the security of the fortress confided to his guardianship. In executing his orders and remaining neutral, he sufficiently promoted the designs of the Bergamascans. They assembled the following day, 12th March, instituted a provisional municipality, declared the city of Bergamo free, and expelled the podestat Ottolini, who withdrew with the Venitian troops. They likewise sent a deputation to Milan to crave the co-operation of the Lombards. The rapid extension of the insurrection to Brescia and the neighbouring towns was of unavoidable occurrence. The Bergamascans had no sooner hoisted the standard of liberty than they dispatched deputies to Brescia, whose presence and exhortations sufficed to arouse the inhabitants of that city. Battaglia, the Venitian who had given such sage advice to the senate in its deliberations, was in authority at Brescia. Believing resistance fruitless, he retired from the town, and the revolution was effected without difficulty on the 13th March. Thence skirting the foot of the mountains, the revolt continued to spread. It reached Salo, where the revolution was accomplished, as elsewhere, by the arrival of Bergamascans and Brescians, by the retirement of the Venitian authorities, and in presence of the French garrison, which remained neutral, but whose aspects, although silent, seemed propitious to the insurgents and filled them with hopes. This outbreak of the patriot party in the towns was naturally calculated to provoke a counter-movement by the opposite party dwelling on the mountains and in the fields. The mountaineers and peasants, long ago armed by the zeal of Ottolini, received the signal of action from the Capuchins and monks who preached a crusade from hamlet to hamlet; preparations were made for attacking and sacking the insurgent towns, and, if opportunities offered, for massacring the French. Henceforth the French generals could no longer continue inactive, however much disposed to remain neutral. They were too well acquainted with the designs of the mountaineers and peasants to suffer their assumption of arms; and without desiring to afford support to any party, they found themselves obliged to interfere and to repress those who harboured and even proclaimed hostile intentions against them. Kilmaine forwarded immediate orders to Lahoz, commander of the Lombard legion, to march towards the mountains and oppose the armament in progress. He neither would nor might have offered any obstacle to the operations of the regular Venitian troops, but it was impossible for him to allow a general rising, the consequences whereof were incalculable should any disaster happen the army in Austria. He dispatched couriers to Bonaparte without loss of time, and sent to hasten the march of Victor's division, which was on its return from the states of his Holiness the Pope.

The government of Venice, as usually happens with besotted rulers, who refuse to avert danger by timely concessions of what is indispensable, was struck with dismay by these events, as if they had been unforetold. It instantly put in motion the troops it had mustered long before, and directed them on the towns to the right of the Mincio. At the same time, convinced that the influence chiefly to be invoked lay with the French, it addressed to the minister of France, Lallemant, the inquiry whether, in this extreme peril, the republic of Venice might rely on the friendship of the Directory. The reply of the minister Lallemant was simple, and such as his position dictated. He declared that he had no instructions from his government anticipatory of such a case, in which he merely stated the truth; but, he added, that if the Venitian government would introduce into its constitution such modifications as were demanded by the exigencies of the times, he was of the opinion that France would cheerfully support it in the present emergency. No other answer could have been given by Lallemant; for if France had offered its alliance to Venice as against foreign powers, it had never done so as against its own subjects; nor could it have entered into any such domestic guarantee, unless on condition that a prudent and rational policy were adopted by the government. The great council of Venice met in solemn deliberation on the reply of Lallemant. Several centuries had passed since a proposition for a change in the constitution had been publicly made, and now out of above two hundred voices it obtained favour only with five. Fifty senators declared for the adoption of energetic measures; but one hundred and eighty decided for a slow and progressive reform, to be deferred until calmer times, or, in other words, for evasion. It was resolved to send forthwith two deputies to Bonaparte, with the view of sounding his intentions and soliciting his aid. For this mission were nominated J. B. Cornaro, one of the sages of the Terra-Firma, and Pesaro, the famous procurator, whom we have already seen in conference with the general.

The couriers dispatched by Kilmaine and the Venitian deputies reached the quarters of Bonaparte at the moment his bold manœuvres had secured him the line of the Alps, and laid open to invasion the hereditary states of Austria. He was at Gorizia, engaged in settling the capitulation of Trieste. He learnt with sincere affliction the events that had occurred on his rear, as may be readily imagined when the daring and perilous nature of his march on Vienna is considered. Moreover, his dispatches to the Directory prove the vexation he experienced; and they who have alleged that he did not express his real feelings in those dispatches have evinced but little reflection, since he never hesitated to avow in such communications his craftiest designs against the Italian governments. It was difficult for him to determine what part he should take under the circumstances. Policy and generosity equally forbid him to repress by force the party which upheld French principles, which caressed and welcomed French soldiers, and to confirm the sway of that which was ready, in case of disaster, to destroy those same principles and soldiers. Meanwhile, he resolved to profit by the actual contingency in order to obtain from the Venitian envoys the concessions and succours which had been hitherto denied to him. He received the two deputies with politeness, and granted them an audience on the 5th Germinal (25th March). "That I should take arms," he said to them, "against my friends, against those who hail our presence and would willingly fight for us, in behalf of my enemies, in favour of those who detest and would willingly massacre us, is quite impossible. So base a policy is equally repugnant to my heart and my interests. I will never lend my aid in opposition to principles for which France has made its revolution, and to which I partly owe the success of my arms. But I once more offer you my friendship and advice. Ally yourselves frankly with France, approximate to her principles, and make indispensable modifications in your constitution; in that case I

answer for all, and without employing a violence which is impossible on my part, I will obtain through my influence over the Italian people, and by the assurance of a more reasonable system of government, a return to peace and order. This result is as desirable for you as for me."

This language, spoken with sincerity, and the wisdom whereof needs no demonstration, did not suit the Venitian envoys, especially Pesaro. Their views were otherwise directed; they were desirous that Bonaparte should restore the fortresses he had occupied by way of precaution, as Bergamo, Brescia, and Verona, and allow the arming of the fanatical party against the patriotic, thus permitting another Vendée to arise in his rear. Such ideas were not calculated to promote an understanding. Bonaparte, whose temper was hasty, treated the envoys with great harshness, and, recalling to them the various proceedings of the Venitian government towards the French army, warned them he was well aware of their secret dispositions and projects, but that he was prepared, and an army remained in Lombardy to keep watch upon their conduct. The conference thus became acrimonious. From these questions the parties passed to those respecting supplies. Hitherto Venice had furnished provisions to the French army, and she had justified Bonaparte in exacting them by the support she gave the Austrian army. Now that he had moved into the hereditary states, the Venitians proposed that Bonaparte should cease to live at their expense. This, however, was not at all his intention, since in order that he might propitiate the inhabitants of the Austrian countries, it was his purpose to avoid subjecting them to any demands. Meanwhile the purveyors, secretly commissioned by the Venitian government to supply the army, had ceased their operations, whereby it had become necessary to make requisitions in the Venitian territories. "This is a vicious method," Bonaparte remarked; "it harasses the cultivator and gives rise to monstrous peculations; give me a million monthly whilst this campaign lasts, which cannot be long; the French republic will afterwards account with you, and it will owe you more for this million than for all the evils you will endure from requisitions. Besides, you have cherished all my enemies, you have given them an asylum, and you owe me reciprocity." The two envoys replied by stating that the exchequer was exhausted. "If it be exhausted," rejoined Bonaparte, "take from the treasures of the Duke of Modena, which you have received to the prejudice of my allies the Modenese; get money from the effects of the English, Russians, Austrians, of all my enemies, which you hold in charge." They parted with abundant dissatisfaction on both sides. Another interview took place the following day. Bonaparte renewed with calmness his propositions; but Pesaro offered nothing to satisfy him, and simply promised to inform the senate of all his demands. Thereupon Bonaparte, whose irritation began to swell beyond control, seized Pesaro by the arm and said to him: "I see through you, I probe you; I know what you are preparing for me; but, beware! if, whilst I am engaged in a distant enterprise, you massacre my sick, attack my depôts or threaten my retreat, you provoke your own ruin. What I might have overlooked whilst in Italy, will become an inexpiable crime when I am entangled in Austria. If you take arms, you decide either my destruction or yours. Reflect, therefore, and expose not rashly the sickly lion of Saint Mark against the fortune of an army whose depôts and hospitals alone could supply force enough to storm your lagoons and exterminate you." This energetic language struck terror, without carrying conviction, into the minds of the Venitian envoys, who immediately transmitted the result of their conference. Bonaparte, on his part, forthwith wrote to Kilmaine, enjoining him to redouble his vigilance, to punish any French commanders who overstepped the limits of neutrality, and to disarm all the mountaineers and peasants.

Events were so far advanced that it was impossible to stop their course. The insurrection of Bergamo occurred on the 23d Ventôse (13th March); that of Brescia on the 27th (17th March); that of Salo on the 4th Germinal (24th March). On the 8th Germinal (28th March), the town of Crema effected its meditated revolution, and the French troops became perforce implicated in it. A detachment which preceded the division of Victor, on its return to Lombardy, appeared before the gates of Crema. It was at a moment of fermentation. The sight of the French troops naturally tended to inflame the hopes and courage of the patriots. The Venitian podestat, who was in great consternation, at first refused admission to the French; eventually he allowed forty to enter, who seized the gates of the town and opened them to the advancing columns. The inhabitants took advantage of the opportunity, arose in insurrection, and expelled the podestat. The French had thus acted merely to secure a passage; the patriots profited thereby to revolt. When such dispositions exist, anything serves as a cause of explosion, and circumstances altogether involuntary lead to results which induce a suspicion of confederacy perfectly groundless. Such was the situation of the French, who, beyond all doubt, were individually favourable to the revolution, but officially preserved neutrality.

The mountaineers and peasants, stimulated by the agents of the Venitian government, and by the exhortations of the Capuchins, overran the open country. The Sclavonian regiments, landed from the lagoons on *terra firma*, advanced towards the insurgent towns. Kilmaine had issued his orders, and put in motion the Lombard legion to disarm the peasants. Several conflicts had already taken place; villages had been burnt, and peasants seized and disarmed. But these, on their part, began to sack the towns and to slaughter the French, whom they designated under the name of Jacobins. Even earlier they had put to death all such as they found scattered in the most horrible manner. First of all, they effected a counter-revolution at Salo: whereupon a body of the inhabitants of Bergamo and Brescia, supported by a detachment of Poles from the Lombard legion, marched upon Salo to drive out the mountaineers. Certain individuals, sent forward to open a parley, were drawn into the town and slain; the detachment was surrounded and repulsed; two hundred Poles were taken prisoners and conducted to Venice. At Salo, Verona, and in all the Venitian cities, the known partisans of the French were siezed and conveyed beneath "the Leads,"* and the inquisitors of state, encouraged by this miserable success, appeared disposed to proceed to cruel extremities. Some have alleged, indeed, that it was prohibited to dredge the canal Orfano, which was appropriated, as is known, to the detestable usage of drowning prisoners of state. Still, whilst preparing to put in force a relentless rigour, the Venitian government strove to deceive Bonaparte by acts of seeming acquiescence, and it granted the million per month which had been asked. The assassination of Frenchmen, however, wheresoever they were encountered, did not the less continue. The situation of affairs was becoming extremely critical, and Kilmaine dispatched fresh couriers to Bonaparte. He, on hearing of the actions fought by the mountaineers, of the event at Salo, where two hundred Poles had been made prisoners, of the incarceration of all the partisans of France, and of the assassinations committed on Frenchmen, was seized with wrath. He instantly addressed an imperious letter to the senate, wherein

* [*I Piombi*, the celebrated prisons underneath the roof of the old ducal palace in Venice.]

he recapitulated all his causes of complaint, and demanded the disarming of the mountaineers, and the liberation as well of the Polish prisoners as of the Venitian subjects confined beneath "the Leads." He commissioned Junot to carry this letter and read it to the senate, and at the same time ordered the minister Lallemant to immediately quit Venice with a declaration of war, if all the points demanded were not conceded.

Meanwhile, he descended with gigantic strides from the heights of the Noric Alps into the valley of the Muehr. His principal reliance, in undertaking a movement of such temerity, was on the prompt co-operation in the campaign of the armies of the Rhine, and their speedy arrival on the banks of the Danube. But he received a letter from the Directory which deprived him of all hopes in this respect. The penury of the exchequer was such that it could not furnish General Moreau with the few hundred thousand francs requisite to procure a bridge-equipage to pass the Rhine. The army under Hoche, which occupied two bridges and was quite ready, clamoured to march, but the government dared not hazard it beyond the Rhine, whilst Moreau remained behind it. In his dispatch, Carnot even magnified the delays which must retard the advance of the two armies into Germany, and left Bonaparte no hope of being supported. The intimation greatly disconcerted him; ardent in imagination, he passed at once from extreme confidence to the uttermost distrust. He suspected either that the Directory wished to ruin the army of Italy and its general, or that the other generals refused to second him. He replied with bitter reflections on the conduct of the armies of the Rhine. He stated, "that a line of water was no impediment, as he had himself sufficiently proved; that when a general desired to cross a river, he could always do so; that by determining never to risk his glory, a man sometimes lost it; that he had cleared the Alps with three feet of snow and ice, and that if he had calculated like his colleagues he would not have ventured to attempt it; that if the soldiers of the Rhine left the army of Italy exposed alone in Germany, *they could have no blood in their veins;* that, for the rest, this brave army, if it were abandoned, would recoil, and to Europe he appealed as the judge between it and the other armies of the republic." Like all proud and irascible men, Bonaparte loved to complain, and to exaggerate the subject of his complaints. Although he thus wrote, he entertained no intention of retreating or even of pausing, but the contrary design of striking Austria with terror by a rapid march, and dictating to her a peace. Many considerations tended to flatter this purpose. Vienna was already in consternation; the court was inclined to treat; Prince Charles strongly advised it; the ministry alone, devoted to England, still resisted. The conditions prescribed to Clarke, previous to the victories of Arcole and Rivoli, were so moderate that Austria might be easily brought to accept them, or perhaps even worse. Re-united with Joubert and Massena, Bonaparte would have forty five or fifty thousand men under his command, and with so powerful a mass he need not dread a general battle, whatever might be the force of the enemy. For all these reasons, he resolved to make an overture to the Archduke Charles, and if he made no reply, to fall upon him with impetuosity, and to strike a blow so prompt and signal that all further opposition to his offers would vanish. And how glorious for him, if, alone, without aid or support, penetrating into the heart of Austria by so extraordinary a route, he should impose peace upon the haughty and puissant emperor!

On the 11th Germinal (31st March), Bonaparte was at Klagenfurth, the capital of Carinthia. Joubert, on his left, was accomplishing his movement, and about to rejoin him. Bernadotte, whom he had detached to sweep the road of Carniola, had possessed himself of Trieste, the rich mines of Idria, and the Austrian magazines, and was advancing by Laybach upon Klagenfurth. On this day, the 11th Germinal, he addressed to Prince Charles a memorable letter.

"General-in-chief," he wrote, "brave soldiers make war and desire peace. Has not this war continued six years? Have we not slain enough of men and caused sufficient evils to suffering humanity? From all quarters her appealing voice is heard. Europe, which took up arms against the French republic, has laid them down. Your nation alone remains, and yet blood is about to flow more profusely than ever. This sixth campaign opens under dismal auguries. Whatever may be its issue, we shall kill on both sides several thousands of men, and after all we must finish by coming to an understanding, since every thing has a term, even the passions of hatred and animosity.

"The Executive-Directory of the French republic has already made known to his Majesty the Emperor its desire to terminate a war which desolates both nations. The intervention of the court of London frustrated the design. Is there then no hope of an amicable settlement; and is it fixed that, for the interests and passions of a nation removed from the calamities of war, we are to continue to massacre each other? You, sir, who by your birth stand so near the throne, and are superior to all the petty passions which often animate ministers and governments, are you ambitious to merit the title of benefactor of all humanity and true saviour of Germany? Think not, commander-in-chief, that I mean by these words that it is not possible to save it by force of arms; but even supposing the chances of war become favourable to you, Germany will not be the less laid waste. As to myself, commander-in-chief, if the overture I have the honour to make you, may save the life of a single man, I shall feel more proud of the civic crown I will esteem myself to have merited, than of the mournful glory which can result from military successes."

The Archduke Charles could not entertain this overture, inasmuch as the determination of the Aulic Council was not yet taken. At Vienna, precautions were being adopted to meet the worst extremity; the moveables of the crown and all important documents were embarked on the Danube, the young archdukes and archduchesses were sent into Hungary, and the court itself was prepared, in case of dire necessity, to evacuate the capital. The Archduke accordingly replied to General Bonaparte, that he was equally desirous of peace with himself, but that he had no power to treat, and that he must address himself directly to Vienna. Bonaparte advanced rapidly through the mountains of Carinthia, and on the morning of the 12th Germinal (1st April), drove the enemy's rear-guard on Saint-Veit and Freisach, and dispersed it. In the afternoon of the same day, he encountered the Archduke, who had taken up a position in front of the narrow gorges of Neumarkt with the remains of his Friulian army, and with four divisions drawn from the Rhine, those of Kaim, Mercantin, and the Prince of Orange, and the reserve of grenadiers. A furious combat ensued in these gorges, of which Massena had again all the honour. The soldiers of the Rhine defied the veterans of the army of Italy, and it became a rivalry between them who should advance quickest and farthest. After a desperate engagement, in which the Archduke lost three thousand men on the field of battle and twelve hundred prisoners, all was forced at the point of the bayonet, and the gorges carried. On the following day, Bonaparte marched without halting from Neumarkt on Hunsmarkt. It was between these two points that the cross road

uniting the great highways of the Tyrol and Carinthia came to a head. By this route Kerpen was approaching, followed by Joubert. The Archduke, with the view of gaining time to secure the junction of Kerpen, proposed a suspension of arms, in order, as he alleged, to take into consideration the letter of the 11th (31st March). Bonaparte returned for answer that they could both fight and negotiate, and continued his march. The next day, 14th Germinal (3d April), he again engaged the enemy in a fierce conflict at Hunsmarkt, where he took 1,500 prisoners, entered Knittelfeld, and met with no further obstacle as far as Leoben. His van-guard reached that town on the 18th Germinal (7th April). Meanwhile, Kerpen had made a considerable circuit to rejoin the Archduke, and Joubert had approximated to the principal French army.

On the very day that Bonaparte entered Leoben, Lieutenant-general Bellegarde, chief of Prince Charles' staff, and Major-general Meerveldt, arrived at head-quarters as envoys of the Emperor, whom the rapid advance of the French had intimidated, and who desired a suspension of arms. They solicited one for ten days. Bonaparte was sensible that a suspension of arms for ten days would give the Archduke time to receive his last reinforcements from the Rhine, to collect together all the scattered portions of his army, and to recover from the effects of his precipitate retreat. But to himself, a truce was extremely needful; and on his side he would thereby gain the advantage of securing a junction with Bernadotte and Joubert; moreover, he trusted in the sincerity of the desire to treat for peace, and he granted a suspension of arms for five days, in order to allow plenipotentiaries time to arrive and sign preliminaries. A convention to this effect was signed on the 18th (7th April), covenanted to continue in force only till the 23d (12th April). He fixed his head-quarters at Leoben, and pushed Massena's van-guard forward to the peak of the Simmering, the last height of the Noric chain, distant only twenty-five leagues from Vienna, and whence the towers of that metropolis were discernible to the eye. He employed the five days in re-positioning and gathering his columns. He issued a proclamation to the inhabitants calculated to calm their fears as to his intentions, and not in words only but in deeds he manifested the sincerity of his protestations. Nothing was taken by the army without being equivalently reimbursed.

Bonaparte awaited the expiration of the five days, ready to strike a fresh blow to complete the terror of the imperial court, if it were not yet sufficiently alarmed. But at Vienna all things wore a favourable aspect for the termination of this long and terrible struggle, which had lasted six years, and caused the effusion of torrents of blood. The English party in the ministry was totally discredited, and Baron Thugut tottered on the verge of disgrace. The inhabitants of Vienna clamoured loudly for peace. The Archduke Charles himself, the hero of Austria, advised it, and declared that the empire could not be saved by arms. The Emperor inclined to the same opinion. At length the determination was taken, and the Count de Meerveldt and the Marquis de Gallo, Neapolitan ambassador at Vienna, were forthwith dispatched to Leoben. The latter was selected through the influence of the Empress, who was a daughter of the Queen of Naples, and who interfered greatly in affairs. Their instructions were to sign preliminaries which should serve as the bases in negotiating thereafter a definitive peace. They arrived on the 24th Germinal (13th April), in the morning, at the moment that Bonaparte, the truce having expired, was about to attack the advanced posts. They intimated that they held full powers to settle the bases of peace. A garden in the vicinity of Leoben was made neutral ground, and the conferences were opened amidst the bivouacs of the French army. The young general, suddenly transformed into a negotiator, had never undergone a diplomatic apprenticeship; but for a year past, he had had manifold important affairs to transact, such as in the world could be scarcely rivalled; moreover he possessed a fame which rendered him the most imposing personage of his epoch, whilst the language he was wont to hold was as calculated to dazzle and overawe as his glory. Thus he constituted a brilliant representative of the French republic. He held no commission to negotiate; Clarke alone was invested with full powers in this respect, and Clarke, whom he had summoned, had not yet arrived at head-quarters. But he might consider preliminaries of peace in the light of an armistice, which was within the province of generals to grant; besides, he was certain that Clarke would sanction whatever he might determine, and he hesitated not to enter upon the negotiation. The regulation of the etiquette to be observed was a chief point with the Emperor and his envoys. According to ancient custom the Emperor had the honour of precedence above the monarchs of France; he was always first named in the protocol of treaties, and his ambassadors also took precedence of the French ambassadors. He was the only sovereign to whom this distinction was conceded by France. The imperial envoys offered to immediately recognise the French republic if the old etiquette were preserved. "The French republic," Bonaparte haughtily replied, "has no need of recognition; it is in Europe as the sun above the horizon; so much the worse for the blind who can neither see nor profit by it." He rejected the article of recognition. As to the point of etiquette, he declared "that such questions were very indifferent to the republic; that it might be hereafter settled with the Directory, which would probably not be averse to sacrifice matters of that sort for substantial advantages; but that, for the moment, they would treat on the footing of equality, and France and the Emperor take alternatively the post of precedency."

Topics of graver interest were then entered upon. The first and most important article was the cession of the Belgian provinces to France. It was not conceivable that Austria could contemplate a refusal. Accordingly, it was at once agreed that the Emperor should relinquish to France all his Belgian provinces, and moreover that he should acquiesce, as a member of the Germanic empire, in the extension of the French boundary to the banks of the Rhine. The difficulty was to find indemnities of equivalent value for the Emperor, which he insisted upon having either in Germany or Italy. There were two modes of procuring them for him in Germany: the assignment of Bavaria, or the secularization of sundry ecclesiastical states of the empire. The first idea had already more than once occupied European diplomacy. The second was due to the wit of Rewbell, who had imagined the scheme as at once the most expedient and the most conformable to the spirit of the revolution. The time in fact was past for bishops to be allowed the possession of temporal sovereignties, and it was an ingenious thought to make the ecclesiastical power pay the penalty of French aggrandizement. But the assent of Prussia to the augmentation of Austrian power in Germany could scarcely be anticipated; and furthermore, if Bavaria were appropriated, an indemnity must be found for the prince who held it. Besides, the states of Germany being already under the immediate influence of the Emperor, he gained comparatively little by the acquisition, and thus it happened that he greatly preferred an aggrandizement in Italy, which would give a veritable increase to his dominion and power. Hence Italy became the region where indemnities for the Emperor were to be found.

If the French had consented to restore Lombardy unconditionally to the Emperor, and undertaken to preserve the republic of Venice in its actual state, and to keep back the approach of democracy to the Alpine frontiers, he would have immediately accepted peace, and have recognised the Cispadan republic, composed of the Duchy of Modena, the two legations, and Romagna. But to replace Lombardy beneath the yoke of Austria, Lombardy which had evinced such attachment towards the French, which had made so many efforts and sacrifices for them, and the principal inhabitants of which had so strongly compromised themselves, would have been an act of equal baseness and imbecility, since their position enabled them, in a certain degree, to dictate terms. To guarantee the independence of Lombardy, therefore, was a settled point, and thus it became necessary to seek in Italy for indemnities to recompense the Emperor for the twofold loss of Belgium and Lombardy. There was a very simple arrangement, which had more than once occurred to the minds of European diplomatists and already formed a subject of hope to Austria and of fear to Venice, which was to compensate Austria with the Venitian territories. The Illyrian provinces, Istria and all Upper Italy, from the Isonzo to the Oglio, formed rich possessions amply sufficient to console Austria for her cessions. The conduct of the Venitian oligarchy towards France, its repeated refusals to form an alliance with her, its secret armaments, the obvious purpose of which was to attack the French in the event of a reverse of fortune, the recent rising of the mountaineers and peasants, the assassinations committed on Frenchmen, had filled Bonaparte with indignation. And if the Emperor, for whom Venice had secretly armed, was content to accept her spoils, Bonaparte, against whom her preparations had been made, could have little scruple to concede them. Besides, equivalents might be offered to Venice. There were Lombardy, the duchy of Modena, the legations of Bologna and Ferrara, and Romagna, rich and extensive provinces, whereof a portion formed the Cispadan republic, with some of which Venice might be indemnified. This arrangement appeared the most expedient, and now, for the first time, was adopted the principle of compensating Austria with the Venitian possessions on terra-firma, in consideration of the republic being indemnified with other Italian provinces.

This mode of settlement was referred to Vienna, whence the negotiators were scarcely twenty-five leagues distant. It was there approved of, and the preliminaries of peace were forthwith arranged and reduced into articles, which were to serve as the bases of a definitive peace. The Emperor relinquished to France all his territories in the Low Countries, and consented, as a member of the empire, that the republic should acquire the boundary of the Rhine. He likewise renounced all rights to Lombardy. In return for these sacrifices, he received the Venitian dominions on terra-firma, Dalmatia, Istria, and Upper Italy to the Oglio. Venice remained independent, retained the Ionian Islands, and was to obtain a recompense out of the provinces which were at the disposal of France. The Emperor recognised the republics which were intended to be established in Italy. The French army was to withdraw from the Austrian states, and canton on their frontier, that is to say, to evacuate Carinthia and Carniola, and plant itself on the Isonzo and at the entrances of the Tyrol. All the arrangements relative to the provinces and government of Venice were to be made in concert with Austria. Two congresses were to be opened, one at Berne for the individual peace with the Emperor, and the other in a town of Germany for the general peace with the Empire. The treaty with the Emperor was to be concluded in three months, under pain of the preliminaries being void. Austria had in addition a powerful reason for hastening the conclusion of the definitive treaty, namely, to enter as early as possible into possession of the Venitian provinces, in order that the French might not have time to propagate revolutionary ideas.

The design of Bonaparte was to dismember the Cispadan republic, comprising the duchy of Modena, the two legations, and Romagna, and to incorporate the duchy of Modena with Lombardy, forming of them a single republic, the capital of which should be Milan and the name *Cisalpine*, on account of its position with respect to the Alps. The two legations and Romagna he proposed to give to Venice, intending at the same time to humble the aristocracy and modify its constitution. Thus two republics would be established in Italy, close allies of France, indebted to him for their existence, and disposed to co-operate in all his plans. The frontier of the Cisalpine republic would be the river Oglio, which might easily be lined with intrenchments. It would not possess Mantua, which, together with the Mantuan, was to be restored to the Emperor; but Pizzighitone, on the Adda, might be rendered a fortress of impregnable strength, and the walls of Bergamo and Crema might be raised. The republic of Venice with its islands, with the Dogado and Polesina, which endeavours would be made to preserve for it, with the two legations and Romagna, which were to be given to it, with the principality of Massa-Carrara, and the gulf of Spezia, which might be added to it in the Mediterranean, would constitute a great maritime power touching the sea on both sides of the peninsula.

It may be asked why Bonaparte did not profit by his position to drive the Austrians altogether out of Italy, and more especially why he indemnified them at the expense of a neutral power, after a process similar in appearance to the infamous partition of Poland. But, as to the first point, was it possible wholly to enfranchise Italy? Must not Europe have been entirely prostrated to wring its consent to the deposition of the Pope, the King of Sardinia, the Grand Duke of Tuscany, the King of Naples, and the Prince of Parma? And was the French republic capable of the efforts which such a consummation implies? Was it not, in truth, a great achievement in this one campaign to extend the principles of liberty by the establishment of two republics, whence they must necessarily spread to the utmost limits of the Peninsula? With regard to the second point, the partition of the Venitian territories bore no resemblance to the celebrated atrocity which has so long formed the reproach of Europe. Poland was divided by the very powers which had fomented her disorders, and which were solemnly bound to afford her their assistance. Venice had repudiated the offers of friendship which the French had often made her in all sincerity, and was, moreover, prepared to betray and attack them in the moment of peril. If she had to complain of any party it was of the Austrians, for whose advantage her treachery toward the French was designed. Poland, besides, was a country whose limits were clearly defined on the map of Europe; whose independence was, so to speak, ordained by nature and essential to European tranquillity; whose constitution, although vicious, was generous; whose citizens, so shamefully betrayed, manifested a noble courage and commanded the sympathies of all civilized communities. Venice, on the contrary, had no natural territory but her lagoons, for her power had never consisted in her possessions on terra-firma; she was not obliterated because certain of her provinces were exchanged for others; her constitution was the most iniquitous in Europe; her government was abhorred by her own subjects; her perfidy and cowardice destroyed all claim either to sympathy or existence. In no feature, there-

fore, could the dismemberment of the Venitian states be assimilated with the partition of Poland, unless it were in the conduct of Austria.

It is, moreover, to be considered that, in order to avoid the necessity of giving such indemnities to the Austrians, they must have been excluded from Italy, which could have been effected only by dictating a peace in Vienna itself. For this the co-operation of the armies of the Rhine was indispensably requisite, and Bonaparte had been informed that they could not enter upon the campaign in less than a month. In this situation his only alternative was to retrograde and await their appearance in the field, a course exposing him to serious inconveniences, for the Archduke would have thereby gained time to collect a formidable army against him, and the Hungarians to rise *en masse* and assail his flanks. And, besides, the very fact of retrograding involved an admission of the heedless temerity of his advance. By accepting the preliminaries he had the honour of singly extorting peace; he reaped the reward of his perilous enterprise, and obtained conditions which, in the situation of Europe, were singularly brilliant, and above all far more advantageous than those which Clarke had been instructed to demand, since they contained stipulations for the frontier of the Rhine and the Alps, and for the establishment of a republic in Italy. Accordingly, partly moved by military and political and partly by personal considerations, he determined to sign the preliminaries. Clarke had not yet reached head-quarters. With his accustomed hardihood, and the assurance which his glory, his services, and the general desire of peace gave him, Bonaparte exceeded his powers and affixed his signature to the preliminaries, as if the question had been one of a simple armistice. The signature was attached at Leoben on the 29th Germinal, Year V. (18th April 1797).

If he had known at the moment what was passing on the Rhine, he would have been less hasty in signing the preliminaries of Leoben; but the only information he possessed was to the effect that the inaction of the armies must be long-continued. He appointed Massena to carry the convention to Paris. This was the only distinguished officer who had not been deputed to present captured banners and enjoy the honours of a triumph. Bonaparte deemed the present a fitting occasion to employ him in so glorious a mission, and one worthy of the signal services he had rendered. He likewise dispatched couriers to the armies of the Rhine and the Sambre-and-Meuse, who passed through Germany, in order that they might arrive with the greater speed, and stop hostilities if they had already commenced.

Hostilities had in fact commenced about the very time of the signature of the preliminaries. Hoche, who had long burned with impatience to enter upon action, continually urged the Directory for permission to take the field. Moreau had repaired to Paris in order to solicit in person the necessary funds for the purchase of a bridge-equipage. At length the order to begin operations was transmitted. Hoche, at the head of his fine army, debouched by Neuwied, whilst Championnet, with the right wing, debouched by Düsseldorf, and marched on Uckerath and Altenkirchen. Hoche attacked the Austrians at Heddersdorf, where they had reared formidable intrenchments, killed a multitude of their soldiers, and took five thousand prisoners. After this brilliant exploit, he advanced with rapidity on Frankfort, constantly repulsing Kray, and striving to cut off his retreat. He was on the point of surrounding him by a masterly manœuvre, and possibly of reducing him to surrender, when Bonaparte's courier, announcing the signature of the preliminaries, arrived. This intelligence arrested Hoche in the midst of his victorious progress, and caused him infinite chagrin, for he once more found himself obstructed in his career. If the couriers had been but sent through Paris, he would have had time utterly to annihilate Kray, which had added a glorious feat of arms to his laurels, and exercised a vast influence on the course of the negotiations. Whilst Hoche was moving so rapidly on the Nidda, Desaiz, who had received from Moreau anthority to pass the Rhine, executed one of the boldest actions recorded in history. He chose a point considerably below Strasburg at which to cross the river. After being stranded with his troops on a sand-bank, he eventually reached the opposite shore; there he remained for twenty-four hours, exposed to the hazard of being driven into the Rhine, and obliged to contend against the whole Austrian army to maintain himself in thickets and swamps whilst a bridge was constructing over the river. At length the passage was effected. The French repelled the Austrians into the Black Mountains, and captured part of their magazines. Here again the army was stopped in the midst of its successes by the courier from Leoben, and it also had cause to regret that the erroneous information transmitted to Bonaparte had induced him to sign the convention so hastily.

The couriers subsequently arrived at Paris, where the intelligence they conveyed diffused inexpressible joy amongst all who ardently longed for peace, but gave indifferent satisfaction to the Directory, who, deeming the military position of the republic extremely formidable, was discontented that it had not been turned to a still more advantageous account. As philosophers, Larévellière and Rewbell desired the total emancipation of Italy, and Barras, as a violent revolutionist, the more complete humiliation of potentates. But Carnot, who had affected moderation for some time past, and very generally supported the views of the opposition, advocated peace, and maintained that in order to render it durable the Emperor ought not to be too much humbled Several warm discussions took place in the Directory upon the preliminaries; ultimately, however, from a dread of irritating opinion and of appearing to desire an endless war, it was decided that the conditions settled at Leoben should be approved.

Whilst these things were passing on the Rhine and in France, important events occurred in Italy. We have seen that Bonaparte, being apprized of the troubles which disturbed the Venitian territories, of the rising of the mountaineers against the towns, of the repulse of the Brescians before Salo, of the capture of 200 Poles, of the assassination of numberless Frenchmen, and of the imprisonment of all French partisans, had written a vehement letter to the Venitian senate from Leoben. He had instructed his aide-de-camp Junot to read it in person to the senate, and to demand the immediate liberation of all the prisoners, together with the prosecution and punishment of assassins; and, if ample satisfaction were not given, he had directed him forthwith to leave Venice after publishing a declaration of war. Junot was introduced to the senate on the 26th Germinal (15th April). He read aloud the threatening letter of his general, and conducted himself with all the rudeness of a soldier flushed with the insolence of victory. He was answered that the warlike preparations complained of had been made with no other view than to maintain subordination within the dominions of the republic, and that if assassinations had been committed, the evil was unintentional, and it should be remedied. Junot refused to be satisfied with vain protestations, and threatened to publish the declaration of war unless the senate liberated the prisoners of state and the Poles, and gave directions to disarm the mountaineers and to prosecute the perpetrators of the assassinations. With difficulty the senate induced him to moderate his tone, and it was finally arranged with him and the French minister Lallemant, that the senate should

write to General Bonaparte, and send to him two deputies to treat of the satisfactions he demanded. The two deputies chosen were Francis Donati and Leonard Justiniani.

Meanwhile, the agitation was far from subsiding in the Venitian dependencies. The peasants and mountaineers were still in hostility with the urban population. The emissaries of the aristocratical and monkish party circulated the most deceitful reports as to the fate of the French army in Austria. They proclaimed that it had been enveloped and destroyed, and appealed to two facts in corroboration of their false assertions. Bonaparte having recalled to the main army the two corps under Joubert and Bernadotte, which he had dispatched, the one through the Tyrol and the other through Carniola, had thereby uncovered his flanks. Joubert had defeated and repulsed Kerpen beyond the Alps, but had left Laudohn in a part of the Tyrol, whence he had shortly emerged, arousing the faithful population of that mountainous country, and descending the Adige in the direction of Verona. General Servier, stationed with twelve hundred men to guard the Tyrol, slowly retreated before him on Verona, in order to obtain the aid and support of the French forces left in Upper Italy. At the same time, a corps of equal force, posted in Carniola, recoiled before the Croats, who had risen in arms like the Tyrolese, and fell back on Palma-Nuova. These were but trivial events, and the French minister, Lallemant, endeavoured to impress upon the senate their trifling importance with the view of saving it from fresh imprudences; but all his arguments were unavailing; and at the very time that Bonaparte had compelled the Emperor to send plenipotentiaries to his headquarters, it was confidently rumoured in the Venitian territories that he was beaten, enveloped, and about to perish in his mad enterprise. The party hostile to France and the revolution, at the head of which stood the majority of the members of the Venitian government, although the government itself studied to appear unconnected therewith, manifested extreme exultation. At Verona, more especially, a prodigious ferment prevailed. This city, the most considerable in the Venitian dependencies, was the next exposed to the revolutionary contagion, since it stood immediately after Salo on the line of insurgent towns. The Venitians determined to save it from the infection and expel the French from its precincts. Every thing encouraged their resolution, as well the general dispositions of the inhabitants as the concourse of mountaineers and the approach of Laudohn. Certain Italian and Sclavonian troops in the service of Venice were already stationed there; more were added, and shortly all the communications with the circumjacent towns were intercepted. General Balland, who commanded the French garrison at Verona, found himself separated from the other commanders posted in the vicinity. Upwards of twenty thousand mountaineers overspread the country around. The French detachments were attacked on the roads, Capuchins preached to the populace in the streets, and a false manifesto of the podestat of Verona was circulated, exhorting to the slaughter of the French. This manifesto was forged, a fact sufficiently avouched by the signature of Battaglia, which had been daringly attached to it; but it did not the less contribute to inflame the passions. Lastly, a communication, addressed by the heads of the party in Verona, announced to General Laudohn that the time had arrived for him to advance, and that the town would be delivered into his hands. All this passed during the days of the 26th and 27th Germinal (15th and 16th April). No intelligence of Leoben had yet been received, and the moment, in fact, appeared most happy for an explosion.

General Balland was on his guard. He had issued orders to his troops to retire into the forts on the first signal. He protested to the Venitian authorities against the measures pursued with regard to the French, and especially against the preparations he saw in progress. But he obtained no real satisfaction; simply evasive assurances. He wrote to Mantua and Milan to request succours, and he held himself in readiness to take refuge in the forts. On the 28th Germinal (17th April), which happened to be Easter Monday, an extraordinary ferment manifested itself in Verona; bands of peasants entered the town vociferating "Death to the Jacobins!" Balland immediately withdrew his troops into the forts, merely leaving detachments at the gates, and intimated that upon the first act of violence he would bombard the town. Nevertheless, towards the middle of the day, repeated whistlings were heard in the streets, and eventually tumultuous assaults were made on the French, armed bands fell on the detachments left on guard at the gates, and all were massacred who had not time to reach the forts. Ferocious assassins pursued the unarmed Frenchmen, whom their functions retained in Verona, slew them, and threw their bodies into the Adige. They did not even respect the hospitals, and a part of the sick was slaughtered to satisfy their thirst of blood. Those who could save themselves by flight, but had not time to reach the forts, escaped into the government hospital, where the Venitian authorities gave them refuge in order that the massacre might not seem their work. Already upwards of four hundred unfortunate men had been sacrificed; the French garrison boiled with rage on beholding their countrymen murdered and their dead bodies floating in the stream of the Adige. General Balland at once gave orders to fire, and a cannonade opened upon the town. He might easily have laid it in ashes. But if the mountaineers who crowded it were indifferent to such a catastrophe, the inhabitants and magistrates were alarmed, and resolved to parley for the purpose of saving their town from destruction. They accordingly sent an envoy to General Balland to negotiate with him and avert the disaster. General Balland consented to listen to terms with a view of rescuing the fugitives in the palace of the government, upon whom all the mischief done to the town was threatened to be avenged. Among these were women and children belonging to the *employés* of the administrations, and the sick escaped from the hospitals, whom it was of consequence to extricate from danger. Balland demanded they should be forthwith delivered to him, and that the mountaineers and Sclavonian regiments should be sent away, the populace disarmed, and hostages given in the persons of the Venitian magistrates, as pledges of the submission of the town. The envoy begged that an officer should be sent to treat at the palace of the government. The brave Colonel Beaupoil had the courage to undertake this mission. He pushed through the crowd of infuriated populace, who howled to tear him in pieces, and with difficulty reached the seat of the authorities. The whole night was passed in fruitless discussions with the proveditore and podestat, but nothing satisfactory could be arranged. They refused to disarm or to give hostages, and they required guarantees against the vengeance which General Bonaparte would not fail to take upon the rebellious city. But during these negotiations, the agreement to abstain from hostilities whilst the conference was held was not maintained by the furious hordes that had broken into Verona; the forts were fired on, and the French troops provoked into sallies. The following morning, 29th Germinal (18th April), Colonel Beaupoil returned to the forts, amidst the greatest dangers, without having contained any concession. Shortly the French learned that the Venetian magistrates, being unable to control the enraged multitude, had disappeared. The firing against the forts was re-

newed. Thereupon General Balland once more applied the torch to his pieces, and opened a general discharge against the town. Flames burst forth in several quarters. Some of the principal inhabitants assembled at the palace of the government to take the direction of the town in the absence of the authorities. Fresh negotiations were commenced. A mutual pledge was given to cease the firing. But this convention was not better observed by the insurgents, who continued to fire on the forts. The barbarous peasants who overran the country fell upon the garrison of the fort of La Chiusa upon the Adige, and put every man to death. They executed the same ruthless vengeance upon all the French scattered in the villages around Verona.

But the hour of vengeance was at hand. Couriers had been dispatched on all sides to carry the intelligence to General Kilmaine. Troops approached from all quarters. Kilmaine had issued immediate orders to General Chabran to march with 1,200 men, to Lahoz, commander of the Lombard legion, to push forward with 800 more, and to Generals Victor and Baraguay-d'Hilliers to advance with their divisions. Whilst these movements were being executed, General Laudohn had received intelligence of the signing of the preliminaries, and halted on the Adige. After a sanguinary conflict which General Chabran had to sustain against the Venitian troops, Verona was encompassed on all sides, and then the madmen who had massacred the French sunk from the height of fury to the deepest dejection and dismay. Meanwhile from the 1st to the 5th Floreal (20th to the 24th April), the negotiations and the firing were both continued without cessation. The Venitian magistrates had re-appeared, and again insisted upon guarantees against the vengeance which menaced them; twenty-four hours were given them to form their determination, but before that time they again vanished A provisional municipality replaced them, which, seeing the French masters of the town, and prepared to reduce it to ashes, surrendered at discretion. General Kilmaine did his utmost to prevent pillage; but with all his efforts he could not save the Mont-de-Piété, which was partly plundered. He put to death some of the acknowledged leaders of the insurrection, taken with arms in their hands, imposed a contribution of 1,100,000 francs (£50,000) on the town for the payment of the army, and sent out his cavalry on the different roads to disarm the peasants, and destroy those who had the hardihood to resist. He then took measures for the re-establishment of order, and drew up a report for the commander-in-chief, awaiting his decision with regard to the further treatment of the rebellious city. Such were the massacres known under the name of the *Veronian Easter*.

Whilst these events were passing at Verona, an act still more atrocious, if possible, was perpetrated at Venice itself. There was an ordinance prohibiting armed vessels of belligerent powers from entering the harbour of Lido. A lugger under the command of Captain Laugier, forming part of the French flotilla in the Adriatic, being chased by some Austrian frigates, had taken refuge under the batteries of the Lido, and fired a salute of nine guns. Notwithstanding the weather and the enemy's vessels in pursuit he was ordered by signal to bear away. He was about to obey, when, without allowing him time to make a tack-off into the open sea, the forts opened on the unfortunate vessel and raked her without mercy. Captain Laugier, inspired with a generous devotion, ordered his crew below, and paced the deck in person with a speaking-trumpet to his mouth, proclaiming his intention to retire. But he was shot dead on the deck with two men of his company. At the same moment several Venitian boats, manned by Sclavonians, rowed off to the lugger, boarded her, and put all the crew to death, with the exception of two or three miserable survivors who were conducted to Venice. This deplorable event took place on the 4th Floreal (23 April).

It was at this time that, following the massacre at Verona, the capture of that city and the signing of the preliminaries were made known at Venice. No longer able to rely on the destruction of General Bonaparte, who, so far from being surrounded and defeated, was, on the contrary, completely victorious, and had dictated peace to Austria, the government felt itself thoroughly compromised. It was now to confront the all-powerful commander whose alliance it had spurned and whose soldiers it had but just cruelly butchered. It was seized with well-founded terror. That it had officially ordered either the massacre at Verona or the cruel outrage in the port of Lido was not to be supposed, and they would know but little of the working of governments controlled by factions who should allege it. Governments in this situation have no need to issue orders for the execution of what they desire; they have but to leave the faction, whose views they approve, to act. They yield it their means, and do through it what they dare not perform openly themselves. The insurgents at Verona possessed cannons, and had been aided by regular Venitian regiments; the podestat of Bergamo, Ottolini, had long before received in abundance the supplies necessary to arm the peasants; wherefore, after having furnished the means, the government had simply to sit still and wink at their employment, and such precisely had been its conduct. Still, in this critical position, it committed a fatal indiscretion,—which was to decree a reward to the commander of the Lido, for having, as it premised, caused the Venitian laws to be respected. Thus it destroyed all hope of propitiating Bonaparte by any valid excuses. It forwarded fresh instructions to the two deputies Donati and Justiniani, who at first had been simply commissioned to answer the demands made by Junot on the 26th Germinal (15 April). At that time the events at Verona and the Lido were not known; but now the deputies had a very different task to accomplish, and occurrences of a more austere order to explain.

These, however, proceeded forward on their mission, and as they advanced amidst the rejoicings occasioned by the news of peace, they speedily comprehended that they alone had reason to be sad at this momentous juncture. They learnt on the way that, to punish their refusal of his alliance, their prosecutions of his partisans and some isolated murders committed on Frenchmen, Bonaparte had ceded a portion of their provinces to Austria. Alas! what would it be when he came to know the grievous charges which had been since supplied!

Bonaparte had already retrograded from Leoben, and, in accordance with the terms of the preliminaries, moved back his army on the Alps and the Isonzo. The envoys found him at Gratz, and were presented to him on the 6th Floreal (25th April). He was as yet aware only of the massacres at Verona, which had commenced on the 28th Germinal (17th April), and not of the occurrence before the Lido, which had taken place on the 4th Floreal (23d April). They had provided themselves with a letter from the general's brother with the hope of procuring a more gracious reception. They approached with trembling awe "*this man so truly extraordinary*," as they themselves describe him, "*from his vivacity of imagination, his promptness of understanding, and his invincible strength of character.*" He received them with urbanity, and, restraining his wrath, permitted them to explain at great length; but at last breaking silence, he abruptly interrogated them: "Are my prisoners discharged? Are the assassins punished? Are the peasants disarmed? I want no vain words;—my soldiers have been massacred, signal vengeance must

be taken!" The two envoys pleaded the circumstances which had compelled their government to provide against an outbreak, the excesses inseparable from such events, the difficulty of seizing the real assassins. "A government," hotly retorted Bonaparte, "so well served by spies as yours ought to know the real instigators of these murders. However, I am well aware it is not more despicable than despised, and that it is no longer able to disarm those whom it armed; but I will disarm them for it. I have made peace, and have 80,000 men; I will demolish your *Leads*, I will prove a second Attila to Venice. I will have no Inquisition, no Golden Book; they are institutions of barbarous ages. Your government is antiquated, it must be swept away. When I was at Goritz, I offered M. Pezaro my alliance and rational counsel. He repudiated me. You waited for my return to cut off my retreat; well, here I am! I will treat no longer, I shall now give law. If you have nothing further to say, I tell you at once you may retire."

These words, uttered with passionate vehemence, struck dismay into the hearts of the Venitian envoys. They solicited a second interview, but could obtain no other declarations from the general, who persisted in the intentions he had expressed, his evident determination being to act arbitrarily towards Venice, and destroy by force an aristocracy he had failed to induce by persuasion to reform itself. But they shortly had fresh grounds of apprehension when they learnt in detail the massacres at Verona, and especially the detestable act of cruelty in the port of Lido. Not daring to present themselves before Bonaparte, they ventured to write him a letter of the most submissive character, offering him all the explanations he might desire. "I cannot receive you all-reeking with French blood," he replied to them; "I will hear you when you have delivered to me the three inquisitors of state, the commander of the Lido, and the principal officer of police at Venice." Nevertheless, as a later courier had arrived with dispatches for them relative to the Lido affair, he consented to see them, but he refused to listen to any proposition until the individuals he had specified were delivered into his hands. Then the two Venitians, seeking to use an appliance which the republic had often in times past found of good effect, essayed to tempt him with a satisfaction of a different species. "No, no," exclaimed the indignant general, "if you were to cover this whole region with gold, all your treasures, with those of Peru to boot, would not avail to redeem the blood of one of my soldiers."

Bonaparte dismissed them. It was the 13th Floreal (2d May), and he forthwith issued a manifesto of war against Venice. The French constitution permitted neither the Directory nor commanders of armies to declare war, but it authorized them to repel hostilities. Accordingly, Bonaparte, founding his proceedings on this provision and on the affairs of Verona and the Lido, declared hostilities commenced, summoned the minister Lallemant to leave Venice, directed the lion of Saint Mark to be struck down in all the provinces of the terra-firma, the towns to be municipalized, the overthrow of the Venitian government to be everywhere proclaimed, and, pending the march of his troops from Austria, ordered General Kilmaine to move the divisions under Baraguay-d'Hilliers and Victor to the margin of the lagoons. His determinations, equally prompt with his anger, were instantly put in execution. In the twinkling of an eye the ancient lion of Saint Mark disappeared from the banks of the Isonzo to those of the Mincio, and was everywhere replaced by the tree of liberty. Troops advanced from all quarters, and the French cannon reverberated on those shores which for so long a period had not been startled by a hostile gun.

The ancient city of Venice, standing amidst its lagoons, might still present almost insuperable difficulties even to the general who had just humbled Austria. All its lagoons were defended. It had thirty-seven galleys, one hundred and sixty-eight gun-boats, carrying seven hundred and fifty pieces of ordnance, and eight thousand five hundred sailors and gunners. It was garrisoned by three thousand five hundred Italians and eleven thousand Sclavonians, was provisioned for eight months, with fresh water for two, and possessed the means of renewing its stores. The French were not masters of the sea; they had no gun-boats to traverse the lagoons; they must advance cautiously, sounding their way every step, along those canals altogether unknown to them, and under the fire of innumerable batteries. However bold and impetuous the conquerors of Italy had proved themselves, these were obstacles which might stop them and compel a siege of several months. And how many events might a delay of months bring forth! Defeated Austria might reject the preliminaries, arise again in its strength, and risk the hazards of a fresh encounter.

But if the military situation of Venice presented resources, its internal condition scarcely allowed an energetic application of them. Like all decayed bodies, its aristocracy was divided; it had neither the same interests nor the same passions. The high aristocracy placed aloof, dispensing offices, honours, and riches, was less ignorant, prejudiced, and impassioned than the inferior nobility; and moreover was actuated by the lust of power. The bulk of the nobles, excluded from employments, living in dependence, ignorant and furious, were imbued with genuine aristocratic prejudices. United with the priests they swayed the populace, which adhered to them, as usually happens in communities where no middle class exists in sufficient strength to direct its impulses. This populace, composed of sailors and artisans, rough, superstitious, and half-savage, was ready for any outbreak of fanaticism and ferocity. The middle class, composed of merchants, shopkeepers, lawyers, doctors, &c., desired, as in other places, the establishment of civil liberty, and rejoiced at the approach of the French, but dared not evince any such feeling, in presence of a populace which might be roused to the most barbarous excesses, until a revolution was actually effected. Moreover, to all these elements of discord was added a circumstance not less fruitful of danger perhaps. The Venitian government was served by Sclavonians. This barbarous soldiery, foreign to the Venitian people, and often in hostility with them, only wanted an occasion to commence a general pillage without reference to the interests of any party.

Such was the internal condition of Venice. Feeble and decrepit, its body-politic seemed on the point of crumbling in pieces of its mere motion. The grandees in possession of the government were terrified to enter the lists with a warrior like Bonaparte. Notwithstanding Venice was in a position to resist an attack, they regarded with deep apprehension the horrors of a siege, the broils which were sure to ensue between two exasperated parties, the outrages of the Sclavonian soldiery, the dangers to which Venice with its maritime and commercial establishments would be exposed; and above all, they dreaded to have their estates, situated on the Terra-firma and liable to confiscation, seized and sequestrated by Bonaparte. They trembled even for the pensions whereon the inferior nobility depended, and which might be lost if, pushing the contest to extremity, the chance of a revolution was incurred. They thought that by means of negotiation they might save the ancient institutions of Venice through modifications; retain the chief power, which always falls to the lot of those accustomed to wield it; preserve their own possessions and the pensions of the lower nobility.

and rescue the city from the horrors of a sack and pillage. Accordingly these men, who lacked both the energy of their ancestors and the passions of the mass of nobles, resolved to treat. The principal members of government met at the palace of the Doge. The assembly comprised the six councillors of the Doge, the three presidents of the Criminal Gallery, the six grand sages, the five sages of the Terra-firma, the five sages of the Orders, the eleven sages deputed from the Council, the three heads of the Council of Ten, and the three Avogadors. The object of this extraordinary assembly, convoked in contravention of all usage, was to provide for the safety of Venice. Terror was predominant in the conclave. The Doge, an old man enfeebled by age, his eyes filled with tears, presided. He spoke, saying there was no security that they should even that night sleep tranquilly in their beds. Every one was eager to proffer his counsel. One member proposed to make use of the banker Haller for the purpose of gaining Bonaparte. The idea was found idle and ridiculous. In truth, their ambassador Quirini had already instructions to do everything he could at Paris in that way, and even to buy votes in the Directory, if it were possible. Others declared for a vigorous defence. This proposal was treated as rash, and worthy only of young and foolish heads. At length the suggestion was adopted of propounding before the Great Council a modification in the Constitution, with the view of appeasing Bonaparte by the concession. The Great Council, usually composed of all the nobility, and representing the Venitian nation, was accordingly convoked. Six hundred and nineteen members, that is to say, somewhat more than one-half, were present. The proposition was submitted amidst a mournful silence. The subject had been already canvassed upon a communication from the minister Lallemant to the senate, and it had been then determined to postpone the modifications to a future day. But at present any recurrence to dilatory measures was felt to be hopeless. The proposition of the Doge was adopted by five hundred and ninety-eight voices. It bore that two commissioners deputed by the senate should be authorized to negotiate with Bonaparte, and to treat even on points within the province of the Great Council, that is to say, on constitutional questions, subject to subsequent ratification.

The two commissioners departed forthwith, and discovered Bonaparte on the margin of the lagoons, at the bridge of Marghera. He was in the act of disposing his troops, and already an exchange of shots had commenced between the French artillery and the Venitian gun-boats. The commissioners drew near and delivered to him the vote of the Great Council. He seemed struck for a moment at its terms; but, resuming his abrupt and rapid manner, he exclaimed: "And the three inquisitors of state and the commandant of the Lido, are they arrested? I must have their heads. No treaty until that French blood is avenged. Your lagoons do not alarm me; I find them just as I expected. In a fortnight I will be in Venice. Your nobles will escape death only by betaking themselves, like the French emigrants, to wander in misery over the face of the earth." The deputies strove ardently to obtain a delay of a few days to arrange the terms of satisfaction he demanded. He refused to grant them more than twenty-four hours. He agreed, however, to give a suspension of arms for six days, to allow the Commissioners time to rejoin him at Mantua, with the acceptance by the Great Council of all the prescribed conditions.

Bonaparte, satisfied to strike the Venitians with terror, was by no means anxious to engage in actual hostilities, for he duly appreciated the difficulty of forcing the lagoons, and foresaw an intervention on the part of Austria. By an article in the preliminaries, it was provided that everything relative to Venice should be regulated in concert by France and Austria. Hence, if he entered the city by force of arms, complaints would be made at Vienna of a violation of the preliminaries. On all accounts, therefore, it suited him better to induce them to submit. So, content with the fright he had given them, he took his departure for Mantua and Milan, not doubting they would soon follow with a full and entire submission.

The assembly of all the members of government, previously constituted at the palace of the Doge, again met to receive the report of the commissioners. No option was left under the circumstances; it was necessary to concede all the demands of the general, for the internal danger was becoming hourly more imminent. It was rumoured that the citizens were conspiring and laying plans to slaughter the nobles, and that the Sclavonians were prepared to profit by the occasion to plunder the city. A resolution was passed to submit a fresh proposition to the Great Council, in substance yielding to all the requisitions of General Bonaparte. On the 15th Floreal (4th May) accordingly the Great Council was again convoked. By a majority of 704 votes to 10, it determined that the commissioners should be authorized to treat unreservedly as to conditions with General Bonaparte, and a prosecution immediately instituted against the three inquisitors of state and the commandant of the Lido.

Invested with these new powers, the commissioners followed Bonaparte to Milan, to lay the boasted constitution of Venice at his feet. But six days were not sufficient, and the truce must necessarily expire before they could reach and satisfy Bonaparte. During the interval, the alarm grew to a fearful pitch in Venice. At one moment so terrible was the consternation, that the commandant of the lagoons was authorized to capitulate with the French generals left in command by Bonaparte. He was merely enjoined to stipulate for the independence of the republic, the security of religion, of persons, and of the foreign ambassadors, for public and private property, the mint, the bank, the arsenal, and the archives. A prolongation of the truce, however, was obtained from the French generals, to afford the Venitian envoys time to negotiate with the commander-in-chief.

The arrest of the three inquisitors of state had disorganized the police of Venice. The most influential personages of the middle class associated together, and openly asserted their intention to hasten the fall of the aristocracy by active means. They applied to the French *chargé-d'affaires*, Villetard, who had remained at Venice after the departure of Lallemant, and who was an ardent patriot. They relied with confidence on him for support in their projects. At the same time, the Sclavonians manifested symptoms of insubordination, and gave rise to fears of frightful excesses. They had already had some broils with the Venitian populace, and the citizens seemed to foment these disturbances, as they tended to promote dissention in the forces of the aristocracy. On the 20th Floreal (9th May), the terror reached its height. Two influential members of the revolutionary party, named Spada and Zorzi, entered into communication with certain of the individuals composing the extraordinary assembly formed at the Doge's palace. They suggested the prudence of applying to the French *chargé-d'affaires*, and consulting with him on the means of preserving Venice from the calamities which threatened it. Donati and Battaglia, two patricians whom we have before known as actors on this scene, did in fact address themselves to Villetard on the above-named day, inquiring of him what measures were best calculated, in the existing peril, to save Venice. He replied that he was not authorized to treat by the com-

mander-in-chief, but that if his private opinion were desired, he would advise the following measures: the dismissal and embarkation of the Sclavonians; the formation of a burgher guard; the introduction of 4,000 French troops into Venice, and the occupation by them of all the fortified posts; the abolition of the ancient government; the substitution in its place of a municipality of thirty-six members chosen from all classes, and taking the present Doge as mayor; and the liberation of all prisoners confined on account of opinion. Villetard added, that on these conditions there was no doubt General Bonaparte would pardon the three inquisitors of state and the commandant of the Lido.

These recommendations were carried to the council assembled at the Doge's palace. They were of serious import, since they involved a total revolution of things in Venice. But the heads of the government were in mortal dread of a revolution effected amid blood and pillage by the execution of the designs of the revolutionary party, through the barbarous violence of the mob, and the unbridled lust of the Sclavonians. Two of their number were differently affected, and vehemently opposed surrender. Pesaro maintained they ought to retire into Switzerland rather than themselves consummate the ruin of the ancient Venitian government. Opposition, however, was disregarded, and a resolution passed to lay these propositions before the Great Council. Its convocation was fixed for the 23d Floreal (12th May). Meanwhile the Sclavonians were paid all their arrears and shipped on board of transports to be reconveyed to Dalmatia. But a contrary wind detained them in the harbour, and their presence in the waters of Venice continued to excite uneasiness and apprehension.

On the 23d Floreal (12th May) the Great Council assembled with unusual solemnity, to vote the annihilation of this ancient oligarchy. An immense crowd was congregated. On one side were seen the citizens, overjoyed at finally beholding the power of their masters abolished; on the other, the populace, stimulated by the nobles, eager to assault and sacrifice those whom it regarded as the promoters of this revolution. The Doge rose, and, with tears starting from his eyes, proposed the abdication of its sovereignty to the Council. While yet in deliberation a report of firing was heard. The nobles started in alarm, believing they were about to be massacred. "To the vote! To the vote!" they cried from all sides. Five hundred and twelve suffrages were given for the demolition of the ancient government. According to the statutes six hundred were requisite. Twelve voted in the negative and six were neuter. The Great Council then surrendered the government to the whole Venitian people. It ordained the establishment of a provisional government, composed of deputies from all the Venitian states, and of a municipality; it consolidated the public debt and the pensions granted to the poor nobles, and decreed the introduction of the French troops into Venice. Scarcely had these resolutions passed, than a flag was hoisted at a window of the palace. At this sight the citizens applauded and were full of joy; but the populace, enraged and furious, seizing an image of St. Mark, rushed through the streets of Venice, and attacked the houses of those accused of having forced the nobility to take this step. The dwellings of Spada and Zorzi were sacked and plundered. Universal confusion reigned, and a frightful carnage and convulsion seemed inevitable. Meanwhile a number of inhabitants interested in the public tranquillity gathered together, placed at their head an old Maltese general, called Salembeni, who had been long persecuted by the State-inquisition, and fell upon the rioters. After a conflict on the Rialto they dispersed them, and restored peace and order.

The Sclavonians were finally embarked and sent off, after committing abominable excesses in the villages of Lido and Malamocco. The new municipality was instituted, and on the 27th Floreal (16th May), the flotilla was dispatched to bring a division of 4,000 French, who quietly established themselves in Venice.

Whilst these events were passing at Venice, Bonaparte had signed at Milan, and on the same day, a treaty with the Venitian plenipotentiaries in every respect conformable to the course things had taken. He therein stipulated for the abdication of the aristocracy, the establishment of a provisional government, the admission of a French division under the guise of protection, and the punishment of the three inquisitors of state and the commandant of the Lido. Secret articles moreover specified certain exchanges of territory, a contribution of three millions in money and of other three millions in naval stores, and the surrender to France of three men-of-war and two frigates. This treaty was to have been ratified by the Venitian government; but this was no longer possible, since the abdication had already taken place, and was besides of no moment, as all the chief articles of the treaty were executed. The provisional municipality, nevertheless, thought fit formally to ratify it.

Thus had Bonaparte accomplished his ends without compromising himself with Austria, or incurring the vexatious embarrassments of a siege. He had overthrown the absurd oligarchy which had betrayed him, and placed Venice in the same situation as Lombardy, Modena, Bologna, and Ferrara. He might now, without any difficulty, make all such arrangements of territory as appeared expedient to him. Whilst ceding to the Emperor all the terra-firma extending from the Isonzo to the Oglio, he possessed the means of indemnifying Venice by giving it Bologna, Ferrara, and Romagna, which at present formed part of the Cispadan Republic. Incorporating these provinces with revolutionized Venice, could not certainly be regarded as again placing them under the yoke of subjection. Then there remained the duchy of Modena and Lombardy, out of which might be carved a second republic, the ally and sister of the first. But a still better and more comprehensive plan was feasible; namely, supposing all local rivalries subdued, to amalgamate all the provinces emancipated by the French arms, and to merge Lombardy, Modena, Bologna, Ferrara, Romagna, Polesina, Venice, and the Isles of Greece, into one mighty republic, capable of commanding both the continent and the seas of Italy.

The secret articles, relative to the payment of three millions in naval stores and to the surrender of three men-of-war and two frigates, afforded an opportunity of laying hands on the whole Venitian navy. Bonaparte, whose vast mind and foresight embraced all objects at a view, was determined that the same mischance should not befall the French with regard to Venice which had happened with regard to Holland, that is to say, that the naval officers and commanders of islands, dissatisfied with the revolution, should deliver to the English the vessels and places under their command. He regarded with especial interest the important islands of Corfu, Zante, Cephalonia, Santa-Maura, and Cerigo, all belonging to Venice, in the Grecian Archipelago. He accordingly made immediate preparations for occupying them. He dispatched letters to Toulon, directing that a certain number of sailors should be sent to him by land, promising at the same time to pay and equip them on their arrival at Venice. He demanded from the Directory orders for Admiral Brueys to sail instantly with six ships, in order to rally under his flag the whole Venitian navy, and be enabled to secure possession of the islands in question. He transmitted two millions to Toulon, that

the admiralty officer might not be delayed in the execution of his commands by the want of funds. In this instance he again transgressed the rules of the treasury to insure promptitude. Nevertheless, fearing that Brueys would arrive too late, he joined the small flotilla he had in the Adriatic to the vessels found at Venice, put mixed crews of French and Venitians on board of them, embarked two thousand troops, and dispatched them to seize the islands. He thus took measures to obtain possession of the most important posts in the Levant and Adriatic; and thereby yet more to improve a position, which, becoming daily more imposing, must necessarily greatly influence the definitive negotiations with Austria.

Since the signing of the preliminaries at Leoben had decided the fate of Italy and the predominance of the French, the revolutionary spirit grew wider and bolder day by day. It was now certain that the greater part of Upper Italy would be formed into a democratic republic. This tended to agitate the minds and excite the hopes of the people of Piedmont, Parma, Tuscany, and the Papal states. The French general, however, took no steps to stimulate disaffection, but stood ready, as it seemed, to extend his countenance to all who should seek his protection. At Genoa, great animosity prevailed against the aristocracy, a less preposterous and emasculated body than that of Venice, but even more obstinate if that were possible. As we have related, France had treated with her to secure the rear of the army of Italy, confining her demands to two millions by way of indemnity, two millions by way of loan, and the recall of the families exiled for their attachment to France. But now that Bonaparte had imposed peace on Austria, no measures were observed by the patriot party. It assembled at the house of a person called Morandi, and established a club of the most violent character. A petition was there drawn up, and afterwards presented to the Doge, demanding modifications in the constitution, which he referred to a commission for consideration. In the interval, the ferment increased. The citizens of Genoa, with sundry young and ardent spirits, took concert together and prepared for an appeal to arms. On their side the nobles, aided by the priests, inflamed the populace, and supplied arms to the charcoal-burners and porters. The French minister, a mild and moderate man, restrained rather than excited the patriot party. But on the 22d May, when the events at Venice were made known, the *Morandists*, as they were called, assembled in arms and attempted to seize the principal posts in the city. A furious conflict ensued; the patriots, who were opposed to the entire populace, were defeated and subjected to the cruelest violence. The victorious mob committed all sorts of excesses, not even sparing the families of the French resident in Genoa, many of whom were grossly abused. The French minister himself was respected only because the Doge took the precaution to send him a guard. As soon as Bonaparte was apprized of these proceedings, he perceived he could no longer refrain from interfering. He dispatched his aide-de-camp Lavellette to claim the release of all imprisoned Frenchmen and compensations in their behalf, and especially to insist upon the arrest of the three inquisitors of state accused of having put arms into the hands of the populace. The patriot party, reanimated by this powerful support, again took the offensive, gained the upper hand, and compelled the Genoese oligarchy, like that of Venice, to abdicate. A provisional government was installed, and a deputation sent to Bonaparte to confer with him touching the constitution suitable for the republic of Genoa.

Thus, after having in two months subdued the Pope, passed the Julian Alps, dictated peace to Austria, recrossed the Alps and chastised Venice, Bonaparte was at Milan, exercising a supreme authority over the whole of Italy, awaiting without pressing the march of the revolution, deliberating upon the constitution of the emancipated provinces, creating a navy in the Adriatic, and rendering his position continually more potential with regard to Austria. The preliminaries of Leoben had been approved at Paris and Vienna; the ratifications were exchanged between Bonaparte and De Gallo, and the immediate opening of the conferences for a definitive peace expected with impatience. And Bonaparte thus at Milan, a simple general of the Republic, wielded greater influence than all the potentates of Europe. Couriers incessantly arriving and departing, proclaimed that there the destinies of nations were to be decided. The enthusiastic Italians clustered whole hours around the palace Serbelloni to catch a glimpse of the great general as he issued forth. His wife, Madame Bonaparte, was constantly attended by the young and beautiful of her sex, who formed around her a brilliant court. Here, in truth, commenced that extraordinary existence which for so long a while amazed, dazzled, and awed the world.

CHAPTER LIII.

BONAPARTE'S POSITION WITH REGARD TO THE DIRECTORY.—EMBARRASSING SITUATION OF ENGLAND AFTER THE PRELIMINARIES OF PEACE WITH AUSTRIA.—RENEWED PROPOSALS FOR PEACE AND CONFERENCES AT LILLE.—ELECTIONS OF THE YEAR V.—CONTEST BETWEEN THE COUNCILS AND DIRECTORY.—STATEMENT OF THE FINANCES OF THE YEAR V.—RETURN OF THE PRIESTS AND EMIGRANTS.—INTRIGUES OF THE ROYALIST PARTY.—POSITION AND STRENGTH OF PARTIES.—DISPOSITION OF THE ARMIES.

The conduct of Bonaparte with regard to Venice was sufficiently bold, but nevertheless within the strict letter of the laws. He had grounded the manifesto issued by him at Palma-Nuova on the necessity of repelling hostilities actually commenced; and before the war had been fairly declared or begun he had concluded a treaty, which rendered it unnecessary for the Directory to submit the declaration of war to the two Councils. Thus the republic of Venice had been attacked, abolished, and effaced from the map of Europe without the general having almost consulted the Directory, or the Directory the Councils. It simply remained to notify the treaty and the result. So with regard to Genoa, which had been similarly revolutionized without any appearance of concurrence on the part of the Directory; all which events, being attributed to General Bonaparte even more than the facts really warranted, gave an extraordinary idea of his power in Italy, and of the authority he arrogated. The Directory in truth felt that Bonaparte had resolved sundry important questions after a too peremptory fashion, but it could scarcely object to him that he had materially exceeded his powers. Moreover, it was unable to deny the general utility and fitness of his operations, whilst it dared not venture to censure a commander so signally victorious and in such high esteem with his countrymen.

The Venitian ambassador at Paris, Quirini, had meanwhile used all possible endeavours to gain voices in the Directory, in behalf of his country. He employed on this service a skilful intriguer, a Dalmatian, who had succeeded in forming an intimate communication with Barras and securing the favour of that director. It would seem that a sum of 600,000 francs (£24,000), was given to him in bills as the consideration of defending Venice in the Directory.

But Bonaparte, being apprized of the transaction, denounced it; and as Venice was not saved, payment of the bills was refused. These facts being known to the Directory, provoked explanations, and even the commencement of a process; but they were ultimately stifled. The conduct of Bonaparte in Italy was approved, and the preliminaries of Leoben were universally hailed with joyful acclamations. It is true the enemies of the revolution and the Directory, who had so lustily invoked peace as a means of harassing the government, were at heart bitterly disappointed with the auspicious conclusion of the war. But all true republicans were exceedingly rejoiced. These would have doubtless preferred the total emancipation of Italy; but they exulted in the fact of the recognition of the republic by the emperor, which seemed to gain a new consecration thereby. The great mass of the population viewed with delight the termination of hostilities, anticipating a reduction in the public burdens. The sitting in which the Councils received the notification of the preliminaries presented an exciting scene of enthusiasm. Decrees were passed that the armies of Italy, the Rhine, and the Sambre-and-Meuse had deserved well of their country and of humanity, by conquering peace with victory. All parties lavished on General Bonaparte expressions of the warmest admiration, and it was even proposed to confer on him the surname of *Italicus*, as the Romans had of old given Scipio that of *Africanus*.

With Austria, the continent was subdued. There now remained only England to combat; and, cut off from all foreign aid, that country was veritably exposed to great dangers. Hoche, stopped at Frankfort in his course of triumphs, was impatient to open a new career. Ireland was always present to his mind, and he still clung to the project he had formed the preceding year. He had nearly 80,000 men between the Rhine and the Nidda; he had left about 40,000 in the district of Brest, and the squadron in that port was all ready for sea. A Spanish fleet collected at Cadiz only awaited an accident of wind, which should compel Admiral Jervis to sheer off, in order to leave the roadstead and sail into the channel, to join the French fleet. The Dutch had likewise at length succeeded in equipping a squadron, and reorganizing a part of their army. Thus Hoche had prodigious means at disposal to invade Ireland. He proposed to detach 20,000 men from the army of the Sambre-and-Meuse, and march them towards Brest, to be there embarked for this service. He had already selected his best troops for the undertaking upon which all his thoughts were fixed. He repaired in person to Holland, preserving a profound incognito, and giving out that he had gone to pass a few days with his family. He there superintended the preparations with his own eyes; 17,000 excellent soldiers of the Dutch army were put on board a fleet, and held in readiness to join the expedition prepared at Brest upon the signal being given. If to these forces were added the Spanish contingent, England was, as we see, truly menaced with appalling dangers.

Pitt was in the greatest terror. The defection of Austria, the preparations at the Texel and at Brest, the squadron collected at Cadiz, which a puff of wind might relieve from blockade—all these were circumstances calculated to excite alarm. Moreover, France and Spain were at work with Portugal to drive her into a peace, and thus there was reason to fear the loss even of that ancient ally. These gloomy considerations had tended very sensibly to affect public credit, and to produce a crisis which had been long foreseen and often foretold. The English government had been in the constant habit of applying to the bank for pecuniary aid, and had obtained from it enormous advances, by forcing upon it both the purchase of stock and the discount of exchequer bills. These advances it had been enabled to make only by profuse issues of notes. But when alarm began to spread, and the fact of the prodigious loans made to government by the bank became generally known, an universal run for gold took place. In consequence, so early as the month of March, at the moment Bonaparte was advancing on Vienna, the bank found itself compelled to demand power to suspend its cash payments. This power was granted to it, and it was relieved from the weight of an obligation it had no longer the means of fulfilling; but even this relief did not suffice to save its credit and its existence. An immediate publication of its assets and liabilities was found necessary. The assets were estimated at £17,597,280 sterling, and the liabilities at £13,770,390 sterling. This showed a surplus of assets of £3,826,800. But it was not stated how much of these assets consisted of government securities. All the bank possessed, in bullion or in commercial bills of exchange, was safe enough; but the stocks and exchequer bills, which constituted the larger portion of its assets, had lost credit with the political mischances of the government. Bank notes forthwith fell upwards of fifteen per cent. in value. The private bankers in their turn claimed the like privilege of paying in notes, on the threat of being obliged to stop payment. It was only fair they should be allowed the same favour as the bank of England, and, in fact, strict justice ordained it; for the bank, by refusing to perform its engagements in specie, had rendered it quite impossible for them to redeem theirs in such medium. But this was tantamount to a forced currency of paper. To avert this inconvenience, the principal merchants of London met together and gave a remarkable proof of public spirit and intelligence. Perceiving that a refusal to accept bank-notes in payments would lead to an inevitable catastrophe, in which the fortunes of all would be equally exposed to danger, they resolved to avoid it as far as lay in their power, and agreed by common consent to receive notes in payment. From that time England entered on the career of paper-money. It is true that this paper-money, instead of being forced, was voluntary; but it possessed merely the attributes of a paper-currency, and depended entirely on the political management of the cabinet. To render it more convenient for the purposes of money, it was emitted in smaller sums. The bank, whose lowest notes were for five pounds, was authorized to issue them for one and two pounds. They were thus made available for the payment of the wages of labour.

Although the good sense of the commercial community thus prevented this financial crisis proving so disastrous as it might have been, yet the situation of affairs was not the less perilous; and that it might not become absolutely fatal, seemed to depend wholly on bringing France to terms, and on stopping the Spanish, Dutch, and French fleets from sailing to light up a flame in Ireland. The Royal family was still as much opposed as ever to the revolution and to peace; but Pitt, who had no other view but the interest of Great Britain, deemed a respite at this moment indispensable. Whether peace should be definitive or not, an interval of repose must be obtained. Entirely agreed with Lord Grenville upon this point, he determined the cabinet to open a sincere negotiation, which might procure two or three years' relief to the over-stretched capacities of England. There could be no longer any pretence for disputing about the Netherlands, as they were now ceded by Austria herself; the only questions that remained for settlement had reference to the colonies, and these there was good reason to hope means might be found to adjust. And not only did the actual condition of affairs indicate a disposition to treat with sincerity, but the choice of a negotiator demonstrated it more fully. Lord Malmesbury was

again appointed upon this occasion, and at his age he would not have been twice in succession employed upon an idle mission. Celebrated for his long diplomatic career, and for his dexterity as a negotiator, Lord Malmesbury sighed for retirement from public affairs, but aspired to signalize his retreat by a happy and brilliant negotiation. None could be more desirable than a pacification with France after so terrible a conflict; and if he had not been assured that his cabinet desired peace, he would not have consented to act, for a vain parade would become ridiculous by repetition. He had received, in fact, secret instructions which left him no room to doubt. The English ministry lost no time in demanding passports for its envoy, and by mutual consent the place of conference was fixed at Lille, instead of Paris. The Directory preferred receiving the English ambassador in a provincial town, because it there cared less for his intrigues. The English minister, on his part, was not over-anxious to be in immediate contact with a government whose forms were somewhat rude, and was well content to treat through the medium of its accredited agents. Lille, therefore, was the place chosen, and each party nominated a solemn legation. Hoche, nevertheless, continued to urge his preparations with vigour, in order to give greater weight to the French plenipotentiaries.

Thus France, victorious on all sides, was in negotiation with the two great European powers, and verging on a general peace. Events so glorious and auspicious ought to have occasioned, it was natural to suppose, no feeling but one of general congratulation; but the elections of the year V. had given the opposition a dangerous accession of strength. We have seen how the opponents of the Directory bestirred themselves as the elections approached. The Royalist faction had greatly influenced the result. It had lost three of its principal agents by the arrest of Brottier, Laville-Heurnois, and Duverne de Presle; but this was of little moment, for so great was the confusion in its ranks that even the loss of its leaders could scarcely increase it. There still existed two associations, the one composed of devoted partisans fitted to take arms, the other of less decided adherents to be relied on only as voters at the elections. The Lyons agency had remained entire. Pichegru, plotting apart, still corresponded with the English minister Wickham, and with the Prince of Condé. Influenced by these intrigues of various kinds, and especially by the spirit of reaction, the elections resulted in the manner that had been foreseen. Almost the whole of the second third, like the first, was formed of men who were opposed to the Directory, either from attachment to royalty, or from hatred to the system of terror. The advocates of royalty, it is true, were not very numerous; but they would avail themselves, according to custom, of the passions of others. Pichegru was nominated a deputy in the Jura. At Colmar, the electors chose one Chemblé, employed in the correspondence with Wickham; at Lyons, Imbert-Colomès, one of the members of the royalist agency in the south, and Camille-Jourdan, a young man of good intentions, but actuated by a lively imagination and a ridiculous wrath against the Directory; at Marseilles, General Willot, who had been detached from the army of the Ocean to take the command of the department of the Bouches-du-Rhone, and who, far from curbing the factions, had allowed himself to be gained, perhaps unconsciously, by the royalist party; at Versailles, a person named Vauvilliers, implicated in Brottier's conspiracy, and designed by the agency for the post of administrator of provisions; at Brest, Admiral Villaret-Joyeuse, who had quarrelled with Hoche, and in consequence with the government, on the occasion of the expedition to Ireland. Several other nominations were made equally significant with these. On the other hand, all were not so threatening to the Directory and the Republic. General Jourdan, amongst others, who had relinquished the command of the army of the Sambre-and-Meuse after the misfortunes of the preceding campaign, was elected a deputy by his department. He was worthy to represent the army in the legislative body, and to redeem the dishonour about to be reflected on it by the treachery of Pichegru. By a strange singularity Barrère was returned from the department of the Upper-Pyrenees.

The new deputies hastened with all speed to Paris. Whilst awaiting the 1st Prairial, the day of their installation, they were enticed to attend the meetings at Clichy, which daily increased in violence. The Councils themselves no longer preserved their former moderation. As they saw the moment draw nigh when they would be so strongly reinforced, the members of the first third began to throw aside that reserve they had maintained during the last fifteen months. Hitherto they had followed in the wake of the Constitutionalists, or in other words, of those deputies who professed to be neither friends nor enemies of the Directory, but affected to adhere to the constitution alone, and to oppose the government only when it departed therefrom. This spirit had yet more especially prevailed in the council of the Ancients. But as the day of the junction approached, the opposition in the Five-Hundred assumed a tone of a more menacing character. It was echoed from mouth to mouth that the Ancients had led the Five-Hundred too long, and that it was time for the latter to emerge from tutelage. Thus, both in the club at Clichy and in the legislative body, the party in expectation of a majority set no bounds to its exultation and audacity.

The self-complacent Constitutionalists, labouring under the delusion that had affected all the parties which, since the commencement of the revolution, had been drawn into the ranks of opposition, believed that they were the destined masters of the movement, and that the new arrivals would prove to them a powerful reinforcement. Carnot was at their head. He, driven continually more in the false direction he had taken, had never ceased to support the opinion of the legislative majority in the Directory. Particularly in the discussion on the preliminaries of Leoben, he had displayed an animosity he had hitherto restrained within the limits of decency, and advocated, with a zeal inconsistent with his whole life, the concessions made to Austria. Blinded by egotism, he regarded the constitutional party, both in the Ancients and in the Five-Hundred, as completely under his guidance, and saw in the newly-elected deputies only so many partisans the more. In his heat to gather the elements of a party which he expected to lead, he sought to ingratiate himself with the most marked of the new deputies. He even made advances to Pichegru, who viewed all the members of the Directory with an evil eye, and paid him a visit. But Pichegru, returning but indifferently his advances, received him with distant coolness, amounting almost to disdain. Nevertheless Carnot was in close intimacy with numerous deputies of the first and second third. His apartments at the Luxembourg became the rendezvous of the new opposition, and his colleagues had occasion to remark their avowed enemies his daily visitors.

The great point was the choice of a new director. Chance was to designate the retiring member. If the lot fell on Larévellière-Lépeaux, Rewbell, or Barras, the policy of the government was changed; for the director nominated by the new majority could not fail to side with Carnot and Letourneur.

A rumour got abroad that the five directors had agreed amongst themselves which should go out; that Letourneur had consented to resign, and that the ballot would be merely nominal. It was impossible for a supposition to be more absurd. All

the directors, Larévellière alone excepted, were duly enamoured of place. Besides, Carnot and Letourneur, expecting to become masters of the government if fortune should rid them of one of their colleagues, could not voluntarily relinquish their position. The report originated in a peculiar way. The five directors had covenanted together that he whom fate decided to abdicate should receive an indemnity of 10,000 francs from each of his colleagues, making a sum of 40,000 francs in the whole, which would serve to break the too sudden transition of a poor director from splendour to penury. This arrangement gave rise to an impression that the other directors had consented to give up part of their emoluments to Letourneur, if he would of his own accord surrender office. There was no pretence nevertheless for the surmise. One false rumour, however, begets another. A further statement gained credit, that this resignation was to take place before the first of Prairial, in order that the appointment of a new director might be carried before the accession of the second third to the councils; a plan altogether impossible with the presence of Carnot.

The Clichy club, however, was in great alarm, and took measures to prevent the arrangement thus spoken of. It resolved to have a motion submitted to the Five-Hundred to the effect that the directors should be compelled to draw the lots publicly. Such a motion was unconstitutional, for the constitution prescribed no particular mode of drawing, but reckoned for its due regularity upon the vigilance of each of the parties directly interested; nevertheless it passed the councils. Larévellière-Lépeaux, unambitious but tenacious withal, represented to his colleagues that this measure was an interference with their functions, and induced them to deny its legality. Accordingly a message from the Directory intimated its refusal to obey the vote of the Councils, seeing that it was clearly unconstitutional. The Councils rejoined by a declaration that the Directory was not competent to judge a decision of the legislative body. The Directory was inclined to persevere, and to maintain that the constitution was placed by a fundamental article under the safeguard of each of the governing powers, and that the executive power was bound not to execute an unconstitutional measure; but Carnot and Letourneur forsook the diet of their colleagues. Barras, who with all his violence lacked firmness, prevailed on Rewbell and Larévellière to yield, and thus all dispute about the mode of drawing was ended.

The turbulent clubbists of Clichy devised fresh motions for discussion in the Councils before the first Prairial. The most important in their eyes was one for the repeal of the famous law of the 3d Brumaire, which excluded the relatives of emigrants from public employments, and barred the door of the legislative body to several of both the first and second third. The motion was brought forward accordingly in the Five-Hundred some days previous to the first Prairial, and after a stormy debate successfully carried. This unexpected victory, even before the junction of the second third, proved the sway already exercised by the Opposition over the legislature, although still composed of two-thirds Conventionalists. The party, however, which styled itself Constitutional was more in the ascendant with the Ancients. It was offended at the violence of deputies who had hitherto professed to follow its impulse, and refused to rescind the law of the 3d Brumaire.

At length the first Prairial arrived, and the two hundred and fifty newly elected deputies repaired to the legislative body, and quietly displaced two hundred and fifty Conventionalists. Out of the seven hundred and fifty members of the two Councils, there thus remained only two hundred and fifty belonging to the great assembly which had achieved and defended the revolution. When Pichegru appeared in the Five-Hundred, the greater part of the members, ignorant as yet that they harboured a traitor amongst them, but seeing in him only a general of illustrious merit disgraced by the government, rose through a movement of curiosity. Out of 444 votes he obtained 387 for the presidency. The moderate and constitutional party desired to place General Jourdan in the bureau, so as to prepare the way for him to succeed Pichegru in the chair; but the new majority, elated with its strength and already regardless of discretion, rejected Jourdan. The members of the bureau elected were Siméon, Vaublanc, Henri La Rivière, and Parisot. The exclusion of Jourdan was impolitic, and could not fail to excite the deep resentment of the armies. When the assembly was constituted, its first act was to annul the election of the Upper-Pyrenees which had returned Barrère to the legislative body. Thereafter the result of the Directorial ballot was communicated to it. By a strange chance, the lot had actually fallen on Letourneur, which confirmed the opinion previously entertained of concert on the part of the directors.* The nomination of his successor became forthwith the leading topic. The choice to be made was now of less importance since it could not change the Directorial majority, but still an efficient ally was to be provided for Carnot; and furthermore, as the real sentiments of Larévellière-Lépaux were not distinctly known, and as he was notoriously a moderate man and one of the proscribed in 1793, hopes were indulged that he might, in certain cases, take part with Carnot and reverse the majority. The Constitutionalists, who desired to modify the policy of the government without destroying it, were in favour of a candidate attached to the actual system, but opposed to the Directory and prepared to support Carnot. They accordingly proposed Cochon, the minister of police, and the friend of Carnot. Beurnonville was likewise mentioned by them. But in the Clichy club, Cochon was not regarded with favour, although he had obtained great credit with it at first on account of his energy against the Jacobites. He was now in bad odour, however, owing to the arrest of Brottier, Duverne de Presle, and Laville-Heurnois, and more particularly to his circulars to the electors. Hence, Cochon was repudiated, as likewise Beurnonville. Barthélemy, French ambassador in Switzerland, and negotiator of the treaties of peace with Prussia and Spain, was proposed. It was certainly not with any view of honouring him as a pacific diplomatist, but as the presumed accomplice of the pretender and the emigrants. Nevertheless, the royalists who hoped, and the republicans who dreaded, to find in him a traitor, were equally deceived. Barthélemy was but a weak and mediocre personage, faithful to the reigning power, and devoid even of the boldness necessary to betray it. To facilitate his election, which encountered obstacles, it was rumoured that he would not accept the office, and that his nomination would be simply an act of homage to the man who had commenced the reconciliation of France with Europe. This manœuvre was not without success. In the Council of Five-Hundred he had 309 votes, and Cochon 230. On the list of candidates presented to the Ancients, there likewise appeared the names of Massena, supported

* We read in a multitude of works that Letourneur went out by a voluntary arrangement. The director Larevelliere Lepeaux, in his valuable but unpublished memoirs, assures us to the contrary. To those who knew that virtuous citizen, so incapable of falsehood, his assertion will be a sufficient proof. But we cannot have a shadow of doubt after reading Carnot's narrative, written subsequent to the 18th Fructidor. In that account replete with gall, and which is to be regretted for the fame of Carnot, he affirms that such an arrangement was a pure fiction. He assuredly had no interest in justifying his colleagues, against whom in fact he was deeply incensed.

by 187 suffrages, of Kleber by 173, and of Augereau by 139. Many of the deputies were desirous of raising to the seat of government one of the most distinguished of the generals of division in the armies of France.

Barthélemy was selected by the Ancients; and, disregarding the subterfuge employed to gain him votes, he replied with prompt alacrity that he accepted the office of Director. His substitution in place of Letourneur effected no change of importance. He was equally incapable with Letourneur of exercising influence over his colleagues, and he was bound by position to vote and act in the same manner as his predecessor had done from attachment to Carnot.

The members of the Clichy club, *the Clichyans*, as they were called, prepared to take the field in earnest after the first Prairial, and announced the most violent intentions. Few amongst them were in the confidence of the royalist agents. Lemerer, Mersan, Imbert-Colomès, Pichegru, and perhaps Willot, alone were in the secret. Pichegru, from having been originally in communication with Condé and Wickham, had recently been put in direct relation with the pretender. He received lavish encomiums, magnificent promises, and additional remittances, which he again accepted without being more certain than before of the use to which he could apply them. He, on his part, promised mighty things, but said that before taking any decisive step he must have time to observe the new course of events. Cold and taciturn, he affected with his accomplices, and with all the world, the mysteriousness of a wondrous profundity and the reserve of an important personage. As common in such cases, the less he said the more deep his combinations, the more ample his means were supposed. The great majority of the Clichyans were entirely ignorant of his secret mission. The government itself was in the same condition, for Duverne de Presle had no knowledge of it, and therefore could not communicate it.

Amongst the Clichyans, some were inspired by ambition, others by an instinctive love of monarchy, but the greater number by dread of the revival of the system of terror, which they held in fearful remembrance. Drawn together by different motives, they were impelled, as too often happens with large assemblages, by the most ardent among them. From the very earliest moment the wildest projects were formed. The first was to declare the Councils permanent. Next they would demand the removal of the troops stationed in Paris; assume the police of the capital under a free interpretation of the clause in the constitution which assigned to the legislative body the police of its place of sessions, reading for the word "*place*" the word "*city*;" put the Directors under impeachment, nominate others, and annul in a mass the laws called revolutionary, that is to say, annul, by virtue thereof, the whole revolution itself. Then Paris in their power, the heads of the government deposed, the entire authority in their hands to dispose of at pleasure, they might hazard any extremity, even to the proclamation of royalty. But these schemes, urged by the more furious of the party, were too desperate for immediate adoption. Certain prudent men, perceiving that they were equivalent to a direct attack by force upon the Directory, opposed them, and succeeded in enforcing more moderate counsels. It was therefore determined that for the present they should make use of their majority to change all the committees, to remodel certain laws, and to thwart the policy of the government. Legislative tactics, accordingly, were preferred for the moment to an assault by arms.

This plan being settled, no time was lost in putting it into execution. The election of Barrère was first of all annulled, and five members of the first third, who had been excluded the year before by virtue of the law of the 3d Brumaire, were installed. The refusal of the Ancients to repeal this law was no obstacle. The deputies rejected from the legislative body were reinstated as unconstitutionally excluded. Their names were Ferrand-Vaillant, Gault, Polissart, Job Aymé de la Drôme, and Mersan, one of the royalist agents. A new mode of abrogating the law of the 3d Brumaire was devised. A proposition for its repeal having been made a few days previously, and negatived by the Ancients, the motion could not be entertained again for a year. Another form was adopted therefore, and the Five-Hundred passed a resolution that the law of the 3d Brumaire was void so far as related to exclusion from public employments. In this consisted nearly the whole law. The Ancients nevertheless concurred in the resolution under this form. By force thereof, the members of the new third, who were debarred from taking their seats as relations of emigrants, or as amnestied for revolutionary offences, were enabled to enter the legislative body. To it M. Imbert Colomès of Lyons owed the opportunity of making his election available. It in like manner profited Salicetti, who had been implicated in the events of Prairial and amnestied with several members of the convention. Nominated in Corsica, his election was held valid. Through an affectation of impartiality, the leaders of the Five-Hundred caused a law of the 21st Floreal, banishing from Paris all conventionalists not invested with public duties, to be likewise repealed. The real motive was to prepare the way for a total abrogation of all the revolutionary laws. The verification of the elections was the next measure that engaged attention, and, as was natural to expect, all doubtful returns affecting a republican were cancelled, and all those affecting an enemy of the revolution were sustained. The whole of the committees were changed, and, pretending that everything ought to take date from the period of the new infusion into the legislative body, the majority called for the financial accounts up to the first Prairial. Special committees were moreover appointed to consider the laws relative to emigrants, priests, religion, public instruction, colonies, &c. The intention to remodel the whole system of government was made sufficiently manifest.

In the laws banishing the emigrants for ever, two exceptions had been made; the one in favour of the artisans and husbandmen whom Saint-Just and Lebas had expelled from the Upper Rhine during their mission in 1793; the other in favour of the individuals concerned in the events of the 31st of May, and obliged to fly in consequence. The exiles of Toulon, who had delivered that fortress and taken refuge on board the English squadron, were alone excepted from the benefit of the second exemption. Under favour of these provisions, a multitude of emigrants had already returned. Some gave themselves out as labourers or agriculturists belonging to the Upper Rhine, and others as proscripts of the 31st of May. The Clichyans obtained an extension of the term granted to the fugitives of the Upper Rhine, prolonging it for six months. They procured a decree, besides, that the Toulon exiles might come in under the exception made in behalf of the proscripts of the 31st of May. Although this grace was well-deserved by many of the Southerns who had fled to Toulon, and from Toulon to the British ships, only to save themselves from the vengeance vowed against the Federalists, it nevertheless recalled and seemed to pardon the most culpable action of the counter-revolutionists, and was calculated to incense the patriots. The discussion upon the colonies and the conduct of the agents of the Directory at Saint-Domingo led to a violent outbreak. The commission charged with this inquiry, and composed of Tarbé, Villaret-Joyeuse, Vaublanc, and Bourdon de l'Oise, presented a report wherein the Convention was treated

with the utmost bitterness. The Conventionalist Marec was accused in it of *not having resisted tyranny with the energy of virtue*. At these words, which realized the design often indicated of aspersing the members of the Convention, all of them who yet sat in the Five-Hundred rushed to the tribune and demanded a report more becoming the dignity of the legislative body. A scene of furious contention ensued. The Conventionalists, however, supported by the moderate deputies, succeeded in having the report sent back to the commission. Carnot influenced the committee by means of Bourdon de l'Oise, and the terms of the projected decree were modified. It had been originally intended to take from the Directory the power to send agents into the colonies; this power was now left, limiting the number of the agents to three, and the duration of their mission to eighteen months. Santhonax was recalled. The Constitutionalists, seeing that in this instance they had been able, by uniting with the Conventionalists, to control the fury of the Clichyans, flattered themselves they could at any time assume the direction of the Councils. But this delusion was speedily dispelled in the following diets.

Among the number of important subjects the newly-elected deputies proposed to regulate, were religion and the laws respecting priests. The commission charged with this grave matter nominated as its reporter young Camille Jordan, whose mind had been inflamed amid the horrors of the siege of Lyons, and whose sensibility, although sincere, was not without pretensions. In his report he entered upon a long and inflated dissertation touching religious liberty. "It was not sufficient," he said, "to allow every one the exercise of his own religion, but, in order that real liberty might prevail, nothing should be imposed offensive to conscience. Thus, for example, the oath required from priests, although attacking no article of creed, having been misinterpreted by them, and regarded as contrary to the doctrines of the Catholic church, ought not to be exacted. It amounted to a tyranny, the result of which was to create a large body of proscripts, and very dangerous proscripts, because they exercised considerable influence over multitudes, and, sheltered from the researches of authority by the pious and eager zeal of the people, laboured in the dark to stimulate revolt. With regard to the ceremonies of religion, it was not enough to permit them in closed temples; certain necessary observances should be openly allowed, under a strict prohibition of any external pomp calculated to excite trouble. Thus bells were necessary to assemble Catholics at a certain hour; they were an essential part of religion; to prohibit them was to outrage liberty. Besides, the people were accustomed to such sounds, loved them, and had never lost their inclination for them; indeed, in the country, the law against bells had never been observed. To allow their use, therefore, was simply to satisfy an innocent desire, and to put an end to the scandal of a disregarded law. The same held good with regard to cemeteries. Whilst interdicting public rites to all persuasions, it was nevertheless proper to allow each of them to possess enclosed grounds consecrated to burials, in which enclosures the signs peculiar to their faith might be placed." In accordance with these principles, Camille Jordan proposed the abolition of the oath, and of the repressive laws consequent upon it, and permission to use bells and have cemeteries, within the walls of which religious symbols might be placed according to pleasure upon the tombs.

The principles of this report, although enforced with indiscreet emphasis, were indisputably just. Nothing is more true than that the only way to extirpate old superstitions is to leave them in poverty and contempt. Governments, by suffering all creeds and subsidising none, take the best means to hasten their decay. The Convention had already restored to the Catholics buildings to serve as churches; the Directory would have done well to give them bells and crosses in their grave-yards, and to abolish the use of the oath and the laws enacted against the priests who refused to take it. But were the proper steps pursued, was the moment wisely selected for urging such claims? If, instead of treating the subject as one of the counts of the grand indictment against the Directory, a moment more seasonable had been waited for and time given for passions to cool, and for the government to acquire stability, the concessions desired would have been readily obtained. But from the very fact of the counter-revolutionists insisting on them as conditions, the patriots opposed them; for it is the nature of man to contest what an enemy wishes. In imagining the sound of bells, they seemed to hear the tocsin of counter-revolution. Every party demands to have its own passions understood and satisfied, even whilst refusing to recognise or regard those of the opposite faction. The patriots had their passions compounded of errors, fears, and hatreds, which still required to be estimated and considered. This report, accordingly, produced an extraordinary sensation, for it touched animosities hot and sensitive. It was the boldest and most dangerous act of the Clichyans, although at bottom the least reprehensible. The patriots spoke absurdly when they described the proposition as one to reward the violation of laws by repealing them. It involved, in truth, the abrogation of laws incapable of being executed.

To all these vexatious attacks on the Directory, the Clichyans added annoyances on the subject of the finances. This, indeed, was the great point on which they expected to distress and overthrow the government. We have already mentioned, in giving a sketch of the financial resources of the year V. (1797), the estimated income and expenditure of that year: 450 millions of ordinary expenses were to be defrayed by 250 millions of the property contribution, 50 millions of the personal contribution, and 150 millions the produce of stamps, registrations, patents, posts, and duties: 550 millions of extraordinary expenses were to be provided for by the last fourth of the price of the national property disposed of in the preceding year, amounting to 100 millions and secured by bills on the part of the purchasers, by the produce of the woods and rents of the national estates, the arrears of contributions, the Batavian payments, the sale of national moveables, different accessary products, and lastly, the eternal resource of the domains remaining unsold. But all these means were insufficient, and for the most part far below their presumed value. The receipts and disbursements of the year being arranged only provisionally, the collection of three-fifths of the property and personal contributions had been ordained to be levied on the provisional lists. But these lists being, as we have said, defectively prepared by the local administrations on account of the continual variations in the fiscal laws, and over-scrawled with annotations, gave rise to perpetual difficulties. The indisposition of the payers likewise increased these difficulties, and the collection consequently was made but slowly. And, independently of this delay in the receipt, the amount was much below what had been reckoned. It became evident that the property-tax would not produce more than 200 instead of 250 millions. The different items of stamps, registers, patents, duties, and posts, would not exceed 100 instead of 150 millions. Such the deficiency in the ordinary income set apart to meet the ordinary expenditure. It was not less in the extraordinary branch. The bills of the national purchasers for the amount of the last fourth had been negotiated at a heavy loss. To avoid the like result upon the Batavian rescriptions, they had been pledged

for a sum greatly inferior to their expressed value. The lands sold slowly, and thus on all sides expectation was defeated and the distress extreme. The army of Italy had contrived to support itself upon the contributions it levied; but the armies of the Rhine, of the Sambre-and-Meuse, of the Interior, and the forces of the Marine, had suffered terrible privations. Upon several occasions the troops had almost been driven to revolt and mutiny. All the national establishments and hospitals were in frightful destitution, and public functionaries pined without hope of salary.

In this extremity it had been found necessary to resort to expedients of all kinds. Thus, as we have related above, recourse was had to delays in the fulfilment of certain obligations. The fundholders were paid only one-fourth in cash, and the other three-fourths in notes redeemable in national property, called "*notes of the three-fourths.*" The charge of the consolidated debt, annuities, and pensions, amounted to 248 millions; accordingly there were only 62 millions to pay, and the ordinary expenditure was thus reduced by 186 millions. But, notwithstanding this reduction, the expenditure did not the less exceed the receipts. Although a distinction had been established between the ordinary and extraordinary expenditures, it was not observed in the payments of the treasury. Extraordinary expences were defrayed from resources appropriated to ordinary charges; that is to say, in default of money to pay the troops, or the contractors who supplied them, funds intended for public functionaries, judges, and administrators of all descriptions, were applied for the purpose. Not only were these two kinds of funds confounded, but receipts were anticipated by assignations on such and such receivers, payable with the first monies that came into their hands. Contractors were paid by drafts on the treasury, of which the minister settled the order of payment according to the urgency of circumstances: a practice which sometimes gave occasion to abuses, but was nevertheless useful as a resource in providing for pressing emergencies, besides being often of great service to individual purveyors, who were thereby enabled and encouraged to complete their undertakings. Finally, in default of every other resource, debentures on the national property were issued, a sort of paper which was negotiable on certain terms. This was the mode employed, since the destruction of the paper-money, of anticipating sales. From this state of the finances it resulted that contractors of the worst description, namely, adventurers and speculators, alone surrounded the government, and imposed on it the most onerous contracts. It was only at a very low value they accepted the paper given to them, and they raised the price of articles in proportion to the delays and risks of payment. Recourse was often had to very singular contrivances to meet particular exigencies. For instance, the minister of Marine had purchased flour for the navy on condition that the contractor, on delivering the flour at Brest, should furnish a part in money, for the purpose of paying the wages of the seamen, who were on the point of mutinying. Compensation for this advance of specie was of course found in the increased price charged for the flour. Such losses were unavoidable, and resulted from the situation of the country. To charge them upon the government was unjust. But unfortunately the scandalous conduct of one of the directors, who had a secret share in the extraordinary profits of the contractors, and who took no pains to conceal either his prodigality or the rise of his fortunes, supplied a pretext for every calumny. It was assuredly not the infamous gains of an individual which plunged the state in distress, but advantage was taken of them to accuse the Directory of ruining financial credit.

Thus, to a violent and unscrupulous opposition, ample scope was afforded for declamations and sinister projects. Nor did it fail to avail itself of the opportunity after a very dangerous fashion. It had formed the finance-commission of men in its own ranks, and decidedly inimical to the government. The first proceeding of this commission was to present to the Five-Hundred, through its reporter Gilbert-Desmolières, an incorrect account of the income and expenditure. It exaggerated the one and largely abridged the other. Compelled to acknowledge the insufficiency of the ordinary resources, such as the property-tax, registration, stamps, patents, posts, customs, it nevertheless objected to all the taxes proposed to make up the deficiency. Since the outbreak of the revolution it had been hitherto found impossible to re-establish indirect taxation. A duty on salt and tobacco being suggested, the commission pretended it would alarm the people; a lottery, it repudiated as immoral; tolls on highways, it found open to serious difficulties. All this was more or less true, but means were somehow or other to be found. The sole resource the commission devised consisted in an intention, as it announced, of discussing the imposition of a notarial duty. As to the deficiency in the extraordinary receipts, far from attempting to provide therefor, it sought to aggravate the extent by prohibiting the Directory from resorting to those expedients by means whereof it had alone contrived to carry on affairs. The case stood thus.

The constitution had divided the Treasury from the Directory, and made a separate establishment of it, which was directed by independent commissioners nominated by the Councils, and having no other duty but to receive the revenue and discharge the expenditure. In this manner the Directory had not the management of the funds of the State; it delivered orders on the Treasury, which the latter paid in concurrence with credits opened by the Councils. Nothing could be more detrimental to the public service than this arrangement, for the management of the state-funds is a matter of polity which ought to rest with the executive, like the direction of military operations, and with regard to which deliberative bodies can no more interfere than with the plan of a campaign. Indeed, it is not unusual that a minister, by a prompt and dexterous adaptation, succeeds in creating temporary resources upon a pressing emergency. The two Councils, accordingly, had, during the preceding year, empowered the Treasury to perform such transactions as might be enjoined by the Directory. The new commission, however, determined to put a stop to the expedients whereby the Directory subsisted, by taking from it all power over the Treasury. In the first place, it decided that the government ought no longer to have the power of ordering the negotiation of securities. When occasions arose for realizing paper on hand, the commissioners of the Treasury were to negotiate it themselves on their own responsibility. In the next place, it proposed to deprive the Directory of the power to settle the order in which drafts for payment should be retired. It, moreover, proposed to forbid all anticipations on the funds receivable in the departmental exchequers. It even urged that all assignations already issued on funds uncollected should be carried to the Treasury, verified, and paid in their turn; a measure which would interrupt and put an end to all the operations then in progress. It insisted, besides, on the necessity of rendering obligatory the distinction established between the two kinds of expenses and receipts, and of enacting that the ordinary expenditure should be strictly borne by the ordinary income, and the extraordinary expenditure by the extraordinary income; a fatal design at a moment when every pressing want as it arose must of necessity be met by the first funds available. To

all these propositions it appended yet another, still more dangerous than any of the preceding. We have stated that, owing to the slow sale of the national domains, anticipations were formed thereon by issuing debentures which were receivable in payment for lands. The contractors were content to take these debentures, which they afterwards negotiated with intending purchasers. This paper, it is true, came into competition with the *notes of the three-fourths* delivered to the fund-holders, and diminished their value by its rivalry. Under pretence of protecting the unfortunate fund-holders against the avidity of the contractors, the commission proposed to annul the privilege of paying for national domains with debentures issued to contractors.

All these recommendations were adopted by the Five-Hundred, the majority of whom, driven blindly forward, no longer preserved any measures. They were fraught with danger, and threatened to paralyse every service in the State The Directory, in fact, being henceforth unable to negotiate at its pleasure the securities it held, or to fix the order of payments according to the exigency of cases, or to anticipate in emergencies the uncollected funds, or to apply the ordinary to the purposes of the extraordinary departments, or to emit a voluntary paper redeemable in national property, was at once deprived of all the means whereby it had hitherto succeeded in carrying on the government, and which had enabled it, under the impossibility of satisfying all wants, to provide at least for the most craving. The propositions adopted, well calculated as they might be to establish order in a period of tranquillity, were utterly destructive in a situation like the present. The Constitutionalists in the Five-Hundred made strenuous but fruitless efforts to prevent their passing. They failed, and no hope remained but in the Council of the Ancients.

The Constitutionalists, moderate enemies of the Directory, beheld with the utmost concern the spirit that actuated the Council of Five-Hundred. They had indulged the hope that the accession of a new third would be advantageous rather than prejudicial to them, that its effect would be simply to shift the majority, and that they would become masters of the legislative body. Carnot, their leader, had given way to these delusive expectations; but he and all of them found themselves carried far beyond their original views, and were taught on this occasion, as on all others, that behind every opposition lurked the counter-revolution with its evil designs. They possessed, however, much greater influence in the Council of Ancients than in that of the Five-Hundred, and they exerted all their strength to procure the rejection of the finance-resolutions. Carnot had, among the Ancients, a devoted friend in the person of the deputy Lacuée, and had likewise relations with Dumas, formerly a member of the Legislative Assembly. He could also count on the co-operation of Portalis, Tronçon-Ducoudray, Lebrun, and Barbé-Marbois, all moderate opponents of the Directory, and inimical to the violent proceedings of the Clichyan party. Through the combined efforts of these deputies, and the general disposition of the Council of Ancients, the first resolutions of Gilbert-Desmolières, which debarred the Directory from commanding the negotiations of the treasury, from fixing the order of payments, and from confounding the ordinary with the extraordinary, were negatived. This result gave great satisfaction to the Constitutionalists, and in general to all moderate men who dreaded above all things a new explosion. Carnot evinced uncommon delight. He again felt confident of his power to control the Clichyans by means of the Council of Ancients, and that the direction of affairs would finally rest with him and his friends.

After all, it proved but a trifling palliative. The Clichy club resounded with the most furious denunciations against the Ancients, and with fresh topics of accusation against the Directory. Gilbert-Desmolières renewed his first propositions, rejected by the Ancients, in the hope that, by presenting them under another form, they would be induced to adopt them upon a second deliberation. Meanwhile, resolutions of every kind adverse to the government rapidly multiplied in the Five-Hundred. Deputies were declared ineligible to accept offices for a year before their retirement from the legislative body. Imbert-Colomès, who corresponded with the court of Blankenburg, carried a motion that the Directory be deprived of the power it held by law of inspecting foreign letters. Aubry, the same who, after the 9th Thermidor, effected a reaction in the army, and who, in 1795, dismissed Bonaparte, proposed to take from the Directory the right of cashiering officers, which deprived it of one of its most essential constitutional prerogatives. He likewise proposed to add a company of artillery and a squadron of dragoons to the 1,200 grenadiers composing the guard of the legislative body, and to give the command of the whole to the inspectors of the hall of the legislative body,—a proposal in itself absurd, but which indicated a spirit of preparation for war. Marked censure was passed against the transmission of a million to the commander of the navy at Toulon, a remittance made direct by Bonaparte, without using the medium of the treasury, in order to expedite the departure of the squadron which he so much needed in the Adriatic. This million had been seized by the treasury and carried to Paris. Similar remittances sent in the same manner from the army of Italy to the armies of the Alps, the Rhine, and the Sambre-and-Meuse, were likewise condemned. A long report was presented respecting the relations with the United States; and whatever reason the Directory might have in the differences that had arisen with America, its conduct was bitterly assailed. In fine, the rage for attacking and condemning all the operations of the government betrayed the Clichyans into a last step, which involved a fatal imprudence on their part.

The events of Venice had caused a profound sensation throughout Europe. Since the manifesto of Palma-Nuova, that republic had been annihilated and the government of Genoa revolutionized, without any intimation on the subject from the Directory to the two Councils. This silence was owing, as we have seen, to the rapidity of the occurrences, a rapidity so great that Venice had fallen before the question of war could be brought under deliberation in the legislative body. The subsequent treaty had not yet been submitted to discussion, but was intended to be so in a few days. At the same time, it was less the silence of the Directory that gave offence than the destruction of aristocratic governments and the progress of the revolution in Italy. Under this feeling Dumolard, a verbose orator, who for nearly two years had kept up an incessant assault upon the Directory in the Five-Hundred, determined to introduce a motion relative to the events at Venice and Genoa. The movement was a bold one, for it was impossible to attack the Directory without attacking General Bonaparte. In this he must defy general opinion, and all that mighty influence surrounding Bonaparte since he had imposed peace on Austria, and, in the double capacity of warrior and diplomatist, seemed at Milan to regulate the destinies of Europe. Such of the Clichyans as still retained any measure of reason used their endeavours to dissuade Dumolard from carrying out his intention; but he persisted, and in the sitting of the 5th Messidor (23d June), made a motion of order on the affairs of Venice. He said, "Fame, whose bounds we cannot circumscribe, has everywhere spread the report of our victories over the Venitians and of the astonishing revolution that has crowned

them. Our troops are in their capital; their navy is delivered up to us; the most ancient state of Europe is annihilated; it reappears in the twinkling of an eye under democratic forms; finally, our soldiers brave the waves of the Adriatic, and are transported to Corfu to consummate the new revolution. Admit these events for certain, and it follows that the Directory has made in disguised terms war, peace, and, in some respects, a treaty of alliance with Venice, and all without your concurrence. Are we no longer then that people who has proclaimed as a principle, and maintained by force of arms, that it is not allowable for foreign powers, under any pretext, to interfere with the form of the government of another state? Abused by the Venitians, was it upon their political institutions that we had a right to declare war? Victors and conquerors, did it behove us to take an active part in their revolution, so sudden in appearance? I will not now ask what fate is reserved for Venice, and more especially for its provinces of the Terra-firma. I will not consider whether their seizure, meditated, perhaps, before the acts which served for its motives, is not destined to figure in history as a worthy appendage to the partition of Poland. I will postpone these reflexions, and I ask, with the constitutional act in my hand, how the Directory can justify the absolute ignorance in which it seeks to leave the legislative body with regard to this multitude of extraordinary events." After having spoken of the affairs of Venice, Dumolard turned to those of Genoa, which presented, he said, the same character, and gave reason to presume the interference of the French army and its leaders. He spoke also of Switzerland, with which, he alleged, France was in contention about a right of navigation, and he demanded whether it was intended to democratise all the states in alliance with France. Whilst frequently extolling the heroes of Italy, he never once mentioned the general-in-chief, whose name at that time none lost an opportunity of pronouncing with extravagant eulogies. He concluded by proposing a message to the Directory, to demand from it explanations touching the events at Venice and Genoa, and the relations of France with Switzerland.

This motion caused general astonishment, and served forcibly to demonstrate the boldness of the Clichyans. It was destined to cost them dear; but whilst its bitter consequences were yet undeveloped, they exhibited the utmost arrogance, proclaimed openly their lofty expectations, and manifested their perfect assurance of speedily becoming masters of the government. On all sides, in truth, was evinced the same confidence and imprudence as at the epoch of Vendemiaire. The emigrants returned in crowds. A multitude of forged passports and certificates of residence were sent from Paris to all parts of Europe, and a regular commerce was established in them at Hamburg. The emigrants passed the frontiers by Holland, Alsace, Switzerland, and Piedmont. Urged alike by the love of country inherent in all Frenchmen, and by the sufferings and distastes experienced in foreign countries, having nothing, moreover, to hope from war since the negotiations opened with Austria, and having even cause to apprehend the disbanding of the corps under Condé, they poured in to attempt, in the chances of peace and by means of internal intrigues, that counter-revolution they had failed to accomplish by the aid of united Europe. And even without much hope of a counter-revolution, they longed to revisit their native country and to recover if possible a part of their possessions. These they in fact enjoyed many facilities for regaining, owing to the interest they inspired in almost every quarter. The jobbing practised with regard to the various securities admitted in payment for national domains and the ease of procuring them at a low price, the feeling of the local administrations for old proscribed families, the complaisance of bidders who withdrew when old proprietors sought to purchase their estates under suppositious names, all enabled the emigrants to redeem their patrimonies for insignificant sums of money. Above all, the priests re-entered France in swarms. They were welcomed by the whole religious community, who lodged and fed them, erected chapels for them in their houses, and even supplied them with money obtained by gathering contributions. The ancient ecclesiastical hierarchy was secretly re-established. None of the new distributions in the civil constitution of the clergy were recognised. The former dioceses were still preserved and administered by bishops and archbishops who corresponded with Rome. Through them and their ministry all the ceremonies of the Catholic church were performed; they confessed, baptized, and married those who remained faithful to the old religion. The Chouans also, or such of them as their occupations permitted, flocked to Paris and joined the emigrants, who were assembled there, it was stated, to the number of five thousand and upwards. Seeing the conduct of the Five-Hundred and the critical condition of the Directory, they deemed a few days would suffice to produce the catastrophe so long desired. They imparted these hopes to their friends abroad. Around the prince of Condé, whose corps had retired into Poland, around the pretender who was at Blankenburg, around the Count d'Artois who was in Scotland, all was joy and exultation. With the same infatuation they had shown at Coblentz, when they boasted of returning to Paris in a fortnight in the train of the King of Prussia, their followers again formed schemes of return, canvassed them in different shapes, and discoursed facetiously concerning them as of events on the eve of accomplishment. Their partisans filled the towns bordering on the frontiers of France, impatiently awaiting the moment of recall to their country. To all these indications must be added the unbridled language of the royalist journals, whose violence augmented with the revived boldness and hopes of their party.

The Directory was well-advised by its police of these various circumstances. The conduct of the emigrants and the proceedings of the Five-Hundred agreed with the declaration of Duverne de Presle as demonstrating the existence of a veritable plot. Duverne de Presle had denounced, without naming them, one hundred and eighty deputies as accomplices. He had specifically mentioned Lemerer and Mersan only, stating that the others were all members of the Clichy club. In this he was mistaken, as we have seen. The greater part of the Clichyans, (five or six might form the exception,) acted under the influence of opinion and not in conspiracy. But the Directory, deceived by appearances and the statement of Duverne de Presle, believed them formally implicated in the plot, and viewed them solely in the light of conspirators. Meanwhile a discovery made by Bonaparte in Italy gave it an insight into an important secret and tended to increase its fears. The Count d'Entraigues, an agent of the pretender, his intermediary with the intriguers in France, and the repository of all the secrets of the emigration, had taken refuge at Venice. When the French entered that city, he was seized and delivered up to Bonaparte. The general might have sent him into France to be shot as an emigrant and a conspirator; but he allowed himself to be moved by his position, and preferred to make use of him and his indiscretions rather than consign him to death. He assigned him the city of Milan for a prison, granted him pecuniary aid, and induced him to disclose all the secrets of the pretender. The whole history of Pichegru's treachery was known to him, which had hitherto remained concealed from the government, Rewbell alone entertaining certain suspicions which

had been treated with scorn by his colleagues. D'Entraigues related to Bonaparte all he knew, and put him in possession of the entire schemes of the emigration. Besides these verbal revelations, other curious information was obtained by the seizure of papers found at Venice in d'Entraigues' portfolio. Amongst other documents was one of great importance, containing the minutes of a long conversation held by d'Entraigues with the Count de Montgaillard, in which the latter gave an account of the first negotiation with Pichegru, which proved abortive through the obstinacy of the Prince of Condé. D'Entraigues had written down this conversation which was found among his papers. Berthier, Clarke, and Bonaparte, immediately affixed their signatures to attest its authenticity, and transmitted it to Paris.*

The Directory kept this discovery secret, as well as the declaration of Duverne de Presle, awaiting the opportunity of using them with advantage. But it no longer entertained any doubt as to the part played by Pichegru in the Five-Hundred: it had found the clew to his unexpected defeats, his extraordinary conduct, his refusal to go to Stockholm, his hostile proceedings, and, finally, his influence over the Clichyans. It henceforth regarded him as the leader of one hundred and eighty deputies, his accomplices, busily plotting a counter-revolution.

The five directors were divided, since the new part taken by Carnot, in which he was followed by Barthélemy. Barras, Rewbell, and Larévellière-Lépeaux alone remained steadfast to the existing system of government. Yet these three directors were not cordially united amongst themselves, for Rewbell, who was a moderate conventionalist, detested Barras as a partisan of Danton, and, moreover, held his habits and character in utter disrepute. Larévellière was attached to Rewbell by certain intimate relations, but held little communication with Barras. The chief bond of union consisted in the habitual uniformity of their votes. All three were exasperated against the faction of Clichy and determinedly opposed to it. Barras, although he received the emigrants at his residence from the mere facility of his manners, constantly avowed his readiness to mount on horseback sword in hand, and, at the head of the faubourgs, put to death all the counter-revolutionists in the Five-Hundred. Rewbell expressed himself in very different terms; he deemed all lost; and though resolved to do his duty, he believed that his colleagues and himself would soon have no other resource but flight. Larévellière-Lépeaux, on the other hand, endowed with equal courage and honesty of purpose, held the necessity of making head against the storm, and of attempting everything for the salvation of the republic. With a heart free from animosities, he served as a connecting tie between Rewbell and Barras, and undertook the part of mediator between them. He first addressed himself to Rewbell, for whose integrity and talents he entertained a profound esteem, and, explaining to him his views, besought him to assist in saving the revolution. Rewbell warmly responded to his overtures and promised him the fullest co-operation. They then consulted about securing Barras, whose energetic language was not sufficient to calm the doubts of his colleagues. Assuming in him neither rectitude nor principles, and seeing him surrounded by all parties, they believed him equally capable of selling himself to the emigration as of putting himself at the head of the faubourgs and perpetrating a horrible massacre. They dreaded the one as much as the other. They desired to save the republic by an act of energy, but not to sully it by fresh murders. Incensed at the conduct of Barras, they regarded him perhaps with unnecessary distrust. Larévellière, however, took upon himself to sound him. Barras, delighted at the idea of a coalition with his colleagues, and of securing himself their support, flattered, moreover, by the credit of their alliance, gave in his glad adhesion to their projects, and manifested every disposition to second their views. Henceforth they were assured of forming a compact majority, and of wholly neutralizing, by their united votes, the influence of Carnot and Barthélemy. Still the important point remained to decide what means they should adopt to defeat the conspiracy, which, as they suppo ed, had such wide ramifications in the two Councils. To employ judicial measures, to denounce Pichegru and his accomplices, demand their impeachment from the Five-Hundred, and afterwards procure their condemnation, was altogether impossible. In the first place, they had only the names of Pichegru, Lemerer, and Mersan. True, they might judge who the others were from their connections, their intrigues, and their violent motions in the Clichy club and in the Five-Hundred, but they were nowhere expressly nominated. The conviction of Pichegru and two or three deputies would not destroy the conspiracy. Besides, they had not even the means of convicting Pichegru, Lemerer, and Mersan; for the existing proofs against them, though carrying a moral persuasion of their guilt, would not suffice to warrant a legal condemnation by the judges. The declarations of Duverne de Presle and of d'Entraigues were in themselves deficient without the corroboration of oral testimony. But still the greatest difficulty lay not therein: for had they possessed against Pichegru and his accomplices all the evidence they lacked, an act of accusation was requisite from the Council of Five-Hundred, and were the proofs clear as day the majority would disregard them; since the culprits would be in fact at the bar of their own fellows in conspiracy. These reasons were so evident, that, notwithstanding their respect for legality, Larévellière and Rewbell were compelled to renounce the idea of a regular trial, and to resolve on a *coup d'état*; a sad and deplorable resource, but one which, in their situation and in their state of alarm, was alone feasible. Determined upon extreme measures, they were still averse to such as might lead to the effusion of blood, and strove to repress the revolutionary tastes of Barras. Without having agreed upon the mode and moment of action, they concurred in the proposal to arrest Pichegru and his one hundred and eighty supposed accomplices, denounce them before the expurgated legislative body, and demand from it an extraordinary law decreeing their banishment without trial. In their supreme distrust they cast unjust suspicions on Carnot; forgetting his past life, his rigid principles, his unbending pride, they almost believed him a traitor. They feared that he, in concert with Barthélemy, was in the plot with Pichegru. His endeavours to marshal the opposition around him and to render himself its leader, were, in their apprehensive eyes, so many proofs of criminal confederacy. They were not fully convinced however; but resolutely bent on a bold stroke, they were determined not to act by halves; and if it proved necessary, they

* M. de Montgaillard, in his work replete with calumnies and errors, has maintained that this document contained genuine facts, but that it was forged and had been fabricated by Bonaparte, Berthier, and Clarke. The contrary is beyond all doubt, though we may conceive the desire of M. de Montgaillard to justify his brother as to the part in the conversation attributed to him in the paper. But it is difficult to imagine under any circumstances that three persons of such station durst venture to commit a forgery. Acts like these are as rare in our days as poisonings. Clarke was dismissed after Fructidor, and belonged to Carnot's party. It is not probable he would lend himself to fabricate papers calculated to strengthen the government of Fructidor. Moreover, the document was insufficient for the purpose for which it was intended, whereas if it had been a forgery it would have been made complete. Everything therefore proves the falsehood of M. de Montgaillard.

were prepared to crush the guilty, even though they sat as their colleagues and in the sanctuary of the Directory itself.

The plan arranged was to make every preparation for the execution of their project, and meanwhile to to keep a watchful eye on their enemies, so as to seize the urgent moment for attacking them. With the intention of attempting so hazardous a blow, it behoved them to look around for support. The patriot party, from which they could alone derive it, was now as heretofore divided into two classes. The one consisting of men who, exasperated at the catastrophe of the 9th Thermidor, had brooded in discontent for three years past, and who were at a loss to comprehend the perverted march of the revolution, holding the faith they did, that the establishment of a legal system was but a concession to the counter-revolutionists, and that vengeance and proscriptions were the true watchwords of government. Still, although the Directory had smitten this party in the person of Babœuf, its members were ready, with their pristine alacrity, to lend it their effective succour. But to employ them in active service was full of danger, and the utmost that could be ventured was, on the day of peril, to draw them out in array, as on the 13th Vendemiare, and trust to their heroism in defying death. They had already given good proof of what they were capable in time of danger by the side of Bonaparte and on the steps of the church of St. Roch. Besides these ardent patriots, who were almost all compromised by their display of zeal or their actual participation in the revolution, there were the moderate patriots who belonged to a superior class, and who, approving more or less the policy of the Directory, and anxious above all things to have the republic based on the authority of laws, perceived the imminent peril to which it was exposed by the progress of reaction. These answered precisely the views of Rewbell and Larévellière, who might draw from them every assistance, if not of force at least of opinion, the most serviceable to the Directory. They were accustomed to frequent the saloons of Barras who entertained for his colleagues, and also those of Madame de Staël, who had not quitted Paris, and who, by the graces of her mind, gathered around her all that was most brilliant in France. Benjamin Constant shone in those assemblies with the greatest lustre, both from the force of intellect and from the writings he had published in favour of the Directory. There also was to be seen M. de Talleyrand, who, erased from the list of emigrants during the latter days of the convention, had returned to Paris with the hope of obtaining employment in the higher diplomatic service. These distinguished men, composing the society of the government, had resolved to form a club to counterbalance the influence of that of Clichy, and for the discussion of political questions in a contrary spirit. It was called the "Constitutional Circle." It soon comprised all the men whom we have just mentioned, and the members of the Councils who voted with the government, that is to say, nearly the whole last conventional third. The members of the legislative body who called themselves constitutionalists might have likewise joined the new "Circle," for their principles were the same; but their *amour-propre* had become piqued in the course of the debates in the councils with regard to the Directory, and they persisted in standing aloof, between the Constitutional Circle and the Clichy club, under the leadership of the directors Carnot and Barthélemy, and of the deputies Tronçon-Ducoudray, Portalis, Lacuée, Dumas, Doulcet-Pontécoulant, Siméon, and Thibaudeau. Benjamin Constant frequently spoke in the Constitutional Circle, as did likewise M. de Talleyrand. The example was imitated; and circles of the same character, composed, it is true, of less elevated members and of less guarded patriots, were formed in all quarters. The Constitutional Circle had been opened on the first of Messidor Year V, one month after the first of Prairial. In a short time similar societies were established throughout all France; the hottest patriots resorted to them, and, by a very natural reaction, the jacobin party seemed on the point of again starting into life.

But after all they supplied a force almost exhausted and of little avail. Clubs had fallen into disrepute in France, and were in truth deprived by the constitution of the means to become formidable. Fortunately the Directory had another resource in the support of the armies, into which republican principles seemed to have taken refuge since the agonies of the revolution had wrought so great and general a revulsion in the interior. Every army is attached to the government which organizes, maintains, and rewards it; but more than that, the republican soldiers of that era saw in the Directory, not only the heads of the government, but the leaders of a cause for which they had been levied *en masse* in 1793, and for which they had fought and conquered during the last six years. And nowhere was the attachment to the revolution more firm than in the army of Italy. It was composed of those revolutionists of the South, who betrayed equal impetuosity in their opinions and in their valour. Generals, officers, and soldiers, had become loaded with honours, enriched with spoil, inflamed by pleasures. Their victories too had inspired them with an inordinate pride. Informed of all that was passing in France by the journals with which they were supplied, they vowed to repass the Alps and put to the sword the aristocrats of Paris. The repose they had enjoyed since the signing of the preliminaries contributed to increase their effervescence, as was natural in a state of idleness. Massena, Joubert, and Augereau, above all, gave them an example of the most ardent republicanism. The troops that had come from the Rhine, without being less republican, were nevertheless colder and less impassioned, and had contracted under Moreau a more decided spirit of sobriety and discipline. Bernadotte commanded them. He affected the man of cultivated breeding, and sought to distinguish himself from his colleagues by the superior polish of his manners. In his division the appellation of *Monsieur* had been revived, whilst in the old army of Italy the title of *citizen* was alone permitted. The old soldiers of Italy, insolent, licentious, and quarrelsome, as sons of the South and men spoiled by success, had heretofore provoked a rivalry in valour with the soldiers of the Rhine; now they commenced a rivalry of a different sort, not one of opinion, but of habits and usages. They scorned the distinction of *Monsieur*, and on this ground frequently measured swords with their comrades of the Rhine. Augereau's division especially, which, like its leader, was noted for hot revolutionary tendencies, was the most unruly. It required an energetic proclamation from its commander to keep it in order and to put an end to duels. The title of *citizen* was however declared to be the only one authorized in the army.

General Bonaparte regarded the spirit that animated the army with satisfaction and fostered its growth. His first achievements had been directed against the royalist faction, both before Toulon and on the 13th Vendemiare. He had broken with it therefore in the outset of his career. Since then it had laboured to depreciate his triumphs, chiefly because their glory spread a lustre over the revolution. Its latest attacks especially roused his anger. He could not restrain his indignation on reading the motion of Dumolard, and on learning that the Treasury had intercepted the million transmitted by him to Toulon. But in addition to these particular reasons for hating the royalist faction, he had one more gen-

eral and profound: this was in his own glory and the greatness of his destiny. What could a king make him? High as he might exalt him, this king would be always above him. Under a republic, on the contrary, no head would overtop his own. Though he might not yet dream of the magnificent fate in store for him, he could at least discern a boldness and vastness of enterprise in a republic tallying closely with the characteristics of his own genius; whilst, with a king, France must have been reduced to an obscure and limited existence. Whatever therefore he did with this republic, whether he served or oppressed it, Bonaparte could be great only with it and through it, and must perforce cherish it as the instrument of his fortune. That Pichegru could be allured by a castle, a title, and a few millions, is conceivable enough; to the soaring imagination of the conqueror of Italy a different perspective was needed. The stupendous idea of a new world, revolutionized by his prowess, was required to fill the mind of Bonaparte.

He accordingly wrote to the Directory that he was ready, himself and his army, to fly to its aid and annihilate the counter-revolutionists. He ventured even to give advice, and strenuously exhorted the Directory to sacrifice certain traitors and break certain presses.

In the army of the Rhine feelings were more tranquil. Although a few malcontent officers had been placed in it by Pichegru, the bulk of the army was republican, but calm, disciplined, poor, and less intoxicated with success than that of Italy. An army is usually moulded after the fashion of its general. His spirit steals into the officers, and from them is communicated to the soldiers. Thus did the army of the Rhine take its tone from Moreau. That general had been an object of flattery with the royalists, who professed to extol his prudent retreat above the marvellous exploits in Italy, and accordingly felt less hatred against them than Bonaparte. In temperament, moreover, he was indifferent, cold, and moderate, and his taste for politics partook the character of his mind. Consequently he held back and sought to avoid declaring himself. Still he was a republican, and not a traitor as has been stated. He held at this very moment proofs of Pichegru's treachery, and might have rendered the government a vast service. We have already related that he had seized a carriage belonging to General Klinglin, containing a great number of papers. These papers comprised Pichegru's entire correspondence in cipher with Wickham, the Prince of Condé, &c. He could therefore have furnished full proof of the treason, and have rendered a judicial process more practicable. But Pichegru had been his commander-in-chief and his friend. He was unwilling to betray him, and contented himself with the task of deciphering the correspondence, without communicating it to the Directory. Let us not omit that it contained evidence of Moreau's own fidelity to the republic. After having thrown up his command, Pichegru could only preserve his importance by one pretence, which was, that he ruled Moreau, and that, whilst confiding to him the conduct of the army, he himself prepared to direct the intrigues of the interior. But, in fact, Pichegru constantly repeated that it was of no use applying to Moreau, for he would listen to no overture.* Hence, we conclude that Moreau was faithful, though cool. His army, at the same time, was one of the finest and bravest ever possessed by the republic.

With the army of the Sambre-and-Meuse the state of feeling was very different. This, as we have elsewhere stated, was the army of Fleurus, of the Ourthe and of the Roehr, an army brave and republican like its former general. Its ardour was still further increased when Hoche, appointed to its command, came to infuse into it all the fire of his soul. That young officer, promoted in one campaign from a sergeant in the guards to be general-in-chief, loved the republic as a mother and a benefactress. In the dungeons of the committee of public welfare his sentiments had not cooled; in La Vendée they had been fanned by contending against the royalists. In Vendemiaire he was ready to fly to the succour of the convention, and he had already put 20,000 men in motion, when the vigour of Bonaparte, on the day of the 13th, rendered his farther advance unnecessary. Having in his political capacity had occasion to mingle with affairs, which Moreau never had, regarding Bonaparte with no jealousy, but with impatience to rival him in the career of glory, he was in heart wholly devoted to the republic, and prepared to serve it in any manner, on the field of battle or amid civil broils. We have already had the opportunity of remarking, that to consummate prudence he joined an uncommon warmth and impetuosity of character. Ever prompt to take part in events, he at once offered his arm and his life to the Directory. Thus physical force was not wanting to the government; but the essential point was to employ it with judgment and especially at the fitting moment.

Of all the generals Hoche was the one whom it best suited the Directory to employ. If the character and high renown of Bonaparte were calculated to inspire distrust, it was otherwise with Hoche. His victories at Weissemburg in 1793, his admirable pacification of La Vendée, and his recent victory of Neuwied, had covered him with glory, but glory of a mixed character, in which esteem for the statesman was mingled with admiration of the warrior;—in a word, a glory that gave no apprehensions for liberty. Therefore, if a general were to be called to interfere in the troubles of the state, he was a more appropriate agent to invoke than the colossus who overrode Italy. In all respects he was the soldier dearest to the republicans, and upon whom their hopes rested without any admixture of fear. Moreover, his army was nearest to Paris. Twenty thousand of his troops might be detached and reach the capital in a few marches, to aid by their presence the vigorous blow contemplated by the Directory.

Upon Hoche accordingly the three directors Barras, Rewbell, and Larévellière, turned their thoughts. But Barras, more active and prone to intrigue than his colleagues, and who desired in this new crisis to usurp the honour of the execution, wrote without their privity to Hoche, with whom he was in correspondence, and requested his intervention in the forthcoming events. Hoche declared his readiness without hesitation. A very opportune occasion offered for directing troops on Paris. He was at this moment engaged in preparing with his wonted energy his new expedition against Ireland, and had visited Holland to expedite the preparations making at the Texel. He had determined to detach 20,000 men from the army of the Sambre-and-Meuse for embarkation at Brest. On their route through the interior it was easy to halt them abreast of Paris, and place them at the disposition of the Directory. He offered yet more. Money was necessary, both for the column on march, and for a *coup-de-main*; he secured it in a very adroit manner. We have seen that the provinces between the Meuse and the Rhine were in an uncertain position until a peace was concluded with the Empire. They had not been, like Belgium, divided into departments and united to France; they were administered with much prudence, but martially, by Hoche, who proposed to republicanize them, and, in case their actual incorporation with France could not be obtained, to constitute them a separate republic attached to France as its

* If M. de Montgaillard had read Klinglin's correspondence, he would not have asserted, on the faith of an expression of Louis XVIII., that Moreau betrayed France from 1797.

creator and protector. He had established a commission at Bonn, with powers to administer the country and to receive the contributions levied on both sides the Rhine. Two millions and some hundred thousand francs were in the hands of this commission at the present time. Hoche forbid it to transfer this sum to the paymaster of the army, since it would thereby have fallen under the authority of the Treasury, and been perverted perhaps to other purposes than those of the army. Instead, he caused the pay of the column intended for detachment to be discharged, and nearly two millions kept in reserve, either for the use of the Directory or for promoting the expedition to Ireland. Political zeal alone impelled him to commit this infraction of the laws, for he, who more than any other general had possessed opportunities of enriching himself, was extremely poor. In making all these dispositions, Hoche deemed he was executing the orders, not only of Barras, but likewise of Rewbell and Larévellière-Lépeaux.

Two months had elapsed since the 1st Prairial, that is to say, since the opening of the new session; it was now the end of Messidor (mid-July). A constant succession of measures, digested at the Clichy club and propounded in the Five-Hundred, had been kept up the whole time. Another was now brought forward to which the royalist faction attached great importance. The organization of the national guards was not yet decreed; the principle only was laid down in the constitution. The Clichyans were anxious to have the control of a force opposed to the armies, and to again place arms in the hands of the young men who had risen in Vendemiaire against the convention. They had accordingly appointed a committee in the Five-Hundred to frame a project of organization, with Pichegru as its chairman and reporter. In addition, the finance-committee had again taken up the propositions rejected by the Ancients, and sought to renew them in another manner, so as to procure their adoption in a different shape. These proceedings of the Five-Hundred, threatening as they were, less alarmed however the three allied directors than the conspiracy, at the head of which they knew a general of celebrity, and which they believed to have the widest ramifications in the two Councils. Urged by these considerations to prompt action, they first proposed to make certain changes in the ministry which they thought necessary, both to render the administration of the state more harmonious, and to make manifest in a firm and decided manner the policy of the government.

Cochon, the minister of police, though somewhat in disgrace with the royalists since the prosecution of the pretender's agents and the circulars regarding the elections, was nevertheless wholly devoted to Carnot. With the designs in view it was impossible for the Directory to permit the police to remain in his hands. Petiet, the minister at war, was in great esteem with the royalists, and a mere creature of Carnot's. Him likewise it would be necessary to dismiss, in order to prevent an enemy remaining the medium of communication between the armies and the directorial majority. Benezech, the minister of the interior, an able person in his department, and submissive to his superiors, gave no particular cause of umbrage to any party; but his known inclinations, and the forbearance of the royalist journals with regard to him, rendered him an object of distrust. It was determined to change him also, were it merely for the sake of having a man more surely to be relied upon. Perfect confidence was felt in Truguet, the minister of marine, and Charles Delacroix, minister for foreign affairs; but reasons derived from regard for the public service induced the directors to wish their displacement. Truguet was attacked with great virulence by the royalist faction, which he, in some measure, deserved by his haughty and violent character. He was a man of sterling honesty and of considerable talents, but wanted the courtesy and attention to individuals necessary in the head of a large department. Besides he might be employed to better purpose in a diplomatic capacity; he himself was desirous of succeeding General Perignon in Spain, with the view of moving that power to co-operate in his great designs on the Indies. With respect to Delacroix, he has since proved his ability to execute the duties of an important office; but he possessed neither the dignity nor information befitting the representative of the republic in relation with foreign powers. But, in truth, the directors were actuated by a strong desire to see another personage in the management of his department: to wit, M. de Talleyrand. The enthusiastic spirit of Madame de Stäel had been fired with admiration of the cold, caustic, profound wit of Talleyrand. She had brought him in communication with Benjamin Constant, who in his turn was made the medium of his introduction to Barras. M. de Talleyrand soon contrived to ingratiate himself with Barras, a thing to him of easy accomplishment with a subtler genius than that of the debauched director. After being thus recommended by Madame de Stäel to Benjamin Constant, and by Benjamin Constant to Barras, he was presented by the latter to Larévellière, and equally succeeded in gaining the ear of the honest man as he had done that of the unprincipled. He appeared to them all a person much to be pitied, for, odious to the emigration as a partisan of the revolution, and suspected by the patriots on account of his aristocratic lineage, he seemed at once the victim of his opinions and of his birth. Thus it became settled that he should be made minister of foreign affairs. The vanity of the directors was flattered by attaching so great a personage to their government, and they had, moreover, the assurance of confiding that department to a man at once well-informed, skilful, and personally connected with the whole of European diplomacy.

Ramel, at the head of the finances, and Merlin de Douai, at that of Justice, were the only remaining ministers. They were both obnoxious to the royalists, more than all the others together, but they fulfilled the duties of their departments with equal zeal and ability. The three directors had therefore no wish to part with them. Thus, out of the seven ministers, policy dictated the dismissal of Cochon, Petiet, and Benezech on account of their opinions, and of Truguet and Delacroix from regard to the interests of the public service; whilst the retention of Merlin and Ramel was commended by both considerations.

In every state with representative institutions, whether monarchical or republican, the appointment of ministers indicates emphatically the leading spirit and policy of the government. The nomination of ministers, therefore, is the great object of party contention, and is sought to be decided as much from regard to the carrying out of opinions as from mere lust of power. But if, amongst opposing parties, there be one desirous of more than a simple modification in the principles of the government, aspiring in fact to an overthrow of the existing system, fearful of reconciliations tending to strengthen and consolidate, and having objects of embroilment in view rather than a change of ministry, it takes no part therein or interferes with the sinister intention of thwarting and preventing it. Pichegru, accordingly, and the Clichyans in the secret of his schemes, attached no importance to any alteration in the departments of the administration. Nevertheless, they made advances to Carnot, and held interviews with him; but more for the purpose of sounding him and discovering his hidden views than of promoting a result which was wholly insignificant in their eyes. Carnot had declared himself in the frankest terms both in conferences and in writing, when replying to

the members deputed to wait upon him. He had stated that "*he would sooner perish than suffer the constitution to be infringed, or the powers it had instituted to be disgraced*"—(the literal expressions in one of his letters). He had thus reduced those who sought to tamper with him to the necessity of discussing merely constitutional projects, such as a change of ministry might involve. As to the constitutionalists, and those of the Clichyans who were less implicated in the faction, they sincerely desired to effect a ministerial revolution, and to rest contented with the attainment of that object. These naturally ranged themselves under the standard of Carnot. The members of the Ancients and of the Five-Hundred, whom we have already specified, Portalis, Tronçon-Ducoudray, Lacuée, Dumas, Thibaudeau, Doulcet-Pontécoulant, Siméon, Emery, and others, consulted with Carnot and Barthélemy, and discussed the changes to be made in the ministry. The two ministers, whose displacement they most eagerly demanded, were Merlin, minister of Justice, and Ramel, minister of the Finances. Having particularly attacked the financial system, they were more embittered against the minister of that department than any other. They likewise urged the dismissal of Truguet and Charles Delacroix. Cochon, Petiet, and Benezech, they were of course in favour of retaining. Carnot and his ally Barthélemy were not difficult to persuade. The feeble Barthélemy, in truth, had no opinion of his own; but Carnot saw all his friends in the ministers retained, and all his enemies in those rejected. The plan, however, easy enough to form in the coteries of the Constitutionalists, was not so simple of arrangement with the three other directors, who, having resolved upon an adverse policy, proposed to discharge those precisely whom the Constitutionalists desired to keep in office.

Carnot, who was unconscious of the union formed by his three colleagues, Rewbell, Larévellèire, and Barras, and little aware that Larévellière formed the connecting link between the two others, indulged the hope that he would be the easiest to gain over. He, therefore, recommended the Constitutionalists to address themselves to him, with the view of inducing him to concur in their projects. They accordingly repaired to Larévellière, and explained to him their purpose, but found beneath his moderation an invincible firmness. Unaccustomed, like all the men of that time, to the tactics of representative governments, Larévellière had no idea that the appointment of ministers could form a subject of negotiation.—"Perform your part," he said to them, "that is to say, make laws; leave us ours, which consists in nominating the public functionaries. We are bound to direct our choice according to our consciences, and the opinion we entertain of the merit of individuals, but without reference to the exigence of parties."—He did not then know, and all were equally ignorant, that a ministry should be formed by an amalgamation of influences, taken from the existing parties in the state, and that the nomination of such or such a minister, being a guarantee of the policy to be pursued, may feasibly become an object of negotiation. He had, however, other reasons for repudiating a compromise. He was confident that he and his friend Rewbell had always acted with the purest motives, and that the directorial majority, whatever might be the personal views of the directors, had never decided otherwise than for the public welfare; that in the management of the finances, without being able to prevent minor peculations, it had at least administered them honestly, and with the smallest amount of evil possible under the circumstances; that in political matters it had never been actuated by personal ambition, or had done any thing to extend its prerogatives; finally, that in the direction of the war it had ever kept steadily in view a speedy, but at the same time an honourable and glorious peace. He could not, therefore, either understand or submit to the reproaches made against the Directory. His own clear conscience rendered them incomprehensible. He regarded the Clichyans in the light of perfidious conspirators, and the Constitutionalists as men suffering under the smart of injured self-love. He was ignorant, with all his contemporaries, that the *temper* of parties is to be taken as an element in politics, and that all pretensions must be considered and treated, even those founded on wounded vanity. Furthermore, the proposals of the Constitutionalists had little of an enticing character in them. The three allied directors were intent on framing a homogeneous administration in order to crush the royalist faction; the Constitutionalists, on the contrary, demanded a ministry wholly opposed to such a one as the directors deemed necessary in the crisis, and they had to offer in return only their votes, which were far from numerous, and which, sooth to say, they refused to pledge on any given question. Their alliance, consequently, presented no advantages sufficient to induce the Directory to hearken to them, and forego its own projects. Hence, from their communications with Larévellière they derived but indifferent satisfaction. They beset him through the medium of the geologist Faujas de Saint-Fonds, with whom he was on intimate terms from the conformity of their tastes and studies; but all in vain. He at length stopped further solicitation by the abrupt rejoinder:—"On the day you attack us, you will find us prepared. We will put you to death, but only politically. You thirst for our blood, but yours shall not be shed. You will be simply reduced to the impossibility of doing mischief."

This obduracy on the part of Larévellière rendered his accession hopeless. Carnot, therefore, advised the Constitutionalists to make application to Barras, doubting nevertheless their success, for he knew the extent of his rancour against them. Admiral Villaret-Joyeuse, one of the hottest members of the opposition, but whom his taste for pleasures frequently led into the society of Barras, was selected to open their proposals. The easy-natured Barras, who was prone to give promises without heeding their import, though his opinions were at bottom sufficiently decided, was in appearance less intractable than Larévellière. Of the four ministers whose dismissal the Constitutionalists demanded, Merlin, Ramel, Truguet, and Delacroix, he readily concurred in their scheme as to two, Truguet and Delacroix. This was according to his compact with Rewbell and Larévellière, and, in undertaking to get rid of them, he did not transgress his previous engagements. But, whether with his usual facility he promised more than he intended to fulfil, or he wished to deceive Carnot and prompt him to move a change of ministers, or his language, generally ambiguous, was too favourably interpreted, the Constitutionalists returned to Carnot with the assurance that Barras had consented to every thing, and would vote with him as to each of the ministers. They were urgent with him that the change should be made at once. But Carnot and Barthélemy, still distrustful of Barras, hesitated to take the initiative. They then pressed Barras to assume the task, and he answered that, from the extreme virulence of the journals at that particular moment, it would be inferred that the Directory was yielding to their clamour. To obviate this objection silence was enjoined on the opposition press; but, meanwhile, Rewbell and Larévellière, strangers to these intrigues, themselves took the decisive step. On the 28th Messidor, Rewbell declared, in the sitting of the Directory, that the time for procrastination was past, that the fluctuations of the government must be brought to a close, and a change of ministers effected. He moved that a scrutiny be forthwith commenced. It was so

agreed, and that the scrutiny should be secret. Truguet and Delacroix, whom every one doomed to exclusion, were cashiered unanimously. Ramel and Merlin, whom the Constitutionalists alone desired to supplant, had simply the two votes of Carnot and Barthélemy against them, and were upheld by the three votes of the other directors. Cochon, Pétiet, and Benezech, were deposed by the same majority that had supported Ramel and Merlin. Thus the project devised by the three directors was so far accomplished. But Carnot, finding himself outwitted, urged that the appointment of successors should be at least deferred, alleging that he was not prepared to make a choice. He was harshly answered that a director ought always to be prepared, and that he should not have joined in dismissing a public functionary without being in a condition to nominate his successor. His opposition was accordingly overruled and a vote taken on the moment. The five new ministers were named by the majority. Ramel had been retained in the Finance department, and Merlin in that of Justice; M. de Tallyrand was now nominated minister of foreign affairs; Pléville le Peley, a bold and veteran sailor, and excellent administrator, minister of the Navy; François de Neufchateau, a man of some eminence in the walks of literature, but of slender practical ability, minister of the Interior; Lemoir-Laroche, a discreet and enlightened individual, who contributed sound political articles to the *Moniteur*, minister of police; and lastly, the young and brilliant commander whose support it had been resolved to secure, Hoche, minister of war. The latter was not of the age required by the constitution, namely thirty. This was known, but Larévellière had proposed to his two colleagues, Rewbell and Barras, to appoint him, even were it necessary to supplant him within forty-eight hours, both in order the more firmly to attach him to their cause, and to propitiate the armies by so flattering a testimony to a military idol.

Thus all parties co-operated in promoting this change of ministers, which as a stroke of policy proved decisive in its consequences. It is common enough, however, to see parties so conspire to provoke a certain result, which they fondly conceive must prove advantageous to themselves. They all concur in hastening the conjuncture, but the strongest decides the event in its own favour.

Carnot, with the irritable pride that characterized him, could scarcely fail to be deeply mortified, or to believe that Barras had tricked him. The members of the legislative body, who had interposed in the negotiation, hurried to his apartments, gathered all the details of the diet that had been held of the Directory, broke into furious denunciations of Barras, proclaimed him a deceitful knave, and gave vent to the most outrageous indignation. A fresh circumstance added fuel to the excitement, and inflamed it to the highest pitch. At the instance of Barras, Hoche had put his troops in motion, with the intention of directing them eventually on Brest, but of halting them for a few days in the vicinity of the capital. He had selected the legion of Franks, commanded by Humbert, Lemoigne's division of infantry, the division of chasseurs commanded by Richepanse, and a regiment of artillery; in all from fourteen to fifteen thousand men. Richepanse's division of chasseurs had already arrived at La Ferté-Alais, eleven leagues from Paris. This involved a serious indiscretion, for the constitutional radius was twelve leagues, and, pending the moment for action, it was needless to transgress the legal limit. The imprudence was owing to the mistake of a commissary of war, who had infringed the law without knowing it. To this unfortunate occurrence were added others. The troops seeing the direction they were made to take, and aware of what was passing in the interior, had no doubt they were intended to march against the Councils. The officers and soldiers openly boasted on the route that they were going to reduce the aristocrats of Paris to reason. Hoche had contented himself with notifying to the minister at war a general movement of troops on Brest for the expedition to Ireland.

All these circumstances indicated to the different parties that some decisive event was approaching. The opposition and the enemies of the government redoubled their activity to parry the blow that threatened them, whilst the Directory, on its part, neglected no means to forward the execution of its projects and to make sure of victory; with what measure of success on either side we shall forthwith proceed to unfold.

CHAPTER LIV.

PREPARATIONS OF THE OPPOSITION AND CLICHYANS AGAINST THE DIRECTORY.—HOSTILITY OF THE COUNCILS.—PROJECT OF LAW AS TO THE NATIONAL GUARD AND AGAINST POLITICAL SOCIETIES.—FETE TO THE ARMY OF ITALY.—NEGOTIATIONS FOR PEACE WITH THE EMPEROR AND ENGLAND.—COMPLAINT OF THE COUNCILS REGARDING THE MARCH OF TROOPS.—DIVISIONS IN THE PARTY OF THE OPPOSITION.—DEFINITIVE PLAN OF THE DIRECTORY AGAINST THE MAJORITY OF THE COUNCILS.—COUP-D'ETAT OF THE 18TH FRUCTIDOR.—INVASION OF THE TWO COUNCILS BY AN ARMED FORCE.—BANISHMENT OF 53 DEPUTIES, TWO DIRECTORS AND OTHER CITIZENS.—CONSEQUENCES OF THIS REVOLUTION.

INTELLIGENCE of the arrival of Richepanse's chasseurs, with an account of the circumstances attending their march, reached the minister Pétiet on the 28th Messidor, the very day on which the change of ministry took place. Pétiet immediately communicated the information to Carnot; and the deputies who flocked around him and the discarded ministers, to indulge their resentment against the directorial majority, and express their sympathy with its victims, were further dismayed by learning at the same moment the advance of the troops. Carnot stated to them that the Directory had not, to his knowledge, issued any orders to that effect; but that the three other directors might perhaps have passed a private resolution, which in such case must be inserted in the secret register; that he would go and ascertain the fact; and that, in the meantime, the event itself should not be made public, until he was in a condition to prove the existence of orders. But the excitement was too great for any prudent exhortation to be of the least avail.

The dismissal of the ministers and the march of the troops, combined with the nomination of Hoche in the place of Pétiet, served to remove all doubts from their minds as to the intentions of the Directory. They proclaimed that the Directory evidently intended to outrage the inviolability of the Councils, perpetrate a new thirty-first of May, and proscribe the deputies faithful to the constitution. They assembled in numbers at the house of Tronçon Ducoudray, who was one of the most influential members of the Ancients. The Clichyans, as is the usage with extreme parties, had beheld with pleasure the moderates, that is to say, the Constitutionalists, deceived in their expectations and foiled in their project of composing a ministry of their own choice. They considered them as duped by Barras, and rejoiced greatly that they had fallen so easily into the snare. But the danger appeared to them rather more serious when they found troops advancing. Their two generals, Pichegru and Willot, being apprized of the special muster at Tronçon-Ducou-

dray's to confer upon the state of affairs, repaired thither, although the meeting was composed of men differing essentially in principles. Pichegru had not yet any real power at command; his only means lay in the passions of parties, and wherever these broke forth most violently there it behoved him to be, either curiously to watch or prominently to act, as circumstances might prompt. Amongst the personages assembled there were Portalis, Tronçon-Ducoudray, Lacuée, Dumas, Siméon, Doulcet-Pontécoulant, Thibaudeau, and Villaret-Joyeuse, with Willot and Pichegru. Great irritation marked the deportments of those present, as was natural. The actual designs of the Directory formed the preliminary theme of discussion. Expressions of Rewbell, Larévellière, and Barras, were quoted, which implied a settled purpose on their part, and from the change of ministry and the march of the troops, it was concluded that this purpose could be none other than an attack on the legislative body. Thereupon the most violent resolutions were proposed, such as the suspension of the Directory, its impeachment, and even its outlawry. But to put these measures in execution an armed force was requisite, and Thibaudeau, who did not partake the prevailing ferment, calmly inquired where it was to be found. He was answered that they had the twelve hundred grenadiers of the legislative body, a part of the 21st regiment of chasseurs, commanded by Malo, and the national guard of Paris; that pending the reorganization of that guard, they might send detachments of grenadiers into the various quarters of the capital and rally around them the citizens who had taken up arms in Vendemiaire. A long debate ensued without leading to any definite conclusion, as usually happens when means are unsubstantial and inadequate to the purpose. Pichegru, cool and composed as ordinary, let fall some observations on the insufficiency and the peril of the steps proposed, the quiet tone of which contrasted strangely with the agitation raging around him. At length the meeting separated, some dispersing to Carnot's, others to the residences of the supplanted ministers. Carnot condemned all the plans proposed against the Directory. A second meeting was held at Tronçon-Ducoudray's, but Pichegru and Willot did not attend it. Much wild and vehement elocution was wasted as before, but, shrinking from recourse to violent measures, temperate counsels prevailed with the majority, and it was finally determined to keep within strict constitutional limits. A motion was accordingly adopted to demand forthwith the law touching the responsibility of ministers and the prompt organization of the national guard.

In the Clichy club as elsewhere great excitement reigned; incessant was the declamation, but equally tame the end, for if hotter passions animated the members, their means of aggression were not more powerful. The removal of Cochon from the ministry of police was with them a chief object of regret, and they revived one of the favourite schemes of the faction, which consisted in depriving the Directory of all control over the police of Paris and vesting it in the legislative body, by a forced construction of the meaning of an article in the constitution. They proposed at the same time to intrust the direction of this police to Cochon; but the whole design was of too bold a character for them to venture on its immediate adoption. They were content in the end with positive resolutions to raise a cavil about the age of Barras, who, it was said, was not forty years old on his nomination to the Directory, and to insist on the instant organization of the national guard.

On the 30th Messidor (18th July), accordingly, the council of the Five-Hundred was a scene of prodigious clamour. The deputy Delahaye denounced the march of the troops, and moved that the report on the national guard be presented forthwith. Others inveighed against the conduct of the Directory, depicted in exaggerated alarm the frightful state of Paris, from the arrival of a multitude of well-known revolutionists and the new formation of clubs, and demanded that a discussion be opened on political societies. Ultimately it was decided that the report on the national guard should be made on the day after the morrow, and immediately afterwards a debate commenced on political societies. By the day prescribed, the 2d Thermidor (20th July), additional particulars had arrived respecting the march of the troops and their number, and it was known that there were already four regiments of cavalry quartered at La Ferté-Alais.

Pichegru presented the report on the organization of the national guard. His plan was conceived in a truly artful spirit. All Frenchmen enjoying the qualification of citizens were to be enrolled on the lists of the national guard; but all were not to compose the actual force of that guard. The national guards intended for duty were to be chosen by the rest, in other words, elected by the mass. In this manner the national guard would be formed like the Councils by electoral assemblies, and the result of the recent elections sufficiently indicated what sort of guard would be obtained by this process. It was to be composed of a battalion for each canton, and in each battalion there was to be a company of grenadiers and chasseurs, thereby re-establishing those chosen companies in which the most decided politicians mustered, and of which parties usually availed themselves for the execution of their schemes. No sooner was the report presented than a motion was made that it be forthwith adopted. The fiery Henri Larivière rose and asserted that everything announced another thirty-first of May. "Let us have it! Let us have it then!" exclaimed certain voices from the left, interrupting him. "Yes," he resumed, "but I console myself by reflecting that we are at the second of Thermidor, and that we approach the 9th, a day fatal to tyrants." He moved that the project be voted on the instant, and a message sent to the Ancients requesting them to protract their sitting, in order that they might likewise pass it without adjourning. This proposal was strenuously resisted. Thibaudeau, the leader of the Constitutional party, remarked with reason that, whatever dispatch might be used, the national guard could not be organized within a month; that such precipitation in passing an important law would therefore be fruitless as a means of saving the legislative body from any dangers that threatened it, and that the national representation should repose on its rights and its dignity, and not seek its force in means actually powerless. He therefore urged the expediency of allowing time for reflection. Eventually an adjournment of twenty-four hours was carried for a further consideration of the measure, the principle of the reorganization being however at once affirmed. At this moment a message from the Directory arrived, giving explanations as to the march of the troops. This message set forth that the troops, intended for a distant destination, were obliged to pass near Paris; that through the inadvertence of a war-commissary they had overstepped the constitutional limit; that the error of this commissary was the sole cause of this infraction of the laws; and that, to make amends, the troops had received orders to retrograde without delay. The Council was far from being content with this explanation. It provoked, indeed, fresh declamations of extreme violence, and a committee was named to examine the message and make a report on the state of Paris and the advance of the troops.

On the following day Pichegru's measure was discussed and four of its clauses voted. The Council next proceeded to take up the question of clubs, which were reviving in all quarters and seemed to

threaten a resurrection of the Jacobin party. It was proposed they should be absolutely prohibited, since the laws which restrained them were continually evaded. A decree was in fact passed that no political assembly should be permitted for the future. Thus the society of Clichy committed a species of suicide, consenting to its own annihilation on condition of destroying the Constitutional Circle and the other inferior clubs forming all around. The leaders of the Clichy faction, in truth, had no need of that tumultuous gathering to concert together, and they could afford to sacrifice it without losing any great resource. Willot subsequently opened the attack on Barras, as not being of the age required by the constitution at the time he was appointed a director. But the army registers oeing searched, proved that it was an idle fiction. Meanwhile fresh troops had arrived at Rheims, and the feeling of alarm grew more intense. The Directory having repeated its previous explanations, they were again declared insufficient, and the committee already named was instructed to prosecute its inquiries and present a report with all dispatch.

In the interim Hoche had arrived at Paris, it being necessary he should visit the capital, whether he intended at once proceeding to Brest, or was to be detained for the execution of a *coup-d'etat*. He presented himself without any misgivings before the Directory, assured that in putting his divisions in motion he had obeyed the directorial majority. But Carnot, who was president of the Directory at the time, sought to intimidate him, demanding under what order he had acted, and menacing him with an impeachment for having transgressed the constitutional limits. Unfortunately, Rewbell and Larévellière, not having been informed of the orders sent to Hoche, could not interfere to assist him. Barras, who had issued the orders in question, did not venture to speak, and thus was Hoche left exposed to the searching examination of Carnot. He made answer that he could not go to Brest without troops; upon which Carnot retorted that there were yet 43,000 soldiers in Brittany, forming a sufficient number of men for the expedition. At length, Larévellière, perceiving the embarrassment of Hoche, came to his rescue, and, expressing to him in the name of the directorial majority the esteem and confidence his services had merited, assured him there was no ground of impeachment against him; and thereafter broke up the sitting. Hoche hastened to Larévellière to thank him for his seasonable interposition, and then learnt that Barras had not apprised either him or Rewbell of the intended movement of troops, having given the orders without their knowledge. He naturally felt indignant with Barras, who, after having compromised him, had shrunk with the meanest cowardice from defending him. It was clear that Barras in thus acting apart, without the privity of his two colleagues, had hoped to retain the sole disposal of the executory force to be employed. Hoche, highly incensed, treated him with haughty disdain, but expressed the greatest regard for Rewbell and Larévellière. The time was not yet come, nor had any preparations been made, for the execution of the project contemplated by the three directors, and Barras, in thus prematurely summoning Hoche, had uselessly compromised both him and them. The young general accordingly returned forthwith to his head-quarters, which were at Wetzlar, and ordered into cantonments the troops he had marched around the environs of Rheims and Sedan, where they were still within reach of a forced march on Paris. Although effectually disgusted with the conduct of Barras towards him, he was ready again to enact the same part on a signal from Rewbell and Larévellière. He had beyond doubt grievously committed himself, and a serious determination was evinced to bring him under accusation; but at his head-quarters he awaited with composure whatever steps the majority of the Five-Hundred, in the bitterness of its wrath against him, might hazard to his prejudice. Meanwhile his age not permitting him to accept the ministry of war, Schérer was nominated to it in his stead.

The unfortunate notoriety that had attended this matter, however, put it out of the power of the Directory to employ Hoche further in the execution of its designs. Moreover, it was a consideration that the importance with which such participation would invest him might excite the jealousy of the other generals. It was not improbable that Bonaparte would take umbrage at others than himself being applied to. It was therefore deemed more advisable not to make use of any of the generals-in-chief, but to employ one of the most distinguished generals of division. The notion was entertained of asking Bonaparte for one of those generals become so famous under his orders; a step which would combine the advantage of gratifying him personally without giving ground of offence to any of the other commanders-in-chief. But whilst this project of appealing to him was still in deliberation, he himself interfered in a manner somewhat startling for the counter-revolutionists, and at least embarrassing for the Directory. He chose the anniversary of the fourteenth of July, answering to the 26th Messidor, to give a festival to his army, and to publish addresses on the state of affairs at home. He caused to be erected at Milan a pyramid bearing numerous trophies, and the names of all the soldiers and officers killed during the campaign of Italy. Around this pyramid the festival was celebrated with great magnificence. Bonaparte was present in person, and addressed his soldiers in an exciting proclamation.

"Soldiers!" he said, "this day is the anniversary of the 14th July. You see before you the names of your companions in arms, killed on the field of honour for the liberty of our country. They have given you an example. You are bound wholly and indissolubly to the republic, to the happiness of thirty millions of Frenchmen, to the glory of that name which has received new lustre from your victories.

"Soldiers! I am aware you are deeply affected with the misfortunes which threaten our country. But the country cannot encounter real dangers. The same men who have made it triumph over allied Europe are still here. Mountains separate you from France; you would clear them with the swiftness of the eagle, if it were necessary, to maintain the constitution, defend liberty, and protect republicans.

"Soldiers! the government watches over the guardianship of the laws intrusted to it. The royalists, the moment they shall show themselves, will have lived.* Be without inquietude, therefore, and let us swear by the manes of the heroes slain by our side for liberty, let us swear upon our standards, implacable war to the enemies of the republic and of the constitution of the year III!"

A banquet wound up the entertainments, at which the most energetic toasts were given by the generals and officers. The generalissimo himself proposed the first toast to the brave Stengel, Laharpe, and Dubois, killed on the field of honour. "May their shades," he exclaimed, "watch around us and guard us from the toils of our enemies!" Other toasts were afterwards drank to the Constitution of the year three, to the Directory, to the Council of Ancients, to the memory of the French assassinated in Verona, to the *re-emigration of the emigrants*, to the union of French republicans, to the destruction of the Clichy club. The charge was sounded as an accompaniment to this latter toast.

* [Bonaparte, who was fond of classical allusions in his proclamations, here uses the Latin expression to signify death, the Romans entertaining a superstitious repugnance to mention dissolution otherwise than as life past.]

Similar fêtes took place in all the cities where divisions of the army were stationed, and were celebrated with the like manifestations. Thereafter, in each division of the army addresses were framed still more significant than the proclamation of the general-in-chief. He had observed in his language a certain dignity of style; but the old jacobin jargon of 1793 was revived in the addresses of the divisions of the army. Above the others, those under Massena, Joubert, and Augereau, distinguished themselves for violence of expression. Augereau's in fact exceeded all bounds. "*Oh conspirators!*" it said, "*tremble! from the Adige and the Rhine to the Seine, there is but a step. Tremble! your iniquities are told, and their reward is on the point of our bayonets!*"

These addresses were signed by thousands of names and sent to the commander-in-chief. He collected and forwarded them to the Directory, together with his own proclamation, in order that they might be printed and published in the newspapers. This proceeding on his part sufficiently indicated his readiness to march against the opposition faction in the Councils, and lend his aid in the execution of a *coup-d'etat*. However, as he knew the Directory was divided, and perceived that matters were growing serious and complicated, desirous at the same time of having correct information from the scene itself, he selected one of his aide-de-camps, M. de Lavalette, who enjoyed his unlimited confidence, and possessed the penetration necessary to estimate persons and events, whom he dispatched to Paris with orders to observe and gather everything worthy of communication. He likewise commissioned him to offer funds to the Directory, in case it needed them to carry into operation any purposed act of aggression.

When the Directory received these addresses it was greatly embarrassed. They were in some sort illegal, for the armies were forbidden to deliberate on political affairs. To accept and publish them was to authorize the armies to interfere in the government of the state, and deliver the republic into the hands of the military power. But was it possible to avoid this dangerous alternative? By applying to Hoche and requesting troops from him, by demanding the aid of a general from Bonaparte, had not the government itself provoked this intervention? Obliged to have recourse to force and to violate legality, could it rely upon other support than that of the armies? To receive these addresses was simply an inevitable consequence of what it had done, of what it had been obliged to do. Such was the melancholy fate of the republic, that to escape its enemies it was compelled to throw itself into the power of the armies. It was the dread of a counter-revolution in 1793 that had driven the republic into the excesses of which we have read the mournful detail; it was the same dread of a counter-revolution that now impelled it to seek protection from soldiers. In short, it was always to avert the like danger that at one time it had recourse to passions, at another to bayonets.

Still the Directory would have willingly concealed these addresses, and withheld them from publication on account of the evil example they afforded; but it would thereby have grievously offended the general, and driven him perhaps to side with the enemies of the republic. It was therefore constrained to print and circulate them. They struck terror into the Clichyan party, and made it sensible how gross had been its imprudence in attacking, by the motion of Dumolard, the conduct of General Bonaparte at Venice. They gave rise to fresh complaints in the Councils. Such an intervention on the part of an army was vehemently denounced, the right of soldiers to express political opinions was denied, and further corroborative testimony of the sinister designs of the Directory was therefrom deduced.

Bonaparte caused additional embarrassment to the government by the general of division he sent upon its application. It happened that Augereau was the occasion of considerable trouble in the army through the violence of his opinions, which were chiefly adapted for the atmosphere of the Faubourg Saint-Antoine. He was ever on the alert to quarrel with any one not equally violent as himself, so that Bonaparte stood in apprehension of some fierce altercation arising amongst his officers. To get rid of him he pitched upon Augereau to detach to the Directory, thinking he would be well fitted for the service required of him, and much better at Paris than at head-quarters, in a season of inactivity, where he might become dangerous. Augereau was well content with the mission, for he liked the agitation of clubs as well as the field of battle itself, and he was by no means insensible to the influence of ambition. He set out for Paris, therefore, with the greatest alacrity, and arrived about the middle of Thermidor. Bonaparte wrote to his aide-de-camp Lavalette that he had dispatched Augereau because he could keep him no longer in Italy; and recommended him to be on his guard with him, and to continue his observations, holding himself as much as possible aloof. He likewise exhorted him to cultivate friendly relations with Carnot; for although openly declaring in favour of the Directory against the counter-revolutionary faction, he had no intention of mixing himself up with the personal quarrels of the directors.

The Directory viewed the arrival of Augereau with any thing but satisfaction. He was agreeable enough to Barras, who found pleasure in drawing around him Jacobins and patriots from the faubourgs, and who was continually boasting of mounting on horseback and brandishing his sword; but he gave umbrage to Rewbell and Larévellière, who had desired to have a prudent and moderate officer, and one who might, in case of need, make common cause with them against the schemes of Barras. As for Augereau himself, none could be more elated with the position he occupied. He was an honest man, an excellent soldier, and possessed of a generous heart, but prone to speak vauntingly, and gifted with but little strength of head. He visited much in Paris, partaking of entertainments in his honour, and enjoying all the celebrity of his brilliant achievements in arms, but attributing to himself many of the operations of the army of Italy, willingly leaving it to be inferred that he had inspired the general-in-chief with the finest of his conceptions, and repeating on every occasion that he would soon bring all aristocrats to reason. Greatly annoyed at this conduct, Larévellière and Rewbell determined to remonstrate with him, and, by appealing to his vanity, to reclaim him to a more sober demeanour. Larévellière accordingly spoke earnestly but affectionately with him, and succeeded in calming him, partly by a little skilful flattery, and partly by the respect he knew how to exact. He pointed out to him that there was no occasion to sully his reputation by a massacre of citizens, but that he was called upon to merit the title of saviour of the republic by energetic but discreet action, whereby the factious might be disarmed without the shedding of blood. Larévellière thus tranquillized Augereau, and brought him to a more tractable and reasonable mood. He was forthwith appointed to the command of the seventeenth military division, which comprehended Paris. This fresh step left no doubt of the intentions of the Directory: they were in fact definitively settled. Hoche's troops were quartered within a few marches, and could be called at a moment's notice. The directors only waited for the funds which Bonaparte had promised, and which they hesitated to extract from the Treasury, in order to avoid compromising the minister Ramel, who was closely watched by the finance-committee of the Five-Hundred. These funds were partly intended to gain the grenadiers of

the legislative body, then amounting to 1,200 men, and who, without being very formidable, might, if they resisted, provoke a combat, which it was determined above all things to shun. Barras, as the most skilled in intrigues, took upon himself this task, the accomplishment of which, in the meanwhile, was the cause of delaying the *coup-d'etat*.

These internal troubles had a most disastrous influence on the important negotiations in progress between the French republic and the powers of Europe. The desperate faction, which had sworn implacable war again t the liberty and the tranquillity of France, was now to crown the catalogue of wrongs by jeopardizing the consummation of the peace so long and ardently desired. Lord Malmesbury had arrived at Lille, and the Austrian ministers had opened conferences at Montebello with Bonaparte and Clarke, who were the two plenipotentiaries appointed to represent France. The preliminaries of Leoben, signed on the 29th Germinal (18th April), had stipulated that two congresses should be held, the one general at Berne for peace with the emperor and his allies, the other special at Rastadt for peace with the empire; that the treaty of peace with the emperor should be concluded within three months, under penalty of nullifying the preliminaries; and that nothing should be done meanwhile in the Venitian states except in concert with Austria, but that the Venitian provinces should not be occupied by the emperor until after the conclusion of peace. The transactions at Venice seemed in some degree to derogate from these conditions, and Austria had, on her part, lost no time in yet more flagrantly violating them by seizing and occupying the Venitian provinces of Istria and Dalmatia. Bonaparte, however, closed his eyes on this infraction of the preliminaries, to escape recriminations with regard to what he had done at Venice, and what he meditated doing in the islands of the Levant. The exchange of the ratifications took place at Montebello, near Milan, on the 5th Prairial (24th May). The Marquis de Gallo, Neapolitan minister at Vienna, appeared as the emperor's envoy. After the exchange of the ratifications, Bonaparte conversed with M. de Gallo, and sought to induce him to forego the intention of holding a congress at Berne, and to treat separately in Italy without calling in the other powers. The reasons he had to urge for this course, as regarded the interest of Austria herself, were very persuasive. It was impossible to imagine that Russia and England, if summoned to this congress, would ever consent that Austria should indemnify herself at the expense of Venice, whose possessions they both coveted. The advantage of Austria, coupled with that of a speedy settlement, would therefore, it was plain, be best consulted by a separate and immediate conference to be held in Italy. M. de Gallo, a shrewd and intelligent man, was by no means insensible to the force of this argument. To decide him and bring over the Austrian cabinet, Bonaparte conceded a point of etiquette upon which the court of Vienna laid great stress. It had been an object of serious apprehension with the emperor lest the republic might reject the ancient ceremonial in use with the Kings of France and insist upon an alternate precedency in the protocol of treaties. He, the emperor, was intent on being always first named, and on his ambassadors retaining the privilege of preceding the ambassadors of France. Bonaparte, who had procured authority from the Directory to yield to any such miserable pretensions, granted what M. de Gallo so urgently solicited. His gratification thereat was so abundant that he forthwith adopted the principle of a separate negotiation at Montebello, and wrote to Vienna to obtain powers in accordance. But old Thugut, fretted, stubborn, wholly attached to the English alliance, and continually offering his resignation since the court, influenced by the Archduke Charles, seemed to incline in the opposite direction, entertained very different views. He regarded the prospect of peace with aversion; the internal troubles of France still served to animate hopes which he fondly cherished, notwithstanding they had proved so often delusive. Although the trust reposed in the vain promises of the emigrants had cost Austria the sacrifice of countless treasure, led her into sundry false movements, and entailed upon her the shame of an unsuccessful war, still the new conspiracy of Pichegru inspired Thugut with the idea of procrastinating the conclusion of peace. He resolved accordingly to oppose studied delays in the way of the negotiation; with which view he disavowed the Marquis de Gallo, and dispatched a fresh envoy to Montebello in the person of Major-general the Count de Meewelt. This individual arrived on the 1st Messidor (19th June), and proceeded to demand the execution of the preliminaries, that is to say, the convention of a congress at Berne. Bonaparte, indignant at this change of system, gave him a very warm retort. He repeated all he had previously advanced as to the impossibility of obtaining the adhesion of England and Russia to the arrangements laid down as the bases of a treaty at Leoben; and added, that a general congress would cause great additional delay, that two months had already elapsed since the preliminaries of Leoben, whilst, according to those preliminaries, the peace was to be concluded in three months, and that its conclusion within such interval would be hopeless if all the powers were invited to assist. These allegations left the Austrian plenipotentiary without the power of a reply. The Court of Vienna appeared to yield, and conferences were fixed to be opened at Udine, in the Venitian provinces, in order that the place of negotiation might be nearer Vienna. They were appointed to commence on the 13th Messidor (1st July). Bonaparte, whom cares of great importance retained at Milan, amidst the new republics in process of forming, and who moreover desired to keep a watch, not too remote, on events at Paris, would not be drawn fruitlessly to Udine, there to be duped by Thugut. He sent Clarke alone, declaring that he would not appear in person until he was convinced, by the nature of the powers given to the negotiators and by their conduct in the negotiation, of the good faith of the Austrian court. He was not deceived in his misgivings, as the event showed. The cabinet of Vienna, more deluded than ever by the wretched agents of the royalist faction, flattered itself it was about to be relieved, by a counter-revolution, from the necessity of treating with the Directory, and accordingly delivered through its agent certain notes, assuredly of a strange character in the existing state of the negotiation. These notes, bearing date the 18th July (30th Messidor), set forth that the court of Vienna was disposed to adhere rigorously to the preliminaries, and consequently to treat for a general peace at Berne; that the period of three months, fixed by the preliminaries for the conclusion of peace, could be understood to commence only with the convocation of the congress, for otherwise it would have been insufficient to be stipulated; and that in consequence, the court of Vienna, resolute to abide by the tenor of the preliminaries, demanded a general congress of all the powers. These notes likewise contained bitter complaints as to the events at Venice and Genoa, maintaining that those transactions involved a grave infraction of the preliminaries of Leoben, for which France was bound to give adequate satisfaction.

On receiving these notes, Bonaparte was highly exasperated. His first impulse was to collect all the divisions of the army, resume the offensive, and again advance on Vienna to exact conditions somewhat more onerous than those of Leoben. But the domestic state of France and the conferences at Lille restrained him, and he concluded it would be

better, under such grave circumstances, to throw on the Directory, who stood in the centre of all affairs, the task of determining the line of conduct to be followed. He contented himself therefore with directing Clarke to present a vigorous rejoinder. His note in reply bore in substance that the time was past for demanding a congress, the incompatibility of which had been acknowledged by the Austrian plenipotentiaries, and which the court of Vienna had itself abandoned by fixing conferences at Udine; that at present no motive existed for such a congress, since the allies of Austria had separated from her and manifested the intention of treating individually, which was proved by the conferences at Lille; that the period of three months could only be interpreted to commence from the day of signing the preliminaries, for otherwise, by deferring the opening of the congress, everlasting delays might be interposed, which France had expressly designed to prevent by stipulating a positive term; and, finally, that the preliminaries had not been violated by the conduct pursued with regard to Venice and Genoa, since those states were at liberty to change the form of their governments without giving offence to any other power, and that, at any rate, by occupying Istria and Dalmatia, contrary to the express articles of the convention, Austria had much more wantonly violated those preliminaries. After thus lodging a reply at once firm and appropriate, Bonaparte referred the whole matter to the Directory and awaited its orders, exhorting it merely to decide with all possible speed, since it was of moment not to defer hostilities until the setting in of the bad season, if so extreme a step should be eventually deemed imperative.

At Lille, the negotiations were conducted with more sincerity and good-faith, which ought to appear singular, since it was with Pitt the French plenipotentiaries had to treat. But Pitt was really alarmed at the situation of England; no longer able to rely on Austria, and having lost all confidence in the tales of the royalist agents, he desired to conclude a treaty with France ere peace with the emperor had rendered her more powerful and exorbitant. If, therefore, in the preceding year he had practised a mere feint, in order to satisfy public opinion and prevent an arrangement with regard to the Low Countries, this year he was sincerely anxious to treat, mentally resolving, no doubt, that the peace should prove but a hollow truce of two or three years' duration. This genuine Englishman, in truth, could not consent to leave the Low Countries in the definitive possession of France.

At the present moment, as we have said, every thing tended to demonstrate his sincerity, both the choice of Lord Malmesbury, and the nature of the secret instructions given to him as ambassador. According to the custom of English diplomacy, arrangements were made for two simultaneous negotiations, the one official and apparent, the other secret and real. Mr. Ellis had been appointed with Lord Malmesbury to conduct under his sanction the secret negotiation, and to correspond directly with Pitt. This practice in English diplomacy is unavoidable under a representative government. In the official negotiation only so much is stated as may be repeated in parliament, whilst for the secret negotiation is reserved all it may be judged impolitic to make public. Moreover, in cases where the ministry itself is divided on the question of peace, the secret conferences are communicated only to such of the ministers as approve and direct the negotiation.

The English embassy arrived at Lille with a numerous suite, and in great pomp, on the 16th Messidor (4th July). The envoys nominated to represent France were Letourneur, the late director, Pléville Le Peley, who remained at Lille only a few days on account of his appointment to the ministry of marine, and Hugues Maret, afterwards Duke of Bassano. Of these three personages the latter was the only one fitted to act a useful part in the negotiation. Still young, and from early years initiated in diplomatic life, he united with great abilities manners which had become rare in France since the revolution. He owed his introduction to public affairs to M. de Talleyrand; and it had been matter of recent concert between them that the one should have the foreign ministry and the other the mission to Lille. M. Maret had been twice sent to London in the early times of the revolution, when he had met with a favourable reception from Pitt, and acquired considerable knowledge of England and its cabinet. He was therefore well adapted to represent France in the negotiations at Lille. His two colleagues in the mission and himself arrived at that town about the same time as the English embassy. It is not in public conferences that diplomatic arrangements are usually in reality settled. The English negotiators, being men of dexterity and tact, were desirous of mingling familiarly with the French envoys, and had too much sense to evince any cold estrangement. On the contrary, however, Letourneur and Pléville Le Peley, who were honest men enough but unaccustomed to diplomacy, retained a good deal of the revolutionary *savagery;* they considered the two Englishmen as dangerous persons, perpetually on the alert to intrigue and deceive, and against whom it behoved them to be on their especial guard. They refused to see them save officially, fearing to compromise themselves by any other species of communication. It was not the likely method to arrive at an understanding.

Lord Malmesbury exhibited his powers, wherein the conditions of the peace were left in blank, and demanded to know the terms proposed by France. The three French negotiators produced their conditions, which were, it may be well imagined, pitched on a high *maximum*. They insisted that the king of Great Britain should renounce the title of king of France, which he continued to assume through one of those ridiculous usages perpetuated in England; that he should re-deliver all the vessels taken at Toulon, and restore to France, Spain, and Holland, all the colonies he had captured from them. In exchange for these sacrifices, France, Spain, and Holland offered peace, and peace only, for they had taken nothing from England. It is true that the position of France was sufficiently imposing to justify the demand of great concessions; but to ask every thing for herself and her allies, and give nothing in return, was to bar the possibility of an agreement. Lord Malmesbury, anxious to attain some substantial result, and perceiving the official negotiation would lead to nothing, sought to provoke a more intimate intercourse. Maret, better accustomed than his colleagues to diplomatic usages, willingly acceded; but it required great finesse to induce Letourneur and Pléville Le Peley to attend parties, even at the theatre. The young men attached to the two embassies were the first to associate more closely together, and gradually the communications became more friendly. France had so completely broken with the past since the revolution, that it was with infinite difficulty she could resume her ancient relations with foreign powers. No attempt of the nature had been made in the preceding year, because the negotiation was not sincere, and both parties were estranged by mutual distrust and a desire to elude contact; but on this occasion it was essential to introduce amicable and effective communications. Lord Malmesbury accordingly sounded M. Maret with the view of engaging him to enter on a private negotiation. Before consenting, M. Maret wrote to Paris to obtain authority from the French ministry. It was granted without difficulty, and he forthwith opened special conferences with the English plenipotentiary.

All pretence of contesting the possession of the Low Countries, or of discussing the new position assumed by France towards Holland, was abandoned; but England wished to retain some of the principal colonies she had conquered, as an indemnification both for the expenses of the war and for the concessions made to France. She consented to restore all the French colonies, and even agreed to renounce all pretension to Saint-Domingo, and assist France in re-establishing her dominion in that island; but she insisted upon having compensation at the cost of Spain and Holland. Thus she refused to restore to Spain the island of Trinidad, which she had seized, and which was a very important colony from its position at the entrance of the Caribbean sea. She desired besides, of the possessions wrested from the Dutch, to keep the Cape of Good Hope, which commands the navigation of two Oceans, and Trincomalee, the principal port in the island of Ceylon. Moreover, she proposed to exchange the town of Negapatnam on the coast of Coromandel for the town and fort of Cochin on the coast of Malabar, an invaluable acquisition for her. As to the renunciation of the title of King of France, the English negotiator resisted from considerations affecting the royal family, which was indisposed to peace, and whose pride it was necessary to soothe. With regard to the vessels carried off from Toulon, and which had been since equipped and armed after the English method, they deemed it ignominious to surrender them, and offered in lieu an indemnity of twelve millions. Lord Malmesbury assured M. Maret as a reason for making these demands, that he durst not return to London if he gave up all, and preserved for the British nation none of the conquests won at the expense of its blood and treasure. To prove more distinctly his sincerity, he showed all the secret instructions furnished to Mr. Ellis, and which bore convincing evidence of Pitt's desire to obtain peace. The conditions he proposed unquestionably deserved to be dispassionately canvassed.

A circumstance that occurred at this moment suddenly gave considerable advantage to the French negotiator. Besides the union of the Spanish, Dutch, and French fleets at Brest, which depended on the first gale which might blow Admiral Jervis from off Cadiz, England had now to apprehend another danger of a different kind. Portugal, menaced by France and Spain, had abandoned her ancient ally and concluded a treaty with France. The chief condition of this treaty prohibited her from permitting in her ports more than six armed vessels at a time belonging to the belligerent powers. England thus lost her advantageous station in the Tagus. This unexpected blow placed the English ambassadors more at the mercy of M. Maret. The definitive conditions were at length brought into form between them. Trinidad could not be recovered; and as to the Cape of Good Hope, which was the most important, it was eventually agreed to be restored to Holland, but on one express condition,—namely, that France should never avail herself of her ascendency over Holland to obtain the cession of it. This was what England most dreaded. She was less anxious to get it herself than to keep France from its possession; and the restitution was agreed to, on condition that France never should hold it. As to Trincomalee, which involved the dominion of Ceylon, it was to be retained by the English, although with an appearance of alternate lordship only. A Dutch garrison was to alternate with an English garrison, but it was understood this should be a mere formality, and that the port should remain for all effective purposes in the possession of England. With regard to the exchange of Cochin for Negapatnam, the English still adhered to the project, without making it however a condition *sine quâ non*. The twelve millions were accepted for the ships transported from Toulon. As to the title of King of France, it was arranged that without formally renouncing it, the British monarch should cease to assume it.

Such were the points to which the respective pretensions of the negotiators were modified. Letourneur, who had been left alone with M. Maret since the departure of Pléville le Peley, appointed to the ministry of marine, remained in complete ignorance of the secret negotiation. M. Maret made him amends for his actual insignificance by yielding to him all the external honours and routine of the mission, to which the good and simple man attached great importance. M. Maret communicated all the details of the negotiation immediately to the Directory and awaited its final orders. Never had France and England been so near the verge of an accommodation. It had been made evident that the conferences at Lille were wholly unconnected with those at Udine, and that England was acting on her own behalf without any design of concert with Austria.

The discussion upon these negotiations was calculated to embroil the members of the Directory more perhaps than any other subject. The royalist faction clamoured furiously for peace without desiring it; the Constitutionalists were sincere in demanding it, even at the cost of certain sacrifices; the republicans wished for it likewise, but without sacrifices, holding as the chief object of their regard the glory of the republic. These last would have willingly bought the total enfranchisement of Italy, and the restitution of all the colonies conquered from France and her allies, at the price of another campaign. The opinions of the five directors were influenced by their several positions. Carnot and Barthélemy argued that the conditions of Austria and England should be accepted, whilst the three other directors upheld a contrary decision. The dispute caused a complete rupture between the two parties in the Directory. Barras bitterly reproached Carnot with the preliminaries of Leoben, the ratification of which the latter had strongly urged, and used with regard to him some very unmeasured terms. Carnot, in reply, and with reference to this accusation, said, *that it was not politic to oppress Austria*: meaning, that to insure a durable peace the conditions thereof ought to be moderate. But his colleagues took great umbrage at the expression, and Rewbell taunted him with the query whether he deemed himself a minister of Austria, or a magistrate of the French republic. On receiving the last dispatches of Bonaparte, the three directors were prompted to declare the truce at an end and order the resumption of hostilities; but the state of the republic, the apprehension of affording fresh topics of arraignment to the enemies of the government, and of supplying them with a pretext for maintaining that the Directory never intended to conclude peace, induced them to temporize yet a little longer. They wrote to Bonaparte that the exigence of affairs demanded they should carry patience to the utmost pitch, and wait until the bad faith of Austria were proved in a manner still more palpable, when the recurrence of hostilities could be attributed to her alone.

The negotiation at Lille supplied a question not less embarrassing for solution. To France itself the course was sufficiently simple, since every thing was restored to it; but with regard to Spain, which was to be deprived of Trinidad, and to Holland, which was to lose Trincomalee, the matter was not so easy of adjustment. Carnot, whom his new position constrained to declare always in favour of peace, voted for the adoption of the conditions proposed, however unfavourable to the allies. As France had good reason to be dissatisfied with Holland and the parties which divided it, he recommended she should be abandoned to herself, and no further concern taken in her fate,—a counsel equally ungenerous with that to

sacrifice her colonies. Rewbell took a warm part on the opposite side of the question. Vehement for the interests of France, even to the length of injustice he maintained that, far from forsaking Holland, they should establish a perfect supremacy over her, and even reduce her to a province of the republic; and he especially opposed with all his might the ratification of the article whereby France renounced the future possession of the Cape of Good Hope. He argued, on the contrary, that this colony and several others ought to revert to France in reward for her services. Thus, as we see, he defended the cause of the allies for the sake of France, rather than for their own. Larévellière, whom a purer spirit of equity moved to advocate their interests, repudiated the proposed conditions for reasons wholly different. He viewed it as disgraceful to sacrifice Spain, who had been dragged into a war to which she was, so to speak, a stranger, and who was to be obliged, as the price of her alliance, to surrender an important colony. He considered it equally scandalous to abandon Holland, whom France had plunged into the vortex of a revolution, with whose fate she had charged herself, and whom she was asked at once to deprive of rich possessions and deliver up to a frightful anarchy. If France withdrew her protection, he urged, it was certain Holland must become the scene of discord and confusion, and for all the blood that might flow she would be responsible. There was much generosity in these considerations; but it is not equally clear they were well-weighed. The allies of France had suffered losses; the question to be pondered was, whether they would not suffer greater by the continuation of the war. The event has proved it to be so; but at that time the successes of France on the Continent inspired hopes that, once freed from Austria, she would obtain equally great on the seas. The abandonment of her allies appeared infamous; and ultimately a middle course was adopted. It was resolved to apply to Spain and Holland in order to ascertain their views. They were to be invited to declare whether they desired peace, at the price of the sacrifices demanded by England; and in case they preferred the continuation of the war, they were to be called upon, moreover, to state what forces they proposed to contribute for the defence of the common cause. The Directory wrote to Lille, at the same time, that a reply to the proposals of England could not be given until it had had an opportunity of consulting its allies.

These discussions inflamed the quarrel amongst the directors to the deadliest animosity. The moment of the crisis was drawing nigh, and the passions of the two parties grew daily more excited. Meanwhile, each of them pursued its determined course. The Finance-Committee in the Five-Hundred had remodelled its resolutions, to induce their adoption by the Ancients with some modifications. The regulations relative to the Treasury had been slightly changed. The Directory was still to have no part in the negotiation of securities, and without confirming or annulling the distinction between the ordinary and the extraordinary expenditures, it was provided that the charges arising from the pay of the armies should always have the preference. Future anticipations were prohibited, but those already made were not revoked. Finally, the new provisions touching the sale of the national property were preserved, but with an important modification: namely, that ministerial orders and contractors' notes might be taken in payment of domains, on the same footing as *scrip of the three-quarters*. These measures, thus modified, were adopted; they were less subversive of financial resources, but were still very dangerous. All the penal laws against priests were likewise repealed; the oath was converted into a simple declaration, on the part of the priests, of obedience to the laws of the republic. Nothing was as yet decided as to the ceremonies of religion, or the bells in churches. The succession to the estates of emigrants was taken from the state and vested in relatives. Families that had been obliged to compound with the republic for the portions of emigrant sons or kinsmen, were to receive an indemnity out of the patrimonial property. The sale of manses was suspended. Lastly, the most important of all the projects, the institution of the national guard, had been passed in a few days on the bases previously detailed. The composition of this guard was to be regulated by way of election. It was upon this measure that Pichegru and his adherents chiefly relied for the execution of their designs. Accordingly, they had added an article whereby the work of organization was to commence ten days after the publication of the law. They thus secured the speedy enrolment of the Parisian guard, and in its ranks of all the insurgents of Vendemiaire.

On its part, the Directory, convinced of the imminence of the peril, and always supposing a conspiracy prepared for immediate outbreak, had assumed a very threatening attitude. Augereau was not the only officer of name at Paris. The armies being in a state of inaction, several other generals had repaired to the capital. In the number were Cherin, the chief of Hoche's staff, and the generals Lemoine and Humbert, who commanded the divisions that had marched on Paris; Kléber and Lefebvre, who were on furlough; and, lastly, Bernadotte, whom Bonaparte had dispatched to present the remainder of the captured standards to the Directory. Besides these superior officers, others of all grades, unattached since the reduction of the reserves, and aspiring to be employed, abounded in all parts of Paris breathing direful anathemas against the Councils. Numbers of revolutionists likewise had flocked from the provinces, as was usual with them when they expected a commotion. These symptoms of an approaching catastrophe were strengthened by the conduct held with regard to the troops detached by Hoche. These were still kept in cantonments in the environs of Rheims. Men argued justly that if they had been solely destined for the expedition to Ireland, they would have continued their march on Brest, and not tarried in the vicinity of Paris; nor would Hoche have returned to his head-quarters; nor, in fine, would so many cavalry have been collected for a maritime service. A committee had been appointed, we remember, to make an inquiry, and report upon all these facts. To this committee the Directory had thought fit to give but very vague explanations. The troops had been put in motion, it said, towards a distant point by the order of General Hoche, who derived his authority from the Directory, and they had transgressed the constitutional radius only through the inadvertence of a commissary of war. But the Councils replied, at the instigation of Pichegru, that troops could not be transported from one army to another on the simple order of a general-in-chief; that the general must hold orders from a higher authority; that he could receive them from the Directory only through the medium of the minister at war; that the minister at war, Pétiet, had not countersigned any such orders; that, in consequence, General Hoche had acted without the proper formal warrant; and lastly, that if the troops had been appointed for a distant service they ought to prosecute their march, and not cluster around Paris. These observations were grounded in reason, and the Directory had good cause for not attempting to answer them. Thereafter, the Councils decreed, in pursuance of these conclusions, that a circle should be traced around Paris describing a circumference of twelve leagues, to be marked on all the roads by columns, and that any officers in command of troops who should overstep this radius were to be deemed guilty of high-treason

Additional circumstances concurred to increase the alarm. Besides the troops already quartered in the departments of the North, around Sedan and Rheims, and within a few leagues of Paris, Hoche had detached others in the same direction. This fresh movement of troops, the language held by the soldiers, the agitation reigning in Paris, the quarrels of the unattached officers with the young men wearing the costume of the *gilded youth*, all supplied Willot with fruitful topics for a second philippic. Mounting the tribune, he declaimed against the march of troops, the spirit manifested in their ranks, the rage instilled in them against the Councils, and, as applicable to this subject, against the addresses of the army of Italy, and the publicity given to them by the Directory. He moved, in consequence, that the inspectors of the hall be charged to take fresh informations, and present a further report. The deputies, called inspectors of the hall, were intrusted with the police of the Councils, and consequently with the duty of watching over their safety. The motion of Willot was adopted, and, at the instance of the commission of inspectors, on the 17th Thermidor (4th August), several embarrassing questions were addressed to the Directory. These reverted to the nature of the orders under which General Hoche had acted. It was asked whether the purport of these orders could be at length satisfactorily explained, and, moreover, whether measures had been taken to enforce the constitutional article which prohibited the troops from deliberating.

The Directory determined to answer the questions proposed to it by an energetic message, without affording the explanations it found inconvenient to give. Larévellière drew up this message which Carnot and Barthélemy refused to sign. It was presented on the 23d Thermidor (10th August). It contained nothing new as to the movements of the troops. The commanders of divisions who had marched on Paris, it stated, had received orders from General Hoche, and General Hoche orders from the Directory. The medium through which they had been transmitted was not specified. With regard to the addresses, the Directory set forth:—that the meaning of the word *deliberate* was too vague to determine whether the armies had committed a fault in presenting them; that it acknowledged the danger of permitting armies to express an opinion, and that it would prevent further publications of the same nature; but that, at the same time, before condemning the step the soldiers of the republic had ventured upon, it was necessary to recur to the causes which had provoked it; that these causes lay in the general anxiety which, during the last few months, had been aroused in the public mind; in the insufficiency of the national revenues, which placed all branches of the administration in a most deplorable situation, and often deprived of their pay, men who for years had shed their blood and wasted their strength in the service of the republic; in the persecutions and murders inflicted on the purchasers of national property, on public functionaries, and on the defenders of the country; in the impunity of crime and the partiality of certain tribunals; in the insolence of emigrants and refractory priests, who, openly recalled and favoured, abounded in all quarters, fanned the flame of discord, and taught contempt for the laws; in the multitude of journals that inundated the armies and the interior, preaching up royalty and the overthrow of the republic; in the interest, always ill-dissembled, and often directly avowed, felt for the glory of Austria and England; in the attempts made to depreciate the just renown of French warriors; in the calumnies propagated against two illustrious generals, who had, the one in the West, the other in Italy, enhanced the fame of their exploits by political conduct of the highest order; finally, in the sinister projects professed by men more or less influential on the destinies of the state. The Directory added that, notwithstanding, it entertained a firm resolution and well-grounded hope of saving France from the new convulsions with which it was menaced.—Thus, far from explaining its conduct or palliating it, the Directory, on the contrary, recriminated, and openly manifested the design of prosecuting the contest and the belief of emerging victoriously from it.—Its communication was taken for a veritable manifesto, and caused a great sensation. The Five-Hundred instantly nominated a committee to consider the message and reply to it.

The Constitutionalists began to be seriously alarmed at the situation of affairs. On one side, they saw the Directory prepared to support itself by the aid of the armies; on the other, the Clichyans intent on enrolling the insurgents of Vendémiaire, under pretence of organizing the national guard. Such as were sincere republicans might prefer the success of the Directory in the coming strife, but they were all averse to a conflict, and now had leisure to repent the evil consequences of their opposition, which had thus resulted in frightening the Directory and encouraging the royalists. They did not avow their error, but lamented grievously the desolate aspect of things, imputing it as usual to their opponents. Those of the Clichyans who were not in the secret of the counter-revolution, who were in fact not friendly to one, but were actuated solely by a blind detestation of the revolutionary excesses, also took the alarm, and seemed to fear that by their contradiction they had awakened all the revolutionary tendencies of the Directory. Their ardour henceforth grew sensibly cooler. But the Clichyans, out-and-out royalists, were urgent for action, and dreaded above all things to be forestalled. These beset Pichegru and warmly pressed him to take the offensive. He, with his accustomed phlegm, hinted at the great results in store, but thought fit as yet to temporize. In truth he had no actual means in his possession; for a few emigrants and Chouans in Paris constituted a force altogether insufficient; and until he had the national guard at his command he could not make any serious attempt. Cool and sagacious, he formed a due estimate of his position, and replied to all instances that it was necessary to wait. He was told that the Directory meditated an immediate blow; he answered that the Directory durst not venture it. For the rest, disbelieving the courage of the Directory, finding his own appliances inadequate, enjoying the consideration of an important personage, and disbursing large sums of money, it was natural he should be in no hurry to hazard the aggressive.

In this posture of affairs, enlightened minds panted earnestly for some means of averting a struggle. A reconciliation appeared the most advisable, which might have the effect of uniting the Constitutionalists and moderate Clichyans with the Directory, restoring to it the majority it had lost, and enabling it to dispense with any violent measures for insuring safety. Madame de Stäel was in a position to desire and attempt such a coalition. She was the centre of that intellectual and brilliant society, which, albeit deeming the government and its heads somewhat vulgar, still loved the republic and clung steadfastly to it. Madame de Stäel admired that form of government, as supplying the best incitement to human energy; and having already placed one of her friends in an elevated post, she hoped to exalt others in their turn, and be to them another Egeria. She discerned the dangers to which this order of things that had become dear to her was exposed; receiving at her house men of all parties, she heard their various sentiments, and learnt to apprehend the imminence of some fatal collision. Of generous impulses and active mind, unable to remain blind to the course of events, it was natural she should attempt to use

her influence to unite men whom no insurmountable differences separated. She assembled republicans, Constitutionalists, and Clichyans, in her saloons, and sought to soften the asperity of discussions by interposing, with the tact of an amiable and gifted woman, to soothe the irritability and captious sensitiveness of rival partisans. But she was not more successful than is common with endeavours to effect reconciliations between parties, and the men most widely opposed began to absent themselves from her house. She sought especially to gain the members of the two committees appointed to answer the last message of the Directory. Some of them were Constitutionalists, such as Thibaudeau, Emery, Siméon, Tronçon-Ducoudray, and Portalis; through them the framing of the two reports might be influenced, which was of the greatest moment, since those documents would be in fact the reply of the Councils to the manifesto of the Directory. Madame de Stäel gave herself no relaxation in the task she had assumed, but laboured diligently both by herself and her friends. The Constitutionalists desired a coalition, for they were sensible of the danger that impended; but this coalition required sacrifices on their part it was difficult to wring from them. If the Directory had ever been really in the wrong or had pursued culpable measures, they might have stipulated the revocation of certain proceedings, and negotiated a treaty founded on the basis of reciprocal sacrifices; but, setting aside the private ill-conduct of Barras, the majority of the Directory had exhibited all the zeal and attachment to the constitution it was possible to exact. No arbitrary act or usurpation of power could be laid to its charge. The administration of the finances, so much decried, was the forced result of circumstances. The change of ministers, the movement of troops, the addresses of the armies, and the nomination of Augereau, were the only facts that could be alleged indicating formidable intentions. But these were precautions imposed upon it by the danger itself, and this danger must be entirely removed, by restoring the majority to the Directory, before it could be justly called upon to abandon such precautions. The Constitutionalists, on the contrary, had supported the newly-elected deputies in all their attacks, however unjust or imprudent, and therefore had alone to retract. Hence, nothing could be demanded from the Directory and much from the Constitutionalists, which rendered the exchange of sacrifices impossible, and the egotism of party-spirit intractable to conciliation.

It was in vain Madame de Stäel and her friends represented that the intention of the Directory was fixed to venture all upon the hazard, and that they, the Constitutionalists, would become the victims of their own obstinacy, and involve the republic in their ruin. They repudiated the notion of any recantation and refused every sort of concession, suggesting sullenly that the Directory ought to make the first advances. Rewbell and Larévellière were thereupon applied to. The latter, frankly entertaining the project of a discussion, entered upon the subject at large, enumerated in detail the various acts of the Directory, and asked, as to each of them, which was blameable. His interlocutors found themselves without an answer. With reference to the dismissal of Augereau, or the revocation of any of the measures adopted under the existing emergency, the directors were immoveable in their refusal, and demonstrated by their calm firmness the inflexibility of the determination they had taken.

Madame de Stäel, and they who seconded her in her laudable but hopeless enterprise, then directed their principal efforts towards the members of the two committees, striving to deter them from proposing legislative measures of too violent a nature, and especially, in replying to the grievances assigned in the message of the Directory, from launching into dangerous and irritating recriminations. All these endeavours were fruitless, for there are but few examples of parties listening to counsels emanating from neutral sources. In both committees there were Clichyans who advocated the most hostile measures. In the first place, they proposed to invest the criminal jury of Paris specially with cognisance of acts affecting the security of the legislative body, and to ordain the retirement of all troops beyond the limit of the constitutional circle; and, secondly, they demanded that this constitutional circle should form no part of any military division. This last proposition had for its object to deprive Augereau of the command of Paris, and thus effect by a decree what they could not accomplish by remonstrance or negotiation. Resolutions founded on these suggestions were adopted by the two committees. But Thibaudeau and Tronçon-Ducoudray, who were charged to frame the respective reports, the one to the Five-Hundred, the other to the Ancients, refused, with equal prudence and firmness, to embody the last proposition. It was accordingly abandoned, and the two first alone retained. Tronçon-Ducoudray presented his report on the 3d, and Thibaudeau on the 4th Fructidor (20th and 21st August). In these documents they replied indirectly to the reproaches of the Directory. Tronçon-Ducoudray, indeed, addressing the Ancients, exhorted them to interpose their wisdom and dignity between the vivacity of the young legislators in the Five-Hundred, and the susceptibility of the heads of the executive power. Thibaudeau, on his part, undertook to justify the Councils, and to prove that they had never intended either to attack the government or calumniate the armies. He referred particularly to the motion of Dumolard regarding Venice, and maintained that no design had existed to criminate the heroes of Italy; but, he urged, the establishments of their creation could be durable only by having the sanction of the two Councils. In the end the trivial measures recommended were passed by both Councils, and these two reports, so anxiously expected, produced scarcely any effect. They sufficiently indicated the impotency to which the Constitutionalists had reduced themselves, by their ambiguous position between the royalist faction and the Directory, unwilling to conspire with the one or to make concessions to the other.

The Clichyans bitterly complained of the insignificant character of these reports, and gratified their rancour by declaiming against the weakness of the Constitutionalists. The more ardent longed for battle, and especially for the means of waging it, and demanded to know what the Directory was doing towards the organization of the national guard. This was precisely what the Directory declined to promote, having resolved to abstain from any participation therein.

Carnot was in a position still more singular than the constitutional party. He had promptly broken with the Clichyans on finding the course they were bent on pursuing, he was of no use to the Constitutionalists, and had taken no part in their endeavours to effect a coalition, for he was of too irritable a temperament to seek a reconciliation with his colleagues. He stood alone, without support, in a vacuum, as it were, having no longer an object or purpose, since the egotistical views he had once indulged were totally dissipated, and the majority he had hoped to command was impossible of attainment. Still, through a perverse obstinacy in supporting the designs of the opposition in the Directory, he introduced a formal motion for the organization of the national guard. His presidency of the Directory was about to close, and he availed himself of the time still remaining to bring that subject under discussion. Larévellière rose upon this occasion with tranquil firmness, and having never had any personal quarrel with Carnot, appealed to him, for the last time, to

reclaim him, if it were possible, to the cause of his colleagues. Addressing him with confidence and mildness, he propounded to him certain questions.—"Have you ever heard us," he asked, "make a proposition tending to lower the jurisdiction of the Councils, to exalt our own, or to infringe the constitution of the republic?" "No," replied Carnot, with hesitation. "Have you ever heard us," resumed Larévellière, "propose a measure, whether in matters of finance, of war, or of diplomacy, which was not conformable to the public interest? With regard to what is personal to yourself, have you ever heard us either depreciate your merit or deny your services? Since you have separated from us, can you accuse us of failing in respect for your person? Has your opinion been less heeded, when it has appeared to us advantageous, and offered in sincerity? As for myself," added Larévellière, "although you have joined a faction which has persecuted both me and my family, have I ever shown you the least animosity?"—"No, no," Carnot answered to all these questions. "Well, then!" retorted Larévellière, "how come you to detach yourself from us to join a faction which perverts you, which seeks to make use of you only to destroy the republic, which will ruin you too after using you as its tool, and which will disgrace as well as ruin you?" Larévellière employed other urgent but friendly expressions, to convince Carnot of the error and danger of his conduct. Rewbell and Barras even did violence to their hatred. Rewbell, from a sense of duty, Barras, from mere facility of disposition, spoke to him almost as friends. But amicable demonstrations often have the effect of irritating certain proud minds: Carnot remained cold and distant, and, after the interpellations of his colleagues, he drily repeated his motion to discuss the organization of the national guard. The three directors thereupon broke up the diet, and retired with the conviction, too natural upon such occasions, that their colleague was betraying them, and acting in concert with the enemies of the government.

It was thence determined that the blow should be struck against him and Barthélemy, as well as against the principal members of the Councils. The plan definitively arranged, was according to the following programme. The three directors still believed that the Clichyan deputies were implicated in a secret conspiracy. They had obtained against them, or against Pichegru, no additional evidence which might admit recourse to a judicial process. It was necessary, therefore, to adopt the medium of a *coup-d'etat*. They had in the two Councils a resolute minority, which would be joined by all the waverers, whom a partial vigour exasperates and alienates, but whom a decisive energy overawes and reclaims. They resolved, accordingly, to shut up the halls in which the Five-Hundred and the Ancients assembled, to fix elsewhere the place of session, to summon thither all the deputies upon whom they could rely, to present a list comprising the names of the two directors and of one hundred and eighty deputies struck from the most suspected, and to propose their banishment without any judicial investigation, but by extraordinary legislative power. They desired not the death of any individual, but the forced removal of all dangerous characters. Many have thought that this *coup-d'etat* had become useless, because the Councils, intimidated by the evident determination of the Directory, betokened a disposition to relent. But this impression is groundless. All who are acquainted with the spirit of parties, and their sanguine impulses, must be aware that the Clichyans, upon seeing the Directory refrain from active aggression, would speedily have resumed their courage. If they had restrained themselves even until a new election, they would have redoubled their ardour with the accession of the third-third, and then become irresistible in their wrath. Nor would then the Directory have had the conventional minority in the Councils to support it, or to lend an appearance of legality to any extraordinary measures it might be driven to attempt. Moreover, without even taking into consideration the inevitable result of a new election, the Directory, if it remained inert, would be compelled to put the laws, passed by its adversaries, in execution, and to reorganize the national guard, that is to say, to give the counter-revolutionists the army of Vendémiaire, which must have led to a terrible conflict between the national guards and the troops of the line. In fact, so long as Pichegru and his accomplices had no other offensive means than motions in the Five-Hundred and an indefinite body of emigrants or Chouans in Paris, their schemes were not very formidable; but, supported by the national guard, they might take the field and commence a civil war of uncertain duration and result.

In accordance with these views, Rewbell and Larévellière determined that it was necessary to act without delay, and to put an end to all further uncertainty. Barras alone still appeared to hesitate, and caused his colleagues great uneasiness. They were in constant dread lest he might coalesce after all with the royalist faction or unite with the Jacobins to perpetrate a massacre. They watched him, however, with attention, and strove diligently to secure Augereau, by flattering his vanity, and endeavouring to render him sensible to the esteem of honest men. Still the preparations were not complete; the grenadiers of the legislative body were yet to be gained, the movements of the troops to be regulated, and, most important of all, money to be procured. A postponement, therefore, for a few days was indispensable. The directors were averse to request funds of the minister Ramel, from a wish not to compromise him; and they accordingly waited for those Bonaparte had offered, and which never came.

Bonaparte, as we have related, had dispatched his aide-de-camp Lavalette to Paris, in order that he might be supplied with accurate information touching all current affairs. An insight into the state of matters at Paris had tended to disgust M. de Lavalette, and he had communicated his impressions to Bonaparte. So much of individual feeling is mingled with political antagonism, that too near a view of parties is apt to prove repulsive to an ingenuous mind. Nay, if an observer regard merely the personal element in political discords, he will be tempted to believe there is nothing generous, sincere, or patriotic, in the motives of public men. Such was the effect that the contentions of the three directors, Barras, Larévellière, and Rewbell, with Carnot and Barthélemy, of the Conventionalists with the Clichyans, might fairly produce: a deplorable conflict in which egotism and self-interest might well seem, at the first aspect, to be the chief actuating principles. The military sojourning in Paris, likewise, tended by their pretensions to aggravate the tumult of those already in collision. Although incensed against the faction of Clichy, they were not prepared to declare unreservedly for the Directory. Men are prone to become petulant and exacting when they imagine themselves necessary. Thus, collecting around the minister Schérer, these military affected to consider themselves ill-used, as if the government had not done sufficient for them. Kleber, one of the noblest but the most intractable of characters, and who has been well described in the phrase that he would be neither the first nor the second, had stated to the Directory in his own original language: "*I will draw against your enemies if they attack you; but in showing my front to them I will turn my back on you.*" Lefebvre, Bernadotte, and the others, expressed themselves in similar terms. Struck with this chaos, M. de Lavalette wrote to Bonaparte in a strain calculated to induce him to remain neutral. He, accordingly,

satisfied with having given the impulse, refused to implicate himself further, and resolved to await the issue. He, therefore, wrote no more. The Directory then applied in its need to the trusty Hoche, who, having alone any reason to be discontented, sent fifty thousand francs, a sum which constituted the greater portion of his wife's dowry.

It was already the tenth day in the month of Fructidor, and Larévellière had replaced Carnot in the presidency of the Directory. In this capacity it was his function to receive the envoy of the Cisalpine republic, Visconti, and General Bernadotte, bearer of standards taken but not previously transmitted by the army of Italy. On this occasion he resolved to speak out in the most undisguised manner, and thereby drive Barras to a decision. He delivered, accordingly, two forcible harangues, in which he replied, without mentioning them, to the reports of Thibaudeau and Tronçon-Ducoudray. In allusion to Venice and the other Italian states recently emancipated, Thibaudeau had stated in substance that their fate would not be fixed so long as the legislative body of France was not consulted. Larévellière glanced at this expression in his address to Visconti, saying that the Italian people had determined to have liberty, possessed the right to secure it for themselves, and had no need of any earthly consent therefor. "This liberty," he added with energy, "of which it is sought to deprive you, both you and us, we will defend it together, and shall know how to preserve it." The menacing tone of these two orations dissipated the last shadow of doubt as to the intentions of the Directory; men who spoke in that style must have their resolution taken and their forces all prepared. The Clichyans were driven wild with sudden apprehensions. In the first paroxysms of fury they revived their project of impeaching the Directory. The Constitutionalists, however, repudiated the proposal, because they felt it would afford the Directory a feasible ground for violence, and they threatened, if it were persisted in, to produce proofs of treason against certain Deputies and move *their* impeachment. This menace deterred the Clichyans, and prevented the exhibition of articles of impeachment against the directors.

For some time past the Clichyans had been desirous of adding to the committee of inspectors Pichegru and Willot, who were regarded as the two generals of the party. But this addition of two new members, increasing the number to seven, was contrary to regulation. They waited, therefore, for the reappointment of the committee, which took place at the beginning of each month, and nominated thereon Pichegru, Vaublanc, Delarue, Thibaudeau, and Emery. This committee of inspectors was charged with the police of the hall; it issued orders to the grenadiers of the legislative body, and formed in some sort the executive power of the Councils. The Ancients had a similar committee, which fraternized with that of the Five-Hundred, and both in conjunction watched over the common safety. Numerous deputies resorted to the place of their meeting who had no business there, and thus constituted a new Clichy club, in which propositions equally violent and fruitless were submitted and debated. One of their first projects was to organize a police, to be employed in obtaining information touching the designs of the Directory. The superintendence of this police was intrusted to one Dossonville. As no fund for its payment existed, each contributed his quota; but a very moderate sum was raised. Furnished as he was, Pichegru might have proffered a large donation; but it does not appear that he applied any of the funds received from Wickham to this purpose.

The use of these police-spies seems to have been principally the collection of idle tales and rumours, with which they afterwards came to terrify the committees. Every day they repeated, "To-day, this very night, the Directory intends to arrest two hundred deputies, and have them massacred by the faubourgs." Such reports naturally excited alarm, and this alarm inspired suggestions of the most indiscreet character. The Directory, on the other hand, received through its spies exaggerated accounts of the proceedings in the committees, and imbibed in its turn fears of the gravest nature. Then expressions dropped in the saloons of the Directory, to the effect that it was time to strike if it were intended to avoid being anticipated, and revengeful threats were uttered, which, quickly conveyed to their ears, revisited upon the Clychians terror for terror.

Cut off from connection with either of the two parties, the Constitutionalists became every day more sensible of their faults and danger, and were overwhelmed with the direst consternation. Carnot, still more isolated than they, at enmity with the Clichyans, odious to the patriots, suspected even by the moderate republicans, calumniated and disowned, received the most rueful warnings. Constant rumours reached him of his doom to death by the orders of his colleagues. Barthélemy, who stood in the like predicament, was in the utmost trepidation and gave himself up for lost.

At the same time, similar warnings were given on all sides. Larévellière had been informed, in a manner to leave no doubt of the fact, that certain Chouans had been hired to assassinate him. Finding him the firmest of the three members of the majority, a resolution had been taken, he was told, to remove him as the means of annihilating it. His death assuredly would have changed the whole state of affairs, for the new director nominated by the Councils, would, without question, have voted with Carnot and Barthélemy. The advantages to be reaped from the crime, and the circumstantial details furnished to Larévellière, were calculated to make him keep on his guard. But he quailed not, and continued his evening promenades in the Jardin des Plantes. One man was found to offer him an atrocious insult. This proved to be Malo, colonel of the 21st dragoons, who had slaughtered the Jacobins in the camp at Grenelle, and had afterwards denounced Brottier and his accomplices. He was a creature of Carnot and Cochon, and had, without designing it, inspired the Clichyans with hopes which rendered him suspected. Being cashiered by the Directory, he attributed his dismissal to Larévellière, and attended at the Luxumbourg to threaten him. The intrepid magistrate was undismayed by the bravadoes of this cavalry officer, and thrust him from his presence by the shoulders.

Rewbell, though sincerely attached to the common cause, was distinguished rather for warmth of temper than firmness. He was informed one day that Barras was treating with an envoy of the pretender, and negotiating to betray the republic. Barras' connections with all parties might undoubtedly warrant apprehensions of any kind. — "We are lost," cried Rewbell, "Barras is betraying us, we are doomed to be killed; it only remains for us to fly, for we can no longer hope to save the republic."—Larévellière, more calm, replied to Rewbell that, so far from taking to flight, it behoved them to see Barras, speak to him with energy, force him to an explanation, intimidate him to compliance. They both forthwith repaired to Barras, interrogated him with sternness, and demanded why he still procrastinated. Barras, who was really occupied in making arrangements with Augereau, begged for a delay of three or four days, and promised that no further interval should elapse. Rewbell felt reassured and consented to wait. This occurred on the 13th or 14th Fructidor.

Barras and Augereau, in fact, had prepared all for the execution of the blow so long meditated. Hoche's

troops were disposed around the constitutional limit, ready to pass it and be at Paris within a few hours. A great part of the grenadiers of the legislative body had been gained through the instrumentality of Blanchard the second in command, and of several other officers, who were devoted to the Directory. A sufficient number of defections in the ranks of the grenadiers had been thus secured to prevent a battle. The commander-in-chief, Ramel, remained faithful to the Councils, on account of his obligations towards Carnot and Cochon; but his influence was not much to be dreaded. As a measure of precaution, the troops in garrison, and even the grenadiers of the legislative guard, were daily drilled in musket practice. This martial commotion and roar of guns were intended to deceive as to the actual day of execution.

Every day was expected to witness the consummation of the crisis. It was believed to be appointed for the 15th Fructidor, then for the 16th; but the 16th answered to the 2d September, and the Directory would not have selected a day of such terrible reminiscences. Meanwhile, the Clichyans were in an agony of dread. The police of the inspectors, misled by false appearances, had persuaded them that the event was fixed for the night of the 15th-16th. They assembled tumultuously towards evening in the room of the two committees. Rovère, that furious reactionist, now one of the committee of the Ancients, read a report from the police, according to which two hundred deputies were to be arrested during the night. Others, panting for breath, rushed in to announce that the barriers were shut, that four columns of troops were entering Paris, and that the executive committee was assembled at the Directory. They stated, moreover, that the hotel of the minister of police was all lighted up. A fearful uproar ensued. The members of the two committees, who ought to have been but ten, and were in reality fifty, complained that it was impossible for them to deliberate. At length messengers were dispatched, both to the barriers and the hotel of the police, to ascertain the truth of the reports, when it was found that perfect tranquillity prevailed in every quarter. A communication was then made that the police agents could not be paid on the following day, for lack of funds; every one emptied his pockets to eke out the requisite sum. The meeting thereafter separated. Several Clichyans surrounded Pichegru beseeching him to act; they proposed in the first place, to declare the Councils permanent, and then to collect the emigrants and Chouans that were in Paris, reinforce them with young men, march on the Directory, and capture the three directors. Pichegru pronounced these schemes ridiculous and impracticable, and again repeated that nothing could be done. The more hotbrained of the party vowed, nevertheless, to usher in the morrow by a motion to proclaim the sittings permanent.

The Directory was apprized, by its police, of the confusion amongst the Clichyans, and their desperate projects. Barras, who had all the means of execution at command, determined to put them in force during the ensuing night. Everything was arranged to enable the troops to clear the constitutional limit in a few hours. The garrison of Paris would suffice in the interim. A grand parade exercise was commanded for the next day, in order to be prepared with a pretext. No one was informed of the time selected, neither the ministers nor the directors Rewbell and Larévellière, so that every body was kept in ignorance of the event being on the eve of occurrence. The day of the 17th (3d September) passed in comparative tranquillity; no motion was made in the Councils. Many of the deputies absented themselves in the fond hope of eluding the catastrophe they had so imprudently provoked.

The meeting of the Directory took place as usual. All the five directors were present. At four o'clock in the afternoon, when the sitting was over, Barras took Rewbell and Larévellière aside, and intimated to them that it had become necessary to strike the blow that very night, to anticipate the enemy. He had demanded a delay of four days, but he forestalled that period to avoid a surprise. The three directors thereupon repaired to Rewbell's apartments, where they established themselves. It was agreed to summon all the ministers to Rewbell's, to remain there until the event was accomplished, and to permit no one to leave. Communications with the outside were to be made only through Augereau and his aides-de-camp. This plan settled, the ministers were convoked for the evening. Assembled altogether with the three directors, they set themselves to frame the necessary orders and proclamations. The design was to surround the palace of the legislative body, force the grenadiers from the posts they occupied, disperse the committees of inspectors, close the halls of the two councils, appoint another place of meeting, summon thither the deputies that could be relied upon, and make them pass a law against all the obnoxious parties. They reckoned with confidence that no deputies who were enemies of the Directory would venture to appear at the new place of meeting. Accordingly they proceeded to draw up proclamations announcing that a grand plot had been formed against the republic, whereof the principal authors were members of the two committees of inspectors, whence indeed it had been arranged the conspirators were to start, and that, to prevent their criminal purpose, the Directory had caused the halls of the legislative body to be shut, and fixed other places for the meeting of deputies faithful to the republic. The Five-Hundred were invited to assemble in the Odeon theatre, and the Ancients in the amphitheatre of the School of Medicine. A recital of the conspiracy, founded on the declaration of Duverne de Presle, and on the document discovered in the portfolio of d'Entraigues, was appended to these proclamations. The whole was immediately printed and ordered to be posted during the night on the walls of Paris. The ministers and three directors remained with closed doors at Rewbell's, whilst Augereau departed with his aides-de-camp to put the plan in execution.

Carnot and Barthélemy, having retired into the privacy of their own apartments at the Luxembourg, were ignorant of what was in preparation. The Clichyans in great excitement crowded the chamber of the committees. But Barthélemy, himself effectually deceived, had intimated as from authority that nothing would be attempted that night. Pichegru, too, had just quitted Schérer, and he gave his assurance that no preparations were as yet made. Some movements of troops had been remarked, but they were, it was stated, on account of the exercises to be held the next day, and they accordingly suggested no uneasiness. Thus every one feeling satisfied retired to his own abode. Rovère alone remained in the chamber of the inspectors, and sought repose in a bed designed for the member of the committees on guard.

Shortly after midnight, Augereau had disposed the troops of the garrison around the palace and brought up a numerous artillery. A perfect calm pervaded Paris, no sound being heard but the tramp of soldiers and the rolling of guns. The first great object was to gain the posts occupied by the grenadiers of the legislative-body without a conflict. About one in the morning an order was conveyed to their commander, Ramel, to attend the minister at war. He refused, at once divining what was intended, hastened to arouse the inspector Rovère, who could not even then believe in the danger, and afterwards proceeded to the barracks of his grena-

diers for the purpose of calling out the reserve and placing it under arms. Scarcely four hundred men held the different posts of the Tuileries; the reserve comprised eight hundred. These were speedily marshalled in arms and drawn up in battle-array across the garden of the Tuileries. The utmost order and deepest silence reigned throughout their ranks.

Nearly ten thousand men, all troops of the line, now surrounded the palace and prepared to storm it. The firing of a cannon charged with powder about three o'clock in the morning served as the signal. The commanders of columns presented themselves at the different posts. An officer advanced on the part of Augereau to order Ramel to evacuate the post of the Turning-Bridge, which formed the communication between the garden and the Place Louis Quinze; but Ramel declined. Fifteen hundred men, however, having appeared at the post, the grenadiers, the greater part of whom were gained, surrendered it. The same thing occurred at the other posts. All the approaches to the garden and the Carrousel were given up, and on all sides the palace was encompassed by large bodies of infantry and cavalry. Twelve pieces of cannon ready yoked were pointed on the building. The only obstacle that remained was the reserve of grenadiers, eight hundred men strong, ranged in form for action, and having the commander Ramel at its head. A portion of the grenadiers was disposed to do their duty; the remainder, seduced by the emissaries of Barras, were inclined on the contrary to unite with the troops of the Directory. Murmurs began to be heard in the ranks.—"We are not Swiss," cried several voices.—"I was wounded on the 13th Vendémiaire by the royalists," exclaimed an officer, "and I have no inclination to fight for them on the 18th Fructidor."—The defection soon spread through the companies. Blanchard, the second in command, promoted it by his words and presence. Ramel, however, was still determined to perform his duty, when he received an order, sent from the chamber of the inspectors, forbidding him to fire. At the same moment Augereau came up at the head of a numerous staff. "Commander Ramel," he said, "do you acknowledge me as chief of the 17th military division?"—"Yes," replied Ramel. "Then, as your superior, I order you to submit to arrest."—Ramel obeyed; but he was subjected to ill-treatment by some furious Jacobins on the staff of Augereau. The latter disengaged him from their brutality and ordered him to be conducted to the Temple. The report of the cannon and the investment of the palace had by this time startled every one from slumber. It was now five in the morning. The members of the committees had hurried to their post, and were assembled in their chamber. They were surrounded, and could no longer doubt the danger that threatened them. A company of soldiers stationed at their door had instructions to admit all who presented themselves with the medal of a deputy, but to allow none to come out. They saw their colleague Dumas approaching, hastening to his post; they threw him a note from the window to apprize him of the peril and warn him to save himself. Augereau took their swords from Pichegru and Willot, and sent them both to the Temple, besides several other deputies apprehended in the chamber of the inspectors.

Whilst this operation was in progress against the Councils, the Directory had instructed an officer to place himself at the head of a detachment and proceed to arrest Carnot and Barthélemy. Carnot, cautioned in time, had fled from his apartments and succeeded in escaping through a wicket in the garden of the Luxembourg of which he possessed the key. But Barthélemy was found at home and captured. His arrest was rather embarrassing to the Directory. With the exception of Barras, the directors were gratified at Carnot's flight, and they wished sincerely Barthélemy had imitated his example. They even proposed to connive at his escape. Barthélemy agreed, on condition he was permitted to travel openly and under his own name to Hamburgh. The directors however could not sanction such a step. Intending to transport several members of the legislative-body, they could not show so much partiality towards one of their own colleagues. Barthélemy was therefore conveyed to the Temple, where he arrived at the same moment with Pichegru, Willot, and the other deputies taken in the chamber of the inspectors.

The morning meanwhile was advancing; it was eight o'clock. Many of the deputies, now aware of all that had occurred, courageously resolved to confront the danger. Siméon, president of the Five-Hundred, and Lafond-Ladebat, president of the Ancients, proceeded to their respective halls, which were not yet closed, and took their seats accompanied by several deputies. But officers soon appeared and ordered them to withdraw. They had merely time to declare that the national representation was dissolved. The members retired to the house of one of their number, where the more intrepid urged a fresh attempt. They determined, in fact, to collect a second time, traverse Paris on foot, and present themselves, with the presidents at their head, at the doors of the Legislative Palace. Eleven o'clock was striking. All Paris was astir, acquainted with the events of the night, but the tranquillity of that immense city was not disturbed. It had not been a rising stimulated by passions; simply a methodical stretch of authority against a body of representatives A multitude of people encumbered the streets and public places without uttering a shout; save some groups from the faubourgs, composed of Jacobins, who paraded the streets vociferating: *Long live the republic! Down with aristocrats!* They provoked no response or opposition from the mass of the inhabitants. Principally around the Luxumbourg these groups assembled. There they cried: *The Directory for ever!* and a few voices: *Barras for ever!*

The procession of deputies moved in silence through the crowd gathered on the Carrousel, and paused at the gates of the Tuileries. Access was denied them. They persisted in demanding it. Thereupon a detachment drove them rudely away, and pursued them until they dispersed. A sad and deplorable spectacle, which foreboded the too near and inevitable domination of prætorian guards! Alas! why had a perfidious faction obliged the revolution to invoke the aid of bayonets! The deputies thus pursued retreated, some to the residence of the president Lafond-Ladebat, others to a house in the vicinity. There they deliberated in tumult, and were occupied in framing a protest, when an officer appeared bearing orders for them to separate. A certain number of them was arrested; namely, Lafond-Ladebat, Barbé-Marbois, Tronçon-Ducoudray, Bourdon de l'Oise, Goupil de Préfeln, and some others. These were conducted to the Temple, whither the members of the two committees had already preceded them.

During this period the directorial deputies had repaired to the new localities assigned for the meeting of the legislative-body. The Five-Hundred assembled at the Odéon, and the Ancients at the School of Medicine. Noon was approaching, and they were as yet few in number; but every instant added to the muster, both from intelligence of this extraordinary convocation being diffused more widely, and from all the waverers, fearing to be pronounced dissidents, hastening to show themselves in the novel legislature. From time to time the members present were counted; and when at length the Ancients numbered one hundred and twenty-six, and the Five-Hundred two hundred and fifty-one, more by one

than the half of the two Councils, they began to deliberate. There was, at first, some embarrassment in both assemblies, for the act they were called to legalize was only too manifestly a *coup-d'etat*. Their primary step was to declare themselves permanent, and to apprize each other they were constituted. Poulain-Grandpré, member of the Five-Hundred, was the first to speak. "The measures which have been taken," he said, "the locality we occupy, all announce that the country has incurred great dangers, and is yet exposed to them. Let us return thanks to the Directory; it is to it we owe the salvation of the country. But it is not enough that the Directory is on the watch; it is likewise our duty to take measures for securing the public safety and the constitution of the year III. With this view, I move the appointment of a committee of five members."

This proposition was adopted, and a committee nominated, composed of deputies devoted to the system of the Directory. They were Sieyes, Poulain-Grandpré, Villers, Chazal, and Boulay de la Meurthe. A message from the Directory to the two Councils was announced about six o'clock in the evening. This message contained a recital of the conspiracy, such as it was known to the Directory, copies of the two famous documents of which we have already often spoken, and fragments of letters found amongst the papers of the royalist agents. These pieces comprised all the evidence that had been acquired; they proved simply that Pichegru was in negotiation with the pretender, that Imbert-Colomés corresponded with Blankenburg, that Mersan and Lemerer were the heads of the conspiracy as regarded the Clichyans, and that a vast association of royalists extended over the whole of France. There were no other names mentioned than those already quoted. These documents produced, nevertheless, a great effect. In carrying a moral conviction, they demonstrated at the same time the impossibility of resorting to a judicial process, from the want of direct and positive testimony. The committee of five soon presented a report founded on the message. The Directory not having the initiative of measures, it was for the committee to exercise it; but this committee was in concert with the Directory, and prepared to propose the decrees it had premeditated. Boulay de la Meurthe, appointed to speak in the name of the committee, expounded the reasons upon which extraordinary measures are usually justified, reasons which, in this instance, were unfortunately too well founded. After stating that they were placed, as it were, on a field of battle, that it was necessary to take prompt and decisive steps, and, without shedding a drop of blood, reduce the conspirators to impotence for mischief, he submitted the motions projected. The principal consisted in annulling the electoral proceedings of forty-eight departments, thus delivering the legislative-body from deputies bound to a faction, and in selecting, out of the number, the most dangerous for banishment. The Councils had scarcely any choice as to the measures to be adopted; the crisis, in fact, admitted none others than were proposed to them, and the Directory, moreover, had assumed so formidable an attitude that they dared not reject them. The fluctuating and uncertain portion common to all assemblies, which vigour is so apt to overawe, was now ranged on the side of the directorialists and ready to vote all they might demand. The deputy Chollet, however, requested a delay of twelve hours to consider these propositions; but cries of *to the vote!* silenced him. The only alteration conceded was the erasure of certain names from the list of the exiled, to wit, those of Thibaudeau, Doulcet de Pontécoulant, Tarbé, Crecy, Detorcy, Normand, Dupont de Nemours, Remusat, and Bailly; some upon the plea of their being good patriots despite their opposition, and others as being too insignificant to be dangerous. After these obliterations, the resolutions as propounded were passed forthwith into decrees. The electoral operations of forty-eight departments were quashed. These departments were the following:—Ain, Ardèche, Arriége, Aube, Aveyron, Bouches-du-Rhone, Calvados, Charente, Cher, Côte-d'Or, Côtes-du-Nord, Dordogne, Eure, Eure-et-Loir, Gironde, Hérault, Ille-et-Vilaine, Indre-et-Loire, Loiret, Manche, Marne, Mayenne, Mont-Blanc, Morbihan, Moselle, Deux-Nèthes, Nord, Oise, Orne, Pays-de-Calais, Puy-de-Dôme, Bas-Rhin, Haut-Rhin, Rhone, Haute-Saône, Saône-et-Loire, Sarthe, Seine, Seine-Inferieure, Seine-et-Marne, Seine-et-Oise, Somme, Tarn, Var, Vaucluse, and Yonne. The deputies returned by these departments were expelled from the legislature. All the functionaries, such as judges or municipal administrators, elected by these departments, were likewise degraded from their offices. The following individuals were condemned to banishment, the place of exile being referred to the Directory:—in the Council of the Five-Hundred, Aubry, Job Aymé, Bayard, Blain, Boissy-d'Anglas, Borne, Bourdon-de-l'Oise, Cadroi, Couchery, Delahaye, Delarue, Doumère, Dumolard, Duplantier, Duprat, Gilbert-Desmolières, Henri Larivière, Imbert-Colomès, Camille-Jordan. Jourdan des Bouches-du-Rhone, Gau, Lacarrière, Lemarchant-Gomicourt, Lemerer, Mersan, Madier, Maillard, Noailles, André, Mac-Curtain, Pavée, Pastoret, Pichegru, Polissart, Praire-Montaud, Quatremère-Quincy, Saladin, Simeon, Vauvilliers, Vaublanc, Villaret-Joyeuse, and Willot; in the Council of Ancients, Barbé-Marbois, Dumas, Ferraut-Vaillant, Lafond-Ladebat, Laumont, Muraire, Murinais, Paradis, Portalis, Rovère, and Tronçon-Ducoudray.

The two directors, Carnot and Barthélemy, the ex-minister of police Cochon, his creature Dossonville, the commander of the guard of the legislative-body Ramel, and the three royalist agents, Brottier, Laville-Heurnois, and Duverne de Presle, were likewise condemned to transportation. Nor did the course of vengeance stop here. The journalists had not been less dangerous than the deputies, and the same incapacity existed for smiting them judicially. It was decided, therefore, to proceed revolutionally with regard to them, as had been done with the members of the legislature. Accordingly the proprietors, editors, and writers of no less than forty-two papers were sentenced to exile; for no conditions being at that time imposed upon political journals, their number was prodigious. Amongst the forty-two the *Quotidienne* figured conspicuously. To these measures against individuals, were added others tending to strengthen the authority of the Directory, and re-establish the revolutionary laws which the Councils had abolished or modified. Thus the Directory was empowered to nominate all the judges and municipal magistrates, whose elections were cancelled in the forty-eight departments. As to the seats of the deputies, they were to remain vacant. The articles of the famous law of the 3d Brumaire, which had been repealed, were again put in force, and even extended. The relatives of emigrants, excluded by that law from the exercise of public functions until the conclusion of peace, were excluded by the new law until a period of four years subsequent to peace; and were moreover wholly deprived of the electoral franchise. Emigrants who had returned under pretence of seeking the erasure of their names, were to leave the communes in which they lurked within twenty-four hours, and the territory of France within a fortnight. Any of them who should be apprehended in contumacy, were to undergo the application of the laws within twenty-four hours. The laws recalling banished priests and relieving them from the oath, substituting a simple declaration, were rescinded. All the enactments relative to the

performance of religious ceremonies were restored. The Directory was likewise invested with the power of banishing, on a simple order, priests whom it had reason to know were misconducting themselves. As to newspapers, it had the privilege in future of suppressing such as seemed to it dangerous. Political societies, that is to say clubs, were again legalized; but the Directory was armed with the same power against them that it held against journals: it might silence them at pleasure. Lastly, what was not less important than all the rest, the organization of the national guard was suspended, adjourned to happier times.

These measures could not be denounced as sanguinary, for the era of blood-spilling was in truth past, but they conferred on the Directory an authority wholly revolutionary. They were voted on the evening of the 18th Fructidor (4th September), in the Five-Hundred. Not a voice was raised against their adoption; certain deputies applauded, the majority were cowed and silent. The decree embodying them was instantly carried to the Ancients, who were in permanence as well as the Five-Hundred, and who were waiting to be supplied with a subject of deliberation. The mere reading of the decree and the report occupied them until the morning of the 19th. Fatigued by so long a sitting, they adjourned for a few hours. The Directory, impatient to obtain the sanction of the Ancients, and to be provided with legal weapons for consummating the blow it had struck, transmitted a second message to the legislative body. "The Directory," the message bore, "has devoted itself to the salvation of liberty, but it relies upon you to support it. To-day is the 19th, and you have done nothing yet to second its endeavours."—The decree was immediately afterwards passed and sent to the Directory.

The moment it was armed with this law, the Directory hastened to put it in force, determining to fulfil its purpose with promptitude, and return with all possible dispatch to a state of order. Several of those condemned to banishment had fled. Carnot had secretly directed his steps towards Switzerland. The Directory would have allowed Barthélemy also to escape, but he refused for the reasons mentioned above. Out of the list of the exiles it selected fifteen, deemed either more dangerous or more culpable than the rest, and adjudged them to a transportation which for some was less merciful than death itself. These were sent off that very day in grated vans to Rochefort, whence they were to be conveyed in a frigate to Guyenne. They included Barthélemy, Pichegru, and Willot, thus doomed on account of their superior importance or delinquency; Rovère, because of his known relations with the royalist faction; Aubry, on account of the part taken by him in the reaction; Bourdon de l'Oise, Murinais and Delarue, on account of their conduct in the Five-Hundred; Ramel, for his behaviour at the head of the grenadiers; Dossonville, for the functions he had performed under the committee of inspectors; Tronçon-Ducoudray, Barbé-Marbois, and Lafond-Ladebat, on account, not of their criminality, for they were sincerely attached to the republic, but of their influence in the council of the Ancients; and lastly, Brottier and Laville-Heurnois, on account of their conspiracy. Their accomplice Duverne de Presle was spared in consideration of his revelations. Personal animosity had undoubtedly its share in this choice of victims, for of these fifteen individuals none was really dangerous but Pichegru. The number was increased to sixteen through the attachment of one Letellier, a servant of Barthélemy, who begged permission to follow his master. They were hurried off to their destination without delay, and were exposed, as always happens, to the brutality of subordinates. The Directory, however, having learnt that General Dutertre, leader of the escort, behaved harshly towards the prisoners, immediately superseded him. These exiles in the cause of royalism were thus sent to follow Billaud-Varennes and Collot-d'Herbois, and consort with them in the same desolate habitation. The remainder of the proscripts were banished to the isle of Oleron.

During these two days, Paris remained perfectly calm. The patriots of the faubourgs, it is true, found the penalty of banishment too gentle, for they had been accustomed to revolutionary measures leading to a different issue. Confiding in Barras and Augereau, however, they still hoped for better things. They formed in groups, and loitered under the windows of the Directory, shouting—*Long live the republic! Long live the Directory! Barras for ever!* Attributing the affair mainly to Barras, they were desirous that the charge of effectually repressing aristocrats should be committed to him for a few days. But these inconsiderable assemblages in no degree disturbed the general tranquillity of Paris. The sectionaries of Vendémiaire, who would shortly, but for the decree of the 19th, have been reorganized in a national guard, were destitute of energy sufficient to prompt a spontaneous assumption of arms. They offered no show of opposition to the full execution of the *coup-d'etat*. For the rest, opinion was undecided. True republicans allowed that the royalist faction had rendered some act of vigour requisite, but they deplored the violation of the laws, and the intervention of military power. They were almost disposed to question the guilt of the conspirators too, on finding a man like Carnot involved in their crime. They feared that antipathies had unduly influenced the determinations of the Directory. In short, even granting that its proceedings might have been necessary, they felt grieved and sad, and with reason; for it had become evident that the constitution, on which they rested all their hopes, was to prove no termination to discord and strife. The mass of the population submitted in silence, and from this time forth almost wholly abjured politics. We have seen it on the 9th Thermidor, pass from the extremity of hatred against the ancient order of things, to that of hatred against the recent reign of terror. Since, it had never been roused to interfere in affairs except in opposition to the Directory, which it regarded in the same light as the convention and the committee of public welfare. Terrified at present by the energy of this same Directory, it learnt, from the events of the 18th Fructidor, the wisdom of keeping aloof from political struggles. Accordingly we find that, from this day, political feeling gradually abated, and in the end subsided into apathy.

Such were the consequences of the *coup-d'etat* of the 18th Fructidor. It has been argued that all necessity for it had ceased at the period of its execution; that the Directory, by alarming the royalist faction, had already succeeded in awing it; and that, by persisting in its determination, it prepared the way for military usurpation by an example of the violation of the laws. But, as we have already urged, the royalist faction was intimidated only for the moment; upon the accession of the next third, it would have infallibly reversed the whole order of things, and uprooted the Directory. A civil war must then have ensued between it and the armies. The Directory, by anticipating this royalist movement and crushing it in embryo, prevented the evils of a civil war, and if it thereby placed itself under the shield of the military power, it submitted to a sad but inevitable necessity. Legality was all a farce in the sequel of a revolution like the French. It was not under the shelter of a mere legal authority that the different parties could settle and find repose; a stronger power was needed to curb, harmonize, amalgamate them, and above all, protect them against Europe in arms: and this power was the military. The Directory, therefore, by the 18th Fructidor

prevented a civil war, substituting for it a *coup-d'etat*, accomplished with force, but with all the calmness and moderation possible in a revolutionary epoch.

CHAPTER LV.

CONSEQUENCES OF THE 18TH FRUCTIDOR. — DISGRACE OF MOREAU.—DEATH OF HOCHE.—LAW AGAINST THE OLD NOBILITY.—RUPTURE OF THE CONFERENCES AT LILLE WITH ENGLAND.—NEGOTIATIONS AT UDINE.—PROCEEDINGS OF BONAPARTE IN ITALY; THE FOUNDATION OF THE CISALPINE REPUBLIC; THE LIGURIAN CONSTITUTION; ESTABLISHMENTS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN. — TREATY OF CAMPO-FORMIO.—RETURN OF BONAPARTE TO PARIS; TRIUMPHAL FESTIVAL.

The 18th Fructidor threw terror into the ranks of the royalists. Priests and emigrants, already returned in great numbers, hurried in a panic from Paris and other large towns to regain the frontiers. Those who were preparing to return, again betook themselves to their haunts in Germany and Switzerland. The Directory had been re-invested, by the law of the 19th, with all the earlier revolutionary omnipotence, and none could venture to brave its wrath. It commenced by sweeping the administrations, as usual upon every change of system, and preferred decided patriots to the majority of vacated places. It had the power of nominating to all the elective offices in forty-eight departments, and was thus enabled greatly to extend its influence and multiply its partisans. One of its first cares was to replace the two directors, Carnot and Barthélemy. Rewbell and Larévellière, whose influence the late event had singularly increased, were unwilling to be accused of having deposed two of their colleagues to render themselves sole masters of the government. They insisted, therefore, that the legislative body should be immediately invited to elect two new directors. In this decision Barras did not concur, and still less Augereau. The latter was wonderfully elated with the day of the 18th, and proud of having so successfully conducted it. In mingling with affairs he had imbibed a taste for politics and power, and formed the ambitious project of aspiring to a place in the Directory. He was of opinion that the three directors, without applying to the legislative body for colleagues, should at once collate him to the vacant dignity. In this pretension he was not gratified, and no other mode of becoming a director remained for him than to obtain a majority in the Councils. But in that hope also he was disappointed. Merlin de Douai, minister of justice, and François de Neufchateau, minister of the interior, commanded the requisite number of votes above all competitors. After them, Massena and Augereau were the candidates who united most suffrages in their favour. Massena had a few more than Augereau. The two new directors were installed with the usual ceremonies. They were republicans, rather after the manner of Rewbell and Larévellière, than that of Barras; and differed even more essentially from the latter in habits and manners. Merlin was a lawyer, François de Neufchateau a man of letters. Both lived in the sober fashion suitable to their professions, and were formed in all respects to assimilate with Rewbell and Larévellière. Nevertheless, it was perhaps desirable, for the sake of the sway and consideration of the Directory with the armies, that some general of celebrity had been appointed a member of it.

In lieu of the two ministers raised to the Directory, that body appointed two excellent officers taken from the provinces. It desired in this manner to compose the government of men strangers to the intrigues of Paris and less accessible to favour. To the ministry of justice it promoted Lambrechts, who was commissary in the central administration of the department of la Dyle, that is to say, prefect; he had hitherto approved himself an upright magistrate. For the ministry of the interior it selected Letourneur, commissary in the central administration of the Loire-Inférieure, an able, active, and conscientious functionary, but too little acquainted with the capital and its usages to save himself at all times from incurring ridicule in the administration of a high department of state.

The Directory had so far every reason to be gratified with the manner in which events had proceeded. The only cause of disquietude existed in the silence of General Bonaparte, who had not written for a long interval, nor had sent the promised remittance. His aide-de-camp Lavalette had not appeared at the Luxembourg during the crisis, and he was suspected to have poisoned his general against the Directory, and to have forwarded him false information touching the state of affairs. It was in fact true that he had continually advised Bonaparte to hold himself aloof, to keep asunder from the *coup-d'etat*, and to content himself with the assistance he had already given the Directory by his proclamations. Barras and Augereau sent for M. de Lavalette and took him angrily to task, saying, he had doubtless deceived Bonaparte and would have been placed under arrest but for the respect due to his general. M. de Lavalette thereupon precipitately departed for Italy. Augereau hastily composed epistles to General Bonaparte and his friends in the army, for the purpose of describing the event in the most favourable colours.

Already discontented with Moreau, the Directory had resolved to recall him, when it received a communication from him which caused a very deep sensation. Moreau had seized, after the passage of the Rhine, the papers of General Klinglin, and found amongst them the whole correspondence between Pichegru and the prince of Condé. He had kept this correspondence secret; but he decided upon imparting it to the government immediately subsequent to the 18th Fructidor. He professed to have taken this resolution before knowing the events of the 18th, and solely with the view of supplying to the Directory the evidence it needed to confound its implacable enemies. But it is asserted that Moreau had received news of the event on the very day of the 18th by telegraph, and had then hastened to forward a denunciation which compromised Pichegru no more than he actually was, and which relieved himself from a heavy responsibility. Be the case as it may, it is, at all events, certain that Moreau had for a long while preserved an important secret, and had brought himself to reveal it only at the very moment of the catastrophe. It was the general impression with regard to his behaviour in this instance, that he loved not the republic sufficiently to expose the treachery of his friend, and yet was too lukewarm a friend to retain the secret to the end. His political character was here exhibited in its real light, that is to say, as weak, vacillating, and uncertain. The Directory summoned him to Paris to render an account of his conduct. On examining the correspondence it found a full confirmation of all it had otherwise learnt respecting Pichegru, and had only cause to regret it did not possess the knowledge sooner. It likewise discovered proof of Moreau's own fidelity to the republic; but it rewarded his supineness and procrastination by depriving him of his command and leaving him destitute of employment at Paris.

Hoche, still at the head of his army of the Sambre-and-Meuse, had undergone during the whole of the past month the most anxious solicitude. He remained in his head-quarters at Wetzler, keeping a carriage constantly ready to fly into Germany with

his young wife, if the opposition in the Councils prevailed. It was in this predicament that, for the first time in his life, he turned a thought to his own interests and sought to secure a sum of money sufficient to answer his necessities during his absence. We have already seen that he had lent to the Directory the greater portion of his wife's dowry. The news of the 18th Fructidor filled him with joy and relieved him from all fear on his own account. To recompense his attachment, the Directory united the two great armies of the Sambre-and-Meuse and the Rhine into one, and appointed him its generalissimo. It was the most extensive command in the republic. Unfortunately the health of the young general prevented him from enjoying the triumph of the patriots and this testimony of regard on the part of the government. For some time a dry and troublesome cough, accompanied by nervous spasms, had alarmed his friends and physicians. A secret malady consumed the youthful hero, once so buoyant of health, and who to his great talents added the advantages of personal beauty and the most masculine vigour. Notwithstanding his untoward condition however, he employed himself in organizing into one the two armies confided to his command, and continued to fix his attention on the expedition to Ireland, which the Directory was desirous of holding *in terrorem* over the British government. But his cough became more violent towards the end of Fructidor, and he began to suffer insupportable torments. He was exhorted to suspend his labours, but he refused. He called his physician and said to him: *Give me a remedy for fatigue, but let not that remedy be repose.* Conquered by the disease, he at length took to his bed on the first complementary day of the year V (17th September), and expired on the following day amidst the most distressing agonies. The whole army was in the deepest consternation, for it adored its young general. The mournful intelligence spread with rapidity and struck with affliction all true republicans, who placed the greatest hopes in the talents and patriotism of Hoche. The report of poison immediately circulated; it seemed impossible to believe that one in such vigour of youth, strength, and health, should be thus carried off by natural means. A *post mortem* examination was instituted; the stomach and intestines were scrutinized by the Faculty, who found them loaded with dark ulcerations, and who, without announcing traces of poison, appeared nevertheless to believe in its existence. Many attributed the poisoning to the Directory, which was absurd, for no member of the Directory was capable of such a crime, so wholly foreign to French manners, and none moreover had any interest in its commission. In fact, Hoche was the most solid support of the Directory, both against the royalists and against the ambitious conqueror of Italy. Others surmised with more likelihood that he had been poisoned in the West. His physician thought he remembered that the alteration in his health dated from his last sojourn in Brittany, when he went to embark for Ireland. Some again supposed, but without any proof, that he had been poisoned at a banquet he had given to persons of all parties with the view of reconciling them.

The Directory instituted magnificent obsequies to his memory. They were celebrated on the Champ de Mars, in presence of all the bodies of the state, and amidst an immense concourse of people. A considerable army followed the procession. The aged father of the general officiated as chief mourner. This funereal pomp produced a deep impression, and remained a grand memorial of that heroic era.

Thus closed one of the fairest and most interesting existences that adorned the revolution. This time at least it was not by the scaffold. Hoche was only in his twenty-ninth year. As a private soldier in the French guards, a few months had sufficed to perfect his education. To the physical courage of the warrior, he added an energetic character, a superior intelligence, an accurate knowledge of men, an excellent capacity for political emergencies, and, moreover, the inspiring impulse of enthusiasm. This with him amounted to a passion, ardent and uncontrollable, and which proved perhaps the predisposing cause of his death. The peculiar circumstances of his career increased the interest his manifold qualities excited. He had always met with untoward accidents to arrest his fortune. Conqueror at Weissemburg and ready to enter upon a glorious scene of action, he was suddenly thrown into a dungeon; released from imprisonment to prosecute the harassing warfare of La Vendée, he on that unpropitious stage played an ever-memorable part, and at the moment he was about to execute his great project on Ireland, a tempest and failures in his combinations again defeated his expectations; removed to the army of the Sambre-and-Meuse, he gained an important victory at its head, and once more had his progress suspended by the preliminaries of Leoben; lastly, in command of the army of Germany, with Europe still disposed for war, he had a vast future before him when he was struck amidst his dazzling prospects, and hurried to the grave by a disease of forty-eight hours' virulence. If, however, a cherished memory can compensate the loss of life, he might be well content to surrender his even thus prematurely. A series of splendid victories, an arduous pacification, a universality of talent, a probity without stain, the belief general amongst republicans that he would have curbed the conqueror of Rivoli and the Pyramids, that his ambition would have remained republican and formed an insuperable obstacle to the imperious pride that aspired to a throne, in a word, lofty deeds, noble inspirations, a youth of the fairest promise,—these are what constitute his renown. And assuredly it is great enough! Let us not pity him then for dying young. It will always redound more to the glory of Hoche, Kleber, and Desaix, that they did not live to be marshals. They all bore the distinction of citizens and freemen to the tomb, and were not reduced like Moreau to become a fugitive in foreign armies.

The Directory gave the army of Germany to Augereau, and thus freed itself from his turbulence, which was becoming inconvenient at Paris.

In the course of a few days the Directory had completed all the arrangements that circumstances demanded; but the important subject of the finances remained to engage its attention. The decree of the 19th Fructidor, by delivering it from its most formidable enemies, reviving the law of the 3d Brumaire, endowing it with increased means of severity against priests and emigrants, arming it with the power of suppressing journals and clubs whose principles gave it offence, permitting it to fill all the vacant offices after the avoidance of the elections, postponing indefinitely the reorganization of the national guards,—this decree, we say, had restored to the Directory all the two Councils had attempted to wrest from it, and had even added a species of revolutionary omnipotence. But it had equally essential advantages to recover in the matter of finance, for in this respect its influence had not been less crippled than in all others. A grand scheme was propounded for the receipts and disbursements of the year VI. The first object was to restore to the Directory the functions of which it had been deprived relative to the negotiations of the Treasury, to the order of payments, in short, to the management of the funds. All the provisions adopted by the two Councils, before the 18th Fructidor, on this subject were accordingly rescinded. It next became requisite to devise fresh sources of income, both with the view of relieving property unduly burdened, and of raising the revenue to a level with the expen-

diture. The institution of a lottery was authorized; a toll on roads and a tax on pledges were likewise established. The imposts on registries were regulated in a manner to greatly augment their produce, and the duties on foreign tobacco were increased. By means of these new expedients, the government was enabled to reduce the property-tax to 228 millions and the personal to 50, and yet raise the sum-total of receipts for the year VI. to 616 millions. In this amount, the anticipated sales of national domains were estimated at only twenty millions.

The income being by these means elevated to 616 millions, it became necessary to diminish the expenditure to the same level. The war was assumed to cost this year, even in case of a fresh campaign, only 283 millions. The other general expenses were estimated at 247 millions, making 530 millions in the whole. The interest of the debt alone amounted to 258 millions; and if it had been actually paid, the charge would have reached a point far superior to the resources of the republic. It was proposed, therefore, to discharge only the third of it, that is to say, 86 millions. In this manner, the war, the general services of the state, and the interest of the debt, would require an expenditure of but 616 millions, answering to the income. But to bring it within this limit, a decisive measure with regard to the debt was necessary. Since the abolition of paper money and a return to specie, the payment of the interest could not be regularly kept up. A quarter had been paid in specie and three quarters in credits on the national domains, called *debentures of the three quarters*. This was in point of fact as if a fourth were paid in cash, and three-fourths in assignats. The public debt had therefore been principally provided for from the resource of the national domains, and it became imperative to devise some remedy on the subject, both for behoof of the state and of the creditors. A debt, the annual charge of which amounted to 258 millions, was in truth enormous for that period. The resources of credit and the effects of a sinking-fund were then unknown. The revenue was much less considerable than it has since become, for there had not yet been time to reap all the benefits of the revolution; and France, which has been able since to contribute a thousand millions in general taxation, could then scarcely raise 616 millions. Thus the debt was overwhelming, and the country was in the situation of an individual in hopeless insolvency. Hence, the expedient was proposed of continuing to meet a portion of the interest in cash, and, instead of paying the remainder by credits on the national property, of liquidating the capital itself out of that property. To effectuate this plan, one-third only of the debt would be preserved, to be styled the *consolidated third*, and to remain in the great book in the light of a perpetual annuity. The two remaining thirds would be paid off, at the rate of twenty times the interest, in securities receivable in payment of national domains. It is true that such securities bore in the market less than a sixth of their value, and that for those who had no desire to purchase lands, it was in reality tantamount to a bankruptcy.

Notwithstanding the quietude and docility of the Councils since the 18th Fructidor, this measure provoked a strenuous opposition. The opponents of the proposed liquidation maintained that it was an actual bankruptcy; that the debt, at the commencement of the revolution, had been placed under the safeguard of the national honour, and that it was to disgrace the republic to liquidate by such means two-thirds of it; that the creditors who did not purchase lands would lose nine-tenths in the negotiation of their credits, for the emission of so great a quantity of paper must of necessity considerably depress its value; that, setting aside the prejudices arising from the origin of the confiscated property, the creditors of the state were for the most part too poor to buy estates; that associations to purchase them in common were impracticable; that, in consequence, the loss of nine-tenths of their capital was unavoidable by the majority; that the pretended consolidated third, even placed above the chance of reduction in future, was only promised; that the promise of one-third was less desirable than the promise of three-thirds; and lastly, that if the republic could not at the moment meet all the charge of the debt, it was better for the creditors to wait as they had done hitherto, but to wait with the hope of seeing their situation ameliorated, than to be at once despoiled of their stock. Many even argued that a distinction should be drawn between the different conditions of stock inscribed in the great book, and that only such as had been acquired at a low price should be subjected to the liquidation. It had been sold indeed as low as ten and fifteen francs, and those who had purchased at that rate would still gain considerably notwithstanding the reduction to one-third.

The advocates of the directorial plan replied that a state possessed the right, like an individual, of abandoning its property to its creditors, when it could no longer pay them; that the debt far exceeded the resources of the republic; and that, in this position, it had the privilege of giving up the actual pledge for that debt, namely, the national domains; that by purchasing lands the creditors would lose very little; that those lands would improve in their hands, so as speedily to regain their old value, and that they would thus recover what they had lost; that 1,300 millions of property remained (the thousand millions promised to the armies being transferred to the creditors of the state); that peace was near at hand, and upon that event the debentures of liquidation would be alone received in payment for national property; that, in consequence, the portion of the capital liquidated, amounting to about 3,000 millions, would have an equivalent of 1,300 millions in domains, and would suffer a diminution at the utmost of two-thirds instead of nine-tenths; that at any rate the creditors had never been treated otherwise heretofore, since they had always been paid in domains, whether in the shape of assignats or of *debentures of the three-fourths;* that the republic was compelled to give them what it had; that they could gain nothing by waiting, inasmuch as it never would be able to provide for the whole debt; that by liquidating their claims, their situation became henceforth fixed; that the security of the consolidated third would be realized forthwith, for the means of discharging the interest subsisted; that the republic would, on its part, be relieved by the operation from an enormous burden, and be enabled to enter for the future upon a regular system; that it would appear in the face of Europe with a lightened debt, and thereby become more powerful and imposing to command peace; and lastly, that no distinction could be made between the different sorts of stock with reference to the price of acquisition, and that they must be all dealt with on an equal footing.

Some measure of this kind was inevitable. The republic merely proposed to do now what it had always done: all engagements above its capacity to meet, it had ever discharged with domains at the price to which they had fallen. It was by assignats it had paid the old burdens of the state as well as all the expenses of the revolution, and it was with lands it had redeemed the assignats. It was in paper-credits, in other words, lands, it had paid the interest of the debt, and it was with lands it finished by liquidating the capital itself. In a word, it gave what it possessed. The United States had done no more for the discharge of their public debt. All the satisfaction their creditors received was derived from the banks of the Mississippi. Measures of this nature cause, like revolutions, much individual suffering and

ruin; but the result must be submitted to when they have become inevitable.

The plan was ultimately adopted. Thus, by means of new and improved taxation, whereby the income was raised to 616 millions, and by virtue of the reduction of the debt, whereby the expenditure could be limited to that sum, an equilibrium was re-established in the finances, and less difficulty might be reasonably anticipated in the operations of the year VI (from September 1797 to September 1798).

All these measures, the fruits of its signal victory, the republican party desired to crown by one more. Pleading that the republic would always be in peril so long as a hostile caste, that of the old nobility, should be suffered within its bounds, it proposed that all families which had been formerly noble, or pretended to be so, should be sent into exile, being permitted to realize their property, and carry it with them in French merchandise whithersoever they might choose to betake themselves, their prejudices, and their passions. This proposition was strongly supported by Sieyes, Boulay de la Meurthe, Chazal, and all decided republicans, but vehemently combated by Tallien and the friends of Barras. Barras was himself noble; the general of the army of Italy was of aristocratic birth; many of those who shared the pleasures of Barras, and filled his saloons, were likewise of old noble parentage; and although an exception was made in favour of those who had usefully served the republic, the apartments of the director resounded with angry denunciations of the proposed law. Even apart from these personal reasons, strong grounds of objection against such a measure existed in its danger and cruelty. It was submitted, however, to the two Councils, but excited such a storm of opposition that it was obliged to be withdrawn, for the purpose of being greatly modified. It was reproduced and passed in a different shape, whereby the penalty of exile was not pronounced, but simply that persons of noble lineage should be deemed aliens, and obliged, in order to recover the privileges of citizens, to observe the formalities and undergo the ordeal preparatory to naturalization. A saving clause was introduced in behalf of men who had served the republic with advantage either in the armies or in the assemblies. Barras, his friends, and the conqueror of Italy, at whose birth malicious inuendoes were constantly levelled, were thus freed from the consequences of this measure.

The Directory had in all things resumed an energy essentially revolutionary. The opposition, which in the Directory and Councils affected to advocate peace, being removed, the government exhibited more firmness and obduracy in the negotiations at Lille and Udine. It ordered all soldiers absent on furlough immediately to rejoin their regiments, and, replacing everything on a war-footing, sent fresh instructions to its envoys. Maret, at Lille, as we have seen, had succeeded in reconciling the pretensions of the maritime powers. The terms of peace were arranged, provided Spain would sacrifice Trinidad, and Holland Trincomalee, and France undertake never to seize the Cape of Good Hope into her own possession. It only remained, therefore, to obtain the consent of Spain and Holland. In this negotiation the Directory found Maret too pliable, and resolved accordingly to supersede him. In his place it accredited Bonnier and Treilhard with fresh instructions. According to these, France demanded the simple and unconditional surrender, not only of her own colonies, but of those likewise of her allies. With regard also to the negotiations at Udine, the Directory displayed an equally keen and positive spirit. It no longer consented to be bound by the preliminaries of Leoben, which gave Austria the limit of the Oglio in Italy; it now insisted that Italy should be wholly enfranchised to the banks of the Isonzo, and that Austria should find an indemnity in the secularization of certain ecclesiastical states in Germany. It recalled Clarke, who had been chosen and sent by Carnot, and who in his correspondence had spoken reproachfully of the generals reputed the most republican in the army of Italy. Bonaparte alone remained charged with the powers of the republic in the conferences with Austria.

The ultimatum which the Directory caused to be signified at Lille by its new envoys, Bonnier and Treilhard, occasioned a rupture of the negotiation almost concluded. Lord Malmesbury was deeply mortified at this result, for he desired peace, both as an honourable termination of his own career, and as the means of securing his government a moment of respite. He testified the most poignant regret, but it was impossible for England to relinquish all its naval conquests and receive nothing in exchange. Lord Malmesbury, at the same time, was so sincere in his wish to treat, that he urged Maret on his return to Paris to see whether it were not possible to influence the determination of the Directory, and even offered several millions to purchase the vote of one of the directors. Maret declined to undertake any negotiation of this sort, and quitted Lille. Lord Malmesbury and Mr. Ellis likewise immediately took their departure. Although the Directory may be reproached on this occasion with having repudiated a certain and advantageous peace for France, its motive nevertheless was creditable. It would have been certainly unjust on the part of France to abandon her allies and impose sacrifices on them for their devotion to her cause. Moreover, presuming on a speedy peace with Austria, or at least on intimidating her into one by another military movement, the Directory indulged the hope of being shortly relieved from its continental enemies, and enabled to concentrate all its forces upon the subjugation of England.

Meanwhile the instructions forwarded to Bonaparte displeased him exceedingly, for he could scarcely expect to act upon them with a prosperous issue. It was a difficult undertaking, in fact, to induce Austria to surrender Italy altogether, and content herself with the secularization of certain ecclesiastical states in Germany, under threat of marching on Vienna. Indeed Bonaparte could no longer aspire to that feat, for he had all the forces of the Austrian monarchy arrayed against him, and it was the army of Germany that must first force its way and penetrate into the hereditary states. To this subject of irritation was added another in the doubts conceived to his prejudice at Paris. Augereau had dispatched one of his aides-de camp with letters for several of the generals and officers of the army of Italy. This aide-de-camp appeared to fulfil a sort of mission, and to be employed in the charge of rectifying the opinions of the army touching the 18th Fructidor. Bonaparte gathered sufficient to convince him he was regarded with suspicion. He hastened to act the part of an injured person, and to complain with the vivacity and bitterness of one who feels himself indispensable; he accused the government of treating him with detestable ingratitude, and of behaving towards him as towards Pichegru after Vendémiaire, and he demanded his supercession. Here we find this man, with so grand and indomitable a spirit, and who knew so well how to assume a noble attitude, abandon himself to the spleen of an impetuous and froward boy. The Directory took no notice of his demand to be recalled, and solemnly assured him that the letters in question or the dispatch of an aide-de-camp covered no sinister intention towards him. Bonaparte was somewhat appeased, but still insisted on being superseded in the functions of negotiator and organizer of the Italian republics. He urged unceasingly that he was ill, that he could not support the fatigue of horse-exercise, and that it was impossible for him to prosecute

a fresh campaign. Nevertheless, although in truth he was ill and oppressed by the prodigious labours he had undergone for the last two years, he had no desire to be replaced in any of his duties, and felt confident he might rely on the elasticity of his mind if strength of body were in emergency to fail him.

He resolved, in fact, to continue the negotiation, and crown his glory as first captain of the age with that of peacemaker. The ultimatum of the Directory, it is true, galled him; but he was not more disposed on this occasion than on many others to pay implicit obedience to his government. His occupations at this juncture appear almost overwhelming. He was engaged in organizing the Italian republics, creating a navy in the Adriatic, projecting great enterprises in the Mediterranean, and negotiating with the plenipotentiaries of Austria.

He had commenced by organizing into two separate states the provinces he had emancipated in Upper Italy. In his early progress he had formed the duchy of Modena and the legations of Bologna and Ferrara into the Cispadan republic. His design was to have united this petty dominion with revolutionized Venice, and thus recompense the latter for the loss of its provinces on terra-firma. He intended to organize Lombardy apart, under the title of the Transpadan republic. But his ideas soon underwent a change, and he preferred to constitute a single state of the enfranchised provinces. The spirit of locality, which at first appeared an obstacle to the incorporation of Lombardy with the other provinces, was now a motive for amalgamating them. Romagna, for example, was averse to a union with the legations and the duchy of Modena, but willing to depend on a central government established at Milan. Bonaparte saw that, each detesting its neighbour, it would be easier to merge the whole into subjection to a single authority. Moreover, the difficulty of determining the question of supremacy between Venice and Milan, and of assigning the preference to one of them as the seat of government, had ceased to fetter him. He was resolved to sacrifice Venice. The Venitians inspired him with no affection; he perceived that the change of government had not produced amongst them a change of disposition. The great nobility, the petty, and the people, were all alike still the enemies of France and the revolution, and unanimous in vows for the success of Austria. Merely a small number of the wealthier citizens cordially approved the new order of things. The democratic municipality evinced the most hostile spirit towards the French. Nearly the whole population seemed to hope that a return of fortune might enable Austria to restore the ancient government. Furthermore, the Venetians were contemptible in the eyes of Bonaparte under another aspect highly important in his view, to wit, prostration of power. Their canals and harbours were almost choked up; their navy was in a deplorable condition; they were themselves emasculated by indulgence in pleasures, and altogether incapable of energy. "They are a soft, effeminate, and cowardly people," he wrote, "without land or water, and we have only to dispose of them." He was well disposed, therefore, to abandon Venice to Austria, on condition that the latter, relinquishing the boundary of the Oglio, stipulated by the preliminaries of Leoben, would retrograde to the Adige. This river, forming an excellent line of demarcation, would then divide Austria from the new republic. The important fortress of Mantua, which, according to the preliminaries, was to be restored to Austria, would remain with the Italian republic, and Milan become the capital without dispute. Hence, Bonaparte greatly preferred the plan of erecting a single state, whereof Milan should be the metropolis, and giving to it the frontier of the Adige and Mantua, to the retention of Venice; and in this he was right from regard even to Italian freedom. The emancipation of all Italy to the Isonzo being impracticable, it was better to sacrifice Venice than the frontier of the Adige and Mantua. Bonaparte had found, in conferences with the Austrian envoys, that this new arrangement might be accepted. In consequence, he proceeded to incorporate Lombardy, the duchies of Modena and Reggio, the legations of Bologna and Ferrara, Romagna, the Bergamasco, the Brescian, and the Mantuan, into one state extending to the Adige, and possessing excellent fortresses, such as Pizzighitone and Mantua, a population of three millions six hundred thousand souls, an admirable soil, navigable rivers, canals, and harbours.

Without delay he set himself to mould this confederation into a republic. He was inclined towards the adoption of a different constitution from that of France. He deemed the executive power in that constitution too weak; and without having any decided predilection for this or that form of government, but moved solely by the necessity of forming a strong state, and one capable of contending with its aristocratic neighbours, he was in favour of a more concentrated and energetic organization. With this view he requested that Sieyes should be sent to him, that he might have the advantage of his assistance in the invention; but the Directory refused to acquiesce in his ideas, and insisted that the new republic should have the French constitution. Its mandate was obeyed, and forthwith the constitution of France was transplanted to Italy. In the first place, the new republic was christened the Cisalpine. The wish at Paris was to have it denominated the Transalpine; but this would have been as if Paris were to be the centre, whereas the Italians contemplated it being fixed at Rome, for all their vows tended to the enfranchisement and unity of their country, and to the re-establishment of the ancient metropolis. The term "Cisalpine," therefore, was more agreeable to them as suitable to that consummation. It was not deemed prudent, at the same time, to intrust the first composition of the government to the suffrages of the Italians. On this first occasion, therefore, Bonaparte himself nominated the five directors, and the members of the two Councils. He endeavoured to make the best selections, or at least the best his position permitted him. As one of the directors he appointed Serbelloni, one of the chief magnates in Italy. He instituted a general enrolment of national guards throughout the country, and assembled thirty thousand of them at Milan for the federation of the 14th July. The presence of the French army in Italy, its great achievements and renown, had begun to diffuse a spirit of military enthusiasm in this land where the use of arms seemed almost forgotten. Bonaparte laboured to stimulate it by every possible means. He was well aware how feeble the new republic was in a military aspect; the Piedmontese army alone commanded any of his esteem in Italy, because the court of Piedmont alone had waged war in the course of the century. He wrote to Paris that a single regiment of the King of Sardinia would suffice to overthrow the Cisalpine republic; that it was of paramount importance therefore to introduce warlike habits amongst its population; that it might then become a potential state in Italy; but that time was needed to accomplish this end, for such revolutions were not made in a few days. He was beginning to succeed, however, in his object, for he possessed in the highest degree the art of communicating to others the most ardent of his passions, that for arms. None ever knew better how to profit by his glory in order to excite enthusiasm for military triumphs, and to point in that direction all pride and ambition. From this period manners began to change in Italy. "The *soutane* (a sort of cassock), which was the dress in vogue amongst young men, gave place to a military uniform. Instead of passing their days at the feet of women, the young Italians

frequented the riding-schools, fencing-schools, and practice-grounds. Children no longer followed their usual games; they formed regiments armed with weapons of tin, and imitated in their sports the evolutions of war. On the stage, and in street-farces, an Italian had been always represented as a coward though full of wit, whilst some blustering captain, either a Frenchman or more frequently a German, strong, bold, and rude, silenced his sallies by sundry rough blows and kicks, to the great enjoyment of the spectators. Now, the people would not permit such exhibitions; authors introduced on the stage, to the satisfaction of the public, brave Italians, putting foreigners to flight, in defence of their rights and honour. A national spirit was, in fact, forming. Italy had again its native songs at once patriotic and warlike. The women repelled with scorn the attentions of men who, with a view to please them, affected effeminate manners."*

This revolution was, however, only in progress; the aid of France was still requisite to uphold the new republic. Hence, it was intended to leave in it, as formerly in Holland, a part of the army, which might there rest from its fatigues, enjoy peaceably its glory, and communicate its own martial fire to the whole country. Moreover, with that foresight which embraced all objects, Bonaparte had conceived a vast and admirable undertaking for behoof of the Cisalpine republic. This state might be regarded as an advanced post to France, and it was essential that troops should be able to reach it with rapidity. With this view, he traced the plan of a road which, proceeding from France to Geneva, should thence traverse the Valais, cross the Simplon, and descend into Lombardy. He was already in treaty with Switzerland on the subject. He had commissioned engineers to make surveys and estimates, and arranged all the details of execution with the precision he observed in the most extensive and even apparently chimerical of his projects. He determined that this stupendous highway, the first directly piercing the Alps, should be spacious, solid, and magnificent, to remain a transcendent monument of liberty and French greatness.

Whilst thus occupied with a republic which owed to him its existence, he was called upon to administer justice likewise, being chosen as arbitrator between two communities. The Valteline had revolted against the sovereignty of the Grison league. The Valteline was composed of three valleys which belonged to Italy, for their waters flowed into the Adda. They were nevertheless subject to the dominion of the Grisons, an insupportable yoke, for there is none more heavy than that imposed by one people upon another. More than one tyranny of this description existed in Switzerland. That exercised by Berne over the Pays de Vaud was celebrated. The inhabitants of the Valteline rebelled, and demanded to be incorporated in the Cisalpine republic. They invoked the protection of Bonaparte, adducing, in order to obtain it, certain ancient treaties which placed the Valteline under the protectorate of the Dukes of Milan. Both people, the Grisons and the Valtelines, agreed to refer the matter to the decision of Bonaparte. He accepted the mediation with the sanction of the Directory. He recommended the Grisons to acknowledge the rights of the Valtelines and to associate with them in a new Grison league. They rejected this advice, and preferred to plead the cause of their sovereignty. Bonaparte assigned a period for their appearance before his tribunal. When the term arrived, the Grisons, at the instigation of Austria, declined to appear. Thereupon Bonaparte, proceeding upon the submission to his award, and upon the old treaties, condemned the Grisons by default, pronounced the Valtelines free, and permitted them to join the Cisalpine republic. This sentence, founded on right and equity, caused a profound sensation in Europe. It struck terror into the aristocracy of Berne, but diffused joy through the Pays de Vaud; and, for the rest, added to the Cisalpine republic a rich, valiant, and numerous population.

Genoa, at the same time, selected him as its counsellor in the choice of a constitution. Not having been conquered, Genoa was free to adopt its own laws, and remained independent of the Directory in that respect. The two parties, aristocratic and democratic, were in consequence at variance. A revolt had broken out, as we have seen, in the month of May; a second had followed more general in the valley of La Polcevera, which was nigh proving fatal to Genoa. It was excited by the priests against the new constitution. The French general Duphot, who was on the spot with some troops, succeeded in restoring order. The Genoese then made application to Bonaparte, who sent them in reply an austere letter, in which he gave them much wholesome advice and rebuked their democratic ardour. He ordered certain changes in their constitution. Instead of five magistrates intrusted with the executive power, he allowed them but three; the members of the Councils too were reduced in number; in fact, the whole government was organized in a manner less popular but more strong. He granted additional privileges to the priests and nobles, to reconcile them with the new order of things; and, inasmuch as a proposal had been made to exclude them from public functions, he condemned it in emphatic terms. "*You would do*," he said to the Genoese, "*what they themselves have done.*" The letter containing this expression he purposely made public. It conveyed a censure upon the measures taken in Paris with reference to the old nobility. He was well-pleased thus to interfere indirectly in politics, to proclaim opinions, to utter them in opposition to the Directory, and to detach himself at once from the successful party; for it was his boast to be independent, to neither support nor serve any faction, but to hold them all equally in contempt and awe.

Whilst thus engaged in the various duties of legistor, arbitrator, and counsellor of the Italian populations, he was intent upon other objects of not less magnitude, and which marked his profound forethought in a different manner. He had appropriated the navy of Venice, and ordered Admiral Brueys into the Adriatic, with the design of taking possession of the Grecian islands held by Venice. He had in this way been led to reflect on the Mediterranean, on its importance, and on the part which France might play therein. The result was a conviction that, if on the ocean France must yield to a master, she ought to reign in the Mediterranean. Whether Italy were wholly or only partially emancipated, whether Venice were finally ceded to Austria or not, he determined that France should possess the Ionian Islands, Corfu, Zante, Santa-Maura, Cerigo and Cephalonia. The people of those islands were indeed eager to become French subjects. Malta, too, the most important post in the Mediterranean, belonged at present to an order, which, long in a state of decrepitude, must necessarily vanish before the influence of the French revolution; and, besides, if left unoccupied by the French, it would inevitably fall into the hands of the English. Under this persuasion, Bonaparte had caused the property of the knights in Italy to be everywhere confiscated to cripple their resources and hasten their fall. He had also opened intrigues at Malta itself, which was defended by only a few knights and a feeble garrison; and he proposed to dispatch thither his squadron and take possession of it. "From these different points," he wrote to the Directory, "we shall command the Mediterranean,

* Memoirs of Napoleon, edited by Count de Montholon, vol. iv. p. 196.

watch over the Ottoman empire crumbling to decay on all sides, and be in a position either to sustain it or secure our portion of its ruins. We shall do more," he added; "we shall render the dominion of the ocean almost useless to the English. They refused us at Lille the Cape of Good Hope; we will contrive to dispense with it. Let us occupy Egypt; we shall then possess the direct route to India, and it will be easy for us to establish there one of the finest colonies in the world."

It was therefore in Italy, when directing his attention to the Levant, that he formed the first idea of the celebrated expedition which was adventured the following year. "It is in Egypt," he wrote, "that England is to be assailed." (Letter of the 16th August 1797—29th Thermidor, year V.)

To accomplish these views, he had directed Admiral Brueys to sail into the Adriatic with six ships of the line, and an attendant force of frigates and corvettes. He had speedily devised a way for gaining the Venitian navy in addition. According to the treaty concluded with Venice, she was to furnish him with three millions in naval stores. Under pretext of this covenant, he appropriated all the hemp, cables, &c., in the Venitian arsenals, of which in truth they formed the solitary contents. After having possessed himself of the stores, under pretence of securing his three millions, Bonaparte seized upon the navy itself, under pretence of subjecting the islands to the new Venitian democracy. He caused such vessels as were on the stocks to be forthwith finished, and thus contrived to launch six sail of the line, six frigates, and several corvettes, which he added to the squadron Brueys had brought from Toulon. He found another million in lieu of the one arrested by the Treasury, supplied Brueys with funds to pick up experienced crews in Albania and on the coasts of Greece, and thus created a marine capable of commanding the whole Mediterranean. He fixed its principal station at Corfu, for very excellent reasons, which met the approval of the Directory. From Corfu the fleet could readily repair into the Adriatic, and act in concert with the army of Italy in case of fresh hostilities; thence it kept the court of Naples in check, was within easy sail of Malta, and, if wanted in the Atlantic to aid in any enterprise, it could reach the Straits more promptly than from Toulon. Moreover, at Corfu the fleet might be practised in the execution of manœuvres, and be better inured for action than at Toulon, where it was generally kept riding lazily. "You will never have sailors," Bonaparte wrote angrily, "by keeping them locked up in harbours."

Such was the manner in which Bonaparte occupied his time during the studied delays of Austria. Meanwhile his military position with regard to that power was likewise a source of uneasiness. Austria had made gigantic preparations since the signing of the preliminaries of Leoben. She had moved the greatest part of her forces into Carinthia, to protect Vienna and shield herself from a sudden irruption by Bonaparte. Hungary had been raised *en masse*. Eighteen thousand Hungarian cavalry had for the last three months been constantly exercising on the banks of the Danube. Thus she deployed ample means to support the negotiations at Udine. Bonaparte had not more than seventy thousand men under his command, of whom only a small number was mounted. He importuned the Directory for reinforcements to enable him to confront his enemy, and he especially urged the ratification of the treaty of alliance with Piedmont, whereby he would obtain six thousand of those Piedmontese soldiers he prized so highly. But the Directory was loath to send him reinforcements, fearing the removal of troops would be attended by numerous desertions; so it preferred, by accelerating the march of the army of Germany, to disengage rather than reinforce the army of Italy. Moreover it hesitated to ratify the alliance with Piedmont, being unwilling to guarantee the stability of a throne whereof it expected and desired the spontaneous downfall. Accordingly only a few troopers were dispatched into Italy on foot. Means were to be found in that country for mounting and equipping them.

Deprived of the auxiliaries on which he had relied, Bonaparte saw himself exposed to a storm gathering on the side of the Julian Alps. Thus menaced, he endeavoured to supply, by expedients, the additional resources denied him. He fortified and armed Palma Nuova with extraordinary activity, and rendered it a fortress of the first order, capable by itself of withstanding a long siege. This precaution sufficed greatly to improve his position. He likewise threw bridges over the Isonzo and erected *têtes-de-pont*, to be prepared for making a forward movement with his accustomed promptitude. If the rupture occurred before the snow began to fall, he hoped to surprise the Austrians, scatter them in disorder, and, despite the superiority of their forces, rapidly penetrate to the gates of Vienna. If, however, the recommencement of hostilities were delayed till snow covered the mountains, he could no longer anticipate the Austrians, but must be content to receive them on the plains of Italy, where they might readily debouch at any time, and then the disparity of numbers would be no longer compensated by the advantage of the offensive. In such an emergency he considered he would be in imminent danger.

Hence it was desirable for Bonaparte that the negotiations should be brought to a speedy close. We remember that after the absurd note of the 18th July, in which the Austrian envoys had again insisted upon holding the congress of Berne, and reclaimed against the proceedings at Venice, Bonaparte had replied in very vigorous terms, calculated to convince Austria that he was quite ready to resume his march on Vienna. Messieurs de Gallo and de Meerwelt, with a third negotiator, M. Degelmann, had arrived on the 31st August (14th Fructidor), and the conferences had immediately recommenced. But it was evidently their object to protract a settlement; for, albeit entering into a separate negotiation at Udine, they still kept in reserve this general congress at Berne. They argued also that as the congress of Rastadt, for peace with the empire, was about to open, the negotiations should be conducted simultaneously with those at Udine, which would have tended greatly to complicate questions and given rise to as many difficulties as a general congress at Berne. Bonaparte observed in reply, that peace with the empire could only be negotiated after peace with the emperor, and that if the congress were opened, France would take no part therein; adding, that if peace with the emperor were not concluded by the first of October, the preliminaries of Leoben would be considered at an end. Things were at this point, when the 18th Fructidor (4th September) extinguished all the false hopes of the Austrian cabinet. M. de Cobentzel forthwith hastened from Vienna to Udine. Bonaparte himself repaired to Passeriano, a charming seat some distance from Udine, and appearances seemed to betoken a sincere desire on both sides to come to terms. The conferences were held alternately at Udine in the house of M. de Cobentzel, and at Passeriano, the residence of Bonaparte. M. de Cobentzel was subtle and argumentative, without being a severe logician; in deportment he was sour and pompous. The three other plenipotentiaries preserved a respectful silence. Bonaparte was the sole representative of France, having no colleague since the recall of Clarke. He was sufficiently haughty, and in speech prompt and bitter enough, to be a match for the Austrian count.

Although it was apparent that M. de Cobentzel was actuated by a real desire to treat, he not the

less propounded very extravagant pretensions. True, Austria ceded the Low Countries, but she refused to guarantee the boundary of the Rhine, on the plea that it belonged to the Empire to make that concession. In recompense for the rich and populous provinces of Belgium, she required possessions, not in Germany, but in Italy. The preliminaries of Leoben had assigned her the Venitian states as far as the Oglio, that is to say, Dalmatia, Istria, Friuli, the Brescian, the Bergamasco, and the Mantuan, with the fortress of Mantua; but those provinces did not compensate half her loss in the cession of Belgium and Lombardy. It was not too much, M. de Cobentzel maintained, not only to leave her Lombardy, but also to give her Venice and the legations, and to re-establish the Duke of Modena in his duchy.

To M. de Cobentzel's oratory Bonaparte replied only by a disdainful silence, to his demands by opposing pretensions equally exorbitant, expressed in a firm and imperious tone. He demanded the limit of the Rhine for France, including Mayence, and the limit of the Isonzo for Italy. Between these conflicting claims a medium was to be struck. Bonaparte, as we have already said, had conceived that by surrendering Venice to Austria (a cession not comprehended in the preliminaries of Leoben, because the annihilation of that republic was not then contemplated), he might obtain in requital that the emperor should recede from the boundary of the Oglio to the Adige; that the Mantuan, the Bergamasco, and the Brescian should be relinquished to the Cisalpine republic, which would thus possess the frontier of the Adige and Mantua; that the emperor, moreover, would recognise the Rhine as the boundary of France, and yield to it Mayence; and that finally he would consent to grant it the Ionian islands. He resolved to treat on these conditions. He saw plainly the substantial advantages accruing from them to France, and that they were all she could obtain at the moment. By accepting Venice, the emperor would dishonour himself in the eyes of Europe, for it was on his account Venice had betrayed France. By abandoning the Adige and Mantua, the emperor gave the new Italian republic a formidable consistence; by surrendering the Isles of Greece to France, he prepared for her the command of the Mediterranean; by acknowledging the boundary of the Rhine, he deprived the Empire of any power to refuse it; in fine, by yielding Mayence to France, he secured her the veritable possession of that limit, and compromised himself in the gravest manner with the Empire by ceding a place belonging to one of the Germanic princes. It was true that by prosecuting the war the total destruction of the Austrian monarchy seemed inevitable, or at least the entire conquest of Italy. But Bonaparte had more than one personal reason for avoiding another campaign. On the eve of October, it was too late to hazard an inroad into Austria. The army of Germany, too, now commanded by Augereau, enjoyed a manifest superiority of position, for there was no power to oppose its progress. The army of Italy, on the contrary, had to contend with the whole Austrian forces; it must play a secondary part by being reduced to the defensive; in short, it could not be first at Vienna. Furthermore, Bonaparte was really fatigued, and longed to enjoy a little of his great renown in peace. A victory or two more would not exalt the marvels of his two campaigns, and by concluding a pacification he would crown himself with a double glory. To the fame of a warrior he would add that of a diplomatist, and be the only general of the republic who combined the two, for none had yet signed treaties. He would satisfy one of the most ardent desires of his country and return to its bosom with every species of applause. No doubt he committed a formal disobedience by completing a treaty on these conditions, for the Directory insisted on the total emancipation of Italy; but Bonaparte felt assured the Directory dared not refuse to ratify the treaty, for it would thereby act in opposition to the whole public opinion of France. The Directory had already outraged it by the rupture at Lille; far more would it do so by similar conduct at Udine, since it would justify all the reproaches of the royalist faction, which accused it of desiring a perpetual war. He was therefore sure that if he signed the treaty, he would compel the Directory to ratify it.

Bonaparte therefore boldly presented his ultimatum to M. de Cobentzel. Its terms were Venice for Austria, but the Adige and Mantua for the Cisalpine republic, the Rhine and Mayence for France, with the Ionian islands. On the 16th October, the final conference was held at Udine in the house of M. de Cobentzel. On both sides a determination was manifested to break off the negotiation, and M. de Cobentzel even announced that his carriages were ready. The plenipotentiaries were seated at a long rectangular table, the four Austrians on one side, and Bonaparte alone facing them on the other. M. de Cobentzel once more repeated all he had previously advanced, maintaining that the emperor when he gave up the keys of Mayence must receive those of Mantua, and that he could not act otherwise without forfeiting his honour; and he added that, at any rate, France had never concluded a more glorious peace, nor could she desire a more advantageous one, that she above all things longed for peace, and would know how to appreciate the conduct of a negotiator who sacrificed the interest and repose of his country to military ambition. Bonaparte, remaining calm and imperturbable during this insulting peroration, allowed M. de Cobentzel to finish his harangue; then moving to a stand on which stood a porcelain vase, given to M. de Cobentzel by Catherine the Great and displayed as a precious object, he seized it and dashed it on the floor, pronouncing these words: "War is declared; but remember that in less than three months I will break your monarchy as I break this porcelain." This extraordinary act and speech struck the Austrian plenipotentiaries dumb with amazement. Stiffly bowing to them he abruptly left the apartment, and, jumping into his carriage, ordered an officer to proceed with all haste to inform the Archduke Charles that hostilities would recommence in twenty-four hours. But M. Cobentzel, effectually intimidated, quickly dispatched the ultimatum signed to Passeriano. One of the conditions of the treaty was the liberation of M. de Lafayette, who had supported for five tedious years, with heroic fortitude, his dreary incarceration at Olmütz.

On the following day, the 17th October (26 Vendemiaire), the treaty was signed at Passeriano. It was dated from a small village situated between the two armies, which, however, was not actually visited as it possessed no building fitted for the accommodation of the negotiators. This village was called Campo-Formio. It gave its name to this celebrated treaty, the first concluded between the emperor and the French republic.

It was stipulated that the emperor, as sovereign of the Low Countries and member of the Empire, should acknowledge the Rhine as the boundary of France and deliver Mayence to the French troops, and that the Ionian Islands should remain in the possession of France; and that the Cisalpine republic should henceforth possess in perpetuity Romagna, the legations, the duchy of Modena, Lombardy, the Valteline, the Brescian, and the Mantuan, with the frontier of the Adige and Mantua. The emperor furthermore subscribed to sundry conditions springing out of this treaty and of others formerly concluded binding the French republic. In the first place he engaged to give the Brisgau to the Duke of Modena in compensation for his duchy. Next he

bound himself to use his influence to procure an indemnity for the Stadtholder in Germany for the loss of Holland, and another for the king of Prussia on account of the small territory he had surrendered to France on the left bank of the Rhine. Under pressure of these engagements, the suffrage of the emperor was secured to France in the congress of Rastadt, touching the solution of all questions in which she was chiefly interested. In return for his valuable cessions, the emperor received Friuli, Istria, Dalmatia, and the mouths of the Cattaro.

France had never made so brilliant a peace. She had at length obtained her natural limits, and obtained them with the consent of Europe. A great revolution was consummated in Upper Italy. There an ancient state was annihilated and a new one founded. But the first was a despotic aristocracy, the irreconcilable enemy of liberty; the latter a republic democratically constituted, fitted to communicate freedom through the whole of Italy. It might be regretted, indeed, that the Austrians were not driven beyond the Isonzo, that all Upper Italy and the city of Venice itself were not incorporated in the Cisalpine republic: one campaign more and this result would have been secured. Personal considerations had prevented the young victor from making that campaign. Selfish interests began to sway the calculations of the man of genius, and now tarnished this the earliest and perhaps the best achievement of his life.

Bonaparte could scarcely doubt the ratification of the treaty; yet he was gnawed by a certain anxiety, for it was in direct contravention to the instructions of the Directory. He forwarded it by the hands of his trusty and pliant chief of the Staff, Berthier, to whom he was much attached, and whom he had not yet sent into France to enjoy the admiration of the Parisians. With his usual tact, he associated with the mere soldier a man of science, Monge, who had been named on the commission appointed to select works of art in Italy, and who, notwithstanding his extreme demagogical principles and mathematical tenacity, had been fascinated, like many others, by the magic influence of genius and glory.

Monge and Berthier reached Paris in a few days. They arrived in the middle of the night and aroused from his bed the president of the Directory, Larévellière-Lépeaux. Although the bearers of a treaty of peace, the two messengers were far from feeling the exuberance and confidence usual on such joyful occasions; on the contrary, they were embarrassed, like men condemned to open their mission with a painful exordium: in truth, they had to announce disobedience to the orders of government. It was only after a propitiatory preamble, in exculpation of the general, that they unfolded the actual tenor of the treaty. Larévellière received them with all the attention due to two such distinguished personages, one of whom at least was celebrated in the walks of science; but he refrained from pronouncing any opinion on the treaty, and simply intimated that the Directory would decide upon its merits. He presented it accordingly on the following morning to that body. Tidings of the peace had meanwhile circulated to the remotest corners of Paris and diffused unspeakable gladness; the conditions were unknown, but whatever they might be, a certainty prevailed they must be brilliant. Bonaparte was extolled as the marvel of his age, thus resplendent with a two-fold glory. As he had anticipated, the enthusiasm was boundless at his union of the pacificator with the warrior; and a peace he had signed in pure egotism was eulogized as an unparalleled act of military disinterestedness. "This young hero," so every body said, "has denied himself the renown of a fresh campaign to give peace to his country."

The manifestation of joy was so unequivocal and prompt, that the Directory could hardly venture to damp it by rejecting the treaty of Campo-Formio. True, the treaty itself was the result of flagrant contumacy, nor did the Directory lack good and sufficient reasons to withhold its ratification: nay, it had been advisable perhaps to teach an audacious officer, guilty of violating precise orders, a severe lesson. But it was impossible to defy public expectation, nor durst the Directory a second time reject peace after refusing it at Lille. It would have given weight to all the imputations of its enemies and rudely exasperated opinion. Another danger not less great warned it to submit. If the treaty were repudiated Bonaparte threw up his command, and reverses would surely follow the resumption of hostilities in Italy. How serious the responsibility to be braved in such a case! Moreover, the treaty secured enormous advantages; over and above the acquisitions of Leoben it gave Mayence and Mantua; it opened the way to a splendid future; in a word, it left all the forces of France disposable to crush and overwhelm England.

The Directory therefore approved the treaty: and the public gratification was only the more intense and heartfelt. With admirable cunning, the Directory sought, at the same time, to direct all animosities against England. The hero of Italy and his invincible comrades were but to fly from one enemy to another, and, on the very day the treaty was published, an ordinance nominated Bonaparte commander-in-chief of the army of England.

Bonaparte now prepared to quit Italy, to snatch at length a few moments of repose and reap the full harvest of his glory, the most exalted known in modern times. He had been appointed plenipotentiary at Rastadt, in conjunction with Bonnier and Trielhard, to negotiate peace with the Empire. It was arranged that he should likewise meet M. de Cobentzel at Rastadt to exchange the ratifications of the treaty of Campo-Formio. He purposed at the same time to observe the execution of the articles relative to the occupation of Mayence. With his accustomed forethought, he had taken care to stipulate that the Austrian troops should not enter Palma-Nuova until his own had obtained possession of Mayence.

Before departing for Rastadt he put the finishing touch to the affairs of Italy. He completed the nominations that remained for him to make in the Cisalpine republic, and settled the conditions of the sojourn in Italy of the French troops and their relations with the new republic. These troops were to be under the command of Berthier and to form a corps of 30,000 men maintained at the expense of the Cisalpine government, to remain until the general pacification of Europe. He withdrew the corps he had at Venice and delivered that city into the hands of the Austrians. The Venitian patriots were furiously incensed on finding themselves transferred to Austria. Bonaparte had assured them an asylum in the Cisalpine states, and stipulated for them with the Austrian government the privilege of realizing their property. They were not sensible of these favours, but railed with vehement imprecations against the conqueror who sacrificed them. Villetard, who had in some sort pledged the French government in their behalf, addressed a memorial to Bonaparte and was visited in return with his harshest displeasure. At the same time, it was not only the patriots who manifested a profound grief upon this occasion; the nobles and the people, who heretofore preferred Austria to France, because they liked the principles of the one and abhorred those of the other, felt all their national feelings rekindle, and now, at the last moment, displayed an affection for their ancient country which inspired an interest they had not previously awakened. A gloomy despair pervaded the whole community. One noble lady was driven to swallow poison, and the old Doge fell

senseless at the feet of the Austrian officer who administered to him the oath of allegiance.

Ere he went Bonaparte addressed a proclamation to the Italians, in which he bid them adieu and gave them his last advice. It was characterized by that noble, emphatic, and somewhat oratorical strain which marked all his public language. "We have given you liberty," he said to the Cisalpines, "learn to preserve it. To be worthy your destiny, let your laws be wise and moderate, but executed with force and energy. Promote the spread of knowledge and respect religion. Form your battalions, not of men void of principles, but of citizens who live in the faith of the republic, and are closely attached to its prosperity. Most of you require to be impressed with a sense of your own strength and of the dignity which befits a freeman: divided and bowed for ages beneath tyranny, you could not have achieved your liberty; but in a few years, if left to yourselves, no power on earth will be strong enough to wrest it from you. Till then, the great nation will protect you against the attacks of your neighbours; its political system will be identified with yours. I leave you in a few days. The orders of my government and some imminent danger threatening the Cisalpine republic will alone recall me amongst you."

This last phrase furnished an answer to those who asserted he wished to make himself king of Lombardy. There was nothing he preferred to the title and distinction of the first general of the French republic. One of the Austrian plenipotentiaries had offered him, on the part of the emperor, a dominion in Germany; he had replied that he would owe his fortune only to the gratitude of the French people. Had he a prophetic glimpse of the future? No, certainly; but were he to remain merely the first citizen of the republic, we can understand he would elect to do so at this moment.

The Italians followed him with their regrets, and saw with pain this brilliant meteor disappear from amongst them. He traversed Piedmont with rapidity, on his way, through Switzerland, to Rastadt. Magnificent fêtes, and presents for himself and his wife, awaited him on the route. Princes and people were alike eager to behold a warrior so famous, the arbiter of so many destinies. At Turin the king had prepared gifts for presentation to him, in testimony of his gratitude for the support he had received from him with the Directory. In Switzerland, the reception by the inhabitants of the Pays-de-Vaud of the liberator of the Valteline was most enthusiastic. Young girls, attired in the three colours, brought him offerings of crowns. Everywhere was seen inscribed the maxim so dear to the Vaudois: *One community cannot be the subject of another community.* At Morat he visited the ossuary; wherever he went multitudes thronged around him. Cannons were discharged in the towns through which he passed. The government of Berne, which viewed with anger the enthusiasm inspired by the liberator of the Valteline, prohibited its officers from firing these salutes, but was not obeyed. On his arrival at Rastadt, Bonaparte found all the German princes impatient to see him. He forthwith put the French negotiators in an attitude becoming their mission and character. He refused to receive M. de Ferson, whom Sweden had chosen to represent her in the congress of the Empire, and whom his connection with the old court of France rendered unfit to treat with the French republic. This refusal occasioned a great sensation, and showed the constant care that Bonaparte took to exalt the *great nation*, as he called France in all his public papers. After having exchanged the ratifications of the treaty of Campo Formio, and made the necessary arrangements for the occupation of Mayence, he resolved to set out for Paris. He found nothing momentous to discuss at Rastadt, and foresaw interminable delays in arranging the affairs of all these petty German princes. Such a part was not according to his taste; besides, he was worn out with fatigue, and some impatience to reach Paris and ascend the capitol* of the modern Rome was only natural.

He left Rastadt, traversed France incognito, and arrived at Paris on the evening of the 15th Frimaire year VI. (5th December 1797). He proceeded straightway to seclude himself in a small house he had purchased in the rue Chantereine. This singular man, in whom pride was so paramount a quality, had all a woman's art in keeping out of sight. At the surrender of Mantua, he evaded the honour of personally superintending Wurmser's evacuation; now at Paris, he sought to hide himself in an obscure dwelling. He affected in his language, dress, and habits, a simplicity which struck the imaginations of men, and the more profoundly, from the effect of contrast. All Paris, apprized of his arrival, was on the alert to behold him. The minister of foreign affairs, M. de Talleyrand, for whom, at a distance, he had imbibed a predilection, proposed to visit him that same evening. Bonaparte begged to be excused receiving him, and deferred seeing him till the following day. In the morning the saloon at the Foreign office was crowded with great personages eager to salute the hero. Silent to all, he perceived Bougainville standing apart, and advancing to salute him, addressed to him a few words, such as, falling from his lips, carried with them an indefinable weight and charm. Already he seemed to ape the condescension of a sovereign towards a useful and celebrated subject. M. de Talleyrand afterwards presented him to the Directory. Although there were grounds of dissatisfaction existing between the Directory and the general, their interview nevertheless was full of cordiality. It suited the Directory to feign satisfaction and the general deference, if they did not feel it. But, in fact, the services were so great, the glory so dazzling, it was all but impossible to harbour discontent, or keep aloof from the general admiration. The Directory forthwith determined to prepare a triumphal festival for the formal presentation of the treaty of Campo Formio. It was appointed to be celebrated, not in the hall of audience, but in the great court of the Luxembourg. Everything was disposed to render this solemnity one of the most imposing of the revolution. The directors were ranged at the bottom of the court, on a platform, apparelled in the Roman costume. Around them, the ministers, the ambassadors, the members of the two councils, the magistracy, and the heads of administrations, were placed on seats piled in form of an amphitheatre. Splendid trophies composed of the numberless standards taken from the enemy were raised at equal distances, and gorgeous tri-coloured draperies festooned the walls. Galleries were crowded with the choicest portion of Parisian society. Bands of musicians were stationed in the enclosure. A numerous artillery was planted around the palace, to add its thunders to the swell of music and the roar of acclamations. Chenier had composed for the occasion one of his finest hymns.

The day selected for the ceremony was the 20th Frimaire, year VI. (10th December 1797). The Directory, the public functionaries, and the spectators, were all in their places awaiting with impatience the illustrious mortal whom few amongst them had yet seen. He appeared at length, accompanied by M. de Talleyrand, who was deputed to present him; for it was the diplomatist to whom the immediate homage was tendered. Survivors of that epoch, who in common with all beholders were struck by the

* [It is to be presumed that M. Thiers here alludes to the custom at Rome for victorious generals to mount in triumph to the Capitol upon their return from a successful expedition.]

attenuated frame, the pallid yet Roman countenance, the bright and flashing eye, of the young hero, still speak to this day of the effect he produced, of the indefinable impression of genius and authority he left upon their minds. An extraordinary emotion thrilled through the assembly. A thousand acclamations burst forth as he advanced upon the arena. *Long live the republic! Long live Bonaparte!* were the cries which resounded from all sides. When they subsided M. de Talleyrand raised his voice, and, in a judicious and concise speech, affected to refer the glory of the general, not to himself, but to the revolution, to the armies, to the *great nation*, in fine. He seemed in this to consult the modesty of Bonaparte, and, with his usual aptitude, to divine how he would wish to be spoken of in his own presence. M. de Talleyrand afterwards alluded to "*what might be called*," as he said, "*his ambition;*" but considering his primitive taste for simplicity, his love for the sciences, his favourite authors, the sublime Ossian with whom he learnt to detach himself from the earth, M. de Talleyrand expressed his fear lest some day it might need urgent solicitations to drag him from his studious retreat. The sentiment thus expressed by M. de Talleyrand was in all mouths, and re-echoed in the various orations pronounced during this great solemnity. Everybody said and repeated that the young general was devoid of ambition, for great was the apprehension of the contrary. When M. de Talleyrand had ceased, Bonaparte spoke, and uttered in a firm tone the disjointed paragraphs which follow:—

"Citizens,

"The French people, to be free, had kings to combat.

"To obtain a constitution founded on reason, they had eighteen centuries of prejudices to overcome.

"The constitution of the year III. and you have triumphed over these obstacles.

"Religion, feudality, royalty, have successively during twenty centuries governed Europe; but from the peace you have just concluded dates the era of representative governments.

"You have succeeded in organizing the great nation, whose vast territory is circumscribed only because nature herself has assigned it bounds.

"You have done more. The two fairest regions of Europe, formerly so celebrated for the arts, the sciences, the great men to whom they gave birth, behold with the loftiest hopes the genius of liberty arise from the ashes of their ancestors.

"They are two pedestals on which the fates will plant two powerful nations.

"I have the honour to present to you the treaty signed at Campo Formio, and ratified by his majesty the Emperor.

"Peace guarantees the liberty, prosperity, and glory of the republic.

"When the happiness of the French people shall repose on better organic laws, all Europe will become free."

No sooner had he concluded this oration than fresh acclamations greeted him in deafening echoes. Barras, being president of the Directory, exercised the privilege of replying. His discourse was long, diffuse, and generally inappropriate; he eulogized with hyperbole the modesty and simplicity of the hero, and hazarded an adroit homage to the memory of Hoche, the supposed rival of the conqueror of Italy. "Why is Hoche not here," exclaimed the president of the Directory, "to meet, to embrace his friend?" Hoche had, in fact, defended Bonaparte in the preceding year with generous warmth. Following the new impulse given to the public mind, Barras offered fresh laurels to Bonaparte, and invited him to gather them in England. After these three harangues, Chenier's hymn was chaunted in chorus, with the accompaniment of a magnificent orchestra. Two generals next advanced, ushered by the minister-at-war: they were the brave Joubert, the hero of the Tyrol, and Andréossy, one of the most distinguished officers of the artillery. Aloft, and fluttering in the breeze, they carried with them a resplendent flag, consecrated by the Directory to the army of Italy at the close of the campaign: the new *oriflamme* of the republic. It was studded with numberless characters embossed in gold, and those characters bore the following mementos: *The army of Italy has made one hundred and fifty thousand prisoners; it has captured one hundred and sixty-six standards, five hundred and fifty pieces of siege artillery, six hundred pieces of field artillery, five bridge equipages, nine ships of the line, twelve frigates, twelve corvettes, eighteen galleys. —Armistices with the kings of Sardinia and Naples, the Pope, the dukes of Parma and Modena.—Preliminaries of Leoben.—Convention of Montebello with the republic of Genoa.—Treaties of peace of Tolentino and Campo Formio.—Liberty given to the people of Bologna, Ferrara, Modena, Massa-Carrara, Romagna, Lombardy, Brescia, Bergamo, Mantua, Cremona, a part of the district of Verona, Chiavenna, Bormio, and the Valteline; to the people of Genoa and of the Imperial fiefs, to the people of the departments of Corcyra, the Ægæan sea and Ithaca.—Transmitted to Paris the master-pieces of Michael-Angelo, Guerchin, Titian, Paul Veronese, Corregio, Albano, Carraccio, Raphael, Leonardo da Vinci, &c.—Triumphed in eighteen pitched battles,* MONTENOTTE, MILLESIMO, MONDOVI, LODI, BORGHETTO, LONATO, CASTIGLIONE, ROVEREDO, BASSANO, SAINT-GEORGES, FONTANA-NIVA, CALDIERO, ARCOLE, RIVOLI, LA FAFORITA, THE TAGLIAMENTO, TARWIS, NEUMARCKT.—*Fought sixty-seven engagements.*

Joubert and Andréossy delivered orations in their turn, and elicited flattering responses from the president of the Directory. After the speeches were concluded, the generals advanced to receive the embrace of the president of the Directory. At the moment Bonaparte was clasped to the bosom of Barras, the four other directors, impelled as it were by an involuntary impulse, threw themselves into the arms of the general. Tumultuous acclamations rent the air; the people outside, clustered in the adjoining streets, re-echoed the shouts; the cannon boomed, the music played; all brains were in a delirium, a whirl of intoxication. Thus it was that France cast herself headlong into the arms of an extraordinary man! Let us not accuse the weakness of our fathers; the glory of that hour comes to us through the mists of time and misfortunes, and yet how it transports us! Let us repeat with Æschylus: *What would it have been had we seen the thing itself!*

CHAPTER LVI.

GENERAL BONAPARTE AT PARIS; HIS RELATIONS WITH THE DIRECTORY.—PROJECT OF AN INVASION OF ENGLAND.—CONGRESS OF RASTADT.—CAUSES OF DIFFICULTY IN THE NEGOTIATIONS.—REVOLUTIONS IN HOLLAND, ROME, AND SWITZERLAND.—DOMESTIC SITUATION OF FRANCE; ELECTIONS OF THE YEAR VI.; NOMINATION OF TREILHARD TO THE DIRECTORY.—EXPEDITION TO EGYPT SUBSTITUTED FOR AN INVASION OF ENGLAND; PREPARATIONS FOR THAT EXPEDITION.

THE triumphal reception accorded by the Directory to General Bonaparte was followed by a series of splendid entertainments given in his honour by the directors, the members of the Councils, and the ministers. Each strove to excel in the sumptuousness of preparation. The hero of these festivities had

occasion to remark the regard evinced towards him by the minister of foreign affairs, and to feel the attractive influence of the old French elegance. Amidst all these pomps, he preserved his simplicity, being affable though austere, seeming almost insensible to pleasure, and ever seeking out the gifted and the celebrated to converse apart of the art or science which they illustrated. The greatest names deemed it an honour to be distinguished by General Bonaparte.

The information of the young general scarcely exceeded that of an officer recently emerged from the military college. Yet with the inspiration of genius he was able to discourse upon topics the most strange to him, and to throw out those occasional bold, but original, suggestions, which are often the mere impertinences of ignorance, but which, coming from superior minds and expressed in their emphatic style, create illusions and deceive even professors themselves. This facility of treating all subjects was observed with surprise. The journals, which sought with avidity the minutest details regarding his person and movements, reporting daily in what house he had dined and what disposition he had shown, whether he was sad or cheerful, made special observation that when dining with François (de Neufchâteau) he had talked of mathematics with Lagrange and Laplace, of metaphysics with Sieyes, of poetry with Chenier, of legislation and law with Daunou. Though none dared venture to question him in company, a strong desire was universally entertained to lead him to speak of his campaigns. If he chanced to do so, he never spoke of himself, but of his army, of his soldiers, of republican valour; he depicted with force the movement and tumult of battles, portrayed with precision the decisive moment, showed the manner it was to be seized, and transported all who heard him by his lucid, stirring, and dramatic recitals. If his exploits had bespoke him a great captain, his conversation revealed an original and teeming mind, either vast or precise by turns, and always captivating whenever he pleased to throw aside his habitual reserve. He had dazzled masses by his glory; he now began to conquer, one by one, the principal men in France by personal intercourse. Admiration, previously excessive, became almost infatuation after he had been seen. Everything about him, even to those marks of a foreign origin, which time had not yet effaced in him, contributed to effect. Singularity always adds to the prestige of genius, especially in France, where, with the greatest uniformity of manners, oddity is strangely idolized. Bonaparte affected to shun the crowd and hide himself from the public gaze. He even sometimes resented extravagant proofs of enthusiasm. Madame de Staël, who adored, as she had reason, grandeur, genius, and glory, evinced a lively impatience to encounter Bonaparte and pour forth her homage. To his imperious character, disposed to repress undue assumptions, it was offensive that she seemed to transgress the female province; he found her too spiritual and of too exalted aspirations; he detected perhaps her independence peering through her admiration; at all events he was cold, repulsive, unjust to her. She asked him one day, somewhat abruptly, who in his estimation was the greatest woman; he answered harshly, "*she who has borne the most children.*" Thus was laid the foundation of that mutual antipathy, which entailed on her such unmerited sufferings, and incited him to acts of petty and brutal tyranny. Meanwhile he seldom appeared abroad, but lived secluded in his modest house in the rue Chantereine, the name of which had been changed, the department of Paris having ordered it to be called the rue *de la Victoire*. He saw only a few men of learning, Monge, Laplace, Lagrange, and Berthollet; a few generals, Desaix, Kleber, Caffarelli; certain artists, and particularly the celebrated actor whom France has lately lost, Talma, for whom he ever after manifested a strong predilection. When he left his residence it was usually in a plain vehicle; if he visited the theatre he sat shrouded in a grated box, and appeared to partake none of the glittering and dissipated tastes of his wife. Nevertheless he exhibited the warmest affection for her; he was enthralled by that enchanting grace which, in private life as on the throne, never forsook Madame Beauharnois, and with her supplied the place of beauty.

A seat having become vacant in the Institute by the banishment of Carnot, it was at once offered to him. He accepted it with alacrity, appeared on the day of his reception between Lagrange and Laplace, and ever after wore on public occasions the costume of a member of the Institute, affecting to conceal the warrior under the garb of science.

Such general homage was calculated to give umbrage to the heads of the government, who, possessing neither antiquity of rank nor personal greatness, were totally eclipsed by the soldier-pacificator. Still they testified towards him unbounded regard, and he responded by ostentatious marks of deference. The feeling which is uppermost is precisely that which is least shown. The Directory was far from evincing any of the fears it experienced. It received numerous reports from its spies, who frequented taverns and public places to hear the language used respecting Bonaparte; and, according to them, he was soon to place himself at the head of affairs, overturn an enfeebled government, and thus save France from the royalists and Jacobins. The Directory, feigning an excess of candour, showed him these reports, and professed to treat them with contempt, as if it believed the general wholly incapable of ambition. The general, equally dissembling on his part, expressed his gratitude for this frankness, and gave assurances he was worthy of the confidence reposed in him. But, notwithstanding, an indelible distrust prevailed on both sides. If the spies of the police warned the Directory of an intended usurpation, the officers who surrounded Bonaparte cautioned him against poison. The premature death of Hoche had originated absurd suspicions, and Bonaparte, who, although free from puerile apprehensions, was nevertheless prudential, adopted extreme precautions when he dined at the table of a certain director. He ate but little, and tasted only of the food he had observed the director himself partake, and of the wine he had seen him drink.

Barras took pains to represent himself as the author of Bonaparte's fortune, and, now that he had ceased to need his patronage, as a devoted friend. He exhibited an extraordinary affection for his person, and sought, with his usual suppleness, to convince him of his unfeigned attachment. He separated himself from the cause of his colleagues, and affected to stand apart. Bonaparte disregarded the advances of this director, whom he held in little esteem, and rewarded his sycophancy with no measure of confidence.

Meanwhile, Bonaparte was often consulted on various questions. A minister was deputed to summon him to the Directory, whither he repaired, took his seat by the side of the directors, and gave his opinion with that superiority of discernment which distinguished him equally in matters of administration and government as in those of war. In politics he inclined to the direction which resulted from the position he had assumed. On the occasion of the 18th Fructidor, we have seen that, when the impulse was once given and the defeat of the royalist faction assured, he stopped short, and refused to afford the government more support than exactly sufficed to prevent the restoration of monarchy. This object obtained, he would not even appear to connect himself with the Directory; he preferred to remain aloof,

the speculation of all parties, neither allied nor embroiled with any. The attitude of a censor was one agreeable to his ambition. The part is an easy one to play with regard to a government assailed by factions on opposite sides, and constantly exposed to the risk of dissolution; and it is advantageous, because it attracts all malcontents, that is to say, all parties, who soon grow disgusted with a government which strives to curb without having sufficient power to crush them. Bonaparte's proclamations to the Cisalpines and the Genoese regarding the laws proposed against nobles, had served to indicate the actual tendency of his views. It was evident, and he studied no disguise, that he condemned the conduct the government had adopted subsequent to the 18th Fructidor. The patriots had naturally resumed a certain ascendency since that event, and the Directory, though not governed, was assuredly influenced by them. This was seen in its appointments, its measures, its whole spirit. Bonaparte, without departing from a suitable reserve, sufficiently marked his censure of the direction followed by the government; he seemed to contemn it as feeble and incapable, abandoning it to be conquered by one faction after being coerced by another. In a word, he made it clear that he did not partake its sentiments. He even acted so as to prove that, whilst determined to oppose the restoration of royalty, he was not disposed to accept the whole revolution and all its deeds. The anniversary of the 21st January * was approaching; and it required much negotiation to induce his appearance at the festival held on this the fifth celebration of the day. He had arrived at Paris in December, 1797. The year 1798 had opened (Nivose and Pluviose year VI). He declined to be present at the ceremony, as if he disapproved the act to be celebrated, or at least wished to make some reparation to the men whom his proclamations, antecedent to the 18th Fructidor, and the cannonade of the 13th Vendemiaire, had alienated. It had been proposed that he should officiate in all his capacities. Heretofore general-in-chief of the army of Italy and plenipotentiary of France at Campo-Formio, he was now one of the plenipotentiaries at the congress of Rastadt, and general of the army of England; hence, he ought to assist in the solemnities of his government. He alleged that these functions in no way bound him to take part in the celebration, and therefore his presence, being voluntary, would argue an approval he had no desire to give. At length a compromise was devised. The Institute was to appear in a body at the ceremony; he mingled in its ranks, and appeared to fulfil a mere corporate duty. Among all the titles already accumulated on his head, that of a member of the Institute was assuredly the most convenient, and he knew how to avail himself of it to advantage.

A rising fortune speedily attracts worshippers. A crowd of officers and parasites already surrounded Bonaparte, who asked him whether he would for ever restrict himself to the command of armies, and not at length take that position in the government of the country to which his ascendency and political genius justified him in aspiring. Without being yet able to determine what he might or ought to be, he felt distinctly enough that he was the first man of his time. Reflecting on the influence of Pichegru in the Five-Hundred, and on that of Barras in the Directory, he might well conclude a high political part was feasible to him; but there was none for him at this moment to play. He was too young to be a director; it was requisite to be forty years old, and he was not thirty. A dispensation of age was indeed spoken of, but that involved a concession which would alarm the republicans, give rise to a prodigious outcry, and certainly not repay the annoyances it would occasion. Besides, to take part as a fifth unit in the government, to have simply his vote in the Directory, to weary himself in struggles with councils still independent, offered no attractions to him; the odium of provoking a breach of the laws was not worth incurring for such a result. France had yet a powerful enemy to encounter, England; and, though Bonaparte was covered with glory, the most advisable course for him was to go forth and reap fresh laurels, leaving the government to exhaust itself in its painful struggle with contending parties.

We have seen that on the same day the treaty of Campo-Formio was ratified at Paris, the Directory, designing to arouse the public mind against England, created an army styled that *of England*, and gave the command of it to Bonaparte. The government was quite sincere in its intention to take the shortest course with England, and make a descent on her shores. In the audacity of ideas that prevailed at this epoch, such an enterprise was regarded as perfectly feasible. The expedition already attempted in Ireland, proved that the straits might be passed under favour of fogs, or a gale of wind. It was not imagined that the British people, with all their patriotism, not having then an adequate land-army, could resist the redoubtable warriors of Italy and the Rhine, and especially the genius of the hero of Castiglione, Arcole, and Rivoli. The government resolved to leave only 25,000 men in Italy, and recalled the remainder. As to the grand army of Germany, composed of the two armies of the Rhine, and the Sambre-and-Meuse, it proposed to reduce it to the strength required to awe the Empire during the negotiations at Rastadt, and distribute the residue along the coasts of the ocean. The same destination was assigned to all the disposable troops. Engineer officers were commissioned to survey the coasts, and select the best points for embarkation; orders were issued to assemble large flotillas in the different ports, and the greatest activity was infused into all the naval establishments. The hope was still entertained that a breeze would ultimately scatter the English squadron blockading the roads of Cadiz, and that the Spanish fleet might then be able to sail out and join the French. As to the Dutch fleet, which was likewise expected to strengthen the French navy, it had recently suffered a severe check off the Texel, and its shattered remains driven back into the ports of Holland. But the combined French and Spanish squadrons would suffice to cover the passage of a flotilla, and protect the transport of sixty or eighty thousand men into England. To carry out all these designs, some fresh means for raising money were to be devised. The budget, fixed, as we have mentioned, at 616 millions for the year VI., was not calculated to meet an extraordinary armament. It was determined, therefore, to make trade co-operate in an enterprise peculiarly adapted to promote its interests, and the scheme of a voluntary loan of eighty millions was planned, to be hypothecated on the state. Part of the advantages to result from the expedition were to be converted into prizes, and drawn by lot amongst the lenders. The Directory negotiated the opening of this loan through some of the most eminent merchants. The project was communicated to the legislature, and, at first, appeared to be received with favour. From fifteen to twenty millions of subscriptions were at once obtained. At the same time, the Directory levelled against England not only its preparations, but its rigours too. A law existed interdicting the import of English goods; the executive was now armed with authority to make domiciliary visits for the purpose of discovering them, which it caused to be put in force throughout the whole of France on the same day and at the same hour. †

Bonaparte seemed to abet this great movement

* [The day of Louis XVI.'s execution.]

† The 15th Nivose year VI. (4th January 1798.)

and to give himself to it; but, at heart, he was indisposed towards the enterprise. To land sixty thousand men in England, march on London and occupy it, was not in his opinion the chief difficulty. But he felt conscious that to conquer the country and retain possession of it was impossible; it might be ravaged, plundered of much of its wealth, thrown back, annihilated, for half a century; still the invading army must be eventually sacrificed, and he its leader might have to return almost in solitude, after executing a mere barbarous incursion. Later, with a power more gigantic, a greater experience of his means, and an intense personal exasperation against England, he seriously thought of engaging her on her own soil and hazarding his fortune against hers; but at present he had other ideas and other designs. One reason especially prevailed to divert him from the enterprise. The preparations would still require several months; the spring and summer were yet to come and pass away, and the fogs and gales of the next winter to be awaited, ere a descent could be safely attempted. Now, he was averse to remain a whole year idle at Paris, adding nothing to his great name, and descending in opinion by the very fact of his not rising. He turned therefore to a project of another kind, one equally stupendous as a descent on England, but more original in design, more productive in its results, more consonant with the temper of his imagination, and above all more prompt of execution. We have seen that while in Italy the Mediterranean occupied a large share of his attention, that he had created a navy of no inconsiderable force, and that, in the partition of the Venitian dominions, he had taken care to reserve the isles of Greece for France; that he had opened intrigues in Malta, with the hope of wresting it from the Knights and the English; and, lastly, that he had often directed his eyes to Egypt, as the intermediary station France ought to hold between Europe and Asia, in order to monopolize the commerce of the Levant, and possibly that of India. This idea had rivetted itself in his imagination and now almost wholly engrossed him. Some valuable documents on Egypt, on its colonial, maritime, and military importance, were deposited in the ministry of Foreign Affairs, which he procured from M. de Talleyrand and perused with avidity. Obliged to traverse the coast in furtherance of the preparations against England, he filled his carriage with books of travels and memoirs relating to Egypt. Thus, whilst apparently promoting the views of the Directory, he had another enterprise in his mind, and if in person he scoured the strands of ancient Batavia, his imagination was wandering on the shores of the East. Dim visions of some vast future floated in his fancy. To plunge into those countries of early enlightenment and glory, where Alexander and Mahomet had overthrown and founded empires, to make his name famous in their regions, and have it wafted back to France resounding with the echoes of Asia, formed the phantasmagoria of a delicious reverie.

He devoted then the months of Pluviose and Ventôse (January and February) to a mission along the coast, imparting an active direction to the preparations in progress, but absorbed in other schemes and prospects.

Whilst the republic was thus concentrating all its resources for an attack on England, it had still important interests to arrange on the continent. Its political province was in truth sufficiently ample. It had to treat at Rastadt with the Empire, that is to say, with the whole extant feudal system, and it had to tutor in their new career three republics, its offspring, to wit, the Batavian, Cisalpine, and Ligurian republics. Placed at the head of the democratic system and in presence of the feudal, its immediate object was to prevent fresh collisions between the antagonist principles, in order to avoid a renewal of the conflict it had recently terminated with so much glory, but which had cost it such fearful efforts. Such was its task, and its accomplishment presented difficulties not less great than those obstructing the invasion and conquest of England.

The Congress of Rastadt had been assembled for two months. Bonnier, a man of considerable capacity, and Treilhard, a straightforward but rude personage, represented France. Bonaparte, during the few days he remained at Rastadt, had secretly settled with Austria the plan to be followed in the occupation of Mayence and the *tête de pont* of Manheim. It had been agreed that the Austrian troops should retire on the approach of the French, and abandon the contingents of the Empire; whereupon the French troops were to seize Mayence and the *tête de pont* of Manheim, either by intimidating the contingents of the Empire, reduced to themselves, or by assault and battery. And thus the affair was executed. The troops of the Elector, seeing themselves forsaken by the Austrians, evacuated Mayence. Those at the *tête de pont* of Manheim, attempted resistance, but were compelled to succumb. A few hundred men were nevertheless sacrificed. After this event it became manifest that, by the secret articles of the treaty of Campo Formio, Austria had conceded the limit of the Rhine to France, since she consented to surrender the most important points on that river. It had been furthermore agreed that during the negotiations the French army should quit the right bank of the Rhine and retrograde to the left, from Basle to Mayence; whilst at that height it might continue to occupy the right bank, skirting the Maine but not crossing it. As to the Austrian armies, they were to withdraw beyond the Danube and even to the Lech, and evacuate the fortresses of Ulm, Ingolstadt, and Philipsbourg. Their position accordingly became, with respect to the Empire, nearly similar to that of the French army. The deputation of the Empire had in fact to deliberate within a circle of soldiers. Austria evaded an exact fulfilment of the secret articles, for, under favour of a specious device, she left garrisons in the three fortresses specified. France winked however at this infraction of the treaty, not wishing to disturb the good understanding. The question of mutually accrediting ambassadors had been likewise mooted; but to this Austria objected, alleging that for the moment it was sufficient to correspond by means of the ministers of the two powers at Rastadt. This refusal certainly evinced no great eagerness to institute amicable relations with France; but after her defeats and humiliations, a little ill-humour on the part of Austria might be expected and pardoned.

The first explanations between the deputation of the Empire and the Austrian envoys were very bitter. The states of the Empire complained, in truth, that Austria contributed to despoil them by confirming the line of the Rhine to the French republic, and by surrendering in a perfidious manner the city of Mayence and the *tête de pont* of Manheim; and they, moreover, complained that Austria, after having dragged the Empire into her special quarrel, abandoned it and gave away its provinces to procure for herself Italian possessions in exchange. The ministers of the emperor retorted that he had been driven into the war from regard for the interests of the Empire and in defence of the Alsatian feudatories; that after having taken up arms in their behalf, he had made extraordinary efforts during six consecutive years; that he had found himself successively abandoned by all the states of the Confederation; that he had sustained almost alone the whole burden of the war; that he had lost in the conflict a considerable part of his own dominions, and especially the rich provinces of Belgium and Lombardy; and that, after such efforts so cruelly rewarded, he had hoped to experience gratitude and not reproaches. The real fact was that the emperor had used the pretext of

the Alsatian feudatories to commence the war, which he had prosecuted for his individual aggrandisement; that he had involved the Germanic confederation therein in its own despite; and that now he betrayed it to indemnify himself at its expense. After lively recriminations, which ended in nothing, the parties cooled and proceeded to discuss the bases of the negotiation. The French demanded the left bank of the Rhine, and proposed, in order to compensate the princes dispossessed of their dominions, the medium of secularizations. Austria, who, not content with having acquired the greatest portion of the Venitian territory, desired to obtain a further equivalent in certain bishoprics, and had besides a secret understanding with France; Prussia, who had stipulated with France to be recompensed on the right bank, for the duchy of Cleves which she had lost on the left; the dispossessed princes, who preferred to have possessions on the right of the Rhine, sheltered from the proximity of the French, to the recovery of their ancient principalities;—all, Austria, Prussia, and the dispossessed princes, upheld the cession of the limit of the Rhine and the adoption of secularizations as the means of indemnity. It was difficult therefore for the Empire to resist such a concurrence of potential voices. But as the powers given to the deputation made the integrity of the Germanic empire an express condition, the French plenipotentiaries declared them too limited and insufficient, and insisted upon others. The deputation procured fresh powers from the Diet in consequence; but, although then authorized to concede the line of the Rhine, it persisted in a refusal. It alleged various reasons, for reasons are never wanting in such cases.—"The German empire," the deputation argued, "had not been the first to declare war. Before the Diet of Ratisbon had promulgated the declaration, Custine had surprised Mayence and invaded Franconia. It had therefore simply defended itself. The deprivation of a part of its territory would lead to the overthrow of its constitution and endanger its existence, which was of importance to all Europe. The provinces on the left side, which were proposed to be torn from it, were of small consideration to a state become so enormous as the French republic. The line of the Rhine might be replaced by another military line, the Moselle for example. In fine, the republic would lose, for very miserable advantages, the ineffable and to it useful glory of displaying political moderation." Accordingly, the deputation offered to convey all that the Empire had possessed beyond the Moselle, and to accept that stream as the boundary. To these arguments France replied by others equally cogent.—"True, she had taken the offensive and commenced the war *de facto;* but the veritable war, that of intention, of machinations, of preparations, had been commenced by the Empire. It was at Treves and Coblentz that emigrants had been protected and organized; it was from there the phalanxes destined to humble, brutalize, dismember France, were appointed to issue forth on their mission. Now, France, instead of being conquered, was victorious; whereof she was disposed to profit, not by returning the evil intended for her, but by indemnifying herself for the war waged against her by claiming her natural boundary, the course of the Rhine."

Thus was the dispute prolonged, for concessions, even when unavoidable, are always contested. Yet it was evident that the deputation would eventually yield the left bank, and only continued this resistance to obtain better terms on other points in controversy. Such was the state of the negotiations at Rastadt in the month of Pluviose year VI. (February 1798).

It was found that Augereau, to whom the Directory, to get rid of him, had given the command of the army of Germany, had congregated around him the most violent Jacobins. He afforded manifest ground of offence to the Empire, which dreaded above all things the contagion of the new principles, and loudly protested against the circulation of incendiary writings in Germany. So general a ferment prevailed throughout Europe, that the supposition of French interference was not necessary to account for the propagation of revolutionary works. But the Directory deemed it incumbent to obviate all causes of complaint; besides, it was dissatisfied with the turbulent conduct of Augereau, and it accordingly deprived him of his command, deputing him instead to Perpignan under pretence of there assembling an army, destined, it was said, to act against Portugal. The Portuguese court, at the instigation of Pitt, had delayed to ratify the treaty concluded with the republic, and condign chastisement was threatened it as the ally of England. At the same time, nothing more was intended than an idle demonstration, and the commission bestowed on Augereau amounted in fact to a covert disgrace.

Besides the immediate relations now renewed with the powers of Europe, France had to direct, as we have mentioned, the three new republics. These were naturally agitated by opposite parties. The mission of France was to save them from the convulsions by which she had herself been torn. For this she was invoked and subsidized. She had armies in Holland and in the Cisalpine and Ligurian states, maintained at the expense of those republics. If, to avoid the appearance of menacing their independence, she left them to themselves, the danger was incurred of inducing either a counter-revolution or an outbreak of Jacobinism. In the first event, the republican system was put in peril; in the latter, the continuance of a general peace. If the Jacobins became masters in Holland, they were almost sure to give umbrage to Prussia and Germany; if in Liguria and the Cisalpine, they might provoke convulsions in Italy and recall Austria into the field. Hence, it was essential to moderate the course of these republics; but in so doing an inconvenience of another kind was engendered. Europe upbraided France with having made the Dutch, the Cisalpines, and the Genoese, subjects rather than allies, and with aspiring to universal dominion. It was incumbent, therefore, to select agents possessing precisely the shade of opinion suitable to the country appointed for their residence, and with sufficient tact to make the influence of France felt without being visible. Thus there were difficulties, we perceive, of divers kinds to encounter, in maintaining face to face, and maintaining without a collision, the two systems which had been recently arrayed against each other in Europe. We have seen them engaged in warfare for a series of six years. We are now to behold them for one year consumed in negotiations, and that year will demonstrate, yet better than actual hostilities, their natural incompatibility.

We have already had occasion to specify the different parties which divided Holland. The moderate and prudent party, which desired a national and temperate constitution, had to combat the Orangeists, partisans of the Stadtholder, the Federalists, upholders of the old provincial divisions, ambitious to domineer in their several provinces, and content to admit only a feeble federal connection, and lastly, the Democrats or Jacobins, advocates of a pure democracy and unity. The Directory was naturally inclined to support the first party in opposition to the three others, because it hoped, without deviating into any of the contrary extremes, to combine the old federative system with an adequate concentration of government. The Directory has been largely abused for desiring everywhere a republic *one and indivisible*, and much imperfect reasoning has been wasted on its system in this respect. The republic *one and indivisible*, conceived in 1793, had always

been a profound idea, had it not been the offspring of a resistless instinct. A country so homogeneous, so thoroughly amalgamated as France, could not adopt the federal system. A country threatened with such peril as France, would have been ruined by adopting it. It was suitable neither to its geographical configuration nor to its political situation. Assuredly to insist upon *unity and indivisibility* in all cases to the same extent as in France would have been absurd: but the Directory, placed at the head of a new system, and constrained to procure powerful auxiliaries, must necessarily seek to give strength and consistence to its new allies; and there can be neither strength nor consistence without a certain degree of unity and concentration. Such was the idea, or to speak more correctly, the instinct, which governed, which could not fail to govern almost unwittingly, the heads of the French republic.

Holland with its old federal system would have been reduced to perfect impotency. Its national assembly had not yet been able to give it a constitution. This assembly was fettered by all the regulations of the old states-general of Holland, and federalism predominated. The partisans of unity and a moderate constitution demanded the abolition of these regulations and the prompt establishment of a constitution. The French envoy, Noël, was accused of favouring the federalists. France could no longer delay taking a part. Joubert was sent to command the army of Holland,—Joubert, who had been one of Bonaparte's lieutenants in Italy, and gained celebrity for his march through the Tyrol, a modest, disinterested, brave, and devoted patriot. Noël was replaced by Delacroix: it must be confessed a more discreet choice might have been made. The Directory was unfortunately deficient in characters adapted for diplomacy. There were many well-informed and distinguished men amongst the members of the existing and dissolved assemblies, but they were unacquainted with the forms of diplomatic intercourse; they were stiff and dogmatic, and it was rare to find any who united firmness of principles with pliancy of manners, such as it behoved envoys to foreign courts to possess, in order that they might at once impose respect for the new doctrines and conciliate antiquated prejudices. On arriving in Holland, Delacroix attended a festival given by the diplomatic committee. All the foreign ministers were invited to be present. After holding in their presence the most demagogical language, Delacroix at last started up, glass in hand, and exclaimed: "*Why is there not a Batavian brave enough to poniard the regulations on the altar of the country?*" The effect which such an effusion was calculated to produce on strangers may be easily conceived. The regulations, in fact, were speedily *poniarded*. Forty-three deputies had already protested against the operations of the national assembly. These met on the 3d Pluviose (22d January 1798), at the palace of Haarlem, and there supported by the French troops, proceeded according to the example set at Paris, four months previously, on the 18th Fructidor. They expelled from the national assembly a certain number of suspected deputies, caused some to be imprisoned, annulled the regulations, and organized the assembly into a species of convention. In a few days, a constitution nearly similar to that of France was framed and put in force. Desirous of imitating the convention in all things, the new lawgivers composed the government of the members of the existing assembly and constituted themselves into a Directory and Legislative-body. The men who come forward to effectuate movements like these are always the most decided of their party. Hence, it was to be feared that the new Batavian government would be strongly tainted with democracy, and that, under the influence of an ambassador like Delacroix, it would transgress the bounds the French Directory was anxious to prescribe it. For the rest, this Dutch parody on the 18th Fructidor failed not to provoke from European politicians, and particularly from the Prussian, acrimonious remarks that France governed Holland, and extended in reality to the waters of the Texel.

The Ligurian republic was pursuing a satisfactory course, although secretly agitated, like all new states, by two parties equally exaggerated in principles. As to the Cisalpine, it was abandoned to furious discords. The spirit of locality was an inevitable source of disunion to the Cisalpins, who of old belonged to several states successively amalgamated by Bonaparte. But besides this inherent element of division, the agents of Austria, the nobles, the priests, the violent democrats, all conspired to distract the new republic. Of these the democrats were the most dangerous, inasmuch as they had a powerful support in the army of Italy, composed, as we know, of the most hot-brained patriots in France. The Directory experienced as much difficulty in checking the impulse of its armies abroad as in guiding the tone of its ministers, and encountered, in this respect, as many obstacles as in any other. Hitherto it had not accredited a minister to the new republic. Berthier alone, in his capacity of general-in-chief, still represented the French government. It was now proposed to regulate, by a treaty of alliance, the relations between the two republics, parent and child. Such a treaty was accordingly framed at Paris, and transmitted for the ratification of the two Cisalpine Councils. An alliance, offensive and defensive in all contingencies, was therein stipulated, and until the Cisalpine republic should become a military state, France covenanted to lend it the succour of 25,000 men on the following conditions:—the Cisalpine was to find barracks, magazines, and hospitals, and furnish ten millions a-year for the maintenance of these troops. In case of war it was to contribute an extraordinary subsidy. France presented to her ally a considerable portion of the artillery captured from the enemy, in order that he might fortify his strongholds. These conditions bore nothing outrageous on the face of them; yet several of the Cisalpine deputies in the Council of Ancients, ill-disposed towards the republican system and France, pretended that the treaty was too onerous, that undue advantage had been taken of the dependent state of the new government, and prevailed to reject the treaty. A manifest perversity was thereby displayed. Having been obliged of himself to choose the individuals composing the Councils and government, Bonaparte had been unable to insure the eligibility of all his selections, and some amendment now proved necessary. The present councils, nominated arbitrarily by Bonaparte, were, therefore, modified arbitrarily by Berthier. Some of the most obstinate members were cashiered, and the treaty again presented, when it met an immediate approval. It was to be regretted that France found herself compelled thus openly to interfere, as Austria instantly protested that, notwithstanding all the pledges given at Campo-Formio, the Cisalpine was not an independent republic, but clearly a mere province of France. She even opposed difficulties to the reception of Marescalchi, who had been accredited at Vienna as the Cisalpine minister.

The territories occupied by France and the new republics intermingled with those of still feudal Europe, in a manner dangerous to the continuance of peace between the two rival systems. Switzerland wholly feudal, though republican, was enclosed between France, Savoy, now a French province, and the Cisalpine. Piedmont, with which France had contracted an alliance, was enveloped by France, Savoy, the Cisalpine, and the Ligurian. The Cisalpine and the Ligurian republics, again, encompassed the duchies of Parma and Tuscany, and approached

near enough to communicate their own excitement to Rome, and even Naples. The Directory, however, had taken the precaution to enjoin upon its agents the strictest reserve, and prohibited them to hold out hopes to the democrats. On the contrary, Ginguené in Piedmont, Cacault in Tuscany, Joseph Bonaparte at Rome, and Trouvé at Naples, had all orders to evince the most amicable dispositions towards the potentates at whose courts they resided. They were instructed to give assurances that the Directory harboured no intentions of propagating revolutionary principles; that it was satisfied to maintain the republican system where it was established, but would encourage no steps to extend it among powers which kept faith with France. The intentions of the Directory on the point were sincere and prudent. It desired, doubtless, the progress of the revolution; but was no longer impelled to accelerate it by arms. It resolved that if a revolution broke out in any fresh places, France should not be reproached with an active participation. Moreover, Italy was full of princes, the relatives or allies of the great monarchs, who could not be injured without provoking superior hostilities. Austria, for instance, would not fail to interfere in behalf of Tuscany, Naples, and perhaps Piedmont; whilst Spain would assuredly step to the rescue of the prince of Parma. It was good policy, therefore, to avoid the responsibility if any important disturbances occurred.

Such were the views of the Directory; but it was beyond its capacity to control passions, and particularly those of liberty. Could it prevent French, Ligurian, Cisalpine democrats from corresponding with Piedmontese, Tuscan, Roman, Neapolitan democrats, and inspiring them with the ardour of their own opinions, sanguineness, and hopes? These told them that policy hindered the French government from openly interfering in the revolutions everywhere preparing, but that it would protect them when once accomplished; that courage only was wanted to make the attempt, and that succours would soon arrive to them.

True, all the Italian states were more or less agitated. Arrests were numerous in every city, but the French ministers interposed only by occasional reclamations in favour of individuals unjustly persecuted. In Piedmont, where wholesale incarcerations took place, the intercession of France was often tendered with success. In Tuscany much greater moderation was observed. At Naples a large class of men existed who had embraced the new opinions, against the increase of which a court, equally destitute of morality and sense, strove madly with fetters and punishments. The French ambassador, Trouvé, was loaded with insults. He was isolated as if infected with the plague. The Neapolitans were forbidden to visit him. He had even difficulty in procuring the attendance of a physician. All were thrown into prison who were accused of holding communication with the French legation, or who wore their hair cut and without powder. The ambassador's letters were seized, broken open, and detained by the police for ten or twelve days. Frenchmen, too, had been assassinated. Even when Bonaparte was in Italy, he had found it difficult to restrain the fury of the court of Naples, and now that the terror of his presence was removed, we may judge of what it was capable. The French government had forces sufficient severely to chastise its offences; but to avoid disturbing the general peace, it instructed Trouvé to observe the utmost forbearance, restrict himself to representations, and endeavour to reclaim it to the dictates of reason.

The government, however, tottering nearest to its ruin was the papal. Not that it took no pains to defend itself, for it likewise made multitudinous arrests; but an aged pontiff with his spirit quenched, and a few feeble incompetent cardinals, could with difficulty struggle against the evils of the times. Already, at the instigation of the Cisalpins, the March of Ancona had revolted and formed itself into a republic. Thence the democrats preached rebellion throughout the whole Roman state. They had not many partisans, it is true, but they were aided by the general discontent. The papal government had lost its imposing splendour in the eyes of the people, since the contributions levied at Tolentino had compelled it to part with the most costly goods and jewels of the Holy See. New taxes, the creation of a paper currency depreciated below a third of its nominal value, the alienation of a fifth of the possessions of the clergy, had sufficed to exasperate all classes, even the ecclesiastics themselves. The Roman grandees, who had imbibed some of the enlightenment shed over Europe during the eighteenth century, also murmured loudly against an emasculated and imbecile government, and avowed that it was time the temporal power should pass from the hands of ignorant incapable monks, unused to the treatment of human affairs, into those of citizens conversant with the customs and practices of the world. Thus the dispositions of the Roman people were far from favourable to the Pope. Still the democrats were not numerous; they inspired prejudices on the ground of religion, to which they were deemed enemies. The French artists studying at Rome encouraged them by exhortations; but Joseph Bonaparte laboured to restrain them, representing that they had not sufficient force to achieve a decisive movement; that they would only ruin themselves and uselessly compromise France; and that, at all events, she would afford them no support but leave them exposed to the consequences of their imprudence.

Nevertheless, on the morning of the 6th Nivôse (26th December 1797), they came to apprize him that a movement was prepared. He dismissed them with an admonition to remain quiet, but they disbelieved the protestations of the French minister. The system of all the promoters of revolutions was to hazard an insurrectionary blow and trust to involving France in spite of herself. Accordingly, they assembled on the 8th Nivôse (28th December) to commence a revolt. Dispersed by the papal dragoons they sought refuge within the jurisdiction of the French ambassador, under the porticoes of the Corsini palace which he inhabited. Joseph hastened to the scene accompanied by some French officers and General Duphot, a distinguished young soldier of the army of Italy. He attempted to interpose between the papal troops and the insurgents in the hope of preventing a massacre. But the papal soldiery, paying no respect to the ambassador, fired and killed at his side the unfortunate Duphot. This young man was about to espouse a sister-in-law of Joseph Bonaparte. His death caused an extraordinary sensation. Several of the foreign ministers hurried to the French embassy, and amongst the first the Spanish envoy, D'Azara. The Roman government alone allowed fourteen hours to elapse without sending to the French minister's, although he had repeatedly written to it in the course of the day. Bonaparte, highly incensed, immediately demanded his passports. They were given to him, and he forthwith took his departure for Tuscany.

This event produced a lively impression. It was clear that the Roman government might have obviated the occurrence, since it was anticipated two days previously, but had preferred to encourage the outbreak with the view of inflicting upon the democrats a severe punishment, and that, in the tumult, it had neglected to take the precautions necessary to prevent a violation of the rights of nations and an outrage upon the French embassy. Great indignation was manifested in the Cisalpine republic and by

all the Italian patriots against the Holy See. The army of Italy demanded with loud shouts to be led against Rome.

The Directory was embarrassed. It acknowledged in the Pope the spiritual head of the party inveterately opposed to the revolution, and to destroy this high-priest of an antiquated and tyrannical religion, garbed as Christian, was a sore temptation, notwithstanding the danger of offending the European powers and provoking their intervention. So, disregarding caution and the inconveniences of a hostile determination, revolutionary zeal prevailed, and the Directory ordered Berthier, who commanded in Italy, to march upon Rome. It hoped, at the same time, that as the Pope was neither the kinsman nor ally of any sovereign, his fall would not occasion any powerful interposition.

Boisterous was the exultation of all true republicans and adherents of philosophy. On the 22d Pluviose (10th February 1798), Berthier arrived in sight of the ancient capital of the world, which the French army had not yet visited. The soldiers paused for an instant to contemplate the venerable and magnificent city. The Spaniard D'Azara, the usual mediator of the Italian powers with France, hastened to the head-quarters of the army to negotiate a convention. The castle of Saint-Angelo was delivered to the French, on the condition, natural amongst civilized nations, of respecting religion, public establishments, persons and property The Pope shut himself in the Vatican, and Berthier, introduced by the gate of the People, was escorted to the Capitol, like some old Roman triumpher. The democrats, at the summit of their wishes, assembled in the Campo-Vaccino, where the vestiges of the ancient forum are perceptible, and, surrounded by a stupid populace, ready to applaud any novelty, proclaimed the Roman republic. A notary drew up an instrument whereby the people, who styled themselves "the Roman People," declared they resumed their sovereignty and constituted themselves into a republic. The Pope had been left in solitude at the Vatican. A deputation waited on him to demand his abdication of the temporal sovereignty, for it was not intended to intermeddle with his spiritual supremacy. He answered, with some dignity, that he could not strip himself of a possession which belonged not to him but to the successors of the Apostles, and which he held only in trust. This theological thesis appeared of little weight in the eyes of republican generals. The pontiff, treated with all the attentions due to his age and office, was abstracted from the Vatican during the night and conducted into Tuscany, where he found an asylum in a convent. The people of Rome seemed to regret but indifferently the loss of this ruler, who had nevertheless reigned over them upwards of twenty years.

Unfortunately, excesses, not against persons, but against property, sullied the entry of the French into the ancient metropolis of the world. There was no longer at the head of the army that stern and inflexible chief, who, less from virtue than an abhorrence of disorder, had so severely punished plunderers. Bonaparte alone could have bridled cupidity in a country so stocked with riches. Berthier had departed for Paris, and Massena succeeded him. This general, to whom France owes everlasting gratitude for saving it at Zurich from inevitable ruin, was accused of having set the first example. It was one at all events that found numerous imitators. Palaces, convents, superb collections, were mercilessly rifled. Jews, in the train of the army, purchased for insignificant sums magnificent objects recklessly abandoned to them by the depredators. The waste was as revolting as the pillage itself. We are bound to record the melancholy fact: it was not the subaltern officers or the soldiers who gave way to these temptations, but the superior officers. All the articles carried off, and to which the rights of conquest applied, ought to have been deposited in a common receptacle and sold for the profit of the army, which had received no pay for five months. The want of an efficient financial organization had delayed the payment of the subsidy by the Cisalpine republic stipulated in the treaty with France. The soldiers and subalterns were in the most horrible destitution; and they naturally felt indignant at the spectacle of their leaders indecently gorging themselves with spoil and tarnishing the glory of the French name, without any relief or advantage to the army. A mutiny broke out against Massena; the officers assembled in a church and resolved that they would no longer serve under him. Some of the people, evilly-inclined towards the French, prepared to seize the opportunity of this misunderstanding to attempt reprisals. Massena forthwith withdrew the army out of Rome, leaving a garrison in the castle of Saint-Angelo. The danger put an end to the mutiny; but the officers remained in combination, and persisted in demanding the punishment of the plunderers and the supercession of Massena.

Here we see exemplified the fact that to the difficulty of tempering the course of the new republics, of selecting and directing agents, was added that of curbing the armies, and all this at immense distances for administrative communications. The Directory recalled Massena, and dispatched to Rome a commission, composed of four upright and enlightened individuals, to organize the new republic: they were Daunou, Monge, Florent, and Faypoult. The latter, an able and honest administrator, was charged with all that related to the finances. The army of Italy was divided into two corps: that which had been instrumental in dethroning the Pope was called the army of Rome.

It was necessary to excuse this fresh revolution to other powers. Spain, whose piety might be supposed to be shocked, but who was under French influence, offered no remonstrance. But interest is keener than religious zeal. Accordingly, the discontented courts were found to be those of Vienna and Naples. To Austria the extension of French influence in Italy was extremely unpalatable. To mitigate her anger, the intention of incorporating the new republic with the Cisalpine was forborne, and it was erected a separate state. The union of the two would have too forcibly awakened the idea of Italian unity, and accredited the imputed design of rendering all Italy democratic. Although the emperor had not sent a minister to Paris, yet Bernadotte was deputed to appease him with explanations and to reside at Vienna. As to the court of Naples, its rage partook of frenzy at witnessing the revolution thus striding towards it. Nothing less than two or three of the Roman provinces would serve to pacify it. It demanded especially the duchy of Benevento and the territory of Ponte-Corvo, which lay very conveniently for its dominion. Garat was sent to negotiate with it: Trouvé being transferred to the Cisalpine republic.

The revolution then was making formidable progress, and more rapidly than was altogether agreeable to the Directory. We have already mentioned a country into which it threatened to penetrate, namely Switzerland. It might seem that Switzerland, the ancient land of liberty, famed for its primitive and pastoral manners, had nothing to learn from France and could have no cause for change; yet, though the thirteen cantons were governed with republican forms, it did not thence result that equity was paramount in the mutual relations of the different republics, or more especially in their relations with the people. On the contrary, feudalism, which is simply a military hierarchy, prevailed with regard to those republics, and there were communities dependent on other communities, as a vassal on his suzerain

and groaning beneath a yoke of iron. Aargau and the Pays de Vaud were in this manner subject to the aristocracy of Berne, the Lower-Valais to the Upper-Valais, and the Italian bailiwicks, that is to say, the valleys pending on the side of Italy, to different cantons. Numerous communes moreover belonged to certain towns. The canton of Saint-Gall rested under the feudal jurisdiction of a convent. Nearly all the subject districts had become so on conditions specified in charters now buried in oblivion, and which it was forbidden to bring to light. The country in almost every instance depended on the neighbouring town, and was harassed by odious monopolies; nowhere was the tyranny of trade-corporations more oppressively exercised. In all the several governments, aristocracy had gradually engrossed the whole of the powers. At Berne, the first of these petty states, a few families had usurped the authority to the perpetual exclusion of all others; they had their golden-book, in which the privileged families were enrolled. Manners often tend to mitigate the injustice of institutions, but it was not so here. These aristocracies exacted vengeance with the vindictive spirit characteristic of local despotisms. Berne, Zurich, and Geneva, had often, and very recently, inflicted punishments of the severest kind. In every part of Europe Swiss might be found forcibly banished from their country, or seeking in voluntary exile protection from aristocratic outrage. Furthermore, the thirteen cantons, disunited and not seldom opposed to each other, no longer possessed any force, and were quite incapable of defending their independence. With the true instinct of bad-fellowship, common among federative bodies, they all sought the countenance of foreign powers in their domestic squabbles, and had particular treaties, some with Austria, some with Piedmont, others with France. Switzerland therefore was nothing now but a romantic recollection and a picturesque region; politically, she presented but one unbroken chain of petty and humiliating tyrannies.

Thus we may conceive the effect likely to be produced within it by the example of the French revolution. At Zurich, Basle, and Geneva, especially, great excitement had been manifested. In the latter city indeed sanguinary tumults had occurred. Over the whole of the French division, and particularly the Pays de Vaud, revolutionary ideas had circulated extensively. On their side, the aristocrats had omitted nothing to discredit France and to injure her as much as they could without provoking her vengeance. The grandees of Berne had harboured the emigrants and rendered them all possible services. Almost all the plots hatched against the republic had been effectuated in Switzerland. It was at Basle, we remember, the English agent Wickham had directed the counter-revolutionary machinations. The Directory therefore had good reason to be dissatisfied. Luckily, it chanced to possess a very convenient mode of avenging France on Switzerland. The Vaudois, persecuted by the Bernese magnates, had invoked the interposition of France. Now, when the Duke of Savoy ceded their country to Berne, France had guaranteed their rights by a treaty bearing the date of 1565: which treaty had been frequently appealed to and enforced by France. Hence there was good precedent for the interference of the Directory now demanded by the Vaudois. Besides several other of these dependent communities had foreign protectors.

We have witnessed with what enthusiasm the Vaudois had received the liberator of the Valteline, when he passed through Switzerland on his way from Milan to Rastadt. Inspired with renewed hope, they had since dispatched envoys to Paris and warmly pressed for the shield of French protection. Their countryman, the brave and unfortunate La Harpe, had died for France in Italy at the head of a division; they were shamefully tyrannized over, and, in default even of any political motive, common humanity would have sufficed to induce the intervention of France. It was not to be imagined that with her new principles, France should shrink from the execution of a treaty securing the liberties of a neighbouring people, which had been enforced by the old monarchy. Political considerations alone might have weighed to prevent her entertaining the appeal, for fresh alarm would be given to Europe, especially at a time when the pontifical throne was shaking so violently at Rome. But, although feeling it incumbent to propitiate Germany, Piedmont, Parma, Tuscany, and Naples, the Directory recognised no necessity for the same deference towards Switzerland, and was moreover greatly tempted to promote the establishment of an analogous government in a country justly deemed the military key of Europe. Here also, as in the instance of Rome, the Directory was drawn from its prescribed policy by an irresistible seduction. To replace the Alps in friendly hands constituted a motive equally persuasive with that which incited to the demolition of the Papacy.

Consequently, on the 8th Nivôse (28th December 1797), the Directory proclaimed that it took the Vaudois under the protection of France, and would hold the members of the governments of Berne and Fribourg responsible for the security of their property and persons. General Ménard, at the head of Massena's old division, immediately repassed the Alps and pitched his camp at Carouge, in sight of the lake of Geneva. General Schawembourg at the same time ascended the Rhine with a division of the army of Germany, and planted himself in Erguel, in the environs of Basle. This demonstration gave to the people of the Pays de Vaud, the diocese of Basle, and the district of Zurich, the utmost joy and confidence. The Vaudois forthwith preferred a claim for their ancient assemblies. Berne replied that individual petitions would be received, but that no state meetings would be permitted, and demanded a renewal of the oath of fealty. This sufficed as a signal of insurrection to the Vaudois. The bailiffs, whose oppression had been long execrated, were expelled, though without ill-treatment; trees of liberty were everywhere reared, and in a few days the Pays de Vaud, constituted itself into the *Lemanique republic*. The Directory hastened to recognise it, and authorized General Ménard to occupy it, signifying to the canton of Berne that its independence was guaranteed by France. Meanwhile a revolution was in progress at Basle, of which the tribune Ochs, a man of spirit, a staunch revolutionist, and in close relation with the French government, was the chief promoter. The country population had been admitted with the townsmen to form a species of national convention to digest a constitution. It was drawn up by Ochs in terms almost similar to that of France, which served at this time as a model to all republican Europe. It was translated into three languages, French, German, and Italian, and circulated through all the cantons to stimulate their zeal. Mengaud, who was the French minister in Switzerland and resident at Basle, contributed to impart the impulse. At Zurich also, the people of the surrounding district had raised the standard of revolt and demanded the restoration of their rights.

In the interim, the Bernese aristocrats had collected an army and convoked a general diet, at Arau, to consult on the state of Switzerland and levy from the several cantons the federal contingents. They represented to their German subjects that the French portion of Switzerland wished to detach itself from the confederation and unite with France, and that the cause of religion was at stake, for the atheists of Paris had vowed to destroy it. They thus excited to descend from the mountains of the Oberland a simple, ignorant, and

fanatical population under the belief that its ancient faith was menaced with subversion. They mustered nearly twenty thousand men, who were divided into three corps and stationed at Fribourg, Morat, Buren, and Soleure, guarding the line of the Aar and observing the French. At the time this movement was effected, namely in Pluviose (February), the diet assembled at Arau gave symptoms of embarrassment and seemed undecided what course to pursue. Its presence, at all events, was insufficient to deter the inhabitants of Arau from breaking into rebellion, planting the tree of liberty and declaring themselves free. The Bernese troops however entered Arau without delay, chopped down the tree of liberty and committed sundry disorders. The French agent Mengaud thereupon announced that the people of Arau were under the protection of France.

The respective forces were thus in array without any actual war being declared. France, in answer to the appeal of the people whose rights she had guaranteed, shielded them with her troops, and threatened hostilities if the least injury were inflicted on them. On its part, the Bernese oligarchy reclaimed its rights of sovereignty, protesting anxiety to live in peace with France, but on condition of recovering its possessions. Unluckily for it, the other governments around all gave way, either voluntarily or by compulsion. Basle enfranchised the Italian bailiwicks, and the Upper-Valais the Lower-Valais. Fribourg, Soleure, and Saint-Gall were in a state of revolution. The Bernese oligarchy, finding itself pressed on all sides, agreed to certain concessions, and admitted fifty individuals, selected from the country districts, to participation in the privileges hitherto confined to the governing families; but it postponed any modification of the constitution for twelve months. This was an insignificant amendment conducive to results altogether inadequate. Meanwhile a French messenger had been dispatched to the Bernese troops stationed on the frontiers of the Pays de Vaud, to intimate that if they advanced they would be opposed. This messenger was assaulted, and two troopers of his escort assassinated. Such an outrage was an inevitable precursor of war. Still Brune, who was intrusted with the command, held some conferences at Payerne, but they proved fruitless, and on the 12th Ventôse (2d March) the French troops moved forward. General Schawembourg, with the division brought from the Rhine, and cantoned in the territory of Basle, occupied Soleure and the course of the Aar. Brune, with the Italian division, seized on Fribourg. General d'Erlach, who commanded the Bernese troops, retired into the positions of Fraubrunnen, Guminen, Laupen, and Neuneck. These positions covered Berne on all sides, whether the enemy debouched from Soleure or Fribourg. This retrograde movement produced upon the Bernese troops the effect usual with fanatical and undisciplined bands. They believed themselves betrayed, and murdered their officers. Part of them disbanded. Nevertheless there remained with d'Erlach some of those battalions, distinguished in all the armies of Europe for their discipline and bravery, and a certain number of determined peasants. On the 15th Ventôse (5th March), Brune, on the Fribourg road, and Schawembourg on that of Soleure, simultaneously attacked the positions of the Swiss army. General Pigeon, who led Brune's vanguard, assailed the position of Neuneck. The Swiss offered an heroic resistance, and, favoured by the advantage of the ground, checked the veterans of Italy. But at the same moment Schawembourg, issuing from Soleure, carried against d'Erlach the position of Fraubrunnen, and the city of Berne was thus uncovered on that side. The Swiss found themselves obliged to retreat, and fell back in disorder on Berne. The French encountered in front of the city a multitude of infatuated and desperate mountaineers. Even women and old men rushed headlong on their bayonets. The soldiers were reluctantly compelled to exterminate these pitiable zealots who sacrificed their lives so uselessly. Berne was eventually entered. The denizens of the Swiss mountains sustained their ancient reputation for valour, but exhibited all the blind and irrational ferocity of an Andalusian horde. They perpetrated a fresh massacre of officers, and assassinated the unfortunate d'Erlach. The celebrated avoyer of Berne, Steiger, head of the Bernese aristocracy, evaded with difficulty the fury of these fanatics, and sought refuge across the mountains of the Oberland in the small cantons, whence, still insecure, he extended his flight into Bavaria.

The capture of Berne decided the submission of all the great Swiss cantons. Brune, called, as had befallen so many French generals, to be the founder of a republic, proposed to incorporate the French part of Switzerland, the lake of Geneva, the Pays de Vaud, a portion of the canton of Berne, and the Valais, into a single republic to be called the Rhodonique. But the Swiss patriots had desired a revolution chiefly in the hope of obtaining two principal advantages: the abolition of all jurisdictions of one people over another, and national unity. They longed to witness the extirpation of all domestic tyrannies, and to mould the whole into a general commonwealth by the institution of a central government. They prevailed that a single republic only should be carved out of the various subdivisions of Switzerland. A convention was summoned at Arau to consider the constitution devised at Basle. The Directory deputed the ex-conventionalist, Lecarlier, to assist the deliberations of the Swiss and promote harmony among them in the establishment of a satisfactory constitution. A remnant of resistance was still exhibited nevertheless in the small mountain cantons of Uri, Glaris, Schweitz, and Zug. The priests and discomfited aristocrats persuaded these simple mountaineers that their religion and independence were alike doomed to destruction. They circulated, amongst other absurd tales, a rumour that France, having need of soldiers to fight the English, intended to kidnap the robust natives of Switzerland, smuggle them on board of ships, and cast them to perish on the shores of Britain.

On entering Berne, the French seized the exchequer of government, which is a usual proceeding and the least contested right in war. All the public property of a vanquished government belongs to the conqueror. In all these petty states, equally parsimonious and extortionate, there were long-hoarded treasures. Berne possessed a small coffer of its own, which has furnished to all the enemies of France a fruitful subject of calumny. It has been represented to contain thirty millions, whereas it held but eight. France is accused of having engaged in the war merely to seize this fund and apply the proceeds in the Egyptian expedition; as if she could have supposed the authorities of Berne would not have the sense to remove it; or as if it were probable she would make war and risk the consequences of such an invasion to gain eight millions. Such absurdities refute themselves.* A contribution to defray the maintenance and pay of the troops was levied on the members of the old oligarchies of Berne, Fribourg, Soleure, and Zurich.

The winter of 1797–8 was drawing rapidly to a close. Five months only had elapsed since the treaty of Campo-Formio, but the situation of Europe had greatly changed in the interval. The republican system had made gigantic strides; to the three republics previously founded by France, two others

* We find them repeated, notwithstanding, by Madame de Staël and a crowd of authors.

had been added, created within two months. Europe heard with a shudder the continual echo of the words: *Batavian republic, Helvetian republic, Cisalpine republic, Ligurian republic, Roman republic.* Instead of three governments, France had now five to superintend—involving an additional complication of cares and further explanations for foreign powers. The Directory thus found itself impelled insensibly. There is nothing more insatiable than a system; it creeps onward almost alone, expanding and overcoming even in spite of its authors.

Whilst so many external objects demanded its attention, the domestic subject of the elections likewise forced itself on the anxious notice of the Directory. Since the 18th Fructidor there remained in the Councils only such deputies as the Directory had voluntarily left there, and upon whom it could rely. These were they who had either promoted or acquiesced in the *coup d'etat.* Six months of quietude between the executive power and the Councils had ensued, which the Directory had employed, as we have seen, in negotiations, maritime projects, and the creation of new states. But although so dead a calm had reigned, it did not thence result a perfect union existed: two bodies with opposite functions could scarcely preserve complete concord for so long an interval.

A new opposition was forming, composed no longer of royalists but of patriots. We may have already remarked that shortly after one faction had been routed, the government found itself involved in a contest with the other which had assisted it to conquer, because the latter became too exacting, and broke into mutiny in its turn. Since the 9th Thermidor, an epoch when the factions, rendered nearly equal in strength, began to sustain a singular alternation of defeats and victories, the patriots had revolted in Germinal and Prairial, and, immediately after them, the royalists in Vendémiaire. Since Vendémiaire and the institution of the Directory, the patriots had shown their teeth and evinced a dangerous audacity in the wild enterprise of the camp at Grenelle. Subsequently to that event, the royalists had resumed the ascendant, had lost it on the 18th Fructidor, and it was now for the patriots to raise their heads. By way of characterizing this course of things, a term had been invented which we have since seen revived, that of *see-saw.* The political condition which consisted in alternately exalting and depressing each party was called the *see-saw system.* The Directory was upbraided with having employed it, and with being by turns the mere creature of the faction whose aid it sought. This reproach was unfounded; for, unless seizing the reins of power at the point of the sword, no government can silence all parties at once, and rule without and in spite of them. At each change of system, administrative changes must also be made, and those are naturally selected who have professed opinions conformable to the system presently victorious. All the adherents of the successful party, redolent of hopes, start up with claims, press forward to besiege the government, and, if their desires be unsatisfied, rail against and attack it. The patriots had thus clamoured, supporting their pretensions by the influence of the deputies who had voted with the Directory in the Councils. The Directory had withstood many demands, but had been obliged to comply with some. It had nominated several patriots commissaries in the departments (prefects). Numerous others aspired to enter the legislative body at the approaching elections. To these the authorities recently appointed promised inestimable advantage.

Besides the new opposition formed by the patriots who were disappointed with the results of the 18th Fructidor, there was another, self-styled the constitutional. It emerged again at this juncture, affecting to lean towards neither the royalists nor the patriots, but boasting independence, moderation, and attachment to the laws, and composed of men who, without being enrolled in any party, had personal grounds of discontent. Some had not obtained an embassy, a promotion, or a contract for a relative; others had failed to attain the vacant seats in the Directory by a few votes. Nothing is more common than this species of dissatisfaction under a new government, reared by contemporaries, and constituted of men who were yesterday in the rank of simple citizens. Inheritance is said to be a check on ambition, and rightly, if it be restricted to certain functions. Incalculable is the importunity wherewith men are assailed who have sprung to dignity from the common herd. Numbers have contributed to raise them, some feel they are above them only by the chance of a few votes: it seems undeniable that such have a right to urge claims and have them gratified. Hence, the Directory, without any intention on its part, had made numerous malcontents amongst the deputies who were formerly classed as directorialists, and whom their services in Fructidor had rendered extremely difficult to satisfy. One of Bonaparte's brothers, Lucien, elected by Corsica to the Five-Hundred, had planted himself in this constitutional opposition, not from any cause of personal pique, but that he imitated his brother, and assumed the office of censor of the government. It was the attitude which suited a family that aspired to take a position apart. Lucien was a man of ability, and endowed with an eminent talent for the tribune. He there produced considerable effect, recommended as he was by the glory of his brother. Joseph too, since his retreat from Rome, had returned to Paris, where he maintained a large establishment, and dispensed a generous hospitality to generals, deputies, and distinguished men. The two brothers, Joseph and Lucien, were thus in a capacity to effect many things, which propriety and his studied reserve prohibited to the general.

Still, if shades might be thus detected in opinions which had continued almost unanimous for six months, no marked dissension was yet apparent. Forbearance and circumspection prevailed in the Councils, and an immense majority sanctioned all the propositions of the Directory.

All appearances indicated that the elections of the year VI. would terminate in favour of the patriots. They predominated in France and in the new republics. The Directory, however, was determined to employ all legal means to avert their too complete ascendency. Its commissaries issued moderate circulars containing sundry exhortations, but no menaces. It had not at its disposition, in fact, any of those influences or infamous devices used in our days to decide elections agreeable to the reigning power.* In the elections of the year V. several assemblies had divided, and, to avoid violence, part of the electors had retired to vote separately. This example was recommended in the electoral assemblies of this year. Accordingly, schisms took place almost universally; everywhere the electors in a minority alleged the pretexts of an infraction of the law, or of some violence exercised towards them, to collect apart and make their particular returns. It is proper to state, at the same time, that, in many of the departments, the patriots conducted themselves with their accustomed turbulence, and justified the withdrawal of their opponents. In some assemblies it was the patriots who were in a minority and made the secession; but almost everywhere they were in a majority, because the mass of the population opposed to them (and which had participated in the two preceding elec-

* [M. Thiers had not been a deputy or a minister when he penned this phrase, or he would have probably modified it. At the same time, it is scarcely possible to conceive a more wretched parody on an election than he is proceeding to unfold. This he feels, for he is almost unintelligible in describing it.]

tions of the years V. and VI.), at present intimidated by the 18th Fructidor, had, so to speak, abjured public affairs, and ventured to take no part therein. At Paris, considerable excitement prevailed. There were two assemblies held, one at the Oratory, wholly composed of patriots, and mustering six hundred electors at least; the other at the Institute, comprehending moderate republicans, and counting scarcely two hundred and twenty-eight electors. This latter, however, returned a leet of excellent nominations.

In general the elections were twofold. Various apprehensions were thereby occasioned. The discontented, the lovers of change, all in fact who, from different motives, desired to subvert the existing order of things, exclaimed—"*This can go no farther; after executing an 18th Fructidor against the royalists, we are exposed to have another against the patriots.*" They reported too, that the constitution was about to be altered. The Directory was even applied to on the subject, but it indignantly spurned the idea.

Different parts might be taken with regard to these elections. Acting in accordance with strict principles, the Councils were bound to sustain the returns made by the majorities; for otherwise it would occur that the minorities, by seceding, would secure the privilege of making the nominations. Disturbances and informalities might be reasons for annulling the elections made by the majorities, but not for adopting those of the minorities. The patriots in the Councils strongly contended for this position, because, their party having been most numerous in almost all the assemblies, it insured them a successful issue of the question. But the bulk of the two Councils was not inclined to allow them this advantage, and two modes of meeting the difficulty were suggested: either to take the returns made by the seceding assemblies, or to execute a new eighteenth Fructidor. This last was inadmissible; the first was milder and more natural. It was accordingly adopted. In almost every instance the elections of the patriots were quashed, and those of their opponents confirmed. The leet chosen at Paris in the assembly held at the Institute, although it numbered but two hundred and twenty-eight electors, whilst that at the Oratory contained six hundred, was in this manner approved. Nevertheless, the new third, notwithstanding this reversal, brought no inconsiderable accession of strength to the patriot party in the Councils. Yet was that party sorely irritated at the expedient adopted for excluding the men of its selection, and became henceforth more active and embittered against the Directory.

A new director was next to be chosen. The lot fell on Francois de Neufchateau to retire. He was replaced by Treilhard, one of the French plenipotentiaries at Rastadt. Treilhard held identically the opinions of Larévellière, Rewbell, and Merlin. His appointment, therefore, caused no change in the spirit of the Directory. He was an upright, honest man, sufficiently accustomed to affairs. Hence, there were four stanch republicans in the government, all voting in perfect unison, and combining intelligence with probity. Treilhard was succeeded at Rastadt by Jean Debry, an ex-member of the legislature and of the national convention.

Since, by the establishment of the Constitution of the year III., parties were obliged to carry on their warfare within the narrow limits of a constitution, domestic scenes and transactions had lost much of their former zest and stirring incident. Especially, since the 18th Fructidor, the tribune had been shorn of its importance. All eyes were fixed on abroad. The colossal influence of the republic in Europe, its singular and complicated relations with other states, its train of dependent republics, the revolutions it was on all sides promoting, and finally, its designs against England, engrossed all attention. How was France to assail this rival in his most vulnerable part, and to inflict on him the terrible blows she had already given Austria? This was the question repeated from ear to ear. Men had grown so accustomed to feats of chivalric boldness, and to astounding prodigies, that the passage of the channel seemed an ordinary affair. Both the friends and enemies of England deemed her in imminent peril. She herself felt uneasy, and made extraordinary efforts to defend herself. The world at large had its gaze concentrated on the coasts of the British channel.

Bonaparte, who thought upon Egypt as he had two years previously thought upon Italy, as he thought upon every thing, that is to say, with uncontrollable energy, had submitted his project to the Directory, which was discussing it at this moment. The great geniuses who have attentively studied the map of the world have all centred their attention on Egypt. We may cite three, Albuquerque, Leibnitz, and Bonaparte. Albuquerque was sensible that the Portuguese, who had just opened the route to India by the Cape of Good Hope, might be deprived of that great trade if the Nile and the Red Sea ever came to be used. Accordingly, he entertained the gigantic idea of turning the course of the Nile, and throwing it into the Red Sea, to render the way for ever impracticable, and assure to the Portuguese the perpetual commerce of India. Vain premeditations of genius, which would constitute fortunes immutable in an unstable and changeable world! If the visionary scheme of Albuquerque had been realized, the Herculean labour would have redounded to the profit of the Dutch, and eventually of the English. In the reign of Louis XIV., the great Leibnitz, whose high capacity embraced all subjects, addressed to that monarch a memorial, which remains one of the most admirable records of political logic and eloquence. Louis designed, in a vain-glorious mood, to invade Holland.—"Sire," so Leibnitz spoke oracularly, "it is not in their own country you will succeed in vanquishing these republicans; you will not be able to cross their dykes, and you will range all Europe on their side. It is in Egypt they must be struck. There, you will find the true route for the commerce of India; you will wrest that commerce from the Dutch, you will insure the everlasting domination of France in the Levant, you will gladden all Christianity, you will fill the world with astonishment and admiration; Europe will applaud you, far from combine against you."

Such were the vast conceptions, slighted by Louis XIV., which stirred the brain of the young republican general.

Even quite recently, moreover, Egypt had been an object of consideration to French politicians. M. de Choiseul had favoured the idea of occupying it, when the American colonies were in danger. Again it was resumed when Joseph II. and Catherine threatened the Ottoman empire. Also M. Magallon, the French consul at Cairo, a distinguished man, and thoroughly conversant with the state of Egypt and the East, had very lately addressed memorials to government, both to denounce the confiscations of the Mamelukes on French traders, and to expose the advantages which would result from their punishment. Bonaparte had provided himself with all these documents and formed his plan with reference to their contents. Egypt was, in his view, the true intermediary point between Europe and India; there it behoved France to establish herself to ruin England; thence, she must for ever rule the Mediterranean, making of it, according to one of his expressions, *a French lake*, and be able to prolong the existence of the Turkish empire, or secure the best portion of its spoils. Once consolidated in Egypt, the French might effect one or both of two objects: either create a navy in the Red Sea and proceed to destroy the factories on the great

Indian peninsula, or make of Egypt a colony and entrepôt. The commerce of India could not fail to be speedily transferred thither to avoid the circuitous route of the Cape of Good Hope. The numerous caravans of Syria, Arabia, and Africa, already intersected at Cairo. The trade of these countries alone might become immense. Egypt was the most fertile country in the world. Besides her prolific harvests of grain, she could supply all the products of America, and wholly supersede the necessity of reliance on that continent. Thus, whether Egypt were used as a point of departure for a crusade against the Indian establishments of the English, or simply as an entrepôt, the high road of commerce was sure to take this its legitimate beat, and end as its ultimate goal in France.

This bold enterprise possessed, moreover, in the eyes of Bonaparte, other signal recommendations. According to the luminous reports of M. Magallon, now was the proper season to de art for Egypt. By hurrying the preparations and the voyage, the French might reach it in the early part of summer. They would then find the crops cut and garnered, and the winds favourable to ascend the Nile. Bonaparte urged that it was impossible to land in England before the winter, and that in any case her government was too well forewarned; that the expedition to Egypt being, on the contrary, wholly unforeseen, would encounter no obstacles; that a few months would suffice for the establishment of the French; that he would return in person by the autumn to execute the descent upon the English coast; that the opportunity would then be more favourable, for a considerable portion of the English fleet would have sailed for India, and the difficulties to overcome in effecting a landing be materially lessened. Besides all these reasons of a public nature, Bonaparte had others personal to himself. The idleness of Paris was insupportable to him; there was nothing to attempt in civil politics; he was fearful of losing lustre; he was on fire to aggrandize his name yet more. He had been heard to say: *Great names are made only in the East.*

The Directory, who has been accused of desiring to get rid of Bonaparte by sending him to Egypt, offered on the contrary serious objections to the project. Larévellière-Lépeaux, especially, manifested extreme obstinacy in opposing it. He argued that it would endanger thirty or forty thousand of the best troops in France, and expose them to all the hazards of a naval warfare; that it would take from France her greatest commander, him whom Austria dreaded the most, at a moment when the continent was far from being pacified, and when the creation of the new republics had excited violent resentments; and that, furthermore, it would probably exasperate the Porte to a declaration of war, invading thus one of its provinces. Bonaparte was prompt with his rejoinder. He contended that nothing was more easy than to escape the English by keeping them in profound ignorance of the scheme; that France with three or four hundred thousand soldiers, could not be dependent on thirty or forty thousand, more or less; that, for himself, he would shortly return; that, as to the Ottoman Porte, it had long ago lost Egypt by the usurpation of the Mamelukes, and would witness with pleasure their châstisement by France; that at all events an understanding might be arranged with the Sultan; that the continent would not break into hostilities so soon, &c. &c. He alluded also to Malta, which he proposed to wrest from the knights as he passed and secure for France. The discussions were often very warm, and on one occasion led to a scene which has been always incorrectly reported. Bonaparte, in a moment of impatience, pronounced the word "resignation."—"I am far from wishing to demand it," Larévellière retorted with firmness, "but if you offer it, I am of opinion it should be accepted."*—From this time Bonaparte was careful to avoid any mention of resignation.

Overcome at length by the instances and reasons of Bonaparte, the Directory consented to the proposed expedition. It was incited by the grandeur of the enterprise, by its commercial advantages, and by the promise of Bonaparte to return before winter and then undertake the descent on England. It was agreed to observe the most perfect secrecy, and, that it might be better guarded, the presence of secretaries was dispensed with. Merlin, president of the Directory, wrote the instructions with his own hand, and even they did not specify the nature of the enterprise. It was settled that Bonaparte should take with him 36,000 men of the old army of Italy, a certain number of generals and officers of his own selection, men of science and learning, surveyors, geographers, workmen of all kinds, and the squadron under Brueys reinforced by part of the vessels remaining at Toulon. Orders were issued to the Treasury to furnish him a million and a half per decade. He was permitted to appropriate three out of the eight millions captured at Berne. It has been said that Switzerland was invaded to procure means for the invasion of Egypt. We may now judge of the truth of such a supposition.

Bonaparte forthwith nominated a commission to visit the harbours of the Mediterranean and prepare the necessary means of transport. This commission was styled a commission *for arming the coasts of the Mediterranean.* Its members were ignorant, with all the world, of the object of the armament. The secret reposed with Bonaparte and the five directors. As preparations were proceeding in all the ports at once, it was supposed that the Mediterranean armament was only a consequence of that in progress on the ocean. The army collected upon the Mediterranean was called the left wing of the army of England.

Bonaparte applied himself to the work with that extraordinary activity which he imparted to the execution of all his projects. Hurrying alternately to the ministers of war, of the navy, of finance, and to the officers of the treasury, noting with his own eyes the accomplishment of his orders, employing all his ascendency to accelerate their dispatch, corresponding with the whole of the ports, with Switzerland, with Italy, he caused all the preparations to be completed with incredible rapidity. He fixed four points as depôts for the convoys and the troops: the principal convoy was to start from Toulon, the second from Genoa, the third from Ajaccio, and the fourth from Civita-Vecchia. He directed towards Toulon and Genoa the detachments of the army of Italy returning to France, and towards Civita-Vecchia one of the divisions which had marched on Rome. He treated both in France and Italy with owners and captains of merchant vessels, and thus contrived to muster in the ports of departure four hundred sail of ships. He selected a numerous artillery to accompany him, and picked out 2,500 troopers, the best in the army, to embark without horses, as he proposed to equip them at the expense of the Arabs. He determined to carry with him saddles and harness only, and shipped but three hundred horses, so as to have upon arrival at least a few mounted cavalry and yoked pieces. He collected artisans of all descriptions; appropriated the Greek and Arab presses of the Propaganda at Rome, and allotted a body of printers to work them. He formed also a complete collection of philosophical and mathematical instruments. The scientific and

* This speech has been by turns ascribed to Rewbell and to Barras. To the discussion itself likewise, a totally different cause from the true one has been assigned. It was with reference to the Egyptian expedition and with Larevelliere that the scene took place.

learned men, the artists, the surveyors, the designers, the geographers, whom he took, amounted to nearly a hundred individuals. The most celebrated names were associated in his enterprise: Monge, Bertholet, Fourrier, Dolomieux, were of the expedition; as were likewise Desgenettes, Larrey, and Dubois. All the world was eager to join the fortunes of the young general. None knew whither the destination tended; but all were ready to follow him anywhere. During the negotiations at Udine, Desaix had gone to inspect the fields of battle become so celebrated in Italy. Thenceforth he had attached himself to Bonaparte, and now resolved to accompany him. Kleber was at Chaillot, grumbling, as usual with him, against the government, and refusing to solicit employment. He was accustomed often to visit the great master in the art he loved so passionately. Bonaparte pressed him to go with him. Kleber consented with joy: "but *the lawyers*," said he, "what will they say?" It was thus he designated the directors. Bonaparte undertook to remove all objections. "So good!" exclaimed Kleber, who believed England the object of attack, "if you send a fire-ship into the Thames, put Kleber on board of it, and you will see what he can do." To these two generals of the first distinction, Bonaparte added Reynier, Dugua, Vaubois, Bon, Menou, Barague-d'Hilliers, Lannes, Murat, Belliard, and Dammartin, who had all so courageously seconded him in Italy. The brave and accomplished Caffarelli-Dufalga, who had left a leg on the Rhine, commanded the artillery. The weak but useful Berthier was appointed chief of the staff. Smitten with love, he was on the point of forsaking the general to whom he owed his fortune; but he grew ashamed, expressed penitence, and hastened to embark at Toulon. Brueys commanded the fleet; Villeneuve, Blanquet-Duchaila, and Decrès served as vice-admirals. Gantheaume was nominated chief of the naval staff. Thus, all that France possessed most illustrious in war, science, and art, prepared to embark, on the faith of this young general, for an unknown destination.

France and Europe rung with the sound of the preparations going forward in the Mediterranean. They gave rise to conjectures of all kinds. "Where is Bonaparte going?" asked every one. "Whither go these generals, these men of science, all this array?" "They go," said some, "into the Black Sea, to restore the Crimea to Turkey." "They go to India," said others, "to support Sultan Tippoo-Saib." A few, who scented the object, asserted that it was intended to pierce the isthmus of Suez, or otherwise to land on the shores of the isthmus and reimbark in the Red Sea for an excursion to India. Others fell upon the design itself, and maintained that Egypt was the destination. A memoir read at the Institute the preceding year gave weight to this latter speculation. Recondite soothsayers augured a combination more profound. All this parade of preparation, which seemed to betoken a scheme of colonization, was according to them a mere feint. Bonaparte designed simply, with the Mediterranean fleet, to double the straits of Gibraltar, attack Lord St. Vincent who was blockading Cadiz, disperse his squadron, relieve the Spanish fleet from thraldom, and conduct it to Brest, where would be effected the long desired junction of all the Continental navies. It was with this view the troops on the Mediterranean were entitled the left wing of the army of England.

This chanced to be precisely the conviction of the British cabinet. It had been in a state of alarm for the last six months, and knew not on what side to expect the bursting of the storm so long brewing. In the general anxiety, the opposition had for a moment coalesced with the ministry, and made common cause with it. Sheridan had turned his eloquence against the insatiable ambition and turbulence of the French people, and, save the suspension of the Habeas-Corpus act, had supported on all points the ministerial propositions. Pitt, meanwhile, lost no time in equipping a second squadron. To prepare it for sea extraordinary exertions were used, and the fleet of Lord St. Vincent was reinforced by six sail of the line to enable him effectually to bar the mouth of the Straits, toward which Bonaparte was so confidently supposed to be steering. Nelson was detached by Lord St. Vincent with three ships to scour the Mediterranean and watch the movements of the French.

Every arrangement was completed for the embarkation. Bonaparte was on the point of setting out for Toulon, when an occurrence at Vienna, coupled with the dispositions manifested by divers cabinets, threatened to detain him in Europe. The creation of two new republics had roused to the highest pitch the dread of the revolutionary contagion. England, wishful to foment this feeling, had distributed emissaries amongst all the European courts. She urged the new king of Prussia to throw off his neutrality, in order to preserve Germany from the torrent; she laboured to inflame the weak and violent mind of the Emperor Paul; she sought to alarm Austria upon the occupation of the Alps by the French, and offered her subsidies to recommence the war; in fine, she exerted her influence to stimulate the insane fury of the queen of Naples and her minion. The court of this latter potentate evinced greater irritation than ever. It insisted that France should evacuate Rome, or cede to it a part of the Roman provinces. The new ambassador, Garat, had in vain displayed an extreme moderation; his patience was severely tested by the mortifications he endured at the hands of the Neapolitan cabinet. The state of the continent, therefore, was calculated to inspire apprehensions, and an incident happened to aggravate them. Bernadotte had been sent to Vienna, upon a mission of explanation to the Austrian cabinet, and he was instructed to take up his residence there, although no ambassador had been yet accredited to Paris. This general, of a restless and susceptible temperament, was very unfit for the post he was appointed to fill. A proposal had been entertained to celebrate at Vienna on the 14th April the enrolment of the Imperial volunteers. We remember the zeal these volunteers had shown in the preceding year, and the fate they met at Rivoli and La Favorita. Bernadotte had the folly to protest against this celebration, affirming that it would be an insult to France. The Emperor replied with justice that he was master in his own dominions, that France was free to commemorate her victories, and that he also was at liberty to commemorate the devotion of his subjects. Bernadotte, thus repulsed, then determined to give an opposition-fête, and accordingly celebrated in his hotel one of the victories of the army of Italy, of which it chanced to be the anniversary, rearing at his door the tri-coloured flag, inscribed with the words *equality, liberty*. The populace of Vienna, excited, it is said, by the emissaries of the English ambassador, attacked the hotel of the French minister, broke the windows, and committed other disorders. The Austrian ministry hastened to send assistance to Bernadotte, and conducted itself with regard to him very differently from the Roman government in the case of Joseph Bonaparte. Bernadotte, whose own imprudence had provoked the outrage, retired from Vienna and betook himself to Rastadt.

The court of Vienna was unquestionably chagrined at this unpleasant circumstance. It was certain that this government, even supposing it to have every inclination to resume hostilities, would not take the initiative by insulting the French ambassador, and thus precipitate a war for which it was wholly unprepared. On the contrary, it is undoubted that,

albeit greatly displeased with France and her late encroachments, and foreboding that the day would come when she must renew the struggle with her, Austria was not yet disposed to try the experiment, deeming both her people too exhausted and her means too inadequate to assault anew the republican colossus. The cabinet, therefore, immediately published a disavowal of the event, and wrote to Bernadotte with the view of appeasing him.

The Directory judged this occurrence at Vienna indicative of a rupture. It forthwith issued counter-orders to Bonaparte, and even urged him to proceed to Rastadt for the purpose of overawing the Emperor, and forcing him either to give satisfaction, or take the consequences of war. Bonaparte, highly displeased at the delay occasioned to his own design, refused to go to Rastadt, and, estimating the position of affairs with more discernment than the Directory, maintained that the event was far from possessing the gravity attributed to it. In fact, Austria speedily intimated that she purposed at length to send an envoy to Paris, in the person of M. Degelmann; made a show of disgracing the prime-minister Thugut; and offered to let M. de Cobentzel repair to any place fixed by the Directory, and meet a French agent to give and receive explanations on the occurrence at Vienna and the changes effected in Europe since the treaty of Campo-Formio. The storm, therefore, appeared to be dissipated. Moreover, the negotiations at Rastadt had begun to make a favourable progress. After disputing the left bank of the Rhine inch by inch, after striving to preserve the territory lying between the Moselle and the Rhine, and ultimately a small strip of land between the Roehr and the Rhine, the deputation of the Empire had finally conceded the whole left bank. The line of the Rhine was at last recognised as the natural boundary of France. Another principle of equal moment had been admitted, that of indemnifying the dispossessed princes by means of secularizations. Nevertheless, points not less difficult of adjustment remained for discussion: the appropriation of the islands of the Rhine, the conservation of fortified posts, bridges, and bridge-heads *(têtes de pont)*, the condition of monasteries and of the intermediate nobility on the left bank, the liquidation of the debts of the countries ceded to France, the application of the emigration laws to those countries, and many others. These were questions of difficult solution, especially when left to the proverbial tardiness of Germans.

Such was the state of the Continent. The horizon appearing comparatively serene, Bonaparte at length obtained permission to depart for Toulon. It was agreed that M. de Talleyrand should start immediately after him for Constantinople, in the hope of inducing the Porte to regard with complacency the expedition to Egypt.

CHAPTER LVII.

EXPEDITION TO EGYPT.—DEPARTURE FROM TOULON; ARRIVAL AT MALTA; REDUCTION OF THAT ISLAND. — DISEMBARKATION AT ALEXANDRIA; CAPTURE OF THAT CITY.—MARCH UPON CAIRO.—BATTLE OF THE PYRAMIDS; OCCUPATION OF CAIRO. — ADMINISTRATIVE LABOURS OF BONAPARTE IN EGYPT; ORGANIZATION OF THE NEW COLONY.—BATTLE OF ABOUKIR; DESTRUCTION OF THE FRENCH FLEET BY THE ENGLISH.

Bonaparte arrived at Toulon on the 20th Floreal year VI. (9th May 1798). His presence spread gladness through the army, which had begun to murmur, and to fear that he was not at the head of the expedition. It was the old army of Italy. Its soldiers were loaded with riches and with glory, and it might be truly said that *its fortune was made*. Accordingly, their passion for war was considerably abated, and it needed all the zeal which their commander inspired to determine them to embark and depart for an unknown destination. Still they were seized with enthusiasm on beholding him at Toulon. Eight months had elapsed since he had been amongst them. He proceeded, without enlightening them as to their destination, to address them in the following proclamation—

"Soldiers!

"You form one of the wings of the army of England. You have practised the war of mountains, of plains, and of sieges; it remains for you to practise war on the seas.

"The Roman legions, whom you have sometimes imitated, but not yet equalled, encountered Carthage alternately on this sea and on the plains of Zama. Victory never forsook them, because they were ever brave, patient in supporting fatigue, disciplined and united amongst themselves.

"Soldiers, Europe has its eyes upon you! You have high destinies to fulfil, battles to wage, dangers, fatigues to overcome; you will accomplish more than you have yet done for the prosperity of your country, the happiness of mankind, and your own glory.

"Soldiers, sailors, infantry, cavalry, artillery, be united; remember that on the day of battle you have need of each other.

"Soldiers, sailors, you have been hitherto neglected; at the present moment the chief solicitude of the republic is for you: you will prove worthy of the army of which you form a part.

"The genius of liberty which has rendered the republic, since its birth, the arbiter of Europe, wills that it shall be so also of the seas and of nations the most remote."

A great enterprise could not have been more impressively announced,—still leaving it veiled in the obscurity in which it was incumbent to shroud it.

The fleet under the command of Admiral Brueys, was composed of thirteen ships of the line, one, the Orient, carrying the Admiral and the General-in-chief, being of 120 guns, two of 80, and ten of 74. There were, moreover, two Venitian ships of 65 guns each, six Venitian frigates and eight French, seventy-two corvettes, cutters, gun-boats, and small craft of all kinds. The transports collected, as well at Toulon as at Genoa, Ajaccio, and Civita-Vecchia, amounted to four hundred. Five hundred sail in all therefore were to crowd the waters of the Mediterranean. Never had such an armament covered the seas. The fleet had on board about forty thousand men of all arms, and ten thousand sailors. It was watered for one and provisioned for two months.

The sails were hoisted on the 30th Floreal (19th May), amidst the roar of cannon, and the acclamations of the whole army. A strong breeze occasioned some damage to a frigate in sailing out of port. The same wind had caused such disasters to the three ships with which Nelson was cruising, that he was obliged to make for the islands of Saint Peter to refit. He was thus removed to a distance from the French squadron, and consequently failed to see it. The fleet made in the first instance for Genoa, to take up the convoy waiting in that port under the command of General Baraguey-d'Hilliers. It afterwards proceeded towards Corsica, picked up the convoy of Ajaccio, which was under the orders of Vaubois, and ultimately steered for the Sicilian sea to receive the convoy of Civita-Vecchia, which was under the orders of Desaix. Bonaparte's design was to shape his course for Malta, and attempt on the way an audacious enterprise, the success of which he had long ago taken means to secure by secret practices. This was to seize upon that island, which, com-

manding the navigation of the Mediterranean, became an important acquisition for Egypt, and would assuredly soon fall into the grasp of the English, if they were not anticipated.

The order of the Knights of Malta was in a similar predicament to all the institutions of the middle ages; its object was gone, and with it its dignity and strength. It was now simply an abuse, profitable only to those who partook it. The Knights enjoyed large possessions in Spain, Portugal, France, Italy, and Germany, which had been bestowed on them by the piety of the faithful to protect Christians visiting the Holy Land. Now that pilgrimages of this sort had ceased, the vocation and duty of the Knights were to protect Christianity against the states of Barbary, and to extirpate the pirates who infested the Mediterranean. The revenues of the order sufficed for the maintenance of a considerable navy, but the Knights took no pains to form one; they kept but two or three decayed frigates, moored constantly in port, and a few galleys in which they jaunted round the coasts of Italy, giving and receiving festivities. The bailiffs, or commanders, living in the various countries of Europe, consumed in luxury and idleness the riches of the order. Not a knight survived who had waged war against the Infidel corsairs. All interest in the order, moreover, had expired. In France its possessions were confiscated, and Bonaparte had caused those in Italy to be seized without exciting a single reclamation in its favour. We have stated that Bonaparte had already endeavoured to establish an intelligence in the island. He had, in fact, gained some of the Knights, and proposed to intimidate the remainder by a bold demonstration and awe them into a surrender, as he had neither time nor means for a regular attack upon a place deemed impregnable. The Order, which had for some time apprehended its danger from the predominance of the French squadrons in the Mediterranean, had placed itself under the guardianship of Paul of Russia.

Bonaparte, in spite of strenuous exertions, was baffled in his attempt to take up the division of Civita-Vecchia, and the junction with it was only effected at Malta. The five hundred sail of the French fleet hove in sight of that island on the 21st Prairial (9th June), twenty-two days after the departure from Toulon. The spectacle occasioned sore tribulation in the minds of the islanders. To make a pretext for stopping, and to originate a cause of quarrel, Bonaparte demanded from the Grand-Master permission to take in water. The Grand-Master, Ferdinand de Hompesch, replied by a positive refusal, pleading the regulations which allowed the introduction of only two vessels at a time belonging to belligerent powers. The English had met with a very different reception when they appeared before Malta. Bonaparte proclaimed this denial a proof of unexampled malevolence, and immediately ordered a debarkation. On the following day, the 22d Prairial (10th June), accordingly, the French landed on the island and completely invested Valetta, which contained a population of nearly 30,000 souls, and was one of the strongest fortresses in Europe. Bonaparte likewise landed artillery to bombard the forts. The knights answered his fire, but inefficiently. They attempted a sally and many of them were captured. Disorder then commenced within the walls. Certain knights of the French tongue declared they would not fight against their countrymen. Some of these were thrown into dungeons. Great trouble reigned nevertheless, and the inhabitants clamoured for a surrender. The Grand-Master, a man of feeble energies, calling to mind the generosity of the hero of Rivoli at Mantua, bethought himself to save his fortunes from shipwreck, and forthwith releasing one of the French knights he had cast into prison, sent him to Bonaparte with a commission to negotiate. An accommodation was soon arranged. The knights relinquished to France the sovereignty of Malta and the dependent isles; and, in return, France promised her intervention at the Congress of Rastadt, to obtain for the Grand-Master a principality in Germany, and, in case of failure, guaranteed him a pension of 300,000 francs for life, and an indemnity of 600,000 francs in money. She settled, moreover, a pension of 700 francs on each knight of the French tongue, and 1,000 on sexagenarians; and engaged to exert her influence that the knights of other tongues might be allowed to enjoy the estates of the Order in their several countries. Such were the conditions on which France gained possession of the first port in the Mediterranean, and of one of the strongest fortresses in the world. It needed the overawing ascendency of Bonaparte to succeed almost without a contest; and it assuredly needed his confident audacity to hazard the delay of such an undertaking with the English in full pursuit. Caffarelli-Dufalga, equally distinguished for wit and valour, remarked as he walked round the place and admired its fortifications: *We are truly fortunate that there was some one inside to open the gates.*

Bonaparte selected Vaubois to command at Malta with a garrison of 3,000 men, and appointed Regnault de Saint-Jean-d'Angely civil commissary. He made all the administrative regulations necessary for the establishment of the municipal system in the island, and then prepared in all haste to continue his voyage to Egypt.

He weighed anchor on the 1st Messidor (19th June), after an interval of ten days. His great object now was to avoid an encounter with the English. Nelson, having refitted at the Saint-Peter islands, had received from Lord St. Vincent a reinforcement of ten ships of the line and several frigates, which constituted him a fleet of thirteen sail of the line and sundry vessels of less calibre. He had reappeared on the 13th Prairial (1st June) before Toulon; but the French squadron had left twelve days previously. He then hastened from Toulon to the roads of Tagliamon, and thence to Naples, where he arrived on the 2d Messidor (20th June) almost at the very moment Bonaparte was quitting Malta. Learning that the French had been seen in the direction of Malta he followed them, prepared to attack if he succeeded in overtaking them.

Throughout the French squadron every thing was prepared for battle. The possibility of meeting the English occurred to all on board, and alarmed none. Bonaparte had distributed to each ship of the line five hundred picked men, who were daily practised at the guns, and over whom was placed one of those generals so well trained to fire under his orders. It was a principle in naval tactics that each ship should have but one aim, that of grappling with another, fighting, and boarding her. Orders were given in conformity, and Bonaparte relied in the event of a conflict on the bravery of the chosen troops stationed in the ships upon which the brunt of the engagement would fall. These precautions taken, he proceeded in tranquillity towards Egypt. This man, who, according to malignant detractors, dreaded the hazards of the sea, abandoned himself calmly to fortune amidst the English fleets, and had even been sufficiently rash to lose several days at Malta to effect its reduction. Gaiety meanwhile prevailed in the fleet; none knew exactly whither it was bound, but the secret began to be whispered, and sight of the land designed for conquest was impatiently expected. In the evenings, the general officers who were on board the L'Orient assembled in the cabin of the general-in-chief, and there the ingenious and learned discussions of the "Institute of Egypt" were commenced. At one time, but for an instant, the English squadron was only a few leagues from the

immense French convoy, and the proximity was unknown on either side. Nelson, beginning to imagine that the French had a design on Egypt, made sail for Alexandria, and got there before them; when failing to find them he hurried to the Dardanelles, in the hope of an encounter. With singular good fortune the French expedition arrived in sight of Alexandria only on the second day after he had left it, to wit, on the 13th Messidor (1st July). Nearly six weeks had elapsed since its departure from Toulon.

Bonaparte's first step was to send for the French consul. He learnt that the English had appeared two days before, and in the fear they might be still hovering on the coast, he determined to attempt an immediate debarkation. He could not enter the harbour of Alexandria for a disposition to oppose his access was betrayed; hence it became necessary to land at some distance upon the adjoining strand, in a bay called Marabout. The wind blew violently, and the sea broke with fury on the shelves of the coast. It was towards the close of evening. Bonaparte gave the signal, resolved to reach the shore without delay. He was the first to leap into a boat; the soldiers clamoured aloud to accompany him. They began to descend from the ships, but the heaving of the waves threatened every instant to dash the boats together and break them to pieces. At length, after incurring great danger, the coast was reached. At this moment a strange sail appeared in the horizon: it was believed to be an English vessel. "Fortune," exclaimed Bonaparte, "thou forsakest me! What! Not give but five days!" Fortune did not forsake him, for it proved to be a French frigate rejoining the fleet. Infinite difficulty was experienced in disembarking between four and five thousand men during the evening and night. Bonaparte determined to march immediately on Alexandria, in order to surprise the place, and not allow the Turks time to make preparations of defence. No sooner had he gained a footing, therefore, than he set out. Not a single horse had been unshipped; but Bonaparte, his staff, and Caffarelli even, despite his wooden leg, accomplished four or five leagues over the sand on foot, and arrived at break of day in sight of Alexandria.

This ancient city, the eldest-born of Alexander, had no longer its magnificent edifices, its innumerable habitations, its countless multitudes; three-fourths of it lay in ruins. The Turks, the wealthy Egyptians, and the European merchants, resided in the modern town, which was the only part preserved. A few Arabs lurked in the remains of the ancient city. A decayed wall, flanked by towers, encompassed the old and new towns, whilst all around stretched a wilderness of sand, which in Egypt everywhere advances as civilization recedes.

The four thousand French, led by Bonaparte, arrived before it, as we have said, at break of day. During their night-march across the sandy plain, they had encountered only a few Arabs, who, after an exchange of shots, plunged into the desert. Bonaparte divided his troops into three columns. Bon, with the first, marched to the right on the Rosetta gate; Kleber, with the second, in the centre on the gate of the Column; Menou, with the third, to the left on the gate of the Catacombs. The Arabs and Turks, who are first-rate warriors behind a wall, sustained a well-directed fire from the defences; but the French planted ladders and speedily cleared the crumbling rampart. Kleber fell amongst the first, struck by a ball in the forehead. The Arabs were pursued from ruin to ruin, even to the new town. The combat threatened to be prolonged from street to street, and to become murderous; when a Turkish officer interposed to negotiate an accommodation. Bonaparte declared that he had not come to ravage the land of Egypt, or to dispossess the Grand-Signor, but solely to rescue it from the dominion of the Mamelukes, and avenge the outrages they had perpetrated to the injury of France. He engaged that the authorities of the country should be maintained, the ceremonies of religion continued as heretofore, property respected: with other pledges of an analogous character. Under favour of these conditions resistance ceased: and the French were installed masters of Alexandria that very day. In the meantime, the army had landed in safety. These preliminary objects accomplished, the next points for consideration were to place the squadron in safety, either in the harbour or in one of the neighbouring roads, to form at Alexandria an administration conformable to the manners of the country, and to arrange a plan of invasion for the entire conquest of Egypt. For the moment the dangers of the sea and of a rencontre with the English were passed; the chief obstacles had been surmounted with the auspicious fortune which seems invariably to attend the dawn of a great man.

Egypt, which the French had thus entered, is the most singular and aptly situated country, as well as one of the most productive in the world. Its position on the globe is well known. Africa adheres to Asia only by a neck of sand called the Isthmus of Suez, and which, if it were cut through, would afford an outlet from the Mediterranean into the Indian Ocean, and save navigators the toil of sailing immense distances and of doubling, amid tempestuous gales, the Cape of Good Hope. Egypt extends in a parallel line to the Red Sea and the Isthmus of Suez. She holds the keys of this isthmus. In ancient times, and in the middle ages, during the greatness of Venice, she was the medium through which the commerce of India flowed. Such is her intermediate position between the Eastern and Western hemispheres. Her physical constitution and form are not less peculiar. The Nile, one of the principal rivers in the world, takes its source in the mountains of Abyssinia, traverses six hundred leagues of the deserts of Africa, then enters, or rather plunges, into Egypt, rushing over the cataracts of Syena, and proceeds for two hundred leagues farther before it joins the sea. Its banks constitute the whole of Egypt. They form a valley two hundred leagues in length, and from five to six leagues only in breadth. On both sides this valley is bounded by an ocean of sand. Chains of mountains, low, arid, and dislocated, trail tristfully through these sands, scarcely casting over their immensity a poor and broken shade. On one side they interpose between the Red Sea and the Nile, on the other they skirt the desert, retreating until lost in its solitudes. On the left bank of the Nile, some distance in the desert, two tongues of cultivable earth meander, which break the surface of the sand and display an appearance of verdure. These are the *Oases*, vegetable islands in a sea of sand. They are known as the greater and the lesser Oasis. By opening a channel from the Nile, the industry of man might render them regions of fertility. Fifty leagues above the sea the Nile divides into two branches, which flow into the Mediterranean sixty leagues apart, the one at Rosetta, the other at Damietta. Antiquity assigns seven mouths to the Nile: they may be still detected, but there are only two navigable. The triangle formed by these two branches and the sea, is sixty leagues at its base, and fifty on each of its sides. It is called the Delta. It is the most fertile part of Egypt, because it is the best irrigated and intersected by canals. The whole country is divided into three parts: the Delta or Lower Egypt, otherwise *Bahari;* Middle-Egypt, otherwise *Vostani;* and Upper-Egypt, otherwise Said.

The Etesian winds, blowing constantly from north to south during the months of May, June, and July, sweep away all the clouds formed at the mouth of

the Nile, leaving not one to linger in the ever-serene atmosphere of this land, and bear them to the tops of the Abyssinian mountains. There they agglomerate, dissolve in rain during the months of July, August, and September, and occasion the celebrated phenomenon of the inundation of the Nile. Thus the country receives from the overflowing of the river the waters denied to it from the skies. No rain ever falls; and the swamps of the Delta, which would be pestilential in the climate of Europe, produce not a single malady. On retiring into its bed, the Nile deposits a rich loam, a sediment which constitutes the only productive soil on its shores, and whence are raised those copious harvests formerly devoted to the nourishment of Rome. The farther the inundation spreads, the more cultivable land is obtained. The owners of this land, levelled undistinguishably by the water every year, apportion it by mensuration. Consequently the Egyptians are adepts in that branch of knowledge. Canals might widen the sphere of the inundation, and be useful in lessening the rapidity of the stream, in retaining it longer, and in extending fertility at the expense of the desert. Nowhere could the ingenuity of man produce more salutary effects, or civilization be more desirable. The Nile and the desert dispute the possession of Egypt, and from civilization alone can the Nile derive the means of overcoming its rival, and compelling it to recede. Egypt is believed to have formerly supported twenty millions of inhabitants, independently of the Roman people. She could with difficulty feed three millions when the French appeared in her territory.

The inundation terminates in September. Then commence the labours of the field. During the months of October, November, December, January, and February, the country of Egypt presents a ravishing landscape of fertility and abundance. It is then covered with the richest crops, luxuriant with flowers, and studded with innumerable flocks. In March, the summer-heats prevail; the land cracks so deeply that it is sometimes dangerous to cross it on horseback. The work of husbandry is then finished. The Egyptians have gathered all the riches of the year. Besides grain, Egypt produces the finest rice, the most succulent vegetables, sugar, indigo, senna, cassia, barilla, flax, hemp, and cotton, all with a marvellous fecundity. Olives she has not, but she finds them opposite to her, in Greece; tobacco and coffee also are wanting, but she has them at her side, in Syria and Arabia. She is likewise destitute of wood, for heavy vegetation is incapable of taking root in the slimy deposit which the Nile annually renews over a bed of sand. A few sycamores and palms are the only trees in Egypt. In lieu of wood, the dung of cows is used for fuel. Egypt supplies with sustenance immense flocks of cattle. Domestic fowls of all kinds abound. She possesses those admirable horses, so celebrated over the world for their beauty, spirit, and attachment to their masters. She boasts also that matchless quadruped, the camel, which can store food and drink for several days, whose hoof is formed to tread the loose and shifting sand without fatigue, and which is as a living bark to navigate the ocean of the desert.

Every year numberless caravans arrive at Cairo, which emerge from the depths of the desert on both sides like fleets approaching from the horizon. Some come from Syria and Arabia, others from Africa and the coasts of Barbary. They are freighted with all the commodities proper to the climes of the sun, gold, ivory, plumes, inimitable shawls, perfumes, gums, aromatics of all kinds, coffee, tobacco, precious woods and slaves. Cairo becomes a magnificent entrepôt for the choicest productions of the globe, those which the genius of the Occidentals, mighty as it is, can never hope to rival, for they are gems of the sun, but of which their refined tastes will always render them eager consumers. Thus the commerce of India is the only one which the progress of nations will never tend to extinguish. It would not be necessary therefore to make a military post of Egypt in order to destroy by violence the trade of England. It would be sufficient to establish there an entrepôt, with security, good laws, and European commodities, to draw with an irresistible attraction the riches of the world.*

The population which dwells in Egypt is, like the ruins of the cities that cover it, the wrecks of several races. Copts, the ancient inhabitants of Egypt, Arabs, conquerors of Egypt from the Copts, and Turks, conquerors over the Arabs,—such are the tribes whose relics miserably fructify on the face of a land which they pollute. The Copts, when the French entered the country, did not exceed two hundred thousand at the utmost. Impoverished, degraded, and despised, they filled, like all proscribed classes, the most abject callings. The Arabs formed nearly the whole bulk of the population; the descendants of the companions of Mahomet. Their condition varied greatly; some, of high birth, tracing their lineage to Mahomet himself, large proprietors, retaining some tokens of the old Arabian knowledge, and combining with nobility of descent the functions of religion and the magistracy, were, under the name of Scheiks, the veritable grandees of Egypt. In divans they represented the country when its tyrants thought fit to address it for any purpose; in the mosques, they composed a sort of colleges, in which they taught religion, the ethics of the Koran, and a little philosophy and jurisprudence. The great mosque of Djemil-Azar was the principal learned and religious institution in the East. After these chiefs came the smaller proprietors, composing the second and most numerous class of Arabs; and lastly, the labourers, who had fallen into the condition of actual Helots. These latter were bond peasants, tillers of the soil, under the appellation of fellahs, and living in misery and subjection. There was a fourth class of Arabs, the Bedouins or wandering Arabs. These had never been induced to settle on the land: they were veritable sons of the desert. Mounted on horses or camels, and driving before them numerous herds, they roamed in search of pasturage on some oasis, or came annually to sow the ridges of cultivable ground skirting the confines of Egypt. Their vocation was to escort caravans, or lend their camels for transport. But, faithless brigands, they often pillaged the merchants they escorted or to whom they had lent their camels. Sometimes indeed, violating the hospitality accorded them on the margin of the cultivable lands, they broke into the valley of the Nile, which, only five leagues broad, is easily penetrated, sacked the villages, and, remounting their horses, bore their booty into the heart of the desert. Turkish supineness left their ravages almost invariably unpunished, contending with no better effect against the robbers than against the sands of the desert. These wandering Arabs amounted in number to a hundred or a hundred and twenty thousand, and furnished twenty or five and twenty thousand cavalry, valorous enough, and effec-

* [Every reflective reader will perceive the exaggerations of M. Thiers in the importance he thus assigns to Egypt. It is, however, a favourite dream with the French, that if they could get hold of Egypt they would crush English commerce, and with it England itself. At the time of Bonaparte's expedition, the state of India and other circumstances would have rendered its success in all probability vastly prejudicial to this country. At the present era, from the entire supremacy of England in India, and the progress of commerce and manufactures, the possession of Egypt by the French could have but a very small effect in deranging the trade of England. For, despite M. Thiers' theory of the immutability of Indian traffic, it has undergone, of late years, great changes, and is likely to undergo yet greater.]

tive to harass an enemy, but incapable of withstanding the shock of close combat.

Finally, the third race was that of the Turks; one equally scanty with the Copts, counting not more than two hundred thousand at the most. It was divided into Turks and Mamelukes. The Turks, inhabitants since the last conquest by the Sultans of Constantinople, were almost all enrolled on the list of janissaries; but we know that they usually procure insertion on these lists, merely to enjoy the privileges of janissaries, and that but a small proportion actually enters the service. There were but few of them consequently in the militia of the Pacha. This Pacha, delegated by the Sublime Porte, represented the Sultan in Egypt; but supported only by a slender force of janissaries, he had found his authority weakened, through the very precautions formerly taken by the Sultan Selim to strengthen it. That Sultan judging from its distance that Egypt might shake off the yoke of Constantinople, or that an ambitious and able pacha might erect an independent empire, had devised a counterpoise in the institution of the Mamelukes. But, as it is impossible to overturn the physical conditions which render a country dependent or independent of another, instead of the Pacha it proved to be the Mamelukes who became independent of Constantinople and masters of Egypt. These Mamelukes were slaves purchased in Circassia. Chosen from amongst the most beautiful boys of the Caucasus, transported young into Egypt, and reared in ignorance of their origin, in the profession and practice of arms, they formed the bravest and most expert horsemen in the universe. They plumed themselves chiefly on their want of origin, on the prices that had been paid for them, on their beauty and valour. They had twenty-four Beys, who were both their owners and their commanders. These Beys had each five or six hundred Mamelukes. This troop they took care to keep up, and they sometimes transmitted it to their sons, but more frequently to some favourite Mameluke, who became a Bey in his turn. Each Mameluke was attended by two fellahs. The whole body was composed of about twelve thousand horsemen, attended by twenty-four thousand Helots. They were the real masters and tyrants of the country. They subsisted either on the produce of the lands belonging to the Beys or on the income of taxes levied in all shapes. The Copts, who, we have already said, performed the most ignoble functions, acted as their collectors, spies, and men of business; for the degraded always cling to the service of the powerful. The twenty-four Beys, peers in rank, were not so in fact. They were accustomed to wage war on each other, and the strongest, subduing the others, exercised a sovereignty for life. He was wholly independent of the Pacha representing the Sultan of Constantinople, tolerated him at most in Cairo as a state-cipher, and frequently withheld from him the *miri* or land-tax, which, symbolical of the rights of conquest, was payable to the Porte.

Egypt, therefore, was in an actual feudalism, such as prevailed in Europe during the middle-ages. It contained at once a conquered people, a dominant soldiery in rebellion against its sovereign, and a primitive degraded class, in the service and employment of the most powerful.

Two Beys superior to the others ruled Egypt at this moment. The one, Ibrahim-Bey, wealthy, astute, and potent; the other, Mourad-Bey, intrepid, valiant, and full of energy. They had agreed upon a certain partition of authority, by virtue of which Ibraham-Bey directed the civil and Mourad-Bey the military departments. The latter was the man of war; he excelled in the art, and engrossed the affection of the Mamelukes, who were all devoted to him.

Bonaparte, who joined to the genius of the captain the skill and aptitude of the founder, and who, moreover, had administered conquered countries sufficiently to have acquired a particular art in the task, saw at a glance the policy he had to follow in Egypt. The first object was to wrest the country from the hands of its real masters, namely, the Mamelukes. They were the parties whom it behoved him to attack and crush by arms and policy. He had, besides, peculiar reasons for calling them to account, since they had continually oppressed and ill-treated the French. As to the Porte, it was incumbent to avoid the appearance of assailing its sovereignty, but affect on the contrary to respect it. Such as it had become, this sovereignty was of little value. A negotiation might be opened with the Porte, either for the cession of Egypt, by offering certain advantages elsewhere, or for a division of authority, which would involve no loss; for in leaving the Pacha at Cairo as he had hitherto been, and simply succeeding to the power of the Mamelukes, there was no cause of regret given. As to the inhabitants, all care must be taken to conciliate them, and especially the true population of the country, the Arabs. By honouring the Scheiks, flattering their patriarchal pride, increasing their influence, and encouraging a secret desire found in them, as it had been found in Italy, and may be found everywhere, for the restoration of the old dominion, of the Arabian sway, the French were sure to command the country and attach it wholly to them. Furthermore, by respecting persons and property amongst a people accustomed to consider victory as conferring the right to murder, pillage and devastate, they would cause an astonishment highly advantageous to them; and if, in addition, they reverenced the women and the Prophet, the conquest of all hearts followed as certainly as that of the soil.

Bonaparte acted upon these impressions so marked by sagacity and forethought. Endowed with a truly oriental imagination, it was easy for him to assume the solemn and imposing style in vogue amongst the Arabs. He issued proclamations which were translated into Arabic and circulated through the country. He addressed the Pacha thus: "The French republic has determined to send a powerful army to terminate the robberies of the Beys of Egypt, as it has been obliged to do several times during the century against the Beys of Algiers and Tunis. Thou, who ought to be the master of these Beys, and whom they hold nevertheless at Cairo without authority, and without power, thou shouldst witness my arrival with pleasure. Thou art doubtless already informed that I have not come to effect anything against the Koran or the Sultan. Thou knowest that the French nation is the only and solitary ally which the Sultan has in Europe. Come then to meet me, and join with me in cursing the impious race of the Beys."

Addressing the Egyptians, Bonaparte spoke to them in these words: "People of Egypt, you will be told that I am come to destroy your religion. Believe it not; reply that I have come to restore your rights, to punish usurpers, and that I respect more than the Mamelukes, God, his Prophet, and the Koran." Denouncing the tyranny of the Mamelukes, he said: "Is there a fine property? It belongs to the Mamelukes. Is there a beautiful slave, a good horse, a fine house? It belongs to the Mamelukes. If Egypt be their farm, let them show the lease God has given them of it. But God is just and merciful to his people, and he has ordained that the empire of the Mamelukes shall pass away." Describing the sentiments of the French he added: "We too, we are true Mussulmans. Is it not we who have destroyed the Pope, who taught that war must be made on the Mussulmans? Is it not we who have destroyed the knights of Malta, because those fools believed that

God wished them to make war on the Mussulmans? Thrice happy they who are with us! They will prosper in fortune and in rank. Happy they who remain neuter! They will have time to know us and will take part with us. But woe, three-fold woe to those who arm for the Mamelukes and fight against us! There is no hope for them, they will utterly perish!"

To his soldiers, Bonaparte said: "You are about to undertake a conquest the effects of which on the civilization and commerce of the world are incalculable. You will give England the surest and most vital stab, until you are enabled to deal her the final death-blow.

"The people with whom you are going to live are Mahometans. Their principal article of belief is this: *There is no other God but one God, and Mahomet is his prophet.* Do not contradict them; behave to them as we have behaved to the Jews and the Italians. Have respect for their muphtis and their imauns, as you have had for rabbis and bishops. Show the same toleration towards the ceremonies prescribed by the Koran and towards mosques that you have exhibited for synagogues, and for the religion of Moses and for that of Jesus Christ. The Roman legions protected all religions. You will find here different usages from those of Europe; you must accustom yourselves to them. The people whose houses we shall enter treat women differently from us. Remember that, in all countries, he who violates them is a coward and a knave.

"The first city we shall meet was built by Alexander. At each step we shall encounter great mementos worthy to excite the emulation of Frenchmen."

Without delay, Bonaparte made his dispositions for establishing the French authority at Alexandria, and for subsequently quitting the Delta to take possession of Cairo, the capital of all Egypt. It was already July, and the Nile was about to rise. He proposed to arrive at Cairo before the inundation, and to employ the time it lasted in consolidating his power. He gave directions that everything should remain in the same state at Alexandria, that the religious usages should be continued and justice be administered as before by the Cadis. His design was simply to take the place of the Mamelukes, and he accordingly appointed an officer to receive the accustomed taxes. He formed a divan or municipal council, composed of the scheiks and notables of the city, with a view that they might be consulted on all measures taken by the French authority. He left 3,000 men in garrison at Alexandria, and gave the command to Kleber, whom his wound necessarily condemned to inaction for a month or more. He instructed a young officer of rare merit, who promised to be a great engineer for France, to put Alexandria in a state of defence, and to execute for that purpose all necessary works. This was Colonel Cretin, who, at little cost, and in a short time, erected at Alexandria admirable fortifications. Bonaparte likewise issued orders to place the fleet in safety. It was a question whether the large ships could enter the harbour of Alexandria, and in consequence a naval commission was formed to sound the harbour and make a report. In the meantime the fleet was brought to anchor in the roadstead of Aboukir. Bonaparte enjoined Brueys to have the doubt promptly solved, and, if it were ascertained that the ships could not get into Alexandria, to repair forthwith to Corfu.

After providing for these objects, he prepared to put his troops in motion. A considerable flotilla, loaded with provisions, artillery, munitions of war, and baggage, was dispatched to skirt the coast as far as the embouchure of Rosetta, there to enter the Nile, and to ascend it at the same time with the army. He then set forth with the bulk of his forces, which, weakened by the two garrisons left at Malta and Alexandria, mustered scarcely thirty thousand men. He had ordered his flotilla to rendezvous at the point of Ramanieh, on the banks of the Nile. There he proposed to join it and ascend the Nile simultaneously with it, his purpose being to leave the Delta and enter Middle-Egypt or Vostani. To Ramanieh from Alexandria there were two routes: the one through an inhabited country along the shores of the sea and the Nile; the other shorter and straight as the bird flies, but across the desert of Damanhour. Bonaparte hesitated not, and decided for the latter. It behoved him to arrive promptly at Cairo. Desaix marched with the vanguard; the main-body followed at some leagues' distance. The army commenced its march on the 18th Messidor (6th July). When the soldiers saw themselves fairly embarked on this boundless plain, with a slippery sand beneath their feet, a burning sky above their heads, without water, without shade, scanty clumps of palm-trees the sole objects to relieve the dreary monotony of the scene, not a living being visible save hovering troops of Arab horsemen, who appeared and disappeared on the horizon, sometimes concealing themselves behind hillocks of sand to slaughter stragglers, they were oppressed with sadness. The desire of repose had already arisen in their minds after the long and harassing campaigns of Italy. They had followed their leader into a distant country, because their faith in him was blind, and because a land of promise had been held out to them, whence they would return rich enough to buy each of them his field of acres. But when they looked upon this wilderness, a heavy depression crept over them, which increased almost to despair. They found all the wells, which at intervals lined the route through the desert, destroyed by the Arabs. Scarcely a few drops of brackish water remained, wholly insufficient to quench their thirst. They had been told they would find relief and comfort at Damanhour; they found only a few miserable hovels, and could procure neither bread nor wine, but merely lentils to satisfy the cravings of appetite, with a small supply of water. It was necessary to move onward and plunge afresh into the desert. Bonaparte saw even the intrepid Lannes and Murat snatch off their hats, throw them on the sand, and trample them under foot. But he overawed all; his presence imposed silence, and sometimes revived a spark of gaiety. The soldiers refused to attribute their sorrows to him; they charged them upon those who evinced such interest in examining the country. Observing the *savants* pause to scrutinize each little ruin, they asserted it was for them they had come there, and avenged themselves by witticisms after their fashion. Caffarelli especially, brave as a grenadier, curious as an antiquary, passed in their eyes for the man who had deceived the general, and enticed him into this dismal region. As he had lost a leg on the Rhine, they said: *He cares nothing, not he, he has one foot in France!* However, after cruel sufferings, supported at first discontentedly, but ultimately with levity and courage, they reached the banks of the Nile on the 22d Messidor (10th July), after a march of four days. At sight of the Nile and of the water so long thirsted for, the soldiers rushed into the stream, and, floundering in its current, soon forgot their calamities. Desaix's division, which from the van had passed to the rear, descried two or three hundred Mamelukes capering in front of it, and dispersed them with a few volleys of grape. They were the first that had been seen. They announced an approaching rencontre with the hostile army. The valiant Mourad-Bey, in fact, duly forewarned of the coming storm, was collecting all his forces around Cairo. Pending their concentration, he hovered with a thousand horse around the French to reconnoitre and watch their march.

At Ramanieh the army awaited the arrival of the

flotilla; it reposed until the 25th Messidor (13th July), and started on that day for Chebreiss. Mourad-Bey attended its movements with his Mamelukes. The flotilla, having departed first and thus got in advance of the army, became engaged with the enemy before it could be supported. Mourad had his flotilla also, and both from the shore and his *djermes* (light Egyptian vessels) he directed his fire. The French had a tough encounter to sustain. The naval officer in command, Perrée, displayed an heroic courage; he was well seconded by the dismounted troopers, who, until equipped at the expense of the Mamelukes, travelled by water. He retook two gun-boats from the enemy and repulsed him. At this moment the army came up. It was arranged in five divisions. It had not yet fought against these singular enemies. To velocity of action, the impetuous charge of horse, the onslaught of scimitars, were to be opposed the immobility of the foot soldier, his long bayonet, and masses fronting on all sides. Bonaparte formed his five divisions into five squares, in the midst of which were placed the baggage and the staff. The artillery was planted at the angles. The five divisions were stationed to flank each other. Mourad-Bey darted on these living bastions a thousand or twelve hundred intrepid horsemen, who, rushing on with loud cries, and at the utmost speed of their horses, discharging their pistols, then drawing their formidable sabres, came plunging on the front of the squares. Encountering on all quarters a forest of bayonets and a terrible fire, they fluttered around the French ranks, and strewed the ground before them or escaped over the plain at full gallop. After losing two or three hundred of his bravest troops, Mourad retired to gain the top of the Delta, and to await in the vicinity of Cairo, at the head of all his forces, the advance of the French.

This conflict sufficed to familiarize the army with the new description of enemies it had raised, and to suggest to Bonaparte the tactics he must employ against them. Meanwhile the army continued its progress towards Cairo. The flotilla kept up the Nile abreast of the army. The march was prosecuted without cessation during the ensuing days. The soldiers had fresh sufferings to brave, but they skirted the Nile, and were permitted to bathe in the evenings. The sight of the enemy had revived their ardour. "These soldiers, already somewhat averse to fatigues, as will always happen when sufficient glory has been gained, I invariably found," says Bonaparte, "admirable in action." During the marches discontent often recurred, however, and after it had worn away pleasantries succeeded. The *savants* began to inspire respect by the bravery they had shown; Monge and Bertholet especially had exhibited an heroic courage on board the flotilla. Even whilst passing jokes upon them, the soldiers were at bottom full of regard for them. Seeing no appearance of this capital of Cairo, so vaunted as the great wonder of the East, they said no such place existed, or that it was sure to be like Damanhour, a mere collection of hovels. They mourned, besides, over the deception that had been practised on their poor general, saying he had allowed himself to be decoyed away and transported like *a good simple man*, he and his companions in glory. At night, when a halt was made, the soldiers who had read or heard related the stories of the Thousand and One Nights, repeated them to their comrades, and they began to promise themselves magnificent palaces, all-dazzling with gold and jewels. In the meantime they were without bread to eat; not that corn was wanting, for it was everywhere found, but they had no mills or ovens. They were compelled to subsist on lentils, pigeons, and an exquisite water-melon, known in southern climates under the name of *pasteque*. The French soldiers called it *Saint pasteque*.

The French now drew near to Cairo, where the decisive engagement was to be fought. Mourad-Bey had assembled there the greatest part of his Mamelukes, ten thousand or thereabouts. They were attended by a double amount of fellahs, to whom arms were given, and who were appointed to fight behind the intrenchments. He had likewise collected a few thousand janissaries or spahis belonging to the Pacha, who, notwithstanding Bonaparte's letter, had tamely suffered himself to be dragged into the party of his oppressors. Mourad-Bey had made his preparations of defence on the banks of the Nile. The capital of Cairo stands on the right bank of the river. It was on the opposite side, namely, on the left bank that Mourad had pitched his camp, in a wide plain extending between the Nile and the pyramids of Ghizeh, the loftiest in Egypt. His dispositions were these. A large village called Embabeh, rose from the margin of the river. Mourad had here erected certain works, conceived and executed with true Turkish ignorance. They were a simple trench encompassing the circuit of the village, and immoveable batteries, whose pieces not having field-frames could not be shifted. Such was the intrenched camp of Mourad. He had stationed within it his 24,000 fellahs and janissaries, to battle with the accustomed obstinacy of the Turks behind ramparts. This village, intrenched and defended on the side of the river, formed his right. The Mamelukes, to the number of ten thousand horsemen, were stretched over the plain between the Nile and the pyramids. Some thousands of Arab cavalry, auxiliaries of the Mamelukes only to pillage and massacre in case of a victory, occupied the space between the pyramids and the Mamelukes. Mourad's colleague, Ibraham-Bey, less warlike and valiant than himself, kept on the other side of the Nile with a thousand Mamelukes, guarding his women, slaves, and treasures, ready to fly from Cairo and take refuge in Syria if the French proved victorious. A considerable number of djermes covered the Nile, freighted with all the moveable wealth of the Mamelukes. Such was the position in which the two Beys awaited Bonaparte.

On the 3d Thermidor (21st July), the French army was in motion before daylight. The soldiers knew that they were on the point of beholding Cairo and encountering the enemy. At break of day, accordingly, they at length discovered on their left, beyond the river, the lofty minarets of that great capital, and on their right, in the desert, the gigantic pyramids, gilded by the rays of the sun. At sight of these eternal monuments, they paused, arrested by amazement and admiration. The countenance of Bonaparte was radiant with enthusiasm; he galloped before the ranks of the army, and pointing to the pyramids exclaimed: "*Reflect that from the summit of those pyramids forty ages look upon you.*" The troops answered with a shout of exultation and moved rapidly onward. On approaching nearer, they saw the spires and minarets of Cairo rise more proudly, the pyramids grow more vast to the view; they saw the multitude congregated in Embabeh, and the glittering array of those ten thousand horsemen, resplendent in gold and steel, stretched in an interminable line over the plain. Bonaparte quickly arranged his plan of battle. The army, as at Chebreiss, was separated into five divisions. The divisions under Desaix and Regnier formed the right, towards the desert; the division under Dugua formed the centre; the divisions of Menou and Bon formed the left along the course of the Nile. Bonaparte, who since the combat of Chebreiss had duly estimated the peculiarities of the ground and the enemy, made his dispositions accordingly. Each division formed a square; each square had six ranks. Behind were the companies of grenadiers in platoons, ready to support the points of attack. The artillery was on the angles; the baggage and the generals in the



centre. The squares were shifting. When they were in motion, two sides marched on the flanks. When they were charged, they were to halt and face round. Again, when they intended to attack a position, the front ranks were to detach themselves and form in columns of attack, whilst the others remained behind, still maintaining the square, but only three files deep, and ready to embrace again the columns of attack. Such were the dispositions ordered by Bonaparte. He was afraid lest the impetuous soldiers of Italy, accustomed to advance at quick march, would have difficulty in resigning themselves to this cold and passionless system of bulwarks. He had taken every pains to train them however. Above all, injunctions were given not to fire too soon, but to wait calmly for the enemy, and to fire only within musket-range.

The French advanced almost within reach of the enemy's cannon. Bonaparte, who was in the centre square formed by Dugua's division, surveyed with a telescope the state of the camp of Embabeh. He perceived that the artillery of the camp, not being on field-frames, could not be moved into the plain, and that the motley garrison was not likely to sally from the intrenchments. Upon this conclusion he based his operations. He resolved to bear down with his divisions on the right, that is to say, on the army of Mamelukes, wheeling out of range of the cannon of Embabeh. His intention was to separate the Mamelukes from the intrenched camp, surround them, drive them into the Nile, and not attack Embabeh until he had disposed of them. It would not be a difficult task, he surmised, to reduce the multitude cooped up in that camp after having exterminated the Mamelukes.

He forthwith gave the signal. Desaix, who formed the extreme right, was the first to march. After him went Regnier's square, and then Dugua's, in which Bonaparte stood. The two others wound round Embabeh, beyond reach of the cannon. Mourad-Bey, who, although without education, was endowed with a high intelligence and keen perception, immediately divined the purpose of his adversary, and determined to charge during the execution of so decisive a movement. Leaving two thousand Mamelukes to support Embabeh, he advanced at speed with the remainder on the two squares of the right. That of Desaix, entangled amidst palms, was not formed when the front Mamelukes came up. But it formed instantly, and was ready to receive the charge. Eight thousand cavalry galloping under one impulse across the plain form a terrific force. They fell with extraordinary impetuosity on Desaix. His brave soldiers, now as cool as they were wont to be headstrong, awaited them with calmness, and received them at musket-shot with a terrible discharge of balls and grape. Checked by the fire, these innumerable horsemen flew along the ranks, and encircled the bristling citadel. Some of the bravest precipitated themselves on the bayonets, and turning their horses and backing them on the French, succeeded in making a breach, and thirty or forty fell dead at the feet of Desaix, in the very centre of the square. The mass, wheeling round, recoiled from Desaix's square upon that of Regnier which followed. Accosted by a similar fire, they turned towards the point they had started from; but they found in their rear Dugua's division which Bonaparte had moved towards the Nile, and immediately broke into a complete rout. They fled in the utmost confusion. Part of the fugitives escaped on the French right towards the pyramids; others, passing under Dugua's fire, threw themselves into Embabeh, whither they carried trouble and dismay. All immediately became confusion in the intrenched camp. Bonaparte, perceiving the moment auspicious, ordered his two left divisions to approach Embabeh and storm it. Bon and Menou advanced under the fire of the intrenchments, and when they reached a suitable distance, halted. The squares unlined; the front ranks formed in columns of attack, whilst the others remained in square, still presenting the appearance of living citadels. But at this moment, the Mamelukes, as well those Mourad had left at Embabeh as those who had sought refuge within it, attempted to anticipate the assault. They charged on the French columns of attack whilst under march. But these, instantly halting and forming in square with matchless rapidity, received them with firmness, and killed a great number. Some retreated into Embabeh, where the disorder became extreme; others, flying into the plain, between the Nile and the French right, were shot down or driven into the river. The attacking columns then vigorously assailed Embabeh, stormed the intrenchments, and forced into the Nile the unfortunate multitude of fellahs and janissaries. Many were drowned; but as the Egyptians are excellent swimmers, the great majority contrived to save themselves. The action was finished, and the day over. The Arabs, who had lurked near the pyramids in expectation of a victory, plunged into the desert. Mourad, with the wreck of his fine cavalry and his own face dyed in blood, retired in the direction of Upper-Egypt. Ibrahim, who contemplated the disastrous conflict from the opposite bank, fled towards Balbeis in retreat for Syria. The Mamelukes set fire to the djermes in the river which contained their valuables. This prey escaped the French, who had the mortification to witness the flames during the whole of the night successively devouring the rich and multifarious booty.

Bonaparte fixed his head-quarters at Ghizeh, on the banks of the Nile, where Mourad-Bey had a sumptuous residence. Both at Ghizeh and Embabeh, considerable stores of provisions were found, and the French soldiers were enabled to make amends for their long privation. They discovered in the gardens of Ghizeh vines loaded with luscious grapes, and failed not to celebrate a speedy vintage. But on the field of battle they gathered fruits of another kind: magnificent shawls, splendid weapons, horses, and purses containing two to three hundred pieces of gold, for the Mamelukes carried their wealth principally on the person. They passed the evening, night, and following day in collecting these spoils. From five to six hundred Mamelukes had been killed. More than a thousand were drowned in the Nile. The French soldiers assiduously commenced to fish up the bodies in order to rifle them; a pursuit in which they consumed several additional days.

The battle had scarcely cost the French a hundred killed and wounded; for if defeat be destruction to broken, so is the loss almost null to compact and victorious squares. The Mamelukes had lost their best horsemen on the field or in the water. Their forces were dispersed, and the fall of Cairo into the hands of the French was inevitable. That capital was in great disorder and agitation. It contained upwards of three hundred thousand inhabitants, and was filled with a ferocious and degraded populace, which abandoned itself to revolting excesses, and attempted to profit by the occasion to plunder the rich palaces of the Beys. Unfortunately, the French flotilla had not yet ascended the Nile, and they had not the means of crossing it to proceed and take possession of Cairo. Some French merchants who happened to be in the city were sent by the scheiks to Bonaparte for the purpose of arranging as to the occupation of the place. He contrived to procure some djermes to carry over a detachment, which restored tranquillity and shielded life and property from the outrages of the mob. On the second day thereafter he entered Cairo in person and took up his abode in the palace of Mourad-Bey.

No sooner was he established at Cairo than he began to put in vogue the policy he had already

adopted at Alexandria, and which was so well calculated to attach the country to him. He visited the principal scheiks, flattered their prejudices, cajoled them with hopes of the restoration of the Arab dominion, promised them the perpetuation of their religion and customs, and completely succeeded in gaining them by a happy blending of adroit blandishments with imposing language, stamped with oriental grandeur. An essential point was to obtain from the scheiks of the mosque of Djemil-Azar a declaration in favour of the French. This would operate as a brief from the Pope amongst the Catholics. Bonaparte exerted all his address to attain this object and he fully succeeded. The great scheiks made the declaration desired, and exhorted the Egyptians to submit to the envoy of God, who revered the Prophet and was come to avenge his children on the tyranny of the Mamelukes. Bonaparte established at Cairo a divan in the same manner as at Alexandria, composed of the principal scheiks and other inhabitants. He intended this divan or municipal council to be instrumental both in securing the good-will of the Egyptians by the show of consulting them, and also in imparting information upon the details of the existing internal administration. It was determined that similar ones should be established in all the provinces, and that these separate divans should send deputies to the divan of Cairo, which would thus become the grand national divan.

Bonaparte resolved to leave the administration of justice in the hands of the Cadis. In execution of his design to succeed the Mamelukes in their domination, he confiscated their property, and continued for the advantage of the French army the perception of the taxes previously levied. For this latter purpose he required the co-operation of the Copts. He omitted no means to gain their attachment, alluring them by hopes of an amelioration of their condition. He dispatched generals with detachments down the Nile to complete the occupation of the Delta, which had been as yet merely traversed. He sent others up the Nile to take possession of Middle-Egypt. Desaix was stationed with his division at the entrance of Upper-Egypt, which it was intended to wrest from Mourad-Bey as soon as the waters of the Nile subsided in the autumn. Each of the generals, furnished with detailed instructions, was to repeat in every part of the country what had been done at Alexandria and Cairo. They were to call the scheiks around them, conciliate the Copts, and provide for the receipt of the taxes to meet the necessities of the French army.

The comfort and health of his soldiers likewise commanded the attention of Bonaparte. Egypt was beginning to please them; they found in it repose, abundance, a pure and healthy climate. They were becoming accustomed to the singular manners of the country, which afforded them a continual subject of banter. Comprehending the intention of the general with their usual sagacity, they also feigned great reverence for the Prophet, and laughed with him at the part policy compelled them to play. Bonaparte caused ovens to be constructed that they might be supplied with bread. He lodged them in the excellent habitations of the Mamelukes, and enjoined them above all things to respect the women. They had met in Egypt an admirable variety of the ass and in great quantity. Upon these animals it was their delight to make excursions in the environs and scour the face of the country. Their vivacity sometimes occasioned unpleasant accidents to the grave denizens of Cairo. It became necessary to prohibit them from traversing the streets otherwise than at a sedate and orderly pace. The cavalry was now mounted on the finest horses in the world, to wit on the Arab chargers captured from the Mamelukes.

Bonaparte also applied himself to maintain relations with the neighbouring countries, in order to preserve and monopolize the rich commerce of Egypt. He himself nominated the emir-hadjée. This is an officer chosen annually at Cairo to protect the great caravan of Mecca. He wrote to all the French consuls on the coast of Barbary, instructing them to apprize the Beys that the emir-hadjée was appointed and that the caravans might depart in safety. He caused the scheiks to communicate to the scherif of Mecca that the pilgrims would be protected and the caravans have security and protection. The pacha of Cairo having followed Ibrahim-Bey to Balbeys, Bonaparte addressed to him, as also to the pachas of St. Jean d'Acre and Damascus, letters affirming the cordial dispositions of the French towards the Sublime Porte. This precaution was unfortunately unavailing. The officers of the Sultan could with difficulty be persuaded that the French, who had invaded one of their sovereign's richest provinces, were in reality his truest friends.

The Arabs were captivated by the character of the young conqueror. They marvelled at the phenomenon of a mortal who wielded the thunderbolts of war being at the same time clement and courteous. They called him the adopted son of the Prophet, the favourite of the great Allah, and had chaunted in the great mosque the following hallelujah:

"The great Allah is no longer angry with us! He has pardoned our sins, sufficiently punished by the long oppression of the Mamelukes. Let us sing the mercies of the great Allah!

"Who is he that has preserved from the perils of the sea and the rage of his enemies *the favourite of Victory?* Who is he that has conducted in safety to the shores of the Nile the warriors of the West?

"It is the great Allah, the all-powerful Allah, who is no longer wroth with us! Let us sing the mercies of the great Allah!

"The Mameluke-Beys put their confidence in their horses; the Mameluke-Beys ranged their infantry in battle.

"But *the Favourite of Victory*, at the head of the warriors of the West, destroyed the infantry and horses of the Mamelukes.

"Even as the vapours which rise at dawn from the waters of the Nile are dissipated by the rays of the sun, so has the army of the Mamelukes been dispersed by the warriors of the West, because the great Allah is truly enraged against the Mamelukes, because the warriors of the West are the apple of the eye of the great Allah."

To enter more completely into the manners of the Arabs, Bonaparte resolved to take part in their festivals. He assisted at that of the Nile, which is one of the greatest in Egypt. That river is the benefactor of the country; it is accordingly held in deep veneration, and is the object of a species of worship. During the inundation it is introduced into Cairo by a large canal; a dam bars the entrance of this canal, until the water has reached a certain height; then it is cut, and the day appointed for this operation is one of jubilee. The height to which the river has attained is proclaimed, and when a plentiful inundation is expected general gladness diffuses itself, for it is a presage of abundance. It was on the 18th of August (1st Fructidor) that this festival was celebrated. Bonaparte had ordered the whole army under arms and ranged it on the banks of the canal. An immense crowd was assembled, which viewed with pleasure the *warriors of the West* participate in their enjoyments. Bonaparte, at the head of the staff, accompanied the principal authorities of the country. First, a scheik declared the height to which the Nile had risen: it was twenty-five feet, which caused acclamations of joy. Then the labour of cutting the dam commenced. The whole French artillery resounded at the moment the waters of the river rushed in. According to custom, a number of boats was launched into the

canal to obtain the prize awarded to the one first afloat. Bonaparte delivered this prize in person. Multitudes of men and boys plunged into the stream, attaching peculiar virtues to this immersion. Women threw into it hair and pieces of cloth. Bonaparte afterwards caused the city to be illuminated, and the day closed amidst festivities. The commemoration of the Prophet was celebrated with equal pomp. Bonaparte repaired to the great mosque, seated himself on cushions, his legs crossed like the scheiks, and repeated with them the homilies of the Koran, poising his body and bowing his head as a true moslem. He edified all the members of the holy college by his orthodox piety. He subsequently attended the entertainment given by the grand scheik, who is elected on that day.

It was by such means Bonaparte, an equally profound politician as great captain, succeeded in conciliating the attachment of the country. But whilst thus flattering its prejudices for a time, he strove to prepare the way for the spread of knowledge within it, by the creation of the celebrated "Institute of Egypt." Assembling the *savants* and artists he had brought over, and associating with them the best-informed amongst his officers, he formed this Institute, to which he assigned revenues, and one of the most capacious mansions in Cairo. Some were appointed to make an exact description of the country, and draw detailed maps; others to survey the ruins and furnish new lights to history; others to study the productions and digest treatises of utility to medicine, astronomy, and natural history; others, in fine, to consider the benefits that might be conferred on the inhabitants by the introduction of machines, by canals, works on the Nile, and processes adapted to a soil so singular and different from that of Europe. If fortune was one day to tear this fine country from France, she could not at least rob her of the conquests science was about to achieve on its territory. a monument was in embryo, destined to illustrate the genius and perseverance of her *savants*, as much as the expedition itself the heroism of her soldiers.

Monge was the first who exercised the presidency. Bonaparte obtained the distinction only after him. He submitted the following subjects of inquiry: the best construction for water and wind mills; a substitution for hops, which are not grown in Egypt, in the brewing of beer; the places best adapted for the cultivation of the vine; the best means of procuring water conveyed to the citadel of Cairo; the expediency of digging wells in different parts of the desert; the mode of clarifying and cooling the water of the Nile; a plan for rendering useful the accumulations of rubbish with which Cairo was choked, as well as all the old towns of Egypt; the materials necessary for the manufacture of powder in Egypt. From these topics, selected by him, we may conceive the young general's turn of mind. Forthwith, the surveyors, designers, and *savants*, spread themselves through the provinces to form a description and map of the country.

Such were the objects of attention to the new colony, and such the manner in which the founder, Bonaparte, directed its labours. The reduction of the provinces of Lower and Middle Egypt was completed without difficulty, leading only to a few skirmishes with the Arabs. A forced march on Balbeis had sufficed to scare Ibrahim-Bey into Syria. Desaix was obliged to await the arrival of autumn to conquer Upper-Egypt from Mourad-Bey, who had retreated thither with the remains of his army.

But, in the meantime, fortune inflicted on Bonaparte the most terrible of reverses. On quitting Alexandria he had strongly urged Admiral Brueys to place his squadron in safety from the English, either by securing it in the harbour of Alexandria or by removing it to Corfu, but on no account to remain in the roadstead of Aboukir, for it was better to encounter the enemy under sail than to receive him at anchor. A warm dispute had arisen consequent upon the question whether ships of 80 and 120 guns could enter the harbour of Alexandria. There was no doubt about vessels of smaller calibre; but the two of 80 and the one of 120 guns would require to be lightened, so as to lessen their draught at least three feet. To effect this it was necessary to disarm them or to construct floaters. Admiral Brueys refused to let his squadron enter the port under this condition. He contended that if such precautions must be taken with regard to his three most powerful ships, he would never be able to leave it again in presence of an enemy, and might be thus blockaded by a very inferior force: so he determined to depart for Corfu. But being strongly attached to General Bonaparte, he was unwilling to set sail before hearing news of his entry into Cairo, and of his safe establishment in Egypt. The time which he consumed, first in sounding the channel of the Alexandrian harbour, and secondly in awaiting intelligence from Cairo, occasioned his own ruin and one of the most fatal events of the revolution: one of those too, which, to the present era, have exercised the greatest influence over the destinies of the world.

Admiral Brueys, then, was still moored in the bay of Aboukir. This bay is an almost regular simicircle. His thirteen vessels formed a semicircular line, parallel with the coast. To secure his line of anchorage, the admiral had extended it on one side towards a small islet, named the islet of Aboukir. He conceived that no ship could pass between this islet and his line to take it in rear; and in this persuasion was content with erecting on it a twelve-gun battery, simply to prevent an enemy from landing. He judged himself so unassailable on this side, that he had stationed there his worst vessels. He feared more for the other extremity of his half-moon. On that side he believed it possible for an enemy to pass between the shore and his anchorage-ground; so he had placed there his strongest and best-commanded ships. Moreover he was consoled by an important consideration, which was, that his line being to the south and the wind blowing from the north, the enemy who should attack on that side would have the wind foul, and would doubtless not expose himself to fight under such a disadvantage.

In this situation, protected on his left by an islet which he deemed sufficient to shut the bay, and on his right by his best ships and the advantage of the wind, he awaited in security the tidings which were to be the signal of his departure.

Nelson, after having scoured the Archipelago, after returning to the Adriatic, to Naples, and to Sicily, had at length obtained certain intelligence of the debarkation of the French at Alexandria. He immediately sailed in that direction, more sure than ever of at length finding their squadron and giving it battle. He dispatched a frigate in advance to seek out and reconnoitre its position. This frigate having found it in the bay of Aboukir, was enabled to pry at leisure into the whole mystery of the French half-moon. If the admiral, who had in the harbour of Alexandria a multitude of frigates and light vessels, had taken the precaution to keep some of them under sail, he might have held the English always at a distance, prevented them from scrutinizing his line, and at all events been apprized of their approach. Unfortunately he did nothing of the kind. The English frigate, after having concluded its observations, returned to Nelson, who, being informed of all the particulars of the French position, instantly bore towards Aboukir. He reached the mouth of the bay on the 14th Thermidor (1st August), about six o'clock in the evening. Admiral Brueys was at

dinner: but upon seeing the English he immediately hoisted the signal for battle. However the French so little expected to receive an enemy that no preparations for an engagement were made in any of their ships, and part of the crews were on shore. The admiral hurried away officers to bring the sailors on board, and to collect some of those in the transports. He concluded Nelson would not venture to attack that evening, and he trusted to have time for the reception of the reinforcements he had sent in quest of.

Nelson resolved to attack immediately, and to hazard a bold manœuvre, on the success of which he grounded his hopes of victory. This was to approach the French line on the left, namely, by the islet of Aboukir, to pass between that islet and their squadron, despite all the dangers of shallows, and to place himself thus between the shore and their line of battle. This manœuvre was very perilous, but the intrepid Englishman hesitated not. The number of ships was equal on both sides, that is to say, thirteen sail of the line. Nelson began the attack about eight in the evening. His tactics did not at first promise to be successful. *The Culloden*, in attempting to steer between the islet of Aboukir and the French line, took the ground. *The Goliath*, which followed her, was more fortunate, and sailed through; but driven by the wind, she ran beyond the first French ship, and was only hauled up opposite the third. *The Zealous*, *the Audacious*, *the Theseus*, and *the Orion* followed in her wake, and succeeded in taking up positions between the shore and the French. They advanced as far as *Le Tonnant*, which lay eighth in the French line, and thus engaged their whole centre and left. Their other vessels advanced outside the line and thus placed it between two fires. As the French had not anticipated being attacked in this way, the guns towards the shore were not slung, and their two first ships could only fire from one side, consequently one was disabled and the other unmasted. But in the centre, where *the Orient* lay, bearing the Admiral's flag, the fire was terrible. *The Bellerophon*, one of Nelson's principal ships, had her rigging shot away, her masts sent by the board, and was obliged to be drifted off. Other English vessels, dreadfully crippled, were obliged to be removed from the field of battle. Admiral Brueys had received only a part of his sailors; nevertheless, he maintained the conflict with advantage; he even hoped, notwithstanding the success of Nelson's manœuvre, to gain the victory, if the orders which he gave at this moment to his right were executed. The English had engaged only the left and the centre; the right, comprising five of the best ships, had no enemy before it. Brueys signalled it to weigh, and turn outside the line of battle; which manœuvre succeeding, the English ships attacking externally would have been placed between two fires; but the signals were not seen. In a similar case, a subordinate ought not to hesitate in flying to the scene of danger, and to the rescue of his chief. Vice-admiral Villeneuve, brave but irresolute, remained quiescent, awaiting orders. The left and centre, therefore, continued exposed to the battery of two fires. Still the Admiral and his captains worked prodigies of valour, and gloriously sustained the honour of the French flag. The French had lost two ships, the English likewise had lost two, one grounded, the other dismasted; the French fire was superior. The unfortunate Brueys had been wounded, but refused to quit the deck of his vessel. "An admiral," he exclaimed, "ought to die giving orders." A ball killed him on his quarter-deck. About eleven o'clock the magnificent vessel *L'Orient* took fire and blew up. This fearful explosion suspended for a time the desolating struggle. Without losing courage, however, the five French ships engaged, *Le Franklin*, *Le Tonnant*, *Le Peuple-Souverain*, *Le Spartiate*, and *L'Aquilon*, kept up their fire during the night. There was still time for the right to hoist sail and come to their aid. Nelson trembled lest this manœuvre should be executed; he was so shattered that he could not have sustained the attack. Villeneuve did, in fact, at length weigh anchor and stand out, but it was for the purpose of making off and saving his wing, which he deemed incapable of encountering Nelson with advantage. Three of his ships ran ashore; he got away with the two others, and two frigates, and crowded all sail for Malta. The battle had now lasted upwards of fifteen hours. All the crews on board the French vessels engaged, had exhibited an heroic valour. The brave captain Du Petit-Thouars lost two limbs at a shot; he asked for a pinch of snuff, remained on his quarter-deck, and waited, like Brueys, to be killed by a cannon-ball. The whole French squadron, with the exception of the ships and frigates draughted by Villeneuve, was destroyed. Nelson was so crippled that he could not pursue the fugitive vessels.*

* [This of course is the most favourable version of the affair for the French. It may be interesting to the reader to have in juxtaposition a good English account of this famous battle, which unquestionably exercised a prodigious effect on the destinies of the world, and one is therefore subjoined from the pen of Mr. Alison:—"No sooner did Nelson perceive the situation of the French fleet, than he resolved to penetrate between them and the shore, and in that way double with his whole force on part of that of the enemy. 'Where there is room for the enemy to swing,' said he, 'there must be room for us to anchor.' His plan was to place his fleet half on the outer, and half on the inner side of the French line, and station his ships, so far as practicable, one on the outer bow and another on the outer quarter of each of the enemy's. Captain Berry, his flag captain, when he was made acquainted with the design, exclaimed with transport, 'If we succeed, what will the world say?'—'There is no "If" in the case,' replied Nelson; 'that we shall succeed is certain; who may live to tell the story is a very different question.' The number of ships of the line on the two sides was equal, but the French had a great advantage in the size of their vessels; their ships carrying 1196 guns, and 11,230 men, while the English had only 1012 guns and 8068 men. The British squadron consisted entirely of seventy-fours; whereas the French, besides the noble L'Orient of 120 guns, had two 80-gun ships, the Franklin and Guillaume Tell. The battery on Aboukir fort was mounted with four pieces of heavy cannon and two mortars, besides pieces of a lighter calibre. The squadron advanced to the attack at three o'clock in the afternoon. Admiral Brueys at first imagined that the battle would be deferred till the following morning; but the gallant bearing and steady course of the British ships as they entered the bay, soon convinced him that an immediate assault was intended. The moment was felt by the bravest in both fleets; thousands gazed in silence, and with anxious hearts, on each other, who were never destined again to see the sun, and the shore was covered with multitudes of Arabs, anxious to behold a fight on which, to all appearance, the fate of their country would depend. When the English fleet came within range, they were received with a steady fire from the broadsides of all the vessels and the batteries on the island. It fell right on the bows of the leading ships; but, without returning a shot, they bore directly down upon the enemy, the men on board every vessel being employed aloft in furling sails, and below in tending the braces, and making ready for an anchorage. Captain Fowley led the way in the Goliath, outsailing the Zealous, under Captain Hood, which for some time disputed the post of honour with him; and when he reached the van of the enemy's line, he steered between the outermost ship and the shoal, so as to interpose between the French fleet and the shore. In ten minutes he shot away the masts of the Conquerant, while the Zealous, which immediately followed, in the same time totally disabled the Guerrier, which was next in line. The other ships in that column followed in their order, still inside the French line, while Nelson, in the Vanguard, at the head of five ships, anchored outside of the enemy, within pistol-shot of their third ship, the Spartiate. The effect of this manœuvre was to bring an overwhelming force against two-thirds of the enemy's squadron, while the other third, moored at a distance from the scene of danger, could neither aid their friends nor injure their enemies. Nelson had arranged his fleet with such skill, that from the moment that the ships took up their positions, the victory was secure. Five ships had passed the line, and anchored between the first nine of the enemy and the shore, while six had taken their station on the outer side of the same vessels, which were thus placed between two fires, and had no possibility of escape. Another vessel, the Leander, was interposed across the line, and cut off the Vanguard from all assistance from the rearmost ships of the squadron, while her guns raked right and left those between which she was placed. The Culloden, which came up sounding after it was dark, ran aground two leagues from the hostile fleets, and, notwithstanding the utmost efforts of her captain and crew, could take no part in the action which followed; but her fate served as a warning to the Alexander and Swiftsure, which would else have infallibly struck on the shoal and perished. The way in which these ships entered the bay and

Such was the celebrated naval battle of Aboukir or the Nile, the most disastrous that the French navy had ever sustained, and the military consequences of which threatened to be most fatal. The fleet which had borne the French to Egypt, which could have succoured or recruited them, which was to second their movements on the coasts of Syria if they undertook any, which was to overawe the Porte, force it to be content with insufficient reasons, and compel it to sanction the invasion of Egypt, which was in fine to carry back the French into their own country in the event of reverses,—this fleet was annihilated. The ships of the French were burnt, but they had not set fire to them of their own accord, which made a vast difference in the moral effect. Tidings of the misfortune rapidly circulated through Egypt, and caused a moment of despair to the army. Bonaparte received the intelligence with imperturbable calmness. "So be it!" he cried; "we must die here or issue forth great as the ancients!" He wrote to Kleber:—"This will oblige us to perform greater things than we contemplated. We must hold ourselves on the alert." The undaunted soul of Kleber was worthy of such language. "Yes," he replied, "we must do great things; *I am preparing my faculties.*"—The fortitude of these great men cheered the army under its affliction, and restored its tone. Bonaparte sought to distract his soldiers by different expeditions, and soon taught them to forget the disaster. At the fête of the foundation of the republic, celebrated on the 1st Vendemiaire, he strove to exalt their imagination: he caused to be engraved on Pompey's pillar the names of the forty soldiers first killed in Egypt. These were the forty who had fallen in the assault of Alexandria. Their names, furnished from the obscure villages of France, were thus associated with the immortality of Pompey and Alexander. He likewise addre-sed to his army a grand and thrilling allocution, retracing its wondrous history. It ran thus—

"Soldiers,

"We celebrate the first day of the year VII. of the Republic.

"Five years ago the independence of the French people was menaced; but you took Toulon,—it was the presage of the ruin of your enemies.

"A year after you beat the Austrians at Dego.

"The year subsequent you were on the summit of the Alps.

"Two years ago you fought against Mantua, and won the famous victory of Saint George.

"Last year you were at the sources of the Drave and the Isonzo, on your return from Germany.

"Who would then have said that you would this day be on the banks of the Nile, in the centre of the ancient world?

"From the English, renowned in arts and commerce, to the hideous and ferocious Bedouin, you attract the eyes of all nations.

"Soldiers, your destiny is glorious, because you are worthy of what you have done, and of the opinion entertained of you. You will die with honour, like the brave men whose names are written on this column, or you will return to your country covered with laurels, and the admiration of the universe.

"During the five months we have been absent from Europe, we have been the constant object of solicitude to our countrymen. On this day forty millions of citizens celebrate the era of representative governments; forty millions of citizens think of you; all say: 'It is to their labours, to their blood, that we owe general peace, tranquillity, the prosperity of commerce, and the blessings of civil liberty.'"

took up their stations amidst the gloom of night by the light of the increasing cannonade, excited the admiration of all who witnessed it. The British ships, however, had a severe fire to sustain as they successively passed along the enemy's line to take up their appointed stations; and the great size of several of the French squadron rendered them more than a match for any single vessel the English could oppose to them. The Vanguard, which bore proudly down, bearing the admiral's flag and six colours on different parts of the rigging, had every man at the first six guns on the forecastle killed or wounded in a few minutes, and they were three times swept off before the action closed. The Bellerophon dropt her stern anchor close under the bow of the L'Orient, and, notwithstanding the immense disproportion of force, continued to engage her first-rate antagonist till her own masts had all gone overboard, and every officer was either killed or wounded, when she drifted away with the tide, overwhelmed, but not subdued, a glorious monument of unconquerable valour. As she floated along, she came close to the Swiftsure, which was coming into action, and not having the lights at the mizen-peak, which Nelson had ordered as a signal by which his own ships might distinguish each other, she was at first mistaken for an enemy. Fortunately, Captain Hallowell, who commanded that vessel, had the presence of mind to order his men not to fire, till he ascertained whether the hulk was a friend or an enemy, and thus a catastrophe was prevented which might have proved fatal to both of these ships. The station of the Bellerophon in combating the L'Orient was now taken by the Swiftsure, which opened at once a steady fire on the quarter of the Franklin and the bows of the French admiral, while the Alexander anchored on his larboard quarter, and, with the Leander, completed the destruction of their gigantic opponent. It was now dark, but both fleets were illuminated by the incessant discharge of above two thousand pieces of cannon, and the volumes of flame and smoke that rolled away from the bay gave it the appearance as if a terrific volcano had suddenly burst forth in the midst of the sea. Victory, however, soon declared for the British; before nine, three ships of the line had struck, and two were dismasted; and the flames were seen bursting forth from the L'Orient, as she still continued, with unabated energy, her heroic defence. They spread with frightful rapidity, the fire of the Swiftsure was directed with such fatal precision to the burning part, that all attempts to extinguish it proved ineffectual; and the masts and rigging were soon wrapped in flames, which threw a prodigious light over the heavens, and rendered the situation of every ship in both fleets distinctly visible. The sight redoubled the ardour of the British seamen, by exhibiting the shattered condition and lowered colours of so many of their enemies, and loud cheers from the whole fleet announced every successive flag that was struck. As the fire approached the magazine of the L'Orient, many officers and men jumped overboard, and were picked up by the English boats; others were dragged into the port-holes of the nearest British ships, who for that purpose suspended their firing; but the greater part of the crew, with heroic bravery, stood to their guns to the last, and continued to fire from the lower deck. At ten o'clock she blew up, with an explosion so tremendous, that nothing in ancient or modern war was ever equal to it. Every ship in the hostile fleets was shaken to its centre; the firing by universal consent ceased on both sides, and the tremendous explosion was followed by a silence still more awful, interrupted only, after the lapse of some minutes, by the splash of the shattered masts and yards falling into the water from the vast height to which they had been thrown. The British ships in the vicinity, with admirable coolness, had made preparations to avoid the conflagration; all the shrouds and sails were thoroughly wetted, and sailors stationed with buckets of water to extinguish any burning fragments which might fall upon their decks. By these means, although large burning masses fell on the Swiftsure and Alexander, they were extinguished without doing any serious damage. After a pause of ten minutes, the firing recommenced, and continued without intermission till after midnight, when it gradually grew slacker, from the shattered condition of the French ships and the exhaustion of the British sailors, numbers of whom fell asleep beside their guns, the instant a momentary cessation of loading took place. At daybreak the magnitude of the victory was apparent; not a vestige of the L'Orient was to be seen; the frigate La Serieuse was sunk, and the whole French line, with the exception of the Guillaume Tell and Genereux, had struck their colours. These ships having been little engaged in the action, cut their cables, and stood out to sea, followed by the two frigates: they were gallantly pursued by the Zealous, which was rapidly gaining on them; but as there was no other ship of the line in a condition to support her, she was recalled, and these ships escaped. Had the Culloden not struck on the shoal, and the frigates belonging to the squadron been present, not one of the enemy's fleet would have escaped to convey the mournful tidings to France."—*History of Europe*, vol. iii. pp. 445—450.]

CHAPTER LVIII.

EFFECT OF THE EXPEDITION OF EGYPT IN EUROPE. — FATAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE BATTLE OF ABOUKIR.—DECLARATION OF WAR BY THE PORTE. —EFFORTS OF ENGLAND TO FORM A NEW COALITION. — CONFERENCES WITH AUSTRIA. — FRESH COMMOTIONS IN HOLLAND, SWITZERLAND, AND THE ITALIAN REPUBLICS.—CHANGE IN THE CISALPINE CONSTITUTION.—DOMESTIC SITUATION OF FRANCE. A NEW OPPOSITION IN THE COUNCILS.

—GENERAL DISPOSITION FOR WAR. LAW OF THE CONSCRIPTION. — FINANCES OF THE YEAR VII.— RESUMPTION OF HOSTILITIES. INVASION OF THE ROMAN STATES BY THE NEAPOLITAN ARMY.— CONQUEST OF NAPLES BY GENERAL CHAMPIONNET. —ABDICATION OF THE KING OF SARDINIA.

THE expedition to Egypt remained a mystery in Europe long after the departure of the fleet. The capture of Malta first tended to fix conjecture. That fortress deemed impregnable, and reduced on the way, threw over the French Argonauts an extraordinary lustre. The debarkation in Egypt, the occupation of Alexandria, the battle of the Pyramids, struck with singular amazement the imaginations of men in France and Europe. The name of Bonaparte, which had appeared so mighty when echoed from the Alps, produced a stronger and yet more startling effect reverberated from the distant regions of the East. Bonaparte and Egypt formed the theme of all conversations. Things done were as nought; still more gigantic enterprises were anticipated. Bonaparte designed, it was said, to traverse Syria and Arabia, and penetrate to Constantinople or India.

Intelligence of the battle of Aboukir came, not to destroy the prestige of the enterprise, but to revive the hopes of all the enemies of France, and hasten the success of their devices. England, who was greatly alarmed for her commercial supremacy, and waited but the favourable moment to raise fresh enemies against France, had filled Constantinople with her intrigues. The Sultan was not sorry to witness the punishment of the Mamelukes, but he had no desire to lose Egypt. M. de Talleyrand, who was to have repaired to Constantinople for the purpose of satisfying the Divan, had not proceeded on his mission. The agents of England had the field free; they instilled into the Porte that the ambition of France was insatiable; that after having convulsed Europe, she proposed to overturn the East; and that in contempt of an old alliance she had invaded the richest province of the Ottoman empire. These representations, with all the gold scattered in the Divan, would not have sufficed to determine it, if the powerful fleet of Brueys had been in a condition to bombard the Dardanelles; but the battle of Aboukir robbed the French of all their ascendency in the Levant, and transferred to England a decisive predominance. The Porte solemnly declared war against France,* and, for the sake of a province long ago lost, quarrelled with her natural ally, and coalesced with her most formidable enemies, Russia and England. The sultan ordered the formation of an army for the reconquest of Egypt. This event rendered the situation of the French extremely critical. Separated from France, and cut off from succour by the victorious fleets of England, they were exposed to the attacks of all the ferocious hordes of the East. They were but thirty thousand to contend against such perils.

The conqueror Nelson repaired to Naples to refit his crippled squadron, and receive the honours of a triumph. Notwithstanding the treaties which bound the court of Naples to France, and forbid it to furnish aid to her enemies, all the ports and dock-yards of Sicily were opened to Nelson. He himself was welcomed with extraordinary distinction. The king and queen advanced to receive him at the entrance of the harbour, and saluted him as the hero-liberator of the Mediterranean. It began to be insinuated that the success of Nelson ought to be the signal of a general rising, that the powers of Europe ought to take advantage of the moment, when the most formidable army of France and her greatest captain were imprisoned in Egypt, to march against her and repel within her own confines her soldiers and her principles. Such suggestions soon became rife in all the courts. Tuscany and Piedmont were especially exhorted, to stimulate the animosity they had hitherto disguised. This was the moment, they were told, to second the court of Naples, to league together against the common enemy, to rise all at once upon the rear of the French, and exterminate them from one end of the peninsula to the other. Austria was urged that she ought to seize the moment when the Italian states took the French in rear to attack them in front, and wrest Italy from their possession. The thing would be of easy accomplishment, she was reminded, for Bonaparte and his terrible army were no longer on the Adige. The Empire was incited by the remembrance of the territory it had lost, and of the compulsory cession of the limit of the Rhine. Urgent endeavours were made to draw Prussia from her neutrality; and lastly, with Paul of Russia influences were used fitted to operate on his diseased mind, and decide him to grant the assistance so long and idly promised by his predecessor Catherine.

These suggestions could scarcely fail to be favourably entertained in the various courts of Europe; but all were not in a condition to act upon them. The nearest to France were the most irritated and the most disposed to drive back the revolution; but for the very reason of their propinquity to the republican colossus, they were compelled to use the greater reserve and discretion ere venturing to declare openly against it. Russia, the most distant from France, and least exposed to her vengeance, both from its remoteness and the moral peculiarities of its populations, was the most easily induced to take the initiative. Catherine, whose wily policy had always tended to complicate affairs in Europe, both to gain a pretext for intervention and to pursue at leisure her designs on Poland, was dead, but her policy survived. This policy is inherent in the Russian cabinet; it results from its very position: it may vary in its manifestations, in its mode of action, according as the sovereign is astute or violent, but it constantly aims at an identical object, moved by an irresistible impulse. The able Catherine had been content to give hopes and subsidies to the emigrants; she had preached a crusade without contributing a soldier. Her successor had the self-same objects in view, but pursued them with the difference befitting his character. At first indeed this prince, violent in temper, and almost deranged, but of a certain generosity nevertheless, had appeared to discard the policy of Catherine, and refused to execute the treaty of alliance concluded with England and Austria; but after this momentary deviation he had speedily returned to the policy of his court. We have seen him afford an asylum to the pretender, and take the emigrants into his pay after the treaty of Campo-Formio. He was persuaded that he ought to place himself at the head of European nobility to defend it against the assaults of demagogues. The proceeding of the Knights of Malta, who took him for their protector, contributed to inflame his mind, and he embraced the ideas suggested to him with the inconstancy and ardour of the Russian character. He tendered his protection to the Empire, and proposed to constitute himself the guarantee of its integrity. The capture of Malta filled him with rage, and he hastened to offer the co-operation of his armies against France. England, therefore, was in the ascendant at St. Petersburg as well as at Constantinople, and enabled to move in unison enemies hitherto irreconcilable in their hate.

The same zeal was not displayed by other powers. Prussia found too much advantage in her neutrality, and in the exhaustion of Austria, to have any wish to interfere in the conflict between the two systems. She contented herself with watching narrowly her frontiers on the side of Holland and France to prevent the intrusion of the revolutionary mania. She had ranged her armies in a manner to form a *cordon*

* On the 18th Fructid. r. year VI. (4th September 1798.)

sanitaire. The Empire, which had acquired, at a heavy cost, a wholesome knowledge of the power of France, and was always exposed to become the theatre of war, desired peace. The dispossessed princes themselves also wished it, because they were assured of obtaining indemnities on the right bank; the ecclesiastical princes alone, threatened with secularization, were favourable to war. The Italian powers of Piedmont and Tuscany were looking forward to a fitting occasion; but for the present trembled under the republican rod. They dared not stir until Austria or Naples gave them the signal. As to Austria, although the best disposed of the courts forming the monarchical coalition, she still hesitated, with her usual tardiness, to take a decided part, apprehensive doubtless on account of her subjects who had been much exhausted in the late war. France had set up against her two new republics in Switzerland and Rome, the one on her flank, the other in Italy, which greatly irritated her, and wholly disposed her for war; nevertheless, she would have overlooked these fresh encroachments of the republican system, if she had been compensated by certain cessions. It was with this view she had proposed conferences at Selz. Those conferences were appointed to be held in the summer of 1798, not far from the congress of Rastadt, and concurrently therewith. On their result depended the determination of Austria, and the success of the efforts made to form a new coalition.

François de Neufchâteau was the envoy chosen by France. It was on this account that the small town of Selz had been selected for the place of meeting, on account of its situation on the banks of the Rhine, not far from Rastadt, but on the left side. This last condition was necessary, inasmuch as the constitution prohibited a retiring director from leaving France before a fixed period. M. de Cobentzel was deputed to represent Austria. From the first moment the real dispositions of that court were apparent. Its object was to obtain compensation, by an extension of territory, for the advances the republican system had made in Switzerland and Italy. France was mainly anxious to arrive at an understanding touching the affair of Vienna, and to procure satisfaction for the insult to Bernadotte. But Austria evaded explanations on that point, and always adjourned this part of the negotiation. The French envoy, on the contrary, constantly recurred to it; at the same time he had orders to be satisfied with the least atonement. France would be content if the minister Thugut, disgraced in appearance, were so in reality, and if a slight concession, the most insignificant in the world, were made to Bernadotte for the outrage committed on him. M. de Cobentzel contented himself with stating that his court disavowed what had passed at Vienna, but he offered no reparation, and persisted in demanding the extensions of territory he claimed. It was clear that the sacrifices of pride would be commensurate only with the gratifications of ambition. Austria contended that the institution of the two republics, the Roman and Helvetian, and the palpable influence exercised over the Cisalpine, Ligurian, and Batavian republics, were violations of the treaty of Campo-Formio, and a dangerous alteration in the state of Europe; in consequence France must give indemnities if she wished these her last usurpations to be forgiven; and, in the shape of an equivalent, the Austrian negotiator demanded additional provinces in Italy. He asked that the line of the Adige should be moved farther back, and the Austrian possessions extended to the Adda and the Po, or in other words, that the best half of the Cisalpine republic should be transferred to Austria. M. de Cobentzel, however, proposed to compensate the Cisalpine republic with a part of Piedmont, the surplus of that kingdom being made over to the Grand-duke of Tuscany, and the King of Piedmont receiving in lieu the states of the Church. Thus, for the bribe of an aggrandizement for himself in Lombardy, and for the Tuscan branch of his family, the emperor would have sanctioned the establishment of the Helvetian republic, the overthrow of the Pope, and the partition of the monarchy of Piedmont. It was impossible, nevertheless, for France to acquiesce in these propositions for several reasons. In the first place, she could not consent to dismember the scarcely formed Cisalpine state, and to replace, under the Austrian yoke, provinces she had emancipated, to which she had solemnly promised liberty, and on which she had levied contributions to insure it; and secondly, she had only the year before concluded a treaty with the King of Piedmont by which she guaranteed his dominions. This guarantee was particularly stipulated against Austria. Hence, France could not sacrifice Piedmont. François de Neufchâteau, therefore, was obliged to reject the propositions of M. de Cobentzel. They separated without effecting any arrangement. No satisfaction was given for the affair of Vienna. M. Degelmann, who was to have appeared at Paris as ambassador, did not present himself, and it was announced that the two cabinets would continue to communicate through their ministers at the congress of Rastadt. This separation was generally regarded as a species of rupture.

The determination of Austria was evidently taken from that moment; but before recommencing hostilities with France, she desired to secure the co-operation of the principal powers of Europe. M. de Cobentzel departed for Berlin, with instructions to proceed from Berlin to St. Petersburg. The object of this journey was to aid the efforts of England in forming a new coalition. The emperor of Russia had sent to Berlin one of the most important personages in his empire, Prince Repnin. M. de Cobentzel was to combine his influence with that of Prince Repnin and the English embassy to sway the young king.

France, on her part, dispatched to Berlin one of her most illustrious citizens,—Sieyes. The reputation of Sieyes had been immense before the reign of the Convention, but had altogether vanished under the committee of public-welfare. It suddenly revived when things began to resume their natural course, and the name of Sieyes was again become the greatest in France after that of Bonaparte; for, in France, a character for profundity is that which commands most regard after a high military renown. Sieyes was therefore one of the two chief personages of his country. Always discontented with and criticizing the government, not like Bonaparte through ambition, but from pique against a constitution he had not himself framed, he was nevertheless an importunate applicant. The idea of giving him an embassy had suggested itself. It afforded an opportunity of removing him, of rendering him useful, and especially of furnishing him the means of existence. The revolution had swept all these away by abolishing ecclesiastical benefices. A great embassy would supply a medium for restoring them. The greatest at present was the Prussian, for the French had no envoys in Austria, Russia, or England. Berlin was the theatre of all intrigues, and Sieyes, though indifferently adapted for the management of affairs, was still a subtle and keen observer. Moreover, his fame rendered him peculiarly fitted to represent France, above all in Germany, which his genius tallied with better than any other country.

To the Prussian monarch the arrival in his dominions of so celebrated a revolutionist was by no means a source of pleasure; yet he ventured not to reject him. Sieyes comported himself with circumspection and dignity; the reception accorded him was of a similar character, but he was left to pine in solitude. Like all the French envoys to foreign courts he was

observed with caution, and so to speak isolated. The Germans were curious to see him, but durst not visit him. His influence at the court of Berlin was null. The consideration of his own interests alone weighed with the king in resisting the instances of England, Austria, and Russia.

Whilst endeavours were thus concentrated to vanquish the reluctance of the king of Prussia, the court of Naples, inflated with exultation and insolence since the victory of Aboukir, was making vast preparations for war, and redoubling its solicitations at the courts of Tuscany and Piedmont. France, through an excess of complaisance, had permitted it to occupy the duchy of Benevento. But this concession was far from tranquillizing it. The Neapolitan cabinet flattered itself with gaining by immediate hostilities a moiety at least of the ancient possessions of the Pope.

Meanwhile the negotiations at Rastadt were progressing favourably for France. Treilhard, elected a director, and Bonaparte, absent in Egypt, had been replaced at the congress by Jean Debry and Roberjot. After having secured the line of the Rhine, a variety of questions, military, political, and commercial, remained for solution. The French legation had become extremely exorbitant and demanded much more than it had any right to expect. In the first place, it claimed all the islands of the Rhine, an important acquisition, especially in a military point of view. Next it sought to retain Kehl and its territory opposite Strasburg, with Cassel and its territory opposite Mayence. It insisted that the commercial bridge between the two Brisachs should be re-established; that fifty acres of land should be given to France in front of the old bridge of Huninguen, and that the important fortress of Ehrenbreitstein should be demolished. It required furthermore that the navigation of the Rhine and of all the German rivers flowing into it should be free, all tolls abolished, merchandise on both banks subjected to the same dues, and the towing-tracks preserved and maintained by the river-side populations. In conclusion, it proposed a final condition of great moment, to wit that the debts of the countries on the left bank, ceded to France, should be transferred to the countries on the right bank, appointed to be given by way of indemnity.

The deputation of the Empire contended with reason that the line of the Rhine ought to afford equal security to both nations; that it was this very argument of equal security which had been principally relied upon in sustaining the claims of France to the line in question; but that this security would no longer exist for Germany if France possessed all the offensive points, as would happen by her retention of the islands, of Cassel and Kehl, of fifty acres opposite Huninguen, &c. The deputation of the Empire therefore refused to admit the demands of France, and proposed as the real line of demarcation the *thalweg*, that is to say the centre of the principal navigable channel: all the islands on the right of this line to belong to Germany, and those on the left to France. In this manner the true impediment which renders a river a military line was placed between the two people, namely the principal navigable stream. In sequence of this basis, the deputation required the demolition of Cassel and Kehl, and refused the fifty acres opposite Huninguen. It was resolute that France should not preserve any offensive point when Germany retained none. With less reason it objected to the demolition of Ehrenbreitstein, which was incompatible with the security of the city of Coblentz. It yielded the free navigation of the Rhine, but insisted upon the freedom extending throughout its course, and called upon France to compel the Batavian republic to recognise this principle. As to the free navigation of the internal rivers of Germany, the stipulation exceeded, it said, its powers, and concerned each state individually. The condition regarding towing-tracks was acceded to. It preferred that the question relative to tolls and their abolition were left to be settled by a treaty of commerce. Finally, it maintained that the debts of the countries on the left bank ceded to France should remain charged upon them on the maxim that the debt follows its pledge, and that the possessions of the intermediate nobility should be deemed private property and secured accordingly. The deputation demanded in addition that the French troops should evacuate the right bank and relinquish the blockade of Ehrenbreitstein, seeing it subjected the inhabitants to the horrors of famine.

These incompatible pretensions gave rise to a series of notes and counter-notes during the whole summer. At last, in the month of Vendémiaire year VI. (August and September), the *thalweg* was admitted by the French legation. The principal navigable branch was assigned as the limit between France and Germany, and the islands were to be divided in accordance with that basis. France consented to the demolition of Cassel and Kehl, but demanded the isle of Pettersau, which lies in the Rhine almost abreast of Mayence and is of great importance to that place. On its side, the German Empire agreed to the demolition of Ehrenbreitstein. The free navigation of the Rhine and the abolition of tolls were accorded. There still remained for settlement the questions touching the establishment of bridges for traffic, the application of the emigration-laws in the ceded countries, the possessions of the intermediate nobility, and the debts of the ceded territories. The secular princes had declared that all concessions compatible with the honour and security of the Empire ought to be made, in order to obtain peace, so indispensable to Germany. It was evident that the majority of those princes were anxious to arrange terms, and Prussia exhorted them to that effect. But Austria began to evince contrary dispositions, and to stimulate the resentment of the ecclesiastical princes against the course of the negotiations. The deputies of the Empire, albeit declaring emphatically for peace, nevertheless observed extreme caution, from the apprehensions Austria caused them, and fluctuated between her and Prussia. As to the French ministers, they manifested an austere reserve; they lived apart and in a species of isolation, like all the French envoys in Europe. Such was the state of the Congress at the close of summer.

Whilst these events were passing in the East and in Europe, France, still burdened with the task of directing the five republics around her, had encountered cares innumerable. These arose from the constant difficulties of controlling public opinion in those republics, obtaining sustenance for the troops stationed in them, maintaining harmony between the generals and the ambassadors deputed to them, and lastly preserving concord between them and adjoining states.

Almost everywhere the same course had been found necessary as in France, that is to say, after having crushed one party to crush another immediately afterwards. In Holland a sort of Fructidor had been executed, on the 3d Pluviose (22d January), for the purpose of expelling the federalists, annulling the ancient regulations, and giving the country a unitarian constitution almost similar to that of France. But this revolution had turned too much in favour of the democrats. They had seized on all the powers of the government. After excluding from the national assembly all the deputies they adjudged suspected, they had constituted themselves into a directory and two councils, without having recourse to fresh elections. They had designed in this respect to imitate the national convention of

France and its famous decrees of the 5th and 13th Fructidor. Since then they had arrogated the entire direction of affairs, and departed from the line in which the French Directory wished to keep all the republics confided to its care. General Daendels, one of the most distinguished men of the moderate party, was summoned to Paris, held conferences with the directors, and returned into Holland to deal the democrats the blow recently administered to their brethren at Paris, namely, excluding them from the legislative body by means of electoral secessions. Thus everything done in France, it became immediately necessary to repeat in the countries which depended on her. Joubert had orders to support Daendels. The latter, in concert with the ministers, and by the aid of the Batavian and French troops, dispersed the directory and the councils, formed a provisional government, and ordained fresh elections. The French ambassador, Delacroix, who had abetted the democrats, was recalled. These scenes produced the ordinary effect. The reproach failed not to be urged that republican institutions could not subsist of themselves, that they required every moment the lever of bayonets, and that the new states were in the most abject dependence on France.

In Switzerland the establishment of the republic *one and indivisible* had not been effected without bloodshed. The petty cantons of Schweitz, Zug, and Glaris, stirred up by the priests and the aristocrats, had sworn to oppose the adoption of the new system. General Schauembourg, averse to reduce them by force, had interdicted all communication between them and the other cantons. The refractory cantons immediately flew to arms and invaded Lucerne, which they pillaged and laid waste. Schauembourg marched against them, and after sundry obstinate conflicts reduced them to sue for peace. The pledge of this peace was the acceptance of the new constitution. It had been requisite, also, to use the sword and even fire in repressing the peasants of the Upper-Valais, who had made a descent into the Lower-Valais, with the design of re-establishing their old dominion. Notwithstanding these impediments, the constitution was everywhere in force by Prairial (May 1798). The seat of the Helvetian government was fixed at Arau. Composed of a directory and two councils, it commenced the labours of the administration of the country. The new French commissioner was Rapinat, brother-in-law of Rewbell. He was to assist with his counsels the Helvetian government in the administration of affairs. Circumstances combined to render this administration peculiarly difficult. The priests and the aristocrats, posted in the mountains, were only watching the favourable moment to arouse the population again. It was necessary to keep on guard against them, to support and pacify the French army retained to oppose them, to organize the administration, and to put things in a train for subsisting independently. This task was not less difficult for the Helvetian government than for the French commissioner placed by its side.

It was natural that France should appropriate the exchequers of the old aristocratic cantons to defray the expenses of the war. The money contained in those depositaries, and the stores accumulated in the magazines formed by the late cantons, were indispensable to her for the support of her army. It was an ordinary exercise of the right of conquest; she might doubtless have waived the right, but necessity compelled her to enforce it at the moment. Rapinat was ordered, therefore, to affix seals on all coffers holding treasure. Many of the Swiss, even amongst those who had promoted the revolution, took it amiss that the funds and magazines of the old governments should be seized. The Swiss are, like all mountaineers, prudent and brave, but extremely avaricious. They were sufficiently pleased that liberty had been conferred on them, that they were freed from their oppressive oligarchies, but they demurred to bear the expense of the enfranchisement. Whilst Holland and Italy had endured, almost without complaining, the heavy burden of long and devastating campaigns, the Swiss patriots raised a prodigious clamour about a few millions rightfully forfeited. The Helvetian directory hastened, on its part, to place other seals on those affixed by Rapinat, and thus protested against the proceeding which confiscated the coffers to the purposes of France. Rapinat immediately caused the seals of the Helvetian directory to be removed, and communicated to that directory that it was restricted to administrative functions, that it was not competent to act contrary to the authority of France, and that for the future its laws and its decrees would possess no force except in so far as they contained nothing in opposition to the ordinances of the French commissioner and general. The enemies of the revolution, and more than one had contrived to creep into the Helvetic councils, exulted at this contest, and railed against tyranny. They vociferated that their independence was outraged, and that the French republic, which pretended to bring them liberty, had brought them in reality nothing but slavery and misery. Contumacy was not confined to the two councils; it was manifested also in the directory and the local authorities. At Lucerne and Berne old aristocrats occupied the administrations, and raised obstacles of every kind to the levy of the fifteen millions imposed on noble families for the necessities of the army. Rapinat deemed it incumbent to purge the government and administrations. In a letter dated the 28th Prairial (16th June), he demanded from the Helvetian government the dismissal of two directors, named respectively Bay and Pfiffer, and of the minister for foreign affairs, and the reconstruction of the administrative chambers of Lucerne and Berne. This demand, expressed in the peremptory tone of an order, could not be refused. The dismissals specified were immediately given; but the roughness with which Rapinat conducted himself excited fresh murmurs, and fixed all the wrong on his side. He in fact compromised his government by openly violating forms to effect changes which might have been easily wrought by other means. Without loss of time, the French Directory wrote to the Helvetian disavowing the conduct of Rapinat, and offering satisfaction for this violation of formalities. Rapinat was recalled; nevertheless the dismissed functionaries were not reinstated. In place of the two deposed directors, the Helvetic councils nominated Ochs, the author of the constitution, and Colonel Laharpe, brother of the general killed in Italy, one of the authors of the revolution in the Pays de Vaud, and also one of the most worthy and best-intentioned citizens in the country.

An alliance, offensive and defensive, was concluded between the French and Helvetian republics on the 2d Fructidor (19th August). According to this treaty, either of the two powers which chanced to be at war had a right to require the intervention of the other, and to demand from it an auxiliary force, the strength of which was to be determined by circumstances. The requiring power was to pay the troops furnished by the other. The free navigation of all the rivers of Switzerland and France was mutually stipulated. Two routes were to be open, the one from France to the Cisalpine republic, traversing the Valais and the Simplon, the other from France into Suabia, ascending the Rhine and following the eastern shore of the lake of Constance. By this system of leagued republics, France secured two great military routes to penetrate into the territories of her allies, and be enabled to debouch rapidly either in Italy or in Germany. It is said that these two routes had the effect of transferring the theatre of

war to the allied states. It was not the routes, but the alliance with France which exposed those states to become the theatre of war. The routes were but a means of accelerating movements and of timeously protecting them, by permitting France to assume the offensive in Germany or Italy.

The city of Geneva was united with France, as likewise the borough of Mulhausen. The Italian bailiwicks, which had long hesitated between the Cisalpine and the Helvetian republics, declared for the latter, and voted their junction accordingly. The Grison leagues, which the Directory was disposed to incorporate with Switzerland, were divided into two rival factions, and wavered between the Austrian and Helvetian domination. The French troops were stationed in observation on them. The monks and foreign agents provoked a fresh disaster in Underwalden. They incited the peasants of that valley to rise against the French soldiers. A desperate conflict took place at Stanz, and it proved necessary to fire that unfortunate hamlet to expel the fanatics who had intrenched themselves within it.

Similar difficulties occurred on the other side of the Alps. A species of anarchy reigned between the subjects of the new states and their governments, between those governments and the French armies, between the French generals and the French ambassadors. Everything was in frightful confusion. The petty Ligurian republic was infuriated against Piedmont, and vowed at all costs to introduce the revolution into it. A great number of Piedmontese democrats had taken refuge in the Ligurian territory, and had emerged therefrom armed and organized, to make incursions in their country and endeavour to subvert the regal government. Another band of them had sallied out of the Cisalpine and advanced by Domo-d'Ossola. But these inroads were repelled and a multitude of lives uselessly sacrificed. The Ligurian republic persevered nevertheless in its design of harassing the government of Piedmont; it collected and armed fresh refugees, and determined to make war on its own account. The French minister at Genoa, Sotin, had the utmost difficulty in restraining it. On the other hand, the French minister at Turin, Ginguené, experienced equal difficulty in silencing the continual complaints of Piedmont and moderating its projects of vengeance against the patriots.

The Cisalpine republic was in a truly deplorable condition. In constituting it, Bonaparte had not had time to calculate exactly the proportions expedient to be observed in the territorial divisions and in the number of functionaries, or to organize effectively the municipal and fiscal systems. This puny state consequently had no less than two hundred and forty representatives. The departments being too numerous, it was devoured by an army of functionaries. It had no regular and uniform system of taxation. With adequate sources of wealth, it had no finances, and could scarcely contrive to pay the subsidy stipulated for the maintenance of the French troops. Moreover, in all other respects, intolerable disorder reigned throughout the country. Since the exclusion of sundry members from the councils by Berthier, when it was found necessary to compel acceptance of the treaty of alliance with France, the revolutionists had gained a complete ascendency, and the phraseology of the Jacobins alone prevailed in the councils and the clubs. The French army abetted this impulse, and lent a ready aid to every variety of exaggeration. After having accomplished the submission of Switzerland, Brune had returned into Italy, where he had received the general command of all the French troops since the departure of Berthier for Egypt. He belonged to the party of the most vehement patriots. Lahoz, the commandant of the Lombard troops, whose organization had been commenced under Bonaparte, boasted similar tendencies. There existed, besides, other causes of disorder in the misconduct of the French officers. They conducted themselves in the Cisalpine state as in a conquered country. They maltreated the inhabitants, appropriated quarters, which, according to the existing treaties, were not exigible by them, devastated the localities in which they sojourned, often levied requisitions as in times of war, extorted money from the local authorities, and emptied the coffers of towns without alleging even the shadow of a pretext beyond their own good pleasure. The commanders of fortresses approved themselves relentless extortioners. The governor of Mantua, for instance, was sufficiently audacious to farm for his own profit the fishing of the lake. The general officers proportioned their exactions to their grade, and independently of all they wrung by such flagitious courses, they netted scandalous profits from companies. The one which had the contract for provisioning the army in Italy, allowed a bonus of forty per cent to the staff ; and we may judge what its gains must have been to afford such a bribe to its patrons. Furthermore, from the effect of desertions, there were not half the men in the ranks entered on the rolls, insomuch that the republic paid double what it ought to have done. Notwithstanding all these malpractices, the soldiers were indifferently provided, and the pay of the greater number was several months in arrear. Thus, the country the French occupied was horribly oppressed, without the soldiers being at all benefited. For the rest, the Cisalpine patriots tolerated all these atrocities without a murmur, because the staff extended to them its support and countenance.

At Rome things were in a more satisfactory train. There a commission composed of Daunou, Florent, and Faypoult, governed with prudence and probity the enfranchised country. These three individuals had framed a constitution which had been accepted, and which, with some few exceptions, and a variation in appellations, exactly resembled the French constitution. The directors were styled consuls, the council of Ancients the senate, the second council the tribunate. But the mere gift of a constitution availed little; the essential point was to put it in operation. To this the chief obstacle opposed was not, as might have been imagined, the fanaticism of the Romans but their indolence. The only actual malcontents were some peasants on the Apennines, excited by the monks, who were easily subdued. But there was discovered in the inhabitants of Rome, called to compose the consulate, senate, and tribunate, a surprising indifference, an extreme inaptitude for labour. Great exertions were needed to induce them to sit one day out of two, and they absolutely mutinied for holidays in summer. To this idleness was joined a complete inexperience and incapacity in the business of administration. There was much more zeal among the Cisalpines, but it was an unenlightened, unbridled zeal, which rendered it equally mischievous with supineness. There was reason to apprehend that, upon the departure of the French commission, the Roman government would fall to pieces from the pure inertness or retreat of its members. And yet places were well liked at Rome, indeed keenly relished, as in all countries more remarkable for sloth than industry.

The commission had put an end to all the malversations practised at the first entry of the French into Rome. It had assumed the care of the finances and managed them with skill and integrity. Faypoult, who was an able and upright administrator, had instituted a well-planned system of taxation for the whole Roman state. He had thus succeeded in satisfying the necessities of the army, and had discharged all arrears of pay not only to the army of Rome, but also to the division embarked at Civita-Vecchia. If the finances had been as well adminis-

tered in the Cisalpine, the country would not have been oppressed as it was, and the French soldiers might have enjoyed comfort and plenty. The military power at Rome was wholly under the control of the commission. General Saint-Cyr, who had succeeded Massena, was distinguished for inflexible honesty; but partaking the taste for authority which had become so general amongst his comrades, he betokened impatience at his subjection to the commission. At Milan, indeed, the utmost dissatisfaction was felt at the state of matters in Rome. The Cisalpine democrats were highly indignant at the curb so effectually fastened by the commission on the Roman democrats. The French staff, which held authority over the divisions stationed at Rome, saw with pain a rich portion of the conquered countries escape it, and sighed for the moment when the functions of the commission should determine.

It is an error to reproach the French Directory with the disorders that prevailed in the allied states. No resolution, however strong, could have obviated the outbreak of passions which disturbed them; and as to the exactions, the prohibition of Bonaparte himself had not succeeded to prevent them in the conquered provinces. What a single individual, powerful in genius and vigour and on the spot, could not effect, was much less possible to a government composed of five members and seated at a great distance. Still, the majority of the Directory was animated with the purest zeal to promote the welfare of the new republics, and viewed with lively indignation the insolence and extortions of the generals, and the palpable robberies of the companies. Excepting Barras, who shared in the profits of these companies and was the patron-saint of all the corruptionists at Milan, the four directors denounced in the strongest terms the proceedings in Italy. Larévellière especially, whose stern probity was shocked by such atrocities, submitted a plan to the Directory which met its approval. He proposed that a commission should continue to direct the Roman government, and restrain the military authority; that an ambassador be sent to Milan to represent the French government and deprive the staff of all influence; that this ambassador be empowered to make the alterations in the Cisalpine constitution which were needful, such as reducing the number of local divisions, of public functionaries, and of members in the two councils; and that this ambassador have for assistant an administrator capable of organizing a system of taxation and responsibility. This plan was adopted. Trouvé, formerly French minister at Naples, and Faypoult, one of the members of the Roman commission, were deputed to Milan to execute the measures recommended by Larévellière.

Trouvé was instructed, on his arrival at Milan, to collect around him the most enlightened men of the Cisalpine state and consult with them on the alterations requisite both in the constitution and in the departments of government. When all these changes were agreed upon, he was to cause them to be proposed in the Cisalpine councils by deputies in his interest, and if necessary to support them by the authority of France. At the same time he was counselled to mask his design until ripe for accomplishment.

Trouvé, repairing from Naples to Milan, acted as he had been ordered. But the secret of his mission was difficult of concealment. It soon transpired that he had come to change the constitution, and particularly to reduce the number of places of all kinds. The patriots, judging from the demeanour of the ambassador that these reductions would fall on them, were furious. They enlisted in their cause the staff of the army, itself incensed against the new authority destined to supersede its own, and a disgraceful feud forthwith commenced between the French legation and the French staff, backed by the Italian patriots. Trouvé and the men who assorted with him were denounced with extreme violence in the Cisalpine councils. It was asserted that the French minister had been sent to violate the constitution, and to repeat one of those acts of oppression which the Directory had already perpetrated in other allied republics. Trouvé was exposed to all the annoyances of petty malice on the part of the Italian patriots and the French officers. The latter behaved with signal indecency at a ball he gave, and occasioned a scene of surpassing scandal. Such occurrences were most deplorable, especially on account of the effect they produced on foreign ministers. And not only were they edified by this spectacle of shameful dissensions, but they were insulted, at diplomatic dinners, by toasts, proclaimed in their teeth, to the extermination of all kings. The most outrageous jacobinism, we see, reigned at Milan. Brune and Lahoz set out for Paris to seek the support of Barras. But the Directory, apprized beforehand, was inflexible in its determination. Lahoz had orders to leave Paris the moment he arrived. As to Brune, he was enjoined to return to Milan and co-operate in effecting the alterations Trouvé had been commissioned to introduce.

After digesting the various modifications expedient in the constitution, Trouvé assembled the most moderate of the deputies and submitted the details to them. They approved them, but the irritation was so great that they dared not undertake to propose them in the two councils. Trouvé was therefore obliged to deploy the French authority and visibly exercise a power he would have fain kept out of view. But, after all, the actual mode employed was of little moment. It would have been absurd in France, who had created these new republics and upheld them by her aid, not to profit by her force to establish therein the order she deemed most advisable. The evil was that she had not managed better at first, so as to avoid the necessity of repeating thus frequently these acts of forcible interference. On the 13th Fructidor (30th August) Trouvé convoked the directory and the two councils of the Cisalpine republic, and presented to them the new constitution and the administrative and financial laws prepared by Faypoult. The councils were reduced from two hundred and forty to one hundred and twenty in number. The individuals to be retained in the councils and the government were specified. A regular system of taxation was established. Both personal and indirect taxation was instituted, a system in progress of execution at the moment in France, and which grievously offended the patriots. All these measures were sanctioned and adopted. Brune had been compelled to afford the support of the French troops. So the rage of the Cisalpine patriots was vain, and the revolution accomplished without an obstacle. By a further provision it was ordered that an immediate convocation of the primary assemblies should be held in order to ratify the alterations made in the constitution.

The object of Trouvé's mission was fulfilled; but the French government, perceiving the ferment that minister had excited, and judging it impossible to leave him in the Cisalpine, came to the conclusion that another embassy must be selected for him, and a person unconnected with the late disputes sent to Milan in his stead. Unfortunately the Directory allowed to be imposed on it an ex-member of the Jacobin club, who had since become a supple and servile creature of Barras, and been admitted by him to a participation in the traffic of the companies, and placed in the way of honours: it was Fouché, whom Barras thus contrived to foist on his colleagues. Fouché accordingly proceeded to succeed Trouvé, who was appointed to the mission at Stutgardt. But Brune, taking advantage of Trouvé's departure,

presumed, with an audacity to be explained only by the military license of the times, to make grave alterations in the work of the French minister. He demanded the resignation of three of the directors nominated by Trouvé, changed several of the ministers, and introduced sundry alterations into the constitution. One of the three directors whose resignation he had demanded, Sopranzi, having courageously refused to give it, he caused him to be seized by his soldiers and forcibly ejected from the palace of the government. He then hastened to convoke the primary assemblies to obtain their approval of the constitution framed by Trouvé and modified by himself. Fouché, who arrived in the interval, ought to have opposed this convocation and not allowed modifications to be sanctioned which the general had no authority to make; but he left Brune to act at his pleasure. The result was that the constitution as altered by Trouvé, with the more recent improvements of Brune, was adopted by the primary assemblies influenced at once by military power and patriot violence.

When the French Directory learnt these particulars, it betrayed no vacillation. It annulled all that Brune had done, cashiered him, and commissioned Joubert to restore things to the state in which they had been placed by Trouvé. Fouché tendered objections; he represented that the new constitution being ratified with the changes introduced into it by Brune, it would have a bad effect to alter it afresh. In this he was right, and he even gained over Joubert to his opinion. But the Directory felt it incumbent to reprove such usurpations on the part of its generals, and especially to deter them from attempting the exercise of such powers in the allied states. It recalled Fouché himself, who thus enjoyed a very brief career in the Cisalpine, and it ordered the establishment of the constitution integrally such as Trouvé had framed it in the name of France. With regard to the individuals from whom Brune had wrung resignations, they were invited to renew them in order to avoid fresh changes.

The Cisalpine republic therefore finally remained constituted as the Directory had designed, save the absence of certain individuals superseded by Brune. But these constant turmoils, these rapid vicissitudes, all these conflicts of civil and military authorities, had a very injurious effect, tending to discourage the newly-enfranchised populations and bring odium on the parent republic, although they demonstrated too truly the difficulty of keeping such numerous bodies in their several orbits.

The conduct of the Directory was severely reprobated with reference to these occurrences in the Cisalpine republic, for it is a custom with men to convert everything into a subject of complaint against a government they oppose, and even to charge upon it as a crime the very obstacles that impede its course. The twofold opposition now assuming consistence in the Councils, assailed variously the operations executed in Italy. The argument was quite simple to the patriot opposition: the Directory had committed an outrage against the independence of an allied republic; it had even committed a breach of the French laws, for the Cisalpine constitution so recently altered was guaranteed by a treaty of alliance, and this treaty, approved by the Councils, could not be infringed by the Directory. As to the constitutional or moderate opposition, it was natural to expect its approbation rather than its reproaches, since the changes made in the Cisalpine were directed exclusively against the patriots. But to this section of the opposition appertained Lucien Bonaparte. It was his province to seek topics of censure against the government, and here he had the farther motive of defending the work of his brother, attacked by the Directory. He declaimed therefore, like the patriots, about infringements on the independence of allies, violations of treaties, and other attendant offences.

These two oppositions declared themselves more openly from day to day. They began to contest the exercise of certain powers conferred on the Directory by the law of the 19th Fructidor, and which it had occasionally used. That law, amongst other high prerogatives, gave it the right of closing clubs or suppressing journals, the conduct of which might appear to it dangerous. The Directory had in fact shut up certain clubs become too violent, and suppressed certain journals which had given false intelligence, manifestly invented with a malevolent intention. One journal in particular pretended that the Directory was about to annex the Pays de Vaud to France. this journal the Directory suppressed. The patriots exclaimed against this arbitrary act, and moved the repeal of several of the articles of the law of the 19th Fructidor. The Councils decided that those articles should continue in force until the enactment of a law on the press, and an investigation was ordered preparatory to the introduction of such a law.

The Directory encountered much virulent contention too on the subject of the finances. The time had come to close the budget of the year VI. (1797–8), and devise that of the year VII. (1798–9). The budget of the year VI. had been fixed at 616 millions; but upon these 616 millions there was an actual deficit of 62 millions, and, besides this deficit, a considerable arrear outstanding. The state-creditors, notwithstanding the solemn pledge to discharge the interest of the consolidated third, had not been wholly paid. It was resolved they should receive, in liquidation of the residue, bills receivable in acquittance of taxes. In the budget of the year VII., now about to be entered upon, the expenditure was taken at 600 millions, without the contingency of a new continental war. A reduction was proposed in the land and personal taxes, which were found too onerous, and an increase in the stamp and registration duties and in the customs. Additional centimes were imposed for local expenses, and dues at the gates of towns for the support of hospitals and other establishments. In spite of these augmentations, the minister Ramel contended that the receipts would not exceed at the utmost three-fourths of the estimate, judging from the results of previous years, and that it would be a wilful exaggeration to reckon the effective income above 450 or 500 millions. He accordingly craved fresh resources virtually to cover the expenditure of 600 millions, and proposed for the purpose a tax on doors and windows, and a duty on salt. This proposition gave rise to violent reclamations. In the end, the tax on doors and windows was decreed, and a report ordered touching the duty on salt.

These altercations were not of serious import in themselves; but they were indicative of a lurking animosity, to which an occasion of public misfortune alone was wanting to explode in open hostility. The Directory, perfectly acquainted with the state of Europe, was conscious that fresh dangers were gathering, and that war was again imminent on the continent. It was scarcely possible longer to doubt the fact from the manifestations of the different cabinets. Cobentzel and Repnin had failed to seduce Prussia from her neutrality, and had left Berlin in dudgeon. But Paul of Russia, completely dazzled, had concluded a treaty of alliance with Austria, and his troops were even reported to be on their march. Austria was arming with activity; the court of Naples had ordained the enlistment of its whole population. It would have betrayed great imprudence not to make preparations in the face of such a movement from the banks of the Vistula to those of the Volturna. The French armies being seriously attenuated by desertion, the Directory originated a scheme to provide for their recruitment by a great

institution, which it yet remained to create. The Convention had twice drawn upon the population of France, but in an extraordinary manner, and without leaving any permanent law for the annual levy of soldiers. In March 1793, it had ordered a levy of 300,000 men; in August of the same year it had planned the grand and magnificent enterprise of the levy *en masse*, generation by generation. Since then, the republic had existed upon this measure alone, compelling those to remain under their colours who had taken arms at that period. But war and sickness had thinned the ranks, and peace had restored to their homes a multitude of men. True, only twelve thousand furloughs had been granted, but desertions were tenfold; and it was difficult to exercise severity towards men who had defended their country for six years and caused it to triumph over Europe at the price of their blood. The depôts still subsisted and upon an excellent footing. These it was of moment to amplify by new levies, and in so doing to adopt, not an extraordinary and temporary expedient, but a comprehensive and permanent measure; in short, to pass a law which should become, to a certain extent, an inherent part of the constitution. In a word, the conscription was eliminated.

General Jourdan was the reporter of this great and salutary measure, which in course of time grew to be abused like all other things in this world, but which was not the less an instrument of salvation to France, and the means of exalting her glory to the highest pitch. By the enactment every Frenchman was declared a soldier in law for a certain period of his life. This period was from the twentieth to the twenty-fifth year of his age complete. The young men between those ages were divided into five classes, year by year. According to exigency the government called out men, commencing with the first class, that of twenty years, and with the youngest of each class. It could successively call out the five classes as necessities arose. In time of peace the conscripts were obliged to serve until twenty-five years old. Thus the period of service varied from one to five years, according to the age of the soldiers as they were enlisted. In time of war this period was unlimited; but the government might grant furloughs when deemed not inconsistent with the public service. There was no exemption of any kind, except for those who had married before the law, or who had already earned their freedom in previous wars. This enactment thus provided for ordinary cases; but in extraordinary emergencies, when the country was declared in danger, the government had a right, as in 1793, to the whole population, and the levy in mass would be again resorted to.

This measure was passed without opposition and regarded as one of the most important creations of the revolution.* The Directory forthwith claimed to make use of it, and requested the levy of two hundred thousand conscripts to complete the armies and place them on a respectable footing. This demand was granted by acclamation on the 2d Vendémiaire year VII. (23d September 1798.) Although the two oppositions often harassed the Directory from dislike or jealousy, still they desired that the republic should preserve its ascendency in presence of the powers of Europe. But a levy of men requires also a levy of money. The Directory asked, in addition to the items of the budget, 125 millions, to wit, ninety for the equipment of 200,000 conscripts and thirty-five to repair the late disaster to the navy. The question was, where they were to be obtained. The minister Ramel replied by showing that the debentures for the liquidation of two-thirds of the debt had almost all returned to the exchequer, and that there still remained 400 millions in national property, which were consequently free and might be dedicated to the new exigencies of the republic. The sale of 125 millions of national property was accordingly decreed. One-twelfth was to be paid in cash, the remainder in obligations of the purchasers, negotiable at will, and payable successively over a period of eighteen months. They were to bear interest at five per cent. This paper might be considered equivalent to money from the facility of passing it to the companies. The estates were to be sold for eight times the rent. This financial operation was hailed with equal unanimity as the law of conscription of which it was a consequence.

The Directory thus assumed a position to retort the menaces of Europe, and sustain the dignity of the French republic. Two events, meanwhile, of minor importance had recently occurred, the one in Ireland, the other at Ostend. Ireland was in a state of rebellion, and the Directory had dispatched thither General Humbert with 1,500 men. A remittance of funds to be made by the Treasury having been unfortunately delayed, a second division of 6,000 men, commanded by General Sarrazin, was unable to set sail, and Humbert remained without support. He had maintained himself for some time, and sufficiently to prove that the arrival of the expected reinforcement would have signally changed the face of affairs. But, after a series of honourable engagements, he had been obliged to surrender with all his corps.† A check of the same nature, sustained by the English, occurred to compensate this misfortune. The English were accustomed to appear at intervals to throw bombs into the French ports on the ocean. About this time they formed a scheme to land at Ostend for the purpose of destroying the sluices; but, chased at the point of the bayonet, they were cut off from their ships and captured, to the number of two thousand men.

Although Austria had contracted an alliance with Russia and England, and could rely upon a Sclavonian army and a British subsidy, she still hesitated nevertheless to re-enter the lists against the French republic. Spain, who viewed with concern the flames of war rekindled on the continent, dreading equally the progress of the revolutionary system and her own ruin, for in one case she might be revolutionized, and in the other punished for her alliance with France, —Spain, we say, once more interposed to calm the irritated antagonists. Her mediation, by raising discussions and suggesting the possibility of an arrangement, led to further hesitations at Vienna, or at least to further procrastination. At Naples, where zeal amounted to phrenzy, all delay was scouted, and a determination formed to provoke hostilities, in order to force Austria to draw the sword. The infatuation of this petty court was without example. It was the calamity of the Bourbons at this epoch to be urged by their wives to the commission of all their errors. Three had been seen at once in the same predicament: Louis XVI., Charles IV., and Ferdinand. The fate of the unfortunate Louis XVI. is known to us. Charles IV. and Ferdinand, though in different ways, were driven by the like influence to inevitable destruction. The people of Naples had been made to wear the English cockade, and Nelson was invoked as a tutelary god. A levy of the fifth of the population had been ordered, an instance of singular extravagance, for to arm efficiently the fiftieth part would have sufficed to enrol Naples amongst the great powers. Each convent was enjoined to furnish a horseman fully equipped; part of the possessions of the clergy had been exposed to sale, and all the taxes doubled; finally, that planner of unlucky enterprises, all whose military schemes had so egregiously failed, and whom

* It was passed on the 19th Fructidor, year VI. (5th Sept.)

† He disembarked on the 5th Fructidor (22d August), and was beaten and made prisoner by General Lord Cornwallis on the 22d (8th September).

fate reserved for reverses of the strangest character, Mack was solicited to place himself at the head of the Neapolitan forces. The honours of a triumph were awarded him before the victory, and the title of liberator of Italy, the same borne by Bonaparte, was prematurely bestowed on him. To these material preparations were added ovations to all the saints, supplications to Saint-Januarius, and chastisements on all suspected of leaning to the opinions of the French.

The court of Naples likewise continued its machinations in Piedmont and Tuscany. It insisted that the Piedmontese should rise on the rear of the army guarding the Cisalpine state, and the Tuscans on the rear of that guarding Rome. The Neapolitans would profit by the occasion to attack in front the army of Rome, the Austrians would seize the like opportunity to fall on the army in the Cisalpine, and from all these combinations it was augured not a Frenchman would escape. The king of Sardinia, being a religious prince, was fettered by certain scruples arising from the treaty of alliance which bound him to France; but he was told that faith pledged to oppressors was not binding, and that the Piedmontese enjoyed a right to exterminate the French to the last man. At the same time, scruples were less the veritable obstacle than the rigorous watchfulness of the French Directory. As to the Grand-Duke of Tuscany, he was wholly destitute of means. To decide him, Naples promised to send him an army by Nelson's squadron.

On the other hand the Directory was on its guard, and took precautions. It chanced that the Ligurian republic, still embittered against the king of Sardinia, had at length declared war against that potentate. To an antipathy of principles was joined an old animosity of neighbourhood, and these puny powers were resolute to have a fight at all hazards. The Directory interposed in the quarrel, signifying to the Ligurian republic a command to lay down its arms, and declaring to the king of Sardinia that it took upon itself to maintain tranquillity in his dominions, but that, for this purpose, it must occupy an important post. In consequence, it asked permission to occupy with its troops the citadel of Turin. Such a pretension was only to be justified by the apprehensions the court of Piedmont inspired. There existed an irreconcilable incompatibility between the old and the new states, which prevented them from reposing any trust in each other. The king of Piedmont proffered urgent remonstrances, but he had no power to resist the instances of the Directory. The French took possession of the citadel, and forthwith commenced to arm it. The Directory had detached the army of Rome from that of the Cisalpine, and given the command to General Championnet, who had distinguished himself on the Rhine. This army was scattered over the surface of the Roman state. In the March of Ancona were four to five thousand men commanded by general Casa-Bianca; on the opposite slope of the Apennines, towards Terni, stood General Lemoine with two or three thousand men. Macdonald, with the right, about five thousand strong, was stationed upon the Tiber. A small reserve held Rome itself. The army called that of Rome contained, therefore, from fifteen to sixteen thousand men at the utmost. The necessity of keeping a vigilant guard upon the country, and the difficulty of procuring provisions in sufficient abundance, had obliged the French thus to disperse their troops; and if an active and well-disciplined enemy had known how to seize the opportunity, he might have made the French rue their inter-isolation.

In truth, this circumstance was duly estimated at Naples: it appeared easy to surprise the French and destroy them in detail. What glory to take the initiative, to gain the first success, to force reluctant Austria to enter upon the career, after having opened it to her! Such were the considerations that impelled the court of Naples to precipitate hostilities. It expected that the French would be easily beaten, and that Austria could no longer vacillate when once the sword was drawn. M. de Gallo and Prince Belmonte-Pignatelli, who understood Europe and affairs somewhat better, opposed the initiative being taken; but their prudent exhortations were spurned. To embolden the poor king and tear him from his innocent occupations, it is said, a counterfeit letter from the Emperor was used, which recommended the commencement of hostilities. Instant orders to march were issued towards the close of November. The whole Neapolitan army was put in motion. The king himself set forth with great pomp to assist in the operations. There was no declaration of war, but a summons to the French to evacuate the Roman state: a summons they answered by preparing for combat, despite the disproportion of numbers.

Considering the respective situations of the two armies, nothing was more easy than to overwhelm the French, dispersed as they were over the Roman provinces, to the right and left of the Apennines. It was simply requisite to march directly on their centre and move the mass of the Neapolitan forces between Rome and Terni. Thus the left of the French, placed beyond the Apennines to guard the Marches, would have been severed from their right, stationed on this side to defend the banks of the Tiber. They would have been thereby prevented from concentrating, and driven in disorder into Upper Italy. The Peninsula at least would have been delivered; and Tuscany, the Roman state, and the Marches, would have fallen under the domination of Naples. The preponderance of the Neapolitan troops rendered this plan only the more easy and sure, but it was impossible for Mack to employ a manœuvre so simple. As in his old plans, he would envelop the enemy by a multitude of detached corps. He had nearly 60,000 men under his command, of whom 40,000 formed the active army and 20,000 the garrisons. Instead of directing this prodigious mass on the essential point of Terni, he divided it into six columns. The first, filing along the reverse of the Apennines and the shore of the Adriatic, was to proceed, by the route of Ascoli, into the Marches; the second and third, acting upon the other side of the mountains and communicating with the first, were to march, the one on Terni, the other on Magliano; the fourth and principal, forming the main-body, was directed on Frascati and Rome; a fifth, skirting the Mediterranean, had the task of traversing the Pontine Marshes and joining the main-body upon the Appian way; the sixth and last, shipped on board Nelson's squadron, was dispatched to Leghorn with the view of arousing Tuscany and intercepting the retreat of the French. Thus all was prepared to surround and entrap them to a man, but nothing unfortunately to defeat them in the first instance.

Such was the order in which Mack set out with his forty thousand men. The quantity of his baggage, the indiscipline of his troops, and the bad state of the roads, combined to render his movements very slow. The Neapolitan army wound tardily along like a huge tail, without order or cohesion. Championnet, warned in time of the danger, detached two corps to observe the march of the enemy and protect the isolated corps as they fell back. Not deeming it feasible to retain Rome, he resolved to take up a position beyond it, on the banks of the Tiber, between Civita-Castellana and Civita-Ducale, and there to concentrate his forces to resume the offensive.

Whilst Championnet wisely retired and evacuated Rome, leaving eight hundred men in the castle of Saint-Angelo, Mack advanced fiercely on all the routes, never dreaming apparently of the possibility of resistance. He arrived at the gates of Rome

on 9th Frimaire year VII. (29th November), and entered the city without obstacle. A triumphal reception had been prepared for the king. That weak prince, hailed as a conqueror and liberator, was intoxicated with the military glory he was persuaded he had earned. A noble use of victory was however inculcated on him, and he invited the Pope to resume possession of his dominions. His army, less magnanimous than its sovereign, committed horrible excesses. The Roman populace, with the instability characteristic of it, rushed into the houses of those accused of being revolutionists and laid them waste. The mortal remains of the unfortunate Duphot were exhumed and barbarously outraged.

During the time the Neapolitans thus consumed at Rome, Championnet executed with commendable activity the skilful determination he had formed. Sensible that the essential point was in the centre upon the Upper-Tiber, he ordered Macdonald to occupy a strong position at Civita-Castellana, and reinforced him with all the troops he could spare. He transported part of the forces he had in the Marches over the Apennines, and left with General Casa-Bianca only as many as were strictly necessary to retard on that side the progress of the enemy. He himself posted to Ancona to hasten the dispatch of his parks and munitions. Not more alarmed than needful at what was preparing on his rear in Tuscany, he commissioned an officer, with a feeble detachment, to observe what passed in that quarter.

The Neapolitans at length encountered the French on the different routes which they traversed. They were three-times more numerous, but were opposed to the famous bands of Italy and found their task harder than they anticipated. In the Marches the column advancing by Ascoli was repulsed and pursued to a distance by Casa-Bianca. On the Terni route, a Neapolitan colonel was captured with all his corps by General Lemoine. These first experiences of hostilities against the French were little calculated to encourage the Neapolitans. However, Mack made his dispositions to force the position he deemed the most important, that of Civita-Castellana, where Macdonald was stationed with the bulk of the French troops. Civita-Castellena is the ancient Veii. It is situated above a ravine, in a very strong position. The French held several distant posts which covered the approaches. On the 14th Frimaire year VII. (4th December), Mack attacked Borghetti, Nepi, and Rignano, with considerable forces. He directed by the opposite side of the Tiber an accessory column with orders to seize on Rignano. None of his attacks succeeded. One of his columns, put to flight, lost all its artillery. A second, enveloped, lost three thousand prisoners. The others, disheartened, confined themselves to simple demonstrations. In fact, in no quarter could the Neapolitans withstand the shock of the French troops. Mack, somewhat disconcerted, relinquished his design of carrying the central position of Civita-Castellana, and began to perceive it was not on that point he ought to have attempted to force the enemy's line. It was at Terni, a point nearer the Apennines and less defended by the French, that he ought to have struck the principal blow. He now strove to mask the movement of his troops and bear them from Civita-Castellana upon Terni. But to conceal this movement a rapidity of execution was required impossible with troops devoid of discipline. It took up several days to repass the bulk of the army over the Tiber, and Mack delayed still more by his own fault an operation already too tardy. Macdonald, whom he expected to retain at Civita-Castellana by demonstrations, had already moved from Civita-Castellana beyond the Tiber; Lemoine had been reinforced at Terni. Thus the Neapolitans had been anticipated on all the points they contemplated surprising. The very first step taken by General Metsch, in advance from Calvi on Otricoli, led to nothing but disaster. On the 19th Frimaire (9th December), driven back from Otricoli on Calvi, that general was surrounded and obliged to lay down his arms with four thousand men, before a corps of only three thousand five hundred. From that moment, Mack thought only of returning to Rome and of recoiling from Rome to the foot of the mountains near Frascati and Albano, there to rally his army and reinforce it with fresh battalions. This was but a sad resource, for it was not so much in the quantity of his soldiers he wanted augmentation as in their quality change; and he could not hope, by withdrawing a few leagues from the field of battle, to enjoy sufficient opportunity for improving them in discipline and valour.

The King of Naples, on learning these dismal circumstances, hurried furtively from Rome, which he had entered a few days previously in triumph. The Neapolitans evacuated it in disorder, to the great joy of the Romans, who were already much more weary of their presence than they had ever been of that of the French. Championnet returned to Rome seventeen days after his departure from it. He had truly earned the honours of a triumph. Ably concentrating himself with fifteen or sixteen thousand men, he had contrived to resume the offensive against forty thousand and driven them in confusion before him. Not satisfied with merely defending the Roman states, he now conceived the bold design of conquering the Kingdom of Naples with his small force. The enterprise was difficult, less on account of the strength of the Neapolitan army than of the disposition of its inhabitants, who, it was to be feared, might wage a long and dangerous guerilla-warfare against the French. Championnet, however, persisted in advancing, and hastened from Rome to pursue the retreat of Mack. He secured, on the road, a great number of prisoners, and completely routed the column which had been disembarked in Tuscany, of which only three thousand men escaped.

Mack, totally demoralized, fell back rapidly into the Neapolitan dominions, and halted only before Capua, on the line of the Volturna. He here picked out his best troops, and planted them in front of Capua, and along the whole line of the river, which is very deep, and forms a barrier not easy to surmount. In the meantime the King had returned to Naples, where his sudden appearance caused a direful commotion. The populace, infuriated at the reverses experienced by the army, raised the cry of treachery, demanded arms, and threatened with slaughter the generals, the ministers, all in fact to whom it imputed the disasters of the war. It vociferated similar menaces against those accused of favouring the French and the revolution. The infamous court actually consented to place arms in the hands of these lazzaroni, with a clear foresight of the use they would make of them. Scarcely had these semi-barbarians received the spoils of the arsenals than they broke into insurrection, and rendered themselves masters of Naples. Exclaiming constantly against treachery, they seized upon a messenger of the King and tore him to pieces. The favourite Acton, to whom the public calamities began to be ascribed, the queen, the king, the whole court, trembled in dismay. Naples no longer appeared safe as a habitation; the idea of taking refuge in Sicily was immediately suggested and adopted. On the 11th Nivôse (31st December), the precious moveables of the crown, all the riches in the palaces of Caserte and Naples, and a treasure of twenty millions, were embarked on board Nelson's squadron, which set sail for Sicily. Acton, the author of the whole mischief, shrunk from braving the dangers of a further sojourn in Naples, and accompanied the queen to sea. Dock-yards and other things that could not be removed, were committed to the flames. It was amidst a howling tempest, and covered with the sinister

glare of a conflagration, that this cowardly and guilty court abandoned to its fate the nation it had compromised. It left orders, as has been said, to destroy the upper class of citizens, suspected of entertaining revolutionary principles. All were to be immolated even to the notaries. Prince Pignatelli remained at Naples charged with the powers of the king.

Championnet, meanwhile, advanced towards Naples. He had committed in his turn the same fault as Mack; he had divided into several columns, appointed to unite before Capua. Their junction through a difficult country, amidst a fanatical population, in arms on all sides against the alleged enemies of God and St. Januarius, was of very uncertain accomplishment.

On arriving with his main-body upon the banks of the Volturna, Championnet resolved to make an attempt upon Capua. Repulsed by a numerous artillery, he was compelled to renounce the design of an assault, and to retrograde with his troops, awaiting the arrival of his other columns. This abortive enterprise occurred on the 14th Nivôse year VII. (3d January 1799). The Neapolitan peasants, swarming in all directions, intercepted the French couriers and convoys. Championnet could gain no tidings of his other columns, and his position might be considered extremely critical. Mack profited by the occasion to tender amicable overtures. Championnet, confident in the fortune of France, boldly rejected the propositions of Mack. Fortunately he was soon after joined by his columns, and he then agreed to an armistice on the following conditions: Mack was to relinquish the line of the Volturna, surrender the town of Capua to the French, retire behind the line of the Regi-Lagni, on the side of the Mediterranean, and of the Ofanto, on the side of the Adriatic, and cede moreover a large portion of the kingdom of Naples. Besides these concessions of territory, a payment of eight millions in money was stipulated. This armistice was signed on the 22d Nivôse (11th January).

When news of the armistice reached Naples, the populace was inflamed with wrath, and shouted yet more vehemently that it was betrayed by the officers of the crown. The appearance of the commissioner charged to receive the contribution of eight millions stimulated it to excesses; it raged in tumultuous insurrection, and prevented the execution of the armistice. Such was the extent of the commotion that Prince Pignatelli abandoned the city in consternation. That beautiful capital was left at the mercy of the lazzaroni. There was no longer any recognised authority, and a total dissolution of society seemed inevitable. At length, however, after three days of convulsion, a successful effort was made to nominate a chief who possessed the confidence of the lazzaroni, and also some means of curbing them: this was Prince Moliterne. In the meantime, a similar explosion had taken place in the army under Mack. His soldiers, far from ascribing their defeat to their own cowardice, laid it to the charge of their general, and vowed to massacre him. The pretended liberator of Italy, who a month ago had received the honours of a triumph, had now no other asylum but the very camp of the French. He craved permission of Championnet to take refuge with him. The generous republican, overlooking the improper language of Mack in his correspondence, afforded him the desired asylum, seated him at his table, and permitted him to retain his sword.

Authorized by the refusal at Naples to execute the conditions of the armistice, Championnet advanced on that city with the design of capturing it. The affair was difficult; for an immense population, which in the open field might have been swept away by a few squadrons of cavalry, became very formidable behind the walls of a town. The French had sundry engagements to encounter in their approach, and the lazzaroni certainly showed more courage than the Neapolitan army. The imminence of the danger had excited their fury to the highest pitch. The Prince Moliterne, who attempted to restrain them, soon lost his popularity amongst them, and they took for leaders two of themselves, men named Paggio and Michael the Mad. From that moment they abandoned themselves to the wildest disorders, and committed every species of violence against the citizens and nobles accused of Jacobinism. So desperate was the state of things that every class interested in the preservation of order desired the entrance of the French. Many of the inhabitants sent word to Mack that they would unite with him to deliver Naples into his hands. The Prince Moliterne himself undertook to seize the fortress of Saint Elmo, and surrender it to the French. On the 4th Pluviose (23d January), Championnet marched to the assault. The lazzaroni defended themselves valiantly, but the citizens, having obtained possession of Saint Elmo and different posts in the city, gave access to the French. Nevertheless, the lazzaroni, intrenched in the houses, prepared to contest the victory from street to street, perhaps even to fire the town; but one of their leaders being taken prisoner, he was treated with consideration, and assured of due respect being paid to Saint Januarius, whereupon he pursuaded his followers to lay down their arms.

Championnet forthwith found himself master of Naples, and of the whole kingdom: his first act was to re-establish order, and disarm the lazzaroni. In accordance with the intentions of the French government he proclaimed the new republic. An ancient denomination was assigned to it, that of the Parthenopean republic. Such was the result of the follies and offences of the court of Naples. A few thousand French and the lapse of two months sufficed to dissipate its mighty projects, and convert its dominions into a republic. This brief and successful campaign invested Championnet with a brilliant reputation. The army of Rome henceforth took the title of the army of Naples, and was detached from the army of Italy. Championnet became independent of Joubert.

Whilst these events occurred in the peninsula of Italy, the fall of the Piedmontese monarchy was finally consummated. Through a precaution which circumstances sufficiently justified, Joubert had already possessed himself of the citadel of Turin, and armed it with the artillery found in the Piedmontese arsenals. But this was an insufficient security in the present state of things. Disturbances continually prevailed in Piedmont; the republicans were incessantly making fresh attempts, and had recently lost six hundred men in an endeavour to surprise Alessandria. A masquerading party from the citadel of Turin, in which the whole court was personated, composed both of Piedmontese and French officers, whom the generals could not always restrain, had almost led to a sanguinary conflict in the streets of Turin itself. It was impossible that the court of Piedmont could be friendly to the French, and the correspondence between the minister of Naples and M. de Priocca, prime minister of Piedmont, sufficiently avouched the fact. Under such circumstances, France, threatened with a fresh war, could not allow to continue, on the line of communication over the Alps, two parties in active contention and a hostile government. She held, with regard to the court of Piedmont, the right that defenders of a fortress may exercise over buildings which embarrass or endanger its defence. It was decided, therefore, that the king should be compelled to abdicate. The republicans were supported, and the French aided them to seize Novarro, Alessandria, Suza, and Chivasso. The king was then told that his reign over a revolted country was no longer feasible, a country, too, likely to become the theatre of war, and his immediate abdication urged, the island of Sardinia being left to him. The

act of abdication was accordingly signed on the 19th Frimaire (9th December 1798). Thus, the two most powerful monarchs in Italy, those of Naples and Piedmont, preserved, of their respective dominions, but two islands. In expectation of coming events, the French government declined the troublesome task of creating a new republic, and, pending the result of the war, it was determined that Piedmont should be provisionally administered by France. No state now survived to grasp in Italy but Tuscany. A simple demonstration would have sufficed to reduce it; but this demonstration was deferred, it being deemed advisable to wait until Austria had openly declared herself.

CHAPTER LIX.

STATE OF THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE REPUBLIC AND OF THE ARMIES AT THE COMMENCEMENT OF 1799.—MILITARY PREPARATIONS.—LEVY OF 200,000 CONSCRIPTS.—DECLARATION OF WAR AGAINST AUSTRIA.—OPENING OF THE CAMPAIGN.—INVASION OF THE GRISONS.—BATTLE OF STOCKACH.—RETREAT OF JOURDAN.—MILITARY OPERATIONS IN ITALY.—BATTLE OF MAGNANO.—RETREAT OF SCHERER.—ASSASSINATION OF THE FRENCH PLENIPOTENTIARIES AT RASTADT.—ELECTIONS OF THE YEAR VII.—SIEYES ELECTED A DIRECTOR IN PLACE OF REWBELL.

Such was the state of things at the commencement of the year 1799. War, from the events we have just recorded, appeared almost inevitable. Moreover, the correspondences intercepted, the aggressive movement of the court of Naples, which would not have taken the initiative without the certainty of a powerful intervention, the vast preparations of Austria, and the arrival of a Russian corps in Moravia, seemed to render the occurrence still more sure. The new year, 1799, had opened, and it was too evident that hostilities would commence within a couple of months. Thus was the incompatability of the two great systems which the revolution had brought in array proved by facts. France had begun the year 1798 with three republics dependent on her, the Batavian, the Cisalpine, and the Ligurian, and at the end of the year six were in existence, by the creation of the Helvetian, Roman, and Parthenopean republics. This extension had been less the result of a spirit of conquest than of the spirit of system. The French had been obliged to succour the oppressed Vaudois; at Rome, they had been provoked to avenge the death of the unfortunate Duphot, slain in attempting to separate the two parties; at Naples they had merely repelled an aggression. They had been led by force of circumstances to keep the struggle alive. It is certain that the Directory, though reposing great confidence in the French power, nevertheless desired peace, for reasons both political and financial; it is equally certain that the Emperor, though desirous of war, wished to postpone it. Still, all had conducted themselves as if anxious for an immediate renewal of the contest, so absolute was the imcompatibility of the two systems.

The revolution had imparted to the French government an extraordinary confidence and daring. The last event at Naples, although inconsiderable in itself, encouraged the belief that nothing could withstand the French bayonet. This in truth was the opinion of Europe. It needed all the prodigious force combined against France to embolden her enemies to enter the lists against her. But this confidence of the French government in its strength was exaggerated, and concealed from it part of the difficulties of its position. The sequel has shown that its resources were immense, but that at this moment they were not sufficiently developed to secure victory. Besides France, the Directory had to govern Holland, Switzerland, and Italy divided into several republics. To administer these countries through the medium of their own governments was, as we have witnessed, more difficult than if the immediate command over them had been assumed. Scarcely any assistance could be obtained from them, either in money or men, from defect of organization. It was requisite, notwithstanding, to defend them, and thus to combat upon a line which extended from the Texel without interruption to the Adriatic, a line which, assailed in front by Austria and Russia, was taken in reverse by the English fleets both in Holland and at Naples. The forces which such a military situation demanded were to be drawn from France alone. Now the armies were singularly weakened; 40,000 soldiers, the best belonging to France, were in Egypt under her great captain. The armies remaining in the country were diminished one-half by the effect of desertions, which peace always brings in her train. The government continued to pay the same number of men, but it had not perhaps 150,000 effective troops. The administrations and the staffs made a profit on the pay, which operated as a useless surcharge on the finances. These 150,000 effective men would form excellent depôts into which the new levies of conscripts might be draughted; but time was required for such an operation, and sufficient time had not elapsed since the establishment of the conscription. Moreover, the finances were in the same pitiable condition, from the inefficient system of collection. A budget of 600 millions had been voted, and an extraordinary item of 125 millions charged on the 400 millions remaining in the national domains; but the tardiness of payments and errors in the estimate of certain products left a considerable deficit. Furthermore, subordination, so necessary in a machine of such magnitude, was beginning to fail. The military were becoming every day more difficult to keep in order. The perpetual state of war made them too sensible of their importance, and they showed themselves imperious and insatiable. Stationed in rich countries, they took flagrant advantage of the opportunity, and were implicated in every description of spoliation and exaction. They attempted likewise to insure the triumphs of their own opinions in the places where they sojourned, and obeyed with reluctance the direction of the civil agents. An instance of this we have seen in the quarrel between Brune and Trouvé. Finally, at home, the opposition which took its rise after the 18th Fructidor, appearing in two phases or characters, was becoming more hostile. The patriots, crushed in the last elections, were preparing to recover their lost ground in the new. The moderates criticized coldly but bitterly all the measures of the government, and according to the practice of all oppositions, reproached it with the very obstacles it had to overcome, and which were for the most part insurmountable. Government is like any other force: it must conquer; and woe betide it if it fail. Its excuses are never heeded, when it would explain the causes of its ill-success.

Such was the situation of the Directory at the moment war was about to recommence in Europe. It made great efforts to infuse order through the complicated machinery committed to its guidance. Italy offered a perpetual derangement. The resources of that fine country were spoiled and squandered, not to the advantage of the army, but to the enrichment of a few plunderers. The commission appointed to establish and administer the Roman republic had recently ceased its functions, and forthwith the influence of the staffs had come into play. The consuls who appeared too moderate were displaced. Advantageous contracts for the maintenance of the army were broken. The com-

mission, in which Faypoult held the financial direction, had concluded a contract for the support and payment of the troops stationed at Rome, and for the transport of all objects of art sent into France. In return it had assigned national property confiscated from the clergy. The contract, besides being moderate in respect of terms, had the advantage of turning to account the national domains. It was annulled however, and subsequently given to the firm of Baudin which literally devoured Italy. This company fortified itself by debauching the staffs, to which it allowed one per cent profit. Piedmont, now placed in French occupation, presented a new and tempting object of prey, and the probity of Joubert, general-in-chief of the army of Italy, formed but a slender guarantee against the cupidity of the staff and the companies. Naples, above all, was eyed greedily as a field of legitimate pillage. Happily, there were four honest men in the Directory, Rewbell, Larévellière, Merlin, and Treilhard, to whom these iniquities were detestable. Larévellière especially, the most severe and the best informed as to facts from his intimate relations with the ambassador Trouvé and with the members of the Roman commission, recommended an exertion of strong authority. He proposed a very excellent plan on the subject, which his colleagues approved; namely, to institute in all the countries dependent on France, and which her armies occupied, commissions charged with the civil and financial departments, and altogether independent of the staffs. Accordingly, at Milan, Turin, Rome, and Naples, civil commissions would receive the contributions payable by the allies of France, conclude contracts, make all the financial arrangements, in a word, provide for the necessities of the armies, but allow no interference with funds by the military chiefs. The commissions would have orders, however, to pay the generals such sums as they might demand, without the latter being obliged to state the application; they were to account only to the government. Thus pains were still taken to propitiate the military power. The four directors decreed the adoption of the measure, and laid upon Scherer positive injunctions to put it into immediate operation with the utmost vigour. As he evinced some indulgence towards his comrades, he was warned that he would be held responsible for all the disorders permitted to continue.

This measure, however expedient it might be, was calculated to mortify the staffs. In Italy indeed they manifested a most mutinous spirit; they asserted that the military were disgraced by the precautions adopted with regard to them, that the generals would be completely fettered and stripped of all authority. Championnet, at Naples, had already arrogated the part of legislator and named commissions to administer the conquered country. Faypoult was dispatched to Naples to take charge of the financial department. He issued the necessary warrants to bring that administration under his charge, and rescinded certain ill-devised measures planned by Championnet. The latter, with all the irascible pride of men of his station, particularly when they are victorious, considered himself insulted; he had the hardihood to promulgate an ordinance commanding Faypoult and the other commissioners to quit Naples within twenty-four hours. Such conduct was too gross for endurance. To contemn the orders of the Directory and expel from Naples the delegates clothed with its powers, was an act which merited the severest reprehension, unless it were intended to abdicate the supreme authority and transfer it to the generals. The Directory wavered not an instant, but, through the energy of the upright members bent on uprooting the system of malversation, acted in the fulness of its might. It cashiered Championnet despite the lustre of his recent achievements, and consigned him to a military commission. Unhappily this was not the only instance of insubordination. The brave Joubert allowed himself to be persuaded that military honour was wounded by the decrees of the Directory; he refused to retain the command on the new conditions prescribed to generals and tendered his resignation. The Directory accepted it. Bernadotte declined to succeed Joubert from a similar motive. Nevertheless the Directory adhered to its determination and persisted in its decrees.

The Directory next devoted its attention to the levy of conscripts, which proceeded but slowly. The two first classes being unable to furnish the two hundred thousand recruits ordained, it obtained authority to raise them from all the classes until the required number was complete. To save time, it was decerned that the communes should be themselves charged with the equipment of the new recruits, and the expense allowed in deduction of the land-tax. When equipped the conscripts were to repair to the frontiers, there to be formed into garrison-battalions, relieve the old troops in the fortresses and reserve-camps, and, as soon as they were sufficiently drilled, be draughted into the active armies.

The deficit in the finances was a source of lively solicitude to the Directory. Ramel, who had administered the financial department with ability and probity since the institution of the Directory, after having tested the produce of the taxes, affirmed that the deficiency would be 65 millions, without reckoning the arrears resulting from delays in payments. A warm discussion arose in the Councils as to the amount of the assumed deficiency. The opponents of the Directory estimated it not to exceed 15 millions. Ramel demonstrated however that it would certainly amount to 65, and perhaps even to 75 millions. A tax had been imposed on doors and windows; but it was insufficient. A duty on salt was again submitted for enactment. The proposal excited a prodigious clamour: it was intended to oppress the people, the opposition vociferated, to fasten the public burdens on a single class, to revive the odious excise (*gabelle*), &c. Lucien Bonaparte, of all the speakers on the question, was the one who urged these objections with the greatest bitterness. The partisans of the government replied by alleging necessity. The duty was refused by the Council of Ancients. To make good its anticipated produce, the tax on doors and windows was doubled, that on street-gates even multiplied ten-fold. The possessions belonging to the protestant religion were directed to be sold, and it was decreed that the protestant clergy should receive salaries in exchange for their property. All sums receivable from the owners of property held jointly with the state were likewise placed at the disposition of government.

Unfortunately these various resources were not sufficiently prompt of realization. Besides the difficulty of eking out the produce of the taxes to the high level of 600 millions, there was the further inconvenience of retarded payments. The government was reduced, this year as in the preceding, to grant assignments to the contractors upon the outstanding amounts. The creditors, to whom, upon the liquidation of the two-thirds, the most scrupulous punctuality was promised, were themselves paid with securities receivable in acquittance of taxes. Thus was the government again constrained to resort to expedients for a subsistence.

It was not sufficient to muster soldiers and collect funds to maintain them; they were to be distributed in an efficient manner and proper generals selected for them. As we have said, it was necessary to defend Holland, the line of the Rhine, Switzerland, and all Italy, in other words, to operate from the Texel to the Gulf of Tarento. On one side Holland was covered by the neutrality of Prussia, which appeared certain of continuance; but an Anglo-Russian

fleet was likely to effect a debarkation on its shores, and from this danger it was incumbent to protect it. The line of the Rhine was guarded by the two places of Mayence and Strasburg; and although there was little probability of Austria succeeding to force it, prudence rendered it fitting to cover it with a corps of observation. Whether the offensive were taken or awaited, it was on the banks of the Upper-Danube, in the vicinity of the Lake of Constance, that the Austrian armies must be encountered. An active army would be needed to advance, either from Alsace or Switzerland, into the plains of Bavaria. A corps of observation would be requisite to cover Switzerland itself, and, in fine, a powerful army to protect Upper-Italy against the Austrians, and Lower-Italy against the Neapolitans and English combined.

The field of battle was of vast dimensions, and was not known or understood as it has since been, in the sequel of long wars and immortal campaigns. It was then believed that the key of the plains lay in the mountains. Switzerland, lying in the centre of the immense line on which the conflict was to rage, appeared the key of the whole continent; and France, who occupied Switzerland, seemed to possess a decisive advantage;—as if by commanding the sources of the Rhine, the Danube, and the Po, she would also command their entire courses: an egregious error. We may conceive that two armies resting each a wing immediately on mountains, as the Austrians and French when they fought in the vicinity of Verona, and in the vicinity of Rastadt, should cling to the possession of those mountains, because either of the two being master of them might outflank the enemy by the heights. But when the field of battle is fifty or a hundred leagues from mountains, they cease to be of the same importance. Whilst a desolating struggle were maintained for the pass of St. Gothard, armies assembled on the Rhine or the Lower Po would have time to decide the fate of Europe. But the great is measured by the small: because eminences are important on a field of battle a few leagues in extent, it was concluded that the power, master of the Alps, became necessarily so of the continent. Switzerland enjoys but one real advantage, that of being able to open the direct approaches to France upon Austria, or to Austria upon France. Hence, for the repose of those two powers and the tranquillity of Europe, it is of consequence to keep those approaches barred. The more points of contact and the means of invasion are prevented so much the better, particularly between two states which cannot meet in collision without convulsing the continent. On this account it is that the neutrality of Switzerland interests all Europe, and that it has ever been good policy to consecrate it as a maxim of general security.

By occupying Switzerland, then, France had secured the advantage of direct approaches upon Austria and Italy, and, in this light, its possession might be regarded as important to her. But if the multiplicity of approaches be an advantage to the power intent to take the offensive and having adequate means, it becomes an inconvenience for the power reduced to the defensive by the inferiority of strength. The latter must naturally desire the points of attack as few as possible that he may concentrate his forces with advantage. If, therefore, it were good for France, sufficiently prepared for the offensive, to be able to debouch into Bavaria by Switzerland, it was bad for her, when reduced to the defensive, to be unable to rely upon the neutrality of Switzerland; it was bad for her to have to guard the whole expanse of frontier between Mayence and Genoa, instead of having the power, as in 1793, to concentrate her forces, between Mayence and Strasburg on one side, and between Mont-Blanc and Genoa on the other.

Thus, the occupation of Switzerland might become dangerous for France in the event of defensive operations. But she was far from believing herself in that predicament. The design of the government was to assume the offensive in every direction, and to proceed, as heretofore, by rapid inroads. But the distribution of its forces was most unfortunate. It stationed an army of observation in Holland, and another army of observation on the Rhine. An aggressive army was intended to start from Strasburg, traverse the Black Forest, and invade Bavaria. A second active army was to combat in Switzerland for the possession of the mountains, and thus support on one side that acting on the Danube, and on the other that to act in Italy. Another large army was to move from the Adige to drive the Austrians beyond the Isonzo. Lastly, a third army of observation was to cover Lower-Italy and guard Naples. It was proposed that the army of Holland should contain twenty thousand men, that of the Rhine forty, that of the Danube eighty, that of Switzerland forty, that of Italy eighty, and that of Naples forty, making in all three hundred thousand men, independently of garrisons. With such a force, this distribution would have been less erroneous. But if, by the levy of conscripts, France might some day swell her troops to that amount, she was far from possessing the capability at this moment. On the contrary, she could scarcely leave 10,000 men in Holland. On the Rhine she could with difficulty muster a few thousand. The troops destined to form that army of observation were retained in the interior, either to watch La Vendée again threatened, or to protect public tranquillity during the forthcoming elections. The army appointed to operate on the Danube amounted at the utmost to forty thousand men, that of Switzerland to thirty, that of Italy to fifty, and that of Naples to thirty. Thus France counted scarcely one hundred and sixty or one hundred and seventy thousand fighting men. To sprinkle these from the Texel to the gulf of Tarento, was of all dispositions the most imprudent.

Since the Directory, impelled by revolutionary audacity, was determined to take the offensive, it became of the utmost consequence, then more than ever, to select well the points of attack, to concentrate sufficient force upon those points, and not to disseminate troops for the purpose of engaging on all at once. Accordingly, instead of scattering its forces in Italy from Verona to Naples, it ought, after the example of Bonaparte, to have concentred the great majority on the Adige, and there operated with commanding effect. Whilst fighting the Austrians on the Adige, it had been sufficiently demonstrated that Rome, Florence, and Naples, might be kept in due subjection. Again, on the side of the Danube, instead of uselessly casting some thousands of men at the foot of Saint-Gothard, it should have diminished the armies of Switzerland and the Rhine, augmented the active army of the Danube, and waged with it decisive warfare in Bavaria. The points of attack might even have been narrowed, remaining in observation on the Adige, and acting aggressively only on the Danube, there to deal a blow all the stronger and surer for the increased mass agglomerated to strike it. Napoleon and the Archduke Charles have proved, the first by example, the latter by precept, that between Austria and France the quarrel must be decided on the Danube. Here lies the shortest passage to the ultimate goal. A French army, victorious in Bavaria, renders null all the successes of an Austrian army victorious in Italy, because it approximates so much more nearly to Vienna.

In exculpation of the plans of the Directory, it is to be remembered that so vast a field of operations had not yet been embraced, and that the only man then capable of doing so was in Egypt. The one hundred and sixty thousand men or thereabouts, actually disposable, were therefore dispersed over the

immense line we have described, and in the order we have indicated. Ten thousand men were to observe Holland, a few thousand the Rhine; forty thousand formed the army of the Danube, thirty that of Switzerland, fifty that of Italy, thirty that of Naples. The conscripts were destined shortly to reinforce these masses and swell them to the amounts contemplated by the directorial project.

The choice of generals was not more happy than the conception of plans. True, since the death of Hoche, and the departure of Bonaparte, Kleber, and Desaix for Egypt, the selection was more confined. One general remained, however, whose reputation was high and deservedly merited,—Moreau. It was possible to be more bold, more enterprising, but scarcely more resolute or safe. A state, defended by such a man, could not perish. Disgraced on account of his conduct in the affair of Pichegru, he had modestly consented to act as a simple inspector of infantry. He was proposed to the Directory for the command in Italy. Since Bonaparte had drawn so much attention to that country, since it was become as the apple of discord between Austria and France, this command appeared the most important. On this account Moreau was suggested. Barras opposed his nomination with all his power. He rested his objection on high patriot grounds, and represented Moreau as open to suspicion from his conduct on the 18th Fructidor. His colleagues had the weakness to yield. Moreau was discarded, and remained a simple general of division in the army he ought to have commanded in chief. He nobly accepted this subordinate rank, one so beneath his talents. Joubert and Bernadotte had refused the command of the army of Italy from motives already stated. Scherer, minister at war, was then thought of. This general, by his successes in Belgium and the brilliant affair of Loano, had acquired considerable reputation. He possessed ability, but his frame was debilitated by age and infirmities; he was no longer capable of leading young soldiers full of vigour and daring. Moreover he had rendered himself obnoxious to the majority of his comrades, by enforcing with some rigour the repression of military license. Barras proposed him as general of the army of Italy. He did so, it was said, to remove him from the ministry of war, where he was beginning to grow distasteful from his severity. However, the military men who were consulted, especially Bernadotte and Joubert, having spoken of his capacity as it was universally estimated in the army, that is eulogistically, he was appointed general-in-chief of the army of Italy. He himself resisted, alleging his age, his health, and above all his unpopularity, arising from the functions he had exercised; but the Directory insisted, and he was obliged to yield.

Championnet, arraigned before a court-martial, was succeeded in the command of the army of Naples by Macdonald. Massena was intrusted with the command of the army of Helvetia. These were excellent appointments, and such as the republic had every reason to applaud. The important army of the Danube was confided to Jourdan. Notwithstanding his reverses in the campaign of 1798, the services he had rendered in 1793 and 1794 were not forgotten, and the hope was indulged that he would prove equal to his early career. Since it was not given to Moreau, the army of the Danube could not have been consigned to a more trustworthy guardian. Unfortunately it was so inferior in numbers, that to command it with assurance required the bold self-confident genius of the conqueror of Arcole and Rivoli. Bernadotte had the army of the Rhine; Brune the army of Holland.

Austria had made preparations greatly superior to the French. Not reposing like them on her successes, she had employed the two years elapsed since the armistice of Leoben, to raise, equip, and discipline fresh troops. She had provided them with all things necessary, and studied to place over them the most efficient generals. She could bring actually in line 225,000 effective men, without reckoning the recruits still under drill. Russia supplied her with an auxiliary force of 60,000 men, whose fanatical valour was vaunted throughout Europe, and who were commanded by the celebrated Suwarrov. Thus the new coalition would operate on the front of the French line with about 300,000 men. Two other Russian contingents were announced, to unite with the English troops, and intended, the one for Holland, the other for Naples.

The plan of campaign digested by the coalition was no better conceived than that by the French. It was the pedantic offspring of the Aulic Council, highly disapproved by the Archduke Charles, but imposed on him and the other generals without permission to modify it. This plan proceeded, like that of the French, on the principle that the mountains form the key of the plains. Consequently considerable forces were accumulated to guard the Tyrol and the Grisons, and to wrest, if possible, the great chain of the Alps from the French. The second object apparently most in favour with the Aulic Council was Italy. A large body of troops was stationed behind the Adige. The most important theatre of war, that of the Danube, seemed not so particularly to command its attention. The happiest arrangement it made in that quarter was placing there the Archduke Charles. Thus then were the Austrian forces distributed. The Archduke Charles, with 54,000 foot and 24,000 horse, was in Bavaria. In the Voralberg, along the course of the Rhine to its issue into Lake Constance, General Hotze commanded 24,000 foot and 2,000 horse. Bellegarde was in the Tyrol with 46,000 men, of whom 2,000 were cavalry, whilst Kray had on the Adige 64,000 foot and 11,000 horse, making 75,000 in all. The Russian corps, too, was intended to join Kray for the purpose of acting in Italy.

We see that Hotze's twenty-six thousand men, and Bellegarde's forty-six thousand, were to operate in the mountains. They were to win the sources of the rivers, whilst the armies in the plains were striving to conquer their streams. On the side of the French, the army of Helvetia was charged with the like task. Consequently, on both sides, a multitude of men were about to destroy each other uselessly on inaccessible rocks, whose possession could influence but remotely the fate of the war.*

The French generals failed not to remonstrate with the Directory on the insufficiency of their means. Jourdan, being obliged to detach several battalions into Belgium to repress some troubles there, and a demi-brigade to the army of Helvetia to replace another demi-brigade sent into Italy, had actually not more than 38,000 effective troops. Such a force was too greatly disproportioned with that under the Archduke to contend against him with any hope of advantage. He demanded the prompt formation of the army under Bernadotte, which as yet contained only from five to six thousand men, and especially the organization of additional field-battalions. He was desirous of permission to combine with his own the army either of the Rhine or of Helvetia, in which he evinced sound judgment. Massena, on his side, complained of having neither the magazines nor the means of transport indispensable for the sustenance of his army in sterile countries, and of such difficult access.

The Directory stated in reply to these complaints that the conscripts would speedily join and be formed into field-battalions; that the army of Helvetia should be forthwith augmented to forty thousand

* All these assertions are demonstrated at length by the Archduke Charles, Jomini, and Napoleon.

men, and the army of the Danube to sixty; and that as soon as the elections were over, the old battalions retained in the interior, should be sent to form the nucleus of the army of the Rhine. Bernadotte and Massena had orders to co-operate in the operations of Jourdan, and to act in conformity with his views. Still relying on the effect of the aggressive, and animated with boundless confidence in its soldiers, the government was eager, despite the disproportion of numbers, that its generals should precipitate the attack, and disconcert the Austrians by an impetuous incursion. Instructions were given in accordance with these sentiments.

The Grisons, divided into two factions, had long vacillated between the Austrian and Swiss dominations. Eventually they had called the Austrians into their valleys. The Directory, considering them Swiss subjects, ordered Massena to occupy their territory, serving the Austrians with a preliminary summons to evacuate it. In case of their refusal, Massena was instantly to attack them. At the same time, as the Russians were still advancing in Austria, it addressed two notes on the subject, one to the congress of Rastadt, the other to the Emperor. Both to the Germanic confederation and to the Emperor it announced that unless, within the space of eight days, counter-orders were given to the march of the Russians, it would deem war declared. Jourdan was enjoined to pass the Rhine upon the expiration of that interval.

The congress of Rastadt had made great progress towards the conclusion of its labours. The questions touching the limit of the Rhine, the partition of the islands and the construction of bridges being adjusted, that relative to the debts alone remained for discussion. The majority of the German princes, saving the ecclesiastical, were undoubtedly solicitous for a settlement to avoid the alternative of war; but subject for the most part to the sway of Austria, they dared not give emphasis to their views. The members of the deputation successively abandoned the Congress, so that further deliberation threatened soon to become impossible. To the note of the Directory the Congress intimated it was not empowered to reply, and referred the matter to the diet at Ratisbon. The note to the Emperor was forwarded to Vienna and remained unnoticed. War was therefore in point of fact declared. Jourdan was directed to cross the Rhine and advance by the Black Forest to the sources of the Danube. He accordingly passed the Rhine on the 11th Ventôse (1st March). The Archduke Charles passed the Lech on the 13th Ventôse (3d March). Thus the boundaries the two powers had mutually prescribed were overstepped, and they were again about to meet in hostile array. Still, although executing an offensive movement, Jourdan had instructions to let the first shot be fired by the enemy, pending the approval of the declaration of war by the legislative body.

Meanwhile, Massena commenced operations in the Grisons. He summoned the Austrians to evacuate them on the 16th Ventôse (6th March). The Grisons comprise the upper valley of the Rhine and the upper valley of the Inn, or Engadin. Massena resolved to pass the Rhine near its fall into the Lake Constance, and thus cut off all the corps scattered in the superior valleys. Lecourbe, who led his right wing, and who from his extraordinary activity and temerity was admirably adapted for mountain warfare, was to start from the vicinity of Saint-Gothard, cross the Rhine towards its sources, and throw himself into the valley of the Inn. General Dessoles, with a division of the army of Italy, was to second him by moving from the Valteline into the valley of the Upper-Adige.

These skilful dispositions were realized with exemplary vigour. On the 16th Ventôse (6th March) the Rhine was breasted on all points. The soldiers hurled waggons into the river and passed over them as on a bridge. In two days Massena was master of the whole course of the Rhine, from its sources to its fall into Lake Constance, and had taken fifteen pieces of cannon and 5,000 prisoners. On his part, Lecourbe was not less successful in performing the operations intrusted to him. He crossed the superior Rhine, pushed from Disentis to Tusis in the valley of the Albula, and from that valley boldly threw himself into that of the Inn, traversing the highest mountains in Europe still covered with the snows of winter. A compulsory delay having prevented Dessoles from advancing to the Upper-Adige from the Valteline, Lecourbe found himself exposed to envelopment by all the Austrian forces cantoned in the Tyrol. In fact, whilst he was heroically urging his way into the valley of the Inn and marching on Martinsbrück, Laudohn planted himself with a corps on his rear; but the intrepid Lecourbe, retracing his steps, attacked Laudohn, repulsed him, captured a number of his troops, and resumed his course into the valley of the Inn.

This brilliant opening seemed to accredit the belief that everywhere, in the Alps as at Naples, the French could face triumphantly an enemy far superior in numerical force. It assuredly confirmed the Directory in the opinion that the aggressive must be pursued and deficiency of numbers compensated by greater hardihood.

The Directory forwarded to Jourdan the declaration of war it had procured from the councils,* with orders to attack immediately. Jourdan had debouched by the defiles of the Black Forest into the district comprised between the Danube and the lake of Constance. The angle formed by the river and the lake widens continually on the advance into Germany. Jourdan, desirous of resting his left on the Danube and his right on the lake of Constance, to communicate with Massena, was therefore obliged, in proportion as he advanced, to extend his line and consequently to weaken it in a dangerous manner, especially before an enemy far superior in number. He had at first pushed as far as Mengen on one side and Marckdorf on the other. But learning that the army of the Rhine would not be organized before the 10th Germinal (30th March), and fearing to be turned by the valley of the Neckar, he conceived apprehensions and made a retrograde movement. The reiterated commands of his government and the success of Massena induced him to resume his forward march. He made choice of a fair position between Lake Constance and the Danube. Two rapid streams, the Ostrach and the Aach, starting almost from the same point, and falling the one into the Danube and the other into Lake Constance, form one straight line, behind which Jourdan established himself. Saint-Cyr, leading his left, was at Mengen; Souham, with the centre, at Pfullendorf; Ferino, with the right, at Barendorf. D'Hautpoult was stationed in reserve. Lefebvre, with the vanguard division, was at Ostrach. This point was the most accessible of the line: placed at the source of the two streams, it presented a tract of marsh-ground which might be traversed by a long causeway. On this point the Archduke Charles, intent to avoid being anticipated, resolved to direct his principal effort. He dispatched two columns to the right and left of the French, against St.-Cyr and Ferino. But his main body, nearly 50,000 strong, was concentrated on the point of Ostrach, where 9,000 French at the utmost were planted. The battle began on the 2d Germinal (22d March), and was bloodily contested. In this first encounter the French displayed a valour and pertinacity which excited the admiration of the Archduke himself. Jourdan hastened to

* This declaration of war was made on the 22d Ventôse Year VII. (13th March 1799)

the threatened position; but the extent of his line and the nature of the ground prevented the possibility, by a rapid movement, of transporting troops from his wings to the centre. The passage was forced, and after an honourable resistance, Jourdan found himself obliged to beat a retreat. He fell back between Singen and Tuttlingen.

A check at the commencement of the campaign was unfortunate; it destroyed that prestige of heroism and invincibility which the French so much needed to obviate the disparity of numbers. Still the inferiority of force had rendered this reverse almost inevitable. Jourdan did not however relinquish the design of acting on the offensive. Aware that Massena was advancing beyond the Rhine, trusting to the co-operation of the army of the Danube, he considered himself bound to make a final effort to support his colleague and flank him in his progress to Lake Constance. He had another motive for moving forward again, namely, the desire to occupy the point of Stockach where the roads to Switzerland and Suabia cross, a point he had done wrong to abandon when retiring between Singen and Tuttlingen. He fixed his operation for the 3d Germinal (23d March).

The Archduke Charles was not yet assured of the direction he ought to give his movements. He was undetermined whether he ought to direct his march on Switzerland, so as to separate Jourdan from Massena, or towards the sources of the Danube, so as to separate him from his base on the Rhine. The direction on Switzerland seemed to him the most advantageous for both armies, since the French had as much interest in combining with the Helvetian army as the Austrians had in keeping them asunder. But he was ignorant of Jourdan's projects, and resolved to make a reconnaissance to satisfy himself. He had appointed the 3d Germinal (23 March) for this reconnaissance, the same day on which Jourdan proposed to attack him.

The nature of the country rendered the position of the two armies extremely complicated. The strategic point was Stockach, where the Suabian and Swiss roads cross. That was the position Jourdan aspired to recover, and the Archduke designed to preserve. The Stockach, a small river, flows with many sinuosities before the town of that name, and ends its devious course in Lake Constance. On this stream the Archduke had taken up his position. He had his left between Nenzingen and Wahlwies upon certain eminences, and behind one of the windings of the Stockach; his centre was stationed on an elevated plateau called the Nellemberg, and in front of the Stockach; and his right upon the continuation of this plateau along the road leading from Stockach to Liptingen. Like the centre the latter also was in front of the Stockach. The extremity of this wing was covered by thick woods stretching along the Liptingen road. There were serious defects in this position. If the left had the Stockach before it, the centre and right had it behind them, and might be driven into it by an effort of the enemy. Besides, all the positions of the army had but one issue to the town of Stockach, and in the event of a forced retreat, the left, the centre, and the right, would all be accumulated on a single way and might be thrown by the entanglement into disastrous confusion. But the Archduke, in determining to cover Stockach, could take up no other position, and necessity formed his excuse. He had to reproach himself with only two actual faults: one in not having reared some works to protect his centre and his right; another in having taken too many precautions on his left, which was sufficiently protected by the river. It was his extreme anxiety to preserve the important point of Stockach that led him thus to distribute his forces. He possessed, at the same time, the advantage of an immense numerical superiority.

Jourdan was partly ignorant of the Archduke's dispositions, for nothing is more difficult than reconnaissances, especially in a country so circumstanced as that in which the two armies were acting. He still occupied the apex of the angle formed by the Danube and Lake Constance, from Tuttlingen to Steusslingen. This was a line of considerable extent, and the nature of the country, which scarcely permitted a rapid concentration, rendered it an inconvenience of serious moment. He ordered General Ferino, who commanded his right at Steusslingen, to march on Wahlwies, and Souham, who commanded the centre at Eigeltingen, to move on Nenzingen. These two generals were to unite their efforts to dislodge the left and centre of the Archduke by passing the Stockach and scaling the Nellemberg. Jourdan then proposed to push his left, his vanguard and his reserve, on the point of Liptingen, with the view of penetrating through the woods which sheltered the right of the Archduke, and carrying its position. These combinations had the merit of centring the largest mass of troops against the right wing of the Archduke, which was the most exposed. Unfortunately the different columns of the army held points of departure too far asunder. To act upon Liptingen, the vanguard and reserve had to start from Emingen, and the left from Tuttlingen, at the distance of a day's march. This separation was the more dangerous, because the French army, about 36,000 men strong, was at least a third weaker than the Archduke's.

On the morning of the 5th Germinal (25th March), the two armies met. The French army was marching to a battle, the Austrian to a reconnaissance. The Austrians, having broken ground before the French, surprised their advanced guards, but were speedily repulsed on all points by the bulk of their divisions. Ferino on the right, and Souham in the centre, penetrated to Wahlwies, Orsingen, Nenzingen, to the margin of the Stockach, and to the foot of the Nellemberg, drove back the Austrians into the positions they occupied in the morning, and prepared to commence the serious attack on those positions. They had to breast the Stockach and storm the Nellemberg. A heavy cannonade thundered along the whole line.

On the French left, the success was still more prompt and complete. The vanguard, now commanded by General Soult, in consequence of a wound received by Lefebvre, repelled the Austrians who had advanced as far as Emingen, chased them through Liptingen, put them to rout in the plain, pursued them with unrelenting ardour, and hunted them through the woods. These woods were the same that covered the Austrian right; by following up their attack the French might have forced it into the ravine of the Stockach and occasioned it a terrible disaster. But it was clear that this wing would be reinforced at the expense of the centre and left, and that a large mass of troops must be brought to bear upon it. Therefore, the vanguard, reserve, and left should all, as in the original plan, have been made to converge on this one point. Unhappily, General Jourdan, inflated with the easy success he had gained, attempted to achieve too extensive an object, and instead of joining Saint-Cyr in the movement, he ordered that general to make a long circuit with the view of hemming-in the Austrians and cutting off their retreat. In this he showed himself too eager to reap the fruits of victory before the victory was won. Jourdan retained on the decisive point only the vanguard division and the reserve commanded by Hautpoult.

Meanwhile, the Austrian right, seeing the woods which covered it forced by the enemy, faced round and disputed with extreme tenacity the road from Liptingen to Stockach, which traverses those woods. The battle was raging with fury, when the Arch-

duke came up in all haste. Discerning the danger with intuitive quickness, he withdrew the grenadiers and cuirassiers from the centre and left, and moved them rapidly to his right. He disregarded the manœuvre of Saint-Cyr on his rear, sensible that if he repulsed Jourdan, Saint-Cyr would only be the more compromised, and resolved to confine himself to a decisive effort upon the point actually menaced.

The possession of the woods was contested with extraordinary obstinacy. The French, greatly inferior in number, resisted with a courage which the Archduke calls admirable; but the prince at last charged in person with some battalions on the Liptingen road and forced the French to give way. They lost the woods, and ultimately found themselves on the uncovered plain of Liptingen, whence they had started. Jourdan had sent to crave succour from Saint-Cyr, but the opportunity had been forfeited. His reserve still remained, and he determined to risk a charge of cavalry to recover his lost advantages. He darted four regiments of cavalry in a simultaneous charge. Stopped by a counter-charge made opportunely at the same moment by the Archduke's cuirassiers, this attempt was not crowned with success. Frightful confusion ensued over the plain of Liptingen. After performing prodigies of valour, the French dispersed. General Jourdan made heroic exertions to arrest the fugitives; he was himself borne along. Nevertheless, the Austrians, exhausted by the prolonged struggle, ventured not to pursue them.

The day was over. Ferino and Souham had maintained themselves, but had forced neither the centre nor the left of the Austrians. Saint-Cyr was hovering on their rear. The battle cannot be said to have been lost: the French, inferior by a third, had everywhere kept the field and displayed transcendent courage; but with their numerical disparity, and the isolation of their different corps, not to have conquered was to be defeated. It became necessary immediately to recall Saint-Cyr, rally the discomfited vanguard and reserve, and draw in the centre and right. Jourdan issued orders in accordance, and especially urged Saint-Cyr to fall back with all possible promptitude. The situation of the latter was very perilous; but he effected his retreat with the decision which always distinguished him, and regained the Danube without accident. The loss was about equal on both sides, in killed, wounded, and prisoners. It amounted to from four to five thousand men.

After this calamitous event, the French could no longer keep the field, and they must of necessity seek shelter behind a strong barrier. Should they retire into Switzerland, or upon the Rhine? It was evident that by retiring into Switzerland they might join the army under Massena, and by such junction be enabled again to assume a formidable attitude. General Jourdan, unfortunately, deemed it incumbent to act otherwise; he trembled for the line of the Rhine, on which Bernadotte had not yet collected above seven or eight thousand men, and he determined to fall back to the entrance of the defiles of the Black Forest. He there took up a position which he considered a strong one, and, leaving the command to his chief of the staff, Ernoulf, departed for Paris to complain in person of the inferiority under which his army had laboured. The result spoke more loudly than all the complaints he could urge, and it had been better to have remained with his army than repair to Paris for such a purpose.

Most fortunately the Aulic Council commanded the Archduke to commit an egregious blunder, which partly retrieved the French disaster. If the Archduke, pushing his advantages, had pursued energetically the conquered army, he might have thrown it into complete disorder and perhaps destroyed it. He would have had afterwards sufficient time to return into Switzerland to attack Massena, deprived of all assistance, reduced to his 30,000 men, and involved in the highest valleys of the Alps. It would not have been impossible to cut him off from France altogether. But the Aulic Council prohibited the Archduke from proceeding towards the Rhine before Switzerland was evacuated: still engrossed by the fixed idea that the key to the theatre of war was in the mountains.

Whilst these events were passing in Suabia, the war was still actively prosecuted in the Upper Alps. Massena acting towards the sources of the Rhine, Lecourbe towards those of the Inn, and Dessoles towards those of the Adige, had encountered about equalized successes. Beyond the Rhine, a little above the point at which it flows into Lake Constance, lay a position of great importance to carry, namely that of Feldkirch. Massena strained all his energies to accomplish the object, but was foiled with the loss of more than 2,000 men. On the other hand, Lecourbe at Taufers, and Dessoles at Nauders, fought two brilliant engagements, which availed to each from three to four thousand prisoners, and amply compensated the check at Feldkirch. Thus the French, by their activity and hardihood, preserved the superiority in the Alps.

Operations commenced in Italy the very day succeeding the battle of Stockach. The French had received about 30,000 conscripts, which raised the gross amount of their forces in Italy to nearly 116,000 men. These were distributed in the following manner: 30,000 veteran troops under Macdonald guarded Rome and Naples. The 30,000 young soldiers garrisoned the fortresses. There remained 56,000 men under Scherer. Of these, 5,000 had been detached under General Gautier to occupy Tuscany, and 5,000 under General Dessoles to act in the Valteline. There were 46,000 men therefore left with Scherer to combat on the Adige, the grand and essential point, where the entire mass of the forces ought to have been agglomerated. Besides the evil of so small a force on this decisive point, there was another not less fatal to the French. The general inspired no confidence; he was too old, as we have said; he had moreover aroused an acrimonious feeling against him during his ministry. Of this he was himself sensible, and had accepted the command with reluctance. He crept stealthily at nights about the tents to listen to the discourses of the soldiers, and gather with his own ears the evidences of his unpopularity. These were circumstances of unfavourable augury at the opening of a great and difficult campaign.

Suwarrov and Melas were intended to command the Austrians. In the meantime they obeyed the Baron von Kray, one of the best of the imperial generals. Even before the arrival of the Russians they mustered 85,000 men in Upper-Italy. Nearly 60,000 were already on the Adige. To both armies orders had been given to assume the offensive. The Austrians were instructed to debouch from Verona, skirt the base of the mountains and advance beyond the river, masking all the fortresses. This movement was designed to support that of the army of the Tyrol in the mountains.

Scherer's injunctions were simply to pass the Adige. This was a difficult commission, for the Austrians possessed all the advantages of that line. It is sufficiently known from the campaign of 1796. Verona and Legnago, which command it, were held by the Austrians. To throw over a bridge on any given point was a very hazardous enterprise, since the Austrians, having Verona and Legnago, might debouch on the flank of the army engaged in attempting a passage. The safest plan, if express orders had not been given to take the offensive, would have been to let the enemy debouch beyond the river, await him on chosen ground, there join battle, and profit by the consequences of victory to cross the Adige in his wake.

Constrained to take the initiative, Scherer hesitated upon the best plan to adopt, and finally decided in favour of an attack on his left. The position of Rivoli, in the mountains, at the entrance of the Tyrol and considerably above Verona, is doubtless well remembered. The Austrians had intrenched all the approaches to it, and formed a camp at Pastrengo. Scherer resolved to dislodge them from this camp in the first instance, and drive them in that direction beyond the Adige. The three divisions of Serrurier, Delmas, and Grenier, were selected for this service. Moreau, become a simple general of division under Scherer, was appointed, with the two divisions of Hatry and Victor, to threaten Verona. General Montrichard, with a division, was detached to make a demonstration on Legnago. This distribution of forces betokened the uncertainty and obscure perception of the general-in-chief.

The attack was made on the 6th Germinal (29th March), the morrow of the battle of Stockach. The three divisions, charged to assail on divers points the camp of Pastrengo, stormed it with an intrepidity worthy of the old army of Italy, and captured Rivoli. They took 1,500 prisoners from the Austrians and several pieces of ordnance. The latter repassed the Adige in all haste over a bridge they had constructed at Polo, and which they had time to destroy. In the centre, under the walls of Verona, a sanguinary struggle occurred for the villages lying in front of that city. Kaim displayed a fruitless pertinacity in defending and retaking them. That of Massimo was taken and retaken no less than seven times. Moreau, not less determined than his adversary, allowed him to gain no advantage, and cooped him up in Verona. Montrichard in making a useless demonstration on Legnago incurred great danger. Kray, deceived by false intelligence, had imagined that the French proposed to direct their principal effort on the Lower-Adige: he had therefore moved a great part of his forces to that point, and by debouching from Legnago placed Montrichard in imminent peril. Happily, the latter was enabled to cover himself by the accidents of the ground, and prudently recoiled on Moreau.

The events of the day had been bloodily contested, but in the end terminated wholly to the advantage of the French on the left and in the centre. The loss of the French might be estimated, in killed, wounded, and prisoners, at 4,000, and that of the Austrians at 8,000 at least. Still, notwithstanding the advantages the French had obtained, the results they entailed were of inconsiderable value. At Verona they had merely compelled the Austrians to confine themselves within the walls; above Verona, it is true, they had driven them over the Adige and gained the means of passing it by restoring the bridge of Polo; but it was unfortunately of questionable utility to pass the Adige at that point. We recollect the road which skirts the farther bank of the river leads through Verona, and that there is no other outlet into the plain. Hence to cross the Adige at Polo was little better than fruitless, since Verona stood directly in the way after it was passed, and must, as in the position of Moreau in the centre, be first carried. If, indeed, on the very day, the disorder of the Austrians after losing the camp of Pastrengo had been profited by and the bridge of Polo rapidly re-established, perhaps the city might have been entered at the heels of the fugitives, especially under favour of the obstinate conflict maintained by Moreau, on the other side of the Adige, against the Imperial General Kaim.

Nothing of that kind however had been attempted. The omission might have been repaired by operating energetically on the following day and moving the mass of the army before Verona and above, by the bridge of Polo. But Scherer wavered for three successive days touching the course he ought to adopt. He sent in quest of a route beyond the Adige permitting the evasion of Verona. The army was indignant at this indecision, and loudly complained of the successes obtained in the engagements of the 6th (26th) being turned to no account. At last, on the 9th Germinal (29th March), a council of war was held, and Scherer made up his mind to act. He conceived the singular design of throwing Serrurier's division over the Adige by the bridge of Polo, and bearing the bulk of his army between Verona and Legnago, there to attempt the passage of the river. To effect this latter purpose, he draughted two divisions from his left to his right, ordering them round behind the centre, and exposing them to needless fatigues over broken roads utterly destroyed by the rains.

On the 10th Germinal (30th March), this new scheme was put in operation. Serrurier, with his division six thousand strong, crossed the Adige at Polo alone, whilst the bulk of the army diverged lower down between Verona and Legnago. The fate of Serrurier's division it was not difficult to foretell. Fixed, after passing the Adige, on a route blocked by Verona and forming thus a sort of *cul-de-sac*,* it was exposed to great hazards. Kray, noting well its situation, directed against it a body of troops triple in number, and vigorously repulsed it to the bridge of Polo. Confusion spread through its ranks, and the other side of the river was regained only in disorder. Some detachments were obliged to cut their way, and 1,500 remained prisoners. On being apprized of this reverse, which was inevitable, Scherer contented himself with rallying the discomfited division and drawing it near the Lower-Adige, where he had now concentrated the greatest part of his forces.

Several days again elapsed in mutual hesitation. Eventually Kray formed a determination, and resolved, whilst Scherer was planting himself on the Lower-Adige, to debouch in mass from Verona, bear down upon the flank of Scherer and inclose him between the Lower-Adige and the sea. The idea was good; but luckily an intercepted order disclosed to Moreau the plan of the Austrian general. He hastened to warn his commander of the danger, and urged him to wheel back his divisions and make front on the side of Verona, whence the enemy proposed to debouch.

It was in executing this movement that the two armies met on the 16th Germinal (5th April), in the vicinity of Magnano. The divisions of Victor and Grenier, forming the right towards the Adige, ascended the river by San-Giovanni and Tomba, with the intention of advancing to Verona. They overthrew Mercantin's division, which opposed their progress, and entirely cut to pieces Wartensleben's regiment. These two divisions accordingly arrived almost abreast of Verona, and were in a capacity to accomplish their object, which was to intercept from the city the forces Kray had sent out. Delmas' division, which was to act in the centre, towards Butta-Preda and Magnano, was too backward, and allowed the Austrian division under Kaim to advance to Butta-Preda, and thus to form a salient point in the middle of the French line. But Moreau, with the divisions of Serrurier, Hatry, and Montrichard, moved forward victoriously on the left. He ordered Montrichard's division to change front, and face round to Butta-Preda, the post at which the enemy had made a point, and marched with his two other divisions on Dazano. Delmas, having ultimately reached Butta-Preda, assisted to cover the French line, and at this moment victory seemed to declare for the French, since their right, completely victorious on the side of the Adige, threatened to cut off the retreat of the Austrians upon Verona.

Meanwhile Kray, judging that the essential point was on the French right, and that the chance of success on the other points must be relinquished to make

* [Literally, a blind alley.]

sure of it there, turned in that direction the great bulk of his forces. He had an advantage over Scherer in the proximity of his divisions, which allowed him to displace them with facility. The French divisions, on the contrary, were far distant from each other, and engaged on a ground intersected by numerous enclosures. Kray fell suddenly with his whole reserve on Grenier's division. Victor would have flown to its succour, but he was himself charged by the regiments of Nadasty and Reisky. Kray was not satisfied with his great superiority. He had caused Mercantin's division, beaten in the morning, to be rallied in the rear; he darted it afresh on the two divisions of Grenier and Victor, and thus decided their defeat. Despite a vigorous resistance they were obliged to abandon the field of battle. The right being routed, the French centre became menaced. Kray failed not to move upon it; but Moreau was there for its protection, and prevented him from pursuing his advantage.

The battle was evidently lost and a retreat necessary. The loss had been considerable on both sides. The Austrians had 3,000 killed or wounded, and 2,000 prisoners. The French had an equal number of killed and wounded, but they had lost 4,000 prisoners. General Pigeon, who during the first Italian campaign had displayed in the vanguards so much talent and intrepidity, was upon this occasion mortally wounded.

Moreau proposed to sleep on the field of battle in order to avoid the confusion of a nocturnal retreat, but Scherer resolved to fall back the same evening. On the morrow he retired behind the Molinella, and on the following day, the 18th Germinal (7th April), on the Mincio. Resting on Peschiera on one side and Mantua on the other, he might have offered a vigorous resistance, recalled Macdonald from the Peninsula, and, by this concentration of forces, regained the superiority forfeited on the field of Magnano. But the unfortunate Scherer had entirely lost his head. His soldiers were worse disposed towards him than ever. Masters for three years of Italy, they were exasperated at beholding it wrested from their possession, and they ascribed their reverses solely to the incapacity of the general who commanded them. It is certain that, on their part, they had fought as well as in the brightest days of their glory. The reproaches of his army tended to disconcert Scherer as much as his defeat. Despairing of maintaining himself on the Mincio, he retired upon the Oglio, and thence upon the Adda, where he arrived on the 12th April. It seemed uncertain where his retrograde movement would stop.

Six weeks had scarcely elapsed since the campaign was opened, and already the French were in retreat on all points. Ernoulf, whom Jourdan had left in command of the army of the Danube at the mouth of the defiles of the Black Forest, had taken alarm on hearing of some light troops hovering upon one of his wings, and retired in disorder upon the Rhine. Thus, in Germany as in Italy, the French armies, though brave as ever, lost nevertheless all their advantages, and returned defeated to the frontiers. It was only in Switzerland they had preserved their fame. There, Massena maintained himself with all the pertinacity of his character, and, save the abortive attempt on Feldkirch, had been invariably successful. But, established on the salient angle formed by Switzerland between Germany and Italy, he was placed between two victorious armies, and it became incumbent on him to retire. He had, in fact, given Lecourbe instructions to that effect, and he fell back into the interior of Switzerland, but with order, and preserving an imposing attitude.

The French arms were humbled, and certain of their ministers abroad were made the victims of a most detestable and atrocious outrage. War being declared against the Emperor, but not against the German Empire, the Congress of Rastadt had continued its session. It was on the point of settling the final subject in dispute, that concerning the debts; but two-thirds of the states had recalled their deputies. This was a consequence of the influence of Austria, who was naturally averse to the conclusion of peace. There remained at the Congress, therefore, only a few deputies from Germany, and the retreat of the army of the Danube having laid open the country, the deliberations were carried on amidst the Austrian troops. Hereupon the Austrian cabinet formed a villanous project, which long reflected deep disgrace upon its policy. It had reason to complain of the haughtiness and vigour displayed by the French ministers at Rastadt. It also imputed to them a revelation which had singularly compromised it in the eyes of the Germanic confederation; to wit, that of the secret articles arranged with Bonaparte for the occupation of Mayence. Those secret articles proved that, in order to gain Palma-Nuova in Friuli, the Austrian cabinet had surrendered Mayence, and betrayed, in a shameful manner, the interests of the Empire. Hence, it became highly incensed, and vowed vengeance against the French ministers. It had a further motive for seizing their papers; namely, to ascertain which of the German princes were then treating individually with the French republic. Thus it came to pass that it conceived the design of causing the French ministers to be arrested on their return to France, plundered, maltreated, and perhaps even assassinated. It has never been known, indeed, whether orders to assassinate them were positively given.

The French ministers already entertained some distrust, and, without apprehending an attempt against their persons, they were in dread concerning their correspondence. In fact, it was interrupted on the 30th Germinal (19th April), by the removal of the ferrymen who served to convey it. The French ministers reclaimed against this violence; the deputation of the Empire protested likewise, and inquired whether the Congress might deem itself in security. The Austrian officer to whom application was made returned an unsatisfactory answer. Thereupon the French ministers declared they would depart within three days, namely, on the 9th Floreal (28th April), for Strasburg; and added, they would remain in that city ready to renew the negotiations whenever the desire was testified. On the 7th Floreal a courier of the legation was stopped. Fresh reclamations were urged by the whole Congress, and it was expressly demanded whether the safety of the French ministers was considered inviolate. The Austrian colonel who commanded the Pandour hussars cantoned near Rastadt, replied by an order for the French ministers to depart within twenty-four hours. He was asked for an escort to accompany them, but he refused it, giving assurance that their persons would be respected. The three ministers, Jean Debry, Bonnier, and Roberjot, set out on the 9th Floreal (28th April), at nine o'clock in the evening. They occupied three carriages with their families. After them followed the Ligurian embassy, and the secretaries of legation. At first, difficulties were opposed to their leaving Rastadt, but eventually all obstacles were removed and they started. The night was dark and dismal. They had scarcely proceeded fifty paces from Rastadt ere a troop of Pandour hussars charged on them sword in hand, and arrested the carriages. That containing Jean Debry led the way. The hussars violently tore open the door, and inquired in a semi-barbarous jargon if he were Jean Debry. Upon his answering in the affirmative, they seized him by the throat, dragged him from the carriage, and, before the eyes of his wife and children, run him through with swords. Believing him dead, they passed to the other carriages, and slaughtered Bonnier and Rober-

jot in the arms of their families. The members of the Ligurian embassy and the secretaries of legation had time to save themselves. The brigands commissioned to perpetrate this outrage afterwards rifled the carriages, and carried off all the papers they contained.

Jean Debry had not been mortally wounded. The freshness of the night restored him to the use of his senses, and he trailed himself all bleeding to Rastadt. When this occurrence was known, it aroused the indignation of the inhabitants and the members of the Congress. German fidelity was horrified by a violation of the rights of nations unheard of amongst civilized communities, and which was conceivable only of a semi-barbarous court. The members of the deputation who remained at the Congress lavished on Jean Debry, and the families of the assassinated ministers, the most assiduous attentions. They subsequently assembled and drew up a declaration, in which they denounced the atrocity that had been committed, and repelled all suspicion of complicity with Austria. Intelligence of the crime being quickly circulated through Europe, it excited universal abhorrence. The Archduke Charles wrote a letter to Massena, announcing that he would cause the colonel of the hussars to be prosecuted; but this cold and formal epistle, which proved the embarrassment of the prince, was wholly unworthy of him and his character. Austria neither could nor attempted to answer the accusations directed against her.

Thus implacable was the war between the two systems which divided the world. The republican ministers, first unfavourably received, next insulted during a whole year of peace, came at last to be infamously assassinated, and with the ferocity hitherto esteemed characteristic only of barbarous tribes. The rights of nations, observed amongst the most bitter foes, were violated only with regard to them.

The unexpected reverses which marked the opening of the campaign, combined with the outrage at Rastadt, produced an impression extremely detrimental to the Directory. From the first moment of the declaration of war, the oppositions began to lose moderation; but they wholly discarded it when they beheld their armies defeated and their ministers murdered. The patriots, incensed by the system of secessions, the military dissatisfied at the curb placed upon their licentiousness, the royalists, concealing themselves behind malcontents of every quality,—all discontented partisans seized, by one consent, upon the late events to denounce the Directory. The armies, they said, had been entirely abandoned. The Directory had allowed their ranks to be thinned by desertion, and had used no activity to replenish them by means of the new conscription. It had retained in the interior a great number of veteran battalions, which, instead of being sent upon the frontier, were employed to control the freedom of elections; and to those armies, thus reduced to so disproportionate a strength compared with that of the enemy's, the Directory had furnished neither magazines nor provisions, nor accoutrements, nor means of transport, nor surplus horses. It had wickedly surrendered them to the rapacity of the administrations, who had fruitlessly consumed a revenue of six hundred millions. Moreover, it had made the worst selections of generals to command them. Championnet, the conqueror of Naples, was in duress for attempting to check the cupidity of the agents of the government. Moreau was degraded to the post of a mere general of division. Joubert, the victor of the Tyrol, and Augereau, one of the heroes of Italy, were without employment. Scherer, on the contrary, who had prepared the way for all these defeats by his administration, had the command of the army of Italy because he was the countryman and friend of Rewbell. Nor did they confine themselves within these bounds. Other names, too, were recalled with bitterness to the prejudice of the Directory. The illustrious Bonaparte, the brilliant Kleber and Desaix, his lieutenants, with their forty thousand companions in arms, the vanquishers of Austria, where were they? In Egypt, in a distant land, whither they had been sent to perish through the imprudence of the government, if not through its villany. For of this enterprise originally so extolled, it now began to be bruited that it was an evil device of the Directory to get rid of a celebrated warrior who caused it umbrage.

The arraigners of the government ascended yet higher; they upbraided it with the war itself; they accused it of having provoked hostilities by indiscretions towards the European powers. It had invaded Switzerland and overthrown the Pope and the court of Naples, thus rousing Austria to vindication, and all without being prepared to enter upon a struggle. By invading Egypt, it had driven the Porte to a rupture. By quarrelling with the Porte, it had delivered Russia from all fear of a diversion, and permitted her to send sixty thousand men into Germany. In short, fury reached such a pitch that the Directory was even charged with being the secret author of the assassination of Rastadt. It was a scheme planned, its accusers alleged, to stimulate opinion against the enemies of the country, and to obtain fresh grants from the legislative body,

These reproaches were repeated everywhere, from the tribune, in the journals, and in places of public resort. Jourdan had repaired in person to Paris to complain of the government and throw upon it the blame of all his disasters. Others of the generals who remained with their armies, had written to expose their grievances. There was an universal clamour and virulence, which might seem incomprehensible if the fury, and, above all, the inconsistency of parties were not well accredited.

By a very slight reference to facts, these accusations might be shown to be groundless. The Directory had not wilfully permitted the ranks of the armies to be thinned, for it had granted only twelve thousand furloughs: but it had been unable to prevent desertions in time of peace. No government in the world had yet succeeded in wholly preventing them. The Directory had even been accused of tyranny in attempting to oblige soldiers to rejoin their colours. It appeared harsh, in fact, to drag again from their homes men who had performed an arduous service of six years for the benefit of their country. The conscription had only been in existence five months, and there had been no opportunity, in so brief a period, of organizing that system of recruiting, and particularly no means of equipping and training the conscripts, of forming them into field-battalions, and of moving them in time into Holland, Germany, Switzerland, and Italy. A few veteran battalions had been retained in the country because they were indispensable to maintain tranquillity during the elections, and because that task could not be confided to young soldiers, whose spirit was not formed, nor their attachment to the republic sufficiently tested. A yet more important reason justified this precaution; namely, the state of La Vendée, still agitated by foreign emissaries, and the danger of Holland, menaced by an Anglo-Russian fleet.

Touching abuses in the administration, the offences of the Directory were not more real. There had been malversations, doubtless, but almost all to the advantage of those who now complained of them, and despite the strenuous exertions of the Directory. Malversation had prevailed in three forms: pillaging conquered countries, charging the state with the pay of soldiers who had deserted, and making disadvantageous contracts with the companies. Now all these were acts of peculation which the generals and staffs had committed, and by which they principally

had profited. They had plundered conquered countries, appropriated a dishonest surplus upon the pay, and partaken the profits of the companies. We have seen that these latter sometimes allowed even forty per cent. upon their gains to obtain the protection of the staffs. Scherer, towards the close of his ministry, had quarrelled with his old comrades from the mere attempt to repress these spoliations. The Directory had been compelled, in the hope of putting an end to them, to appoint commissions independent of the staffs, and we have witnessed the reception given them by Championnet at Naples. Another cause existed for the onerous contracts made with the companies, arising from the situation of the finances. Promises only were given to the contractors, and they sought to indemnify themselves, through the price, for the uncertainty of the payment. The credits opened this year amounted to 600 millions of ordinary and 125 millions of extraordinary expenditure. Out of these sums the minister had already disbursed 400 millions for expenses incurred. Only 210 millions of these had as yet been received, so 190 had been provided by anticipations.

Hence there was no blame imputable to the Directory on account of the malversations. The selection of generals, excepting of one only, could not be made a legitimate ground of censure. After his conduct towards the commissioners sent to Naples, it was impossible to retain Championnet in his command. Besides Macdonald was quite equal to him as a general, and enjoyed a reputation for severe probity. Joubert and Bernadotte had both declined the command of the army of Italy, and had both joined in recommending Scherer. It was Barras who had repudiated Moreau, and it was he also who had alone urged the nomination of Scherer. With regard to Augereau, his demagogical turbulence was an adequate reason for refusing him a command, and, moreover, notwithstanding his incontestable qualities, he was not competent for a command-in-chief. Upon the charge respecting the expedition to Egypt we have seen how far the Directory was really guilty of it, and whether it had formed any design of exiling Bonaparte, Kleber, Desaix, and their forty thousand companions in arms. Larévellière-Lépeaux, we remember, had almost come to an open rupture with Bonaparte through his firmness in opposing the expedition.

The provocation to war was no more the act of the Directory than any other of the misfortunes. It has appeared sufficiently manifest that the war was solely owing to the incompatibility of the political passions which convulsed Europe. No person could be particularly charged with evoking it; but, at all events, the patriots and the military were the last parties to impeach the conduct of the Directory on the subject. What would the patriots have said if the Vaudois had not been supported, the Papal government chastised, the king of Naples overthrown, the king of Piedmont forced to abdicate? And had not the military in the army of Italy been continually urgent with the government for the occupation of additional countries? Had not tidings of the declaration of war filled them all with gladness? Moreover, were not Bernadotte at Vienna, and a brother of Bonaparte at Rome, the parties who had been guilty of indiscretions, if any such had been committed? The hostile determination of the Ottoman Porte had not influenced the conduct of Russia; but even if it had, the author of the Egyptian expedition alone deserved to be upbraided therewith.

The bulk of the accusations accumulated against the Directory was therefore altogether unjust and absurd. One reproach it undoubtedly merited, and that was the excessive confidence it reposed, in common with the patriots and military, in the power of the republic. Fired with revolutionary passions it had blindly yielded to their impulse. To commence the war it conceived 170,000 men would suffice, and relied implicitly on the decisive effect of the aggressive. Its plans were certainly bad, but not worse than those of Carnot in 1796, not worse than those of the Aulic Council, and were moreover partly based on a project of General Jourdan. One man only could have formed better, as we have already said, and it was not the fault of the Directory that that man had departed from Europe.

Still, although the spirit of equity enjoins the historian to expose the injustice of these reproaches, it is an evil day for a government when everything is imputed to it as a crime. One of the essential properties of a government is to possess a character sufficient to repel injustice. When it loses this, and the wrongs of others, and those even of fortune, are ascribed to it, it no longer enjoys the faculty of governing, and this impotency forebodes its dissolution. How many governments had been paralyzed since the commencement of the revolution! The action of France against Europe was so violent that the springs of government became necessarily weakened and successively broken. The Directory was effete, as had been the committee of public welfare, as was Napoleon himself at a later date. The accusations levelled against the Directory betokened, not its errors, but its decay.

At the same time, it is not surprising that five civil magistrates, raised to power, not on account of their hereditary rank or their personal greatness, but from a slight superiority of estimation over their fellow-citizens, magistrates armed only with the authority of the laws to contend against infuriated factions, to retain in subjection numerous armies and generals covered with glory and full of pretensions, to administer, in fine, the government of one-half of Europe, should appear inadequate to the crisis, amidst the terrible struggle now again to be sustained. The occurrence of a disaster only was needed to bring out this prostration in more full relief. The factions alternately defeated, and the military curbed in their licentiousness, called them contemptuously *the lawyers*, and asserted with one accord that France could not be governed by them.

By a singular obliquity, witnessed nevertheless occasionally in the conflict of revolutions, opinion was indulgent only towards one of the directors who had least deserved it. Barras, without question, solely merited the imputations against the Directory. In the first place he had taken no part in business, but had left the whole burden of affairs to his colleagues. Except in decisive moments, when he raised his voice, more vigorous than his courage, he absolutely did nothing. At all events he interfered merely in appointments, which best suited his intriguing disposition. He had participated in all the profits of the companies, and alone justified the reproach of malversation. He had always been the defender of the turbulent and of knaves; it was he who had supported Brune and commissioned Fouché in Italy. He was the cause of the unfortunate selection of generals, for he had opposed the nomination of Moreau, and strongly urged that of Scherer. Yet, notwithstanding all his grievous delinquencies, he affected to hold himself apart. He did not, like his four colleagues, come under the category of a *lawyer;* for his indolence, his dissolute habits, his military propensities, his relations with the Jacobins, the recollection of the 18th Fructidor, which was exclusively attributed to him, constituted him in appearance a man of execution, more capable of governing than his colleagues. The patriots found in him many points of resemblance with themselves, and believed he was in heart devoted to them. The royalists were cajoled by his secret promises. The staffs, whom he flattered and protected against the just severity of his colleagues, held him in consider-

able favour. The contractors applauded him too, and in this manner he contrived to escape the general odium. He even acted perfidiously towards his colleagues, for all the opprobrium he himself merited, he had the address to fix upon them alone. Such a part cannot be long successful, but it may for a time: it succeeded on this occasion.

The animosity of Barras against Rewbell has been mentioned. The latter, a truly able administrator, had offended, by his surliness and pride, all who came in contact with him. He had evinced a repulsive sternness towards men of business, towards all the creatures of Barras, and particularly towards the military, and had thus earned very general detestation. He was upright, albeit somewhat penurious. Barras had the cunning, in his own society, which was very numerous, to direct hateful suspicions against him. An unfortunate accident contributed to accredit them. The agent of the Directory in Switzerland, Rapinat, chanced to be the brother-in-law of Rewbell. In Switzerland exactions had been practised as in all the other conquered countries, but to a far less extent than elsewhere. Yet the vociferous complaints of its parsimonious population had occasioned much scandal. Rapinat had executed the invidious commission of placing seals upon the coffers and exchequer of Berne; he had likewise treated with superciliousness the Helvetian government. These circumstances, and his peculiar name, which was unhappy, conduced to brand him as the Verres of Switzerland, and as the author of peculations in which he had no concern; for he had in fact quitted Switzerland before the work of spoliation had grown to a height. But in the society of Barras poor and malicious puns were fabricated on his name, all which passed current, and recoiled on Rewbell, whose brother-in-law he was. Thus the probity of Rewbell himself became obnoxious to calumny.

Larévellière, from his inflexible severity, and the influence he had exercised over the affairs of Italy, had rendered himself equally distasteful with Rewbell. His mode of life, however, was so simple and modest that it was impossible to cast suspicion upon his honesty. The society of Barras, therefore, assailed him with ridicule. His personal peculiarities were mocked, and his pretensions to a new papacy jeered. He was taunted with a scheme to found the religion of Theophilanthropy, of which he was in truth not the author. Merlin and Treilhard, though less old in the possession of power, and less in view than Rewbell and Larévellière, were, nevertheless, involved in the same unpopularity.

Such was the inclination of public feeling when the elections of the year VII. occurred, which proved to be the last. The patriots, fermenting with wrath, were determined not to be excluded from the legislative body this year as in the preceding. They vehemently protested against the system of secessions, and strove to anathematize it in advance. They were so far successful that it was not again attempted to be put in practice. In that state of excitement when adversaries are suspected of entertaining every design that is dreaded, they asserted that the Directory, using as on the 18th Fructidor extraordinary means, intended to prolong for five years the powers of the actual deputies, and to suspend, during the whole of that interval, the exercise of electoral rights. They alleged, moreover, that Swiss were to be brought into Paris, the ground of the accusation being that the organization of the Helvetian contingent was commenced. They raised also a loud clamour touching a circular to the electors issued by the commissary of the government (the prefect) in the department of the Sarthe. This was not such a circular as we have witnessed since, but simply an exhortation. The Directory was constrained to disavow it by a message. The elections, made in these dispositions, elevated to the legislative body a considerable number of patriots. No endeavour was hazarded this year to exclude them, and their return was confirmed. General Jourdan, who had good reason to ascribe his reverses to the numerical inferiority of his army, but none to charge the government, as he was weak enough to do, with a desire to ruin him, was again chosen to the legislative body, and took his seat animated with the bitterest resentment against the Directory. Augereau was likewise returned, with an increased growth of bile and truculence.

According to the constitution a new director also was to be chosen. On this occasion fortune declared against the republic, for, instead of Barras, Rewbell, the most efficient of the five directors, drew the lot to retire. His mischance afforded, however, the utmost satisfaction to all his enemies, and supplied a fresh opportunity of reviling him with greater impunity. But, as he had been elected to the Council of Ancients, he seized an occasion of replying to his detractors, and did so in the most triumphant manner.

The retreat of Rewbell was signalized by the only breach of the rigorous laws of probity with which the Directory could be reproached. The first five directors, nominated at the institution of the Directory, had made an agreement amongst themselves to deduct from their salaries each 10,000 francs as a contribution for the benefit of the retiring member. The object of that noble sacrifice was to soothe the transition from supreme power to private life, especially to such of the Directory as were destitute of fortune. There was also a motive of dignity if not of policy in thus acting, for it was apt to endanger the consideration of government the spectacle of a man reduced to indigence who a day or two ago had wielded the supreme executive. This very reason now induced the directors to provide in a yet more substantial manner for their seceding colleagues. Their salaries were so moderate that a deduction of 10,000 francs appeared excessive. They resolved therefore to allocate a sum of 100,000 francs to each retiring director. This involved an extra charge upon the state of one hundred thousand francs per annum. This sum was to be drawn from the minister of finance, who might provide it from one of the numberless surplusses so easily eked out in budgets of six or eight hundred millions. It was decided, moreover, that each director should take with him his carriage and horses. As the legislative body allowed every year a sum for travelling expenses, this was a charge to be avowed and so rendered legitimate. The directors also resolved that what was saved out of the allowance for travelling expenses should be divided amongst them. This assuredly was but a small inroad upon the public fortune, if it were one at all; and whilst generals and companies made such enormous profits, 100,000 francs per annum, devoted to the sustenance of men so recently clothed with the high functions of government, were far from constituting a serious robbery. The motives and the form of the measure, it must be allowed, excused it in some sort. Larévellière, when it was communicated to him, refused to consent to it. He declared to his colleagues he would never accept his portion. Rewbell received his however. The 100,000 francs that were paid him were taken from the two millions of secret service-money, of the appropriation whereof the Directory was not bound to give any account. Such is the solitary offence with which the Directory can be upbraided collectively. One of its members, out of the twelve who succeeded each other, was accused of engrossing illegitimate profits. Where is the government in the wide world of which the same thing may not be predicated?

A successor was to be found in place of Rewbell. It was desirable to select a person of high reputation to give some consideration to the Directory, and at-

tention was turned to Sieyes, whose name, after that of Bonaparte, was the most important of the epoch. His embassy to Prussia had added to his renown. He had already been considered, and very justly, as a man of profound understanding; but since his mission to Berlin, he was esteemed the preserver of the Prussian neutrality, which, sooth to say, was less due to his intervention than to the situation of that power. Thus he had come to be regarded as a man equally capable of directing a government as of devising a constitution. He was accordingly elected to the vacant directorship. Many individuals viewed this choice as a confirmation of the rumour generally circulated of intended modifications in the constitution. These contended that Sieyes was called to the Directory merely for the purpose of aiding in the concoction of these modifications. So little trust was placed in the stability of the existing state of things that certain indications of change were detected in every occurrence.

CHAPTER LX.

CONTINUATION OF THE CAMPAIGN OF 1799; MASSENA COMBINES THE COMMAND OF THE ARMIES OF HELVETIA AND THE DANUBE, AND OCCUPIES THE LINE OF THE LIMMAT.—ARRIVAL OF SUWARROV IN ITALY.—SCHERER TRANSFERS THE COMMAND TO MOREAU.—BATTLE OF CASSANO.—RETREAT OF MOREAU.—ATTEMPT TO JOIN THE ARMY OF NAPLES; BATTLE OF THE TREBBIA.—COALITION OF ALL PARTIES AGAINST THE DIRECTORY.—REVOLUTION OF THE 30TH PRAIRIAL.

Amid the turmoil of the domestic events last narrated, the Directory had not intermitted its efforts to retrieve the disasters which had darkened the opening of the campaign. Jourdan had forfeited the command of the army of the Danube, and Massena had received the command-in-chief of all the troops stationed from Düsseldorf to Mount Saint-Gothard. This fortunate appointment was destined to save France. Scherer, anxious to quit an army whose confidence he had lost, had obtained permission to transfer the command to Moreau. To Macdonald pressing orders had been sent to evacuate the kingdom of Naples and the Roman States, and to effect a junction with the army of Upper-Italy. All the veteran battalions hitherto retained in the interior were marched to the frontiers; the equipment and organization of the conscripts were accelerated, and reinforcements forwarded to all points.

The moment Massena was nominated commander-in-chief of the armies of the Rhine and Switzerland, he took steps to dispose advantageously the troops confided to him. He could not have assumed the command at a more critical conjuncture. He had at the utmost 30,000 men, scattered over Switzerland from the valley of the Inn to Basle; opposed to him were 30,000 men under Bellegarde in the Tyrol, 28,000 under Hotze in the Voralberg, and 40,000 under the Archduke between Lake Constance and the Danube. This mass of nearly one hundred thousand men might, it seemed, at any time, envelope and annihilate him. If the Archduke had not been thwarted by the Aulic Council or retained by illness, and had crossed the Rhine between Lake Constance and the Aar, he might have intercepted Massena from France, surrounded and destroyed him. Fortunately he was not unshackled in his movements; fortunately also Bellegarde and Hotze had not been placed immediately under his orders. A continual estrangement prevailed amongst the three generals, which prevented them acting in concert for a decisive operation.

These circumstances favoured Massena, and permitted him to take up a solid position and to distribute appropriately the forces placed at his disposal. All indications tended to prove that the Archduke proposed merely to observe the line of the Rhine on the side of Alsace, and to operate in Switzerland between Schaffhausen and the Aar. In consequence, Massena moved the greatest part of the army of the Danube into Switzerland, and assigned to it positions it ought to have taken at first, that is to say, immediately after the battle of Stockach. He had committed the error of leaving Lecourbe too long engaged in the Engadine. That general had been obliged to retreat, after sustaining sundry brilliant encounters, in which he manifested an admirable intrepidity and presence of mind. The Grisons were evacuated. Thereupon Massena disposed his army between the great chain of the Alps and the confluence of the Aar with the Rhine, choosing the line which seemed to him the best.

Switzerland presents several lines of water, which, starting from the Great Alps, traverse it throughout and end eventually on the Rhine. The largest and most distended is that of the Rhine itself, which, taking its source not far from Saint-Gothard, flows at first to the north, then expands into a vast lake,* from which it issues near to Stein, and turns west to Basle, where it recommences to run north, forming the frontier of Alsace. This line is the most extensive and embraces all Switzerland. There is a second, that of Zurich, included within the first; it is formed by the Lint, which, taking its rise in the small cantons, stops to form the lake of Zurich, leaves it under the name of the Limmat, and finishes its course in the Aar, not far from the embouchure of this latter river in the Rhine. This line, which embraces only a portion of Switzerland, is much more contracted than that of the Rhine. There is yet a third, that of the Reuss, contained still within the second, which, from the bed of the Reuss, passes into Lake Lucerne, whence it proceeds into the Aar, in close proximity to the point where the Limmat joins that river. These lines, commencing on the right at the base of enormous mountains, and terminating on the left in large rivers, consisting now in streams, now in lakes, offer numerous advantages for acting on the defensive. Massena could not hope to defend the most extensive, that of the Rhine, and stretch from Saint-Gothard to the mouth of the Aar. He was obliged to recoil on that of the Limmat, where he consolidated himself in massive form. He planted his right wing, composed of the three divisions of Lecourbe, Menard, and Lorge, between the Alps and the lake of Zurich, under the orders of Ferino. He fixed his centre on the Limmat, and constituted it with the four divisions of Oudinot, Vandamme, Thureau, and Soult. His left guarded the Rhine, towards Basle and Strasburg.

Before intrenching himself in this position, Massena attempted by a battle to prevent the junction of the Archduke with Hotze. Those two generals, both stationed on the Rhine, the one above the entrance of the river into Lake Constance, the other below its issue therefrom, were separated by the whole extent of the lake. In leaving this line to establish themselves before that of Zurich and the Limmat, where Massena was placed, they must start from the two extremities of the lake to effect their junction beyond it. Massena might seize the moment when Hotze had not yet advanced to fall upon the Archduke, drive him over the Rhine, afterwards wheel back on Hotze and repulse him in his turn. It is calculated he would have had time to execute this double movement, and to defeat separately the two Austrian commanders. Unhappily, he did not think of attacking them until they were almost in a position to support each other. He engaged

* The lake of Constance.

them on several points on the 5th Prairial (24th May), at Aldenfingen and at Frauenfeld, and although he had everywhere the advantage, from the vigour he always displayed in action, he could not prevent the junction, and he was constrained to fall back on the line of the Limmat and Zurich, where he prepared to give the Archduke a spirited reception, in case that prince decided to attack him.

Events wore a far more sinister complexion in Italy. There disaster took no pause.

Suwarrov had joined the Austrian army with a corps of twenty-eight or thirty thousand Russians. Melas had assumed the command of the Austrian army. Suwarrov commanded in chief the two armies amounting at least to 90,000 men. He was designated the *Invincible*. He was renowned for his campaigns against the Turks, and his cruelties in Poland. He possessed a remarkable strength of character, and an affected eccentricity pushed to the verge of insanity, but no capacity for combination. He was a true barbarian, luckily incompetent to discern the proper employment of his forces, for otherwise the republic might perhaps have fallen. His army was the counterpart of himself. Singularly brave, tinged with fanaticism, but devoid of instruction. Artillery, cavalry, engineers, were reduced to an absolute nullity. The bayonet alone was used by it, used as the French had employed it during the revolution. Suwarrov was overbearing towards his allies, and gave the Austrians Russian officers to teach them to handle the bayonet. He held very insulting language respecting them, saying that *women, fops, and idlers* might quit the army, that tattlers, presuming to criticise the sovereign service should be deemed egotists and lose their grades, and that everybody must be prepared to sacrifice himself to rid Italy of the French and the atheists. Such was the style of his discourses. Fortunately, after inflicting upon the French infinite mischief, this brutal energy was doomed to encounter an artistic and considerate energy, and to be crushed before it.

Scherer, having entirely lost the use of his faculties, had retired precipitately upon the Adda amidst the indignant exclamations of his soldiers. Of his army of 46,000 men, he had lost 10,000 in killed and prisoners. He was obliged to leave 8,000 more at Peschiera and Mantua, and thus only 28,000 finally remained with him. Still, even with this handful of men, if he had known how to manœuvre skilfully, he might have gained time for Macdonald to join him and obviated many calamities. But he planted himself on the Adda in the most unfavourable manner. He divided his army into three divisions. The division of Serrurier was at Lecco, at the issue of the Adda from the Lake of Lecco. Grenier's division was at Cassano, Victor's at Lodi. Montrichard was stationed with some light corps towards the Modenese and the mountains of Genoa, to maintain the communications with Tuscany, by which Macdonald was to arrive. His 28,000 men, thus dispersed over a line twenty-four leagues in extent, could offer no substantial resistance on any point and must be routed wherever the enemy should attack in force.

On the evening of the 8th Floreal (27th April), at the very moment the line of the Adda was forced, Scherer resigned to Moreau the command of the army. That excellent general had good reason to refuse it. He had been degraded to the rank of a simple divisionary, and now that the campaign was lost, that there was nothing but disasters to sustain, the command-in-chief was given to him. However, with a patriotic devotedness which history cannot too highly extol, he accepted discomfiture by accepting the command on the very evening the Adda was forced. Here commences the least eulogized but fairest portion of his life.

Suwarrov had approached the Adda upon several points. When the first Russian regiment appeared in sight of the bridge of Lecco, the carabineers of the brave 18th light infantry sallied from the intrenchments, and intrepidly confronted the soldiers who were described as such awful and invincible giants. They charged upon them with fixed bayonets and executed a prodigious slaughter. The Russians were repulsed. This success fired the French troops with exalted courage; they vowed to make the insolent barbarians, who had come so far to interfere in a quarrel wholly foreign to them, bitterly repent their journey. The nomination of Moreau also tended to exhilarate all hearts and inspire the army with confidence. Unfortunately, the position was no longer tenable. Suwarrov, repulsed at Lecco, succeeded in passing the Adda upon two points, at Brivio and Trezzo, above and below Serrurier's division, which formed the left. That division was thus cut off from the rest of the army. Moreau, with Grenier's division, commenced a furious combat at Trezzo, to repel the enemy beyond the Adda, and recover his communication with Serrurier. He engaged with eight or nine thousand men a body of more then twenty thousand. His soldiers, animated by his presence, performed prodigies of valour, but were unable to drive the enemy over the Adda. Unluckily, Serrurier, to whom it was impossible to send orders, had not the wit to move upon this identical point of Trezzo, where Moreau so obstinately contended to restore the communication with him. It was eventually found necessary to forego the endeavour and abandon Serrurier's division to its fate. It was surrounded by the whole hostile army, but fought with the tenacity of despair. Hemmed in at length on all sides, it was obliged to lay down its arms. Part of the division, through the hardihood and presence of mind of an officer, contrived to escape by the mountains into Piedmont. During this terrible conflict, Victor had fortunately retired to the rear with his division intact. Such was the fatal encounter called the battle of Cassano, fought on the 9th Floreal (28th April), which diminished the army to about 20,000 men.

It was with this diminutive force Moreau undertook to execute a retreat. This admirable commander lost not for an instant that calmness of mind with which nature had endowed him. Reduced to 20,000 soldiers, in presence of an army which might have been raised to 90,000, if its leaders had understood how to march in mass, he preserved his serenity unbroken. This composure was more commendable than that he displayed when he returned from Germany with a victorious army of 60,000 men; and yet it has been much less celebrated, so greatly do the accidents of passion influence the judgment of contemporaries.

His primary care was to cover Milan, in order to afford opportunity for removing the magazines and baggage, and also to give time to the members of the Cisalpine government and all the compromised Milanese to withdraw. Nothing is more dangerous for an army than fugitive families whom it is obliged to receive into its ranks. They embarrass its march, impede its movements, and may sometimes even endanger its safety. After passing two days at Milan, Moreau resumed his march to cross the Po. From the conduct pursued by Suwarrov, he might judge he would have leisure to take up a solid position. He had a twofold object to attain, namely, to cover his communications both with France and Tuscany, by which latter the army of Naples was advancing. To secure this important object, it appeared to him advisable to occupy the slope of the Genoese mountains, being the most favourable point. He marched in two columns: the one, escorting the magazines, the baggage, all the paraphernalia of the army, followed the high road from Milan to Turin; the other diverged upon Alessandria to occupy the routes to the riviera of Genoa. He executed this

march without being much incommoded by the enemy. Instead of falling with his victorious troops upon the enfeebled army of the French, and completely destroying it, Suwarrov stopped at Milan to have the honours of a triumph awarded him, by the priests, monks, nobles, and other creatures of Austria, who flocked in the wake of the allied army.

Moreau had ample time allowed him to arrive at Turin and send forward all his heavy baggage towards France. He manned the citadel, strove to stimulate the zeal of the partisans of the republic, and eventually moved to rejoin the column he had directed upon Alessandria. He there chose a position which evinced the perspicuity of his judgment. The Tanaro, falling from the Apennines, flows into the Po below Alessandria. Moreau planted himself at the conflux of these two rivers. Protected at once by both, he had not much to fear from a direct attack; and guarding at the same time all the routes to Genoa, he might here await the arrival of Macdonald. His position could not have been more happily selected. He occupied Casale, Valenza, and Alessandria; he had a chain of posts on the Po and the Tanaro, and his masses were disposed in such a manner that he might reach in a few hours the first point assailed. Here he consolidated himself then with 20,000 men, and awaited with imperturbable tranquillity the movements of his formidable enemy.

Suwarrov had, most auspiciously for the French, consumed much time in advancing. He had demanded from the Aulic Council that the Austrian corps of Bellegarde, acting in the Tyrol, should be placed at his disposition. This corps had accordingly descended into Italy, and augmented the combined army to upwards of 100,000 men. But Suwarrov, having injunctions to besiege simultaneously Peschiera, Mantua, and Pizzighitone, desiring at the same time to cover himself on the side of Switzerland, and ignorant moreover of the art of distributing masses, was unable to muster more than 40,000 under his immediate command, a force certainly quite sufficient wherewith to overwhelm Moreau, if he had only known how to manage it properly.

He appeared at length along the banks of the Po and the Tanaro, directly in front of Moreau. He established himself at Tortona, and there fixed his head-quarters. After some days' inaction, he finally resolved to make an attempt on Moreau's left wing; that is to say, on the side of the Po. A little above the confluence of the Po and the Tanaro, opposite Mugarone, occur some woody islands, under favour of which the Russians determined to attempt a passage. During the night of the 22d, 23d, Floreal (11th, 12th, May), they crossed to the number of nearly 2,000 into one of these islands, and thus found themselves over the principal stream. The branch which remained for them to clear was inconsiderable, and might be easily swam across. They boldly traversed it, and attained the right bank of the Po. The French, warned of the danger, hastened to the threatened post. Moreau, who was apprized of other demonstrations on the side of the Tanaro, paused until the real point of danger was clearly ascertained: when it was made certain he marched thither with his reserve, cut down and drove into the river all the Russians who had had the temerity to cross it. There were 2,500 of them killed, drowned, or captured.

This vigorous blow effectually assured the position of Moreau in the singular triangle he had shut himself within. But the inaction of the enemy disquieted him; he feared lest Suwarrov had merely left before Alessandria a simple detachment, and with the bulk of his forces had ascended the Po, in the view of moving upon Turin, and taking the position of the French in the rear, or otherwise had marched to meet Macdonald. In the uncertainty induced by Suwarrov's inertness, he resolved to act himself in order to ascertain the actual state of things. He proposed to debouch beyond Alessandria, and make a powerful reconnaissance. If it should turn out that the enemy had left before him only a detached corps, Moreau's design was to convert this reconnaissance into a serious attack, cut to pieces this detached corps, and then leisurely retire by the great road of La Bochetta, towards the mountains of Genoa, there to await Macdonald. If, on the contrary, he found the main body of the enemy, he purposed to fall back without delay, and regain in all haste the riviera of Genoa, by all the accessory communications remaining to him. One reason which above all decided him to adopt this step, was the insurrection of Piedmont on his rear. It behoved him to approximate towards his base with all possible speed.

Whilst Moreau was forming this very wise resolution, Suwarrov conceived one also wholly destitute of rationality. His position at Tortona was certainly the best he could hold, because it placed him between the two French armies, that of the Cisalpine and that of Naples. It was incumbent on him not to quit it on any account. Nevertheless he proposed to push part of his forces beyond the Po, ascend the river to Turin, seize that capital, organize the Piedmontese royalists, and force Moreau from his position. Nothing could be worse calculated than such a manœuvre; since, if he wished to force Moreau from his position he might have attempted a direct and vigorous attack, but never for any purpose whatsoever ought he to have abandoned the intermediate position between the two armies striving to effect a junction.

Consequently, whilst Suwarrov, dividing his forces, left a part in the vicinity of Tortona, along the Tanaro, and moved the remainder beyond the Po to march on Turin, Moreau executed the reconnaissance he had projected. He sent Victor's division in advance to attack the Russian corps in front of him. He held himself a little in the rear with all his reserve, ready to change his reconnaissance into a serious attack if he judged that the Russian corps might be overwhelmed. After a smart engagement, in which Victor's troops displayed a rare gallantry, Moreau concluded that the whole Russian army was before him; hence, he durst not attack at large for fear of drawing upon him an enemy too superior in force. In consequence, of the two plans he had intended to follow, he preferred the second as the safest. He, therefore, resolved to retire towards the mountains of Genoa. His position was very critical. All Piedmont was in revolt on his rear. A body of insurgents had taken possession of Ceva, which commanded the principal route, the only one accessible to artillery. The great convoy of objects of art collected in Italy was threatened with capture. These circumstances were singularly unfortunate. By taking the routes situated more backward, and which led to the riviera of Ponent, Moreau was afraid of removing too far from the communications with Tuscany, and leaving them exposed to the enemy, whom he supposed collected in mass around Tortona. In this perplexity he forthwith took his resolution and made the following dispositions. He detached Victor's division, without artillery or baggage, to proceed by paths practicable to infantry only to the mountains of Genoa. It was to hurry forward to occupy all the passages of the Apennines, with the view of joining the army coming from Naples, and reinforcing it in case it should be attacked by Suwarrov. Moreau, retaining only 8,000 men at the most, set out with his artillery, his cavalry, and all that could not pursue the paths through the mountains, to gain one of the carriage roads which are found behind Ceva, and which lead into the riviera of Ponent. In determining upon this concentric retreat he had another calculation in view; namely, that he would draw upon himself the hostile army,

and divert it from pursuing Victor, and falling foul of Macdonald.

Victor retired without accident by Acqui, Spigno, and Dego, and occupied the crests of the Apennines. Moreau, on his part, retreated with extraordinary celerity on Asti. The capture of Ceva, which formed his principal communication, placed him in extreme embarrassment. He forwarded the greatest part of his magazines by the pass of Fenestrella, preserved only the field artillery which was indispensable to him, and resolved to open a route through the Apennines by making his own soldiers construct one. After four days of incredible exertion, the road was rendered practicable for artillery, and Moreau passed into the riviera of Genoa, without having retrograded to the pass of Tende, which would have carried him too far from the troops of Victor detached towards Genoa.

Suwarrov, on learning the retreat of Moreau, caused him in all haste to be pursued; but he was unable either to divine or to prevent his refined combinations. Thus, through his consummate coolness and address, Moreau redeemed his 20,000 men without permitting them to be once entangled, but on the contrary checking the Russians wherever he encountered them. He had left a garrison of 3,000 men in Alessandria, and was now with nearly 18,000 in the environs of Genoa. He was seated on the crest of the Apennines awaiting the arrival of Macdonald. He had directed the division of Lapoype, the light infantry of Montrichard, and Victor's division, upon the Upper-Trebbia to be ready to join Macdonald. He himself remained in the vicinity of Novi with the residue of his mainbody. His plans for a junction were profoundly meditated. He might either draw the army of Naples to him by the shore of the Mediterranean, combine with it at Genoa, and debouch in company from La Bochetta, or otherwise cause it to debouch from Tuscany into the plains of Placenza, and on the banks of the Po. The first plan insured the junction, since it would be made under shelter of the Apennines, but then the Apennines must be again passed, and the enemy confronted to carry the plain. On the other hand, by debouching in front of Placenza, he became master of the plain up to the Po, could choose his field of battle on the very banks of that river, and, in the event of victory, drive the enemy into it. At the same time Moreau intended that Macdonald should keep his left closely abutting upon the mountains in order to link himself with Victor who was at Bobbio. For his own part he held Suwarrov in observation, ready to fall upon his flanks should he attempt to march against Macdonald. In this situation the junction appeared equally sure as behind the Apennines, and effected on far preferable ground.

At this precise period, it chanced that the Directory had succeeded in collecting a considerable naval force in the Mediterranean. Bruix, minister of the marine, had taken the command of the Brest fleet, raised the blockade of the Spanish squadron, and entered the Mediterranean with fifty sail of ships, in the hope of delivering it from the English, and restoring the communication with the army in Egypt. This long desired junction was, therefore, at length accomplished, and might become the means of re-establishing the French preponderance in the waters of the Levant. Bruix was at this moment before Genoa. His presence had the effect of operating beneficially on the spirit of the army. It was bruited that he brought supplies, munitions, and reinforcements. It was not so; but Moreau took advantage of the belief, and strove to give it credence. He encouraged the circulation of a rumour that the fleet had disembarked 20,000 men and considerable stores. This report emboldened the army and greatly abated the confidence of the enemy.

It was now the middle of Prairial (beginning of June). A fresh event had just occurred in Switzerland. We have seen that Massena occupied the line of the Limmat or of Zurich, and that the Archduke, debouching from the two extremities of Lake Constance, had approached to confront that line along its whole extent. He resolved to attack it between Zurich and Bruk; that is to say, between the lake of Zurich and the Aar, the entire length of the Limmat. Massena had taken position, not on the Limmat itself, but on a series of heights which rise in front of the Limmat, and cover at once both lake and river. He had intrenched these heights in the most formidable manner, and rendered them almost impregnable. Although this part of his line was the strongest, the Archduke had determined to assail it, because a long detour, to attempt an assault above the lake upon the line of the Lint, would have been attended with great danger. Massena might have profited by the opportunity to overwhelm the corps left before him, and thus obtain a decisive advantage.

The projected attack was executed on the 16th Prairial (4th June). It took place over the whole extent of the Limmat, and was everywhere victoriously repelled, despite the stubborn perseverance of the Austrians. But the Archduke, conceiving that such enterprises ought to be followed up, that there might be no fruitless sacrifices, recommenced the attack on the following day with similar pertinacity. Thereupon, Massena, reflecting that he might be forced, that in such case his retreat would become difficult, and that the line which he relinquished was immediately succeeded by one stronger, the chain of the Albis, which skirts on the farther margin the Limmat and the lake of Zurich, resolved to retire voluntarily. By this retreat he lost merely the town of Zurich, which he regarded as of little importance. The mountain-chain of the Albis, skirting the lake of Zurich and the Limmat to the Aar, and presenting moreover a continuous steep acclivity, was almost unassailable. In occupying it, the French made but a slight concession of ground, for they recoiled only the breadth of the lake and the river. Accordingly, Massena retired thither of his own accord, and without loss, and there established himself in a manner which stifled the lust of the Archduke to attack him.

The position of the French, therefore, was still almost the same in Switzerland. The Aar, the Limmat, the lake of Zurich, the Lint, and the Reuss, to the base of Mount St. Gothard, constituted their defensive line against the Austrians.

In Italy, Macdonald had at length emerged through Tuscany. He had left garrisons in Fort St. Elmo, in Capua, and in Gaeta, conformably to his instructions. It was a needless abandonment of troops incapable of sustaining the republican party, and whose loss weakened the active army. On retiring, the French left the city of Naples a prey to a royalist reaction, which rivalled in atrocity the most deplorable scenes of the French revolution. At Rome, Macdonald had picked up Garnier's division, comprising a few thousand men; in Tuscany he collected Gauthier's division, and in the Modenese the light corps under Montrichard. He had thus formed a mainbody of 28,000 men. He reached Florence on the 6th Prairial (25th May). So far his retreat had been effected with great rapidity and remarkable order. He unfortunately lost a good deal of time in Tuscany, and debouched beyond the Apennines, into the plains of Placenza, only towards the end of Prairial (the middle of June).

If he had debouched earlier he would have surprised the allies in such a state of dispersion that he might have successively overthrown them, and driven them beyond the Po. Suwarrov was at Turin, of which he had recently taken possession, and where he had seized immense supplies of military stores. Bellegarde was observing the approaches from Genoa,

and Kray beleaguering Mantua, the citadel of Milan, and the other fortresses. On no point were 30,000 Austrians or Russians concentrated. Macdonald and Moreau, debouching together with 50,000 men, might have reversed the fortune of the campaign. But Macdonald deemed it expedient to devote an interval of some days to the repose of his troops, and to the reorganization of the divisions he had gathered to his army. He thus permitted an inestimable opportunity to pass away, and gave Suwarrov time to retrieve his blunders. On learning Macdonald's approach, that Russian general hastily quitted Turin and marched with a reinforcement of 20,000 men, to plant himself between the two French generals and resume the position he ought never to have left. He ordered General Ott, who was in observation on the Trebbia in the vicinity of Placenza, to retire on him if he were attacked; he directed Kray to send him from Mantua all the troops he could spare; and, leaving to Bellegarde the task of observing Novi, whence Moreau was expected to debouch, he prepared to march in person into the plains of Placenza to meet Macdonald.

These are the only dispositions which, during the whole of this campaign, have gained Suwarrov the unqualified approbation of military men. The two French generals occupied the positions we have indicated. Both placed on the Apennines, they must descend from them to unite in the plains of Placenza: Moreau from Novi, Macdonald from Pontremoli. Moreau had dispatched Victor's division to reinforce Macdonald, and had stationed General Lapoype with a few battalions at Bobbio, on the slope of the mountains, to favour the junction. His purpose was to seize the moment when Suwarrov advanced against Macdonald to charge into his flank. But to that end it was necessary Macdonald should keep himself flanked by the mountains, and not give battle too far in the plain.

Macdonald broke ground about the end of Prairial (middle of June). Hohenzollern's corps, located in the vicinity of Modena, guarded the Lower-Po. He was overwhelmed by superior forces, lost 1,500 men, and narrowly escaped utter destruction. This first success encouraged Macdonald and induced him to hasten his march. Victor's division, which had now joined him, and increased his army to nearly 32,000 men, formed his vanguard. The Polish division of Dombrowski marched on the left of Victor's, Rusca's division flanking both. Although the bulk of the army, composed of the divisions under Montrichard, Olivier, and Watrin, was still in the rear, Macdonald, elated with the success he had obtained over Hohenzollern, resolved to crush Ott, who was in observation on the Tidona, and ordered Victor, Dombrowski, and Rusca to march against him without a moment's delay.

Three streams, flowing in parallel lines from the Apennines into the Po, formed the field of battle: these were the Nura, the Trebbia, and the Tidona. The main body of the French army was still on the Nura; the divisions of Victor, Drombrowski, and Rusca were advanced on the Trebbia, having orders to pass it and move on the Tidona, in order to overwhelm Ott, whom Macdonald believed without support. They marched on the 29th Prairial (17th June). At first they repulsed General Ott's vanguard from the banks of the Tidona, and obliged it to take up a position behind the river at the village of Sermetto. Ott was on the point of being overthrown, when Suwarrov arrived to his assistance with all his forces. He opposed General Bagration to Victor who was moving along the Po, pushed Ott on the centre against Dombrowski, and directed Melas to the right against Rusca. Bagration was not successful against Victor and was forced to retrograde; but in the centre, Suwarrov charged Dombrowski's division with the Russian infantry, poured upon its flank two regiments of cavalry, and broke it. Upon this event, Victor, who had advanced on the Po, found himself outflanked and compromised. Bagration, reinforced by grenadiers, resumed the offensive. The Russian cavalry, which had broken the Poles in the centre and thus outflanked Victor, charged him in flank and compelled him to retire. Rusca, on the right, was then constrained to yield the ground to Melas.

The three French divisions repassed the Tidona and retrograded on the Trebbia.

This first encounter, in which scarcely a third of the French army had been engaged against the whole army of the enemy, thus proved unfortunate. Macdonald, ignorant of Suwarrov's arrival, had been too hasty. He now resolved to establish himself behind the Trebbia, there unite all his divisions, and signally avenge the check he had sustained. Unhappily, the divisions of Olivier, Montrichard, and Watrin were still in the rear on the Nura, and he proposed to wait until the second day, namely, until the 1st Messidor (19th June), to renew the battle.

But Suwarrov left him no time to combine his forces, and prepared to attack the very day after, to wit, the 30th Prairial (18th June). The two armies were moving along the Trebbia, resting their wings on the Po and the Apennines. Suwarrov, judging correctly that the essential point was in the mountains, by which the two French armies were enabled to communicate, directed to that side his best infantry and cavalry. He turned Bagration's division, which was originally on his left along the Po, to his right against the mountains. He placed it with Schweikofsky's division under the command of Rosemberg, and ordered them both to cross the Trebbia at Rivalta, in the upper part of its course, with the view of detaching the French from the mountains. The divisions of Dombrowski, Rusca, and Victor were placed towards that point, on the left of the French line. Olivier and Montrichard's divisions were intended to be stationed in the centre, along the stream of the Trebbia. Watrin's division was designed for the right, towards the Po and Placenza.

On the morning of the 30th Prairial (18th June), the Russian outposts attacked the French outposts, which were beyond the Trebbia, at Casaliggio and Grignano, and drove them in. Macdonald, who had no expectation of being attacked, was engaged in bringing up into line his divisions of the centre. Victor, who commanded on the left, immediately transported all the French infantry over the Trebbia, and for a moment placed Suwarrov in great jeopardy. But Rosemberg, pushing forward with the division of Schweikofsky, recovered the advantage, and, after a furious combat, in which the slaughter was terrific on both sides, obliged the French to retire behind the Trebbia. In the meantime, Olivier and Montrichard's divisions arrived in the centre and Watrin's on the right, and a cannonade commenced along the whole line. After an exchange of a few shots, both sides desisted, reposing on the opposite banks of the Trebbia, which flowed between and separated the two armies.

Such was the second encounter. It had consisted in a mere conflict on the French left, a very terrible conflict indeed, but without result. Macdonald, now operating with his entire force, proposed to render the third encounter decisive. His plan was to pass the Trebbia on all points and outflank the two wings of the enemy. With this intention, Dombrowski's division was appointed to ascend the river as far as Rivalta and cross it above the Russians. Watrin's division was at the same time to clear it near its embouchure in the Po, and so gain the extreme left of the Russians. He reckoned likewise that Moreau, whose co-operation he had expected during the two previous days, would cor-

tainly enter on action this day at the latest. Such was the plan of Macdonald for the encounter of the 1st Messidor (19th June). But a horrible engagement took place during the night. A French detachment having traversed the bed of the Trebbia to take position, the Russians imagined themselves attacked and flew to arms. The French, in similar alarm, followed their example. The two armies became involved in a night-struggle, where, intermingled and in dire confusion, an indiscriminate slaughter was waged, without distinction of friends or foes. After a useless carnage, the generals succeeded in drawing off their soldiers into bivouack. On the morrow, both armies were so fatigued by three days' fighting and the disturbance of the night, that they did not enter on action until towards ten in the morning.

The battle commenced on the French right, upon the Upper-Trebbia. Dombrowski cleared the Trebbia and Rivalta in spite of the efforts of the Russians. Suwarrov detached Prince Bagration against him. This movement left Rosemberg's flanks uncovered. Victor and Rusca instantly profited by it to fall impetuously on him, pushing across the Trebbia. They advanced with success, and surrounded on all sides Schweikofsky's division, in which stood Suwarrov in person. They placed it in imminent danger; but it faced round in every direction and made a valiant defence. Bagration, spying its perilous condition, turned promptly back to the menaced point and compelled Victor and Rusca to give way. If Dombrowski, also seizing the occasion, had in his turn defiled on Bagration, the advantage would have continued with the French on that point, which was the most important of all, since it abutted on the mountains. Unfortunately he remained inactive, and Victor and Rusca were obliged to repass the Trebbia. In the centre, Montrichard had crossed the Trebbia at Grignano, Olivier at San-Nicolo. Montrichard marched against the corps under Forster, when the Austrian reserves, which Suwarrov had requested from Melas and which were then in the act of defiling on the rear of the field of battle, suddenly charged into the flanks of his division. It was taken by surprise, and the 5th Light, which had performed prodigies in a hundred fights, fled in disorder. Thus Montrichard likewise found himself obliged to repass the Trebbia. Olivier, who had met with success at San-Nicolo and had vigorously repulsed Ott and Melas, became uncovered by Montrichard's retreat. Thereupon Melas, countermanding the Austrian reserves, whose appearance had already thrown Montrichard's division into confusion, directed them on Olivier's division, which was forced in its turn to repass the Trebbia. In the meantime, Watrin's division, fruitlessly detached to the extreme right, where it found nothing to do, wound along the Po without being of any use in the battle. It was in like manner obliged to repass the Trebbia, following the general movement of retreat. Suwarrov, in constant dread of Moreau debouching on his rear, made great efforts during the rest of the day to force a passage over the Trebbia, but he was unable to succeed. The French opposed him along its entire course with invincible firmness, and this mountain-stream, the unconscious witness of so determined a struggle, again separated for the third time the two hostile armies.

Such was the third encounter or act of this sanguinary drama. Both armies were disorganized. They had each lost about 12,000 men. The majority of the generals were wounded. Whole regiments had been cut to pieces. But their respective situations were very different. Suwarrov was receiving reinforcements every day, and he had only to gain by the prolongation of the fight. Macdonald, on the contrary, had exhausted all his resources, and by persisting in the contest might be driven back in disorder into Tuscany. He preferred therefore to retire on the Nura, with the view of gaining Genoa behind the Apennines. He quitted the Trebbia on the 2d Messidor (20th June) at dawn. A despatch, in which he described to Moreau his desparate condition, having fallen into the hands of Suwarrov, the latter was transported with joy and hastened to pursue him to the death. Nevertheless, the retreat was executed with comparative order on the banks of the Nura. Unluckily, Victor's division, which had been constantly engaged in combat for four days, was at last broken and lost a number of prisoners. Macdonald had however time to gather his army beyond the Apennines, after sustaining a loss of fourteen or fifteen thousand men, in killed, wounded, and prisoners.

By good-fortune, Suwarrov, hearing the cannon of Moreau on his rear, was diverted from the pursuit of Macdonald. Moreau, whom insurmountable obstacles had prevented from putting himself in motion before the 30th Prairial (18th June), had eventually debouched from Novi, attacked Bellegarde, put him to rout, and took from him nearly 3,000 prisoners. But this tardy success was now, so to speak, abortive, having no other result than that of recalling Suwarrov and preventing him from satiating his ferocity on Macdonald.

The junction, then, from which such great results were expected, had led only to a bloody defeat, and occasioned between the two French generals recriminations which have never been fully brought to issue. Military men have reproached Macdonald with remaining too long in Tuscany, and moving his divisions too far from each other, insomuch that the divisions of Victor, Rusca, and Dombrowski were beaten two days in succession before the divisions under Montrichard, Olivier, and Watrin were in line; with attempting, on the day of battle, to outflank the two wings of the enemy, instead of directing his principal effort on his left towards the Upper-Trebbia; with keeping too far distant from the mountains, so as not to permit Lapoype, who was at Bobbio, to come to his assistance; lastly, and chiefly, with having been in too great a hurry to give battle, as if he desired to monopolize all the honour of the victory. On the other hand, military men, approving the plan artistically combined by Moreau, have urged against him but one reproach, namely, that of not having cast aside all complaisance towards an old comrade, taken the direct command of the two armies, and more especially commanded in person at the Trebbia. Whatever justice there may be in these allegations, it is certain that Moreau's plan, if executed as conceived, would have saved Italy. It was utterly foiled by the battle of the Trebbia. Fortunately, Moreau was still there to collect the remains of the French, and prevent Suwarrov from profiting by his great superiority. The campaign had been opened but three months, and, excepting in Switzerland, the French had experienced an unbroken series of reverses. The battle of Stockach had caused them to lose Germany; the battles of Magnano and the Trebbia robbed them of Italy. Massena alone, firm as a rock, still occupied Switzerland along the chain of the Albis. It is not to be forgotten however, amidst these cruel visitations, that the courage of the French soldiers had been as indomitable and brilliant as in the most auspicious days of victory; and that Moreau had approved himself a true patriot and a great captain, and had heroically interposed to save the armies of Italy from annihilation by Suwarrov at a single blow.

These last disasters supplied fresh weapons of accusation to the enemies of the Directory, and aroused against it a redoubled storm of invective. The fear of an invasion began to haunt imagination. The southern and alpine departments, lying first exposed to the inroad of the Austro-Russians, were in a state

of great excitement. The towns of Grenoble, Chambery, and Orange sent addresses to the legislative body, which caused an extraordinary sensation. Yet they merely embodied the groundless aspersions which for two months had circulated in all quarters; they recurred to the pillage of the conquered countries, the peculations of the companies, the privations of the armies, the ministry of Scherer, his generalship, the injustice manifested towards Moreau, the arrest of Championnet, &c. "Why," they asked, "have honest conscripts been obliged to return to their homes on account of the destitution in which they were left? Why have all the malversations remained unpunished? Why was the incapable Scherer, proclaimed as a traitor by Hoche, retained so long in the ministry at war? Why was he enabled to consummate as general the evils he had prepared as minister? Why are names dear to victory superseded by names unknown? Why is the conqueror of Rome and Naples under impeachment?"

The real value of such reproaches we have already learnt to appreciate. But the addresses which contained them were awarded the honour of being printed, specially noticed commendably, and referred to the consideration of the Directory. This manner of receiving them sufficiently demonstrated the dispositions of the two Councils. They could not, in truth, be more hostile. The constitutional opposition had coalesced with the patriot opposition. The first was composed of the personally ambitious who aspired to form a new government, and of the officious and importunate who were incensed that their counsels or recommendations had not been heeded; the latter comprised the patriots excluded by the secessions from the legislative body or reduced to silence by the law of the 19th Fructidor, all equally desiring the ruin of the existing government. These affirmed that the Directory had at once misgoverned and misdefended France, and had violated the freedom of elections, the liberty of the press, and the independence of popular societies. They denounced it as both weak and violent, and even recurred to the 18th Fructidor; saying that, having paid no respect to the laws on that day, it could not now invoke them in its favour..

The nomination of Sieyes to the Directory had been a chief incitement to these dispositions. The elevation to the Directory of a man who had never ceased to regard the directorial constitution as vicious, and who had for that very reason previously refused to be a director, indicated a certain consciousness that some change was desirable. The acceptance of Sieyes, which was doubted on account of his former refusal, only tended to confirm this impression.

The malcontents of every hue, who fostered notions of change, gathered around Sieyes. He, Sieyes, was far from an able party-leader; he had neither the fitting character at once designing, supple, and daring, nor in sooth the ambition; but through his fame numbers flocked as it were to his standard. It was notorious that he viewed with a censorious eye both the constitution and the government; and he seemed thus courted to encourage him to subvert the system. Barras, who had the art to get his long continuance in the Directory overlooked, through his relations and intrigues with all parties, cultivated the good graces of Sieyes, and succeeded in forming an alliance with him by a base desertion of his colleagues. Around these two directors therefore rallied all the enemies of the Directory. The party was anxious to obtain the support of some young general of high reputation, who enjoyed, like many others, the credit of being a victim of the government. The position of Joubert, on whom great expectations were founded, and who was without employment since his supercession, fixed attention upon him. He was about to ally himself with M. de Sémonville by marrying a certain demoiselle de Montholon. He was brought into communion with Sieyes; the appointment of general of the 17th military division was conferred upon him, and every effort used to constitute him the chief of the new coalition.

Fundamental changes were not as yet contemplated; it was merely intended at first to gain possession of the government, and save France from the danger of an invasion, postponing constitutional projects to a period when all perils should be passed. The primary object to compass was the removal of the older members of the Directory. Sieyes' nomination was but a fortnight old; he had only succeeded Rewbell on the 1st Prairial. Barras had timeously crouched to the storm as we know. Hence animosity was concentrated on Larévellière, Merlin, and Treilhard, all three wholly guiltless of the delinquencies charged against the government.

They possessed the majority, however, being three in a body of five, but it was proposed to render their exercise of authority impracticable. On their part, these three directors had resolved to evince the greatest consideration for Sieyes, and even to treat his testiness with forbearance, to avoid aggravating the difficulties of the position by those which personal contests might create. But Sieyes proved intractable; he found everything wrong, and doubtless in perfect good-faith; but he expressed himself in a manner to show he would not concert with his colleagues to amend any evil. Somewhat infatuated with what he had witnessed in the country he had lately visited, he repeated pretty constantly to them: "It is not so things are managed in Prussia." "Pray teach us then," observed his colleagues in reply, "how things are managed in Prussia; enlighten us with your counsel, assist us to act for the best." "You would not understand me," Sieyes retorted; "it is useless my exhorting you; proceed as you have been accustomed to do."

Whilst internal dissension thus took root within the Directory itself, vehement attacks were made upon it from without on the part of the two Councils. On the subject of the finances an open rupture occurred. A deficiency had arisen, as we have stated, from two causes, the tardiness of payments, and the unproductiveness of assumed sources. Out of 400 millions already dispensed in charges incurred, only 216 millions had been actually received. The decrease upon the estimate of products amounted, according to Ramel, to 67 and even to 75 millions. As the aggregate of this deficit was still contested, he published in the Moniteur an explict denial to the statements of the deputy Génissieux, and proved his own to be correct. But what avail proofs at certain moments? The minister and the government were not the less assailed with invectives; it was not the less repeated that they were ruining the state and only demanding fresh funds to supply the means of fresh malversations. However, the force of evidence compelled a supplementary grant. A duty upon salt had been refused; to supply its place, an additional ten per cent. was laid upon all the taxes, whilst that upon doors and windows was again doubled. But it was of little use to impose taxes; the more essential point was to insure their receipt by appropriate laws for their assessment and collection. These laws were suffered to remain unpassed. In vain the minister urged their discussion; they were constantly postponed, and his pressing instances answered by cries of treachery, robbery, and so forth.

Besides the dispute upon the finances, another was originated upon a different subject. Earlier, reclamations had arisen touching certain articles of the law of the 19th Fructidor, which invested the Directory with power to close clubs and suppress journals by a simple ordinance. A project of law had been then ordered upon the press and popular

societies, framed to modify the law of the 19th Fructidor, and to deprive the Directory of the arbitrary authority with which it was clothed. Complaints were likewise enforced against the faculty that law conferred upon the Directory to banish at pleasure suspected priests and erase emigrants from the list. The patriots themselves manifested a disposition to abolish this dictatorship, hurtful only as it was to their adversaries. The discussion upon the press and popular societies was first commenced. The project introduced was the work of Berlier. The debate opened in the beginning of Prairial (middle of June). The advocates of the Directory, amongst whom were distinguished Chénier, Bailleul, Creuzé-Latouche, and Lecointe-Puyraveau, argued that the dictatorship granted to the Directory by the law of the 19th Fructidor, although formidable in ordinary times, was of indispensable necessity under actual circumstances. It was not, they contended, in a moment of extreme peril that the prerogatives of the government should be curtailed. The dictatorship bestowed upon it on the morrow of the 18th Fructidor was become essential to it, not against the royalist faction, but against the anarchical faction, equally to be dreaded with the former and secretly allied with it. The disciples of Babœuf, they added, were reappearing on all sides, and menacing the republic with a fresh envelopment.

The patriots, who abounded in the Council of Five-Hundred, replied with their wonted vehemence to the arguments of the directorial partisans.—It was necessary, they asserted, to give an impulse to France, to restore to it the energy of 1793, which the Directory had completely stifled by fastening upon it an oppressive yoke. All patriotism would be extinguished unless clubs were opened, and freedom restored to the patriotic journals. "It is in vain," they added, "you accuse the patriots, in vain you affect to dread an insurrection on their part. What have these much traduced patriots done? For three years they have been murdered, proscribed, without a country, in the republic they have powerfully contributed to found, and which they have mainly defended. What crimes have you to upbraid them with? Have they reacted against the reacters? No. They are exaggerated, turbulent; be it so. But are these crimes? They talk, they clamour even, if you wish it; but they do not assassinate, and every day they are assassinated."—Such was the language of Briot du Doubs, of the Corsican Arena, and of numerous others.

The members of the constitutional opposition expressed themselves differently. They were naturally more moderate. They adopted the measured deliberative tone, but withal the caustic and dogmatic. It was expedient, in their view, to recur to principles too much neglected, and to restore liberty to the press and popular societies. The dangers of Fructidor had perhaps justified a momentary dictatorship in the Directory, but this dictatorship confided in trust, how had it been used? It was only necessary to ask parties, said Boulay de la Meurthe. Although all entertaining discordant views, royalists, patriots, constitutionalists were agreed in declaring that the Directory had misused omnipotence. Such concord, amongst men so opposed in principles and views, could leave no doubt, and the Directory stood unequivocally condemned. So spoke the constitutionalists.

Thus the incensed patriots bewailed oppression; the constitutionalists, in the fulness of their pretensions, denounced misgovernment. All coalesced, however, and the articles of the law of the 19th Fructidor relative to journals and popular societies were rescinded. This was an important victory over the Directory, which was sure to lead to a furious inundation of periodical prints and revived associations of Jacobins.

The excitement continued to increase during the progress of Prairial. The most sinister rumours circulated in all quarters. The new coalition, meanwhile, had resolved to employ those identical tactics in vogue with oppositions under representative governments to compel a ministry to resign. Embarrassing and accumulated questions, threats of impeachment, all were put in requisition. These means are so natural, that, even without practice in the ways of representative government, the native instinct of party infallibly prompts to their adoption.

The committees of expenditure, of funds, and of war, appointed by the Five-Hundred to inquire into those various matters, combined and voted a message to the Directory. Boulay de la Meurthe was charged with the report, and presented it on the 15th Prairial On his motion, the Council of Five-Hundred addressed to the Directory a message in which it requested to be informed of the causes of the internal and external dangers which threatened the republic, and of the means which existed for meeting them. Demands of this nature have usually no other effect than to extort avowals of weakness, and to compromise still more the government from which they are wrung. A government, we repeat, must succeed; to oblige it to acknowledge that it has not succeeded is to force from it the most fatal of all confessions. To this message were added numberless motions of order, all having an analogous aim. They had reference to the right of forming popular societies, to individual liberty, to the responsibility of ministers, to the duplication of accounts, &c. &c.

On receiving the message in question, the Directory determined to return a circumstantial answer, tracing the course of events, and explaining the means it had taken, and those it still proposed to take, in order to rescue France from the crisis in which it was involved. A reply of this nature required the co-operation of all the ministers, so that each might furnish his particular report. Several days at least were requisite to digest it; but this was far from agreeable to the leaders of the Councils. They had no desire for an exact and faithful account of the state of France; what they wanted were prompt and embarrassing avowals. Accordingly, after waiting for a few days, the three committees which had suggested the message submitted to the Five-Hundred a new proposition through the medium of the deputy Poulain-Grand-Pré. He presented his report on the 28th Prairial (16th June). It recommended the Five-Hundred to declare themselves permanent until the Directory had replied to the message of the 15th. The proposal was adopted. This step was tantamount to a proclamation of danger, and announced some near catastrophe. The Five-Hundred communicated their resolution to the Ancients, with a solicitation to do likewise. The Ancients in truth imitated the example, and also constituted themselves permanent. The three committees of expenditure, funds, and war, being too numerous, were condensed into a single committee, composed of eleven members, and delegated to frame measures suited to the emergency.

The Directory intimated, on its part, that it would likewise remain in permanent diet to accelerate the report demanded from it. We may conceive the agitation that must necessarily result from these determinations. Rumours of the most alarming character were as usual widely disseminated. The opponents of the Directory proclaimed that it meditated a new *coup d'etat*, and intended to dissolve the Councils. Its partisans asserted, on the other hand, that there was a coalition formed by the different parties to overthrow by violence the constitution. On neither side were any such schemes contemplated. The coalition of the two oppositions was cemented solely by the common desire to supplant the three obnoxious directors. A preliminary measure was adopted

to accomplish this object. The constitution prescribed that a director entering on office should have quitted the legislature a whole year previously. It was now remembered that Treilhard, who had sat thirteen months in the Directory, had left the legisture on the 30th Floreal year V., and been elected to the Directory on the 26th Floreal year VI. Four days, therefore, were wanting to the required period. The objection was truly flimsy and frivolous, for the irregularity was covered by the silence observed respecting it during two sessions, and besides, Sieyes himself was in the same predicament. Nevertheless, the committee of eleven instantly proposed to annul Treilhard's nomination. The decree of abrogation was passed on the same day, the 28th, and signified to the Directory.

Treilhard was rough and abrupt in manners, but totally destitute of corresponding firmness. He was disposed to yield. Larévellière-Lepeaux was in a very different frame of mind. That upright and disinterested man, to whom his functions were a burden, who had accepted them only from a sense of duty, and who offered vows every year that fortune would restore him to privacy, was resolute to retain office as soon as the allied factions seemed inclined to exact its surrender. He considered that they could wish to expel the old directors only for the purpose of abolishing the constitution of the year III.; and that Sieyes, Barras, and the Bonaparte family, concurred in one aim with wholly discordant views, but all equally detrimental to the republic. In this persuasion he was unwilling that the old directors should abandon their post. Consequently he hastened to Treilhard and urged him to resist. "With Merlin and me," he said, "you will form the majority, and we will refuse to execute this resolution of the legislative body, as illegal, seditious, and extorted by a faction." Treilhard, however, had not courage to follow this advice, but forthwith sent his resignation to the Council of Five-Hundred.

Although the majority was thus lost, Larévellière determined nevertheless to refuse his abdication if it were demanded. The leaders of the Five-Hundred first took the precaution of supplying a successor to Treilhard. Sieyes would have had a person named devoted to him; but his influence on this occasion was disregarded. The election fell on an ex-advocate of Rennes, actual president of the tribunal of Cassation, and known to adhere rather to the patriot than to the constitutional opposition. This was Gohier, an honest citizen and earnest republican, but of slender abilities and profoundly ignorant of men and things. He was nominated on the 29th Prairial, and appointed to be installed on the following day.

The exclusion of Trielhard merely tended to whet the desire of tearing Larévellière and Merlin from the Directory. The patriots especially were furious against Larévellière; in their wrath they called to mind that, although stern and rigid, he had never been a mountaineer, that he had often since the 9th Thermidor contended against their party, and that in the previous year he had encouraged the system of secessions. They threatened accordingly to put him under impeachment, both him and Merlin, if they delayed to abdicate their functions. Sieyes was deputed to make a preliminary overture, with the view of inducing them to succumb voluntarily to the storm.

On the evening of the 29th, the day of Treilhard's retirement, Sieyes proposed a private meeting of the four directors in Merlin's apartments. They assembled there at the appointed hour. Barras, as if he anticipated danger, came with his sword by his side and retained an unbroken silence. Sieyes opened the conference in evident perplexity, preluding with a lengthy exordium touching the faults and blunders of the government, and fencing obscurely with the real object of the meeting. At length Larévellière calmly besought him to explain himself with clearness.—"Your friends," replied Sieyes, "and those of Merlin, recommend you both to tender your resignations." Larévellière inquired who those considerate friends were. Sieyes was unable to name one entitled to the least respect or confidence. Larévellière thereupon addressed him in the language of a man indignant at finding the Directory betrayed by its own members, and abandoned by them to the plots of the factious. He showed that his conduct and that of his colleagues had been irreproachable, and that the delinquencies ascribed to them were a mere tissue of calumnies; he then directly attacked Sieyes on his secret schemes, and covered him with confusion by his forcible apostrophes. Barras, during the whole of the time, observed a gloomy silence. His position was embarrassing, for he alone had merited the imputations so profusely charged upon his colleagues. To urge their resignation for faults they had not committed, and of which he was solely guilty, would have been too grotesque. He therefore was silent. The interview terminated without result. Merlin, who lacked decision to act for himself, declared he would follow the example of Larévellière.

Barras imagined the device of employing an intermediary to obtain the abdication of his colleagues. He applied with this view to an old Girondist, Bergoeng, whom a taste for pleasures brought into his society. He charged him to wait on Larévellière and beseech him to divest himself of the obnoxious dignity. Bergoeng, accepting the mission, came to Larévellière in the gloom of night, appealed to the long friendship which united them, and inculcated every argument to shake his resolution. He assured him that Barras loved and honoured him, and regarded his removal as iniquitous, but that he conjured him to yield in order to escape an inevitable outrage. Larévellière remained inflexible. He replied that Barras was the dupe of Sieyes, Sieyes of Barras, and that both were duped by the Bonapartes; adding that the ruin of the republic was designed, but that he would resist to his last gasp.

On the morrow, the 30th, Gohier was to be installed. The four directors were assembled; all the ministers were present. When the installation was completed, and the orations of the president and the new director were duly delivered, the subject of the eve was revived. Barras requested to speak in private with Larévellière; they retired into an adjoining chamber. Barras renewed towards his colleague the same instances, the same caressing flatteries, but found him equally partinacious. He returned sufficiently disconcerted with his failure, and keenly apprehensive of any discussion regarding the acts of the Directory, which could by no means redound to his credit or advantage. He rose to speak, and not venturing to assail Larévellière, he declaimed against Merlin, whom he heartily detested, drew a description of him the most ludicrous and false, and depicted him as a braggart bully, planning, with a gang of scape grace cut-throats, to execute a *coup d'etat* against his colleagues and the Councils. Larévellière, rushing to the rescue of Merlin, immediately replied and exposed the gross absurdity of such charges. Nothing assuredly could be more dissimilar than this portrait of the meek jurisconsult Merlin. Larévellière proceeded to unfold the history of the whole directorial administration, dwelling upon it in detail to enlighten the ministers and the entering director. Barras sat during this recital in painful confusion; he at length started to his feet, exclaiming: "So be it! it is done; swords are drawn!"—"Wretch!" Larévellière retorted with sternness, "what dost thou say of swords? There are but knives here, and they are directed against blameless men, whose throats you would cut, since you cannot induce them to commit a weakness!"

Gohier then attempted to interpose as mediator, but was unable to succeed. At this moment, several members of the Ancients and of the Five-Hundred having taken concert together, appeared to entreat the two directors to yield, promising that no act of impeachment should be exhibited against them. Larévellière answered proudly that he asked no favour, that they might impeach him and he would defend himself. The deputies, who had volunteered this mission, then returned to the two Councils and occasioned an egregious ferment by a narrative of what had occurred. Boulay de la Meurthe rose to denounce Larévellière, acknowledging his probity, but reviling him for projects of a new religion and inveighing bitterly against his waywardness, which, he said, threatened to ruin the republic. The patriots gave vent to most intemperate exclamations, and vociferated that since they persisted, no mercy should be shown to the two recusant directors.

The excitement grew to a fearful height, and the struggle being once fairly commenced, it was impossible to determine to what extremities it might lead. In this conjuncture sundry moderate men of the two Councils entered into consultation, and agreed that, in order to avoid some pitiable catastrophe, it was absolutely essential to prevail on Larévellière to succumb. They repaired to his residence during the evening of the 30th, and besought him, in the name of the dangers which beset the republic, to resign his office. They assured him they were all exposed to the utmost peril, and that if he persevered in his resistance they knew not to what extravagance the fury of the parties might be goaded.—"But do you not perceive," Larévellière replied to them, "the greater peril the republic incurs? Do you not see that it is not against you intentions are harboured, but against the Constitution? that in yielding to-day, it becomes incumbent to yield to-morrow, continually, and that the republic will be lost through our weakness?—My functions," he added, "are burdensome to me; and if I am obstinate in now retaining them, it is because I deem it a duty to oppose an insurmountable barrier to the plots of the factious. However, if you all believe that my resistance will expose you to danger, I will surrender; but, I forewarn you, the republic is lost. A single individual cannot save it; I yield therefore, since I remain alone, and I give you my resignation."

He framed it in the course of the night. He accompanied it with a letter, simple and dignified in style, expressive of his motives. Merlin solicited permission to copy it, and the two resignations were forwarded together. Thus was the old Directory dissolved. All the factions it had successively laboured to repress ultimately combined to overpower it, their resentment concentrated on a common object. It was guilty only of one fault, that of being weaker than its enemies; a signal fault, it is true, and one which necessitates the fall of a government.

Notwithstanding the general exasperation, Larévellière carried with him the esteem of all enlightened citizens. On quitting the Directory he declined to receive the hundred thousand francs which his colleagues had agreed to give retiring members; he even rejected the portion to which he was entitled of savings upon their appointments, and left behind him the carriage it was usual for an ex-director to take with him. He withdrew to Andilly, to a small mansion he possessed at that place, where he received the visits of all the eminent men whom the wrath of parties failed to intimidate. The minister Talleyrand was in the number of those who visited the fallen director in his retreat.

CHAPTER LXI.

FORMATION OF THE NEW DIRECTORY.—MOULINS AND ROGER-DUCOS SUCCEED LAREVELLIERE AND MERLIN.—LEVY OF ALL THE CLASSES OF CONSCRIPTS.—FORCED LOAN OF ONE HUNDRED MILLIONS.—FRESH MILITARY PLANS.—RESUMPTION OF OPERATIONS IN ITALY.—JOUBERT GENERAL-IN-CHIEF.—BATTLE OF NOVI AND DEATH OF JOUBERT.—DEBARKATION OF THE ANGLO-RUSSIANS IN HOLLAND.—NEW TROUBLES IN THE INTERIOR; ARREST OF ELEVEN JOURNALISTS; MOTION TO DECLARE THE COUNTRY IN DANGER.

Years assuage party-spirit, but many are needed to extinguish it. Passions expire only with the hearts in which they blazed. An entire generation must disappear ere the assumptions of parties subside into legitimate claims, and time can operate between them a fair and reasonable compromise. But before that period arrives, parties are ungovernable by the sole influence of reason. The government which would address them in the language of justice and the laws soon becomes insupportable to them, and the more moderate it is, the more they despise it as weak and impotent. Should it, finding faction deaf to its voice, seek to employ force, it is pronounced tyrannical, reviled as adding iniquity to weakness. Apart from the effects of time, a strong despotism alone can curb exasperated factions. The Directory was that legal and moderate government which endeavoured to impose the restraint of laws upon the parties the revolution had produced, and which so many years had not yet tamed. They all coalesced, as we have just witnessed, on the 30th Prairial, to effect its downfall. The common enemy overthrown, they stood in presence of each other without any rein to guide them. We shall see how they used their license.

The constitution, although no longer but a phantom, was not abolished, and it was requisite to replace, by some shadow of an executive, the dissolved Directory. Gohier had superseded Treilhard; successors were to be found to Larévellière and Merlin. Roger-Ducos and Moulins were chosen. Roger-Ducos was an old Girondist, of upright character, but very moderate capacity, and wholly devoted to Sieyes. He owed his nomination, indeed, to the influence of Sieyes in the Council of Ancients. Moulins was an obscure general, formerly engaged in La Vendée, a zealous and virtuous republican, elected, like Gohier, through the sway of the patriot party. Other men of note, both civil and military, had been put in nomination but rejected. From such selections it was evident the parties were not disposed to give themselves masters. They had raised to the Directory only those mediocre personages usually charged with *interim* governments.

The new Directory, composed like the Councils of opposite parties, was necessarily weaker and less homogeneous than the preceding. Sieyes, the only superior man among the five directors, dreamed, as we know, of a reformed political organization. He was the chief of the party which designated itself the moderate or constitutional, all the members whereof nevertheless upheld the necessity of a new constitution. He had no attached colleague but Roger-Ducos. Moulins and Gohier, both warm patriots, and incompetent to conceive anything but what existed, supported the actual constitution, but desired to execute and interpret it in the sense of the patriots. As to Barras, naturally occupying the position of arbiter between them, who could rely on him? The chaos of conflicting vices, passions, interests, and ideas which the expiring republic presented, found in him alone a living emblem.

The majority, depending on his vote, was therefore committed to hazard.

Sieyes told his new colleagues pretty roundly that they assumed the direction of a government threatened with a speedy fall, but that the republic must be saved if the constitution could not. This language highly displeased Gohier and Moulins, and was received by them in dudgeon. So, from the first day, opinions seemed in little unison. Sieyes held the same language to Joubert, the general sought to be entrapped in the re-organizing party. But Joubert, a veteran of the army of Italy, partook its political sentiments; he was a stanch patriot, and the views of Sieyes appeared to him suspicious. He opened himself in secret to Gohier and Moulins, and thenceforth manifestly sided with them. But, in truth, these were questions which could only come hereafter under discussion. The urgent and immediate point was to administer and defend the menaced republic. Intelligence of the battle of the Trebbia, universally diffused, had thrown all men into alarm. Decisive measures for the public safety were become indispensable.

The first care of a government is to do precisely the reverse of its predecessor, were it merely in deference to the passions which have insured its triumph. Championnet, the much-vaunted hero of Naples, Joubert, and Bernadotte, were now destined to emerge from prison or disgrace to fill the highest employments. Championnet was immediately set at liberty, and named general of a new army proposed to be formed along the Great-Alps. Bernadotte was intrusted with the portfolio of the minister of war. Joubert was deputed to command the army of Italy. His achievements in the Tyrol, his youth, and his heroic character, all tended to inspire the most exalted hopes. The re-organizers wished him sufficient success and glory to enable him to promote their schemes. The selection of Joubert was very good doubtless, but it was a fresh injustice to Moreau, who had so generously accepted the command of a defeated army, and saved it with such consummate ability. But Moreau was distasteful to the zealous patriots, who predominated at the moment. He was assigned the command of a pretended army of the Rhine which had no existence.

There were, moreover, sundry changes in the ministry. Ramel, the minister of finance, who had rendered eminent services since the installation of the Directory, and who had officiated during the difficult transition from paper-money to specie, was involved in the odium attached to the old Directory. He was so virulently assailed that, despite the esteem they entertained for him, the new directors were constrained to accept his resignation. They appointed as his successor a man dear to the patriots, and respectable with all parties: Robert Lindet, formerly member of the committee of public welfare, so indecently attacked during the reaction. He strenuously opposed the offer of a portfolio: the experience he had learnt of the injustice of parties was little calculated to induce his resumption of public life. He eventually consented, however, from a spirit of devotion to the republic.

The diplomacy of the Directory had been equally censured with its financial administration. It was accused of having replunged the republic in war with all Europe; most wrongly so, especially if we consider who were the accusers. They were, in fact, the patriots themselves, whose own passions had mainly contributed to stir afresh the embers of war. They reproached the Directory more particularly with the expedition to Egypt, primarily so extolled, and contended that this expedition had provoked the rupture with the Porte and Russia. The minister Talleyrand, already disagreeable to the patriots as an ex-emigrant, had incurred all the responsibility of this diplomacy, and was so hotly denounced hat it became necessary to act with him as with-Ramel, and accept his resignation. The successor assigned him was a Wurtemberger, who, under the cloak of German hilarity, concealed a remarkable acumen, and whom M. de Talleyrand himself recommended as the man most capable of taking his place. This was M. Reinhard. It has been said that this appointment was only provisional, and that M. Reinhard held it merely until M. de Talleyrand could be reinstated. The ministry of justice was taken from Lambrechts on account of his health, and conferred on Cambaceres. In the ministry of police was installed Bourguignon, an ex-magistrate, a sincere and honest patriot. Fouché, the ex-jacobin, so supple, so insinuating, whom Barras had interested in the traffic of the companies, and afterwards provided with the embassy to Milan, Fouché, cashiered on account of his conduct in Italy, also passed for a victim of the late Directory. He must, therefore, participate in the triumph awarded to all the victims, real or pretended; he was delegated to the Hague.

Such were the principal changes made in the departments of government and in the armies. The mere change of men availed little; the more essential point was to furnish them with additional capabilities of accomplishing the task, under the weight of which their predecessors had succumbed. The patriots, intent, as usual with them, on revolutionary expedients, maintained that great evils must be met by great remedies. They recurred to the urgent measures of 1793. After having refused all aid to the late Directory, they were content to lavish every resource on the present; they proposed to place in its hands extraordinary means, and compel it to use them too. The committee of eleven, formed from the three committees of expenditure, funds, and war, and charged, during the crisis of Prairial, to devise the means of saving the republic, conferred with the members of the Directory, and digested with them different measures conformable to the dispositions of the moment. Instead of 200,000 men, drawn from the five classes of conscripts, the Directory was empowered to call out the whole of the classes. Instead of the taxes propounded by the late Directory and repudiated with such asperity, a forced loan was again resorted to. Agreeably to the system of the patriots it was to be made progressive, that is to say, in lieu of making each person contribute according to the amount of his direct taxes, which would have at once constituted the lists of property and personal contributions the basis of assessment, each would be obliged to contribute according to his fortune. In that case a taxing jury was requisite, or, in other words, an ambulatory commission to assess wealth. The middle party opposed this project, alleging it to be a revival of the system of terror, and foreboding that the difficulty of assessment would render the measure inefficacious and null, as in the instance of the old forced loans. The patriots replied that the expenses of the war must be thrown, not upon all classes, but upon the rich alone. The same passions, we see, always employ the same reasons. The forced and progressive loan was decreed; it was fixed at one hundred millions, and declared redeemable in national domains.

Besides these measures for recruiting the armies and the finances, the adoption of some police regulation had become indispensable for the suppression of *chouannerie* in the South, and in the departments of the West, the former theatres of civil war. Fresh depredations and atrocities had been commenced in those quarters; the purchasers of national property, reputed patriots, and public functionaries, were assassinated, and the diligences were stopped and plundered. Among the perpetrators of these enormities were several Vendeans and Chouans, many members of the famous companies of the Sun, and also numer-

ous refractory conscripts. Although these brigands, whose presence announced a species of social dissolution, had pillage for their real object, yet it was clear, from the selection of their victims, that they had a political origin or bias. A committee was named to concoct a system of repression. It produced a law, which was called the law of hostages, and has remained celebrated under that name. As the greater part of these crimes was attributed to the relatives of emigrants or ex-nobles, it was in consequence proposed to oblige them to give hostages. Whenever a commune was certified to be in a notorious state of disorder, the relations or connections of emigrants, the ex-nobles, the parents and ascendants of individuals known to form part of the gangs, were considered as hostages, and as civilly and personally responsible for the offences committed. The central administrations were to designate the individuals marked as hostages, and cause them to be incarcerated in houses selected for the purpose. There they were to live at their own expense, and as it behoved them, remaining shut up during the continuance of the disorder. When the delinquencies reached the height of murder, four hostages were to be banished for every assassination. All that might be urged for or against such a law is easily conceived. It afforded, argued its partisans, the only mode of reaching the authors of the disorders, and this mode was mild and humane. It constituted, retorted its adversaries, a new law of the suspected, a revolutionary law, which, in the incapacity to reach the true culprits, smote indiscriminately, and inflicted all the injustices attendant upon laws of that nature. In a word, *pro* and *con* the same arguments were repeated which we have so often had occasion to quote in the course of this history touching revolutionary laws. But an insuperable objection existed against this measure beyond all others. These brigands springing solely from an actual social dissolution, the only fitting remedy lay in a vigorous reorganization of the state, and not in measures utterly discredited, and which were incapable of imparting any force to the springs of government.

The law was passed after a warm discussion, during which the parties that had for a moment combined to supplant the old Directory, separated amid a blaze of invective. To these important measures, designed to arm the government with revolutionary powers, others were added tending, in different respects, to curtail its prerogative. These accessory measures were a consequence of the reproaches levelled against the late Directory. To prevent secessions for the future, it was decreed that the return of every electoral fraction should be void; that every agent of the government seeking to influence elections should be punished as for a crime against the sovereignty of the people; that the Directory should not bring troops within the constitutional radius without an express authority; that no military officer could be deprived of his grade without the decision of a court-martial; that the privilege granted to the Directory of issuing warrants of arrest could no longer be delegated to agents; that no person in government employment, or any functionary whatsoever, could be either a contractor or even interested in the bargains of contractors; and that a club could not be formed without the sanction of the municipal and central administrations. With regard to the press, it was found impossible to agree upon a law for its regulation; but the article in the law of the 19th Fructidor, which conferred on the Directory the power of suppressing journals, continued nevertheless repealed; therefore, pending a new enactment, the press remained indefinitely free.

Such were the acts adopted consequent upon the 30th Prairial, both to reform alleged abuses, and to restore to the government the energy it needed. But measures taken in moments of crisis, in the sequel of a change of system, and intended to save a state, rarely achieve the object in view, for all is often decided before they can be brought into effectual action. They provide for the most part only resources for the future. The loan of a hundred millions, and the new levies, could not be raised for some months. Nevertheless, the effect of a crisis is to give an impetus to the motions of government, and inspire it with vigour. Bernadotte hastened to send into all quarters pressing circulars, and thus succeeded in accelerating the organization already commenced of the battalions of conscripts. Robert Lindet, to whom the loan of a hundred millions presented no immediate resource, assembled the principal bankers and merchants of the metropolis, and urged them to lend their credit to the state. They consented, and gave their signatures to the minister of finance. They formed themselves into a syndicate, and pending the receipt of the taxes, signed bills which they were to be reimbursed as products were realized. This constituted a sort of temporary bank established for the exigencies of the moment.

New plans of campaign were likewise deemed necessary, and Bernadotte was asked for a scheme. He speedily produced one of a singular character, which was fortunately not put in execution. A field of battle so vast as that over which operations extended was of course susceptible of numerous combinations. Every one studying it might entertain a different idea; and if each were allowed to submit his individual impressions, and have them adopted, there might be a change of project every instant. If in discussion a variety of counsel is advantageous, in execution it is deplorable. In the outset, it had been determined to act simultaneously on the Danube and in Switzerland. After the battle of Stockach, it was resolved to operate only in Switzerland, and the army of the Danube was suppressed. At present, Bernadotte was of a different persuasion; he imagined that the cause of the success of the allies lay in the facility with which they were enabled to communicate, over the Alps, from Germany into Italy. To debar them from these means of communication, he suggested that Saint-Gothard and the Grisons on the right wing of the army of Switzerland should be wrested from them, and that an army of the Danube should be formed to re-carry the war into the heart of Germany. To compose this army of the Danube, he proposed to promptly organize the army of the Rhine, and to reinforce it with 20,000 men abstracted from Massena. This was effectually to compromise the latter, who had before him all the forces of the Archduke, and might readily be overwhelmed under the effect of this displacement. True, it would have been advisable to carry back the war to the Danube, but it was sufficient to give Massena the means of assuming the offensive, in order that his army might itself become this identical army of the Danube. Hence, his hands were to be strengthened rather than weakened. According to Bernadotte's plan, an army was to be assembled on the Great-Alps, in order to cover the frontier against the Austro-Russians on the side of Piedmont. And Joubert, collecting the remains of all the armies in Italy, and reinforced by disposable troops from the interior, was to debouch from the Apennines and fall upon Suwarrov with irresistible force.

This plan, highly approved by Moulins, was forwarded to the generals. Massena, weary of these fickle and extravagant projects, tendered his resignation. It was not accepted, nor the plan put in execution. Massena retained the command of all the troops from Basle to Saint-Gothard. The scheme of mustering an army on the Rhine to protect that line was however persisted in. An army-nucleus was formed on the Alps, under the orders of Championnet. This nucleus was nearly 15,000 men strong.

All the reinforcements disposable were sent to the army under Joubert, who it was intended should debouch from the Apennines. It was now the very middle of the season, Messidor (July). The reinforcements began to reach his camp. A certain number of veteran battalions, hitherto detained in the interior, were moved to the frontier. The conscripts were organizing, and destined to replace the veteran troops in the garrisons. Lastly, as the depôts were insufficient for the great number of conscripts, the device of augmenting the number of battalions in the demi-brigades or regiments was hit upon, which permitted the incorporation of the new levies in the old corps.

A reinforcement of 30,000 Russians was known to be advancing through Germany, under the orders of General Korsakof. Consequently, Massena was urged to move from his positions and attack those of the Archduke, in order to defeat him if possible before his junction with the Russians. In this respect the government doubtless judged correctly, since it was of importance to make an attempt before so imposing a mass of troops was concentrated. However, Massena refused to act upon the offensive, either that he lacked in this instance his wonted daring, or that he awaited the resumption of hostilities in Italy. Military authorities have all condemned his inaction, which, in truth, proved eventually fortunate through the blunders of the enemy, and was at all events redeemed by illustrious exploits. Still, in obedience to the instances of the government, and in partial execution of Bernadotte's plan, the grand feature of which was to prevent the Austro-Russians from communicating between Germany and Italy, Massena ordered Lecourbe to prolong his right as far as Saint-Gothard, seize upon that important point, and retake the Grisons. By this operation the Great-Alps reverted under the command of the French, and the hostile armies engaged in Germany were cut off from communication with those acting in Italy. Lecourbe performed the enterprise with the intrepidity and hardihood which distinguished him in mountain warfare, and once more rendered himself master of Saint-Gothard.

Meanwhile, fresh events were pending in Italy. Suwarrov, explicitly enjoined by the court of Vienna to reduce all the fortresses before pushing his advantages, had not profited in the slightest degree by his victory on the Trebbia. He might, indeed, even whilst conforming with his instructions, have reserved a mass sufficient to scatter to the winds the broken remnants of the French; but his genius was inadequate to military combinations of that description. He consumed his time, therefore, in prosecuting sieges. Peschiera, Pizzighitone, and the citadel of Milan, had fallen. The citadel of Turin had undergone the like fate. The two celebrated strongholds of Mantua and Alessandria still held out and gave promise of a long resistance. Kray beleaguered Mantua, and Bellegarde Alessandria. Unfortunately all the places had been intrusted to commanders destitute either of energy or education. The artillery was inefficiently served, since none but shattered corps had been thrown into them; whilst the distance of the active armies, driven back on the Apennines, singularly depressed the courage of their defenders. Mantua, the principal of these fortresses, was far from deserving the reputation Bonaparte's siege had conferred upon it. Not its strength, but the concatenation of circumstances had then protracted its defence. Bonaparte, in fact, with 10,000 men had shut up within its walls 14,000 to perish of fever and famine. At present General Latour-Foissac was the governor of Mantua. He was an experienced officer of engineers, but deficient in the vigour requisite for the particular nature of the service required. Discouraged by the irregularity of the place, and the defective state of the fortifications, he had no idea of supplying the want of walls by activity and boldness. Moreover, his garrison was insufficient, and, after the first assaults, he appeared disposed to surrender. General Gardanne commanded at Alessandria. He was a man of determination, but not adequately instructed. He vigorously repulsed a first assault; nevertheless, he was incompetent to discern in the place the resources it still presented.

More than a month had elapsed since the revolution of the 30th Prairial and the nomination of Joubert. Moreau was sensible of the importance of assuming the aggressive before the fall of all the fortresses, and of debouching, with the army reorganized and reinforced, upon the dispersed Austro-Russians. Unhappily he was fettered by directions from the government enjoining him to await the arrival of Joubert. Thus, in this calamitous campaign, a series of untimely incongruous orders had always been the cause of the reverses. Instability of ideas and plans in matters of execution, more particularly in war, is invariably prejudicial. If Moreau, to whom the command ought to have been given at first, had held it even since the battle of Cassano without participation, all would have been well; but associated now with Macdonald, now with Joubert, he was prevented for the second and third time from retrieving the disasters and vindicating the honour of the French arms.

Joubert, whom it was sought to attach, by a marriage and flattering attentions, to the party contemplating a reorganization, wasted a whole month, that of Messidor (June and July), in celebrating his nuptials, and thus lost a decisive opportunity. He was not actually gained to the party so desirous of his support, for he remained devoted to the patriots, and the precious interval was in that respect fruitlessly consumed. He at length departed, saying to his young spouse: "*Thou wilt see me again dead or victorious.*" He bore with him, in truth, the heroic determination to conquer or to die. Upon reaching the army in the middle of Thermidor (beginning of August), this ingenuous young general testified the utmost deference towards the consummate master he was appointed to supersede. He besought him to remain with him to assist him with his counsels. Moreau, equally generous with the young soldier, consented to be present at his first battle and give him the benefit of his experience. Noble and touching brotherhood, which reflects high honour on the virtues of the republican generals, and belongs to a time when patriotic zeal still overcame ambition in the hearts of French warriors!

The French army, composed of the relics of the armies of Upper-Italy and Naples and of reinforcements from the interior, amounted to 40,000 men, perfectly reorganized and burning with desire to measure swords again with the enemy. Nothing could excel the patriotic ardour of these soldiers, who, though constantly defeated, had never been discouraged, but still demanded to be led against their insolent foes. No republican army ever deserved better of France, for none more fully repelled the unjust reproach attached to the French of being unable to support reverses. Unquestionably, its firmness was partly owing to the brave and unassuming general in whom it had placed all its confidence, and who was taken from it always at the moment he was about to conduct it again to victory.

These 40,000 men were independent of the 15,000 intended to serve, under Championnet, as the nucleus of the army of the Great-Alps. They had debouched by the Bormida on Acqui, by the Bochetta on Gavi, and taken position in front of Novi. An army of such force might, by debouching in time, before the junction of the different corps engaged in sieges, have gained decisive advantages. But Alessandria had recently opened its gates, on the 4th Thermidor (22d July). A vague rumour also pre-

vailed that Mantua had likewise surrendered. This sad report was soon confirmed, and tidings arrived that the capitulation had been signed on the 12th Thermidor (30th July). Kray had just joined Suwarrov with 20,000 men, and the operative mass of the Austrio-Russians was now augmented to sixty and some thousand men. Hence it was no longer possible for Joubert to contend on equal terms with an enemy so superior. He held a council of war, at which the general opinion was in favour of retreating into the Apennines and acting on the defensive in expectation of additional forces.

Joubert was about to execute this resolution when he was anticipated by Suwarrov and obliged to accept battle. The French army was ranged in a semicircle on the slopes of the Monte-Rotondo, commanding the whole plain of Novi. The left, formed of the divisions under Grouchy and Lemoine, extended circularly in front of Pasturana. It had behind the ravine of Riasco, which rendered its rear accessible to an enemy sufficiently daring to entangle himself in the ravine. The reserve of cavalry, commanded by Richepanse, was in the rear of this wing. In the centre, the division of Laboissière covered the heights to the right and left of the town of Novi. Watrin's division, on the right wing, defended the approaches of the Monte-Rotondo, on the side of the Tortona road. Dombrowski with a division blocked Seravalla. General Perignon commanded the French left, and Saint-Cyr the centre and right. The position was strong, advantageously occupied on all points, and assuredly difficult to force. Still forty thousand men against upwards of sixty thousand laboured under an immense disadvantage. Suwarrov resolved to attack the position with his accustomed violence. He directed Kray on the French left with the divisions of Ott and Bellegarde. The Russian corps under Derfelden, having in front the vanguard led by Bagration, was appointed to attack their centre at Novi. Melas, remaining a little in the rear with the rest of the army, was to assail their right. By a singular combination, or rather through a want of combination, the attacks were to be successive and not simultaneous.

At five in the morning of the 28th Thermidor (15th August), Kray commenced the attack. Bellegarde selected the division under Grouchy on the extreme left and Ott the division under Lemoine. These two divisions being yet unformed were nearly surprised and broken. The obstinate resistance of one of the demi-brigades obliged Kray to throw himself upon the 20th Light, which he routed, concentrating upon it his principal effort. His troops were already gaining ground on the plateau, when Joubert galloped in all haste to the point of danger. There was no longer time to think of a retreat, and every hazard must be encountered to repel the enemy to the foot of the plateau. Advancing amidst the tirailleurs to encourage them, Joubert received a bullet which struck him near the heart and stretched him on the ground. On the point of expiring, the young hero still cried to his soldiers: "*Forward, my Friends, forward.*" This untoward event was calculated to throw the army into disorder; but fortunately Moreau had accompanied Joubert to the spot. He immediately took the command, which was resigned to him by the general confidence, rallied the troops, inflamed with resentment, and led them on the Austrians. The grenadiers of the 34th chased them at the point of the bayonet and hurled them to the foot of the hill. It was to be regretted the French had not yet their artillery in battery, whilst the Austrians, on the contrary, ploughed their ranks with a storm of shells and balls. During this action, Bellegarde attempted to turn the extreme right by the ravine of Riasco, which has been already mentioned as giving access to the French rear. He had advanced a considerable distance, when Perignon, confronting him opportunely with the reserve commanded by General Clausel, arrested his march. Perignon succeeded in driving him back into the plain, charging upon him the grenadiers of Partouneaux and the cavalry under Richepanse. This vigorous exploit disembarrassed the left wing.

Under favour of the peculiar combination planned by Suwarrov, who designed to render his attacks successive, the French centre had not yet been attacked. Saint-Cyr had gained time to make his dispositions and draw towards Novi Watrin's division, forming his extreme right. At the instance of Kray, who begged to be supported by an attack in the centre, Bagration finally determined to assault him with his vanguard. Laboissière's division, which stood to the left of Novi, allowing Bagration's Russians to approach within half-musket-shot, suddenly overwhelmed them with a terrible discharge of musketry and grape and strewed the field with dead. Without giving ground, Bagration detached some battalions to turn Novi on the right; but, encountered by the division of Watrin, which was approximating Novi, they were repulsed into the plain.

Thus the middle of the day arrived without the French line being impinged. Suwarrov had just come up with the Russian corps under Derfelden. He immediately commanded a general attack along the whole line. Kray was again to assail the left, Derfelden and Bagration the centre; whilst Melas was enjoined to accelerate his pace and fall upon the right of the French. All being ready, the Austro-Russians advanced upon the entire line. Kray, charging furiously on the left, again sought to break it in front; but the reserve under Clausel worsted the troops of Bellegarde, and Lemoine's division routed Ott upon the slopes of the hills. In the centre, Suwarrov opened a tremendous assault both right and left of Novi. A fresh attempt to turn the town was foiled, as in the morning, by Watrin's division. The French soldiers, unfortunately, impelled by their ardour, abandoned themselves too hotly to the pursuit of the enemy, adventured into the plain, and were with difficulty rallied into position. At one o'clock, the action slackened from mutual fatigue; but it speedily recommenced with violence, and during four successive hours the French, firm as a wall of rock, resisted with admirable coolness the furious onslaughts of the Russians. They had as yet suffered an inconsiderable loss. The Austro-Russians on the contrary had been horribly butchered. The plain was choked with their slain and dying. At this moment, the rest of the Austro-Russian army arrived from Rivalta under the orders of Melas. This new irruption was intended for the French right. Saint-Cyr, descrying its approach, recalled Watrin's division, which had advanced too far on the plain, and directed it on a plateau to the right of Novi. But whilst operating this movement, it found itself already enveloped on all sides by the numerous corps of Melas. This discovery bewildered it; it instantly broke and gained the plateau in disorder. It was rallied however a little in the rear. In the meantime, Suwarrov, redoubling his efforts on the centre at Novi, finally drove the French into the town, and stormed the heights which commanded it both right and left. From that moment, Moreau, deeming a retreat unavoidable, ordered it before the further progress of the enemy barred the communications on Gavi. On the right, Watrin's division was obliged to cut its way to gain the Gavi road which was already blocked. Laboissière's division retired from Novi; while Lemoine's and Grouchy's divisions recoiled on Pasturana, sustaining the furious charges of Kray. A hostile battalion unluckily penetrated through the ravine of Riasco, which extends beyond Pasturana

Its fire threw the French columns into dismal confusion; infantry, artillery, cavalry, all were confounded. Lemoine's division, pressed by the enemy, disbanded and poured into the ravine. The French soldiers were swept away like chaff before the wind. Perignon and Grouchy rallied a few brave men to arrest the enemy and save the artillery; but they were cut down and made prisoners Perignon had received seven wounds, Grouchy six, all sabre cuts. The gallant Colli, the Piedmontese General who had so highly distinguished himself in the early campaigns against the French, and had afterwards taken service in their armies, formed in square with some battalions, resisted until broken and forced, and fell all-mutilated into the hands of the Russians.

After this first moment of confusion, the French army rallied in advance of Gavi. The Austro-Russians were too exhausted to follow in pursuit. It was enabled to re-form in marching order without being incommoded. The loss on both sides was equal; it amounted to about ten thousand men in each army. But the killed and wounded were far the most numerous on the part of the Austro-Russians. The French had lost more prisoners. They had likewise lost their general-in-chief, four generals of division, thirty-seven pieces of ordnance and four colours. Never had they displayed more cool or pertinacious valour. They were inferior to the enemy by at least a third. The Russians had manifested their fanatical bravery, but owed their advantage solely to the superiority of numbers, and certainly not to the combinations of their general, who had exhibited the profoundest ignorance. He had in fact exposed his columns to be mowed down one after the other, and had failed to point his efforts sufficiently against the French left, which was the position it behoved him especially to carry. This deplorable battle definitively shut out the French from Italy, and permitted them no longer to keep the field. They were compelled to remain close within the Apennines, happy to be enabled to retain them. The loss of the battle could not be imputed to Moreau, but to the lamentable circumstance of the junction between Kray and Suwarrov. Joubert's procrastination, in truth, had alone occasioned this last disaster.

The French misfortunes were not limited to the battle of Novi. The expedition against Holland, previously intimated, was at length undertaken by the combined British and Russians. Paul had concluded a treaty with Pitt, by which he bound himself to furnish 17,000 Russians, to be in the pay of England and to act in Holland. After many difficulties had been encountered and overcome, the expedition had been prepared towards the end of August (beginning of Fructidor): 30,000 English were intended to join the 17,000 Russians, and if the debarkation were effected without obstacle, confident hopes were entertained of wresting Holland from the hands of the French. It was a subject of the deepest concern to England; and did she succeed merely in destroying the fleets and arsenals of Holland, she would be sufficiently remunerated for the expenses of the expedition. A powerful squadron sailed in the direction of the Sound in quest of the Russians. A first detachment embarked under the orders of General Abercrombie to attempt a landing. All the troops of the expedition when once collected were to be under the supreme command of the Duke of York.

The most advantageous point to land in Holland was the embouchure of the Meuse. There the French line of retreat was menaced, and the Hague, where the Stadtholder had most partisans, was close at hand. The convenience of the coast caused North Holland to be preferred. Abercrombie proceeded towards the Helder, where he arrived about the end of August. After sundry obstacles, he disembarked near the Helder, in the environs of Groot-Keeten, on the 10th Fructidor (27th August). The immense preparations the expedition had required, and the presence of all the English fleets on the coasts, had sufficiently warned the French to be upon their guard. Brune commanded both the French and Batavian armies. He had scarcely under his orders above 7,000 French and 10,000 Dutch commanded by Daendels. He had directed the Batavian division to the vicinity of the Helder, and disposed the French division in the neighbourhood of Haerlem. On disembarking, Abercrombie encountered the Dutch at Groot-Keeten, worsted them, and thus succeeded in safely landing his troops. The Dutch, on this occasion, showed themselves not deficient in bravery, but they were not commanded with competent ability by General Daendels and were compelled to retreat. Brune rallied them, and made his dispositions to attack with promptitude the disembarked troops, before they had firmly established themselves, or been reinforced by the English and Russian divisions on their way to join them.

The Dutch evinced very favourable dispositions. The national guards offered to garrison the fortresses, which allowed Brune to draw additional troops into the field. He had summoned to his aid the division of Dumonceau, 6,000 men strong, and he resolved to attack, at the commencement of September, the camp in which the English had planted themselves. This camp was formidably situated on the Zip, formerly a marsh but drained by Dutch industry, and now an extensive plain intersected by canals, thickly strewed with dykes, and studded with habitations: 17,000 English occupied it, with the best possible defensive dispositions. Brune could muster but 20,000 men at the utmost to execute the assault, which was an insufficient force considering the nature of the ground. He attacked this camp on the 22d Fructidor (8th September), and, after a desperate conflict, was obliged to beat a retreat and fall back on Amsterdam. Thenceforth, he was no longer in a position to prevent the junction of the Anglo-Russian forces, and must await the formation of a French army to oppose them. This establishment of the English in Nord-Holland occasioned an event which was chiefly to be dreaded, the defection of the Dutch fleet. No pains had been taken to close the Texel, and the English Admiral Mitchell was enabled to enter it with all his squadron. For some time past the Dutch sailors had been tampered with by emissaries of the Prince of Orange; accordingly, at the first summons of Admiral Mitchell, they mutinied and compelled Storey, their admiral, to strike. The whole Dutch navy thus fell into the power of the English, in itself an advantage of inestimable price.

As tidings of these events successively reached Paris, they produced the effect naturally to be anticipated. They increased the excitement of all parties but especially of the patriots, who clamoured, with greater vehemence than ever, for the employment of revolutionary expedients. The license restored to journals and clubs had called a great number of both into existence. The remains of the Jacobin party had collected in the old hall of the Manege, where the first assemblies had sat. Although the law prohibited popular societies from assuming the form of deliberative assemblies, the society of the Manege had notwithstanding given itself, under different titles, a president, secretaries, and other officers. It was frequented by the ex-minister Bouchotte, Drouet, Felix Lepelletier, and Arena, all disciples or accomplices of Babœuf. Here they invoked the shades of Goujon, Soubrany, and the victims of Grenelle. And here were demanded, in the style of 1793, the punishment of the blood-suckers of the people, the disarming of royalists, the levy *en masse*, the establishment of manufactures of arms in the public places, the restitution of cannons and pikes to the national

guards, &c. The impeachment of the late directors was particularly insisted upon, since to them the recent disasters were unhesitatingly ascribed, as falling within the results of their administration. When intelligence of the battle of Novi and of the events in Holland arrived, the ferment exceeded all bounds. Direful imprecations were lavished upon the generals. Moreau was reviled as a fumbler; Joubert himself, despite his heroic death, was accused of having destroyed the army by his delay in joining it. His young wife, with Messieurs de Semonville, Sainte-Foy and Talleyrand, to whom his marriage was attributed, were loaded with the vilest abuse. The Dutch government was denounced as guilty of treachery; it was alleged to be composed of aristocrats, of *stadtholderians*, all enemies of France and liberty. The *Journal of Free Men*, the organ of the party congregating in the hall of the Manege, continually declaimed in this rabid style, and aggravated the abomination of its matter by accessary incentives in its publication.

These manifestations awakened in many breasts a sensation of terror. A fresh representation of the scenes of 93 was apprehended. Those who designated themselves *moderates*, or *politicians*, and who, treading in the path of Sieyes, harboured the laudable desire but presumptuous conceit of saving France from the fury of parties by re-constituting it, were much incensed by the outbreak of these revived Jacobins. Sieyes especially, who held them in habitual fear, declared against them with all the force of his acerbity. And doubtless they wore a formidable aspect, for independently of the bawlers and fire-eaters, who paraded their patriotic energy in clubs and journals, they counted partisans of a graver complexion, more powerful, and consequently more dangerous, ay in the government itself. In the Councils, the patriots, once excluded by the device of secessions, and forcibly returned in the elections of this year, repeated, with variations of a more moderate character, nearly the language used in the society of the Manege. They were men who demurred to risk the chances of a new constitution, and regarded with suspicion those who professed to desire one, dreading, above all, lest they should seek for aid amongst the generals. They upheld, moreover, that, to extricate France from her dangers, measures similar to those employed by the committee of public welfare were necessary. The Ancients, more temperate and discreet from their position, were but slightly imbued with this opinion; yet it was a doctrine hotly supported by upwards of two hundred members in the Five-Hundred. In this number were not merely such obstreperous personages as Augereau, but prudent and enlightened men like Jourdan. These two generals served to give the patriot party a great ascendency in the Five-Hundred. In the Directory, this party had two votes, those of Gohier and Moulins. Barras remained undecided; on one hand he distrusted Sieyes, who testified an aversion towards him and shunned him as one tainted; on the other, he dreaded the patriots and their extravagances. Thus he hesitated to declare himself. In the ministry, the patriots had unexpectedly gained an adherent in Bernadotte. This general was not nearly so emphatic in his principles as the majority of the generals who had served in Italy, and it may be remembered that his division on arriving upon the Tagliamento, became involved in a quarrel with that of Augereau on the subject of the word *monsieur*, which it had already substituted for *citizen*. But Bernadotte was of a fretful ambition; he had viewed with sullen anger the confidence reposed in Joubert by the reorganizing party, and believed Moreau now the object of attention since the death of Joubert; which circumstance, inciting him against the projects of reorganization, attached him irresistibly to the patriots. General Marbot, commander of the garrison of Paris, a violent republican, was of the same disposition as Bernadotte.

Thus, two hundred deputies avowed partisans in the Five-Hundred, at whose head were two celebrated generals, the minister at war, the governor of Paris, two directors, numerous journals and clubs, and a large residuum of men compromised and fit for any enterprise, might reasonably cause some alarm; and, though the party of the Mountain might not be resuscitated, yet it is easy to conceive the terrors which even its shadow would inspire in the breasts of men who shuddered at the recollection of 1793.

At this time it happened that Bourguignon gave cause of dissatisfaction in his exercise of the functions of the police. He was an honest citizen, but too inconsiderate. Barras suggested to Sieyes a substitute in the person of his creature, for whom he had recently procured the embassy to Holland, the wily and astute Fouché. An old associate of the Jacobins, perfectly initiated in their spirit and mysteries, wholly indifferent to their cause, and intent only amid the shipwreck of parties on his own fortune, Fouché was eminently adapted to keep watch over his former friends, and shield the Directory from their designs. He was accepted by Sieyes and Roger-Ducos, and obtained the ministry of police. Under the circumstances he was an invaluable acquisition. He fortified Barras in the tendency to side rather with the reorganizing than with the patriot party, because the latter had no future in perspective, or such as it had might be carried to a dangerous excess.

This precaution taken, war against the patriots commenced. Sieyes, who had great influence over the Ancients, inasmuch as that Council was almost wholly composed of *moderates* and *politicians*, now exercised it to have the new society of Jacobins suppressed. The hall of the Manege, being contiguous to the Tuileries, was comprised within the precincts of the palace of the Ancients. Each Council having the police of its own precincts, the Ancients were entitled to close the hall of the Manege. Accordingly, the committee of inspectors issued an order prohibiting any future assemblage in that hall. A simple sentinel placed at the door sufficed to prevent the meeting of the new Jacobins. This was a proof that, if the declamation were the same, their strength at least was very different. The order in question was vindicated before the Council of Ancients by a report of the deputy Cornet. Courtois, he who had framed the report on the 9th Thermidor, seized this occasion to make a fresh denunciation of the plots of the Jacobins. His oration was followed by a debate resulting in an order for a report upon the subject.

The patriots, driven from the hall of the Manege, retired to a spacious building situated in the rue du Bac, where they resumed their accustomed vociferations. Their organization as a deliberative assembly remaining as before, the constitution gave the executive power the right of dissolving their society. Sieyes, Roger-Ducos, and Barras, at the instance of Fouché, determined to close it. Gohier and Moulins dissented from this course, contending that, in the present danger, it was necessary to quicken public spirit by means of clubs; and that if the new society of Jacobins contained turbulent characters, it boasted no formidable supporters, since it had succumbed before a single sentinel when the hall of the Manege was shut. Their opposition was not heeded, and the determination to stifle the society carried. The execution was deferred till after the celebration of the anniversary of the 10th August, which was to be held on the 23d Thermidor. Sieyes being president of the Directory, in that capacity it was his province to deliver a discourse during the solemnity. He took occasion to pronounce a remarkable harangue, in which he strove forcibly to illustrate

the perils in which the new anarchists threatened to involve the republic, and denounced them as dangerous conspirators, contemplating a fresh revolutionary dictatorship. The patriots present at the ceremony received this oration with stormy disapprobation, and uttered sundry derisive exclamations. Amidst the salvos of the artillery, Sieyes and Barras were startled by the belief they heard bullets whistling past their ears, and retreated to the Directory inflamed with indignation. Distrusting the authorities of Paris, they resolved to take the command of the garrison from General Marbot, who was accused of being an unscrupulous patriot, and implicated in the alleged plots of the Jacobins. Fouché recommended in his stead Lefebvre, a brave general, acquainted only with military routine, and a total stranger to the intrigues of parties. Marbot was therefore dismissed, and, on the second day thereafter, the ordinance commanding the suppression of the society of the rue du Bac was published.

The patriots offered no greater resistance in the rue du Bac than at the Manege. They withdrew, and remained definitively separated. But the press continued open to them, and they turned it to formidable account. The paper called the *Journal of Free Men* vituperated, in terms of extreme virulence, the members of the Directory known to have sanctioned the ordinance. Sieyes was remorselessly assailed.—"This perfidious priest," said the patriot journals, "has sold the republic to Prussia. It is arranged with that power to restore monarchy in France, and give the crown to Brunswick."—Such assertions had no better foundations than the well-known opinion of Sieyes on the constitution, and his residence in Prussia. He was wont to repeat, in fact, almost daily, that blustering demagogues rendered all government impossible; that authority must be concentrated; that liberty was compatible even with monarchy, as England testified; but that it was incompatible with this successive domination of various parties. Another saying was attributed to him, that the north of Europe was full of wise and moderate princes, who might, with a vigorous constitution, secure the happiness of France. These opinions, whether true or false, sufficed to cast on him imputations of schemes which existed only in the imagination of his enemies. Barras was not more leniently treated than Sieyes. The forbearance the patriots had long exhibited towards him, because he had always flattered them with his support, was now at an end. They proclaimed him a traitor, a rotten corruptionist, one who was of no use to any party. Fouché, his adviser, an apostate like himself, was covered with similar opprobrium. Roger-Ducos was, according to them, a mere imbecile, blindly subservient to the dictation of two traitors.

The liberty of the press was unlimited. The law proposed by Berlier having been allowed to drop, there existed but one mode of silencing writers, which was to revive a law of the convention against those who, by word or deed, tended to subvert the republic. It was necessary that this intention should be demonstrated to render the law applicable, and then the penalty of death was awarded. Hence, no available use could be made of such a provision. A new law had been demanded from the legislative body, and a resolution passed to take the subject into immediate consideration. But, in the meanwhile, the attacks continued with unabated violence; and the three directors composing the majority declared that it was impossible to govern. In this extremity they conceived the idea of applying the 144th article of the constitution, which gave to the Directory the power of issuing warrants of arrest against the authors or accomplices of plots hatched against the republic. The article assuredly required to be singularly strained to reach the case of the journalists. Nevertheless, as it afforded a means of stifling the abuse of their pens, by apprehending their persons and seizing their presses, the directorial majority, on the advice of Fouché, issued warrants of arrest against the editors of eleven journals, and caused seals to be affixed on their presses. The ordinance was signified on the 17th Fructidor (5th September) to the legislative body, and produced an explosion on the part of the patriots. They railed, as the occasion warranted, against a stretch of authority, a transgression of the law, a dictatorship, &c. &c.

Such was the situation of affairs. In the Directory, in the Councils, everywhere in fact, the *moderates*, the *politicians*, contended against the patriots. The former had a majority in the Directory as likewise in the Councils. The patriots were in a minority, but they were sufficiently ardent and boisterous to alarm their adversaries. Fortunately, means of aggression were worn threadbare as the parties themselves, and they could cause each other little injury beyond mutual dread. The Directory had twice closed the new society of Jacobins, and suppressed their journals. The patriots exclaimed and threatened, but had no longer sufficient audacity or sufficient partisans to venture an open attack upon the government. In this condition of things, which had lasted since the 30th Prairial, that is to say, for nearly three months, a suggestion was started, very common on the eve of decisive events, for a reconciliation. Several deputies on both sides proposed an interview with the members of the Directory, in order to explain and remove their respective causes of complaint.—"We all cherish liberty," they said, "we all aspire to save it from the perils to which it is exposed by the defeat of our armies; let us endeavour then to agree upon the choice of expedients, since that choice is the sole occasion of our disunion."—The interview was held at the residence of Barras. There never was nor can be a reconciliation between parties, for it requires a renunciation of their several aims, which it were hopeless to expect from a conference. The patriot deputies complained that plots were constantly spoken of, and that the president of the Directory had himself alluded to a class of dangerous men who meditated the ruin of the republic. They demanded that these men should be specified, so that they might not be confounded with the patriots. Sieyes, to whom this interpellation was addressed, replied by reviewing the conduct of the popular societies and the journals, and descanting on the dangers of a fresh anarchy. He was again requested to designate the real anarchists that they might be combined against and opposed.—"And how combine against them," exclaimed Sieyes, "when every day members of the legislative body ascend the tribune to abet them?"—"It is then we you attack?" retorted the deputies to whom Sieyes had made this observation. "When we desire to make peace with you, you abuse and repel us!"—Anger supervening, the meeting immediately separated, words of defiance rather than of conciliation falling from the lips of all as they departed.

Immediately after this interview, Jourdan formed the resolution of mooting an important proposition, to wit, a declaration of the country being in danger. Such a motion if carried, involved the levy in mass and several great revolutionary measures. It was submitted to the Five-Hundred on the 25th Fructidor (13th September). The moderate party strenuously opposed it, alleging that such an announcement, far from adding to the strength of the government, would only tend to diminish it, by exciting exaggerated fears and dangerous agitation. The patriots, on the other hand, maintained that it was necessary to use a powerful lever to raise public spirit and save the revolution. The expedient, however efficacious in 1793, could not succeed at the present moment, and was but an erroneous application of the past. Lucien Bonaparte, Boulay de la Meurthe, and Chenier

spoke energetically against its adoption, and carried an adjournment of the debate until the following day. Meanwhile, the patriots of the clubs had tumultuously surrounded the palace of the Five-Hundred, and insulted several deputies. A rumour began to spread that Bernadotte, upon their eager solicitations, was about to take horse, place himself at their head, and provoke a catastrophe. It was certain that several of the more headstrong of the party had vehemently urged him to do so. That he would allow himself to be persuaded by them was at least a matter of apprehension. Barras and Fouché consequently hastened to visit him, and endeavour to ascertain his intentions. They found him full of resentment against the projects which he asserted to have been planned with Joubert. Barras and Fouché assured him he was deceived, and besought him to remain tranquil.

They returned to Sieyes, when it was agreed to extort from Bernadotte his resignation, without appearing to dismiss him. So Sieyes, entering into conversation with Bernadotte the same day, adroitly led him to confess that he desired soon to resume active service, and that he would regard the command of an army as the most agreeable reward of his ministry. Forthwith, interpreting this avowal as a request to be relieved from office, Sieyes, Barras, and Roger-Ducos resolved to write to Bernadotte, notifying that his resignation was accepted. They embraced the opportunity when Gohier and Moulins were absent to take this determination. On the morrow the letter itself was written to Bernadotte. On receiving it he was struck with amazement, and returned to the Directory a very sour rejoinder, in which he stated that a resignation had been accepted which was never given, and demanded his retiring allowance. Intelligence of this disguised dismissal was announced in the Council of Five-Hundred, at the very moment it was about to divide on the motion of the country being in danger. It occasioned a considerable uproar. "They are preparing *coups d'etat!*" exclaimed the patriots.—"Let us swear to die on our curule chairs!" cried Jourdan emphatically.—"My head shall fall," vociferated the impetuous Augereau, "before any outrage shall be committed upon the national representation!" At last, after a prodigious tumult, the vote was taken. By a majority of two hundred and forty-five against one hundred and seventy-one voices, the proposition of Jourdan was negatived and the country not declared in danger.

When the two directors Gohier and Moulins learnt the deprivation of Bernadotte, adopted without their participation, they complained to their colleagues, saying that such a step ought not to have been taken without the co-operation of all the five directors.—"We formed the majority," Sieyes replied to them, "and we had a right to do what we have done." Gohier and Moulins immediately proceeded to pay Bernadotte an official visit, which they took pains to make with the greatest parade and publicity.

Dubois de Crancé succeeded Bernadotte in the ministry at war. The administration of the department of the Seine having also inspired some distrust in the directorial majority, it was likewise abruptly changed.

Thus the disorganization was complete in all respects; defeated without by the coalition, convulsed within by parties, the republic seemed tottering to its fall. A power from some source was needed sufficient to curb domestic factions and resist foreign enemies. This power could be no longer derived from a party, for all were equally enfeebled and discredited; it could spring only from the bosom of the armies, where force resides, that silent, regular, and imposing force which suited a nation exhausted by the turmoil of dissension and the conflict of systems. Amidst this utter prostration, men cast their eyes on the individuals distinguished during the revolution as in quest of a chief fitted for the exigency. "*We want no more bawlers,*" Sieyes had said, "*we want a head and a sword.*" The head was found, for it was already in the Directory. A sword was to be sought. Hoche was dead; Joubert, whom his youth, his virtues, his heroism, endeared to all the friends of the republic, had just breathed his last at Novi. Moreau, deemed the greatest master of the art of war amongst the generals left in Europe, gave an unfavourable impression of coldness, indecision, caution, and aversion to incur great responsibilities. Massena, one of the most eminent generals of the republic, had not yet gained the glory of saving France. Besides, he betokened no qualities beyond those of the soldier. Jourdan had but lately been vanquished. Augereau was of a rough and turbulent, Bernadotte of a discontented temperament, and neither possessed an adequate measure of renown. There remained one effulgent personage, who united all glories, who to a hundred victories had added a brilliant peace, who had raised France to the pinnacle of greatness at Campo-Formio, and who seemed in departing to have borne away her fortune,—Bonaparte; but he was in a far distant land; he filled with his name the echoes of the East. He alone had continued victorious, and made resound on the banks of the Nile and the Jordan the thunders with which he had startled Europe on the Adige. Nor was it enough that glory shed its rays around him; feeling invested him with even a deeper interest; he was believed to be basely exiled by a suspicious and jealous government. Whilst he had set forth like some champion of old in search of a career vast as his imagination, his countrymen pictured him as an obedient citizen repaying by victories the unworthy banishment imposed upon him. "Where is Bonaparte?" asked every one. "His health already shattered will be destroyed under that broiling sun. Ah! if he were among us, the republic would not be threatened with destruction. Europe and the factions would equally respect him!" Vague rumours, meanwhile, circulated respecting him. Sometimes it was said that victory, treacherous to all the French generals, had forsaken him too in his turn and left him stranded on a distant shore. But such reports were rejected; "he is invincible," was soon the exulting cry; "far from encountering reverses, he marches to the conquest of the entire East." Gigantic enterprises were ascribed to him. Some even scanned the probability of his having traversed Syria, and crossed the Euphrates and the Indus; others were content to maintain that he had marched on Constantinople, and that, after having subverted the Ottoman empire, he would bestride Europe from its opposite boundary. The journals were full of these speculations, proving how imagination waited on the footsteps of a man, so young, and yet so paramount in fame.

The Directory had sent him an order to return, and collected in the Mediterranean an immense fleet, composed of the French and Spanish navies, to bring back the army.* The brothers of the general, re-

* It is proper to state that this order is disputed. We know there exists an ordinance of the Directory, signed by Treilhard, Barras, and Larévellière, and bearing the date of the 7th Prairial, which recals Bonaparte from Italy. Larévellière, in his Memoirs, declares he has no recollection of having signed such a document, and treats the ordinance as supposititious. But in this case the naval expedition of Bruix would remain without an object. At all events, it is certain that the Directory desired the presence of Bonaparte at this juncture, and that it assuredly stood in less terror of his ambition than of Suwarrov's ferocity. If the order be not authentic, it has probability on its side; at the same time the question is of very slight importance, as Bonaparte was authorized to return whenever he judged it advisable.

maining at Paris, and commissioned to inform him of the shifting condition of affairs, had forwarded to him dispatch upon dispatch to acquaint him with the state of confusion into which the republic had fallen and to urge his speedy return. But these advices had to traverse the seas and the English squadrons, and none could tell whether the hero would be apprized in time and arrive before the ruin of the republic was consummated.

CHAPTER LXII.

CONTINUATION OF BONAPARTE'S OPERATIONS IN EGYPT.—CONQUEST OF UPPER-EGYPT BY DESAIX.—EXPEDITION TO SYRIA; BATTLE OF MOUNT TABOR AND SIEGE OF ST. JEAN D'ACRE.—RETURN TO EGYPT; BATTLE OF ABOUKIR.—DEPARTURE OF BONAPARTE FOR FRANCE.—MARCH OF THE ARCHDUKE CHARLES ON THE RHINE AND OF SUWARROV INTO SWITZERLAND.—VICTORY OF ZURICH; RETREAT OF SUWARROV.—EVENTS IN HOLLAND; DEFEAT AND CAPITULATION OF THE ANGLO-RUSSIANS.—CLOSE OF THE CAMPAIGN OF 1799.

After the battle of the Pyramids, Bonaparte had found himself undisputed master of the greatest part of Egypt. He had subsequently taken pains to consolidate his power, and distributed his generals through the provinces to complete their subjugation. Desaix, planted at the entrance of Upper-Egypt, with a division of about 3,000 men, held the charge of reducing that province against the remnants of Mourad-Bey's defeated Mamelukes. Desaix commenced his expedition in Vendemiaire and Brumaire of the preceding year (October 1798), at the period the inundation subsided. The enemy retreated before him, awaiting him eventually at Sediman, where Desaix, on the 16th Vendemiaire year VII. (7th October 1798), sustained a terrible encounter against the desperate remains of Mourad-Bey. None of the conflicts of the French in Egypt was attended with such loss of blood. Two thousand French had to contend against four thousand Mamelukes and eight thousand fellahs intrenched in the village of Sediman. The battle was fought after the manner of that of the Pyramids and similarly to all the engagements in Egypt. The fellahs were stationed behind the walls of the village and the horsemen in the plain. Desaix formed in two squares, and placed on his wings two other smaller squares to deaden the shock of the Mameluke cavalry. For the first time the French infantry was broken and one of the small squares forced. But, with quick and happy thought, the soldiers instantly crouched to the ground, so that the great squares were enabled to fire above their heads. The Mamelukes, riding over them, charged the great squares with furious impetuosity for several hours without intermission, and plunged at length maddened with desperation on the very points of the bayonets. As usual, the squares afterwards broke ground to attack the intrenchments and speedily stormed them. During this operation, the Mamelukes, wheeling on a semicircle to the rear, began to butcher the wounded; but the French quickly chased them from their work of carnage, and the incensed soldiers sacrificed a considerable number of them in their wrath. Comparatively, never had more dead strewed a field of battle. The French lost three hundred men. Desaix continued his march throughout the winter, and after a succession of smart combats became master of all Upper-Egypt even to the Cataracts, spreading the fame of his clemency equally with the terror of his arms. At Cairo, Bonaparte had been denominated Sultan Kebir, the *King of Fire;* but in Upper-Egypt Desaix was known as Sultan Al Rashid, or *the Just*.

Bonaparte, meanwhile, had executed a march upon Balbeis to drive Ibrahim-Bey into Syria, and gathered on his route the wrecks of the caravan of Mecca, pillaged by the Arabs. Returning to Cairo, he there continued to organize an administration upon French principles. A revolt, excited by the emissaries of Mourad-Bey, was rigorously stifled, to the utter discouragement of the enemies of the French.† The winter of 1798–9 thus passed over in expectation of events. In this interval, Bonaparte learnt the declaration of war issued by the Porte and the preparations it was making with the aid of the English. It was forming two armies, the one at Rhodes, the other in Syria. These armies were intended to act simultaneously in the spring of 1799, the one to land at Aboukir near Alexandria, the other to cross the desert which divides Syria from Egypt. Bonaparte instantly felt his position, and resolved, as was his wont, to disconcert his foe by anticipating him with an unexpected onslaught. He could not cross the desert between Egypt and Syria in the hot season, and therefore he determined to take advantage of the winter to proceed and disperse the forces assembling at Acre, Damascus, and the principal cities. The celebrated Pacha of Acre, Djezzar, was appointed Seraskier of the army collected in Syria. Abdallah, pacha of Damascus, commanded his vanguard, and had already advanced to Fort El-Arisch, the key to Egypt on the Syrian side. Bonaparte made his dispositions to act with promptitude. He had opened an intelligence with the populations of Mount Lebanon. The Druzes, Christian tribes, and the Metualis, schismatic Mahometans, offered him their aid and invoked him with constant prayers. By sudden assaults on Jaffa, Acre, and other ill-fortified places, he might in a short period overrun Syria, add its conquest to the Egyptian, become master of the Euphrates as he was already of the Nile, and thus occupy all the communications with India. His ardent imagination stretched still farther, and dwelt on some of those grand projects imputed to him by his admirers in Europe. It was not impossible that by raising the populations of Lebanon he might muster sixty or eighty thousand auxiliaries, and with these, supported by twenty-five thousand of the bravest soldiers in the universe, march on Constantinople and seat himself in that famous metropolis. Whether so stupendous a design were feasible or not, it is sure he contemplated the possibility of the enterprise; and when we remember the feats he performed under the ægis of fortune, who shall presume to deride as insane any of his projects?

Bonaparte commenced his march in Pluviose (beginning of February), at the head of the divisions under Kleber, Regnier, Lannes, Bon, and Murat, comprising a force of about 13,000 men. Murat's division was composed of cavalry. Bonaparte had instituted a regiment of an entirely novel arm, to wit of dromedaries. Two men, placed back to back, were mounted on a dromedary, and could, through the strength and celerity of that animal, cover twenty-five or thirty leagues without halting. Bonaparte had formed this regiment to give chase to the Arabs who infested the regions round Egypt. It followed in the track of the main army. He had ordered Rear-Admiral Perrée to weigh from Alexandria with three frigates, and steer for the coast of Syria with the siege-artillery and munitions. On the 29th Pluviose (17th February), he arrived before the fort of El-Arisch. After a slight resistance, the garrison surrendered to the number of 1,300 men. Considerable magazines were found in the fort. Ibrahim-Bey, having attempted to succour it, was put to flight, his camp falling into the power of the French,

† This occurrence took place on the 30th Vendemiaire year VII. (21st October 1798).

who reaped an immense booty. The soldiers suffered many hardships in traversing the desert; but they saw their general toiling at their side, supporting with debilitated health the same privations and the same fatigues, and dared not murmur. Soon they arrived at Gaza, which town they took in sight of Djezzar-Pacha, and found within it, as in the fort of El-Arisch, large stores of munitions and provisions. From Gaza the army moved on Jaffa, the ancient Joppa. It arrived before it on the 13th Ventose (3d March). This town was surrounded by a high wall flanked with towers. It contained a garrison of 4,000 men. Bonaparte caused it to be battered in breach, and then sent a summons to the commander, who answered it by cutting off the herald's head. The assault was given, the place stormed with incredible hardihood, and abandoned to thirty hours of pillage and massacre. A considerable quantity of artillery and provisions of all sorts here likewise fell into the hands of the captors. Several hundreds of prisoners remained on hand, who could not be sent into Egypt as there were no means of escorting them, and whom it was impolitic to set at large to swell the ranks of the enemy. Bonaparte was induced, in solution of the difficulty, to adopt a terrible expedient; which constitutes the only atrocity of his life. Transported into a barbarous country, he had involuntarily imbibed its spirit: he put to the edge of the sword the prisoners who incommoded him. The army performed, with obedience, but with a sensation of horror, the execution committed to it. During their stay at Jaffa, the French soldiers caught the germs of the plague.

Bonaparte now advanced upon St. Jean-d'Acre, the ancient Ptolemais, situated at the foot of Mount Carmel. This was the only place that could again stop him. Syria was his if he succeeded in taking it. Djezzar had shut himself behind its walls with all his treasures and a strong garrison. He relied on the support of Sidney Smith, who was hovering on the coast, and who had furnished him with engineers, artillerymen, and munitions. He expected, moreover, to be speedily succoured by the Turkish army collected in Syria, which had left Damascus to cross the Jordan. Bonaparte hastened to attack the fortress in the hope of carrying it, like that of Jaffa, before it was strengthened by fresh troops, or the English had time to perfect its defences. The trenches were forthwith opened. Unfortunately the siege-artillery, which was to be transported by sea from Alexandria, had been captured by Sidney Smith. The whole force of siege and field artillery possessed by the French consisted of a thirty-two caronade, four twelve-pounders, eight howitzers, and thirty four-pounders. They were also deficient in balls, but a plan was devised for procuring a supply. A few cavalry were sent to manœuvre on the plain, seeing whom Sidney Smith opened a rolling fire from all his batteries; whereupon the French soldiers, to whom five sous for each ball were promised, ran to pick them up amidst the thunders of the cannonade and peals of laughter.

The trenches had been opened on the 30th Ventose (20th March). The general of the engineers, Sanson, thinking he had reached, during a nocturnal reconnaisance, the foot of the rampart, declared there was neither counterscarp nor moat. Hence, Bonaparte concluded he had merely to effect a breach, and then mount to the assault. On the 5th Germinal (25th March), a practicable breach was wrought, but when the assault was attempted, the French were arrested by a counterscarp and moat. They had, therefore, immediate recourse to mines. The operation was carried on under the fire of all the batteries, and especially of the admirable artillery Smith had taken from the French. Djezzar had been supplied by him with excellent English gunners, and an engineer-officer of great merit, a French emigrant, Phélippeaux by name. The mine was sprung on the 8th Germinal (28th March), and blew up only a part of the counterscarp. Twenty-five grenadiers, headed by young Mailly, mounted to the assault. On seeing that gallant officer plant a ladder, the Turks were appalled, but Mailly fell dead. The grenadiers were, thereupon, discouraged, and the Turks returned to the defence. Two battalions which followed were received with a terrific fire; their leader Laugier was killed, and the assault again failed.

Unhappily, the fortress had been recently strengthened by a reinforcement of some thousands of men, a great number of cannoniers exercised in the most approved European gunnery, and vast stores of munitions. To lay siege to such a place with 13,000 men, and almost without artillery, was assuredly a bold enterprise. A fresh mine was requisite to blow up the whole counterscarp, and another covered way was to be commenced. More than ten days had already been consumed, and the near approach of the grand Turkish army was announced; thus it became necessary to carry on the works and cover the siege, with the mere expeditionary army to accomplish all. Bonaparte gave orders to labour uninterruptedly at the fresh mine, and detached Kleber to the Jordan to dispute the passage with the Turkish army advancing from Damascus.

This army, swelled by the mountain tribes of Naplouse, amounted to about 25,000 men. Upwards of 12,000 cavalry constituted its chief strength. It was incumbered by an immense train of baggage. Abdallah, pacha of Damascus, held command over it. On the 15th Germinal (4th April), it passed the Jordan by the bridge of Jacob. Junot with Kleber's vanguard, 500 men strong, encountered the Turkish vanguard on the road to Nazareth on the 19th (8th April). Far from recoiling, he bravely defied the enemy, and, forming in square, covered the ground with dead, and captured five banners. But, compelled to yield to numbers, he subsequently fell back on Kleber. The latter was himself advancing and hastening his march to join Junot. Bonaparte, apprized of the force of the enemy, prepared to set out with Bon's division to support Kleber, and bring on a decisive engagement. Djezzar, who was in communication with the army coming to relieve him, attempted a sally; but, mercilessly raked, he left the French works choked with his dead. Bonaparte forthwith began his march.

Kleber had debouched with his division into the plains which extend to the base of Mount Tabor, not far from the village of Fouli. He had entertained the idea of surprising the Turkish camp during the night, but he arrived too late to execute his design. On the morning of the 27th Germinal (16th April), he found the whole Turkish army drawn up in battle array: 15,000 infantry occupyed the village of Fouli, upwards of 12,000 cavalry were deployed on the plain. Kleber had scarcely 3,000 infantry in square. This vast mass of cavalry moved forward and fell on the French squares. Never had it been the fortune of the French to witness such a swarm of horsemen galloping madly, raging to and fro, and charging on every side. They preserved their accustomed coolness, and receiving the Turks with a continuous fire at musket-range, laid low a considerable number at every onslaught. Speedily they formed around them a rampart of dead bodies, both of men and horses, and under shelter of this horrible barricade were enabled to resist for six successive hours the incessant assaults of the foe. At length Bonaparte debouched from Mount Tabor with Bon's division. He perceived the plain enveloped in fire and smoke, and the compact division of Kleber contending against a host of enemies from behind a bulwark of carcasses. Without loss of time he partitioned the division he led into two squares; which squares advanced so as



to form an equilateral triangle with Kleber's division, and thus placed the enemy between them. They marched in silence, and without giving any signal of their approach till within a certain distance; then Bonaparte suddenly caused a cannon to be discharged, and appeared on the field of battle. A murderous fire instantly opened from the three extremities of the triangle, swept as with a whirlwind the Turks who were in the midst, drove them pell-mell upon each other, and put them to flight in all directions. Kleber's division, inflamed with redoubled ardour at this spectacle, rushed upon the village of Fouli, carried it at the point of the bayonet, and executed a prodigious carnage of the enemy. In an instant the multitude of adversaries dispersed and vanished, and the plain was bared save of mangled corpses. The Turkish camp, the Pacha's three tails, four hundred camels, and an enormous booty, became the prey of the French. Murat, planted on the banks of the Jordan, intercepted and slaughtered numbers of the fugitives. Bonaparte caused all the villages of the Naplousians to be delivered to the flames. Six thousand French had sufficed to destroy this army which the natives called innumerable *as the stars of the firmament and the sands of the sea.*

During this interval, the operations of mining and countermining had continued without intermission around the walls of St. Jean-d'Acre. A space torn up and convulsed by all the artifices of sieges was disputed with the fiercest pertinacity. The French had been now six weeks before the place, had made in that time numerous assaults, repulsed sundry sallies, and killed a great many of the enemy; but, despite their continual advantages, they suffered irreparable losses of time and men. On the 18th Floreal (7th May), a reinforcement of 12,000 men arrived in the port of Acre. Bonaparte, calculating that they could not be landed in less than six hours, immediately brought a twenty-four pounder to play on a piece of wall to the right of the point on which his efforts had been for some time directed. On the approach of night the French mounted to the breach, stormed the works of the enemy, threw them down, spiked the guns, put all to the sword, and were at last masters of the fortification, when the troops which had disembarked advanced in form of battle and presented an overwhelming mass. Rambaut, who commanded the first grenadiers that had marched to the assault, was slain. Lannes was wounded. At this moment the enemy made a sally, took the breach in reverse, and cut off the retreat of the brave men who had penetrated into the town. Some contrived to force their way out, others, under the impulse of desperation, fled into a mosque, there intrenched themselves, fought until their last cartridges were consumed, and then prepared to sell their lives as dearly as they might, when Sidney Smith, touched with their heroic gallantry, granted them a capitulation. Meanwhile the besiegers, marching upon the enemy, drove him back into the fortress with prodigious havoc, and a loss of 800 prisoners. Bonaparte, obstinate to the point of fury, gave his troops two days' repose, and on the 21st (10th May) ordered a fresh assault. They mounted with the same intrepidity, and scaled the breach, but were unable to pass beyond it. A whole army was arrayed in defence of the place, and guarding all the avenues. It was necessary to forego the attempt.

Two months thus elapsed in the siege of Acre, during which the French had sustained grievous losses, and prudence forbid the hazard of more. The plague prevailed in the town, and the army had imbibed the germs of it at Jaffa. The season for debarkation approached, and the arrival of a Turkish army at the mouth of the Nile was announced. By persisting longer, Bonaparte incurred the risk of weakening himself so far as to be unable to repulse fresh adversaries. The main design of his enterprise was accomplished, since he had destroyed the Turkish army assembled in Syria, and on that side rendered the enemy impotent to act. As to the more dazzling of his projects, those vague and magnificent dreams of conquest in the East, they were to be relinquished. He determined at last to raise the siege. But his regret was such that, notwithstanding his great career, he was often heard to repeat, with reference to Sidney Smith: "*That man marred my fortune.*" The Druzes, who during the siege had supplied the army with provisions, and all the populations hostile to the Porte, learnt the intention to retreat with feelings of despair.

The French had commenced the siege on the 30th Ventose (20th March), and now raised it on the 1st Prairial (20th May): an interval of two months. Before finally quitting the walls of St. Jean-d'Acre, Bonaparte resolved to leave a memorial of his presence: he discharged upon it the full venom of his wrath by a furious cannonade, and reduced it almost to a heap of ashes. He resumed the route of the desert. He had lost in combat, or through fatigues and sickness, nearly a third of his expeditionary army, that is to say, about four thousand men. He carried with him twelve hundred wounded. On his route he ravaged the whole country, and impressed it with a wholesome terror. On his arrival at Jaffa he blew the fortifications into the air. An hospital had been established in that place for the plague patients. To remove them was impossible; to leave them was to abandon them to inevitable death, either from the malady, from hunger, or from the cruelty of the enemy. Accordingly, Bonaparte suggested to the physician, Desgenettes, that it would be more humane to administer opium to them than leave them alive; to which the physician replied in a retort much celebrated: "*My vocation is to cure and not to kill.*" Opium was not administered, but the incident served to propagate an infamous calumny, now exploded.

Bonaparte eventually re-entered Egypt after an absence of nearly three months. His arrival was sufficiently opportune. A spirit of revolt had spread throughout the Delta. An impostor, calling himself the angel El-Mohdhy, who announced himself as invulnerable, and professed to destroy the French by scattering dust, had collected several thousand fanatics. The emissaries of the Mamelukes assisted him with their aid; he had seized Damanhour, and put the garrison to the sword. Bonaparte forthwith detached a body of troops which dispersed the rebels and killed the invulnerable angel. The disturbance had extended to the different provinces of the Delta; his presence sufficed to restore tranquillity and obedience. He instituted at Cairo magnificent fêtes, to celebrate his triumphs in Syria. He made no reference to the defeated portion of his enterprise, but extolled the numerous engagements fought in Syria, the brilliant victory of Mount Tabor, and the exemplary vengeance wreaked on Djezzar. He disseminated fresh publications amongst the inhabitants, in which he warned them he was in the secret of their most inward thoughts, and divined their projects at the very instant of conception. They gave implicit credence to this singular pretension of Sultan Kebir, and believed him present at all their cogitations. Yet Bonaparte had not merely to overawe the inhabitants, but also to keep his own generals and army in subjection. A sullen discontent reigned amongst the French, not the result of fatigues or of dangers, still less of privations, for they were abundantly supplied with all necessaries, but of that love of country which haunts the Frenchman in every clime. They had been a whole year in Egypt, and for nearly six months had received no intelligence from France. Not a vessel had been able to pass: a sombre melancholy oppressed all hearts. Almost daily officers and generals solicited furloughs to revisit Europe. Bonaparte granted very few, or rather dropped such

words as scared applicants with the dread of dishonour. Berthier himself, his faithful Berthier, pursued by an absorbing passion, craved permission to depart for Italy. For the second time he was ashamed of his weakness, and renounced the design. On one occasion the army had formed a resolution to bear its colours from Cairo and march on Alexandria with a view to embark. But it was little more than a fleeting thought, and gave way to the apprehension of rousing the indignation of Bonaparte. The generals of division, who all afforded examples of murmuring, were also subdued into silence before him, and cowed beneath his ascendency. He had more than one dispute with Kleber, however. The irritability of the latter did not spring from despondency, but from habitual indocility. They soon became reconciled again, for Bonaparte admired the lofty soul of Kleber, and Kleber was fascinated by the genius of Bonaparte.

The month of Prairial wore away, and still the ignorance of events in Europe, and of the disasters sustained by France, continued. It was merely known that great excitement prevailed throughout the Continent, and that war seemed inevitable. Bonaparte impatiently awaited further information to determine his own course, content, if exigency demanded, to return to the first theatre of his fame. But, previously, he was desirous of extirpating the second Turkish army, mustered at Rhodes, of which the speedy debarkation was rumoured.

This army, shipped on board numerous transports, and escorted by the naval detachment of Sidney Smith, hove in sight of Alexandria on the 23d Messidor (11th July), and proceeded to cast anchor in the roadstead of Aboukir, the same in which the French fleet had been annihilated. The place of debarkation chosen by the English was the promontory which forms this bay and which bears the same name. It is a narrow strip extending between the sea and Lake Maadieh, and terminated by a fort. Bonaparte had ordered Marmont, who commanded at Alexandria, to complete the defences of this fort, and destroy the village of Aboukir clustered around it. But instead of destroying the village, it was preserved to lodge the soldiers, and had been simply surrounded by a redoubt, to protect it on the side of the land. But the redoubt, not joining the two margins of the water, was not a closed barricade, and rendered the fort little better than a mere field-work. The Turks, in fact, landed with great boldness, gallantly assailed the intrenchments, carried them sword in hand, and effected a lodgment in the village of Aboukir, putting to death the unfortunate garrison. The village being taken, the fort could no longer hold out, and it was obliged to surrender. Marmont had hastened from Alexandria with 1,200 men to succour the troops in Aboukir. But learning that the Turks had disembarked in considerable force, he shrank from attempting to drive them into the sea by a vigorous attack. He accordingly returned into Alexandria, and left them to establish themselves in tranquillity on the peninsula of Aboukir.

The Turks amounted to nearly 18,000 foot. They were not the miserable fellahs who composed the infantry of the Mamelukes, but brave Janissaries, carrying muskets without bayonets, slinging them behind upon their shoulder-belts after firing, and then charging the enemy with swords and pistols. Their army was not only numerous but well-appointed and directed by English officers. They were deficient in cavalry, for they had brought only three hundred horses; but they expected the arrival of Mourad-Bey, who was to leave Upper-Egypt, skirting the desert and crossing the oases, and bring to Aboukir two or three thousand Mamelukes.

When Bonaparte received intelligence of the debarkation, he instantly quitted Cairo, and executed one of those extraordinary marches, from Cairo to Alexandria, of which he had given so many examples in Italy. He took with him the divisions of Lannes, Bon, and Murat. He ordered Desaix to evacuate Upper-Egypt, and Kleber and Regnier, who were in the Delta, to draw near Aboukir. He appointed Birket, a place lying between Alexandria and Aboukir, for the concentration of his forces, intending thence to manœuvre according to circumstances. The chief object of his apprehension was lest an English army should disembark in concert with the Turkish.

Mourad-Bey, agreeably to the plan arranged with Mustapha-Pacha, had attempted to descend into Lower-Egypt; but, encountered and defeated by Murat, he had been driven to regain the desert. Consequently the Turkish army alone remained to fight, destitute of cavalry, but encamped behind intrenchments, and disposed to resist with characteristic obstinacy. After inspecting the condition of Alexandria and particularly the admirable works erected by Colonel Cretin, and administering a reprimand to his lieutenant Marmont, who had not ventured to attack the Turks during their debarkation, Bonaparte quitted Alexandria on the 6th Thermidor (23d July). On the morrow, the 7th, he was at the mouth of the peninsula. His first idea was to hem-in the Turkish army by intrenchments and await, ere attacking them, the arrival of all his divisions, for he had under his immediate charge merely the divisions of Lannes, Bon, and Murat, composing about 6,000 men. But upon viewing the dispositions made by the Turks, he changed his opinion and resolved to attack them immediately, hoping to coop them up in the village of Aboukir and blow them to atoms with shells and bombs.

The Turks occupied the extremity of the peninsula which is very narrow. They were covered by two lines of intrenchments. Half-a-league in advance of the village of Aboukir, where their camp was pitched, they had occupied two sand-banks, one flanked by the sea, the other by the lake of Maadieh, and thus forming their right and left. In the midst, between these two hills, was a village which they likewise guarded. They had two thousand men on the right hill, one thousand on the left, and three to four thousand in the village. This was their first line. The second was at the village of Aboukir itself. It was composed of the redoubt constructed by the French, and joined the sea by two branch trenches. There they had fixed their main encampment and the bulk of their forces.

Bonaparte made his dispositions with his usual promptitude and precision. He ordered General Destaing to march with some battalions against the left hill, where the thousand Turks stood; Lannes he directed to move on the right hill, where the other two thousand were; and Murat, who was in the centre, to defile with the cavalry to the rear of the two eminences. These operations were executed with perfect fidelity. Destaing advanced upon the left hill and valiantly scaled it, whilst Murat turned it with a squadron. Upon seeing this, the Turks abandoned their position, and were caught as they retreated by the cavalry, which cut them down and drove them into the sea, where they preferred to throw themselves rather than surrender. On the right the same result occurred. Lannes assailed the two thousand Turks and Murat turned them; they were likewise slaughtered and chased into the sea. Destaing and Lannes then diverged to the centre, which was defended, we have said, by a village, and attacked it in front. The Turks resisted with great bravery, relying on assistance from the second line. A column was, in fact, detached from Aboukir; but Murat, who had already defiled to the rear of the village, intercepted this column, and repulsed it into Aboukir. The infantry of Destaing and Lannes then

charged impetuously into the village, expelling the Turks and scattering them in all directions, who, still obstinately refusing to surrender, plunged into the sea and were drowned.

Four or five thousand Turks had thus already perished. The first line was carried, and the object of Bonaparte accomplished; penning the Turks within the fold of Aboukir, he might bombard them at leisure, pending the arrival of Kleber and Regnier. But he was eager to profit by his success and consummate his victory on the instant. After allowing his troops to recover breath, he marched upon the second line. The division under Lanusse, remaining in reserve, supported Lannes and Destaing. The redoubt which covered Aboukir was difficult to storm; and it sheltered from nine to ten thousand Turks. On the right a trench connected it with the sea; on the left another trench prolonged it, but without absolutely joining Lake Maadieh. The open space was occupied by the enemy and swept by numerous gunboats. Accustomed to direct his soldiers against the most formidable obstacles, Bonaparte ordered them to assail the position. His infantry was to march on the front and right of the redoubt. The cavalry, concealed in a palm-grove, was to defile on the left, and cross, under the fire from the gunboats, the space left open between the redoubt and Lake Maadieh. The charge was thus executed. Lannes and Destaing urged their brave infantry forward; the 32d marched with arms fixed on the intrenchments, the 18th turned them on the extreme right. The Turks, without waiting for them, advanced to the encounter. They came in collision body to body. The Turkish soldiers, after firing their muskets and pistols, brandished their scymiters. They attempted to wrench the bayonets with their hands; but their breasts were pierced before they could seize them. Thus the combatants mingled their blood on the intrenchments. The 18th was on the point of penetrating into the redoubt, when a terrific discharge of artillery arrested and repelled it to the foot of the works. The gallant Leturcq fell gloriously in determining to retire last. Fugieres lost an arm. Meanwhile, Murat, on his side, had deployed with the cavalry to traverse the space between the redoubt and Lake Maadieh. Several times he had charged and repulsed the enemy; but, caught between the fires from the redoubt and the gun-boats, he had been obliged to recoil. Some of his troops had even pushed to the moat of the redoubt; but all the efforts of such intrepidity seemed vain. Bonaparte contemplated this carnage pondering the favourable moment to renew the assault. Fortunately the Turks, in accordance with their custom, poured from the intrenchments to decapitate the slain. Bonaparte seized the opportunity and darted forward two battalions, one from the 22d, the other from the 69th, which scaled the intrenchments and carried them. On the right, the 18th likewise profited by the occasion and entered the redoubt. Murat, on his part, sounded a fresh charge. One of his squadrons succeeded in clearing the formidable ground separating the intrenchments from the lake, and penetrated into the village of Aboukir. Thereupon the Turks fled in a panic on all sides, and the French had nothing to do but butcher them. They spitted them on their bayonets and hurled them into the sea. Murat, at the head of his cavalry, rushed onward to the very tent of Mustapha-Pacha. In a paroxysm of despair, the Turkish commander drew a pistol and fired it at Murat, whom he slightly wounded. Murat hacked off two of his fingers by a blow of his sword and sent him captive to Bonaparte. The Turks who were neither killed nor drowned retreated into the fort of Aboukir.

Upwards of twelve thousand corpses floated on these waters of Aboukir, which had been once covered with the bodies of French sailors; between two and three thousand strewed the field of battle. The residue of the Turkish forces, pent up in the fort, had no resource but in the clemency of the conqueror.

Such was this extraordinary battle, in which, for the first time perhaps in the annals of war, the hostile army was utterly extinguished. It was upon this occasion that Kleber, arriving at the close of day, hugged Bonaparte by the waist, and exclaimed: *General, you are grand as the universe!*

Thus, through the expedition to Syria and the battle of Aboukir, Egypt was delivered, at least for the time, from the forces of the Porte. The situation of the French army might be reckoned sufficiently satisfactory. After all the losses it had sustained, it still mustered twenty-five thousand men, the bravest and best commanded in the world. Every day must tend to bring it in closer harmony with the inhabitants and to consolidate its establishment. Bonaparte had now been a year in the country: arriving in summer before the inundation, he had employed his first moments in possessing himself of Alexandria and the capital Cairo, which he secured by the victory of the Pyramids. In the autumn and after the inundation, he had completed the subjugation of the Delta and intrusted to Desaix the conquest of Upper-Egypt. In the winter he had undertaken the expedition to Syria and destroyed the Turkish army under Djezzar at Mount Tabor. In the summer again, he had just exterminated the second army of the Porte at Aboukir. His time therefore had been fully and advantageously occupied; and whilst victory seemed to have utterly forsaken the banners of the republic in Europe, it had remained faithful to them at least in Asia and in Africa. The tri-coloured flag waved triumphantly upon the Nile and the Jordan, over the very region sanctified as the birth-place of the religion of Christ.

Regarding the affairs of France, Bonaparte was still in profound ignorance; none of the despatches from the Directory or his brothers had reached him, and he was tormented with anxiety. In the hope of picking up some news, he sent out brigs to cruise, with directions to stop merchantmen and interrogate them on events passing in Europe. He also sent an envoy on board the Turkish fleet, who, under pretence of negotiating an exchange of prisoners, was chiefly enjoined to extract intelligence. Sidney Smith accosted this envoy, entertained him civilly, and, finding that Bonaparte was unconscious of the disasters which had befallen France, took a malicious pleasure in giving him a file of newspapers. The envoy returned and placed the deposit in the hands of Bonaparte. The general consumed a whole night in devouring the contents of these prints, and in making himself acquainted with European transactions since his absence. His resolution was instantly formed; he determined to embark secretly for Europe and hazard the passage, at the risk of being taken on the voyage by the English fleet. He summoned Admiral Gantheaume, and instructed him to prepare the frigates *La Muiron* and *La Carrère* for immediate service. Without communicating his purpose to any one, he paid a hasty visit to Cairo to make his final dispositions, digested a long code of instructions for Kleber, in whom he designed to vest the command, and immediately returned to Alexandria.

On the 5th Fructidor (22d August), taking with him Berthier, Lannes, Murat, Andréossy, Marmont, Berthollet and Monge, and escorted by some of his guides, he repaired to a secluded part of the coast. Boats were in waiting; he and his companions put off and embarked on board the frigates *La Muiron* and *La Carrère*. They were followed by the corvettes *La Revanche* and *La Fortune*. The sails were instantly hoisted to get out of sight of the English cruisers by day-light. Unfortunately it fell calm; his companions were in dread of being surprised and urged returning to Alexandria, but Bonaparte would

not hearken to them. "Be still," he said, "we shall cross." Like Cæsar he relied upon his fortune.

This was not, as has been said, a base desertion of his army; for he left it victorious to brave dangers of an indefinite and formidable character, and the most frightful of all, that of being carried in captivity to London. It was rather one of those acts of temerity with which the ambitious great tempt Providence, and to which they owe that overweening confidence which alternately exalts and crushes them.

Whilst this man, big with such important destinies, thus committed himself to the hazards of the sea and of a hostile encounter, victory returned to the French flag in Europe, and the republic emerged by a sublime effort from the perils that environed it. Massena was still upon the line of the Limmat, deferring the moment to resume the offensive. The army of Italy, after having lost the battle of Novi, had dispersed on the Apennines. Happily, Suwarrov used his victory at Novi to no better purpose than that he had gained upon the Trebbia, and wasted in Piedmont an interval diligently employed by France in preparations. At this period the Aulic Council, equally fickle in its plans as the Directory had been, hit upon one calculated materially to change the aspect of events. It was jealous of the authority Suwarrov had assumed in Italy, and viewed with anger the invitation addressed by that general to the king of Sardinia to return into his dominions. The Aulic Council had other views regarding Piedmont, and desired to remove the old marshal from its vicinity. Moreover, a want of concord existed between the Russians and Austrians, and these combined reasons decided the Aulic Council to change entirely the distribution of troops upon the lines of operation. The Russians were mingled with the Austrians on both the theatres of war. Korsakoff acted in Switzerland with the Archduke Charles, and Suwarrov in Italy with Melas. The Aulic Council proposed to transport the Archduke Charles upon the Rhine, and Suwarrov into Switzerland. In this manner the two Russian armies would both operate in Switzerland. The Austrians would act alone upon the Rhine, as likewise in Italy, where they were to be speedily reinforced by a new army, intended to supply the vacuum left by Suwarrov. As motives for this alteration the Aulic Council alleged, that it was more advisable to allow the troops of each nation to combat together, that the Russians would find the temperature in Switzerland more analogous to that of their own climate, and that the movement of the Archduke upon the Rhine would aid the expedition in Holland. England could not fail to approve this plan, for she anticipated great benefit to the progress of the expedition in Holland from the presence of the Archduke on the Rhine, and was not grieved to see the Russians, who had already landed in Corfu and entertained a design upon Malta, discarded from the neighbourhood of Genoa.

This displacement, to be executed in presence of Massena, was extremely dangerous; besides, it transferred the Russians to a field which was wholly unsuited to them. Those soldiers, accustomed to charge on the plain and at the point of the bayonet, were unacquainted with the use of the musket, and in mountain warfare the chief requisite is expert marksmen. However, the Aulic Council, actuated by the ruling principle of cabinets and viewing political reasons as paramount to military, strictly enjoined the Austrian generals to offer no objection, and ordered a rigorous execution of its new plan towards the close of August.

We have already described the configuration of the theatre of war and the disposition of the armies upon that theatre.* Bodies of water issuing from the Great-Alps, now flowing in streams, now stagnating in lakes, presented different lines one within the other, commencing on the right at the base of a lofty mountain-chain, and terminating on the left in the great river which separates Germany from France. The two principal were those of the Rhine and the Limmat. Massena, obliged to abandon that of the Rhine, had recoiled upon that of the Limmat. He had even been constrained to retire a little to the rear of the latter and rest upon the Albis. The line of the Limmat did not the less separate the two armies. This line was formed by the Lint, which derives its source from the Great-Alps in the canton of Glaris, and proceeds into Lake Zurich; by Lake Zurich itself, and by the Limmat, which issues from that Lake at Zurich and eventually falls into the Aar near Brück. The Archduke Charles was behind the Limmat, extending from Brück to Zurich. Korsakoff was behind the lake of Zurich, awaiting the assignment of a position. Hotze guarded the Lint.

According to the plan prescribed, the Archduke, appointed to diverge to the Rhine, was to be replaced behind the Limmat by Korsakoff. Hotze was to remain on the Lint with the Austrian corps of the Voralberg, in order to extend a hand to Suwarrov advancing from Italy. A question of paramount importance was what route Suwarrov ought to follow. He had to scale the mountains, and might take one or other of the avenues which intersect Switzerland. If he preferred to penetrate by the valley of the Rhine, he might, by traversing the Splugen, reach the Upper-Rhine by Coire, and so effect his junction with Hotze. It was calculated he might arrive about the 5th September (3d Vendémiaire year VIII.). This movement had the advantage of being executed at a distance from the French, out of their reach, and thus independent of any accident. Suwarrov might likewise take another route, and instead of following the line of the Rhine, enter by Saint-Gothard into the valley of the Reuss, and debouch by Schweitz behind the line of the Lint occupied by the French. This march had the advantage of carrying him to the rear of the hostile line; but he had to cross the Saint-Gothard occupied by Lecourbe; a preconcerted movement by Hotze across the Lint was necessary to aid the approach of the army in its advance from Saint-Gothard; to second this movement an attack on the Limmat was essential; in a word, a general operation along the whole line was required, one perfectly well-timed and combined, a precision difficult of attainment when troops act at great distances and in such numerous detachments. This plan, which the Russians charge upon the Austrians and the Austrians upon the Russians, was nevertheless preferred. In consequence, a general attack was ordered along the whole line to be made about the end of September. At the moment Suwarrov should debouch from Saint-Gothard into the valley of the Reuss, Korsakoff was to attack below Lake Zurich, that is to say, along the Limmat, and Hotze above the lake along the Lint. Two of Hotze's lieutenants, Linken and Jellachich, were to penetrate into the canton of Glaris as far as Schweitz, and extend a hand to Suwarrov. The general junction once operated, the allied troops in Switzerland would amount to 80,000 men. Suwarrov was approaching with 18,000; Hotze had 25,000, and Korsakoff 30,000. The latter had in reserve the corps of Condé, and some thousand Bavarians. But before the junction was accomplished, the 30,000 men under

* Whatever pains I may take to render myself intelligible, I cannot hope to make the events about to follow thoroughly understood, unless the reader keep before him a map, however imperfect it may be. But those events were so extraordinary, and wrought in a manner so decided the salvation of France, that I esteem them worthy to be well pondered, and therefore recommend the reader to consult a map. The worst map of Switzerland will still be sufficient to afford a general perception of the operations.

Korsakoff and the 25,000 under Hotze, making 55,000 together, were exposed to the attacks of Massena's entire army.

In fact, the moment the Archduke quitted the Limmat, and whilst Suwarrov had not yet passed the Alps, was too favourable for Massena not to sieze, and at length emerge from the inaction which had been so severely censured. His army had been augmented to about 75,000 men by the reinforcements it had received; but it had to cover the immense line extending from Saint-Gothard to Basle. Lecourbe, forming its right, and having Gudin and Molitor under his orders, guarded Saint-Gothard, and the valley of the Reuss, and the Upper-Lint, with twelve or thirteen thousand men. Soult, with ten thousand, occupied the Lint to its fall into the lake of Zurich. Massena, with the divisions of Mortier, Klein, Lorge, and Mesnard, forming a total of thirty-seven thousand men, was upon the Limmat from Zurich to Brück. Thureau's division nine thousand strong, and Chabran's division eight, guarded, the one the Valais, the other the environs of Basle.

Although inferior in the aggregate amount of forces, Massena had the advantage of being able to concentrate his principal mass upon the essential point. Thus he had 37,000 men before the Limmat, which he could throw upon Korsakoff. The latter had just weakened himself by a detachment of 4,000 men sent as a reinforcement to Hotze, behind the lake of Zurich, which reduced him to 26,000. Condé's corps and the Bavarians, which were to serve as his reserve, were still greatly in the rear at Schaffhausen. Massena was therefore in a position to attack 26,000 men with 37,000. If he defeated Korsakoff he might turn back on Hotze, and after having routed, perhaps destroyed, them both, overwhelm Suwarrov, who was pushing into Switzerland in the expectation of finding a defeated enemy, or at least one pent up within his defensive line.

Massena, apprized of the projects of the enemy, anticipated by a day his general attack, and fixed it for the 3d Vendémiaire (25th September). Since he had retired upon the chain of the Albis, a few paces behind the Limmat, the course of that river belonged to the enemy. It was necessary to take it from him by effecting a passage, which he accordingly proposed to attempt. Whilst he was operating below Lake Zurich, he directed Soult to operate above it, and to cross the Lint on the same day. Military authorities have here censured Massena: he ought, they say, rather to have tempted Suwarrov into Switzerland than deterred him; if, therefore, instead of leaving Lecourbe to contend uselessly upon Saint-Gothard with Suwarrov, Massena had united him with Soult, he would have been more sure of overwhelming Hotze, and forcing the line of the Lint. At the same time, as the result obtained was as great as could be wished, this criticism on Massena is based only on a very rigid regard to principles.

The Limmat issues from the lake of Zurich at Zurich itself, and flows through the town dividing it into two parts. Agreeably to the plan arranged with Hotze and Suwarrov, Korsakoff had prepared to attack Massena, and with this view had moved the bulk of his forces into the quarter of Zurich situated over the Limmat. He had left but three battalions at Kloster-Fahr, to guard a point where the Limmat is most accessible, and detached Durasof with a division near the embouchure of the Limmat into the Aar to watch on that side: but his main body, 18,000 men strong at least, was in front of the river in offensive attitude.

Massena grounded his plan on this disposition of the enemy. He resolved to mask rather than attack the position of Zurich, where Korsakoff had agglomerated his forces; and with a considerable portion of his troops to hazard the passage of the Limmat at Kloster-Fahr, a point weakly defended. The passage being effected, he designed that this detachment should ascend the Limmat upon the opposite bank, and advance to the rear of Zurich. He then proposed to attack Korsakoff upon both banks, and hold him entrapped in the town of Zurich. Vast consequences might result from this operation.

Mortier with his division, which was 8,000 men strong, and occupied the right of this field of battle, was directed on Zurich. He was first to check, then to attack the Russian mass. Klein with his division, which was 10,000 men strong, was to be stationed at Altstetten, between the point of Zurich and that of Kloster-Fahr, where the passage was to be attempted. He might thus either diverge before Zurich and aid Mortier against the Russian main body, or move rapidly to the point of passage if it proved necessary to support it. His division contained 4,000 grenadiers, and a reserve of superb cavalry. Lorge's division, with a part of Mesnard's, was to perform the passage at Kloster-Fahr. These formed a corps of nearly 15,000 men. The rest of Mesnard's division was to make a demonstration on the Lower-Limmat to baffle and retain Durasof.

These dispositions, which have commanded the admiration of all critics, were put in execution at five in the morning of the 3d Vendémiaire (25th September). The preparations for the passage had been made near the village of Dietikon, with extraordinary care and secrecy. Boats had been carried by hand, and concealed in the woods. By dawn they were afloat, and the troops ranged in silence upon the bank. General Foy, afterwards so distinguished as an orator, commanded the artillery on this eventful day. He planted several batteries in a manner to protect the passage. Six hundred men fearlessly embarked and landed on the opposite shore. They immediately charged the enemy's sharp-shooters and dispersed them. Korsakoff had stationed three battalions with cannon on the plateau of Kloster-Fahr. The French artillery, more efficiently directed, soon silenced the fire of the Russian guns, and protected the successive passage of the whole vanguard. When General Gazan had added a sufficient reinforcement to the 600 men who had first crossed, he marched against the three Russian battalions guarding Kloster-Fahr. These were planted in a wood, and defended themselves with great bravery. Gazan surrounded them, and was obliged to slay them almost to the last man to dislodge them. These three battalions cut to pieces, the bridge was thrown over. The remainder of Lorge's division and part of Mesnard's passed the Limmat: thus 15,000 men were transported beyond the river. Bontemp's brigade was stationed at Regensdorf to confront Durasof if he endeavoured to ascend from the Lower-Limmat. The bulk of the troops, directed by the chief of the staff Oudinot, skirted the Limmat to reach the rear of Zurich.

This portion of the movement accomplished, Massenna returned in person to the other bank of the Limmat to overlook the motions of his wings. Towards the Lower-Limmat, Mesnard had so completely deceived Durasof by his demonstrations, that the latter had hastened to the bank of the stream and there deployed all his strength. On the right, Mortier had advanced on Zurich by Wollishofen, but had there encountered Korsakoff's mainbody, posted, as we said, in front of the Limmat, and been compelled to fall back. Massena, arriving at this moment, brought up Klein's division from Altstetten. Humbert, at the head of 4,000 grenadiers, marched on Zurich and restored the combat. Mortier renewed his attack, and the French succeeded in driving the Russians into Zurich.

Meanwhile, Korsakoff, perplexed at hearing cannon on his rear, had retransported some battalions beyond the Limmat; but this feeble succour was unavailing; and Oudinot had continued to ascend the Limmat

with his 15,000 men. He had stormed a small encampment at Hong, as also the heights to the rear of Zurich, and occupied the high road to Winterthur, which gives access into Germany, and was the only avenue by which the Russians could retire.

The day was now drawing to a close, and great results had been prepared for the morrow. The Russians were cooped up in Zurich; Massena had moved, by the passage at Kloster-Fahr, 15,000 men on their rear, and planted 18,000 in front of them. It was difficult for them to avert a disaster. Cavillers have contended that, instead of leaving Klein's division before Zurich, Massena ought to have carried it by Kloster-Fahr behind that town, so as wholly to bar the route of Winterthur. But he feared that Mortier remaining with 8,000 men only, Korsakoff might pass through him and throw himself on the Lint. True, Korsakoff in such case would have encountered Soult and Lecourbe; but he also might have fallen in with Suwarrov coming from Italy, and none can determine the possible consequences of so singular a combination.

Korsakoff had at length become conscious of his real position and moved his troops into the other quarter of Zurich behind the Limmat. Durasof, on the Lower-Limmat, having learnt the fact of the passage, had departed stealthily, and, avoiding Bontemps' brigade by a circuit, advanced to regain the Winterthur road. The combat of the following day, the 4th Vendémiaire (26th September), was necessarily to be of a desperate character, for the Russians would naturally attempt to break through, and the French to secure the greatest amount of success. The battle began at early dawn. The unfortunate town of Zurich, encumbered with artillery, baggage-waggons, and wounded soldiers, and cannonaded from all sides, was enveloped in flames. On this side the Limmat, Mortier and Klein had approached and were ready to enter it; on the other, Oudinot pressed on it from the rear, intent to debar Korsakoff from disentangling himself and attaining the route of Winterthur. This road was the scene of a sanguinary contest, being taken and re-taken several times. Determined at last to make a vigorous effort to extricate himself, Korsakoff placed his infantry in the van, his cavalry in the centre, his artillery and baggage in the rear, and thus advanced in form of a long column. His intrepid infantry charged the French with fury, overthrew all before them, and opened a passage; but when it had passed with part of the cavalry, the French returned to the charge, attacked the residue of the cavalry and the baggage, and drove them back to the gates of Zurich. At the same moment Klein and Mortier appeared on the opposite side. For some time an obstinate conflict was waged in the streets. The illustrious and unfortunate Lavater received a ball at the door of his dwelling, fired by a drunken Swiss soldier, who levelled his musket at him with a demand for money; he fell from a severe wound in the thigh, of which he died some months afterwards. Eventually, all the Russian force remaining in Zurich was compelled to surrender at discretion. One hundred pieces of cannon, all the baggage, the administrations, the army-chest, and five thousand prisoners, became the prey of the French. Korsakoff had lost eight thousand men besides, killed or wounded, in the engagement. Eight and five make thirteen, exactly half of his army. The glorious victories in Italy had not been attended by more substantial trophies. The effect, too, upon the remainder of the campaign was calculated to be equally great with the mere material acquisitions. Korsakoff with his remnant of 13,000 men sought in all haste to regain the Rhine.

In the meantime, Soult, directed to pass the Lint above Lake Zurich, executed his commission with not less success than the general-in-chief. He had effected the passage between Biltem and Richemburg. One hundred and fifty soldiers, bearing their pieces above their heads, had swam across the river, scaled the opposite bank, chased away the sharp-shooters, and protected the passage of the vanguard. Hotze, having hastened immediately to the point of danger, had been shot dead, which threw the Austrian ranks into great confusion. Petrasch, who succeeded Hotze, had in vain struggled to force back into the Lint the corps which had passed; he had been obliged to recoil, and retire precipitately on St. Gall and the Rhine, leaving 3,000 prisoners and several pieces of cannon. On their side also, Generals Jellachich and Linken, detached to advance by the Upper-Lint into the canton of Glaris to receive Suwarrov at the avenue of Saint-Gothard, had retreated on hearing of these misfortunes. Thus, nearly 60,000 men were already repulsed from the line of the Limmat beyond that of the Rhine with prodigious loss. Suwarrov, who expected to debouch into Switzerland on the flank of an enemy assailed on all sides and to decide his defeat by his arrival, was destined on the contrary to find all his lieutenants dispersed, and to be entangled amidst an army victorious in all directions.

Starting from Italy with 18,000 men, Suwarrov had reached the foot of Saint-Gothard on the fifth complementary day of the year VII. (21st September). He had been obliged to dismount his Cossacks to load his artillery on the backs of their horses. He dispatched Rosemberg with 6,000 men to turn Saint-Gothard by Disentis and the Crispalt. Arriving on the 1st Vendémiaire (23d September) at Airolo, at the mouth of the gorge of Saint-Gothard, he there encountered Gudin with a brigade of Lecourbe's division. He fought with his wonted obstinacy; but his soldiers, bad marksmen, capable only of advancing and meeting death, fell in whole platoons under balls and stones. He determined at length to threaten Gudin on his flanks, and thus compelled him to yield the gorge as far as the hospital. By his resistance, Gudin had given Lecourbe time to collect his troops. But having at command but 6,000 men, the latter was unable to resist Suwarrov who advanced with 12,000, whilst Rosemberg, already arrived at Urseren, had 6,000 on his rear. He threw his artillery into the Reuss, gained the opposite bank by scaling almost inaccessible rocks, and plunged into the valley. Arrived beyond Urseren, and having Rosemberg no longer in his rear, he broke down the Devil's Bridge and slew a multitude of Russians before they had cleared the precipice by descending into the bed of the Reuss and climbing the opposite bank. He thus retreated foot by foot, profiting by all obstacles to weary and destroy the soldiers of Suwarrov.

The Russian army thus arrived at Altorf, at the extremity of the valley of the Reuss, exhausted with fatigues, destitute of provisions, and greatly weakened by the losses it had sustained. At Altorf, the Reuss falls into Lake Lucerne. If, according to the preconcerted plan, Hotze had been enabled to push forward Jellachich and Linken beyond the Lint to Schweitz, he would have sent boats to receive Suwarrov at the mouth of the Reuss. But after the events which had occurred, Suwarrov found no means of embarking, and discovered himself shut up in a frightful valley. It was the 4th Vendémiaire (the 26th September), the day of disaster along the whole Austro-Russian line. There remained to him no resource but throwing himself into the Schachenthal and passing over horrible mountains, where no beaten road existed, in order to penetrate into the valley of Müttenthal. He set out on the following day. Only one man at a time could advance along the path he had to follow. His army consumed two days in traversing this interval of a few leagues. The foremost soldier was already at Mütten before the last had started from Altorf. The precipices were strewed

with carriages, horses and soldiers dying of hunger or fatigue. Arrived in the valley of Müttenthal, Suwarrov might debouch by Schweitz not far from Lake Zurich, or ascend the valley, and by Bragel make good his way to the Lint. But on the side of Schweitz, Massena approached with Mortier's division, and on the side of Bragel stood Molitor, occupying the defile of Klönthal towards the banks of the Lint. After giving his troops two days' rest, Suwarrov resolved to retrograde by Bragel. On the 8th Vendémiaire (30th September) he commenced his march. Massena attacked him in rear, whilst on the side of Bragel Molitor kept him at bay in the defile of Klönthal. Rosemberg valiantly resisted the attacks of Massena; but Bagration struggled in vain to pierce Molitor. He succeeded in opening the route of Glaris, but was unable to penetrate that of Wesen. After a series of obstinate and bloody conflicts, intercepted on all the avenues, and driven back on Glaris, Suwarrov had no alternative but to ascend the valley of Engi in order to attain that of the Rhine. But this route was even more fearful than the one he had previously traversed. He entered upon it nevertheless, and after four days of toil and hardships almost unprecedented, reached Coire and the Rhine. Of his eighteen thousand men, he had rescued scarcely ten. The corpses of his soldiers lined the chain of the Alps. This barbarian, asserted to be invincible, retreated covered with confusion and maddened with rage. In the course of a fortnight, upwards of twenty thousand Russians and from five to six thousand Austrians had perished or been made captive. The armies arrayed to invade France were hunted out of Switzerland and repulsed ignominiously into Germany. The coalition was dissolved, for Suwarrov, exasperated against the Austrians, refused to serve any longer with them. It may in truth be said that France was saved.

Eternal glory to Massena, who thus achieved one of the most memorable operations which the history of war records, and which saved France at a moment more perilous than that of Valmy or Fleurus! Great victories are to be admired from their conception or political results; but those are to be especially celebrated which conduce to deliverance. Applause is due to the first, gratitude to the latter. Zurich is Massena's brightest gem, and none exists of purer lustre in any military diadem.

Whilst these auspicious events were passing in Switzerland, victory also declared for France in Holland. Brune, feebly pressed by the enemy, had enjoyed leisure to concentrate his forces, and after having worsted the Anglo-Russians at Kastrikum, had chased them to Zyp, where he reduced them to capitulate. The conditions were the evacuation of Holland, the restitution of all that had been taken at the Helder, and the liberation, without exchange, of 8,000 prisoners. The restoration of the Dutch fleet was likewise desired, but the English refused it, and in sanctioning the capitulation, the evils they might inflict on the country were taken into consideration.

Thus terminated the memorable campaign of 1799. The French republic, entering too prematurely on action, and committing the error of assuming the offensive without having concentrated its forces, had been discomfited at Stockach and Magnano, and lost by those two defeats Germany and Italy. Massena, remaining alone in Switzerland, stood dangerously prominent between two victorious armies. He had recoiled on the Rhine, then on the Limmat, and eventually on the Albis. There he had continued invulnerable during a space of four months. In the interim, the army of Naples, endeavouring to unite with the army of Upper-Italy, had been beaten on the Trebbia. Subsequently combined with that army behind the Apennines, rallied and reinforced, it had lost its general at Novi, been defeated afresh, and definitively driven from Italy. The Apennines even were carried, and the Var menaced. But this had proved the limit of the French disasters. The coalition, displacing its forces, had moved the Archduke on the Rhine and Suwarrov into Switzerland. Massena, seizing this moment, had worsted Korsakoff deprived of the Archduke, and routed Suwarrov deprived of Korsakoff. He had thus retrieved the French misfortunes by an immortal victory. In the East, glorious triumphs had terminated the campaign. But, it must be confessed, if these great exploits had sustained the republic when ready to succumb, if they had restored some glory to it, they had restored neither its grandeur nor its power. France was saved, but only saved; she had not yet recovered her rank, and was even menaced with invasion from the banks of the Var.

CHAPTER LXIII.

RETURN OF BONAPARTE.—HIS DEBARKATION AT FREJUS.—EXCITEMENT AMONGST ALL PARTIES ON HIS RETURN.—HIS COALITION WITH SIEYES TO OVERTURN THE DIRECTORIAL CONSTITUTION.—PREPARATIONS FOR AND REVOLUTION OF THE 18TH BRUMAIRE.—INSTITUTION OF THE PROVISIONAL CONSULATE.—CONCLUSION OF THIS HISTORY.

The tidings of the battle of Zurich, and the capitulation of the Anglo-Russians, arrived in quick succession, and revived public confidence. It was the first time the odious Russians had been defeated, and their complete overthrow was a source of the deepest satisfaction. But Italy was still forfeited, the Var menaced, the southern frontier in danger. The grandeur of Campo-Formio was far from being restored to France. Yet, in truth, the chief peril it incurred was not exterior, but internal. A disorganized government, refractory parties, spurning the yoke of authority, and yet not sufficiently powerful to usurp and exercise it; an universal derangement or social dissolution, with gangs of brigands, the symptom of that dissolution, infesting the highways, especially in the provinces formerly distracted by civil war:—such was the situation of the republic. A respite of some months being insured by the victory of Zurich, it was not so much a defender that was needed at the present moment as a chief who could grasp and wield the reins of government. The great mass of the population sighed, at any price, for tranquillity, for order, for the termination of dissensions, and the unity of purposes. It dreaded Jacobins, Chouans, Emigrants, all parties equally. The moment was one of marvellous aptitude for a man capable of uniting all suffrages and stilling all apprehensions.

The dispatches containing an account of the expedition to Syria, and of the battles of Mount Tabor and Aboukir, produced an extraordinary sensation, and confirmed the general belief that the hero of Castiglione and Rivoli must conquer wherever he appeared. His name was again immediately on all lips, and the question *what is he doing? when will he come?* renewed on all sides. *If he would but return!* was the universal exclamation. By a singular presentiment, a rumour that he had arrived prevailed twice or thrice. His brothers had written to him, and his wife likewise; but it was uncertain whether their letters had ever reached him. We know that they had not succeeded in escaping the English cruisers.

Meanwhile, the personage, the object of such constant speculation, was calmly treading the seas amidst the English fleets. His voyage had not been prosperous; contrary winds procrastinated it. Several times the English had been seen and fears suggested

of falling into their power. He alone, pacing the deck of his vessel with a serene and placid countenance, confided in his fortune, and inspired others with a similar reliance, rebuking useless solicitude for predestined evils. He studied the pages of the Bible and the Koran, the sacred writings of the populations he had left behind him. Fearing, after late events, that the south of France might be invaded, he directed the vessels to be steered, not towards the coast of Provence, but towards those of Languedoc. He wished to disembark at Collioure. or Port-Vendres. A gust of wind had carried him to Corsica. The whole island had flocked to greet its renowned citizen. He then set sail for Toulon. That port was almost reached, when, suddenly, as the sun sank beneath the horizon, thirty hostile sail were descried on the larboard quarter of the vessel: they were seen flitting in the rays of the setting sun. It was proposed to hoist out a boat to land in secrecy. Still trusting to his destiny, Bonaparte preferred to wait. The enemy, in fact, shortly disappeared, and at break of day, on the 17th Vendémiaire year VIII. (9th October 1799), the frigates *Le Muiron* and *La Carrère*, with the corvettes *La Revanche* and *La Fortune*, cast anchor in the bay of Frejus.

The people of Provence had been tormented with dread, for three successive years, of the horrors of an invasion. Bonaparte had freed them from this woful apprehension in 1796; but it had recurred more keenly than ever since the battle of Novi. On learning that Bonaparte was moored off their coast, they hailed his arrival as that of their preserver. All the inhabitants of Frejus hurried to the beach, and in an instant the sea was covered with boats. Inflamed with enthusiasm and curiosity, they boarded the vessels, and in defiance of sanatory laws, held eager intercourse with the new-comers. All clamoured for Bonaparte, all demanded to see him. It was no longer time to enforce an observance of quarantine regulations. The board of health felt bound to relieve the general from their operation, for it might have condemned the whole population to undergo the ordeal, since the crews had been indiscriminately mingled with. Bonaparte immediately proceeded to shore, desirous of posting with all speed to Paris.

The telegraph, quick as the wind, had already communicated along the route from Frejus to Paris the great news of Bonaparte's landing. Everywhere the most tumultuous joy was expressed. The tidings, announced at all the theatres, elicited extraordinary raptures. Patriotic songs superseded dramatic representations. The deputy Baudin of the Ardennes, one of the authors of the constitution of the year III., a reflective and sincere republican, whose attachment to the republic amounted to a passion, and who foreboded its subversion unless a powerful arm appeared to sustain it, Baudin of the Ardennes, we say, expired with joy when he heard the intelligence.

Bonaparte started on the very day of his arrival for Paris. He passed through Aix, Avignon, Valence, and Lyons. In all these towns the enthusiasm was boundless. The bells peeled in every town and village, and during the night bonfires were lighted along the roads. At Lyons especially, the manifestations were even more energetic than elsewhere. In departing from that city, Bonaparte, who wished to enter Paris incognito, took a different route from that he had indicated to his couriers. His wife and brothers, deceived as to his direction, had hastened to meet him, whilst he arrived at Paris. On the 24th Vendémiaire (16th October), he had reached his house in the rue Chantereine without any one suspecting his arrival. Two hours afterwards he repaired to the Directory. The guard recognised him, and uttered on seeing him the cry of *Bonaparte for ever!* He hurried to the apartments of the president of the Directory, who happened to be Gohier. It was arranged that he should be presented on the following day to the Directory. On the morrow accordingly, he appeared before that supreme body. He addressed it, saying that after having consolidated the establishment of his army in Egypt by the victories of Mount Tabor and Aboukir, and intrusted its fate to a general capable of insuring its prosperity, he had flown to the succour of the republic, which he deemed in imminent jeopardy. He found it saved by the exploits of his brethren in arms and rejoiced. "Never," he added, placing his hand on his sword, "would he draw it except for the defence of the republic." The president congratulated him on his triumphs and on his return, and extended to him the fraternal embrace. His reception was in appearance most cordial; but at heart jealousy and apprehension were too real, and too well justified by the situation of affairs, for his return to be a source of pleasure to the five republican magistrates.

When after an interval of listless indifference men awaken and interest themselves in an object, it is usually with impassioned ardour. In the state of prostration into which opinions, parties, and authorities had fallen, for some time nothing had existed to inspire sympathy or attachment. A feeling of unmitigated disgust with men and things pervaded the whole community. But at the appearance of the extraordinary individual, whom the East had in so unforeseen a manner returned to Europe, this apathy and aversion ceased. He arose as the star of hope, and fixed universal expectation and regard.

All the generals, employed or not employed, patriot or moderate, hastened to welcome Bonaparte. This was but natural, since he was the first member of their ambitious and discontented class. In him it seemed to have found an avenger against the government. All the ministers, and all the functionaries successively disgraced during the fluctuations of the Directory, likewise flocked to pay court to the new arrival. Ostensibly they attended to visit the illustrious warrior, but in reality to observe and offer homage to the potent personage who seemed to hold the future at his nod.

Bonaparte had brought with him Lannes, Murat, and Berthier, and they were in his train at all times. Shortly Jourdan, Augereau, Macdonald, Beurnonville, Leclerc, Lefebvre, and Marbot, despite their differences of opinion, mustered around him. Moreau himself after a brief delay formed part of this retinue. Bonaparte had met him at Gohier's. Feeling that his superiority permitted him to make the first advances, he accosted Moreau, testified his desire to form his acquaintance, and expressed for him an esteem which deeply moved the general. He subsequently presented to him a Damascus blade enriched with jewels, and succeeded in wholly gaining him. In a few days Moreau was enrolled of his court. He also harboured dissatisfaction, and resorted with his comrades to the presumed avenger. To these celebrated captains were added men of all professions. Amongst others were Bruix, ex-minister of the navy, who had recently scoured the Mediterranean at the head of the French and Spanish fleets, a man of subtle and acute intellect, equally capable of conducting a negotiation as of commanding a squadron, and M. de Talleyrand, who had reason to fear the displeasure of Bonaparte on account of his not having repaired to Constantinople. But M. de Talleyrand confided in his ability, his name, and his importance for a favourable reception, and he was not deceived. Their mutual predilection was too strong, and their reciprocal need of association too attractive, to remain estranged. Amongst the attendants in the rue Chantereine were likewise counted Rœderer, the old procurator of the Commune, a frank and intelligent personage, and Regnault de Saint-Jean-d'Angely, an ex-constituent to whom Bonaparte had been attached

in Italy and whom he had employed at Malta, a brilliant and accomplished orator.

But they were not only the discarded and the malcontent who besieged Bonaparte. The chiefs of the government frequented his domicile with similar assiduity. The directors and ministers vied in entertaining him as on his return from Italy. A large proportion of the members of the two Councils sought to be presented to him. The ministers and directors rendered him a homage still more flattering; they came to consult him every instant on the business of the state. Dubois-Crancé, the minister at war, had in some sort transferred his portfolio to Bonaparte's residence. Moulins, who of the directors more peculiarly arrogated the war department, passed a part of each morning with him. Gohier and Roger-Ducos were equally constant in their attentions. Cambaceres, the minister of justice, an expert jurisconsult, who entertained for Bonaparte the reverence weak men yield to strength, and whom Bonaparte affected to caress as a proof he could appreciate civil attainments; Fouché, minister of police, who was not unwilling to exchange his old and emasculated patron, Barras, for a new and puissant protector; Réal, commissary in the department of the Seine, an ardent and ingenuous patriot, and one of the most intellectual men of the time, all diligently plied their court to Bonaparte, and craved deferentially his views of public policy. He had been scarcely a week in Paris, and already the government of affairs had devolved upon him almost involuntarily. In default of actual authority, of which he was as yet destitute, his advice was earnestly solicited. He, with his accustomed reserve, affected to shun the attentions bestowed on him. He refused to receive numbers of people, seldom showed himself, and crept abroad so to speak by stealth. His features had become harder, and his complexion darker in hue. He usually wore, since his return, a short grey riding-coat, and a Turkish scimitar slung upon a silken cord. To those who saw him thus attired, this latter appendage vividly recalled the East, the Pyramids, Mount Tabor, and Aboukir. The officers of the garrison, the forty adjutants of the national guard, the staff of the division, requested leave to wait upon him. He deferred their reception from day to day, and appeared to comply reluctantly with these exhibitions of homage. Meanwhile he listened, opened himself to no one, and scanned narrowly men and things. This conduct was sagacious and profound. When a man is necessary, he has nothing to dread by waiting. He but irritates impatience, induces applications, and enables himself to choose his part and dictate terms.

"What is Bonaparte going to do?" was the question canvassed on all sides. It proved that something inevitable was expected from him. Two principal parties, and a third, a subdivision of the two others, offered themselves to him and were disposed to serve him if he adopted their views: these were the patriots, the moderates or politicians, and the *putrid*, as they were called, the corrupt of all times and of all factions.

The patriots distrusted Bonaparte and his ambition; but with their taste for subverting and their improvidence for the morrow, they would have used him as an instrument to overturn the existing state of things, content to take on hazard a future reconstruction. At the same time, this course was advocated only by the more violent, who, always discontented with the actual condition, regarded the task of destroying as the most urgent of all. The rest of the patriots, those who may be styled republicans, were jealous of the fame of the general, and desired at the utmost that he should be elevated to the Directory, reflecting with pain that for this purpose a special dispensation must be granted to him on account of his age, but wished most of all that he should repair to the frontiers to restore the glory of the French arms and exalt the republic to its former grandeur.

The moderates or politicians, men dreading the fury of parties, and particularly that of the Jacobins, having no longer any faith in a violated and worn-out constitution, contemplated a change, and were anxious that it should be accomplished under the auspices of an influential personage. "Take the power, give us a wise and moderate constitution, and afford us security," was the secret language they addressed to Bonaparte. They composed the most numerous party in France, comprising even many compromised patriots, who, entertaining fears for the revolution, desired to intrust its safety to a powerful supporter. They had a majority in the Ancients, and a strong minority in the Five-Hundred. They had hitherto followed the chief civil celebrity of the day, Sieyes, and the more cordially that Sieyes had been grossly abused in the club of the Manege. At present they were necessarily inclined to adhere still more zealously to Bonaparte; for it was effective strength they mainly sought, and that was much greater in a victorious general than in a publicist, however renowned he might be.

Lastly, the *putrid* comprehended all the knaves and intriguers who strove to amass fortunes, and had disgraced themselves in such efforts, but who were prepared to reap further illicit gains at the same cost. They followed Barras and Fouché the minister of police. They were made up of all parties, Jacobins, moderates, and even royalists. They formed not a party so much as a numerous sect or coterie.

In the sequel of this enumeration, it is not necessary to mention the partisans of royalty. They were too completely crushed since the 18th Fructidor, and moreover Bonaparte inspired them with no hopes. Such a man as he could be none other than egotistical in his ambition, and must scorn to grasp power merely to surrender it into the hands of others. They contented themselves, therefore, with swelling the number of the enemies of the Directory, and with assailing it after the fashion of all parties.

Amongst these different parties, Bonaparte had but one choice to make. The patriots were wholly repugnant to him. Some of them, attached to the existing condition, suspected his ambition; others desired a physical-force overthrow, and then a revival of interminable agitation; with them nothing stable could be founded. Besides they were in opposition to the spirit of the times, and were in the last throes of their pristine ardour. The *putrid* were of no account; they had no influence except in the government into which they had naturally crept, for thither tended all their desires. For the rest, it was unnecessary to be concerned about them; they were sure to side with him who combined most chances in his favour, for their sole aspiration was to gain office and money. The only party on which Bonaparte could repose was that which, partaking the cravings of the whole population, aspired to place the republic beyond the prey of factions, by constituting it in a solid manner. Here a wide future was opened, and here it behoved him to take his position.

His determination could not be doubtful; mere instinct prompted to it by anticipation. Bonaparte had an abhorrence of turbulent men, and also of corrupt. He could relish only such as were content to be governed. In this category was involved almost the entire nation. Still his vocation was to temporize, suffer himself to be tempted by the offers of parties, and study their leaders, to ascertain with whom amongst them policy might advise an alliance.

The parties were all represented in the Directory. The patriots had, as we have seen, Moulins and Gohier. The *putrid* had Barras. The politicians or moderates had Sieyes and Roger-Ducos.

Gohier and Moulins, sincere and honest patriots,

more moderate than their party since they were in the exercise of power, admired Bonaparte; but, averse to use his sword otherwise than for the glory of the constitution of the year III., they wished to send him to the armies. Bonaparte treated them with great consideration; he esteemed their honesty, a quality he always honoured in men (a disposition natural and interested in one born to govern). Furthermore, the regard he manifested towards them was a mode of demonstrating his respect for true republicans. His wife had formed a close intimacy with Madame Gohier. She calculated in this manner, and had said to Madame Gohier: "My intimacy with you will supply an answer to all these calumnies."

Barras, who felt his political end approaching, and saw in Bonaparte an inevitable successor, detested him most cordially. He would have stooped to flatter him as formerly, only he was conscious of being more thoroughly despised by him, and therefore held aloof. Bonaparte entertained for this ignorant, corrupt, and besotted debauchee, an aversion rendered every day more insurmountable. The epithet of *putrid*, which he had given to him and his kind, sufficiently marked his disgust and contempt. It was impossible he should consent to be allied with such a character.

Sieyes remained; a man veritably important in every essential respect, and dragging in his train Roger-Ducos. In raising Sieyes to the Directory immediately before the 30th Prairial, it seemed as if it were intended to constitute him the presiding genius of the republic. Bonaparte eyed him with a certain spleen for having occupied the first place in his absence, fixed for a moment general attention, and given birth to expectations. He harboured a resentment against him he disdained to explain. Although strongly opposed in genius and habits, they both enjoyed that degree of superiority which permitted them to treat and merge their differences, but each had too much pride to make concessions. Unfortunately they had never yet maintained any intercourse, and two lofty spirits that have not exchanged flatteries are natural enemies. They kept each other in observation, reciprocally waiting for the other to tender the first advances. They chanced to meet at a dinner-party given by Gohier. Bonaparte had felt sufficiently above Moreau to proffer the first overtures; he had a different impression with regard to Sieyes, and abstained from speaking to him. The latter maintained a like silence. They retired in mutual wrath. "Did you mark this little insolent?" said Sieyes; "he did not even salute the member of a government which ought to have him shot!" "What possessed you," said Bonaparte on his part, "to put this priest in the Directory? He is sold to Prussia, and if you don't take care he will deliver you to her." Thus, in men of the greatest superiority pride prevails even over policy. But, sooth to say, were it otherwise, they would lack that haughty assumption which fits them to domineer over mortals.

Accordingly, the individual whom it chiefly behoved Bonaparte to gain was precisely he for whom he felt an incorrigible repugnance. But their interests were so identical that, by their several partisans and in their own despite, they were to be rivetted in a common cause.

Whilst this alienation continued, and the concourse around Bonaparte grew daily larger, he, uncertain yet as to the part he ought to take, had sounded Gohier and Moulins to ascertain whether they would consent to his nomination as a director, notwithstanding his defect of age. It was in the place of Sieyes he would have designed to enter the government. By excluding Sieyes, he would become master of his colleagues, and be assured of governing under their name. This, doubtless, was but an imperfect success; nevertheless it afforded the means of arriving at power without actually perpetrating a revolution; and once in possession, he might await a further development. Whether he were really sincere, or merely meant to deceive them, as is possible, and persuade them that his ambition was confined to a seat in the Directory, it is certain he sounded them, and found them intractable upon the subject of age. A dispensation, albeit granted by the Councils, appeared to them an infraction of the constitution. So it became incumbent to relinquish this idea if ever veritably formed.

Gohier and Moulins, beginning to be alarmed at the impatience they conceived Bonaparte displayed to assume political functions, recommended his removal by giving him the command of an army. Sieyes demurred to this conclusion, remarking with bitterness that, so far from affording him an opportunity to gather fresh glory, it was advisable on the contrary to overlook him, and so cause him to be forgotten. As the suggestion of sending him into Italy was started, Barras observed that he had harvested sufficient plunder there to have no wish to return. In the end, it was resolved to request his attendance with the view of offering him a command, leaving to himself the choice of the army.

Bonaparte, being accordingly summoned, repaired to the Directory. He was cognizant of Barras' remark. Before the object for which he was called had been intimated to him, he addressed the Directory in a lofty and menacing tone, cited the observation of which he had to complain, and, fixing his eyes on Barras, said that if he had made his fortune in Italy, it was not, at least, at the expense of the republic. Barras was silent. The president Gohier replied to Bonaparte that the government was well convinced that his laurels constituted the only wealth he had amassed in Italy. He then proceeded to state that the Directory invited him to accept a command, and referred to himself the choice of his army. Bonaparte answered coldly, that he had not yet sufficiently recovered from his fatigues; that the transition from a dry to a humid climate had severely tried his constitution, and that he still required some time to retrieve his health. He withdrew without deigning further explanation. This occurrence was eminently calculated to warn the Directory of his views and to acquaint him also with their suspicions.

It furnished a motive to act with promptitude. His brothers, his habitual advisers, Rœderer, Réal, Regnault de Saint-Jean d'Angely, Bruix, and Talleyrand, brought to him every day members of the moderate and political party in the Councils. Amongst the principal of these were, in the Five-Hundred, Boulay de la Meurthe, Gaudin, Chazal, Cabanis, and Chenier; in the Ancients, Cornudet, Lemercier, Fargues, and Daunou. All concurred in opinion that an alliance with the genuine party, to wit, the reorganizing, was indispensable, and consequently a coalition with Sieyes, who had a constitution ready compiled, and a majority in the Council of Ancients. Bonaparte acquiesced in this opinion, sensible that he had really no alternative; but then there was the obstacle of an approximation with Sieyes. But the interests at stake were so great, and between his sensitive pride and that of Sieyes there were mediators so delicate and so adroit, that a pacification could not long be delayed. M. de Talleyrand was fitted to soothe more savage and indomitable antipathies than theirs. The negotiation was speedily opened and concluded. It was agreed that a stronger constitution should be given to France under the auspices of Sieyes and Bonaparte. Without entering into explanations touching the form and nature of this constitution, it was understood that it should be republican, whilst it delivered France from what both the one and the other called "brawlers," and that it should vest in the two high contracting personages the preponderance of authority.

A dogmatist intent on the long deferred accomplishment of his conceptions and an ambitious warrior aspiring to rule the world, were, in the prostration of all systems and all strength, signally fitted to coalesce. Their incompatibility of disposition was of little consequence. The address of mediators and the gravity of interests sufficed to alleviate this inconvenience, at least for the moment, and this moment was sufficient to work out a revolution.

Bonaparte, therefore, was persuaded to act with Sieyes and Roger-Ducos. He still evinced the same repugnance towards Barras, and the same consideration for Gohier and Moulins, but maintained an equal reserve with all three. Fouché, however, skilful in divining a rising fortune, viewed with the deepest regret the distaste of Bonaparte for his patron Barras, and was especially grieved to perceive that Barras took no pains to mitigate it. He himself was fully determined to pass into the camp of the new Cæsar; but hesitating, through a remnant of shame, to abandon his protector, he wished to carry him in his train. Assiduous in his attentions to Bonaparte, and sufficiently well received on account of his holding the portfolio of police, he strove to overcome his animosity against Barras. In this endeavour he was seconded by Réal, Bruix, and the other adherents of the general. Believing he had succeeded, he prompted Barras to invite Bonaparte to dinner. Barras sent him an invitation accordingly for the 8th Brumaire (30th October). Bonaparte accepted it and attended. After dinner a conversation on public affairs was commenced. Bonaparte and Barras discoursed apart. The latter first broke ground. He preluded by a tissue of generalities on his personal position. Anticipating doubtless that Bonaparte would contradict him, he affirmed that he was ill, worn-out, and condemned to relinquish office. Bonaparte preserving a solemn silence, Barras proceeded to remark that the republic was disorganized, and that to save it he deemed a concentration of power and the nomination of a president requisite; instancing General Hedouville as a fit person to fill that post. Hedouville was equally obscure and incompetent. Barras shrouded his real design, and designated Hedouville to avoid naming himself.—"As to you, general," he subjoined, "your purpose is to repair to the army; proceed thither to gain fresh glory and replace France in her proper rank. For myself, I propose to seek the retirement which I so much need."—Bonaparte threw on Barras a fixed gaze, answered not a word, and so allowed the conference to pause. Barras, disconcerted, added not another syllable. Bonaparte immediately withdrew, and before quitting the Luxembourg visited the apartments of Sieyes. He there declared to him emphatically that he would act with him alone, and that they had only to settle the means of execution. Their alliance was cemented at this interview, and it was agreed to make preparations for the 18th or 20th Brumaire.

On returning home, Bonaparte found Fouché, Réal, and the other friends of Barras.—"Well! your Barras," he exclaimed to them, "do you know what he has proposed to me? To make a president, who is to be Hedouville, that is to say, himself, and for me, I am to go to the wars! Nothing can be done with such a man."—The friends of Barras attempted to palliate this absurdity and to exculpate Barras. Bonaparte gave little heed to their remarks and changed the subject, for his determination was taken. Fouché immediately repaired to Barras to lecture him on his folly, and urged him to hasten and correct the effect of his stupidity. Early the following morning, in fact, Barras betook himself to Bonaparte's in order to excuse his words of the preceding evening; he tendered him his devotion and his co-operation in all he might contemplate. Bonaparte heard him with inattention, answered him by generalities, and in his turn spoke of his fatigues, his debilitated health, and his disgust at men and things.

Barras perceived he was lost, and his career about to terminate. It was full time he should reap the reward of his double intrigues and of his base treacheries. The ardent patriots repudiated him since his conduct towards the society of the Manege. The republicans, attached to the constitution of the year III., regarded him with suspicion and contempt. The reorganizers, the politicians, saw in him a man utterly discredited, and applied to him the epithet of "Putrid," invented by Bonaparte. He retained merely some relations with the royalists by means of certain emigrants concealed in his court. His intrigues with them were of ancient date; they had commenced from the 18th Fructidor. He had communicated them to the Directory, and obtained authority to continue them in order to detect the ramifications of the counter-revolution. He had thus contrived the means of betraying at will the republic or the pretender. At this moment there was a negotiation with the latter touching the payment of several millions to promote his return. It is possible, at the same time, that Barras was not sincere with the pretender, for all his predilections must have been for the republic. But to judge accurately the preferences of this veteran corruptionist would be difficult. Perhaps he was unconscious of them himself. Moreover, on this point of corruption, a little money would unhappily prevail over all the prepossessions of inclination or principle.

Fouché, appalled at the disgrace of his patron, and shocked more especially at finding himself involved in his fate, redoubled his court to Bonaparte. The latter, distrusting a person of his character, studiously kept from him his secrets; but Fouché, nothing daunted, for he was profoundly sensible of Bonaparte's inevitable success, resolved to overcome his prejudices by force of services. Holding the police department, which he managed with great skill, he knew that a conspiracy was on foot. Of this fact he abstained from apprizing the Directory, the majority of which, comprehending Moulins, Gohier, and Barras, might have drawn from his revelations a discovery fatal to its contrivers.

Bonaparte had been but a fortnight in Paris, and nearly all was prepared for the blow. Berthier, Lannes, and Murat daily added to his partisans amongst the generals and officers. Of these, Bernadotte from jealousy, Jourdan from attachment to the republic, and Augereau from pure jacobinism, held back and had inspired apprehensions in the patriots of the Five-Hundred; but the bulk of the military was gained. Moreau, a sincere republican, but suspected by the predominant patriots, and discontented with the Directory which had so unworthily rewarded his services, placed his sole reliance on Bonaparte. Wholly won by his blandishments, and yielding with contentment to a superior, he declared he would second all his projects. He desired only not to be in the secret, as he had a horror of political intrigues, but requested to be summoned at the moment of execution. There were stationed in Paris at this time the 8th and 9th regiments of dragroons, which had formerly served under Bonaparte in Italy, and were entirely devoted to him. The 21st Chasseurs, organized by him when he commanded the army of the interior, and which had once counted Murat in its ranks, equally adhered to him. These regiments often repeated a demand to be reviewed by him. The officers of the garrison and the adjutants of the National guard had likewise begged to be presented to him, but had not yet been gratified. He delayed, intending to make their reception instrumental to his designs. His two brothers Lucien and Joseph, and the deputies of his party, also continued to make fresh converts in the Councils.

An interview was fixed with Sieyes for the 15th Brumaire, to arrange the plan and the means of executing it. The same day had been appointed for a banquet given by the Councils to General Bonaparte, as on the return from Italy. On this occasion, however, the Councils did not give it officially as then. The subject had been proposed in secret committee; but the Five-Hundred, who, under the first impulse of the landing, had nominated Lucien president, with the view of honouring the general in the person of his brother, were now actuated by suspicions and refused to sanction a banquet. It was thereupon determined it should be given by subscription. The number of subscribers, after all, was between six and seven hundred. The dinner took place in the church of St. Sulpice. It proved chilly and lugubrious; every one eyed his neighbour furtively and maintained a gloomy reserve. It was visible some impending event was anticipated, to be the work of part of those present. Bonaparte was sombre and preoccupied; as he well might be, since upon leaving that scene he was to attend and assign the place and hour of a conspiracy. The moment the dinner was concluded, he arose, and making the circuit of the tables with Berthier, addressed a few words to the deputies and abruptly retired.

He repaired to the apartments of Sieyes to make with him his final arrangements. In the first place, the government to be substituted for the one existing was settled. It was agreed that the Councils should be suspended for three months, and the five directors superseded by three provisional consuls, who during those three months should exercise a species of dictatorship, and be commissioned to frame a constitution. Bonaparte, Sieyes, and Roger-Ducos were to be the three consuls. In the next place, the means of execution were canvassed. Sieyes had an assured majority in the Ancients. As incendiary projects attributed to the Jacobins were the daily topic of discourse, it was concluded to suppose an outrage contemplated by them against the national representation. The committee of inspectors of the Ancients, wholly at the disposition of Sieyes, was to recommend the translation of the legislative body to Saint-Cloud. The constitution, in fact, gave such a right to the Council of Ancients. The Council was to add to this measure another which was not authorized by the constitution; namely, to intrust the care of protecting the removal to a general of its selection, of course to Bonaparte. It was at the same time to vest in him the command of the 17th military division and of all the troops cantoned in Paris. With these forces Bonaparte was to escort the legislative body to Saint-Cloud. There it was intended to overawe the Five-Hundred and extort from them the decree for a provisional consulate. Sieyes and Roger-Ducos were on the same day to give in their resignations as directors. It was proposed to contrive the abdication of Barras, Gohier, or Moulins. Then the Directory would be disorganized by the dissolution of the majority; the Five-Hundred would be told there was no longer a government, and be obliged to nominate the three consuls. This plan was excellently conceived, for when a revolution is to be accomplished it is always essential to disguise the illegal as much as possible, and to use the forms of a constitution to destroy it and the members of a government to subvert it.

The 18th Brumaire was fixed for procuring the decree of translation, and the 19th for the decisive session at Saint-Cloud. The duty of the plot was divided. To Sieyes and his friends was apportioned the task of obtaining the decree of translation. To Bonaparte was assigned the muster of the armed force and the charge of conducting the troops to the Tuileries.

All being arranged they separated. Rumours prevailed on all sides of a great catastrophe on the point of occurring. It had always been so on similar occasions. There are no revolutions in truth which succeed but such as may be known beforehand. As it was, Fouché refrained from enlightening the three directors without the pale of the conspiracy. Dubois-Crancé, despite his deference for the military knowledge and fame of Bonaparte, was still a warm patriot; he had information of the project and hastened to denounce it to Gohier and Moulins, but his statement was not credited. They were ready to believe in Bonaparte an aspiring ambition, but not a conspiracy all ready hatched. Barras was more sensible of a great movement in progress; but he felt himself so completely ruined in every sense that he abandoned himself supinely to the course of events.

The committee of the Ancients, over which the deputy Cornet presided, undertook to make every preparation during the night of the 17th–18th Brumaire to procure the decree of translation. The shutters and curtains of the windows were closed to prevent the public being apprized, by the lights, of the nocturnal labours proceeding in the rooms of the committee. It took care to convoke the Council of Ancients for seven in the morning, and that of the Five-Hundred for eleven. In this manner the decree of translation might be passed before the sitting of the Five-Hundred; and as all deliberation was prohibited by the constitution immediately consequent upon the promulgation of the decree of translation, the tribune of the Five-Hundred would be at once closed, and all embarrassing discussion stopped. It adopted the further precaution of delaying the transmission of the letters of convocation to certain deputies. Thus it provided that those about whom there was any doubt should not arrive until after the decree was passed.

On his part, Bonaparte had made all necessary provisions. He had sent for Colonel Sebastiani, who commanded the 9th dragoons, to be assured of the dispositions of the regiment. This regiment was composed of 400 foot and 600 horse. It contained a considerable number of young soldiers; but the veterans of Arcole and Rivoli gave it its tone. The colonel answered for the regiment to Bonaparte. He was then directed, under a pretext of holding a review, to leave the barracks at five in the morning, to distribute his men, partly on the Place de la Revolution and partly in the garden of the Tuileries, and to occupy in person with two hundred cavalry the streets of Mont-Blanc and Chantereine. Bonaparte subsequently conveyed an intimation to the colonels of the other cavalry regiments that he would review them on the 18th. He likewise sent word to all the officers who desired to be presented to him that he would receive them on the same morning. As an excuse for the early hour appointed, he alleged the pretence of an intended journey. He besought Moreau and all the generals to be in the rue Chantereine at the same hour. At midnight he despatched an aide-de-camp to Lefebvre to beg attendance at six in the morning. Lefebvre was devoted to the Directory; but Bonaparte relied upon his not being able to resist his ascendency. He gave no notice to either Bernadotte or Augereau. He had taken the precaution, in order to deceive Gohier, to invite himself to dine with him on the 18th, with all his family, and at the same time, in the hope of inducing him to resign his office, he caused him to be solicited through his wife to come on the following morning at eight o'clock, and breakfast in the rue Chantereine.

Before dawn of the 18th, a movement, unexpected on the part of those even who concurred to produce it, was manifested in all quarters. A numerous cavalry traversed the boulevards; all the generals and officers in Paris proceeded in full uniform to the rue Chantereine, unconscious of the concourse they were there to find. The deputies of the Ancients hurried to their chamber, astonished at so sudden a

convocation. The Five-Hundred were for the most part not cognisant of any unusual preparation. Gohier, Moulins, and Barras, remained in profound ignorance. But Sieyes, who had for some time past been taking lessons in horsemanship, and Roger-Ducos, were already mounted and on their way to the Tuileries.

So soon as the Ancients were constituted, the president of the committee of inspectors, Cornet, addressed them. He said that the committee charged to watch over the security of the legislative body had learnt that sinister projects were hatching, and that conspirators were flocking in crowds to Paris, there holding secret conclaves and compassing criminal designs against the liberty of the national representation. He added that the Council of Ancients had within itself the means of saving the republic and was bound to use them. These means consisted in transferring the legislative body to Saint-Cloud to shelter it from the attempts of the conspirators, in placing meanwhile the public tranquillity under the guardianship of a general able to secure it, and in nominating Bonaparte as that general. No sooner had this proposition and the decree which embodied it been read than a marked emotion was perceptible through the Council. Some members rose to oppose it; Cornudet, Lebrun, Fargues, and Regnier, supported it. The name of Bonaparte, which had been introduced to give weight to the motion, and whose aid it was well known might be relied upon, decided the majority. By eight o'clock the decree was passed. It transferred the Councils to Saint-Cloud and there convoked them for the following day at noon. Bonaparte was appointed general-in-chief of all the troops comprised in the 17th military division, of the guard of the legislative body, of the guard of the Directory, and of the national guards of Paris and the environs. Lefebvre, the actual commander of the 17th division, was placed under his orders. Bonaparte was enjoined to attend at the bar to receive the decree and to take an oath in the hands of the president. A messenger of state was deputed to bear with all speed the decree to the general.

The messenger of state, who was no other than the deputy Cornet himself, found the boulevards lined with a numerous cavalry, and the streets of Mont-Blanc and Chantereine filled with officers and generals in full uniform. All were hastening to obey the invitation of General Bonaparte. His rooms being too small to receive so great a crowd, he had thrown open the doors, advanced to the steps in front, and thence harangued the military. He said that France was in danger, and that he relied upon them to aid in saving her. Cornet at this moment presenting to him the decree, he snatched it from him, read it aloud, and asked them if he might count upon their support. All answered with their hands upon their swords that they were ready to second him. To Lefebvre he addressed himself particularly. That general, finding the troops in motion without his orders, had interrogated Colonel Sebastiani on the subject, who, without replying, had entreated him to enter Bonaparte's house. Lefebvre had accordingly done so in no pleasant mood.—"Ha! Lefebvre," said Bonaparte to him, "you, one of the props of the republic, will you allow it to perish in the hands of these *lawyers?* Unite with me and assist in saving it. Here," he added taking up a sword, "this is the sword I wore at the Pyramids; I present it to you as a token of my esteem and confidence." "Yes," answered Lefebvre much moved, "let us throw these *lawyers* into the river."—Joseph Bonaparte had brought Bernadotte to the scene; but he, perceiving what was intended, withdrew to go and apprize the patriots. Fouché was not in the secret; but, informed of the event, he had ordered the barriers to be shut and suspended the departure of couriers and public vehicles. He came in haste to acquaint Bonaparte with what he had done and to make protestations of his zeal. Bonaparte, who had hitherto passed him aside, did not now repel him, but told him that his precautions were useless, that there was no occasion to close the barriers or arrest the ordinary course of things, for he acted in concert with the nation and depended upon it. At this moment Bonaparte learnt that Gohier had refused to accept his invitation; he manifested some irritation, and sent a messenger to warn him he would fruitlessly compromise himself by resistance. He then mounted on horseback to proceed to the Tuileries and take the oath before the Council of Ancients. Almost all the generals of the republic were on horseback around him. Moreau, Macdonald, Berthier, Lannes, Murat, and Leclerc, were immediately behind him as his lieutenants. At the Tuileries he found the detachments of the 9th, whom he paused to harangue, and, after stirring them to a pitch of enthusiasm, entered the palace.

He presented himself before the Ancients accompanied by this brilliant staff. His appearance caused a strong emotion, and proved to the Ancients that they had invoked a man of might, who had all the means necessary to insure the success of a *coup d'etat*. He advanced to the bar: "Citizen representatives," he said, "the republic was about to perish, your decree has saved it! Woe to those who attempt to oppose its execution; aided by all my companions in arms, assembled here around me, I will know how to resist their efforts. Past examples are vainly cited to inspire apprehensions; nothing in history resembles the eighteenth century, and nothing in that century resembles its termination.—We will uphold the republic.—We will uphold it founded on true liberty and on the representative system.—We will so maintain it, I swear in my own name and in the name of my companions in arms."—"We all swear!" cried the generals and officers who crowded the bar. This mode of taking his oath was singularly adroit on Bonaparte's part, since he thus avoided swearing fidelity to the constitution. In fact a deputy rose to animadvert upon the omission; but the president silenced him on the plea that the decree of translation foreclosed all debate. The Council immediately broke up. Bonaparte returned to the garden, mounted his horse, and, attended by all the generals, passed in review the regiments of the garrison as they came in succession upon the ground. He delivered a short and energetic speech to the soldiers, telling them he was about to effect a revolution which would restore to them abundance and glory. Shouts of *Long live Bonaparte!* responded from the ranks. The weather was splendid, the concourse innumerable: all seemed to smile auspiciously on the catastrophe about to terminate confusion by absolute power.

By this time the Five-Hundred, warned of the revolution in progress, had resorted tumultuously to their hall of session. Upon assembling, they received a message from the Ancients embodying the decree of translation. Its annunciation provoked an outcry from numerous voices; but the president Lucien Bonaparte enforced silence by virtue of the constitution which prohibited discussion. The Five-Hundred forthwith separated; the more ardent, hastening to each other's domiciles, formed themselves into conclaves to reciprocate their indignation and devise means of resistance. The patriots of the faubourgs also rushed forth in great excitement and gathered uproariously around Santerre.

Meanwhile, Bonaparte, having finished the review of the troops, re-entered the Tuileries, and repaired to the Ancients' committee of inspectors. The like committee of the Five-Hundred had intimated its adhesion to the new revolution, and concurred in the arrangements for promoting it. Here the further steps were to be taken under pretext of executing the translation. Bonaparte established himself at the committee in permanence. The minister of jus-

tice, Cambaceres, had already presented himself before it. Fouché likewise soon appeared, and Sieyes and Roger-Ducos came to lodge their resignations. It was of importance to obtain a third, as then the directorial majority would be dissolved; in which event there being no longer an executive power, no act of energy on its part was to be dreaded. No hopes were entertained that Gohier or Moulins would voluntarily abdicate; so M. de Talleyrand and Admiral Bruix were dispatched to Barras to prevail on him to resign.

Bonaparte next distributed the command of the troops. He deputed Murat, with a numerous cavalry and a corps of grenadiers, to occupy Saint-Cloud. Serrurier was stationed at the *Point-du-jour* with a reserve. Lannes was appointed to command the troops guarding the Tuileries. To Moreau was assigned an invidious commission, and certainly the least honourable of all upon this great occasion. Bonaparte instructed him to proceed with five hundred men to guard the Luxembourg; enjoining him to blockade the directors under pretence of insuring their safety, and rigorously to prevent them from holding any communication beyond its precincts. At the same time Bonaparte sent word to the commander of the directorial guard to obey his orders, withdraw his corps from the Luxembourg, and repair to him at the Tuileries. An additional and important precaution was adopted with the aid of Fouché. The Directory had the power of suspending municipalities; therefore Fouché, acting in his capacity of minister of police as if he had been empowered by the Directory, suspended the twelve municipalities of Paris, and abrogated their authority. By these means no rallying point remained to the patriots either in the Directory or in the twelve communes which had succeeded to the great commune of former times. Fouché subsequently caused placards to be affixed exhorting the citizens to order and tranquillity, and assuring them that exertions to rescue the republic from its perils were at that moment in active progress.

These measures completely succeeded. The authority of General Bonaparte was everywhere recognised, although the Council of Ancients had not acted constitutionally in delegating it to him. For if that Council could ordain the translation, it had no jurisdiction to nominate a supreme chief of the armed force. Moreau proceeded to the Luxembourg and blockaded it with five hundred men. Jubé, the commander of the directorial guard, paying prompt obedience to the orders he had received, mounted his troops and quitted the Luxembourg for the Tuileries. During this interval, the three remaining directors, Moulins, Gohier, and Barras, were thrown into grievous perplexity. The two former, at length painfully aware of the conspiracy that had eluded their notice, had resorted to Barras' apartments to ascertain from him whether he would abide firmly by them and continue the majority. They found that voluptuous personage in the bath, and shortly informed him of Bonaparte's proceedings. "That man," he exclaimed with a gross expression, "has outwitted us all!" He pledged himself to remain steadfastly by his colleagues, for he never failed to give promises, and sent his secretary Bottot to the Tuileries upon a mission of discovery. But Gohier and Moulins had scarcely quitted him ere he fell into the hands of Bruix and Talleyrand. They had little difficulty in convincing him of the impotency to which he was reduced, and equally slender cause to apprehend an heroic struggle on his part in defence of the directorial constitution. They promised him immunity and fortune, and he consented to abdicate. A letter had been already framed which he signed, and Talleyrand and Bruix hastened therewith to Bonaparte. After that, the efforts of Gohier and Moulins to gain access to him proved abortive, and they eventually learnt the fact of his resignation. Standing alone, and incompetent to deliberate officially, they knew not what course to follow, and yet were resolute to fulfil honestly their duties towards the constitution of the year III. They determined at length to repair to the committee of inspectors, for the purpose of appealing to their two colleagues, Sieyes and Ducos, to join them in reconstituting the majority, and promulgating at least the decree of translation. This offered but a sad resource. It was impossible to collect an armed force, and raise a standard in opposition to that of Bonaparte; hence, it was wholly useless to visit the Tuileries and affront Bonaparte in his very camp, and in the centre of all his forces.

They persisted in the design, however, and were allowed to execute it. They found Bonaparte surrounded by Sieyes, Ducos, a crowd of deputies, and a numerous staff. Bottot, Barras' secretary, had just been dismissed with a severe rebuff. Bonaparte, raising his voice, had said to him: "What have you made of that France I left so brilliant? I left peace, and I find war; I left victories, and I find defeats; I left the millions of Italy, and I find despoiling laws and penury. What has become of the hundred thousand Frenchmen whom I knew, all my comrades in glory? They are dead!" Bottot had retreated in trepidation; but immediately afterwards Barras' resignation was brought which tended to calm the general. He told Gohier and Moulins he was rejoiced to see them, and that he relied upon their abdication since he believed them too good citizens to oppose an inevitable and salutary revolution. Gohier replied with energy that he had come with his colleague Moulins merely to endeavour to save the republic. "Yes," retorted Bonaparte, "to save it, and with what? with the appliances of a constitution which is shivered to atoms?" "Who has told you that?" interrupted Gohier: "people who have neither the courage nor the will to adhere to it." A warm altercation ensued between Gohier and Bonaparte. At this moment a note was placed in the hands of the general. It gave advice of a considerable ferment in the Faubourg Saint-Antoine. "General Moulins," said Bonaparte, "you are a relative of Santerre's?" "No," answered Moulins, "I am not his relative but his friend." "I learn," rejoined Bonaparte, "that he is creating a disturbance in the faubourgs; tell him that at the first movement I cause him to be shot." Moulins replied with acrimony to Bonaparte, who repeated he would cause Santerre to be shot. The altercation with Gohier was then resumed. Bonaparte concluded it by exclaiming: "The republic is in danger, it must be saved—*I will it so!* Sieyes and Ducos have tendered their resignations, and Barras has just sent his. You are but two, isolated, powerless, and can do nothing; I advise you not to resist." Gohier and Moulins replied that they would not desert their post. They returned to the Luxembourg, where they were from that moment confined, separated from each other, and debarred from all communication by the express orders of Bonaparte transmitted to Moreau. Barras had already taken his departure for his estate of Gros-Bois, escorted by a detachment of dragoons.

Hence, there was no longer an executive power. Bonaparte alone had any force at disposal. The whole of the ministers had resorted to him at the committee of inspectors. All orders emanated from there, as from the sole point where an organized authority existed. The day finally closed in comparative stillness. The patriots congregated in numerous conclaves, and canvassed desperate propositions, but with no faith in the possibility of their execution, so paramount was deemed the ascendency of Bonaparte over the troops.

In the evening a council was held at the committee of inspectors. The object of this council was to

arrange, with the principal deputies of the Ancients, the proceedings of the morrow at Saint-Cloud. The plan settled with Sieyes was to enforce the adjournment of the Councils and the appointment of a provisional consulate. This scheme was attended with certain difficulties. Many members of the Ancients, who had concurred in passing the decree of translation, began to be alarmed at the idea of a military domination. They had not suspected the design of creating a dictatorship for the advantage of Bonaparte and his two associates; they had contemplated merely a different composition of the Directory, and, despite the age of Bonaparte, were willing to nominate him a director. They submitted a formal proposition to this effect. But Bonaparte replied, in a determined tone, that the constitution could no longer subsist; that a more concentrated authority was requisite, and particularly a temporary cessation of the political debates which agitated the republic. The appointment of three consuls, and the suspension of the Councils until the First Ventose, were therefore moved. After a somewhat prolonged discussion, these measures were finally adopted. Bonaparte, Sieyes, and Ducos, were fixed upon for consuls. The motion was reduced to form, and agreed to be submitted the following morning at Saint-Cloud. Sieyes, thoroughly conversant with revolutionary movements, recommended that forty of the leaders in the Five-Hundred should be arrested during the night. Bonaparte repudiated the suggestion, and had occasion to repent his exuberant confidence.

The night elapsed free from any violent demonstrations. The next morning, the 19th Brumaire (10th November), the road to Saint-Cloud was thronged with troops, carriages, horsemen, pedestrians. Three chambers had been prepared at the palace: one for the Ancients, another for the Five-Hundred, and a third for the committee of inspectors and Bonaparte. The preparations were to be made by mid-day, but could not be completed before two o'clock. This delay almost proved fatal to the instigators of the revolution. The members of the two Councils promenaded during the interval through the gardens of Saint-Cloud, and conversed together with extreme vivacity. Those of the Five-Hundred, irritated at being exiled, as it were, by their colleagues of the Ancients, before they had been permitted to utter a remonstrance, naturally demanded of the latter what their views were, what they purposed doing that day.—"The government is decomposed," they said to them; "granted, we allow it must be reconstructed, and stands in good need thereof. Do you wish, instead of men incompetent and without renown, to substitute commanding, influential persons? Do you wish to raise Bonaparte to the Directory? Although he is not of the age required, we will nevertheless consent to his elevation."—These pressing questions perplexed the Ancients. They were loath to confess that totally different designs were formed, and that the overthrow of the constitution was projected. Some amongst them dropped insinuations to that effect, which were repelled with unequivocal disapprobation. Already predisposed to alarm from what had passed on the previous evening at the committee of inspectors, the Ancients were effectually staggered on witnessing the spirit of resistance manifested amongst the Five-Hundred. From this moment, the dispositions of the legislative body began to wear a dubious aspect, and the revolutionary project to be seriously compromised. Bonaparte had mounted his horse and was at the head of his troops. Sieyes and Ducos had a post-chariot and six in waiting at the gate of Saint-Cloud. Several others had similar equipages in readiness, prepared, in case of discomfiture, to take to flight. Nevertheless Sieyes displayed throughout the whole scene an admirable coolness and self-possession. Fears were entertained lest Jourdan, Augereau, and Bernadotte should appear to address the troops. Orders were given to cut down the first individual who should present himself with an intention to harangue, were he representative or general, no matter which.

The diet of the two Councils opened at two in the afternoon. In the Ancients, reclamations were offered on the part of the members who had not been summoned the day before to attend the debate on the decree of translation. These remonstrances were disregarded, and a motion submitted to notify to the Five-Hundred that a majority of the Council was in session, and ready to deliberate. In the Five-Hundred the proceedings commenced differently. The deputy Gaudin, who was commissioned by Sieyes and Bonaparte to open the discussion, appeared in the tribune, and after dilating upon the dangers which beset the republic, proposed two measures: first, a vote of thanks to the Ancients for having transferred the Council to Saint-Cloud, and secondly, the appointment of a committee to present a report on the dangers of the republic, and the means of obviating those dangers. If this motion had been carried a report was already compiled, and the provisional consulate and the adjournment would have been recommended. But Gaudin had scarcely ceased to speak ere a fearful tumult broke out in the assembly. Violent exclamations resounded: on all sides were heard, — *Down with the dictators! No dictatorship! Long live the constitution!* The voice of Delbrel articulated above the storm: *The Constitution or death! Bayonets appal us not; we are free!* These words stimulated fresh outcries. Several enraged deputies, turning towards the president, Lucien Bonaparte, vociferated: *No dictatorship! Down with dictators!* Upon these insulting shouts and gestures, Lucien arose. "I am too sensible," he said, "of the presidential dignity to suffer longer the insolent menaces of certain orators; I call them to order!" This injunction failed to calm them, but tended rather to render them more furious. After a prolonged scene of agitation, the deputy Grand-Maison moved that an oath be taken to the constitution of the year III. The proposition was hailed with rapture. A call of the Council was moreover demanded, and adopted with the like transports. Each deputy mounted the tribune in his turn to swear, amidst the clamour and cheers of all the members. Lucien himself was obliged to quit the chair, in order to take the oath which levelled in the dust the ambitious designs of his brother.

Events were assuming a portentous aspect. Instead of nominating a committee to detail schemes of reconstruction, the Five-Hundred swore to maintain the state of things in existence, whilst the Ancients faltered, and were ready to retrace their steps. The revolution seemed foiled and abortive. The danger was most critical. Augereau, Jourdan, and other influential patriots, were at Saint-Cloud, awaiting the favourable moment to rally the troops to their side. Bonaparte and Sieyes agreed it was necessary to act with promptitude and invigorate their wavering partisans. Bonaparte determined to present himself before the two Councils at the head of his staff. On his way he met Augereau, who in a tone of mockery cried to him: "You appear in a very pleasant predicament!" "Affairs were in a far worse state at Arcole!" Bonaparte retorted, and advanced to the bar of the Ancients. He was wholly unused to large assemblies. To speak for the first time in public is embarrassing, intimidating even, to the strongest minds, under circumstances the most ordinary. In the excitement of present events, and to one who had never appeared in a rostrum, it was necessarily still more trying. Bonaparte, labouring under great emotion, and speaking in a broken, yet sonorous voice, essayed to address the Ancients:—"Citizen representatives," he said, "you are not

in an ordinary position, but upon a volcano. Allow me a few explanations. You believed the republic in danger; you transferred the legislative body to Saint-Cloud; you invoked me to secure the execution of your decrees; I left my home to obey you, and now we are assailed with calumnies, myself and my companions in arms; we are told of a new Cromwell, a new Cæsar. Citizens, if I had aspired to such a part it would have been easy for me to arrogate it on my return from Italy, at a period of glorious triumph, and when the army and all parties invited me to do so. I did not then desire it, nor do I now. The dangers of the country have alone aroused my zeal and yours."

Bonaparte then proceeded, still in accents tremulous with emotion, to depict the dangerous situation of the republic, torn by intestine factions, and threatened with another civil war in the West, and an invasion on the South. "Let us prevent," he added, "so many evils; let us save the two objects for which we have made so many sacrifices, liberty and equality." "Speak also of the constitution!" exclaimed the deputy Linglet. This interruption somewhat disconcerted the general; but he soon recovered, and replied in the same agitated tone: "Of the constitution! You have no longer one! It is you who have destroyed it, by outraging, on the 18th Fructidor, the national representation, by annulling, on the 22d Floreal, the popular elections, and by subverting, on the 30th Prairial, the independence of the government. That constitution of which you prate, all parties concur to annihilate! They have all come to me to confide their projects and solicit me to second them. I have declined; but if it were necessary I can mention the parties and the individuals." "Name!" shouted his opponents, "name them! demand a secret committee!" It was long before the turmoil occasioned by this interpellation subsided. At length Bonaparte resumed, and, adverting again to the condition in which France was involved, urged the Ancients to adopt measures calculated to save it. "Surrounded," he concluded, "by my brethren in arms, I shall be able to support you. I obtest those brave grenadiers whose bayonets I perceive, and whom I have so often led against the enemy; I obtest their courage to aid you in saving the country. And if any orator," Bonaparte added with a menacing gesture, "if any orator, suborned by the foreigner, spoke of placing me under the ban of outlawry, I would appeal to my companions in arms. Reflect that my steps are attended by the god of fortune and the god of war!"

These audacious expressions were intended as a warning to the Five-Hundred. The Ancients hailed them with satisfaction, and appeared signally reanimated by the presence of the general. They awarded him the honours of the sitting.

After having thus revived the drooping courage of the Ancients, Bonaparte resolved to visit the Five-Hundred, in the hope of overawing them. He entered their hall followed by some grenadiers; on advancing he left them behind him at the end of the chamber. He had to traverse half the arena to reach the bar. On attaining midway he was saluted by furious outcries.—"What!" shouted numerous voices, "soldiers here, and arms! What is intended?—Down with the dictator! down with the tyrant!" Several deputies rushed into the centre of the hall, surrounded the general, and apostrophized him with passionate energy. "What!" they vociferated, "is it for this you have conquered?—All your laurels are tarnished! your glory is converted to infamy! Respect the temple of the laws.—Begone! begone!" Bonaparte was confounded in the crowd swarming around him. The grenadiers whom he had left at the door hastened to his rescue, repulsed the deputies, and grasped him round the body. It is said that amid this tumult, grenadiers received the points of daggers destined for him. Thomé, a grenadier, it is certain, had his clothes torn. It is quite possible that in such a scuffle clothes might be torn without the use of poniards. It is equally possible that poniards were in more hands than one. Republicans who deemed they saw another Cæsar in the senate, might arm themselves with the weapon of Brutus without being assassins. It would be weakness to justify them from the charge. But, be it as it may, Bonaparte was borne by his soldiers out of the hall. He is stated to have been much confused, which is not more surprising than the supposition of daggers. He remounted on horseback, rode back to the troops, told them that his life had been attempted by assassins and placed in great danger, and was everywhere enthusiastically greeted by cries of *Long live Bonaparte!*

Meanwhile the storm raged more violently than ever in the assembly, expending its fury against Lucien. He evinced in the crisis an indomitable firmness and courage.—"Your brother is a tyrant," shouted the infuriated deputies; "in one day he has forfeited all his glory!"—Lucien in vain strove to justify him.—"You have refused to hear him," he said, "he came to explain to you his conduct, to make known to you his mission, to answer all the questions you have not ceased to ask since you assembled. His services merited at least that he should be allowed time to exculpate himself."—"No, no! down with the tyrant!" roared the patriots.—"Put him to the ban!" they added with increasing rage, "to outlawry!" This was a terrible word; it had sufficed to insure the downfall of Robespierre. Pronounced against Bonaparte, it might perhaps have caused the troops to fluctuate, eventually to desert him. Lucien intrepidly opposed the motion of outlawry, and insisted that his brother should be first heard. He long contended with unshaken fortitude amidst a tempestuous uproar. At length, divesting himself of his cap and gown, he cried: "Wretches! would you have me outlaw my own brother? I relinquish the chair and proceed to the bar to defend him you accuse!"

At this moment Bonaparte was informed of the scene enacting in the Council. Fearing for his brother's safety, he dispatched ten grenadiers to bear him from the hall. The grenadiers entered, found Lucien amidst an incensed concourse, seized him by the arms alleging the orders of his brother, and conveyed him outside the building. The decisive crisis had now arrived. All was lost if any vacillation were shown. Oratorical means of reclaiming the assembly had proved inoperative, and force alone remained; it had become necessary to hazard one of those daring acts before which usurpers always pause. Cæsar hesitated ere passing the Rubicon, Cromwell in discarding the parliament. Bonaparte finally resolved to march his grenadiers on the Council. Directing Lucien to accompany him on horseback, he rode in front of the troops. Lucien addressed them.—"The Council of Five-Hundred is dissolved," he said to them; "it is I who announce it to you! Assassins have invaded the hall of session and done violence to the majority; I summon you to march for the purpose of delivering it."—Lucien afterwards obtested that he and his brother would be the faithful defenders of liberty. Murat and Leclerc then put in motion a battalion of grenadiers and led it towards the Council of Five-Hundred. They advanced to the door of the hall. At sight of the bayonets, the deputies uttered terrific cries, as they had done on the appearance of Bonaparte. But the rolling of drums drowned their shouts.—*Forward, grenadiers!* exclaimed the officers. The grenadiers poured into the hall and dispersed the deputies, who fled in precipitation, some by the corridors, others by the windows. In an instant the hall was evacuated, and Bonaparte stood master of this deplorable field of battle.



Compiègne disarming the Guard of Francis II.

Dec. November 1852

Intelligence of this event was communicated to the Ancients, who were filled with anxiety and compunction. They had not anticipated such an outrage. Lucien presented himself at their bar and essayed to justify his conduct with regard to the Five-Hundred. His reasons were held to be satisfactory, for what could be done under the pressure of the situation? It remained to conclude the business and realize the object originally contemplated. The Council of Ancients could not alone decree the adjournment of the legislative body and the institution of the consulate. The Council of Five-Hundred was dissolved; but there survived about fifty deputies partisans of the *coup d'etat*. These were assembled and used to pass the decree, the aim of the revolution now effected. The decree was afterwards carried to the Ancients, who adopted it towards midnight. Bonaparte, Roger-Ducos, and Sieyes, were nominated provisional consuls and invested with the whole executive power. The Councils were prorogued to the 1st of next Ventôse. They were replaced by two commissions of twenty-five members each, selected from the Councils, and empowered to sanction the legislative measures which the three consuls, in the course of their functions, might require. The consuls and commissions were charged to compile a new constitution.

Such was the revolution of the 18th Brumaire, so variously judged by men, regarded by some as the heinous crime which nipped the bud of liberty, by others as a bold but necessary blow which terminated anarchy. What may in truth be said is, that the revolution, after having worn all characters, monarchical, republican, democratic, assumed at last the military guise, because, in the continual struggle with Europe, it required to be constituted in a strong and solid manner. Republicans deplore so many fruitless efforts, such torrents of blood uselessly shed to establish liberty in France, and sigh to witness it sacrificed by one of the heroes it had generated. In this, a sentiment more noble than reflective misleads them. The revolution, intended doubtless to confer liberty on France and a preparative to her full enjoyment of it some day, was not nor could be itself liberty. It was rather a convulsive struggle against the ancient order of things. And after having vanquished this order in France, it had to overcome it in Europe. A contest so violent admitted not the forms or even the spirit of liberty. An interval of liberty existed under the Constituent Assembly, and of very short duration; but when the popular party became so violent as to cause general intimidation; when it invaded the Tuileries on the 10th August; when it immolated all who gave it umbrage on the 2d September; when on the 21st January it provoked universal complicity by the sacrifice of a regal victim; when in August 1793 it compelled every citizen to repair to the frontiers or surrender his property; when, in fine, it abdicated its own power and delegated it to that great committee of public welfare composed of twelve individuals,—was there or could there be liberty? No; there was the strenuous effort of passion and of heroism, the muscular tension of a wrestler contending against a powerful adversary After the first period of danger, after the victories of the French arms, there was a moment of reprieve. The end of the Convention and the Directory presented degrees of liberty. But the conflict with Europe could only be for a while suspended. It soon recommenced; and at the first reverse, all parties arose against a too moderate government and invoked some potent arm. Bonaparte, returning with the halo of glory from the East, was hailed as the desired chief and installed in power. It is in vain to allege that Zurich had saved France. Zurich was an isolated accident, a mere respite; Marengo and Hohenlinden were still needed for her salvation. And more than military successes were required; a powerful internal reorganization of all the departments of government had become essential, and a political rather than a military chief was the main exigency of France. The 18th and 19th Brumaire were therefore necessary. It may be affirmed only that the 20th was condemnable, and that the hero abused the service he had just rendered. But it will be answered that he acted under a mysterious mission which he held, unknown to himself, from destiny, and which he fulfilled as an instrument. It was not liberty he came to uphold, for it could not yet exist; he came to continue under monarchical forms the revolution in the world; to continue it by placing himself, a plebeian, on the throne; by conducting the Pontiff to Paris to pour the sacred oil on a plebeian forehead; by creating an aristocracy with plebeians; by compelling the old aristocracies to associate with his plebeian aristocracy; by making kings of plebeians; by receiving into his bed a daughter of the Cæsars and mingling a plebeian blood with one of the most ancient royal bloods in Europe; by intermixing nations and spreading French laws through Germany, Italy, and Spain; by refuting, in fine, all established prejudices, by stirring and confounding all elements. Such the inscrutable mission he was to accomplish: and in the interim, the new society was to be consolidated under the ægis of his sword, and liberty to follow at the appointed time. It has not yet arrived, but it will come.

I have described the first crisis which prepared the elements of this liberty in Europe. I have done so without animosity, lamenting error, revering virtue, admiring greatness, seeking to discern the profound designs of Providence in these wondrous events, and reverencing them when, as I have deemed, revealed.

END OF THE FRENCH REVOLUTION.

EDINBURGH:
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GENERAL INDEX

TO THE HISTORY OF THE FRENCH REVOLUTION.

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